The Question Juan Rial of the Military in Lebanon Roman ruins in the city of Tyre in a state of abandonment. Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoint in the south of the country. Makeshift camp for Syrian refugees in the Marjayoun region. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are at the center of the security situation in Lebanon today. The support of central countries through an International Conference for assistance programs, the donation of four billion dollars from Saudi Arabia for the purchase of military equip- ment, and the operations carried out in the face of the advances of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - ISIS - in the border zone with Syria, are some of the pieces that constitute the scene. SERIES PEACE& SECURITY Presented here is the vision of a Latin American analyst with experience in the processes of the reconfi guration of military forces following the dictatorships, and the change in the regional and international scene produced by the disappearance of the internal and external Soviet empire. SERIES PEACE& SECURITY About the author: Juan Rial is a political analyst and consultant to international organizations, such as the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, International IDEA, and the Organization of American States. Rial is a founding member of RESDAL and a member of the Board of Directors. He was a professor of Political Science at UDELAR (Universidad de la Republica) and of ORT University, both in Montevideo. He is an author of a dozen books and over a hundred articles on themes related to democracy, institutions, security and defense. Copyright RESDAL. Rights reserved. This report was carried out within the framework of the ‘Gender Perspective in Peacekeeping Operations: Cases and Lessons from Contributing Countries’ project, which receives fi nancial support from: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation July 2014 Other RESDAL publications https://www.facebook.com/resdal https://twitter.com/RESDAL_ http://www.resdal.org [email protected] Juan Rial* 1 The Question of the Military in Lebanon The Lebanese Armed Forces: Evading the Temptation of Becoming an Actor in the Political Struggle, while Remaining as a Corporate Institution The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are at the center of the security situation in Lebanon today. support of central countries through an International Conference for assistance programs, the donation of four billion dollars from Saudi Arabia for the purchase of military equipment, and the operations carried out in the face of the advances of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - ISIS - in the border zone with Syria, are some of the pieces that constitute the scene. Presented here is the vision of a Latin American analyst with experience in the processes of the reconfi guration of military forces following the dictatorships, and the change in the regional and international scene produced by the disappearance of the internal and exter- nal Soviet empire. The subtitle that summarizes our thesis ap- national State), and from there its formation pears to be contradiction, but its overtones are into units marked by their confessional nature. rooted in reality. Lebanon is a heritage of the But, at the same time with a trait that moves Ott oman Empire, where 17 confessional units in the direction of embodying the Lebanese coexist. The 18th - the Jewish – practically dis- national identity. To manage the contradiction appeared following the confl icts of 1958 and implies “neutrality” in the face of intra- and in- 1975. It is the only Middle Eastern country that ter- confessional, family, and clan etc. confl icts. contains such confessional diversity, including This neutrality should extend also to regional- an important number of Christians. Within this international confl icts. framework, the Lebanese Army - the relevant This idea of “neutrality” covers the entire military force - has been in a constant process Lebanese entity as a State. The national pact of construction, “de-construction” and resur- of 1943 – a pact that was realized fundamen- gence following very diffi cult confl icts.1 tally between the Christian Maronites and the Two fundamental principals inform the Leb- Sunni Muslims - in some manner removed the anese Army. In accordance with the doctrine possibility of having a united instrument that of its creator, General Fouad Chéhab (French monopolized the use of violence (or threat of trained), it is a force that should refl ect the violence). The political formula surrounding community dimensions of Lebanese society the pact is: “neither East, nor West”, providing (that never pointed towards a centralism of the the origin of a fragile entity, more or less stable, based in constant negotiation, a custom that is 1 The concept was expressed very adequately by Ambassador Fre- deric Hof at the III Regional Conference organized by the Center on the other hand a heritage of the old com- of Strategic Studies of the LAF in 2013, page 33: “In many ways mercial character of the country. this precarious Republic - Professor Michael Hudson’s term - is a tiny replica of the empire that ended 90 years ago. The once key The Sunnis accepted the independence of element of the Ott oman system, the Sultan, was replaced by a Na- tional Pact. Whether or not the One Lebanon citizenship ethic em- Lebanon, leaving aside pan-Arabism in ex- bodied by the Lebanese Armed Forces can take root and grow in a change for the acceptance of the Arabic charac- peaceful Lebanese version of the Arab Spring remains to be seen.” * The article largely follows the direction set out in the excellent study Re-construire une Armée Nationale. L’exemple du Liban despuis 1958, carried out by Emma Soubrier and published in 2013 as “Cahier du Retex” of the Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi de Forces -CDEF, Division Recherche et Retour d’Experience (Paris: Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, February 2013). We also took into account the study by Hubert Dupont “La nouvelle armée libanaise. Instrument de pouvoir ou acteur politique” published in Confl uence Méditer- ranée (Paris: Édition l’Harmatt an, Printemps 1999, Nº 29) and the study of Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces. Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon (Washington DC: CSIS, 2009). This latt er study contains important information about the structure, equipment and budget of the LAF. We also considered the views of my colleague C.Perelli, who has signifi cant experience in Lebanon, and L.Cnel.AX, who works as an expert in the country of the Levant. The Question of the Military in Lebanon Juan Rial 2 ter of the country by the Maronites. This way, communities and confessions as the basic prin- Lebanon became part of the Arab League and cipal). And from 1964 until 1970 it became a opposed the partition of Palestine and the cre- guardian of the civil power through its intel- ation of Israel, yet its participation in the fi rst ligence body known as Deuxième Bureau (Sec- Arab-Israeli war was marginal. ond section of the General Staff ). But its actions This fragile arrangement confronted its fi rst fi nally led to its dissolution. test with the 1958 crisis. The then Maronite Some authors consider that between 1958 and President – Camille Chamoun – took the side 1970 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were of those opposing the preachings of G.A. Nass- eff ectively a “government in the shadows”, er and the creation of the UAR (United Arab supporting Maronite Presidents through the Republic of Egypt and Syria), seen as an im- actions of the Deuxième Bureau. But this action portant regional and confessional threat. The simultaneously promoted a pan-Arab and pro- Muslims, on the other hand, viewed Nasser’s Palestinian opposition that undermined the pan-Arab (albeit secular) doctrine with certain LAF, which was unable to prevent the 1975 cri- sympathy. The confl ict was sett led through the sis, thus leading to its dissolution and the dis- intervention of the United States and the multi- appearance, at least for a time, of the Lebanese national force that followed, with the Lebanese state entity. Army a mere spectator to the process. A prior att empt at reconciliation and ne- Antoine Messarra points to a consensual gotiation at all costs, which did not lead to system with multiple balances that supported good results, had followed a similar line. To- itself through the use of the Army as a supra- wards the end of 1969, Emily Boustany, then community body, supposedly responsible for Commander-in-Chief of the Army, signed an restoring order after crises that endangered the agreement with the leader of the Palestinian entire system. In a certain manner Messarra Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasser Arafat in sought to att ribute to the Army a political role Cairo, which was also approved by then Presi- as a “moderating” body, avoiding polariza- dent Charles Hélou, in what was an event that tions and playing a sort of arbitrating role. strongly infl uenced Lebanon’s subsequent his- General Chéhab, by then President, reaf- tory. The agreement provided the PLO with fi rmed the doctrine of neutrality. Decree Nº 136 freedom of action in Lebanese territory - where of June 1959 banned all forms of party affi lia- an important number of Palestinian refugees tion for military personnel.2 were installed, and for the creation of autono- Between 1958 and 1964 the Army sought to mous areas where authority would lie with the be a “reforming” power, restructuring itself PLO.3 The PLO could supposedly not ignore along well-known lines (“neutrality” towards Lebanese authority, and its activities had to be coordinated with the General Staff of the Leba- 2 For Antoine Messarra, member of the Constitutional Council and professor of Law at the Université Libanaise, the principle of nese Army.