ANALYSIS PAPER Number 21, July 2010 LEVANTINE RESET: Toward a More Viable U.S. Strategy for Lebanon Bilal Y. Saab ANALYSIS PAPER Number 21, July 2010 LEVANTINE RESET: Toward a More Viable U.S. Strategy for Lebanon Bilal Y. Saab TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary . iii Acknowledgements . vi The Author . vii Introduction . 1 The Importance of Lebanon to the United States . 4 The Problems of Lebanon . 14 A New U .S . Strategy for Lebanon . 24 LEVANTINE RESET: TOWarD A MOre ViaBle U .S . StrateGY FOR LEBanON ii The Saban Center at Brookings EXECUTIVE SUMMARY he United States should adopt a new ap- exploit Lebanon to improve their strategic positions proach toward Lebanon if it wishes to secure in the region at the expense of the United States its interests in that country and in the broader and its allies . Two, an internally secure and strong TMiddle East . The 1983 attack against the U .S . Ma- Lebanon that is capable of fixing or defusing its own rines in Lebanon was the beginning of the end of problems boosts U S. security interests in the Middle the United States’ involvement in Lebanon . Since East and those of its ally, Israel . Three, the United then, with the exception of a brief period during States has a strategic interest in supporting demo- the George W . Bush administration, there has been cratic countries and in strengthening democratic in- a strong sentiment in Washington that the price of stitutions around the world . The fact that Lebanon is U .S . engagement is too high, and that problems in a democracy (even if imperfect) with liberal impulses Lebanon are not threatening to American strate- that plays an important cultural-intellectual role in gic interests in the Middle East . Even when Leba- the region, but is surrounded by neighbors who are non’s problems boiled over on several occasions outright hostile to it should be an American concern . and threatened to engulf other parts of the region in conflict, the United States still assumed it could The United States’ past experiences and setbacks in treat these problems on the cheap . When the Unit- Lebanon furnish a number of useful lessons that ed States did engage during the George W . Bush should guide the formulation of a new U .S . strat- administration, it did so inconsistently, without a egy toward Lebanon: sense of purpose, and without a long-term plan in mind, thus undermining not only Lebanon’s stabil- • The United States should strike the right ity, but also U .S . interests in the region . balance between immediate needs and long- term interests . The core of a new, effective U .S . strategy toward Lebanon should entail a clear understanding by • Washington should take concrete diplomatic Washington of what is at stake and what it will take action to prevent Israel from using excessive to achieve success . The United States has gotten it force against Lebanon during times of mili- wrong in Lebanon over the years because it misdi- tary confrontation with Hizballah, as large- agnosed its own interests there and misunderstood scale punitive operations by Israel against the implications of Lebanon’s problems for U .S . Lebanon are counterproductive and under- policies . mine American interests in Lebanon . There are three main reasons whyW ashington should • The United States should not intervene mili- pay closer attention to Lebanon and help it address tarily to support one Lebanese camp over its problems while nurturing its assets: One, Leba- another . Doing so would deepen Lebanese non’s independence and sovereignty uphold U S. political polarization, exacerbate existing geopolitical interests in the Middle East by deny- communal cleavages, and jeopardize the en- ing U S. adversaries—Iran and Syria—the ability to tire U .S . approach . LEVANTINE RESET: TOWarD A MOre ViaBle U .S . StrateGY FOR LEBanON iii The Saban Center at Brookings • The United States should not use Lebanon as limit external intervention in its affairs if it were not a battlefield against regional adversaries or as for Hizballah’s links to Damascus, and especially, a bargaining chip in regional diplomacy . Do- Tehran . Washington’s goal, therefore, should be to ing so would further destabilize the country . take diplomatic measures that help turn Hizballah into a purely local actor and end its active involve- • Washington should implement a policy that ment in the Arab-Israeli conflict . contains Hizballah . No U .S . policy in Leba- non can succeed without an effective con- The “Syrian solution” to the Hizballah challenge tainment strategy for Hizballah, the single (asking Syria to reign in Hizballah) should be a most powerful political and military actor in non-starter because its record is bleak and its price the country . tag is high . Indeed, not only did Damascus fail to contain Hizballah when Syria was militarily pres- Because Lebanon has internal problems, such as a ent in Lebanon (1990-2005), it also harmed Leba- weak central authority, as well as external problems, nese democracy by maintaining a tight grip over such as excessive intervention in its domestic af- Lebanese politics . A Syrian solution should be even fairs by outside forces, any new U S. policy toward more unappealing to Washington today because Lebanon should contain a local component and a President Bashar al-Asad has repeatedly stated that regional component . The local part of a new U S. it is in his country’s interest to pursue policies that strategy should entail assisting Lebanon in bolstering seek to bolster, as opposed to weaken, Hizballah . its internal strength and stability . While USAID has already made strong contributions to strengthening The United States should also forgo military ap- Lebanese state capacity, Washington should focus proaches to declaw Hizballah . Israel’s 2006 war on investing in the building of a strong, modern shows (as do its previous military actions in Leba- Lebanese national military and security apparatus . non) that any strategy aimed at militarily destroy- Indeed, no area in Lebanon’s state apparatus deserves ing Hizballah—short of waging a total war against more urgent attention by Washington than the Leb- Lebanon as a whole, which would ignite a regional anese Armed Forces . The current Lebanese military conflict—would likely fail and backfire . Equally is incapable of assuming the responsibility of defend- important, any U .S . or Israeli military approach to ing the country from major internal and external the Hizballah challenge would significantly under- threats, given the small size of its budget and poorly mine other U .S . and Israeli interests in Lebanon by trained and badly equipped combat force . Therefore, weakening the country and possibly causing further because security in Lebanon is in short supply, all political breakdown and disintegration . attempts at reform and state building will suffer and remain incomplete unless security is achieved . Only Iran, which has long invested in and nur- tured Hizballah, is in a position to exert control The regional part of a new American strategy to- over the group . Therefore, the United States has a ward Lebanon should address the problem of ex- good chance of localizing and taming Hizballah by ternal intervention . While Hizballah is a product engaging in direct talks with Iran . However, Wash- of Lebanon’s internal weakness (the Lebanese state ington should realize that Iran will never accept de- has been historically unable to address the politi- mands to disarm Hizballah (in any event, only the cal, security, and socio-economic needs of Lebanese Lebanese people can disarm Hizballah) . The most it Shi’ah), it is also the product of Iran’s and Syria’s in- would do is instruct it to discontinue its regional role terventions in Lebanese domestic politics . Indeed, and adopt a more compromising posture toward Israel Lebanon would have been able to more effectively and the Arab-Israeli peace process . LEVANTINE RESET: TOWarD A MOre ViaBle U .S . StrateGY FOR LEBanON iv The Saban Center at Brookings While it is true that a U .S .-Iranian understanding Lebanon . Only an Israeli-Palestinian peace settle- that includes an agreement on Hizballah would ment that successfully tackles the future of Pales- not eliminate Syria’s influence in Lebanon (perhaps tinian refugees in Lebanon (and elsewhere) would nothing would), it can significantly limit it . The solve Lebanon’s refugee problem . main reason why Hizballah has defended Syrian interests in Lebanon over the years is because Syria In order for the United States to protect its interests sends arms to the group and facilitates weapons in Lebanon, it will have to break from its past poli- shipments that come from Iran, making it possible cies and look at Lebanon in a truly different light . for Hizballah to be a regional, rather than a local, Implementing a new U .S . strategy for Lebanon actor . However, if Iran were to instruct Hizballah would be a difficult task, given the country’s many to discontinue its regional role and armed struggle internal and external complexities, but it is a chal- against Israel, the group would no longer need to lenge worth pursuing . The opportunity for a more receive weapons from Syria and would no longer principled and consistent American approach in feel obliged to defend Syrian interests in Lebanon . Lebanon, one that benefits Lebanon and advances Instead, it would focus on its local interests, Is- both American interests and ideals still exists, but lamist agenda, and role in Lebanese politics . the recent drums of war in the region serve as a stark reminder that the opportunity may not be Yet, a strategy that reduces Syrian influence in around for much longer . Lebanon would not address the Palestinian issue in LEVANTINE RESET: TOWarD A MOre ViaBle U .S .