Aristotle's Anticommunism Author(s): Darrell Dobbs Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 29-46 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111210 Accessed: 10/12/2010 23:50

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http://www.jstor.org Aristotle'sAnticommunism

DarrellDobbs, Universityof Houston

This essayexamines Aristotle's critical review of Plato's Republic,the focus of whichreview is restricted,surprisingly, to Socrates'communistic political institutions; Aristotle hardly men- tionsany of theother important themes developed in thedialogue. For this reason commentators havecharged Aristotle with misrepresenting Plato's intention.Against this view, the author finds inAristotle's anticommunism the most incisive formulation of hispolitical disagreement with Plato's Socrates.Communism will not promote the harmonious articulation of cityand man,as Socrates suggests;rather, it underminesthe integrity of thepolitical community and precludesthe proper developmentof thebest human nature. Aristotle holds that communism thus disrupts the entele- chiesof bothcity and man. Moderncritiques, by contrast,merely indicate the adverse effects of communismon economicproductivity or efficiency.Thus Aristotle'santicommunism is seento offerfor our considerationa dimensionof thisimportant issue that is typicallyneglected in con- temporarypolitical argument.

PreliminaryConsiderations In Plato'sRepublic Socrates argues in behalf of the most radical form of communismever proposed.' Not onlywould he prohibitthe private posses- sionof material goods among his guardians,2 he wouldeliminate all privacy andcommunize even the family. In thePolitics Aristotle undertakes a lengthy criticalexamination of Socrates' political proposals as a primarystep toward

l Many studentsnow considerSocrates' endorsement of communismto be ironic,i.e., not to representhis true view, much less Plato's. The evidencefor this interpretation is impressive but notconclusive. Among other considerations, itwill suffice here to notethat Aristotle treats Socrates' proposalsas indicatinghis genuine intention. He goes so far,in fact,as to identifySocrates' com- munisticproposals as belongingto Plato (1274b9-11).Aristotle even points toward a motiveunder- lyingSocrates' intention (1264bl5-17; note the middle voice, aphairoumenos). The textualfoundation forAristotle's interpretation lies, I suggest,in Socrates'express reliance on a communisticregime to makemanifest the divine quality of thephilosophical nature and to aid in itsproper develop- ment(497a3-5, 497bl-c7). Aristotle's chief objection to Socraticcommunism meets this issue head- on: accordingto Aristotle,communism precludes exactly this education or developmentof the philosophicalnature. How Plato mightrespond to Aristotle'scriticism is one of themost intrigu- ing questionsin politicalphilosophy. The significanceof the dialogue thatwould emergefrom sucha responsedepends, however, on whetherAristotle's objections to Socrates'city are indica- tiveof a genuinedisagreement or merelyevidence of misunderstanding.The commentators,as farback as Proclus,typically charge that Aristotle's political criticism stems from misrepresenta- tion,misconception, or merelya carelessreading of theRepublic. Against this tendency, my inten- tionhere is to showthat Aristotle's objections are coherentlyorganized and thatthe focus of his presentationis strategicallycentered on what is, indeed,a centralconcern of Plato's Republic. Thus thisessay provides a firstbut essential step toward the eventual reconstruction of a trulysig- nificantdialogue betweentwo greatpolitical thinkers. 2 Since Aristotlecontends that Socrates fails to determinethe political institutions in force amongthe restof his citizenry(1264al3-17), perhaps one should say "at least among his guar- dians."In returnfor his trouble in pointingout thisdifficulty, Aristotle has beenreproached virtu- allyunanimously by classical scholars as carelessand captious.But a carefulreading of the Republic willindeed reveal a dilemmain the scope of communismin Socrates'city. Socrates does suggest thatif his guardians ever acquire private property, they should rather be called householdersand 30 DarrellDobbs presentinghis own account of the best regime,which, he argues,necessarily embracesseparate families and privateproperty. I aim in thisessay to bring to lightsomething of thepolitical disagreement between Aristotle and Plato thatthis controversy indicates. One would hardlydescribe Aristotle's break withPlato as an under- researchedor arcane topic of scholarlyanalysis. But the available commen- tariesfail to preserve,to saynothing of explaining,the particular phenomenon of theirpolitical disagreement. Most commentatorsallege that in thePolitics Aristotlemisrepresents (or simplymisunderstands) Socrates' arguments and impertinentlydirects his ojectionsat his own misconceptions;what we have, theysuggest, is nota genuinedisagreement but rather a case of mistakeniden- tity.3Others construct merely eclectic reconciliations which, moreover, tend to belittleAristotle's own declarationof opposition.4Those commentatorswho

farmers(417a6-7); but he also saysthat above all his guardiansmust ensure that the youths best suitedto rulein the future are properly selected, nurtured, and preservedfrom corruption (415b3-c6). Now some of thoseselected to join theguardians will have been bornof artisanparents. If com- munismprovides the proper nurture for the golden children of thecity's rulers, the same arrange- mentswould seem, on thisbasis, to be necessaryfor the farmers and artisans,whose children may wellinclude some goldennatures too youngto have sufficientlyshown their "metal" but not too youngto be corruptedby an unfitrearing. On the otherhand, privateproperty would seemto be necessaryfor the farmers and artisans,whose bronze and ironnatures presumably require the incentivesassociated with private ownership to performproperly their civic function. Hence, the textualevidence is ambiguous;there is difficulty,as Aristotlesuggests, either affirming or denying the propositionthat communism is limitedto Socrates'guardians. 3Consider, forexample, these representative indictments of Aristotle'spolitical criticism of The Republic:Franz Susemihl(Susemihl and Hicks, 1894),"It is not easy to imaginea stronger case of inabilityto transportoneself to an opponent'ssphere of thought.In fact[Aristotle] cannot be acquittedof veryculpable carelessness in theuse of thework he is criticizing"(p. 241). Benja- minJowett (1885), "Nor is it possibleto set anylimits to the misinterpretationof Plato passing underthe name of Aristotle"(II, p. 56). R. D. Hicks, in Susemihland Hicks (1894), "Hence the argumentsadvanced by Aristotle have little direct application to thescheme which he is ostensibly criticizing"(p. 221). E. Bornemann(1923), "I cannot see anythingin it otherthan a sophistical amusement[sophistische Spielerei/" (p. 128). W. D. Ross (1930), "Here Aristotleseems to forget Plato's actualarrangements" (p. 244). R. G. Hoerber(1944), "In thisconnection another instance of carelessnesson the partof Aristotleis of interest... . [It] is a clear indicationof insufficient studyof, and carein quoting,his sources"(p. 106). ErnestBarker (1959), "He was notcriticizing what Plato had meant"(p. 391). 4 ConsiderWerner Jaeger (1948, pp. 187-96,393-99), who suggeststhat despite the evidence of a growingrift particularly between Aristotle and theSpeusippean Academy, his project remained throughall thestages of hiscareer the elaboration of essentiallyPlatonic insights. Thus JohnWild (1948) maintainsthat we should understandthe differencesbetween Plato and Aristotlenot as evidenceof opposition but as manifestingtwo phases of "one and thesame philosophy" (pp. 12-22). Eric Voegelin(1957) maintainsthat "there is a continuityof evolutionfrom Plato, the founder of thegood polis, throughthe Athenian Stranger, who transmitsas muchof his mysticalknowl- edgeas is bearableto thefounders of a colony,to Aristotle,who formulatesstandards and devises ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 31 do addressthe disagreement between Aristotle and Plato as suchelect a strictly metaphysicalfocus and disregardthe political dimension of thecontroversy. Thereis good reasonto be skepticalof any reductionistaccount of the politicalcontroversy between Plato and Aristotle,but especially of a metaphysi- cal reduction.For it was Socrates'renunciation of the studyof physicsand metaphysicsto concentrateon humanaffairs that first "brought philosophy downfrom the heavens" and thusprovided the occasion forAristotle's politi- cal disagreementwith Plato. Socrateschose thispolitical focus, which distin- guishedhim from previous philosophers, not because he had grownweary of cosmologicalinquiry but precisely because he calculatedthat politics provided the best access to the kosmosor whole (Phaedo, 99c6-100a3;Metaphysics, 987bl-3).6As Leo Strauss(1953) notes,"Socrates' turn to thestudy of human thingswas based,not upon disregardof thedivine or naturalthings, but upon a newapproach to theunderstanding of all things... of thewhole" (p. 122). If our access to understandingthe whole indeed lies in humanaffairs or politics,and Aristotle'steaching regarding the kosmos or wholeopposes Plato's, wemay well expect politics to be a primaryrather than merely a derivativefac- torin theiroverall disagreement. In supportof thissuggestion, it is worthnot- ingthat nowhere else does Aristotledevote so elaborateand textuallydetailed a discussionof hisopposition to theteachings of a Platonicdialogue as in the passagesof thePolitics on whichI hope hereto shedsome light.In thissense, Aristotlehimself emphasizes above all thepolitical dimension of hisdisagree- mentwith Plato.

meansfor their maximum relatization under varying material conditions" (p. 283). Foran approach to thereconciliation of Plato and Aristotlethat does not depend upon speculationconcerning the orderof compositionof eitherAristotle's treatises or Plato's dialogues,see HarryV. Jaffa (1963,pp. 80-85). Jaffabases hisreconciliation on whathe sees as thecompatibility of Aristotle's pragmaticobjections to Socrates'scheme with Plato's ironicintention. For a furtherelaboration of thistheme, see ArleneSaxonhouse (1982). 5 Consider, for example,Erich Frank (1940), Harold Cherniss(1944), and Hans-Georg Gadamer(1980). For a suggestiveexception see HelmutFlashar (1977). Although primarily devoted to a criticismof Jaeger'sreading of theEudemian and NicomacheanEthics, Flashar presents in theconcluding paragraphs of his essay a brief"hint" concerning the true relationship between thePlatonic and Aristotelianteachings. What is remarkableis thatin so doinghe adopts foronce apoliticalstandpoint: he turnsto thedifferences between their images of man'sstatus in the "cave." 6 Referencesto Plato areto JohnBurnet's edition of thedialogues (Oxford, 1900-1907) and, unlessindicated otherwise, are to theRepublic; references to Aristotleare likewiseto theeditions includedin the OxfordClassical Textseries and, unlessindicated otherwise, are to thePolitics. The translationsin thispaper are myown. 32 DarrellDobbs A moreimmediate impetus than the prospect of cosmological insight for thisstudy of Aristotle's anticommunism exists, however, inour own contem- porarypolitical circumstance. For the great controversy that currently divides Leftand Right, to say nothing of East and West, concerns precisely the propri- etyof private property and the scope of political authority over private men andwomen. It is fitting, then, that the disagreement between Plato and Aristo- tlecomes to light first for us inits aspect as a disputeover the status of private propertyand family life. By beginning accordingly, with what is first"for us" (N.E.,1095b2-4), it is possiblenot only to movetoward a deeperunderstand- ingof the political teachings of Plato and Aristotle but also to recover that fun- damentalperplexity which is itselfprerequisite to our own political learning. Forone cannot compare the arguments of Platoand Aristotle concerning pri- vateproperty and the family without accounting for the role these arguments playin their disagreement concerning the best political community. Nor, in turn, can oneattend carefully to theirprofound disagreement concerning the best politeiaand not acknowledge the radical and truly perplexing character of the question:in whatmanner is thebest political community constituted? Itshould be observed, furthermore, thatcontemporary political argument againstcommunism presumes that man is essentiallyan apoliticalindividual. YetSocrates abolishes private property and communizes family life, not in pur- suitof individual equality or welfare,but to ensurethe cohesion or integrity ofthe political community as a whole(462clO-d7 with 464a4-c4). In response, Aristotleobjects to Socrates'proposals, not fundamentally because of their consequencesfor the maximization of economicproductivity oreven because oftheir apparent impracticability; Aristotle contests Socratic communism rather becauseof its corrosive effect on politicalcohesion or community. Aristotle's anticommunisn,then, expressly addresses a neglected dimension of the primor- dialpolitical issue (proton, 1260b36-37). Hence, I recountAristotle's critique of Socraticcommunism not to indulgean antiquariancuriosity, but to gain a deeperinsight than is otherwiseavailable into one of themost urgent and fundamentalpolitical questions. Beforeplunging into the depths of Aristotle's specific objections to Socratic communism,itis wellto recognize and address a difficultyevident in the very surfaceof his account. It hasbeen well said that "the problem inherent in the surfaceof things, and only in the surface of things, isthe heart of things." Thus one immediatelyencounters the surprising fact that Aristotle, in hiscritical reviewof the Republic, bends all hisefforts toward refuting Socrates' claims inbehalf of communism and hardly mentions any of the other important themes thatplay a partin the dialogue. Now Plato's Republic indeed contains a thor- oughexamination of the grounds for introducing communism into political life.But that, as everyreader of the Republic knows, is notall thatit contains. Itis evident, furthermore, that no commentator, not even Aristotle, can extract ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 33 a particulardiscussion from its dialogical context without disturbing its place, and henceultimate significance, in the Republic as a whole.Such neglect of thelogographic and dramatic integrity ofPlato's work can result only in the misrepresentationofhis intention. Considering especially that Aristotle's guid- ing interestlies expresslyin the constitutionof the best politicalorder (1260b22-30),however, itis incrediblethat he disregards particularly the most sensationalof Socrates'political prescriptions: that philosophers should be kings.Still, Aristotle does not so muchas mentionthe philosopher king. His remarkableomission of reference tothe philosopher king deserves the closest scrutiny,to saythe least. One mighteven hazard to pronounceit the touch- stoneof competingaccounts of Aristotle'scritique of theRepublic. Anattractive explanation ofAristotle's omission is suggestedby Leo Strauss (1964:122).7One mightwell consider Aristotle's disregard of the philosopher kingto be legitimate,notwithstanding itsapparent violation of the composi- tionalintegrity of theRepublic, Strauss maintains, since Socrates introduces thephilosopher merely as instrumentalto the realization of hisbest city, not as an integralpart of it.Now this interpretation, unlike any which preceded it,has the significant merit of explaining the restricted focus of Artistotle's criti- cismon thebasis of his insight into, rather than misrepresentation of,Plato's dialogue.But it too proves untenable, inmy view, in light of Socrates' argument inthe Republic. For whatever the initial cause on accountof whichSocrates introducesphilosophers, heleaves little doubt finally that the philosopher king is essentialto theintrinsic perfection of thecity (502d8-503b5; 506a9-b2; 520e4-521a9).This refinement inSocrates' argument immediately renders ques- tionable,i.e., examinable, exactly the "legitimacy" ofAristotle's apparent dis- regardof thephilosopher king. We must frame the difficulty as squarelyas possible:against Aristotle's judgment that philosophy is extraneousto or "broughtinfrom outside" Socrates' city (1263b39-40), Socrates affirms the con- tinuityand coherence of the best city through its warlike and philosophical stages (497c3-d2;503bl-5; 540c5-9; 541a3-4).

7 ProfessorStrauss, whose works always warrant the closest study, writes here only obliquely on thedisagreement between Plato and Aristotle.His orientationtoward this controversy is governed to some extent,we mayinfer, by his broaderconcern with the presentation of the"ancients" and "moderns"as the fundamentalalternatives in politicalphilosophy. This presentationinvolves a mitigationof differences,a closing of ranks,within each camp forthe purposeof highlighting thedifference between them. Certainly, no one who has read Strauss'saccount would maintain thatthe gulf separating Aristotle and Plato is greaterthan that separating, say, Aristotle and Hobbs. Nevertheless,we shouldremember, as Strausswas undoubtedlyaware, that a narrowfissure may be deeperthan a wideone. The relativeimportance of disagreementsbetween various philosophers neednot be determinedpresently, however, to agreewith Strauss that an understandingof theancients mustbe guidedby their understanding of themselves. Aristotle in particularunderstood his search forthe best regime to requirean aggressivecritical examination of Plato's Republicas a primary step.Aristotle's self-understanding, then, is in an importantway bound up withhis opposition to Plato. 34 DarrellDobbs

I suggestthat Aristotle's exclusive focus on thecity of warrior kings should be understoodinstead as an implicitdenial of thecontinuity Socrates affirms. I shallargue that Aristotle disregards the philosopher king precisely because, in his estimation,the communisticpolitical arrangements Socrates endorses precludethe education of a philosopher.At stakein Aristotle'scontention is nothingless thanthe very integrity and sufficiencySocrates hopes to achieve forhis city (423c2-4). For a cityto be self-sufficient,itmust be capable ofgener- atingits own rulers. But, according to Aristotle,Socrates' choice of institutions underminesthe education of thevery philosophers destined to becomerulers in hisbest city. Thus Aristotle'sscrutiny of Socraticcommunism, we shallsee, does notbetray inattention to therest of theRepublic or violateits logographic integrity.On the contrary,Aristotle chooses his focusstrategically, targeting whathe seesas a weakbut essential link in theconstruction of Socrates'politi- cal philosophyas a whole. Communism,in Aristotle'sjudgment, is the key- stone,if not the apex, of Socrates'dialectical edifice. Consideration of Aristotle's specificobjections to Socraticcommunism will substantiate this interpretation. Aristotle'sObjections Justas an adequatecomprehension of Aristotle's critique requires an expla- nationof his peculiarfocus on communismwithin the Republic as a whole, it is necessarysimilarly to account forthe role th critiqueplays in the plan of the workof whichit is a part. Now theprincipal thesis, quite literally,of Aristotle'sPolitics is thatthe rule of a statesmanis differentin kind- and not simplyin quantityof subjects- fromthe rule a household manager (1252a7-16).Aristotle presents his teaching regarding household management (oikonomia)in Book One. Thisincludes discourses on whatwe today narrowly termeconomics, as wellas on theproper bearing of masterto slave,father to child,and husbandto wife.The latterdiscussions turn naturally to a consider- ationof the specific excellence appropriate to each ofthese relations. But since thehousehold is onlya partof a morecomprehensive partnership, the polis, thespecific excellence of itscomponent relationships can be properlyunder- stood onlywith a viewto thepart the householdplays in the wholepolitical community(1260b8-24). For this purpose it is necessary,Aristotle says, to make a freshstart (alln archen).We mustconsider political regimes, because the regime(politeia) governs the ordering of the political whole and itsparts. Aristo- tleintends to presenthis own understandingof thebest such political regime. But firsthe mustshow the necessity of his searchfor something beyond those regimes,whether already in existenceor merelyput forwardin speech,which are thoughtto be wellordered (1260b28-36). This he does by devotingBook Twoto thecriticism of a numberof theoreticaland actual regimes,beginning withthat described in Plato's Republic. Now Socrates'city warrants this immedi- ate attentionbecause its regimeturns the orderbetween the polis and its ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 35 constitutentparts topsy-turvy. Although it, like the other regimes Aristotle con- sidersin Book Two,appears to be finelycontrived, Socrates' regime, more even thanthese others, poses an obstaclehindering the establishment of Aristotle's principalthesis. For Socrates'regime, according to Aristotle,utterly confuses wholeand part;Socrates, Aristotle contends, "makes a householdout of the polis." Accordingto Aristotle,it is above all Socrates'reliance upon communism, ostensiblyprescribed to promotepolitical unity, that reduces the polis to the statusof a household,and destroysthe political community as such(1261a21-22). Now it is not immediatelyevident in whatsense the polis would be destroyed bybeing unified in the manner of a household.Surely certain advantages would accrueto a politicalcommunity that could rely on thebonds of kinship to recon- cilethe conflicts of interestthat regularly threaten to breakit up intorival fac- tions.For thisreason Socrates proposed that all citizensin his cityregard one anotheras brothers,and took thenecessary steps to supportthe credibility of thissupposed kinshipby communizingfamily life and property(464a4-c4). Aristotlerecalls, however, that the polis initiallyevolves out of a commu- nityof manyhouseholds. The householdoutside a polis is incomplete- even as a household.Only as a part of a politicalcommunity, Aristotle claims, is thehousehold perfected (telestheises), and itscapacity to achieveits proper end (telos)energized (1252b9-39, 1253al8). If one triesto make a householdout of a city,reversing the development, the political community will be incapaci- tatedwith respect to itsproper end. Such an incapacitatedassociation is, accord- ingto Aristotle,no longertruly a politicalcommunity. For "it is evidentthat thecultivation of virtuemust belong to thepolis thatis truly,and not merely forthe sake of a word,so called"(1280b6-8, 1253a23-25). Thus Aristotle finally objectsto Socraticcommunism, not because it is impracticableor economi- callyinefficient, but ratherbecause it "destroysthe city"as a fithabitat for humanexcellence. Aristotle's several objections to theregime described in Plato's Republiccan be seen,then, to culminatein a singlecomprehensive contention: Socraticcommunism disrupts the entelechies of man and polis, disablingeven thebest human nature from its proper fulfillment. Aristotle criticizes Socrates' politeiabecause he findsit feebleand impotent,while the regime for which he is searchingis the "mightiestof all" (1260b27-29). As wehave seen, Aristotle suggests that Socrates' chief mistake is hiscon- fusionof politicalunity and familialkinship, of wholeand part,and thatthis is responsiblefor all his subsequentpolitical errors (1263b29-31). We infer, accordingly,that it is notthe destruction of thefamily as muchas itselevation intoa paradigmfor political unity to whichAristotle objects. Although Socrates hopesto makehis citizens care for one anotheras forbrothers, Aristotle main- tainsthat Socrates' elevation of the householdinto the dominatingprinciple of politicallife erodes the truebond of politicalunity, namely friendly love 36 DarrellDobbs (philia),and simultaneously undermines the proper education of the philosophi- calnature. It is to the effects of communism on friendly love, that we shall turn firstto discoverthe foundation of Aristotle'scriticism of theRepublic. Communismand Friendship Communism,then as now,seems to promisea "wondrousfriendship" amongeveryone (1263bl5-18). But, Aristotle argues, the appeal of communism is specious;in fact communism undermines friendship. Aristotle's analysis of theRepublic reveals three ways in which philia or friendly love suffers from the measuresSocrates proposes. First, Socrates' attempt to expand the domain of suchterms of familial endearment as "son,""brother," and "father" results in lessrather than more concord or likemindedness (homonoia), which, it seems toAristotle, is a specificallypolitical form of philia. Second, Socrates' expan- sionof thehousehold to comprisethe entire polis means that the realms of familialand erotic love will no longerbe separate;philia can scarcely flourish in themingling that results. Third, Socrates' communization of property obstructsthe development ofgenerosity orliberality, the special work of which is toliberate philia from its bondage to one'sself and possessions. Let us con- siderthese each in turn. The polis is literallyheld togetherby concordor likemindedness (homonoia),which, it seems to Aristotle, is"political friendship" (NE., 1167b2-3, 1155a22-28).Accordingly, itis with a viewto homonoia that Aristotle first criti- cizesSocrates' political institutions:

Nevertheless,even if thisis thebest - forthe communityto be one as muchas possible- it is not manifestlyindicated in accordancewith the saying:"if all at the same timesay 'mine' and 'notmine' ". . . because all is two-fold... on accountof whichall sayingthe same thing is in one wayfine but not possible, and inanother way not fit at all forhomonoia. (1261bl6-32) Homonoia,we learn, arises for fellow citizens when, "concerning what is advantageousthey share a likejudgment, choose the same things, and act ontheir common resolutions" (NE., 1167a26-28).Aristotle maintains that "all sayingthe same thing" is notat all indicativeof homonoia, i.e., of a trulycom- monresolve and disposition to act.For although all saythe same thing, they maynot speak from personal conviction. With this consideration in mind, Aristotlehimself splits in two the property of each of the citizens of hisbest polis(1330a14-20). One parthe wouldlocate safely in the central districts of thecity, the other part more remotely and precariouslynear the frontier. In thisway each citizen has a personalstake in both places. This leads, Aristotle says,to more likemindedness. Forcitizens then can stand together behind a for- eignpolicy which is based on their common personal interests rather than splin- teringinto factions favoring either jingoism or appeasement. Hence it would indeedbe a finething if each spoke for himself (hds hekastos), saying "mine." Butin Socrates' regime, all, when they say "mine," speak only collectively, on ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 37 behalfof the polis (462d8-e3). Aristotle contends that for them to speakfor themselvesis impossible. Why? Hisreasoning turns on the nebulous connection among citizens established byfamilial communism. He says:

A thousandyouths become sons to each of thecitizens, but theyare not his personally[hMs hekastoul;rather to the chance man likewisethe chance youthis son.... Thus, each says "mine". .. inwhatever relation to number he happensto be, namely "mine or someone else's". . . and doubtingthis too, forit is unclearto whoma child happensto be born and forwhom saved once born. (1261b38-1262a6) Thusthe clarity of personalinterest and convictionis doublyobscured by Socrates'communization of familylife. Each saysnot "mine," but "mine or someoneelse's"; and he doubts even this already diluted connection. This cir- cumstanceprecludes likemindedness because each is nothimself permitted to havea clear"mind" to be likeminded with. Hence their all saying "mine" is hol- low;such speech, Aristotle says, is a paralogism,an abuseof logos. Merelysaying the same thing, then, is notsufficient for homonoia. But neitheris iteven necessary. For if all citizenssay the same thing - forexample, "I'llrule" - theresult is civilwar rather than likemindedness. Likemindedness exists,for example, when the whole political community intends that a partic- ularperson should rule, provided he is willing (N.E., 1167a30-34). But then the ruledsay "you rule," while the prospective ruler says "I'll rule." We see homonoia inthis instance precisely because fellow citizens are not all saying the same thing. Theysay different but concordant things. Aristotle infers, then, that by stretching theapplication of suchterms as "son,""father," and "brother"beyond their naturaldomain, Socrates does not at all contributeto homonoiaor political philiaamong his citizens. In fact,in Aristotle's estimate, the present mode of speaking ismore indica- tiveof homonoia than that which Socrates proposes. Aristotle emphasizes that philiastems especially from the sense of ownership (1262b22-23); but in Socrates' citythe disjunction "mine or someone else's" dulls and dilutes this sense. The presentmode of saying "mine," therefore, is mightier and better (kreitton). For presentlymany speak with personal conviction of the same youth as theirown. Somecall thesame lad son,others call himbrother and stillothers nephew or cousin.All ofthem employ these different terms, however, as expressions oftheir personal relationship tothe lad. Eachspeaks "for himself" when call- ingthe lad his own. Their personal attachments provide a basis for a trulycom- monresolve to tendto hiswelfare. Aristotle concludes, then, that it is better tobe a privatenephew than even a sonin the manner prescribed by Socrates. ForSocrates so dilutesthe special care that accompanies familial philia, that itsspecific care inspiring quality is renderedineffectual. 38 DarrellDobbs In anyevent, Aristotle observes, some of Socrates' citizens will inevitably detecttheir own kin, despite his elaborate precautions. Children tend to resem- bletheir natural parents. Aristotle indicates, moreover, that the existence of suchresemblances as betraynatural kinship is just(1262a23-24). His objec- tionto Socraticcommunism penetrates deeper than the practical observation of familyresemblances initially suggests. Once again it is notfundamentally considerationsofimpracticability, butrather concern for communism's con- sequenceson the promotion of human excellence that moves Aristotle to oppo- sition.Particularly interesting is Aristotle's juxtaposition of thedoubting (distazdn,1262a5) to which Socrates' prescribed designations give rise and the trustworthyevidence (taspisteis, 1262al8) seized upon by his citizens in accord- ancewith natural family resemblances. For every greater confidence Socrates' citizensplace in naturalsimilarities, Aristotle thus suggests, the authority of conventionaldesignations, and the political community which posits them, is furtherdiminished. In a goodpolis, by contrast, law or convention(nomos) supplementsand fortifies a father's rule; in turn, the father's endorsement of lawadds the force of filiallove and respect to itsauthority (NE., 1180a18-24, 1180b3-7).Accordingly, the mightiest and best (kratiston) program for super- visingthe care and education of the young must combine community and pri- vateparticipation (NE., 1180a29-bI3).Socrates' elimination of private family connections,however, precludes the possibility of thiscombination. AgainstSocrates' hopes of instilling friendly love in his citizens by extend- ingfamilial kinship, Aristotle maintains that it willbe all themore difficult forsuch a communitytoguard against assaults, incest, and other outrages as a resultof Socrates'reforms (1262a25-27). Presumably, this follows because fearand shame, the safeguards on which Socrates depends to discourage these outrages(465alO-11), will be weakenedby the dilution of thefamilial philia onwhich they are based. Significantly, however, Aristotle chooses not to dwell onthe increased difficulty ofpreventing these crimes. Instead, he stresses their impietyand impropriety. Aristotleobjects in particular to Socrates'handling of erds. Socrates allows erosbetween citizens, in partbecause of itsirresistibility, butalso as a lever forunification. This becomes apparent when he accedesto Glaucon's"addi- tion"to thelaw governingthe behavior of guardson militarycampaigns (468bl1-c5):no one- father,mother, brother, or sister-may thenrefuse the overturesof a lover.Socrates presumably hopes that his warriors will be stirred bythe presence of the beloved to performdeeds of heroic valor. Certainly the citybenefits from the intensified exertions of its warriors. But Aristotle insists thatsuch an incestuousarrangement, allowing eros between kin, involves the greatestimpropriety (aprepestaton). Onceagain, the fault can be tracedto theSocratic scheme for political unification.Having eradicated the private family, Socrates has no choicebut tointroduce incest into his city. As a consequence,erds may pervade the whole ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 39 city;there no longer exists a shieldedenvironment inwhichphilia can arise and developuncontaminated bythe influence of erds. Socrates may have intended theopposite, but his city does not become chaste; the household merely loses itsinnocence. Eros, we infer, has no businessin thehousehold, which is the cradleof philia. On this basis Aristotle criticizes erds among kin as outof place (atopon).8For philia requires a sheltered environment tobe nurturedto matu- rity.But Socrates destroys this environment, according to Aristotle,by com- munizingthe family. As a resultSocrates causes a diminutionrather than an increaseof philia. For thisreason incest, erds between kin, is superlatively improper;the most fitting thing among kin, not to mentionfellow citizens, is philia. Up tothis point Aristotle has discussed only the shortcomings ofSocrates' proposedcommunization ofthe family. To examine his proposal for communal propertyinvolves a separate (choris) inquiry, Aristotle says, because even if the currentseparation of families were maintained, one could still ask whether prop- ertyshould be common. Socrates, we recall, recommends a legislative declara- tionabolishing all privateproperty for his guards (416c5-417b9). Aristotle maintainsthat legislators should attend to the characters oftheir citizenry rather thanto their property. Property will be used in common, he says, if men become friends;men do notbecome friends as a resultof the communization oftheir property.Thus the integrity of Aristotle'sapparently independent inquiries emergesin his recurrentconcern for the effect of Socraticcommunism on friendlylove, i.e., philia. In accordancewith this concern, Aristotle first indi- catesthat liberality, a virtue that implicates private property, is itself a prereq- uisitefor sharing in philia, and thus for participating inthe political community. Thenhe argues that Socrates' politicization of property and other household mattersresults instead in the development ofhabits which undermine liberality. Aristotlebegins his examination by making a distinctionthat proves to beimportant for determining how property might be made common. In accord- ancewith the distinction between holding, or possession,and use thereare threepossible schemes according to which one might make property common. Use couldbe common,while possession is private;possession could be com- mon,and use private;or, both possession and use couldbe madecommon (1262b37-1263a3).Aristotle indicates his dissatisfaction with both common possessionand common use. Common possession, or holding, leads to neglect, andcommon use leads to abuse or overconsumption. Nevertheless, hedoes not mentiona fourth possibility, that possession and use remain private. Aristotle,

8 WhetherAristotle acknowledges eros as appropriateeven between husband and wifeis an interestingquestion. Certainly he authorizessome suspicionto thecontrary by omitting to men- tioneros in connectionespecially with his descriptionof humanbeings as "coupling"even more thanpolitical animals (NE., 1162al6ff.).More likely,this silence is itselfindicative of thedelicate treatmentfitting for that eros whichnecessarily plays a role in the household. 40 DarrellDobbs inother words, stops short of recommending that property bekept private. Prop- ertymust somehow be madecommon, though by law it is thoroughlyprivate (1263a26-27,1263a37-39). Why? Ifproperty were kept private, there would be nosharing. The correspond- ing characteris called by Aristotleilliberal, or evenmoney-loving (NE., 1121b12-16).Aristotle says that individuals like the self-lover and the money- loverare justly condemned, but hastens to add that their perverted loves should not be confusedwith the philia we all quitenaturally have for ourselves (1263a41-b5).Taking Aristotle quite literally, the decisive difference between the"self-lover" (philauton) and one who "feels a friendlylove for himself" (to phileinheauton) appears to be theinseparability ofthe self-lover's philia from hisself. To be a self-loverormoney-lover means essentially to haveone's philia "stuckon" one's self or possessions. The attachment tothese things is, in this case,greater than that to which we are naturally bound. In this stuck condition philiacannot be drawnout of the radically private. The self-lover, accordingly, isincapable of partaking in the common bond that holds together the political community(NE., 1155a22-28).9But man, who uniquely possesses logos, is by naturea politicalanimal; it follows,then, that it is unnaturalfor philia to be stuckon anythingthat prevents one's partnership ina polis.It is thefunction ofliberality, I suggest, to liberate philia from this bondage, and thus to support thepossibility of a politicalcommunity.10 In contrastto theself-lover, one whofeels friendly love toward himself evidentlypossesses an unfettered capacity for friendship that may be extended toothers. He alonecan truly become a citizen,a member of a politicalcommu- nity,as distinguishedfrom an "individual."But precisely how this liberation ofphilia, with its politically advantageous consequences, isto be brought about

9 The money-lover,like the self-lover,lacks the liberalcharacter necessary for political life. The money-loverbecomes addicted to hoardingowing, presumably, to the undeniablepleasure of ownership.But thegreatest pleasure of ownership,Aristotle insists, arises when one makeshis privatepossessions common in use. The liberalman's pleasureis greaterthan the money-lover's, then,because it is genuinelya pleasureof ownership.Paradoxically, only if one shareshis prop- ertywith another can it be said thathe has trulyacquired it. This is theinsight that lies beneath Aristotle'sotherwise puzzling use of theverbal and substantiveforms of "possession."In other wordsit is in a liberalaction that it firstcomes to lightthat a possession(ktema) can be one's own apartfrom the active possessing (ktesis) or hoardingof it. Thus onlythe liberal man will feel genu- ine,natural pleasure in ownership. 10In thisrespect Socrates' proposals, which aim to promotethe cohesion of the political com- munity,are properlyjudged by the test of theirconsequences for liberality. Thus W. L. Newman's (1887,I, p. 168)objection, that one mightreasonably consider whether the loss of opportunities forliberality entailed by the communization of propertymight not be outweighedby gains in other constituentsof happiness,misses the point. Newman supposes that Aristotle treats liberality indiffer- entlyas one amongmany elements of thegood lifewhich might be sacrificedin orderto obtain certainothers. The keyto Aristotle'sargument, overlooked in Newman'sanalysis, is thatliberality occupiesa specialposition in thatit isprerequisite to community,including the political commu- nity,and thusto the promotionof the "otherconstituents of happiness". ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 41 is notimmediately clear. Aristotle offers two remarks, however, that suggest, in outline,a feasiblestrategy. First, he observesthat in whatevermanner the liberationof philia is to be accomplished,itis the"private job" (ergonidion) ofthe lawgiver, surprisingly describing the task of community building as some- thingprivate (1263a39-40). Community spirit may be promoted,itseems, by assigningpersonal responsibility and honors especially where the fruits of one's effortsare common. In line with this observation, Aristotle further notes that, notwithstandingthe"unspeakable" pleasure that arises from considering some- thingas one'sown private property, the greatest pleasure comes from graciously aidingfriends, guests, and comrades (1263b5-6). In contrast to the "unspeaka- ble"pleasure of hoarding, Aristotle would appear to be offeringdeeds of good legislationand hospitalityas thevery things of whichinstructive stories or "myths"are made. The customsinculcated by such music presuppose, how- ever,the existence of private families and property. Socratic communism can- notpromote liberality. Communized property only nurtures hoarding illiberality andaggravates conflict (1263a4, 1263al0-15). Private property isnecessary for thenurture and perfectionof liberality. Property,then, is notan ingredientof politicalhomonoia; it is emphati- callyno partof the polis (1328a34-35, cf. 1253b23). For Aristotle it is toward thedevelopment of liberalcharacters, rather than toward the designation of specificproperty arrangements, that legislation isproperly directed. The politi- cizationof property and other household affairs, authorized by Socrates' pecu- liarnotion of political unity, will merely undermine philia. If the polis is made intoa largehousehold, these contentious trivialities will be elevatedinto the politicalrealm, poisoning the community between fellow citizens. For the extendedhousehold contains only an adulterated,watery philia, which is too weakto facilitate a harmonious sharing of the all-too-hu an things. Even within thehousehold, Aristotle observes, "we collide especially with those of our ser- vantswhom we use most in connection with routine chores" (1263al9-21). No potentfamilial philia lubricates this friction with servants. Aristotle suggests, significantly,that the best one can do is to hiresomeone else to supervisehis servants,freeing himself for "politics or philosophy"(1255b35-37). Communismand Philosophy Aristotle'sconcluding objections are directed toward the impact of Socrates' politicalproposals on education. Socrates communizes property and abolishes theprivate family to promote political unity, to ensure that his guards remain thefriendly allies of their fellow citizens. But he implies that such precautions wouldnot be necessaryif theguards were "truly educated in a fineway" (416b5-c5).Presumably because they have not yet received this education, Socratessupplements their early training inmusic and gymnastics with his com- munisticinstitutions. As Aristotlenotes, however, the evils Socrates wishes to removefrom his city arise as a consequenceof viciousness, not as a resultof 42 DarrellDobbs thelack of communism (1263b22-23). Thus he picks up Socrates'suggestion thatcommunism is an institutionalprop for his regime, which serves in the absenceof the intrinsic support that only a propereducation can provide. The difficultywith this strategy, according to Aristotle,consists in the immediate effectsof communization:communism cannot serve as an effectivestopgap becauseits own consequences preclude the effectiveness of Socrates' higher, philosophicaleducation. Becauseof this preclusion of further education, Socrates' guards will fall outamong themselves:

The mannerin whichSocrates establishes even the rulers is precariousin thathe has thesame rulingalways. But thisis a cause of factioneven among those who possess no noteworthy qualities,and certainlywill be withspirited [thymoeidesil and warlikemen. (1264b6-10) Toappreciate the point of Aristotle's remarks here one must recall that Socrates originallyplaced philosophy inman to temper the ferocity essential to the nature of a good guard(375e9-376c5, 525b8-9). Aristotle, however, describes the guards,who Socrates says must be philosophicalas wellas spirited,merely as spiritedand warlike. He deliberatelyomits the guards' philosophical quality, whichis preciselythe factor on whichthe city depends if it is tobe savedfrom theguards' savagery. In Aristotle'sestimate Socrates has failedto developthe philosophical capacitycharacteristic ofthe guard's nature. Socrates' reliance on thehouse- hold(oikia) as an appropriatepattern for political integration commits his philosophicalguards to the authority of the kindred (to oikeion). By virtue of themonopoly he establishes for the kindred, Socrates makes it impossible for anyclaim higher than the claim of whatis nearestand dearest to arisein his city.The guards' devotion to the city as theirown obstructs their transcendence ofthe political horizon. Such potential philosophers, we can infer, will never escapethe cave. Thisdiscovery reveals an addeddimension to Aristotle's earlier criticism ofSocrates' regime as impious(1262a28). Piety as ordinarilyunderstood requires thatspecial care be taken in regard to kinship. This, however, isthe piety Aristotle notoriouslyexcludes from his own catalogue of virtuesin theNicomachean Ethics.In thisrespect it is perplexingto seeAristotle criticizing Socrates for impiety.But piety assumes a specialmeaning, particularly when Aristotle is facedwith the task of criticizingPlato, or hisfellow academicians. For then hestresses that it is precisely piety that requires that special care and allegiance to kin,our nearest and dearest,be overthrown:

It would seemto be a betterthing, and necessaryas a conditionof preservingthe truth, to overthrowour nearestand dearest[ta oikeiaJ,especially insofar as we are loversof wisdom [philosophousontas]; for although both of themare dear, it is pious to honorthe truth fore- most. (N.E., 1096al4-17) ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 43 Aristotleperhaps eschews the treatment ofpiety as a separatevirtue in the Ethics becausetrue piety is, for him, a componentof philosophical virtue. Philia in itsaspect as philosophia,the love of wisdom, however, cannot be toleratedin Socrates'regime, precisely because it is inits nature to challengethe kindred. Aristotlethus suggests that Socrates' regime in factprecludes philosophy. Aristotleunderscores this point in comparing Socrates' city to Sparta. He maintainsthat if a regimesuch as Socrates'were observed coming to be not merelyin speech but in deed, it would differ little from what the Spartans have undertaken(1264alO-11). The comparison to Sparta is apt,in connection with Plato'scriticism of it forcultivating only the polemical virtues (1271bl-10, 1334all-41;N.E., 1180a24-26), but especially in light of the notorious xenopho- bictendency of the Spartan regime. In Spartathe "foreign seed" (Rep., 497b3-4) of philosophywould not be tolerated. Aristotle'sastonishing objection that Socrates "takes happiness away from hisguards" (1264bl5-16) must be understood in this light. Commentators have ridiculedthis contention as themost preposterous ofAristotle's claims against Socrates,suggesting that it is essentiallynothing more than a resurrectionof Adeimantus'materialistic objection within the Republic (419al-420bl). " But Aristotle'scareful formulation ofthis particular objection furnishes a further clueto his interpretation ofSocrates' treatment ofphilosophy in the Republic. Aristotle'suse of the middle participle (aphairoumenos) suggests that Socrates actsin his own interest in "takingaway" happiness from the guards; further, theposition of this participle, standing between the guards and happiness (ten eudaimonianaphairoumenos tdn phylakdn) reinforces this contention. What thenis Socrates'interest, and howdoes it literallystand between the guards and theirhappiness? Theclearest indication of Socrates' interest in the Republic surfaces in his responseto the prevalent reproach leveled against philosophy. Only in this con- nectionin the whole of the Republic does the remarkable sobriety of Socrates falter.The mudslinging against philosophy, Socrates says, arouses his spirited- nessor anger (536c2-7). The genuinely philosophical nature, Socrates insists, isneither wicked nor worthless as manybelieve. On the contrary, itis truly mag- nificentand divine. But this cannot be perceived, Socrates notes, under present politicalcircumstances,

11 ConsiderSusemihl (Susemihl and Hicks, 1894):"Here Aristotleis guiltyof a furtherpiece of carelessness... [He] has not attendedto anotherpassage V 465d-466b,where this thread is takenup... whenceit appears that the former statement is onlyprovisionally made.... Thus this objectionbreaks down entirely. We have had instancesof similarnegligence already" (p. 244). Jowett (1885): "This passage likemany others in thePolitics involves a misconceptionof Plato's mean- ing"(pp. 57-58).Bornemann (1923): "Has Aristotlereally read Plato's Republic?... Thislast maneu- verof Aristotleis completelymeaningless" (p. 150). Both Susemihl(Susemihl and Hicks, 1894, p. 243) and WilhelmOncken (1875, pp. 190-91)further miss the point of Aristotle'sobjection by readingguards (phylakes, 1264b22) as philosophers.But it is Aristotle'sprincipal concern, as I suggest,to show thatthese guards cannot be philosophers. 44 DarrellDobbs

but thisis the chargeI am bringing-that none of the presentlyexisting cities is worthyof thephilosophical nature.... if it should,however, receive the bestpoliteia, just as it too is best,then it will be manifestthat the philosophicalnature is reallydivine while the others are merelyhuman. (497bl-c2) By foundingin speechthis best politeia, Socrates hopes, on theway toward illuminatingthe nature and profitability ofjustice, to debunk the popular con- ceptionof thephilosopher and revealhis life as best.This, simply stated, is Socrates'interest. We note that his strategy will succeed, on hisown account, however,only if the regime he founds genuinely isbest. With this consideration inmind, however, Aristotle charges that Socrates' political prescription for a regimeworthy of the philosophical nature conflicts with the happiness of his foremostcitizens, who are themselves potential philosophers! Accordingto Aristotle,Socrates establishes his guards like a garrisonin a foreignland rather than as citizens(1264a26-27). The guards' full-time occu- pationwith the city's business is necessary,Socrates indicates, if the city is to be integratedand made whole and to achieveits greatest good. This demands too much,according to Aristotle,for precisely those citizens who have the greatestaptitude for philosophy are made to care above all forthe city - their owncity. But, as wehave noted, the special mark of a philosopheris to be free to honorthe truth ahead of hisown. Thus Aristotle maintains that Socrates depriveshis guards of happiness, above all by stunting their development inphi- losophy.This is Aristotle's most devastating indictment ofSocrates' best regime, andwith it his critique of the Republic reaches its culmination. The means by whichSocrates attempts to satisfythe political necessity of devoted rulers are irreconcilablewith the prerequisites of philosophicaleducation. Summaryand Conclusion Aristotle'scritical review of Plato's Republic, rich in detail and particular considerations,nevertheless culminates ina comprehensiveand formidable con- tention.Socratic communism, Aristotle charges, disrupts the entelechies ofman andpolis. Both political integrity and philosophy suffer under a communistic regime.This contention of Aristotlepoints toward a genuineand important disagreementwith Plato's Socrates regarding the conditions of philosophical educationand their compatibility with political concerns. Plato is fullyaware of thedifficulties plaguing any effort to reconcilecivic and philosophical interests.In fact,he may be saidto share with Aristotle the view that these two interestsmake the most rightful demands of allegiance on humanbeings and yetare not obviously in harmony with one another. But Socrates, anyway, evi- dentlysupposes that he has achieveda successfulreconciliation, for he con- cludeshis discussion of hisphilosopher kings saying,

Each in turn,although for the most part spending time [diatribontas] at philosophy,when histurn is come,drudges in politics and rulesfor the sake of thecity... and in thisway having alwayseducated other like men... theydepart to the Blessed Isles to dwell.(540bl-7) ARISTOTLE'S ANTICOMMUNISM 45 Aristotle,the careful student and critic of the Republic, is awareof Socrates' aimsand strategy. But he deliberately disagrees that Socrates has achieved the reconciliationbetween philosophy and the polis for which they both hope. He doesnot so muchas mentionthe philosopher kings, and by implication lumps themtogether with the other extraneous material with which, he says, Socrates hasfilled up the Republic (1264b39-40). Paradoxically, this omission is the most tellingindication of Aristotle's critical view of the Republic. Socrates has no rightto speakof philosophers as rulersin his city, in Aristotle's view, because hispolitical institutions preclude philosophy. Aristotle's answer to Socrates' introductionof philosophersas theactual rulers of hisbest city is eloquent inits simplicity: you can't get there from here! "Thus, the politeia concerning whichSocrates has spokeninvolves these dead-ends [aporias] and othersno lessthan these" (1264a24-25). Bytaking happiness away from his premier citizens, that is, by precluding thepossibility of theirphilosophical development, Socrates undermines the putativecontinuity of his warriorcity and kallipolis,the cityruled by philosophers.Socratic communism, Aristotle contends, creates a fractureor discontinuitywithin the political community. As againstthe household unity elevatedto politicalstatus in Socrates'regime, Aristotle indicates that the integrityofthe polis properly consists in its ability to achieveits telos, namely thecultivation ofexcellence and the good life. We may say, then, that for Aristotle thecontinuity of the political entelechy constitutes the integrity of thepolis. ButSocratic communism, he charges,renders both man and commonwealth powerlessto achieve their goals. Communism, inAristotle's view, precludes the integrationofthe political community and thus also precludesany contribu- tionit might make to theintegration of thehuman soul. The precisedimen- sionsof this prospective contribution ina noncommunisticregime remain for Aristotle,and forus, to explorein thebalance of hisPolitics. Manuscriptsubmitted 13 September1983 Finalmanuscript received 4 June1984

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