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20150325_STL-11-01_T_T135_OFF_PUB_EN 1/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Procedural Matters (Open Session) Page 1 1 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Badreddine, Merhi, 3 Oneissi, and Sabra 4 STL-11-01 5 Presiding Judge David Re, Judge Janet Nosworthy, 6 Judge Micheline Braidy, Judge Walid Akoum, and 7 Judge Nicola Lettieri - [Trial Chamber] 8 Wednesday, 25 March 2015 - [Trial Hearing] 9 [Open Session] 10 [The witness takes the stand] 11 --- Upon commencing at 10.01 a.m. 12 THE REGISTRAR: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is sitting in an 13 open session in the case of the Prosecutor versus Ayyash, Badreddine, 14 Merhi, Oneissi, and Sabra, case number STL-11-01. 15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Good morning. We will continue with the 16 evidence of Mr. Siniora today. 17 And good morning to you, Mr. Siniora. We trust you are 18 refreshed. 19 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 20 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I just note the appearances. We have 21 Mr. Cameron appearing for the Prosecution. For the Legal Representative 22 for the Victims, we have Mr. Mattar and Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra. For the 23 Defence we have Mr. Aoun for Mr. Ayyash; Mr. Korkmaz for Mr. Badreddine; 24 Mr. Hassan for Mr. Oneissi; Mr. Young for Mr. Sabra; and Mr. Khalil, who 25 is halfway through his cross-examination we hear, for Mr. Merhi. And Wednesday, 25 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150325_STL-11-01_T_T135_OFF_PUB_EN 2/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 2 Cross-examination by Mr. Khalil (Continued) 1 there are two representatives of the Defence Office seated in the court. 2 So you will have heard the good news there, Mr. Siniora, that 3 Mr. Khalil has assured us that he is halfway through his 4 cross-examination and has maybe 15 minutes to go. 5 Over to you, Mr. Khalil. 6 And just one further word, Mr. Siniora. We understand that you 7 are linguistically gifted and speak fluently the three official languages 8 of the Tribunal. We just had a little difficulty yesterday with the 9 French-English-Arabic relay around the courtroom, so could we just -- 10 could I just ask you again to watch the transcript as you are doing and 11 wait until the words stop being typed. That will allow us to record what 12 you're saying. Thank you. 13 Mr. Khalil. 14 MR. KHALIL: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. Good 15 morning, honourable members of the Bench. 16 WITNESS: FOUAD SINIORA [Resumed] 17 [Witness answered through interpreter] 18 Cross-examination by Mr. Khalil: [Continued] 19 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Prime Minister, how are you doing 20 today? 21 A. Good. Thank you. 22 Q. We will continue regarding what we were discussing today and the 23 last ministerial statement that was issued before the assassination of 24 Prime Minister Hariri. The government is formed of the Deputy Prime 25 Minister, Mr. Issam Fares. You were minister of finance. Mr. Marwan Wednesday, 25 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150325_STL-11-01_T_T135_OFF_PUB_EN 3/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 3 Cross-examination by Mr. Khalil (Continued) 1 Hamade was minister of economy and trade, and the minister of defence was 2 Mr. Mahmoud Hammoud, and the minister of interior was Mr. Elias El-Murr. 3 I would like to touch upon two issues in this ministerial statement. 4 The first issue is in the text in the Arabic language line 13 of 5 the ministerial statement, and in the English version it's line 16. I 6 will be reading. 7 "The government ..." 8 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Siniora, you've got a copy of that, I 9 think Mr. Khalil gave it to you to read overnight? 10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. 11 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Khalil, you were reading something on to 12 the record. 13 MR. KHALIL: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. 14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Siniora, you've read the document. I 15 think Mr. Khalil has a question to you of this document. 16 MR. KHALIL: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. 17 Q. So line 13, Mr. Prime Minister: 18 "The government affirms its solidarity with its sister state 19 Syria in the face of all unfair pressure, accusations and threats against 20 it, including the Syria Accountability Act that is before the US Congress 21 and that affects Lebanon as much as it affects Syria ..." 22 My question, Mr. Prime Minister, is: On the basis of what is 23 mentioned in this ministerial statement, can we say that the Syria 24 Accountability Act was at the time unfair and it addressed unfair 25 pressure, accusations, and threats? Wednesday, 25 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150325_STL-11-01_T_T135_OFF_PUB_EN 4/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 4 Cross-examination by Mr. Khalil (Continued) 1 A. First of all, I would like to say that this was an act that was 2 adopted in the United States of America. Number two, the people working 3 closely with Prime Minister Hariri had nothing to do with this act. 4 Third, one of the allies of the Syrian regime, General Aoun, and Prime 5 Minister Hariri had nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with 6 this. This statement mentions this act that was adopted by the US and it 7 asserts and says that this is a threat to both Syria and Lebanon. The 8 Lebanese government approved this statement and it was adopted by 9 Parliament. 10 Q. Thank you, Your Excellency. Can we say that the Lebanese 11 government presided by Prime Minister Hariri has asserted at the time and 12 confirmed its solidarity in the face of the Syria Accountability Act as 13 it was mentioned specifically in the statement? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Thank you. I will move on to the second point in this statement. 16 Line 26 -- in the English translation it's on the second page, the first 17 paragraph, and I will be reading. 18 "The special relations between Lebanon and Syria are a permanent 19 and crucial choice determined by legacy, history, geography, brotherhood, 20 and common interests, they are not a seasonal bet based on the 21 circumstances; the government is also determined to strengthen these 22 relations, both politically and culturally, and to develop them 23 economically, and to enhance them through common projects and the 24 organization of the exchange of facilities, services, and expertise in 25 the context" - and this is what is important for me - "in the context of Wednesday, 25 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150325_STL-11-01_T_T135_OFF_PUB_EN 5/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 5 Cross-examination by Mr. Khalil (Continued) 1 the Lebanese-Syrian Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination Treaty 2 and its institutions." 3 My question to you, Your Excellency, is the following: What we 4 understand from this paragraph is that the special relations between 5 Lebanon and Syria can be strengthened and this is a very important 6 choice. This can be done through the Lebanese-Syrian Brotherhood, 7 Co-operation and Co-ordination Treaty and its institutions. When we talk 8 about its institutions, Your Excellency, of course that includes the 9 security institutions that are mentioned in the treaty, in the 10 co-operation and -- Brotherhood and Co-operation Treaty, especially 11 Article 5 that refers to the defence committee that is composed and that 12 includes both the ministers of defence and interior in Lebanon and Syria. 13 Is this correct, Your Excellency? 14 A. Dear counsel, this is a ministerial statement that was adopted 15 and approved by the Council of Ministers. It is also based on this 16 treaty that we are talking about. Therefore, all what you are trying to 17 say and all that you're referring to in this paragraph and all the other 18 paragraphs of the statement is included in the treaty. The question is 19 not in the text, it's in the practices, the practices that were leading 20 at the time, and in the context of this Lebanese-Syrian security 21 apparatus it was leading to the consequences that we saw. 22 You are referring to these paragraphs. Yes, every one of these 23 paragraphs was adopted by the cabinet, by the government, and by the 24 Parliament and all -- everything in it is also based on the treaty. Yes, 25 this was adopted and ratified. This is not the question. The question Wednesday, 25 March 2015 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20150325_STL-11-01_T_T135_OFF_PUB_EN 6/104 PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Fouad Siniora –PRH108 (Resumed) (Open Session) Page 6 Cross-examination by Mr. Khalil (Continued) 1 is: How was this translated in the -- into reality? How was it 2 translated on the ground? And this led to a violation of every item of 3 this statement. 4 There is a paragraph here that talks about the government, that 5 the government intends to further strengthen Lebanon's relation and it 6 talks about strengthening the judiciary, but we all know how the 7 judiciary was manipulated. Parliament adopted a law and ten days later 8 it has to rescind that law.
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