The Question

Juan Rial of the in

Roman ruins in the city of Tyre in a state of abandonment. checkpoint in the south of the country. Makeshift camp for Syrian refugees in the region. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are at the center of the security situation in Lebanon today. The support of central countries through an International Conference for assistance programs, the donation of four billion dollars from for the purchase of military equip- ment, and the operations carried out in the face of the advances of the Islamic State of and the Levant - ISIS - in the border zone with , are some of the pieces that constitute the scene. SERIES PEACE& SECURITY Presented here is the vision of a Latin American analyst with experience in the processes of the reconfi guration of military forces following the dictatorships, and the change in the regional and international scene produced by the disappearance of the internal and external Soviet empire. SERIES PEACE& SECURITY

About the author:

Juan Rial is a political analyst and consultant to international organizations, such as the Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, International IDEA, and the Organization of American States. Rial is a founding member of RESDAL and a member of the Board of Directors. He was a professor of Political Science at UDELAR (Universidad de la Republica) and of ORT University, both in Montevideo. He is an author of a dozen books and over a hundred articles on themes related to democracy, institutions, security and defense.

Copyright RESDAL. Rights reserved. This report was carried out within the framework of the ‘Gender Perspective in Peacekeeping Operations: Cases and Lessons from Contributing Countries’ project, which receives fi nancial support from:

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

July 2014

Other RESDAL publications

https://www.facebook.com/resdal https://twitter.com/RESDAL_ http://www.resdal.org [email protected] Juan Rial*

1 The Question of the Military in Lebanon

The Lebanese Armed Forces: Evading the Temptation of Becoming an Actor in the Political Struggle, while Remaining as a Corporate Institution The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are at the center of the security situation in Lebanon today. support of central countries through an International Conference for assistance programs, the donation of four billion dollars from Saudi Arabia for the purchase of military equipment, and the operations carried out in the face of the advances of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - ISIS - in the border zone with Syria, are some of the pieces that constitute the scene. Presented here is the vision of a Latin American analyst with experience in the processes of the reconfi guration of military forces following the dictatorships, and the change in the regional and international scene produced by the disappearance of the internal and exter- nal Soviet empire.

The subtitle that summarizes our thesis ap- national State), and from there its formation pears to be contradiction, but its overtones are into units marked by their confessional nature. rooted in reality. Lebanon is a heritage of the But, at the same time with a trait that moves Ott Empire, where 17 confessional units in the direction of embodying the Lebanese coexist. The 18th - the Jewish – practically dis- national identity. To manage the contradiction appeared following the confl icts of 1958 and implies “neutrality” in the face of intra- and in- 1975. It is the only Middle Eastern country that ter- confessional, family, and clan etc. confl icts. contains such confessional diversity, including This neutrality should extend also to regional- an important number of . Within this international confl icts. framework, the Lebanese Army - the relevant This idea of “neutrality” covers the entire military force - has been in a constant process Lebanese entity as a State. The of construction, “de-construction” and resur- of 1943 – a pact that was realized fundamen- gence following very diffi cult confl icts.1 tally between the Christian Maronites and the Two fundamental principals inform the Leb- Sunni Muslims - in some manner removed the anese Army. In accordance with the doctrine possibility of having a united instrument that of its creator, General Fouad Chéhab (French monopolized the use of violence (or threat of trained), it is a force that should refl ect the violence). The political formula surrounding community dimensions of Lebanese society the pact is: “neither East, nor West”, providing (that never pointed towards a centralism of the the origin of a fragile entity, more or less stable, based in constant negotiation, a custom that is 1 The concept was expressed very adequately by Ambassador Fre- deric Hof at the III Regional Conference organized by the Center on the other hand a heritage of the old com- of Strategic Studies of the LAF in 2013, page 33: “In many ways mercial character of the country. this precarious Republic - Professor Michael Hudson’s term - is a tiny replica of the empire that ended 90 years ago. The once key The Sunnis accepted the independence of element of the Ott oman system, the Sultan, was replaced by a Na- tional Pact. Whether or not the One Lebanon citizenship ethic em- Lebanon, leaving aside pan-Arabism in ex- bodied by the Lebanese Armed Forces can take root and grow in a change for the acceptance of the charac- peaceful Lebanese version of the Arab Spring remains to be seen.”

* The article largely follows the direction set out in the excellent study Re-construire une Armée Nationale. L’exemple du Liban despuis 1958, carried out by Emma Soubrier and published in 2013 as “Cahier du Retex” of the Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi de Forces -CDEF, Division Recherche et Retour d’Experience (: Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, February 2013). We also took into account the study by Hubert Dupont “La nouvelle armée libanaise. Instrument de pouvoir ou acteur politique” published in Confl uence Méditer- ranée (Paris: Édition l’Harmatt an, Printemps 1999, Nº 29) and the study of Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces. Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon (Washington DC: CSIS, 2009). This latt er study contains important information about the structure, equipment and budget of the LAF. We also considered the views of my colleague C.Perelli, who has signifi cant experience in Lebanon, and L.Cnel.AX, who works as an expert in the country of the Levant. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 2

ter of the country by the Maronites. This way, communities and confessions as the basic prin- Lebanon became part of the and cipal). And from 1964 until 1970 it became a opposed the partition of Palestine and the cre- guardian of the civil power through its intel- ation of , yet its participation in the fi rst ligence body known as Deuxième Bureau (Sec- Arab-Israeli war was marginal. ond section of the General Staff ). But its actions This fragile arrangement confronted its fi rst fi nally led to its dissolution. test with the 1958 crisis. The then Maronite Some authors consider that between 1958 and President – – took the side 1970 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were of those opposing the preachings of G.A. Nass- eff ectively a “government in the shadows”, er and the creation of the UAR (United Arab supporting Maronite Presidents through the Republic of and Syria), seen as an im- actions of the Deuxième Bureau. But this action portant regional and confessional threat. The simultaneously promoted a pan-Arab and pro- Muslims, on the other hand, viewed Nasser’s Palestinian opposition that undermined the pan-Arab (albeit secular) doctrine with certain LAF, which was unable to prevent the 1975 cri- sympathy. The confl ict was sett led through the sis, thus leading to its dissolution and the dis- intervention of the and the multi- appearance, at least for a time, of the Lebanese national force that followed, with the Lebanese state entity. Army a mere spectator to the process. A prior att empt at reconciliation and ne- Antoine Messarra points to a consensual gotiation at all costs, which did not lead to system with multiple balances that supported good results, had followed a similar line. To- itself through the use of the Army as a supra- wards the end of 1969, Emily Boustany, then community body, supposedly responsible for Commander-in-Chief of the Army, signed an restoring order after crises that endangered the agreement with the leader of the Palestinian entire system. In a certain manner Messarra Liberation Organization (PLO) in sought to att ribute to the Army a political role , which was also approved by then Presi- as a “moderating” body, avoiding polariza- dent Charles Hélou, in what was an event that tions and playing a sort of arbitrating role. strongly infl uenced Lebanon’s subsequent his- General Chéhab, by then President, reaf- tory. The agreement provided the PLO with fi rmed the doctrine of neutrality. Decree Nº 136 freedom of action in Lebanese territory - where of June 1959 banned all forms of party affi lia- an important number of Palestinian refugees tion for military personnel.2 were installed, and for the creation of autono- Between 1958 and 1964 the Army sought to mous areas where authority would lie with the be a “reforming” power, restructuring itself PLO.3 The PLO could supposedly not ignore along well-known lines (“neutrality” towards Lebanese authority, and its activities had to be coordinated with the General Staff of the Leba- 2 For Antoine Messarra, member of the Constitutional Council and professor of Law at the Université Libanaise, the principle of nese Army. Through this, Arafat took another a neutral army (al-jaysh al-muhâyid) justifi able due to the fear felt step in his career, in accordance with the idea by the army («peur pour l’armée») would be bett er explained as fear towards the army («peur de l’armée»), that a political actor expressed at that time: “Give me a square kilo- arises in search of altering the confessional balance or to exercise 4 corporate power (cited by Sobrier). With the Lebanon in reality metre and I will control the country”. an “oligarchy of godfathers”, of “community lords”, they could Antoine Messarra considered this agreement not support the building of a national military force that would threaten community and local authorities and their related busi- to be the epitome of Lebanese political culture: nesses. Its security would be based on external support, such as those promoted by Chamoun in 1958 with U.S. and . See A. Nasri Mesarra, La gouvernance d’un système consensuel: Le Liban 3 The number of Palestinians, and very importantly their leaders, après les amendements constitutionnels de 1990 (: Librairie Ori- increased and they became principal actors following the expul- entale, 2003). While LAF personnel passed from 3,000 to 4,000 in sion of and the PLO from (in September 1970). 1948 to some 13,000 in 1965, this growth was less than the rate of 4 Cited by Samantha Power in Chasing the Flame (London: Pen- demographic growth. In the same period Syria went from 8,000 to guin Press, 2008) referring to Carina Perelli’s memory of Sergio 60,000 men. At the same time, Lebanon’s military equipment was de Mello, who used to like to cite Yasser Arafat saying “Give me a minimal and of low quality. square kilometre, and I’ll control the country.” The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 3

LAF checkpoint close to the , towards the south of Naqoura. commitment and negotiation at all costs. It was led to the Army’s rupture as a corporate entity. to be the seed of the next big crisis. A report carried out by a special parliamen- Since the Six Day War of 1967, in Lebanon there tary commission established that by January have lived some 400,000 Palestinian refugees. 1976 5% of military personnel had deserted, The Cairo agreement gave the PLO authority to while 24% of the Interior Security Force (ISF) control these camps between 1969 and 1975, and had followed the same route. it began forming armed among the refu- These fueled the creation of mili- gees to launch att acks against Israel. Through tias in events that marked the porosity between this it achieved control of a large portion of the the Lebanese Army, in a process of decomposi- south of the country, leading to sporadic clashes tion, and the confessional groups. with the Lebanese Army. Faced with this threat In January 1976, at the bequest of Sunni of- to their traditional power, Lebanese Christians fi cers, the Arab Lebanese Army (ALA) made its began arming themselves, a phenomenon which fi rst appearance in the Bekaa Valley, and short- was followed by the “militarization” of various ly thereafter (in March) the Free Lebanon Army political and religious groups. (FLA) appeared in the north of Beirut, led by By 1971 the situation was out of control and a Christian Colonel. A few days later, in Mar- the much-weakened Lebanese government jayoun (near Nabatieh) Major was unable to maintain order. As a result, founded what became a more permanent mi- fi erce clashes broke out in Beirut between the litia: the (SLA), another Christians of the east of the city and Palestin- Christian formation. ians from various camps, and by April 1975 Att empts to rebuild the Army were unsuc- these clashed had expanded to the rest of the cessful, and in 1982 it was clear that the militias country. In the face of the Army’s inability to followed the game played out by the Syrians impose order, militias arose, and this quickly and Israelis, which supported the Muslim and The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 4

Christian militias respectively. Up until 1984, the the in 1989, with L. Brahimi Army, in a situation of complete paralysis, was acting as a mediator-promoter. But let’s return replaced almost in its entirety by the militias. to events further back for now. In 1983 then President Amin Gemayel, to- The Israeli invasion of 1978, which brought gether with the Commander of LAF, General them up until the Litani River, liquidated Pal- Ibrahim Tannous, att empted once more to re- estinian resistance in the zone, strengthened build the Army, increasing its personnel from Haddad’s army, and led the UN, through Res- 25,000 to 35,000 in a move that entailed the im- olution 426, to send the fi rst UNIFIL mission. position of obligatory . General It was unable, however, to contain the confl ict. Chehab had never favoured this option, argu- In 1982 Israel went further still in its att empt ing that it would entail budgetary diffi culties, to suppress the Palestinians, arriving in Beirut.5 but in reality responding to concerns over its While it achieved that the PLO and its leader impact on the LAF’s consensual inter-confes- Arafat moved to Tunis, they were unable to sional balance. hold this position and retreated back south of The idea was to form an army of citizens, with the Litani River. UN troops established them- conscription a form of integration that sought to selves in the south of Lebanon, while an ad hoc overcome communal, confessional, religious and coalition formed by the US, France, and class factionalism. However, the ability to evade the UK att empted to restore peace in the capi- conscription through the payment of a monetary tal, but ended up failing.6 The UN received a fee indicated strong resistance to the idea. mandate to assist in reorganizing the govern- The new Forces were organized on the foun- ment and the Lebanese Armed Forces. dation of twelve brigades, each fairly homo- The resistance in the south of Lebanon became geneous in terms of their religious integration protagonized by Shia militias, fi rst AMAL7 and and distributed according to regional compat- then , as Israel withdrew, a task that ibility – a characteristic that also contradicted was completed in 2000, when the South Leba- the idea of a military force integrated by citi- non Army also broke apart and disappeared. zens. The same criteria were applied to the Spe- The area had now become shared, de facto, by cial Forces. For example, the brigade formed by UNIFIL troops, militias, and Hezbollah “poli- (No 11) was based in the Chouf moun- ticians”, who now controlled most of the mu- tains; No 12, Sunni, was located in Saida. The nicipalities in the area.8 th 5 Brigade, with its Christian base, was located 5 Well remembered in the media for the massacre of Palestinian in the east of Beirut, and the 6th (Shiite) in the refugees in the Sabra and Chatila camps in Beirut, which was committ ed by Christian militiamen with no opposition from the Bekaa Valley. A few were mixed, such as the Tsahal (Israeli Defense Forces). The camps were rebuilt and still 3rd. Composed of Christians and Muslims, it exist today. 6 In October 1983 an unknown group called “Islamic Jihad” sent was deployed in downtown Beirut in the area two suicide truck bombs. One struck the cantonment of U.S. ma- separating the two sectors. rines of the Multinational Force, and the other French paratroop- ers. President Reagan decided to withdraw the US contingent, This att empt, however, failed. The Army was precipitating the end of the mission. unable to contain the Israelis, while also failing 7 Created in 1974 as the Movement of the Forsaken and as Lebanese resistance regiment. Its base were Shiites, who in addition to to supplant the militias. the confessional diff erence felt excluded for reasons of class and so- Fractured, with defi cient personnel and cial structure. The symbol of the movement in Arabic means “hope.” Its initial appeal was secular, non-confessional, appealing to the sense equipment, the military apparatus was unable of community and territorial belonging. It eventually grew to four- teen thousand militia and fought the “” against the to restore order. The Arab League sent a deter- Palestinians between 1985 and 1988, with support from the Syrians rent force that legitimized Syria’s military pres- and Druze. It then had to confront a rival group originating in its ranks, the “Party of God”, or Hezbollah. With violent confrontations ence from 1976 onwards; of the 35,000 troops between them in Beirut, Hezbollah prevailed by 1988. sent, 25,000 were Syrians. It was also Syria – 8 Hezbollah created a memorial and commemoration space (Mleeta) in Nabatiyeh to the south of the headquarters of the South with help from Saudi Arabia - that promoted Lebanon Army in Marjayoun, where it affi rmed its character as the only force that fought and defeated Israel. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 5

The relative inaction of the Lebanese Army The violence, however, continued. In one of during the Israeli invasion hurt its legitimacy, the scarce interventions, in 1990, brigades of a situation that ran parallel to the disappear- the Lebanese Armed Forces - led by the same ance, for a long time, of Lebanon as a nation - confronted Christian Phalange state, despite its republican-representative in- militias. In October, Syrian troops annihilated stitutions continuing to formally exist. It was Aoun’s positions. supplanted by the very diverse communities, Following the Taif Agreement, the recon- their militias, and political movements, in ad- struction of the State and of the LAF was car- dition to Syrian and Israeli forces and those of ried out under Syrian control. Although this ig- UNIFIL in the south, which struggled to assert nored Lebanese sovereignty as an independent itself as a separation force. The Lebanese Army state, it is certain that promoted the remained, however, as part of the country’s reestablishment of the LAF as a military au- formal institutional structure, and following thority throughout the Mediterranean coastal the Taif Accords it went in search of a renewed strip, the most populous area. reconstruction. From 1992 the Army implemented the “Total The militias had no comprehensive proposal Integration” project. With a total of eleven bri- for Lebanon, but instead only for their respec- gades, it maintained the scheme of confession- tive communities and leaders. They constituted al parity in fi ve of them while the rest, with a embryos of totalitarian community states, with body of troops that were 70% Muslim and 30% powers of life and death in their sett lement ar- Christian, refl ected the demographic changes eas. They charged taxes, had TV and radio net- registered following the great confl ict. Par- works, and suppressed all dissent through bru- ity was also sought in the relevant specialized tal methods. Each was supported by regional units. Budgetary support was requested to en- powers and diverse economic interests, while able this reconstruction, and in 1995, 22% of the dressed in confessional justifi cations. state budget went to the military and police. Of The national symbol of integrity and patrio- the 45,000 LAF members, 42,000 belonged to tism was the LAF. While ineffi cient, it trans- the Army, with this number rising to 55,100 by formed itself (once again) into a moderate op- 1997 (double that at the beginning of the great tion for “national” continuity. confl ict of 1975). In 1999, troop strength was in- In 1989, General Michel Aoun, who was creased further to 67,900 (27,400 of which were also the commander of various Christian mili- conscripts), while it possessed nearly one thou- tias, launched an off ensive against the Syrian sand armored personnel carriers.10 troops. These actions, together with the fatigue In 1993, aerial bombardments and skirmishes provoked by the communal and sectarian vio- occurred in the south of the country between lence, led to a new consociationalism: the Taif Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army. Accords.9 Towards 1995, Syria could count on then LAF Commander, General Emile Lahoud, together 9 Signed in October 1989, the Taif Agreement was negotiated in the city of Taif (Saudi Arabia) by the surviving members of the 1972 with second in command of intelligence, to of Lebanon and chaired by the President of Parliament Hussein el-Husseini. The agreement refers to political reform in control its economic and media interests, along Lebanon, and led to the conclusion of the civil war, the establish- with those of the diverse associations, universi- ment of relations between Lebanon and Syria, and the design of a framework for the gradual Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The ties, and state institutions. agreement included a National Pact to restore the political system in Lebanon by transferring some of the power that the Maronite Chris- exception of the Shiite Hezbollah and the non-Lebanese Fatah and tian community had had as a privilege under the French colonial re- and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The gime. The was increased in size (to 128 mem- rest disarmed themselves. Initially the SLA did not either. Several bers), and shared equally between Christians and Muslims, rather militias were absorbed into the Army, as was the case with AMAL, th than being elected by universal suff rage, which would have led to which was integrated into the 6 Brigade. a Muslim majority. A cabinet was established, also divided equally 10 The great majority M113, many still in service in 2014. It also between Christians and Muslims. The agreement also provided for had approximately 400 and some 200 artillery, of diverse the disarmament of all national and non-national militias, with the type and origin. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 6

Beirut and the coexistence of the old and the new. Israeli incursions, such as Operation Grapes The LAF, in the face of this assassination, re- of Wrath in 1996, did not cease either.11 called its “Chehabist” roots by reaffi rming the In February 2005, ex-prime minister Rafi q principle of “neutrality” and its role of defend- Hariri was killed in an att ack. In addition to ing the country against the centrifugal tenden- being prime minister for several terms, he cies that threatened to devour it. Despite re- had promoted a large amount of Beirut’s re- quests from President Emile Lahoud and Prime construction and had developed a substantial Minister for the intervention of business activity. Despite the creation of an the Armed Forces to contain demonstrators call- International Tribunal, the implications of an ing for the withdrawal of the Syrian military investigation for those responsible for his as- from the country, General Michel Sleiman – sassination are so strong that they could not LAF Commander - refused to execute the order, proceed.12 maintaining the LAF’s old position of not acting as a repressor of either the majority or any par- 11 Codename used by the Israeli armed forces to refer to the 16 day campaign conducted against Lebanon from April 11th to 27th ticular community. Such a position, obviously, 1996 in order to end Hezbollah att acks on northern Israel. The helped it to regain its legitimacy and trust. Israeli Tsahal conducted more than 1,100 aerial incursions, and bombed Lebanon intensely, employing some 25,132 projectiles. The death of Hariri led to the so-called “Ce- A UNIFIL installation was also att acked by an Israeli projectile, killing some 118 Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah, from its bases in dar Revolution”, which determined the with- the south of Lebanon, launched 639 rockets into northern Israel, drawal of Syrian forces from the entirety of the especially in the city of Kiryat Shemona. Hezbollah forces were involved in various clashes with Israeli forces and the South Leba- Lebanese territory. non Army. Hezbollah used human shields. A ceasefi re agreement th ended the confl ict on April 27 1996. man prosecutor, who suff ered an att ack from which he fortunately 12 Persons linked to Hezbollah, LAF generals or the police, ap- escaped alive. The court continues to exist, performing purely bu- peared in the original investigation that was carried out by a Ger- reaucratic activities. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 7

In 2006, the latest Tsahal incursion into Leba- of Nahr el-Bared in the extreme north of the nese territory was recorded, but their advance country. was repelled by Hezbollah, which resorted to Inter-militia struggles continued, however. In the unconventional tactics of asymmetric war- May 2008, following a confl ict with the govern- fare to confront them. ment, Hezbollah occupied the streets of Beirut, Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a militia is based in disarmed the Druze and Sunni militias, and re- its social action, providing services to the com- negotiated the presence of Shiite politicians in munity and its political counterparts. While government following the .15 Hezbollah cannot compete with a conventional The Army began “cohabiting” with Hezbol- army, it based itself in actions designed to wear lah in the south and in parts of the Bekaa val- down its enemy, engaging in constant harass- ley. Despite these “adjustments” - which defi ne ment (armed propaganda, strikes, and terror- a LAF that is neither a unique nor a strong na- ism, etc.) that discouraged and damaged the tional force, and whose capacity to both repel confi dence of the Tsahal.13 external aggressions and to maintain internal Upon the withdrawal of Israeli troops from order are low - in the absence of an alternative , the territory was occupied reference, the institution remains very much – in accordance with Resolution 1701 of the relevant to the fragile but persistent Leba- UN Security Council - by the Lebanese Armed nese State. It is a state seeking to survive in a Forces (which did not confront the Hezbollah “bifurcated world” (as H. Dupont says), and militia) and by UNIFIL troops, which had been one, which aims to substitute the nation state unable to contain the confl ict. Neither was it through communal structures that, in turn, able to disarm Hezbollah’s military wing. In- confront and collaborate among themselves.16 stead it was forced to take up a negotiated set- tlement with this organization, which provid- Final Observations ed (and continues to provide) social services to The LAF has tried to resist its leadership local communities and gained political control becoming presidents upon their retirement,17 of the majority of the municipalities UNIFIL’s 15 This was achieved through the Doha agreement (). Hezbol- area of operations. lah had manifested itself against the International Tribunal to inves- tigate the death of Hariri. The government coalition, called “March To “share” responsibilities with Hezbollah14 14”, could not escape the opposition blockade and there was no pos- sibility of selecting a replacement for President Emile Lahoud in the was a necessity for LAF, whose troop numbers allocated timeframe, due to being unable to meet the required two passed from 65,000 to 45,000 in 2005. thirds parliamentary majority. Prime Minister failed to break the blockade and, as always, the Army remained on the In one of the few combat incursions it pro- sidelines to avoid a new rupture. LAF commander General Michel tagonized, in 2007 the new Lebanese Army Sleiman maintained “neutrality”. UN Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701 were mere rhetoric and Hezbollah converted destroyed the Fatah al group, one of the itself into a parallel “armed” force. The agreement reached in Doha required the formation of a national unity government composed “boutiques” which, following the example of of 30 ministers, 11 of which should belong to the opposition forces Al Qaeda, was founded in the Palestinian camp led by Hezbollah, which constructed the “March 8” alliance. Issues such as the tribunal for the investigation of the assassination of Har- iri, the disarming of all militias in Lebanon, or negotiations with 13 This way, instead of facing the and armoured units of Israel, will not be successful without the approval of the Shiite op- the Tsahal in open country, they did so in urban areas, trying to position. Likewise, the agreement paved the way for the election of gain infl uence through the media of the international community, Michel Sleiman as . showing collateral damage. They also sought to launch unguided 16 A survey conducted in July 2008 by the International Peace Insti- missiles from positions in the Bekaa valley, crossing the UNIFIL tute found that 76 percent of respondents believed it to be desirable area of operations in their trajectory. Hezbollah emerged as the to have a bett er-equipped LAF to confront the militias. Shortly be- only credible defence against Israel, prompting the Lebanese gov- fore the batt le against Fatah Al-Islam, a Lebanese fi rm - Information ernment to recognize the legitimacy of Hezbollah, while the LAF International – carried out another study that found that, given the had a “tolerant” view, accepting this parallel action. continuing instability, 63% of respondents believed it to be conven- 14 “Any att empt to strengthen the LAF so that it can fi ght Hezbol- ient for the Army to take temporary control of the country. The LAF lah will fail. Close to 30 percent of the offi cers corps is Shia and, resisted the idea of leading a “commissarial dictatorship”. given that the LAF is a refl ection of Lebanese society, it cannot be 17 The case of Fouad Shihab in 1958, Iskandar Ghanim in 1970, ordered to act militarily against one or another (or its communi- Hana’ Said in 1976, Michel Aoun in 1989. Some later became presi- ty).” See Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Op- dents. Dupont considers that becoming president or prime minis- portunities in Post-Syria Lebanon (Washington: CSIS, 2/10/09), p. 3. ter puts in question the LAF’s “neutrality”. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 8

but this has happened on several occasions; in The pillars of an army are its personnel, train- such cases, the President does not maintain its ing, equipment and what in jargon is called its authority within the corporation, which has a “moral strength”.21 This last one is of funda- new head, but instead becomes a political actor mental importance to LAF’s future. As a mir- with a military background. ror of Lebanese society, this corporation also The reconstruction of a Lebanese national refl ects its problems: the coexistence of sev- armed force is based on the concept developed enteen communities and the antagonisms be- in the 90s of “security sector reform” (SSR). It tween their leaders and interests, which shelter is based on a holistic character, with a plurality in their communities and confessions and in a of actors, roles, functions and responsibilities, framework in which a multitude of regional but one that responds to the need for the entire and global actors are at play. sector to be under the control of the legitimate In this context, since its inception the LAF has political authority. oscillated between paralysis, deconstruction LAF’s experience was also informed by that and constant exercises of re-foundation. of countries with generalized problems of in- Observers hope to see a combative LAF, but tegration, social cohesion, multi-ethnic and/or its cadres are conscious of the challenges pres- multi-confessional demography, violence and ent in abandoning their tradition. Doing this in widespread fear.18 the past almost led to its disappearance. The relationship between political power and To maintain the principles inherited from armed corporation (civil-military relations in and the structure created by the old jargon), as in many countries in con- Amin Gemayel is a challenge for this “young” fl ict, is bidirectional between the political pow- LAF, which desires to be a national institution. er - represented by the Minister of Defence and The question is, without a strong state and in the political apparatus of the ministry - and the constant institutional crisis, is this possible? armed corporation, through their leadership. The temptation of making the armed corpo- On the other side of the relationship, protec- ration play a stronger role in politics could lead tion of the corporation leads it to practice neu- them to play a moderating role22, and more so trality and to disobey, or to change the direc- than embodying a commissarial dictatorship.23 tion of, commands to intervene.19 This is done Others, however, would like it to embody the when it is considered convenient: when the interests of just one sector. country’s stability – fragile indeed - or that of 21The ability to embody corporate interests, which in jargon is 20 the corporate unit, are at stake. called “military spirit”, and the capacity for internal circumscribed powers (“esprit de corps”) and all that covered by “rituals” and ceremonies that reinforce it. In the face of personnel and equip- 18 Nigeria, Bosnia, Angola, and Iraq are clear examples. The mul- ment weaknesses, these att ributes are substantial and addressing ti-ethnic problems in Latin America didn’t lead to the creation of and directing them corresponds to LAF command. Press releases (armed) political movements at the command of (some- indicate that Saudi Arabia will provide a substantial sum, about times real majorities in number). They only produced non-armed three thousand million dollars, to purchase equipment that shall movements that evolved along the “NGO model”. be of French origin. Christians remain opposed to compulsory 19 One of our interviewees noted the diff erent att itude towards military service, and the cost of a professional army is great for incidents in Saida and Tripoli, where militias recently operated in the State. According to one interviewee, it is estimated that, be- 2013/14, (Saudi Arabia and the Future Party were accused of sup- tween salaries and other expenses, to maintain a Lebanese soldier porting them in order to support the Syrian President). The task requires around USD 12,000 annually. force sent to Saida and Tyre was the same, as was its command. In 22 In the Spain of the late twentieth century, especially following Saida they negotiated, and in Tripoli they replied with repression. the trials of the fi rst republic, the Army tried to act as a moderat- In this they followed the actions of ex-LAF commander Michel ing force between political factions that threatened to destroy the Sleiman, when he opposed the orders of Prime Minister Fouad unity of the State. But factionalism led to constant “pronounce- Siniora and his supporters of the “March 14” coalition in the face ments”. Finer, which refers to this characteristic, holds that all cor- of the “March 8” coalition, which has Hezbollah at its foundation. porate military forces are an instrument with a determined intent 20 A senior offi cer expressed to Nerguizian: “Our challenge is not (purpose instrument). See Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback in the implementation of diffi cult orders. We can carry out diffi cult (London: PallMall, 1974). In the case of the LAF, the purpose is to orders. What would make things diffi cult for the [LAF] is if in the maintain in it the national state identity of Lebanon. future we are given orders that we could not in good conscience 23 See Carl Schmit, La Dictadura (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, execute without hurting Lebanon and the [LAF].” Cited by Ner- 1962). Original in German, published in 1922. guizian in the document already cited, p.11. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 9

What can Latin American countries contribute to Security Sector Reform and Defence in Lebanon?

This small Middle Eastern country lives in a consider the army to be the founder of the state, constant state of fragility in one of the most politi- while in more than one case, it is considered to pre- cally volatile areas of the globe. By contrast, Latin cede it. Americans live in an area where the overall sce- Professionally, the forces did not stop intervening nario seems rather quiet and predictable, although in politics, protagonizing institutional ruptures. In public security leaves much to be desired in many general, they led “commissarial dictatorships”, in countries. many cases supporting a military leader in alliance Lebanon is an atypical Middle Eastern country with civilian support, and only very occasionally where, despite the crises and thanks to constant ac- involving the upper echelons of the armed corpo- commodations, the legacies of the Ott oman Empire ration in the daily management of political aff airs. are maintained, particularly in relation to the co- This experience has cost them legitimacy, hav- existence between the diverse faiths and identities. ing lost in political terms the confrontations they In Latin America, “transplanted peoples”, some the faced in the second half of the twentieth cen- heirs of emigrants of European origin, and others tury. They survived the fall of the regimes they of slaves that came from many parts of the African had led, but their subsequent accommodation coast, coexist with indigenous peoples. It is, in es- has meant that they have to accept a much di- sence, a social formation of mestizos, the product minished role compared to what they consid- of a colonial past governed by sex, the cross and ered their role to be “when they commanded”. the sword. The Lebanese Armed Forces followed the lines of the In this diverse past, however, both Lebanon and French tradition of being a neutral force in terms of the countries of Latin America have a common confessional or identity-based groups and their po- characteristic: upon these societies they have built litical expressions, and sought to apply this principle States in accordance with the formalities of the lib- consistently, even when confronting reconstruction eral republics that emerged after the moderated processes after having split and disintegrated in the path introduced by Bonaparte’s regime following face of confl icts that involved the entire Lebanese so- the French revolution. ciety. Although the Lebanese Armed Forces sought The military - the “armies” - played a predomi- to keep to the lines of the consociational political nant role in this process. In Latin America the pact, they could not avoid the fractures that led to armed groups who staged fi ghts for independence their deconstruction after 1958 and 1975. and were then part of long confrontations as part In Latin America, the armed forces also had their of partnerships with civil factions gave way, in the dissents, but they did not lead to paralysis and de- second half of the nineteenth century and early struction; the forces expelled, imprisoned or fought twentieth century, to armed corporations whose those that did not follow the orientation of the ma- heart was (and is) a corps of professional offi cers jority. Today, where in many countries they have trained in military academies. They basically fol- witnessed the political triumph of their past “en- lowed two models: the French and Prussian. The emies”, they traverse the path of accommodation. navies, meanwhile, followed the British model. It is about precisely recounting the path trodden U.S. infl uence was noted in the Caribbean and in in Latin America, disseminating what have been the Central America, but it only aimed at the creation changes in relations with political powers (civil-mil- of National Guards, bodies charged with the pres- itary relations), what are their missions, and what ervation of public and political order but devoid of are their roles in relation to the society they must transcendent ends tending to national purposes. serve, so that their Lebanese counterparts have an U.S. infl uence was noted throughout Latin America experience regarding what can be done and, more during and after World War II, notably with regard importantly, what roads are advisable to avoid. to tactical doctrines, equipment and its employ- In the opposite direction, so that the Latin Amer- ment, but not in relation to the “transcendent” mis- icans take into account what happens in one of the sion of military forces. key areas of the world, especially given that so This idea of transcendence appears in the offi cial much of the world’s destiny in coming years de- histories of the armed forces in the region: most pends on what happens in the today. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 10

Annex

The Ministry of Defence, beyond being the top in the chain of command, now acts as an admin- istrative section of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Ministry shares its headquarters with that of the command of the Armed Forces and with the Military Museum, in Yarzeh ( District, ). The Lebanese Armed Forces are at the command of a Commander-in-Chief. He is assisted by a Chief of Staff and four Second Chiefs of Staff . Several management bodies are important within this structure, including that of intelligence. Another of the relevant management bodies is that of geographic aff airs, due to its provision of maps, which is a very sensitive issue in the country.

Structure of the Lebanese Army

Army Command

11 mechanized brigades, fi ve of these “heavy”

5 Special Forces regiments

1 regiment of commandos, which includes mountain troops (Maghaweer)

1 regiment of naval rifl emen commandos

1 aerial transport brigade; according to unoffi cial forces it is a regiment (Moujawkal)

2 artillery regiments

1 “Republican Guard” brigade

Logistical support

Support brigade

Logistics brigade

Military Police regiment

Medical Services

The offi cial website does not refer to engineering units (instead a construction unit), or commu- nications. Neither does it refer to a counter-sabotage unit (Moukafaha) or an anti-terrorist force, called Kouwa el-Dareba. This information comes from alternative sources. Equipment is a mix of Western materials and those of the USSR, including almost 1,000 APC M113 (the majority of those inoperable). In July 2014 it was announced that Saudi Arabia would donate a substantial amount for the purchase of equipment for the Army, to be provided by France. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 11 Annex

There are fi ve regional commands. North of Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, Bekaa Valley, and South of Lebanon. Very small. Operational equipment is re- stricted to airplanes and helicopters for training purposes only. Apparently there Since August 1945, a training school for are still 3 British Hawker Hunters in ser- Army offi cers has been functioning, now vice, although they only fl y; their avionics called the Military Academy. and are completely obsolete. It has some 50 helicopters from diverse ori- gins, and they have incorporated a further There is also: 12 surveillance UAV (Raven class). There exists a school for training Air Force An Institute of Basic Training for troops. pilots. Total personnel would be around A School of Mountain Skiers 100 persons. A School of Special Forces, which functions for intervention units of this type A Center of Strategic Studies and Investi- The Command and General Staff School gation seeks to locate the Force within the “Fouad Shehad” regional political framework.

It is diffi cult to estimate the number of per- sonnel in the Army. According to some it is around 30,000. Some 15,000 more would Interior (FSI) constitute logistical support, bringing the total to 45,000. However, it is important to It is the Police force. Under the authority know the number of relevant personnel. It of the Ministry of Interior and Municipali- could be between 5,000 and 10,000. Key are ties. Apparently it includes some 30,000 the various units of Special Forces. Since personnel. Its personnel initially receive 2007, it is a force of contracted volunteers. training as a soldier of the Army.

Naval Force Small force of coastal patrols (around 15 to 25 units of greatly diverging types, sizes and origins), surveillance radars and a land General Directorate of General Security surveillance batt alion with its headquarters The is the general intelligence body. It also in the . Its personnel would issues passports and visas. Its Director is an apparently number around 1,000. Army General.