Crisis in Southern

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Author/Creator Ranger, Terence Date 1960-07-30 Resource type Articles Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) Source Rhodes House Library, Ranger Papers, Box 1, 16R-19V Format extent 8 page(s) (length/size)

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http://www.aluka.org CRISIS IN

CRISIS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA Reprinted from CENTRAL AFRICAN EXAMINER July 30, 1960. The Central African Examiner is an independent journal published fortnightly in Salisbury, the capital of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It reports on and interprets political, social and economic developments in these territories and in all of Central and Southern Africa. Single copy price (from August, 1960): Is. Annual subscription rates (26 copies): Central, Southern and East Africa ...... 25s. and Europe (by air) ...... 50s. U .S.A . and Canada (by air) ...... $12 Priee: 3d.

WHAT PRICE OPPOSITION? The ordinary course of law BY A LEGAL CORRESPONDENT THE origin of this present difficulty arose with the arrest of three I leaders of the National Democratic Party in the ordinary course of law. I do want to stress this, that the normal processes of law were followed, information was laid before the Department of the AttorneyGeneral and they decided that a prosecution was warranted, and that prosecution was brought in the ordinary way'. (The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in the Legislative Assembly, 20th July, 1960). 'I am sure that the due process of law which is being pursued will fill the United Kingdom Government with admiration in the present circumstances.' (The Prime Minister in the Legislative Assembly, 21st luly, 1960). S IR Edgar Whitehead has, of course, been concerned to emphasize that arrests had been made according to law and not in the exercise of any arbitrary executive power not sanctioned by ordinary law. Unfortunately, however, 'the due process of law' and arbitrary action by the government are not necessarily incompatible under the statute law of Southern Rhodesia. Certain statutes permit the government, in effect arbitrarily, to curtail the fundamental liberties of the individual to a considerable degree, not by taking extraordinary or emergency powers for the purpose, but 'in the ordinary course of law'. It is not intended here to pass any judgment, on the recent prosecutions which have been instituted. But the Prime Minister's remarks suggest the interesting exercise of considering what an unscrupulous or frightened government could do to destroy legitimate political opposition without ever overstepping the bounds of 'the ordinary course of law.' The exercise is not an academic one, for while the powers are there, some of the normal constitutional obstacles to the abuse of power are absent or have been removed. The right of the subject to seek the redress of the Courts has in some instances been excluded, and the other check on the abuse of power, public opinion, is effective only to the extent that it is enfranchised. It is therefore not beyond the bounds of possibility that some future Government, representative only of a minority of the people, urged on by its electorate and free of the control of the judiciary, might be tempted to destroy the opposition of the unenfranchised majority. How could it do so 'in the ordinary course of law' without taking and exercising emergency powers? 1. It could simply declare the party opposing it to be an unlawful organization in terms of the Unlawful Organiza.ions Act, 1959. Thereafter it would be an offence for anyone to continue to be a member or persist in the activities of that party. It is true that the wording of the Act permits the banning of an organization only when it appears to the Governor 'likely to endanger public safety, to disturb or interfere with public order' etc. But these are matters which, only the Government has the power to determine, because the Act provides that a proclamation under it 'shall not be open to question in any court of law'. Only the approval of Parliament is required, a slender safeguard when the Government has a majority in Parliament, the banned party no representation at all, and the minority electorate supports the action of the Government (a not inconceivable concurrence of circumstances). 2. The Government could prevent all political activity by the leaders of the party by detaining them, without conviction of any offence, under the Preventive Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1959. According to the Act, the power of detention can only be exercised in respect of a person concerned in activities 'which in the opinion of the Governor are potentially dangerous to public safety or public order to such an extent that the continuance thereof might necessitate the declaration of a state of emergency under the Public Order Act'. But again this is a matter for the decision of the Government. The detained person has recourse, not to the Courts, but only to a semi-judicial tribunal, whose judgment in any event the Government is quite at liberty to reject. These measures would effectively curtail any legal opposition to government policy by -the party concerned, and they could in practice be taken though that opposition had never been violent, subversive or unconstitutional. But the Government might prefer to deal with the opposition by more subtle means, by making it impossible or difficult for the opposing party to carry out normal political activities. For example: 3. The Government could, under the provisions of the Subversive Activities Act, 1950, prohibit the holding of any public meeting by the party within specified areas for a specified period, or could prohibit any leader of the party from attending public meetings for a period. In terms of the Act, the Government can take such action only when in its opinion 'there is reason to apprehend from written information taken upon oath that feelings of hostility likely to cause a serious breach of the peace would be engendered . . . or that subversive propaganda would be advanced'. But these limitations would appear to be no more enforceable than the others. 4. Under the Public Order Act, 1955, the Government could prohibit the party from holding any public processions for a period of up to three months, if it was of the opinion that because of the circumstances prevailing serious public disorder might result from such processions. 5. If the party were thus prohibited from holding public meetings or processions, it might wish to rely on the written word for the dissemination of its ideas. But the Government could cope THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EXAMINER JULY 30, t960 with this as well. Under the Subversive Activities Act, the Minister of Justice may prohibit the publication or circulation of any written matter. True, he may do so only if he is of the opinion that such document may engender feelings of hostility between different sections of the population, or contains subversive propaganda. Once again, however, the courts cannot question the validity or reasonableness of his opinion. Only Parliament can do so. 6. Under the same Act, the Minister can prohibit any person who is promoting feelings of hostility or spreading subversive propaganda from being within any specified area of the Colony. This, however, is one of the Government's less effective weapons, because here the person concerned can appeal to the High Court, which can substitute its findings for that of the Minister. But, as we have seen, the Government is not without other powers. 7. If the opposing party were an African one, the Government would have the additional comfort of knowing that apart from the special exercise of executive powers, the holding of public meetings in African urban areas is restricted by regulations, and in the reserves and other tribal areas by the Native Affairs Act. It should in fairness be said that it is not inconsistent with the rule of law for government to have power where necessary to prohibit public meetings and processions. The United Kingdom Government has such power by statute. But the only really effective safeguard against abuse of such power is a genuine respect by the government for the rights of the individual, and a public opinion which can ultimately assert itself by means of the vote. Similar considerations apply to certain penal laws designed to prevent violent, seditious, inflammatory or intimidatory conduct. Such laws may be necessary, but they are particularly difficult to formulate so as to achieve a fair balance between the public safety and individual liberty. Inevitably the lawmaker leans towards the safety of the state, with the result that the laws are so drafted as to penalize behaviour which is no more than legitimate political agitation, or are so widely stated as to make it uncertain whether a particular act is criminal or not. Take, for example, the section in the Public Order Act prohibiting the making of statements indicating or implying that it would be incumbent or desirable to do any act likely to lead to death or physical injury or to the destruction of property, or to do any act or omit to do any act 'with the object of defeating the purpose or intention of any law in force in the Colony'. Or take the provisions in various Acts prohibiting conduct intended or calculated to promote hostility between different sections of the nopulation, or the provision in the Public Order Act making it an offence to publish or reproduce any statement, rumour or report calculated to cause fear and alarm to the public or to dis- turb the public peace, knowing or having reason to believe that such statement is false. Such prohibitions cannot be precisely applied in practice. Their vagueness is tolerable where the government concerned is genuinely disinclined to interfere with political opposition. In such circumstances prosecutions for these vaguely formulated offences will be instituted only where the conduct is flagrantly illegal. But in different circumstances the existence of such offences may be a danger to legitimate political activity. Our hypothetical government, desiring to put down quite legitimate opposition, could embark on wholesale prosecutions under the Pubife Order Act or the Sedition Act. If funds and lawyers were available adequately to fight cases wholesale, the courts might interpret the sections in favour of the accused. But some responsible politicians would no doubt be caught in the wide net, and certainly the fear of prosecution, coupled with doubt as to what the laws do, in fact, prohibit, might well curtail quite legitimate opposition to the Government. SALISBURY What happened in the townships? BY A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT T HE demonstrations and disturbances in Salisbury's African townships were sparked by the arrest in the early hours of Tuesday, July 19, of three leaders of the National Democratic Party; Mr. Michael Mawema, the President-General; Mr. Sketchley Samkange, the TreasurerGeneral; and Mr. Leopold Takawira, Chairman of the branch. It was claimed by Government that these arrests were not directed against any particular Party nor against any particular race, hut the European press, whilst describing them as a routine police operation, stressed the N.D.P. functions of those arrested. The remaining leaders of the N.D.P. took the arrests as a direct and deliberate Govern- mental challenge to the continued existence of the party. They apparently believed this for several reasons: partly because in the weeks before the arrests there had been other manifestations, of Government hostility towards the N.D.P.-the Party office searched on July 8, homes of Asian sympathisers searched on July 9, and leaders constantly trailed by the C.I.D. They apparently believed it partly because on the morning of the arrests dozens of party officials and members of the N.D.P. were searched in Salisbury, , Umtali, Gwelo and Gwanda, including one of the European members of the Party. Finally, they apparently believed it because the three men arrested were charged under the Unlawful Organisations Act, which provides penalties of £1,000 fine or 5 years' imprisonment for the offences of continuing to be an officer or member or assiqter of an unlawful "iHE CENTRAL AFRICAN EXAMINtR JULY 30, 1960 I organisation. Members of the N.D.P. believed that the Government's intention was to demonstrate, through the use of section four of the Unlawful Organisations Act, that although the banned Southern Rhodesian African National Congress had been formally dissolved some of its members were still in association together for the attainment of its aims. And they believed that if a prosecution were to be successful the N.D.P. itself would be held to be a continuance of an unlawful organisation. The New Tadec Whether or not these deductions were valid, the remaining leaders of the N.D.P. acted upon them. They resolved to show that the Party had massive popular support and that it could exercise peaceful but powerful pressure upon the Government. They appealed to their followers to surrender themselves to the police for arrest on the grounds that it was their civic duty to do so if the Government believed the Party to be unlawful. This appeal was made on the night of Tuesday, July 19 at two big meetings, one of four thousand people at the Cyril Jennings Hall, Highfields. and the other of one thousand people in Mabvuku township. At Highfields the appeal was made, and the resultant march on the police station led, by Mr. T. G. Silundika, a young executive member of the N.D.P. At Mabvuku the demonstration was led by Mr. Morton Malianga, the deputy-President. At both places there was great emphasis upon discipline and self control. Mr. Herbert Chitevo, who spoke first to the Highfields meeting, told it that 'this is the time we must show courage and courage does not mean acting carelessly . . . probably the most important thing will be discipline.' Mr. Silundika told the crowd that he wanted them to prove that Africans in Southern Rhodesia are a peace-loving people. 'We are your leaders' said Mr. Nkala, the SecretaryGeneral, 'You chose us and thus you should follow our instructions. Don't do anything harmful to anybody. Don't do harm to the police--the police are just carrying out their duties under the existing unjust laws and thus don't even touch their ears, don't shout at them.' Order and Discipline These injunctions were remarkably successful. At Highfields the march on the police station and the subsequent events were observed by a number of European journalists, and members of the Central Africa Party as well as three European members of the N.D.P. These observers all agree that the demonstration was orderly and disciplined to an impressive degree. On arrival at the police station the marchers were made to sit down while their leaders negotiated with the police and made to keep clear a path for cars and buses. Equally the police handled the situation with tact and restraint, refusing to arrest any of the demonstrators and urging them to return home. At last Mr. Silundika announced that since the police would not accept their surrender of their persons the demonstrators must take the matter to the Prime Minister himself and requested the police to contact Sir Edgar Whitehead. At 11.30 p.m. the demonstrators moved away from the police station to march to Sir Edgar's office in Salisbury and thus began the second part of the demonstration. This march into the city was undertaken only by the Highfields' section of the demonstrators, since the Mabvuku crowd had dispersed after reaching Rhodesville police station. Nevertheless, there were still some 3-4,000 people on the march between Highfields and Harare. Once the column had reached Harare township in the very early hours of Wednesday, July 20, its numbers rapidly grew as more N.D.P. followers came out to join it. By the time the march reached the border between Harare and Salisbury there were probably some 6-7,000 demonstrators involved. On the outskirts of the township they found their way barred by a small body of police in riot kit and armed with tear guns. 'Here was a situation,' reports an African eye-witness, 'where if there was violence, the police could have been disregarded and the march continued.' This did not happen. Mr. Silundika made the crowd sit down once again and reminded them of Mr. Chitepo's call for discipline. Then he and the other leaders opened negotiations with the police. Their intention was still to obtain an interview with Sir Edgar Whitehead or to persuade him to address the crowd in Harare. They now dispatched a letter addressed to the Prime Minister and signed by Mr. Nkala in an endeavour to bring this about. After some time they were informed by the police that Sir Edgar was coming to address them at the Stodart Hall in Harare at 10 a.m. on the same day, July 20. Having received what turned out to be a false assurance, the leaders took the crowd away from the police barrier and to the area around the Stodart Hall, where they waited for Sir Edgar's arrival. On their way back into the township the demonstrators shouted to people in the hostels and houses that they were going to a meeting at the Hall and called on everyone to join them. This had two consequences. The first was that thousands of African workers in Harare did not leave for work but went instead to the Stodart Hall, where numbers soon grew to more than 20,000. The second was that elements in the hostel area, excited by these unusual events, took advantage of the situation to stone cars and put up road blocks. These elements were dispersed by the police and order was soon restored. For the. rest of Wednesday, July 20, the story was one, of continued efforts by the N.D.P. leaders to see Sir Edgar, continued refusal on his part, and increasing frustration and irritation on the part of the demonstrators. Sir Edgar did not, of course, appear to address the huge crowd at the Stodart Hall at 10 a.m., and Messrs. Silundika and Nkala were then dispatched into town in an attempt to see him personally. In their absence the crowd remained orderly for a further two and a half hours. Then, at about 12.30 p.m., the answer to Mr. Nkala's letter was read to the crowd. This answer came not from the Prime Minister but from the Ministers of Labour and Native Affairs, and it said merely that the two Ministers would be prepared to meet a delegation once the demonstration had broken up. This answer angered the crowd. Mr. Silundika and Mr. Nkala were not present to advise them; and they decided to march once more into the city-unwise because it could only lead to another confrontation with police and another stalemate, unless violence was used. But even at this point the demonstration was orderly and the temper good- humoured. A Euronean observer and his wife who arrived at the Stodart Hall in search of a friend at this point report that they were escorted right through the crowd, which had now reached some 30,000, without any manifestation. of hostility. Sir Edgas Answer Once the marchers came face to face with the detachment of police who were stationed in the;r path. they were again made to sit down and at no point did they make any gestures of attack. Tension, however, grew, especially after news came through of Sir Edgar Whitehead's uncompromising statement in the Southern Rhodesian Assembly at 2.15 p.m. in which he announced that all processions were now illegal, that the police had been ordered to keep the demonstrators out of the city, and that he would not receive a delegation from an illegal assembly. When Messrs. Silundika and Nkala arrived back to find their followers once more confronting the police they at once realised the dangers of the situation and managed to persuade the greater part of the crowd to return to the Stodart Hall, even though there was no longer any hope that Sir Edgar would come to address them there. But at this point discipline, which all observers agree had hitherto been remarkable, broke down. About 1,000 of the demonstrators refused to return to the Hall. This refusal marked an ominous weakening of the leaders' control. It was now that the police, after a short warning period, dispersed the remaining 1.000 Africans with tear gas and temporarily cleared the road into the township. An African spectator, who was among the crowd thus disnersed, reported later that the gas attack had angered them and had further undermined the authority of leaders who had not been there to suffer the attack themselves. The third stage of the demonstration now began. The leaders of the N.D.P. made a last desperate effort to save the situation and appealed to the police to persuade Sir Edgar to receive a deputation, since they could not guarantee discipline much longer. This request was rejected and the leaders told that they must disperse their followers and end the demonstration. This it was clearly no longer really in their power to do, even if they had wished to do so. The 1,000 or so people who had become separated from the main body had reassembled opposite the police lines and began to stone workers returning from the city, thus precipitating another sharp clash with the police. As for the demonstrators at the Stodart Hall, they resolved to stay together in order to prevent the arrest of their leaders and some 10,000 settled down there for the evening. Tog CmnAL ArsxcAi ExAkmiNsR Jutv 30. 1960 17v

For Government the phase of defence had now ended and the phase of attack was beginning. Sir Edgar told the Assembly in the evening of Wednesday, July 20, that all meetings in Salisbury's African townships had been proclaimed illegal and thus paved the way for the breaking up of the Stodart Hall meeting. He also told the Assembly that the police could handle the situation. In fact more forces were being rapidly assembled. The police reserve had been called out during the day. By midnight 36 lorries had reached Salisbury carrying a battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles. The first territorial battalion of the Royal Rhodesia Regiment had been called up and denloyed around Harare township. These impressive forces easily put an end to the sporadic disturbances occurring away from the main meeting. But it was not until about 5 a.m. on July 21, when the numbers at the Stodart Hall had dwindled to a 'hard core' of some 500 under the leadership of Mr. Marondera, the Publicity Secretary of the N.D.P., that action was taken to break up the meeting there. Regular police and reservists broke up the meeting of 500 with repeated tear gas volleys and many arrests were made. Mr. Nkala, who had retired from the meeting to sleep, was arrested at his house. Mr. Maliapga and other leaders were also arrested. The police remained at the Stodart Hall throughout the morning, turning away or arresting the many people who came back to resume the meeting there or to discover what was going on. Equally successful action was taken to break up the strike. The Rhodesian African Rifles made a demonstration march through the location; spotter planes showered leaflets urging that the strike be ended; police BACKGROUND TO IGNORANCE reservists entered houses and drove men out to work. Later in the morning the Chief Native Commissioner summoned three leading citizens of Harare and requested them to broadcast an appeal for a return to work. The three Africans refused on the grounds that only the arrested leaders had the authority to make such an appeal. Some time after this Messrs. Mawema, Samkange and Takawira received in prison, a deputation, purporting to come from N.D.P. officials outside, which urged them to sign an appeal for the end of the strike and all further demonstrations. The three leaders refused to do so because they suspected that the deputation had not been sent by the N.D.P. at all, and subsequently no N.D.P. officials could in fact be found to vouch for the deputation. But despite these refusals, the strike was successfully broken on Thursday, July 21. The Fourth Stageeildren, haos, reserves and bans The fourth, last, and most confused stage of the troubles now began. The events of Thursday, July 21, are impossible to narrate in coherent sequence. It was no longer a question of a centralised, controlled, demonstration but of a leaderless and fragmentary mob. Nor, indeed, were the components of the mob the same as the components of the demonstration. On July 21 they were mainly youths and schoolchildren out on the streets because the schools had been officially closed. With their parents at work and the political leaders in jail or hiding, no-one could control them. Throughout the day, in both Highfields and Harare, groups of these young people stoned cars and police, smashed windows, attacked shops and banks and generally wreaked havoc. On their side the policeespecially the Reservists--showed little idea of how to cope with the situation. As the African Daily News complained, and as observers confirm, tear gas and batons were used indiscriminately throughout the day. When in the morning three Africans, including a woman and her baby, were wounded by gun- shot, and in the afternoon a European constable was badly beaten up in Highfields, the bitterness of the day was complete. Meanwhile over 200 arrests were made during Thursday, among them that of the Central Africa Party's senior vice-president, Mr. Stanlake Samkange. Bans on all meetings in African rural areas were also announced, as a result of the activities of two political parties -un-named by the Minister-whose activities had been causing concern there, From Thursday night onwards the military and police strength at the Government's disposal imposed a restoration of order in the townships. People who had been too engrossed by the events of the past days to ask many questions about them now began to do so. Some of these questions were asked by Dr. Palley in a debate in the Assembly on Friday, July 23 when he maintained that the disturbances showed the bankruptcy of partnership and the massive support enjoyed by the N.D.P. Other questions were asked at a private Central Africa Party meeting in Salisbury on Friday night which was addressed by Mr. Stanlake Samkange, Mr. Nathan Shamuyarira and other eye-witnesses of events in the townships. The next day all meetings in Salisbury were banned for a month and later this ban was extended to Bulawayo. The case of African X BY HARDWICKE HOLDERNESS E XCLUDING the current disturbances, there have been, since 1923 when Southern Rhodesia w a s granted Responsible Government, five actual or alleged African disturbances which have come to the notice of the public. The first was a strike of African railway workers in 1945. This was dealt with by police action; a Commission was appointed and, as a result of its recommendations, an Advisory Board was set up and wages increased. In 1948 there was a spontaneous General Strike of all African urban workers other than railway workers. It started in Bulawayo and spread to Salisbury and other centres. It was dealt with by the police and the Territorial Army; a Commission was appointed which made a confidential report to Parliament; further Native Labour Advisory Boards were set up and statutory minimum wages were prescribed for a number of industries. In 1954 there was a spontaneous strike of African workers at the Wankie Colliery. Again the Territorial Army was called out and the strike broken, followed by a Native Labour Board enquiry and adjustment of wages. In 1956 there was a bus boycott in Salisbury organised by the newly-formed African National Youth League, the body which was subsequently to form the nucleus of the S.R. African National Congress. A Commission was appointed to investigate bus fares and adjustments were made. In 1959 the Southern Rhodesian Government alleged that a State of National Emergency existed in the country due to the activities of the S.R. African National Congress. It arrested some 530 Congress members, banned Congress and passed legislation empowering the Government to continue imprisoning people without trial and without having to justify the continuance of a State of Emergency. Of the original detainees, some 400 were released within four months, a further 50 were detained for 7 months and then restricted, and 7 are still in jail today, uncharged and untried. The Government's view of the state of feeling amongst Africans during the period 1945-1960 can be gleaned from the annual reports of the Chief Native Commissioner, and it amounts to this: that certainly until 1954 and probably until Congress became active in 1958, all was well; the 'natives' had a 'deep sense of trust in the Government', which was restored after the banning of Congress, at least in the Rural Areas; hardships existed, to be sure---shortage of land in the Reserves, shortage of houses in the urban areas, and so on; but there was nothing that could not be solved by economic and social measures which the Government had in hand; politically there was no problem, provided that strict enough measures were taken against a small group of 'so-called native leaders'. who were a product of the urban areas but who tried to 'reach out tentacles into the rural areas'. These people, according to the reports, are all self-seeking and mischievous; most are corrupt; they would have no influence with the rank and file of the Africans but for certain diabolical techniques, the playing up of 'imaginary grievances and hardships', intimidation and so on, to which the rural African in particular is an easy prey. The language of the C.N.C. in referring to them is interesting. In 1954 they are 'the usual vociferous few who have made the occasion of Federation one of maligning the THE CamRAL AFRICAN EXAMINER JuLY 30, 1960 motives of the Europeans . . . malcontents who in the aggregate live, not by an honest day's work, but on what they can squeeze from a simple and credulous native population who generally see, too late, hard-earned money passing into the pockets of thieves and rogues, who filched it from them on the pretext of taking legal advice or other suitable steps to safeguard the interests of the natives.' In 1957, 'those tub thumping traders in politics, who by their stage antics, by their shouting, by hurling invectives and insults against Europeans in general and against the Police and this Department, and by issuing threats against any native who might take a different view, prevent the development in many natives of any sound political opinion or thought and render them inarticulate in public. It is clear that the primary motive of these general atmosphere of regimentation irks them. The cost of living is rocketing and wages remain static. Europeans in the shops are hostile and teach the innumerable white immigrants to be the same. City Councillors keep calling for stricter and stricter control and one makes a habit of referring to kaffirs. Letters by Europeans in the Rhodesia Herald (which African X reads) express contempt for natives, their innate inferiority, proneness to revert to barbarism and so on. During visits to parents and relations in the Reserve there is always depressing talk of stricter measures there ---cattle must be sold, houses must be built in places decided by the Government, only the crops the Government chooses may be planted. SIL CENTRAL AFRICAN EXAMIN R JULY 30, 1960 I2~, VA ranged in Harare by a new group of Europeans who appear well disposed towards Africans and who say they intend making proposals to the Government on necessary changes in the law. This experience proves rather embarrassing. He and his friends can hardly bear to hear matters about which they feel deeply sensitive and concerned talked about in a detached and satisfied wayand often condescendingly as if to small children. For example, to one speaker the Land Apportionment Act is a reasonable measure and in the interests of 'the native.' But to the audience it means the heart-breaking removal, for no good reason they can see. of thousands of families from land which they have occupied for generations to new land in remote and unfamiliar districts while endless 'European' acres alongside the original land remain uncultivated. Listening to the lectures African X finds himself constantly in fear that his fellow members of the audience, and even he himself, might commit a breach of good manners. And when this happens he is ashamed. Federal AdventuresHope and Disillusionment In 1953, with the advent of Federation, a wider group of Europeans, Africans, Asians, Coloureds and Eurafricans is formed to see if some agreement can be hammered out on reforms, both practicable and necessary, in order to give effect to 'partnership.' This body becomes the Interracial Association and at about the same time the Capricorn Africa Society, with approximately similar aims, begins to operate. African X joins both. His more sceptical friends say this kind of movement will go the same way as previous attempts at co-operation with Europeans: the Europeans will become progressively ostracized by their fellows and so unable to help, even if they still want to do so, and that the only way change can be achieved is by people prepared to be tough and defy the law if necessary. About this time African X finds himself one of a deputation of Africans who are seeking to interview the Minister of Native Affairs about the transport problems Africans have in getting to work. The deputation is allowed to see the Minister, after spending most of a day waiting in the yard of the Native Department, but the Minister makes it clear that he has little patience with natives like African X who seem to expect everything to be done at once. However, in the new, post- Federation Parliament of Southern Rhodesia one or two of the Members begin to make actual, personal contact with their black constituents, and sometimes try to explain to the House how they feel. In 1955 African X is persuaded, with some of his colleagues-people with real influence amongst the Africans and not merely ones who like to ingratiate themselves leaders is personal aggrandisement, Introduction to Politics power and status'. (European politicians, African X has heard of some white it would seem, all have different leaders who sympathize and say that motives). Their 'African nationalism' did Members of Parliament are meant to not represent in 1959 'the aspirations and represent Africans as well as Europeans. ambitions which flow from light which That is the difference they say, between we have supplied but the antics of a Southern Rhodesia and South Africa few people, hungry for publicity, power where the common voters' roll, retained and personal aggrandisement at any in the Cape Province at the time of cost.' Union, was afterwards abandoned. Sir ' United Party has proConflicting Conceptions mised the Europeans that it will follow This conception of the facts contained the example of the Cape Province, but in the C.N.C.'s Reports is shared by the there is another political Party, the Government, as its method of dealing Southern Rhodesia Labour Party, which with Congress and other actions have has set up an African Branch, and clearly shown; and it is also shared by African X decides to join it. the great majority of the European At the general election of 1946 the population, who have no reason to think S.R. Labour Party is wiped out. African otherwise, and by many editors and X looks round for another way to members of the European press. But it influence the Government. He joins the conflicts sharply with the facts as they African Welfare Society. The European have been found by Europeans who have Chairman is persona grata with the tried since the War to make direct con- Government and some concessions are tact with Africans in political matters, obtained. But they don't get near the A hypothetical case will illustrate the root of the problems the people are point. I' worried about. In about 1950 the possibility arises of AFRICAN X was born in a village in election to a new body, the Harare A the Reserves. Various members of Native Advisory Board, set up to advise the City Council's Director of Native his family scraped together the money Administration who is the supreme for his education at mission schools in authority in Harare. By this time the Rhodesia and South Africa, no second- feelings of the people are such that if ary education being available at the time an ote are sucesary dany votes are to be got it is necessary in this country. In 1945 he is 25, and to make some pretty hot speeches, and teaches in a Government Primary even then African X fails to get elected. School at Harare. He was taught by the He is relieved, for already he is getting missionaries to be a Christian, and he into hot water with the Native Educaattends Church.,r tion Department. Later, his relief is conIn 1945 there is a ferment of ideash firmed when the successful candidates and feelings in Harare. Most of ltell him that their efforts on the Advipeople are migrant labourers, unmarried-J sory Board have had little or no effect. or without their wives, and many ory Ba - , i them quite enjoy the adventure-tbe bil tAfrican X s brother who is still lvng town, money to earn, beer drinks and IN the Reserve has tie serving on te skokiaan, prostitutes, gamblin ative Counci there, but he says it is even roaan, p si ' g l t simply not done to disagree with the ghosts at home. f tr om e of them, anop satsve Commissioner, who usually takes ghost . Bt so them, adthe chair at meetings. There is too much nearly all who have made their per- to lose in the Reserve by being an manent homes in Salisbury, are worried . They are liable to be turned out of agitator in the N.C.'s eyes-trading their accommodation for some chance rights, reputation with the police and occurrence-the wife deciding to brew much else. beer, or an accidental mix-up with some- African X now decides to go along to thing the authorities don't like. The ,lectures on National Affairs being ar- with Europeans-to join the governing Party. 1 he Party has passed some pretty harsh legislation, like the Public Order Act, which, the Africans of Southern Rhodesia on their past record don't seem to have deserved, but, so the argument ran, even if the Government wants to do the right thing it cannot unless it has a mandate from the Party, and it is worth trying the experiment: join the Party, form branches, bring up resolutions at the Party Congress and see what happens. This experiment works exceedingly well. The first resolutions are well received and Government action follows. Some of African X's friends are busy forming the African National Youth League to take more direct action, but ne feels he is on the right lines. In 1957 there is obviously a tussle behind the scenes in the caucus of the governing Party over the franchise, but Mr. Todd stands firm and makes a public statement that he will not depart from the spirit of the lredgold proposals. This act of political courage wins African support for the new Southern Rhodesian francise taw, notwisnstanwng that the qualications in it seem excessively high. However, in January 1958 Mr. Todd is repudiated by his Ministers who later explain that one of their objections to Mr. fodd is that he recenuy granted a personal interview to Joshua Nkomo, the President of the S.R. African National Congress. It is wrong, they say, to treat so-caled native leaaers' in that way. In June the action of Mr. Todd's Mimsters is endorsed by the E uropeans and is Party is wiped out at the polls Following the 1958 election membership of the ANC increases tremendously. it looks to African X as if his sceptical friends must have been right: it is only an orgamsation of the Congress type, sponsored by Africans, which can make any headway. The Youth League were successful with the bus boycott and pernaps it is necessary to incur the hate of the Native Department before anyone will take any notice. It is certainly no good joining the Federal Party. The Federal Prime Minister talks about 'partnership' but he keeps hurling bricks at tile countries in Africa where Africans are being given real responsibility. I he Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia keeps calling for the abolition of restrictions in the Constitution as if his Government intended doing things which the British Government would not approve. African teachers have now been finally barred from taking any part in politics and African X decides he must resign as a teacher, take another job and put his weight behind Congress. Once again he finds himself embarrassed by being associated with statements made by fellow members which go much further than he would himself, but he consoles himself with the thought that the 'characters' in the leadership, who make the most dramatic orations and always get an enormous cheer, are not taken all that seriously by the people. He is as active as he can be, and he becomes aware that he is being watched more and more closely by members of the C.I.D. and people who are generally thought to be paid informers. He is deeply opposed to violence, but he thinks that in the circumstances some form of passive resistance may have become necessary. The rest of African X's story is the same as that of many other members of the ANC who were arrested in the early hours of a morning in February 1959. were detained and subsequently joined the National Democratic Party. He is glad to have endured the experience. He feels clearer in his mind now about the need for reform and the obstacles in the way of achieving it. And he feels that his standing with his people has been enhanced. T HE case of African X suggests that ever since the last war there has existed in Southern Rhodesia the problem of a rapidly growing political consciousness amongst Africans, based on real and not imaginary grievances and N.D.P. ROOTS African in Souther BY A POLITICAL M ODERN African politics in Southern Rhodesia-as distinct from tribal politics on the one hand and participation in European politics on the otherbegan as long ago as 1934 when the first Congress was founded. Before the last war, however, Congress acted merely as a very restrained and genteel pressure group on Government, and it was not until after the war that African politics made any impact upon the European community. The war had brought a considerable increase in the political consciousness of Southern Rhodesian Africans. It had also stimulated industrial and urban growth and the growth of an African urban group. In 1948 these factors came together in a remarkably successful strike for higher wages which almost brought Bulawayo industry to a standstill, and which took Government completely by surprise. The strike was organized by the revived Congress under the Reverend Thompson Douglas Samkange-father of both Stanlake Samkange, present vice-president of the C.A.P. and Sketchley Samkange, treasurer-general of the National Democratic Party-in combination with a more proletarian and robust movement, the African Voice under its leader Burumbo. In some ways the strike was an illusory success because it stimulated Government into legislative and other measures which have ever since made its repetition impossible, but it did show the potentialities of African urban discontent. C C hardships, which has never had any hope of being solved by economic and social measures alone; that the so-called 'native leaders' of the urban areas have had the tacit support of the vast majority of the African population, including Africans in the Reserves who dare not risk expressing it openly; and that amongst these leaders there have at least been some who have tried every opening available which seemed to give any promise of progress by constitutional means, but each of these openings has led to a cul-de-sac. This conception is open to challenge, but at least it is based on personal contact, while the Government's view is derived partly from reports by Native Commissioners who are quite understandably hostile to 'agitators' and partly from reports by the C.I.D. and paid informers who are quite understandably on the look out only for damaging information. Momentous steps have been taken on the basis of the official view. If it is at variance with the facts, then a lot of re-thinking has to be done and a lot of re- educating of the European public, and a lot of reform achieved, very quicklyif indeed it is not already too late. politics i Rhodesia ORRESPONDENT Burombo's subsequent activities showed equally clearly the potentialities of African rural discontent. In 1949 and 1950 his African Voice Movement campaigned against de-stocking in the Reserves. In 1951 it fought the Land Husbandry Bill and organized African protests against it. But then a new issue arose which momentarily transcended concern over urban and rural conditions. This was the issue of Federation. In 1951 all African organizations in Southern Rhodesia combined to combat the Federation proposals in the All/African Convention under the presidency of the Trade Union leader, Charles Mzingeli. Thus early the three issues which dominate current African politicswages, land, and Federation-were raised by explicitly political movements. Federation, of course, was achieved despite African opposition, and with its achievement African politics in Southern Rhodesia seemed to lose their vitality. The General Secretary of the All African Convention, Joshua Nkomo, and the General Secretary of Congress, Stanlake Samkange, both joined the Federal Party and campaigned in the first Federal election as independent Federal candidates against the African candidates officially chosen by the Federal Party itself. The All African Convention was dissolved in 1954 and for some time there was no organized African political movement. It looked to optimistic Europeans as if partnership and the participation of Africans in THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EXAMINi RJULY 30, 1960

European dominated political parties bad removed the raison d'9tre of separate African organizations. Sadly this hope was ill-founded. Urban and rural problems were becoming more, rather than less, acute and African self-assertion elsewhere on the continent becoming more confident and successful. In 1955 African discontent with the slow pace of partnership and the ineffectiveness of multi-racial organizations, like the Inter-racial Association, led to the formation in Salisbury of the militant Youth League under George Nyandoro, James Chikerema, and Edson Sithole. The appeal of the Youth League was almost entirely confined to the younger urban Africans in Salisbury, and particularly to those in Highfields, but in September, 1957, the basis of the movement was broadened when the leaders of the Youth League combined with a rump of the old Congress in Bulawayo under Mr. Nkomo to form the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress. There was a distribution of offices among the leaders of the two participating organizations-Mr. Nkomo becoming President, Mr. Chikerema becoming vice-President, and Mr. Nyandoro, Secretary-General of the new Congress. The S.R.A.N. Congress operated between September, 1957 and February, 1959, when its leaders were arrested during the Southern Rhodesian emergency, and it was declared an unlawful organization. For the remainder of 1959 there was no African political organization in the field, but on January 1, 1960, the National Democratic Party was formed under the presidency of Mr. Michael Mawema, an ex-member of the banned Congress. It is perhaps worthwhile examining some of the similarities and differences between the two organizations, the S.R.A.N. Congress and its successor. In doing so it must be remembered that all explicitly African parties--even if like the Congress and the N.D.P. their membership is open to all races-necessarily have important factors in common. Thus they must be mass parties, because the African electorate is still too small to provide significant support. Because they must be parties of non-voters they must all face the problem of how to make their demands and strength felt, and because there are only a certain number of ways of achieving this there is bound to be a similarity of techniques. Finally, because the grievances of their followers are few and simple but deeply felt, they will inevitably tend to stress precisely the same things-land, wages, the colour bar. In all these ways the N.D.P. is strikingly similar to Congress. But there are, of course, many possible differences. One such difference lies in whether a mass organization outside the system adopts a policy of violent or nonviolent, illegal or constitutional, methods. The Government alleged during the emergency that the old Congress had adopted violent and unconstitutional methods and the question of the moment is clearly whether it can be shown that the N.D.P. has done so. This is a question better left to await the results of the cases brought against N.D.P. leaders. But other significant differences between the two organizations can be discussed. One such difference lies in the attitude of the N.D.P. towards political objectives, as distinct from economic and social ones. Although the N.D.P. inevitably speaks much of Land Apportionment, Land Husbandry, urban wages and so on, it is not so exclusively concerned with these matters as was the old Congress. One reason for this is that the N.D.P. has come to believe that only with the attainment of political power can the economic and social changes desired be brought about. It has, therefore, concentrated on political action instead of the economic and social pressure group activity which was characteristic of the S.R.A.N. Congress. Another reason is that the N.D.P. is much more conscious of the general movement to self-government in Africa as a whole and is much more of a PanAfricanist movement than Congress ever was. This difference emerges from a comparison of the printed programmes of the two organizations. The S.R.A.N. Congress issued a very long and comprehensive policy statement on agriculture, industry, urbanization, education, social services and so on, and stressed that its 'immediate concern' was 'to raise the standard of - living of the underprivileged'. The N.D.P. has so far issued only a brief statement of Aims and Objects, most of which stress 'freedom', 'one man, one vote', Pan- Africanism, and so on. Even for the underprivileged, political emancipation cp1, before economic. This chimes wit tl*,thinking of the intellectual membersiolrthe N.D.P. Thus Chitepo, for examples t d a Capricorn Conference at Unktdli 'earlier this year that Africans were ndw concentrating on achieving political power rather than on redressing economic and social grievances. The difference is also apparent if one compares a meeting of the N.D.P. with a meeting of the old Congress. At an N.D.P. meeting speakers make constant reference to events elsewhere in Africa, to their own meetings with African leaders in Ghana or Nigeria, in Nyasaland or Tanganyika. They stress particularly the achievement of self-government by Africans; they talk in the highly intellectual language of the PanAfricanist-of 'the African personality', of the lessons of ancient Egypt, of the crippling effect of the inferiority complex. Their meetings are much more sophisticated, much more consciously political, than those of the S.R.A.N.C. were. There are also differences in organization. Fittingly enough the N.D.P., with its political pre-occupations, is a political party, while Congress never formed itself into a party as such. The N.D.P. intends to fight all elections, whilst Congress boycotted elections. The N.D.P. has more regular meetings-once a week in the Salisbury townships, with audiences every time of more than a thousand. At these meetings it uses techniques learnt from other Pan-Africanist movementsthe slogan, the song, the willing submission to discipline. It has just evolved a suitably Pan-Africanist emblem-the Zimbabwe bird against a rising sun. But, whilst these regular meetings are used to instil discipline and loyalty, they are far from fanatic or totalitarian in atmosphere. And their success can be seen if one compares last week's demonstration with the Harare riots in 1957. Finally, one other difference should be noted. The N.D.P. with. its intellectual, political and disciplined approach is so far an urban party. It has not yet penetrated the Reserves as the S.R.A.N. Congress did. This is probably as much due to the obstacles put in the way of the organization of branches in the rural areas by Government as to the N.D.P.'s own disregard of the rural question. Indeed, an N.D.P. meeting always shows that the Party inevitably sees the closest connection between the rural situation and the urban, between rural discontents and the demand for self-government. Up to the present the N.D.P. has not achieved an overall strength, much greater than that of the S.R.A.N. Congress, largely because of this relative lack of rural organization. But in the towns it is clearly better organized, more enthusiastically supported, and altogether more formidable than the Congress ever was. It can only be a matter of time before either the N.D.P. or its successor manages to combine urban enthusiasm and rural support into a really strong African opposition. THi CziuaAL ApIcAN ExAmINai JULY 30, 1960