A PRECARIOUS ACCORD Navigating the Post-Summit Landscape

JUNE 2018 A PRECARIOUS ACCORD Navigating the Post-Summit Landscape Patrick M. Cronin and Benjamin Katze Silberstein About the Authors PATRICK CRONIN is a Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously, he was the Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University where he simultaneously oversaw the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Aairs. Dr. Cronin has a rich and diverse background in both Asia-Pacific security and U.S. defense, foreign, and development policy. Prior to leading INSS, Dr. Cronin served as the Director of Studies at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Before joining IISS, Dr. Cronin was Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In 2001, Dr. Cronin was confirmed as Assistant Administrator for Policy and Program Coordination, the third-ranking position at the U.S. Agency for International Development, where he led the interagency task force that helped design the Millennium Challenge Corporation. BENJAMIN KATZEFF SILBERSTEIN is an Associate Scholar with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and a Doctoral Candidate at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also co-editor of North Korean Economy Watch, and a contributor to IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review. Mr. Katze Silberstein has researched the North Korean economy extensively, with a particular focus on access to food and the country’s market system. He formerly worked as a Special Advisor to the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation. Acknowledgements This report was made possible by the generous funding of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and dozens of ocials and scholars in the United States and elsewhere. CNAS also benefitted from the ongoing support the Korea Foundation, which has enriched research and discussions with South Korea ocials, scholars, and other experts. While the authors alone accept responsibility for what is written, they give special thanks to Evans Revere, Jung Pak, Sue Mi Terry, Frank Aum, Scott Snyder, Choi Kang, Matthew Pottinger, Joseph Yun, Allison Hooker, Mark Lambert, Marc Knapper, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy’s Institute for Foreign Aairs and National Security, the Korea Institute for National Security Strategy, President Dongho Jo and his colleagues, Dr. Lee Seong-Hyon, Dr. Paik Haksoon, Yonghwan Choi, Soo-ho Li, Young Joon Kim, Seong-Ryoul Cho, and Soo-hyung Lee, the Sejong Institute, the Chosun Ilbo’s Asian Leadership Conference, Markus Garlauskas, Sydney Seiler, Bruce Klingner, David Maxwell, Stephen Rademaker, Robert Gallucci, Robert Joseph, Ambassador Cho Joon-ye, Gary Samore, Duyeon Kim, John Delury, Kurt Campbell, Michael Green, John H. Tilelli Jr., Jan-Marc Jouas, James Minnich, William McKinney, James “Hammer” Hartsell, the University of International Relations in Beijing, the Northeast Asia Research Foundation in Seoul, the Hankook Ilbo and other organizers of the Korea Forum 2018, Lucy Sexton, Joseph DeTrani, Robert Einhorn, Adam Mount, Patricia Kim, Jennifer Kwon, Morton Halperin, Walter ‘Skip’ Sharp, Robert Manning, Wallace ‘Chip’ Gregson, Laura Rosenberger, Robert Litwak, Chun In-bum, Chloe Taeseul Joo, Harry Kim, Adena Peckler, Alexis Stangarone, Ross Tokola, William B. Brown, Bradley Babson, Peter Ward, and all those who wished to remain anonymous or whose names we have forgotten. This report would not have been possible without assistance from a variety of CNAS colleagues, including Abigail Grace, Melodie Ha, Sarah Donilon, Kristine Lee, Maura McCarthy, Melody Cook, Ely Ratner, Loren Schulman, Daniel Kliman, Richard Fontaine, Victoria Nuland, and Molly Parrish. About the Asia-Pacific Security Program The Asia-Pacific Security Program seeks to inform the exercise of U.S. leadership in Asia by analyzing how the United States can rebalance its priorities, shape a rules-based regional order, modernize traditional alliances, build the capacity of new partners, and strengthen multilateral institutions and respect for the rule of law. From exploring rising maritime tensions in the region, to crafting ways to renew key alliances and partnerships, to articulating strategies to extend and enhance U.S. influence, the program leverages the diverse experiences and background of its team, deep relationships in the region and in Washington, and CNAS’ convening power to shape and elevate the conversation on U.S. policy across a changing Indo-Asia- Pacific. Cover Photo: Handout/Getty Images A PRECARIOUS ACCORD Navigating the Post-Summit Landscape 02 Executive Summary 08 Introduction: The Power and Peril of Diplomacy 10 Chapter 1: A Diplomatic Opening 22 Chapter 2: The Economic Dimensions of North Korean Diplomacy 32 Conclusion: Safely Descending the Summit 1 ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY PROGRAM | JUNE 2018 A Precarious Accord: Navigating the Post-Summit Landscape Executive Summary States, the largest remains whether it will be possible to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear threat this time around. Throughout 2017, diplomacy remained almost dormant Has Kim Jong-un o ered the irresistible concession of as North Korea blazed through a record set of nuclear-re- what could turn out to be but a portion of his nuclear lated activities and demonstrated its ability to launch capabilities in exchange for badly needed relief from ballistic missiles with an intercontinental range capable economic and military pressure? of reaching North America. But at the end of the year, The world is in uncharted territory because of the in December, the nuclear and missile tests went silent. two-step summit process: first, the inter-Korean summit From the first day of 2018, the diplomatic bustle has on April 27 at the Demilitarized Zone (and the subse- been nonstop and marked by unprecedented meetings quent, less-publicized Moon-Kim summit a month later, among leaders. Seemingly overnight, Kim Jong-un’s on May 27); and second, the meeting between President priority shifted from nuclear-armed missiles to economic Donald Trump and Chairman Kim in Singapore on June development, a change that had been on the radar for 12. But these developments represent a new chapter, several years but never seemed to come. What explains a third significant attempt, in a long history of seeking this radical shift in the most immediate security threat in diplomatic engagement with and nuclear disarmament of Asia? Based on an understanding of the power and peril North Korea. of diplomacy of the past 18 months, how should ocials The first e ort to stem North Korea’s then-embry- move forward to establish a durable peace on a nucle- onic nuclear weapon development came in the 1990s. ar-free peninsula? The breakup of the Soviet Union prompted the United A series of summits, culminating with the inaugural States to remove its remaining 100-or-so tactical meeting between the U.S. and North Korean leaders, nuclear weapons on the peninsula.1 The two Koreas provides an opportunity both to look back at the recent signed a non-aggression agreement in December 1991, past and to reflect on what comes next. One key lesson followed the next month by a commitment “not to test, from past summits is that the descent is more perilous manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, than the ascent: The climb is exhausting, and the thrill or use nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy solely of achieving great heights distracts from the tremen- for peaceful purposes; and not to possess facilities dous e ort yet required. There are multiple challenges for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.”2 emerging from the spring summits, but for the United Rapprochement quickly gave way to the first nuclear crisis in 1993–1994, when North Korea balked at international inspection of its main plutonium nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. But diplomacy again prevailed in the form of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. A multilateral e ort emerged on top of that bilateral deal, which committed to replacing North Korea’s graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with light-water reactors, strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and normalizing relations between Washington and Pyongyang.3 The Agreed Framework eventually faltered over the disclo- sure of a clandestine uranium-enrichment facility, and diplomacy gave way to heightened brinkmanship. A second attempt to find a diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea centered on Six-Party Talks among both Koreas, the United States, and China, as well as Japan and Russia. In the landmark Joint Declaration of September 19, 2005, North Korea pledged it was “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” For its part, the United States provided negative security guarantees, rearming its promise that it had no nuclear weapons on the Korean North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Peninsula and had “no intention to attack or invade the Roh Moo-hyun meet for the second-ever inter-Korean Summit on DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.”4 Only a October 2, 2007, in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Pool/Getty Images) 2 @CNASDC year after the historic accord, North Korea conducted its remain, and the ability to reverse sanctions should be a first nuclear test. The Six-Party Talks managed to restate routine part of policy planning. Similarly, it should be the 2005 commitments in a 2007 Joint Statement, but as possible to reduce military tensions without

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