University of Florida Levin College of Law UF Law Scholarship Repository UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2020 The Political Economy of Corporate Law and Governance: American and Korean Rules Under Different Endogenous Conditions and Forms of Capitalism Robert J. Rhee University of Florida Levin College of Law,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert J. Rhee, The Political Economy of Corporate Law and Governance: American and Korean Rules under Different Endogenous Conditions and Forms of Capitalism, 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 649 (2020) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE: AMERICAN AND KOREAN RULES UNDER DIFFERENT ENDOGENOUS CONDITIONS AND FORMS OF CAPITALISM Robert J. Rhee* Advanced economies operate under different forms of capitalism and social order. Corporate law is fixed only insofar as a country's political economy and social organization are static. This article explains why an advanced economy may choose inefficient rules. Korean rules are the product of past industrial development policies and current social-political-economic conditions; endogenous conditions align corporate law with nationalisticsentiments and the public interest. The cost of this policy is diminution of firm value. The benefit is the erection of a plausible distinction between rule- and fact-based control of key corporate groups.