The Legal Methodology of Late Nehardean Sages in Sasanian Babylonia the Brill Reference Library of Judaism

The Legal Methodology of Late Nehardean Sages in Sasanian Babylonia The Brill Reference Library of Judaism

Editors Alan J. Avery-Peck (College of the Holy Cross) William Scott Green (University of Miami)

Editorial Board David Aaron (Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati) Herbert Basser (Queen’s University) Bruce D. Chilton (Bard College) José Faur (Netanya College) Neil Gillman ( Jewish Theological Seminary of America) Mayer I. Gruber (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) Ithamar Gruenwald (Tel Aviv University) Maurice-Ruben Hayoun (University of Geneva) Arkady Kovelman (Moscow State University) David Kraemer ( Jewish Theological Seminary of America) Baruch A. Levine (New York University) Alan Nadler (Drew University) Jacob Neusner (Bard College) Maren Niehoff (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Gary G. Porton (University of Illinois) Aviezer Ravitzky (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Dov Schwartz (Bar Ilan University) Günter Stemberger (University of Vienna) Michael E. Stone (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Elliot Wolfson (New York University)

VOLUME 30 The Legal Methodology of Late Nehardean Sages in Sasanian Babylonia

By Barak S. Cohen

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011 This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cohen, Barak S. The legal methodology of late Nehardean sages in Sasanian Babylonia / by Barak S. Cohen. p. cm. — (The Brill reference library of Judaism ; v. 30) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-90-04-19381-9 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Jewish law—Methodology. 2. Jewish law—Interpretation and construction. 3. Amoraim. 4. Rabbis—Iraq—Babylonia. 5. Nehardea (Extinct city) 6. Judaism— History—Talmudic period, 10–425. I. Title. BM503.6.C64 2011 296.1’20092235—dc22 2010045616

ISSN 1571-5000 ISBN 978 90 04 19381 9

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Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgments ...... ix

Chapter One: Introduction ...... 1 1. The Origins of Rabbinic Activity in Nehardea ...... 1 1.1. R. Shila ...... 4 1.2. Samuel ...... 5 2. Fourth and Fifth Century Nehardean Sages ...... 7 3. The Legal Methodology of Amemar and the Latter Nehardeans ...... 10 3.1. Earlier Scholarship ...... 10 3.2. Differences in Legal Methodology ...... 15 3.3. The Late Nehardean Amoraim ...... 17 3.3.1. “The Nehardeans Say” (Chapter Three) ...... 17 3.3.2. R. Zebid of Nehardea (Chapter Five) ...... 18 3.3.3. R. Dimi of Nehardea (Chapter Six) ...... 19 3.3.4. Amemar and R. Hama (Chapter Two and Four) ...... 20 4. Broader Implications Ensuing from this Study ...... 22 4.1. Deviation from the Halakhic Tradition and Strained Interpretations of Tannaitic Texts ...... 22 4.2. The Historical Accuracy/Reliability of Amoraic Statements ...... 25

Appendix A: Sages Active in the Environs of Nehardea During the Saboraic Period ...... 31 Appendix B: “When R. Hoshaya Came from Nehardea, He Came and He Brought a Tannaitic Teaching with him” ...... 33

Chapter Two: Amemar ...... 37 1. “I am of the Elders of Nehardea”: The Time and Status of Amemar in Nehardea ...... 37 1.1. Dating Amemar’s Rabbinic Activity ...... 37 1.1.1. Subordination to Fifth Generation Amoraim ...... 38 vi contents

1.1.2. The Subordination of Sixth Generation Amoraim to Amemar ...... 39 1.1.3. Amemar Died During R. Ashi’s Lifetime ...... 40 1.1.4. Reassessing Earlier Scholarly Assumptions .... 41 2. Did Amemar Head a Rabbinic Yeshiva? ...... 43 2.1. “R. Ashi was Sitting in Front of Amemar” (Rav Ashi hava yativ kameh de-Amemar) ...... 47 2.2. Amemar as Judge ...... 48 2.3. “[Once When] I was Standing Before Amemar” (hava ka’imna kameh de-Amemar) ...... 49 3. Summary and Conclusions ...... 50 4. The Halakhic Methodology of Amemar ...... 51 4.1. Previous Scholarship: Amemar’s Conservative Halakhah ...... 51 4.2. A New Appraisal of Amemar’s Halakhic Methodology ...... 52 4.3. Analysing His Rulings in Actual Cases ...... 55 4.4. Analysing His Halakhic Decisions ...... 67 4.4.1. “Amemar said: The halakha is (hilkheta) . . .” ..... 67 4.4.2. “I am of [The Elders] of Nehardea” [ana (mi-savei de) nehardea ana] ...... 74 4.5. Rulings Employing the Formula: “One who wishes to . . .” ...... 77 4.6. Amemar’s Interpretation of Tannaitic Sources ...... 82 5. Summary and Conclusions ...... 91 5.1. Halakhic Rulings ...... 91 5.2. Interpretations of Tannaitic Sources ...... 93 5.3. The Source of Amemar’s Unique Halakhic Characteristics ...... 96 5.4. Amemar’s Date and Status ...... 97

Chapter Three: “The Nehardeans Say” ...... 99 1. Early Babylonian Halakhic Traditions? ...... 99 2. A Characterization of Their Halakhic Rulings and Their Relationship to Earlier Sources ...... 106 2.1. Halakhic Debates Between “the Nehardeans say” and Other Sages ...... 109 2.2. Reactions to Statements by Earlier Sages ...... 115 2.3. Rulings Issued in Concrete/Theoretical Cases ...... 119 3. Summary and Conclusions ...... 122 contents vii

Chapter Four: Rav Hama ...... 127 1. Identity and Dating ...... 127 1.1. Previous Scholarship ...... 127 1.1.1. How Many Rav Hama’s Are in the Babylonian Talmud? ...... 130 1.1.2. A Reexamination of the Dating of R. Aha bar Jacob ...... 133 1.1.3. Summary and Conclusions ...... 136 2. Halakhic Methodology ...... 139 3. Summary and Conclusions ...... 149

Chapter Five: Rav Zebid of Nehardea ...... 153 1. “I Reported the Statement before R. Zebid of Nehardea, and He Said to Me”: The Indirect Reports of R. Zebid’s Statements ...... 153 2. Analysing His Responses and Reactions to Earlier Amoraic Statements ...... 156 3. Summary and Conclusions ...... 170

Chapter Six: Rav Dimi of Nehardea ...... 177 1. His Era and Location ...... 177 2. His Halakhic Methodology ...... 178 2.1. Previous Research ...... 178 2.2. A Reevaluation ...... 179 2.3. Analysis of Sugyot ...... 182 3. Summary and Conclusions ...... 192

Bibliography ...... 195

Index of Hebrew and Aramaic Terms ...... 211 Index of Selected Amoraim/Saboraim ...... 213 Subject Index ...... 218 Index of Babylonian Talmud Sources ...... 220

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book consists of a systematic analysis of the halakhic/legal methodology of fourth and fifth century Nehardean amoraim in Babylo- nia. My analysis of this literature expands upon similar studies that I have published elsewhere concerning the methodology of Babylonian amoraim with whom I do not deal directly here. In those articles I described various distinct characteristics present in the halakhic decision making and source interpretation (Bible, Mishnah, baraitot, and early amoraic statements) ascribed to certain outstanding Babylonian amoraim. I documented how certain amoraim can be characterized as portraying consistent interpretive and legal approaches throughout talmudic literature and that this consistency is most evident in the discourse found in the Babylonian Talmud (Bavli). Uncovering the methodological characteristics that distinguish some amoraim from other amoraim can aid the talmudic interpreter/scholar in clarifying the legal foundations of their rulings, the proofs that they bring within talmudic discourse, as well as their disputes and interpretations. This is especially significant in cases where such literature is strained or complicated, presenting difficulty to the traditional scholar and modern interpreter alike. My basic claim is that each statement attributed to an amora must be analyzed not only on a point by point basis, but also in light of that amora’s broader methodology. This type of analysis occasionally prevents the necessity of attributing what seems to be a strained statement or interpretation to an interpolation made by a later anonymous editor, a “solution” often proffered by modern talmudic scholars. Besides the aid this type of “broad analysis” provides in interpreting isolated difficult passages, there are other more general benefits as well. For instance, the systematic study of the methodology of the amoraim allows us to better understand the development of the talmudic legal system. Perhaps most significantly, this analysis has considerable consequences as to the reliability of the ascription of amoraic statements in the Babylonian Talmud, which has been questioned throughout the history of modern talmudic scholarship. The fact that different amoraim exhibit distinctive methodological approaches throughout the Talmud, approaches that occasionally sharply contrast with those of x preface and acknowledgments their colleagues, strengthens the general reliability of the ascription of statements in the Bavli. It seems quite unlikely that such a high degree of consistency could be the result of statements being written or con- structed by later editors, especially when the distinct dialectics of the amoraim are also documented in traditions ascribed to them in the Palestinian Talmud. Rather, the analysis found in this book strongly suggests that the transmitters of talmudic literature have passed down their traditions in a relatively reliable fashion, even if the level of this reliability does not extend to the very words attributed to the amora. Turning our attention to the particulars of Nehardea and its sages, our analysis of the methodology of late Nehardean amoraim leads to a reevaluation of some assumptions and theories that have been accepted among modern scholars as to the sources and characteristics of the legal literature produced in Nehardea during the fourth and fifth centuries. For instance, systematic analysis of the halakhic traditions ascribed to late Nehardean amoraim does not support the generally accepted theory that the source of this literature is to be found in early Babylonian halakhah from the pre-talmudic period, or slightly thereafter. Another example is the new light this study brings as to the source of the collection of baraitot found in Nehardea that R. Hoshaya, a third generation amora, regularly quoted. Perhaps of greatest consequence as to our understanding of Nehardea and its sages, our analysis leads us to reject the tendency among modern scholars to perceive Nehardean amoraim throughout the talmudic period as a “school” with a conservative tendency, tending to rule systematically according to local halakhic traditions which originated with Samuel or R. Nahman. We shall also question the notion that the Nehardean sages can be characterized as focusing more on the interpretation of Mishnah and baraita than their counterparts in Sura and Mahoza. These types of claims, and others which have been suggested by talmudic scholars and historians, will be reevaluated based on the findings that emerge from my systematic analysis of late Nehardean halakhic literature and its comparison with contemporary literature produced in both Babylonia and Palestine. This book further reevaluates the identity and dating of some of the sages who stand at the center of our discussion. Employing recent research into talmudic terminology and the hierarchical relationship between Babylonian amoraim, I have re-examined a series of assumptions and theories that are found in both medieval geonic chronologies preface and acknowledgments xi of the talmudic period and in modern research. This analysis has led to some adjustments in the chronology and identification of a few late Babylonian amoraim. There are many people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for their help in writing this book. First and foremost, I wish to thank my father, Professor Avinoam Cohen, for his advice and comments, which have been of inestimable help to me. A special thanks to Professor Yaakov Elman, who read parts of this study and aided me in clarifying many central points discussed throughout this book. On questions of Babylonian geography and history I have been assisted throughout my research by Professor Aharon Oppenheimer. Thank you to Profes- sor Leib Moscowitz—head of the Department of Talmud at Bar-Ilan University—for his advice and helpfulness, always offered with great patience. Dr. Carla Sulzbach, McGill University, also read and commented on a draft of this manuscript—I am thankful for her remarks, references, and pertinent suggestions. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Taylor-Schechter Geniza Research Unit of Cambridge University for making available to me their collection of Cairo Geniza fragments. I would especially like of the (ז"ל) to thank Dr. Ben Outhwaite and Dr. Friedrich Niessen Taylor-Schechter Unit for their time and assistance. Throughout my work on this book, I was able to make extensive use of the Geniza fragments found in the library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. I wish to thank Prof. David Kraemer, Dr. Jay Rovner and Mrs. Sarah Diamant for facilitating my work and making my visit as productive and pleasant as possible. I wish to thank the staff of “The Israel Institute for the Complete Talmud,” and especially Rabbi Ephraim Rothman, for providing me with access to Dikdukei Sofrim Hashalem of Yad HaRav Herzog, which is ready for publication. I thank the staff of the Bar-Ilan library, and especially Dr. Ronit Shoshani for her support and advice. Thanks also goes to Rivkah Dagan, administrator of the Bar-Ilan Talmud Department, for her help and support throughout my many years of study and work in the department. I wish to thank the following foundations for their support in helping with the publishing of this book: The Bet Shalom-Kyoto Foundation (Bar- Ilan University); The Doctoral Fellowships of Excellence Foundation, headed by Motti Mishan, Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser to the President of Bar-Ilan University. xii preface and acknowledgments

I would like to thank my family, including my mother, Miriam, for her help and support throughout the years it has taken me to write this work. This book is dedicated to my wife, Mali, for her undivided support, and to my children, Aﬁk, Meir Hayim and Gitit.

Cover image: The Yemenite Manuscript (Yad Harav Herzog 1) to Bavli, Sanhedrin 46b. Published with permission of Yad Harav Herzog institute, Jerusalem. CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. The Origins of Rabbinic Activity in Nehardea

The origins of a center of rabbinic activity in Nehardea1 have been obscure and in dispute since the very beginning of the writing of rabbinic history, with the writing during the geonic period (ninth-tenth centuries, Babylonia) of the two classic chronologies, Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim and the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon.2 R. Sherira describes Rav and Samuel as being the sages who originally lead two “yeshivot”3 (Babylonian academies, schools), one in Nehardea and the other in Sura: “and to Rav and Samuel there were two academies (tartin metiva’ata).”4 A similar conception concerning the nature of the centers

1 Nehardea is located on the northern portion of the Euphrates river, near the Malka river. It has been identified with Tal Nihar, found on modern maps of Iraq opposite Ctesiphon on the Tigris, the Sasanian capital. On the geographical location of Nehardea see: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 287. 2 On the nature and reliability of the chronological information concerning the talmudic period found in Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim and the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon see mainly: Beer, “The Sources of Rav Sherira Gaon’s Igeret” [Heb.], 181–197; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb], 239–265; Brody, “On the Sources” [Heb], 92–95; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 181–182. Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 38, expresses significant doubt concerning the reliability of the talmudic chronologies found in these two works, but in his later work he seems to temper his skepticism. See: Goodblatt, The Monarchic Principle, 147, n. 63, and 298. Recently, Gafni demonstrated that we must distinguish between chronological information found in the Epistle (and in Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim) which is based on external sources stemming from the amoraic period, and the historiographical narrative which runs through the Epistle, whose source is likely to be R. Sherira’s understanding and commentary on the Bavli itself. See: Gafni, “On the Talmudic Historiography in the Epistle of Rav Sherira” [Heb.], 271–296. On our approach as to the reliability of the ascription of amoraic statements found in the Bavli, see below, section 4.2. 3 The terms “yeshiva” or “academy” as I shall use them throughout this book designate some type of institutional learning/instruction that existed in Sasanian Baby- lonia. The questions concerning the structure and characteristics of these institutions (see below, footnote 14) are not directly relevant to our discussions throughout the book. 4 R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 81. R. Sherira does not describe their terms as academy heads with the word “rule” (malakh), as he typically does with other academy heads in Babylonia (see: Gafni, “Yeshiva and Metivta” [Heb.], 31–34; Brody, “On the Sources” [Heb], 99–100). R. Sherira uses the verb “malakh” only from 2 chapter one of learning in Babylonian can be found among historiographers of Babylonian amoraim from the geonic period and onward, although these writers do not agree as to the origins of these centers.5 In contrast, the author of Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim notes that Rav and Samuel “exercised with authority (nahagu serara)” in Nehardea, and ascribes the first actual yeshiva to R. Huna (died in 297),6 “and R. Huna’s yeshiva was in Nehardea.”7 Both traditions8 locate the origins of the first Babylonian academies in the beginning of the amoraic period. They disagree as to the details: whereas R. Sherira claims that such academies existed by the beginning of the third century, during the period of Rav and Samuel, the author of Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim posits a slightly later starting date, at the end of the third century, during the time of R. Huna and R. Hisda.9 The lack of accordance on this matter between the different geonic chronologies and the gap of eighty years between the two dates led Moshe Beer to the following conclusion: “Based on these conclusions, it becomes clear that there was no unified tradition during the geonic period as to the beginnings of the Babylonian yeshiva.”10 Modern scholars have also debated the question of the origins of rabbinic instruction in Babylonia. There are scholars who claimed that rabbinic instruction existed already during the mishnaic period,11 while there are those who pushed off the origins to the period of Rav and

R. Huna’s generation and onward (towards the end of the third century): “and after Samuel, R. Huna ruled (malakh) . . .” (Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 83). 5 Concerning the two main theories as to the nature of the yeshivot in Babylonia during the amoraic period see below, n. 14. 6 On the date of R. Huna’s death see, Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 85. 7 Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 4. See also the introduction attached to the story of R. Natan HaBavli, of the tenth century in: Neubauer, ed., Seder Olam Zuta, 77. Brody demonstrated that the author of this section based his survey upon the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, and that it should not therefore be regarded as an independent historical source. See: Brody, “On the Sources” [Heb], 102–104. 8 In addition to these two stances, there is a third, more radical stance, espoused by Pirqoy b. Baboy, who extends the origins of the Babylonian academies to the exile of Jehoiachin and the beginning of the Second Temple period. See: Lewin, “Geniza Fragments” [Heb.], 395, 402. This claim is obviously polemical and cannot be relied upon as historically accurate. See: Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb], 182; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 14–15; ibid., “The History of Babylonian Academies,” 822; Stern, “Rabbinic Academies in Late Antiquity,” 223–224. 9 See also: Goodblatt, “The History of Babylonian Academies,” 825. 10 Beer, “The Emergence of the Talmudic Academy” [Heb], 100. 11 See most recently: Oppenheimer, “Battei Midrash in Babylonia” [Heb], 19–29. introduction 3

Samuel.12 Other scholars posited that rabbinic activity and instruction developed their foundations gradually, beginning during the period of Rav and Samuel and continuing to grow during the second half of the third century, the period of R. Huna and R. Hisda. This position is based, among other factors, on the appearance of certain terms which carry an institutional connotation [such as: “academy head” (resh metivta/rosh yeshiva), kallah, pirka] in connection with sages of the second half of the third century. According to this view, the existence of these terms strengthens the possibility of some type of development in the formation and solidiﬁcation of the academies in Sura and Nehardea throughout the third century.13 Other scholars have taken an altogether different approach, and suggested that throughout the talmudic period rabbinic instruction took place in small settings, known as “disciple circles”—groups of students centered around one central sage. The structural change that turned these small circles of sages into the academies that clearly existed during the geonic period occurred only during the post-amoraic period, from 500 C.E. and onward.14

12 See Goodblatt’s survey, “The History of Babylonian Academies,” 827–828. To Goodblatt’s list, we should add Frankel, “Towards an Introduction to the Talmud,” 106; Hoffman, Mar Samuel, 28. Nineteenth century historians and maskilim tended to push back the development of centers of Torah learning in Babylonia to the beginning of the talmudic period. In contrast, historians who identiﬁed with the emerg- ing Orthodox movement tended to stake the opposite claim, namely that a center of Torah learning in Babylonia was operative from as early as the Second Temple period, and perhaps even earlier. It is clear that both of these tendencies can be tied to the political and religious leanings of the authors, and to the struggle between those historians and intellectuals who placed themselves in the Haskalah/Reform camp and those from the traditionalist/Orthodox camp. See Gafni, “Between Babylonia and the Land of Israel” [Heb.], 213–242. 13 See: Brody, “On the Sources” [Heb], 105–107 and n. 115; Goodblatt, “The History of Babylonian Academies,” 837. See also below, in sections 1.1–1.2 14 Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 263–285; Goodblatt, “New Developments” [Heb], 14–25; ibid., “The History of Babylonian Academies,” 830–838; Rubenstein, “The Rise of the Babylonian Rabbinic Academy,” 55–68; ibid., The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud, 16–23, 35–38; ibid., “Social and Institutional Settings,” 66–73; Stern, “Rab- binic Academies in Late Antiquity,” 237–238. Concerning the qualitative difference between an educational institution such as a disciple-circle (in the amoraic period) and an “academy for the general public” (from the post-talmudic period and onwards) Goodblatt writes, By “school” I mean an institution which transcends its principals. It has a staff, a curriculum, and, most important, a life of its own, a corporate identity. Students come and go, teachers leave and are replaced, the head of the school dies and a new one is appointed—the institution goes on. A disciple circle, on the other hand, does not transcend its principals. Disciples meet with a master and 4 chapter one

Despite the range of opinions as to the origins of rabbinic activity in the Babylonian academies, all scholars agree that by the first half of the third century some form of instruction took place. However it was organized and whatever its characteristics were it, already existed in Nehardea.15 Indeed, I have found that from the beginning of the amoraic period there is significant literary testimony as to the existence of a formal learning setting in Nehardea. This testimony centers around two sages who were active during the first half of the third century in Nehardea—R. Shila and Samuel.16

1.1. R. Shila The talmudic terminology used in connection with this sage points to his having headed some kind of educational framework, in Babylonia at the beginning of the amoraic period. This evidence is mostly based on the term “of the house of R. Shila” (devet rav shila/devei rav shila/bei rav shila)—that is the bet midrash/study circle of R. Shila—which is mentioned in both talmudim (twenty-ﬁve times17). In one tradition found in b. Yoma 20b and in a parallel in y. Sukkah 5:5 (55c) in which R. Shila’s place of study is mentioned, Rav is referred to as the “amora”—one of the ofﬁcial positions in the Babylonian yeshiva during the talmudic period.18 Even Goodblatt, who considered the Babylonian academies

study with assistants. The group may meet in a special building . . . but when . . . the master dies, the disciple circle disbands (Goodbalatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 267). In contrast, Gafni perceives the yeshivot as “academies” which consisted of large assemblies of students and were the focal point for the spiritual and religious life of Babylonian Jews in the talmudic period. See mainly: Gafni, “Yeshiva and Metivta” [Heb.], 12–37; ibid., “The Babylonian Yeshiva” [Heb.], 292–301. 15 This consensus is shared by all scholars mentioned above (including Goodblatt, see below near footnote 19). See also: Bacher, “Nehardea,” 208; Florsheim, “The Estab- lishment and Early Development of the Babylonian Academies” [Heb.], 190–191. 16 There is no literary testimony that Abuha de-Shmuel (Samuel’s father) served as a rosh yeshiva. Most of the talmudic evidence points to his having acted with some leadership capacity in Nehardea and points to his ties with R. Judah Hanasi (or R. Judah Nesia). See: S. Albeck, Mishpekhot Soferim, 21, 25; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 1:13; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:146; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 7:22; Yudolow- itz, Nehardea, 34–35. In contrast, Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 5:225–228, considered him to have served as an actual rosh yeshiva in Nehardea. However, while the evidence presented by Halevy points to his having had some power within the city, it does not actually prove that he had any institutional position within a yeshiva. As we shall see, such evidence does exist in connection with those amoraim discussed below. 17 See: Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 137–141. 18 On the position of “amora” within the yeshiva framework during the talmudic period Gafni, Babylonian Jewry and Its Institutions [Heb.], 80 writes, “this is a posi- introduction 5 to be small disciple circles, concluded from this evidence that a center of learning existed in Nehardea already in this early period: Some kind of institution also seems indicated by bē (R.) Shila…In view of my conclusions regarding the bē Rav + MR materials, I incline toward assuming that bē Shila does refer to a school or disciple circle.19

1.2. Samuel There are twenty-ﬁve instances in the Bavli (including manuscripts) in which the phrase “It was taught in the house of Samuel” (Tanna/ Tannu/Tannei D’Bei Shmuel) appears.20 When the Bavli uses the phrase “in the house of Rav X” (bei rav x) it refers to the bet midrash/study circle at whose head stood Rav X (with the exception of cases in which it is clear that the term refers to a private house21).22 In addition, Samuel’s bet midrash/study circle is mentioned by two sages, R. Elazar of the second generation (“the house of Mar Samuel”) and R. Nahman of the third generation (“those of the house of Samuel”).23 Similarly, there are sages

tion parallel to the Palestinian “meturgeman,” whose job it was to transmit and make heard the rosh yeshiva’s lesson to the larger audience of those gathered to learn.” For more information on this position see: Rappaport, Erekh Milin, 1:208; Dalman, Aramäische-Neuhebräisches Handwörterbuch, 22; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 1:101; Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 1:76; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 139. Concerning the talmudic evidence as to the formality of this position within the yeshiva framework throughout the talmudic period see: Assaf, Tekufat HaGeonim Vesifrutah, 46; Melamed, An Introduction to Talmudic Literature, 414; Amir, Institutions and Titles [Heb.], 89–95; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 18; Safrai, “Amora,” 88. 19 Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 137, 141. 20 b. Shabbat 12a (Mss.); ibid. 35b (Mss.); ibid. 54a; ibid. 131b; b. Eruvin 70b; ibid. 86a; ibid. 89b; b. Pesahim 3a; ibid. 39b (3 times); b. Rosh HaShanah 16a (Mss.); b. Yoma 70a; b. Sukkah 56b; b. Betzah 29a; b. Megilah 4b (Mss.); ibid. 23a (Mss.); ibid. 30a; b. Mo’ed Qattan 18b; b. Gittin 24b (Mss.); ibid. 66a (Mss.); ibid. 70b (Mss.); b. Bava Metzi’ah 111b (Mss.). 21 The most notable example of such a case is the phrase “X happened upon the house of Y.” In the overwhelming majority of these cases “the house of Y” refers to a private house, and not a bet midrash with a formal learning structure. See: A. Cohen, “Towards the Historical Meaning” [Heb.], 61, 63–64. 22 See mainly: Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 149–151; Gafni, “Concerning D. Goodblatt’s Article” [Heb.], 54; Rubenstein, “The Rise of the Babylonian Rab- binic Academy,” 56 n. 6. 23 b. Kiddushin 21b: “R. Nahman said to R. Anan: when you were in the house of Mar Samuel you played a game with tokens?!” b. Eruvin 70b: “Rava asked of R. Nah- man . . . He said to him: I teach . . . but those of the house of Samuel teach (hanei devei shmuel tannu).” Ibid. 89b: “R. Elazar said: when we were in Babylonia we would say . . . but those of the house of Samuel taught . . .” (hanei devei shmuel tannu). In both cases the tannaitic tradition stemming from Samuel’s bet midrash is cited using the term “Those of the House of Samuel [D’Bei Shmuel] taught [tannu],” where the verb tannu appears 6 chapter one who are described as “sitting” in front of Samuel, using the technical term “yativ.”24 The phrase “R. X sat in front of R. Y” and more complicated, such phrases referring to several sages learning while “sitting” in rows, all describe one or more sages sitting in front of another sage who leads an intellectual discussion. In such cases the “sitter” is a student, or at least a younger, subordinate sage, who “sits” in front of a more senior and authoritative sage.25 The Bavli also mentions “reciters” (shannanim) who quote baraitot in front of Samuel.26 The shannanim played a role in reciting tannaitic material in front of heads of study circles during the talmudic period and continued to do so throughout the geonic period as well.27 In summary, despite the questions concerning the dating of the formation of rabbinic activity in Babylonia, about which rabbis and scholars have disagreed from the geonic period through modern talmudic historical scholarship, one fact is clear. There is concrete evidence concerning R. Shila and Samuel indicating the existence of study sessions already in the beginning of the amoraic period. There is increasing evidence as to the existence of a study circle headed by Rav Sheshet in Nehardea during the second half of the third century.28 after the expression “[of] the house of Samuel”. This phrase is parallel to the common literary term “the house of Samuel taught” (Tanna D’Bei Shmuel) and it is ascribed only to these two sages. Amoraim of the fourth generation and later who cite the same collection of baraitot use the more common phrase. This implies that the phrase “those of the house of Samuel taught” (hanei devei shmuel tannu) is ﬁrst-hand testimony by R. Elazar and R. Nahman concerning the members of their own generation and concerning Samuel’s yeshiva. For a more expanded treatment of this subject see: B. Cohen, “In Quest of Babylonian Tannaitic Traditions,” 279–280. 24 b. Shabbat 55a (R. Yehuda); b. Mo’ed Qattan 16b (Mar Ukba); b. Arakhin 16b (R. Huna and Hiyya b. Rav). 25 See mainly: Gwirtzman, “Hamunah ‘Yativ’ Umashmauto,” 9–10; Beer, “The Emergence of the Talmudic Academy in Babylonia’ [Heb.], 99; Abramson, Mavo HaTalmud, 19; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 224; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 200; Kalmin, “Collegial Interaction in the Babylonian Talmud,” 392 and n. 35; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 186. The phrase “yativ kumi” in the Yerushalmi has a similar meaning. See: Hezser, The Social Structure, 209 n. 180. 26 b. Ketubbot 60a; b. Betzah 16b; b. Kiddushin 66a. On Samuel’s shananim see: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:212 n. 6. 27 Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 28 n. 30; Beer, “Academies In Babylonia and Erez Israel,” 203; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 204–214; Gafni, The Jews of Baby- lonia [Heb.], 112 n. 4; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 151 n. 41; Zuss- man, “Torah SheBe’alpeh,” 240–245. On this position during the geonic period see mainly: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 2:688–692; Immanuel, “New Responsa of R. Hai Ga’on” [Heb.], 105–126. 28 Concerning evidence connected to Rav Sheshet see mainly: B. Cohen, “Local Academies” [Heb.], 448–458. introduction 7

2. Fourth and Fifth Century Nehardean Sages

Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim and the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon both describe the destruction of Nehardea in 259, which was followed by the transfer of the yeshiva to Pumbedita: And in the year 259 Papa b. Natzer came and destroyed Nehardea. Rabbah bar Abuha, our elder, and R. Nahman went to Šekansiv and to Šilhe and to Mahoza, where R. Joseph bar Hama father of Rava was located. And the rest of our rabbis [went] to Pumbedita, which from the time of the Second Temple was the main center of the Diaspora.29 This event mentioned by the geonic chroniclers seems to refer to the wars waged by Tadmor (Palmyra),30 who began a campaign against Shapur I, the Sasanian king, which lasted until the capture of Emperor Valerian by the Persian king in the years 259–260.31 Scholars have posited several reasons why the Tadmors would have destroyed Nehardea. These include the possibility that the Tadmors perceived of the Jews as an enemy agent loyal to the Sasanian king,32 for strategic reasons, or perhaps even for economic reasons.33 R. Sherira Gaon describes the passage of Rabbah bar Abuha and R. Nahman (bar Jacob) to Mahoza and of “the rest of our rabbis” to Pumbedita.34 From this point and onward Nehardea is no longer

29 R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, French recension, 82. See also: Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 4. This event is also mentioned in Seder Olam Zuta, ed. Grossberg, 36. 30 Epigraphical evidence demonstrates that the appellation “Nas[o]r” refers to princes of the Tadmorian dynasty (see: Sorek, “Who Destroyed Nehardea?” [Heb.], 119). The name “[Papa] bar Nas[o]r” is identiﬁed with Odenathus of Palmyra or with another prince of the Tadmorian dynasty, (who also receive this appellation, as a dynastic name). See: Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 1:75–76; ibid., Monumenta Tal- mudica, 296; Berliner, Geographie und Ethnographie Babyloniens, 51; Bacher, “Nehardea,” 208; Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonien, 255 n. 3; Alon, The Jews in Their Land [Heb.], 2:170; Sorek, “Who Destroyed Nehardea?” [Heb.], 119; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 263–264. Concerning the dynastic appellation of the Tadmorian princes in light of epigraphical ﬁndings, see recently: Sartre, “The Arabs and the Desert Peoples,” 512. 31 See mainly: Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 263–264. 32 Ibid. 33 Sorek, “Who Destroyed Nehardea?” [Heb.], 118. 34 In addition to the testimony of R. Sherira Gaon, who places R. Nahman in Mahoza (after its destruction), Yaakov Elman has outlined his world view, his halakhic literature, his religious lifestyle and his status, all of which point at the fact that 8 chapter one mentioned as a center of rabbinic activity in the geonic chronicles until the saboraic period (500–689).35 Nevertheless, there is evidence throughout the Bavli documenting the activity of prominent amoraim in Nehardea throughout the fourth and the beginning of the

R. Nahman was firmly rooted in the social and religious culture of Mahoza, at the end of the third and the beginning of fourth centuries. Many of his halakhic rulings can be understood in light of the religious and social challenges with which he had to cope in Mahoza. See mainly: Elman, “A Tale of Two Cities” [Heb.], 95–102, 118–119; ibid., “The Socioeconomics”, 85–86, 109–112, 113–114, 120–122; ibid., “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages”, 168–169, 171–176, 179, 185–186, 192–193. While there is ample testimony as to the fact that R. Nahman also lived in Nehardea, this does not contradict his being a “Mahozan,” or even the fact that most of his rabbinic activity was in Mahoza, as Elman has claimed. Later amoraim construe R. Nahman as being a “Nehardean.” R. Aha son of Rava, who was subordinate to R. Ashi, explicitly testifies in front of R. Ashi that Amemar adopted R. Nahman’s opinion because both were Nehardean (“the Nehardeans follow their own reasoning”—b. Bava Batra 124b). From this source, and another also found in the Bavli, Goodblatt concluded, “In these The latter term .נהרדעאי two passages there is no doubt as to the identity of the denotes Samuel, Nahman, Hama and Amemar, masters who lived at different times in the third and fourth centuries” (Goodblatt, “Local Traditions”, 190). R. Nahman is documented as rendering halakhic decisions in Nehardea (b. Bava Batra 153a; b. Ketubbot 97b; b. Eruvin 6b), he relates to situations that commonly occur in Nehardea (for instance: b. Ketubbot 100b; b. Megilah 27b), and he is even mentioned as sitting with his students in Nehardea (b. Eruvin 34b). It is worth noting that R. Sheshet and Amemar are also documented as being active in both locales (Nehardea and Mahoza); R. Nahman is not, therefore, unusual in this regard. In any case, talmudic evidence which points to R. Nahman’s having been in Nehardea, served scholars as a basis for the claim that R. Nahman’s “Nehardean” halakhic outlook is reflected in the statements and thought-processes of later Nehardean amoraim. As we have stated, we have not found any basis for this claim. It is difficult to assume that all of this activity occurred before the city was destroyed in 259. If R. Nahman died in 320 (according to Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5), and had been active as a sage in Nehardea already before its destruction, we must assume that R. Nahman lived close to one hundred years, and perhaps even longer. Indeed, Florsheim, “The Establishment and Early Development of the Babylonian Academies” [Heb.], 192 n. 37, who dates most of R. Nahman’s activity to his time in Nehardea before its destruction, was forced to assume that R. Nahman lived for about one hundred years (an assumption that he makes concerning R. Judah and R. Huna as well). The credibility of this exaggerated assumption can be called into question by the knowledge that the Bavli provides concerning the maximum age of the amoraim (see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 105–106.) Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate [Heb.], 98–99, also noted this problem. It seems likely that the answer is that Nehardea was restored as a center of rabbinic activity not long after its destruction, as has been claimed by scholars and as can be demonstrated by literature attributed to later Nehardean amoraim (see below). R. Nahman seems to have returned there and resumed his activity there closely following its destruction. 35 For a discussion of the different scholarly theories concerning the dating of the Saboraic period see recently: Cohen, “The Saboraic Halakha” [Heb.], 161–162 n. 1. There are two sages who are known to have been active in the “environs of Nehardea” during the Saboraic period. See below in appendix A. introduction 9

ﬁfth centuries.36 This documentation strengthens the claim by scholars, one which has not been thoroughly examined, that the destruction of Nehardea in 259 was only temporary, and that Jewish settlement was restored there by the beginning of the fourth century.37 Modern scholars have had a multiplicity of doubts and opinions concerning the dating and identity of the later Nehardean amoraim who stand at the center of our research. However, a reassessment of the evidence based on a more precise understanding of talmudic ter- minology38 and of the hierarchical relationships that reigned between the amoraim39 can allow us to determine with greater precision in dating and identifying these amoraim. The following is a chart listing the names, places and dates of the Nehardean amoraim upon whom our research focuses:

36 See mainly: Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 1:132; Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Baby- lonien im Zeitalter des Talmuds und des Gaonats, 255; Bacher, “Nehardea,” 208; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 2:416 n. 3 and 499; Epstein, Mevo’ot Lesifrut Ha’Amoraim, 129; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:162–163 and n. 6–8; Yudolowitz, Nehardea, 73; Goodblatt, “Local Tra- ditions in the Babylonian Talmud,” 204–205 n. 40; Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 290 n. 40; Kahana, “Shalosh Makhlokot”, 303 n. 4. 37 See above, footnote 36. Possible support for the theory that the Jewish community in Nehardea was reestablished shortly after its destruction can be brought from our knowledge concerning the military conquests of Emperor Julian in Babylonia in 363, which were described by the fourth century Roman historian, Ammianus Mar- cellinus. Marcellinus describes the destruction of a Jewish city by the Roman army, after the conquest of Pirisabora on their way to Ctesiphon, the Sasanian capitol. See: Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, 2:609–611. Marcellinus does not name the Jewish city that was destroyed, but some scholars have posited that this city was none other than Nehardea (see: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 290). If this suggestion is correct, then on top of the other evidence we cited above, we have further support for the theory that there was a Jewish presence in Nehardea in the middle of the fourth century. However, the difﬁculty in precisely determining the identity and location of the cities mentioned by Marcellinus (including Pirisabora) diminishes the reliability of this particular proof. See: Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonien, 57; Widengren, “The Status of the Jews in the Sasanian Empire,” 132; Neusner, A History of the Jews in Babylonia, 4:10–17; Stern, Greek and Latin Authors, 2:611. 38 Most of this material is found in several studies which focused on the Babylonian yeshiva during the talmudic period. See mainly: Gafni, The Babylonian Yeshiva [Heb.], 29–106; Gafni, “Yeshiva and Metivta” [Heb.], 12–37; ibid., Babylonian Jewry and Its Institutions [Heb.], 113–114 n. 24, 27, 28; ibid., The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 185–236; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction; ibid., “New Developments” [Heb], 14–38; Rubenstein, “The Rise of the Babylonian Rabbinic Academy, 55–68; A. Cohen, “The Contrastive Term,” 45–60; ibid., “Mar Zutra,” 201–203. Additional bibliographical references will be discussed below. 39 See: Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors, 81–85, 193–216; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages, 100; A. Cohen, “Was Age the Decisive Criterion of Subordi- nation Among the Amoraim?” 279–313; B. Cohen, “How Many R. Hamnunas,” 95–113. 10 chapter one

Table One: Nehardean Amoraim of the Fourth and Fifth Centuries Year Sage 300 R. Sheshet (died ca. 310)40 “The Nehardeans Say” (ﬁrst half of 4th century) 350 R. Zebid of Nehardea (died before 375) R. Hama (died 377) R. Dimi of Nehardea (died 388) 400 Amemar (died ca. 410)

3. The Legal Methodology of Amemar and the Latter Nehardeans40

3.1. Earlier Scholarship Historians and scholars of talmudic reasoning and logic have pointed out the existence of certain trends and deﬁning characteristics in the argumentation and interpretation of certain Babylonian amoraim. For instance, scholars have noted consistent differences and positions ascribed to amoraim who frequently dispute with one another (for instance: Rav and Samuel,41 R. Nahman and R. Sheshet,42 R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish,43 Rami bar Hama and Rava,44 Abbaye and Rava45). Scholars have also identiﬁed cases of distinctive methodology found in

40 See: B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet [Heb.], 34–37. 41 Gordis, “The Exegesis of Mishna and Baraita of Rav and Samuel” [Heb.]; Weis, “The Controversies of Rab and Samuel”, 288–297. 42 B. Cohen, “Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet” [Heb.], 11–32. 43 Goldberg, “The Use of the Tosefta and the Baraita” [Heb.], 109–116. 44 B. Cohen, “Rami bar Hama in Contrast to Rava” [Heb.], 149–184. 45 Henshke, “Abbaye and Rava” [Heb.], 187–193. introduction 11 connection with certain amoraim (R. Nahman,46 R. Sheshet,47 Rava,48 and Mar bar Rav Ashi49). Sages or groups of sages from a specific yeshiva or geographical location have been described as demonstrating a tendency to maintain consistent local halakhic traditions,50 or as having a common approach to interpretation of tannaitic sources, or halakhic rulings.51 Scholars have also pointed out similar such tendencies among Palestinian amoraim.52 In light of these general findings, some scholars have portrayed Nehardean amoraim throughout the talmudic period as a cohesive group whose halakhot reflect an early Babylonian tradition or who present a comprehensive and consistent method of learning. Other scholars specifically claimed that the halakhic statements attributed to “the Nehardeans say” (who date from the first half of the fourth century) represent early “Babylonian traditions,” stemming from the

46 For a summary of the scholarship concerning R. Nahman, see: B. Cohen, “Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet” [Heb.], 14–17. 47 B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet [Heb.] 48 Goldberg, “The Use of the Tosefta and the Baraita” [Heb.], 144–157; Elman, “Rava and Palestinian System of Midrash Halakha” [Heb.], 217–242. 49 A. Cohen, Mar bar Rav Ashi [Heb.], 143–258; ibid., “On the Non-Chronological Location of Mar bar Rav Ashi’s Statements” [Heb.], 49–66. 50 Concerning the tendency of Babylonian amoraim to rule based on local tradition see mainly: A. Cohen, “Al Hitpalgut Haneti’ot HaHilkhati’ot,” 107–129; Izhaki, “Masorot Shonot BiShivot Sura Upumbeditha,” 99–106; Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors, 47–48; Kahana, “Shalosh Makhlokot”, 302–333; A. Cohen, “Mar Zutra” [Heb.], 226–227; Hidary, Legal Pluralism in the Talmud, 139–178. 51 See mainly: Zuri, Toldot Darkhe i HaLimud, 1, 15–16, 42, 44–45, 69, 73, 77–80; Yudolowitz, Yeshivat Pumbeditha, 23; Goldberg, “The Use of the Tosefta and the Baraita” [Heb.], 144 n. 1; Elman, “A Tale of Two Cities” [Heb.], 3–38; ibid., “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages,” 165–197; ibid., “The Socioeconomics of Babylonian Heresy,” 80–127. Elman demonstrated this phenomenon especially in Mahoza during the fourth century. 52 The division of halakhic tendencies into “schools” was posited by scholars as a result of certain common terms found in the Yerushalmi: “those of the house of R. Yannai,” (rabbanan devei rabbi yanai) “the sages of Caesarea,” (rabbanan d’kesarin) “the sages of Naveh,” (rabbanan d’naveh) and others. These terms are used to cite groups of sages who are concentrated in one local yeshiva, which is identified by the name of the sage who stood at its head and which continued to function even after the sage’s death. Scholars have pointed out that these groups of sages also represent a unified halakhic tradition, one that sometimes lasted for several generations. For several significant studies which have demonstrated this phenomenon see: Bacher, “Die Gelehrten von Caesarea,” 298–310; Lieberman, “The Talmud of Caesarea” [Heb.], 18; Levine, Caesarea Under Roman Rule, 95–97; Zussman, “Veshuv LiRushalmi Nezikin,” 83; Oppenheimer, “Batei Midrash in Eretz-Israel” [Heb.], 81; ibid., “Those of the School of Rabbi Yannai” [Heb.], 137–145; Beer, “About the “Hevraya’ in the Talmudim” [Heb.], 76–95, and especially 81–82; Hezser, The Social Structure, 180–184; Miller, Sages and Commoners, 456. 12 chapter one pre-talmudic era.53 According to another theory, in the fourth century Nehardea served as a source of tannaitic traditions which were unknown to other Babylonian amoraim.54 A different suggestion conceived of traditions ascribed to late Nehardean amoraim as reflecting a singular and consistent halakhic approach whose source was Samuel,55 who according to R. Sherira Gaon was the founder of the Nehard- ean yeshiva (until his death in 254).56 Finally, yet another approach claimed that throughout the talmudic period the Nehardean method of learning consistently differed from that adopted by the sages in Sura, in that the former engaged intensely in the interpretation of tannaitic sources.57 One of the main contributions of this book is to question the applicability of these theories with regard to the sages of Nehardea. To begin in answering this question, I first examined literature ascribed to late Nehardean amoraim to determine whether early halakhic traditions from Nehardea served as the basis for their halakhic rulings and interpretations. Is there evidence, direct or indirect, that indicate the existence of local halakhic traditions in Nehardea throughout the talmudic period? Before I present my findings on this question, I should first explain what I mean by “local halakhic traditions.” When I use this term my intention is early halakhah—from the mishnaic period or in the generations which followed—whose source is Babylonian, and which has a direct connection to the yeshiva or geographical location of the sage who issued the ruling. Babylonian amoraim tend to distinguish between two types of early halakhic traditions that exist outside of the Mishnah and are used as a source for halakhah: “matnita”—tannaitic halakhic traditions found in baraitot,58 and “shma’ata”/“shma’ateta”— early amoraic traditions found in amoraic statements.59 Furthermore, amoraim tend to clearly distinguish between these types of sources

53 Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 1:IV n. 2. 54 Bacher, “Nehardea,” 208; Yudolowitz, Nehardea, 73. For an analysis of these sources see below, appendix B. 55 See: Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:162–163; Zuri, Rav Ashi, 15. 56 See above, near footnote 4. Concerning the date of Samuel’s death see: Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 4; Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 82. 57 See: Zuri, Darkhei HaLimud, 77, 83, 98. 58 See mainly: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 2:813; Albeck, Mekhkarim Babaraita, 1; ibid., Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 19. 59 On the use of the terms “shmu’a” or “shmu’ata” see mainly: Bacher, Die Exegetische Terminologie, 222–224; Urbach, Ha-Halakha, 103; Rosenthal, “Torah She’alpeh Ve-Torah Misinai,” 456 n. 33; Zussman, “Torah Shebe’alpeh,” 262 n. 15. introduction 13 when it comes to the level of their halakhic authority. Jacob Zussman has described this phenomenon: The tradition itself is termed “shmu’a” already in the tannaitic period . . . And in the amoraic period the [sages] distinguish between tannaitic and amoraic traditions (“matnita”/”shmu’a”) and tend to prefer the tannaitic tradition (. . . and they distinguish between: “matnita”/“shma’ata” . . .). In conclusion, the term “shmu’a” or “shma’ata” is reserved for reference to amoraic traditions, specifically in the field of halakhah.60 As stated above, scholars have demonstrated a tendency among Babylonian amoraim to issue halakhic rulings based on local traditions ascribed to other amoraim from the same geographical location. So too, scholars have attempted to show examples of halakhic rulings or interpretations which are based on early Babylonian halakhah from the mishnaic period.61 A manifestation of such a theory can be found in the widespread scholarly claim that the source of halakhah reflected in tannaitic collections transmitted in Nehardea during the first generation of amoraim—“it was taught (tanna) in the House of Samuel”/“Samuel taught (tanni)”/“the teaching (matnita) of Samuel”— is an early Babylonian tradition, in essence a “Babylonian Mish- nah” (mattni’ata debavla’ei).62 Recently, I have examined this claim, not only in connection with the baraitot ascribed to “the House of Samuel” (Tanna D’Bei Shmuel) but also with baraitot ascribed to “the tanna of the House of Levi” (Tanna D’bei Levi) and the halakhic rulings issued by Samuel’s father (Abuha D’shmuel). In each of these cases, I have found no evidence that these halakhot are based on some type of “Babylonian Mishnah” or any other early Babylonian halakhic tradition.63 A similar claim was put forth by scholars in

60 Zussman, “Torah Shebe’alpeh,” 262 n. 15. See also: Urbach, Ha-Halakha, 103. 61 It should be noted that during the Sasanian period, the Christian schools in Edessa and Nisibis preserved Biblical commentary in the form of local oral traditions (in addition to written sources). The existence of such sources, whose precise nature is not fully determinable, is mentioned by Barhadbšabba during the second half of the sixth century, in his composition, The Cause of the Foundation of the Schools, 382–383. See mainly: Rompay, “The Christian Syriac Tradition of Interpretation,” 632–633; Becker, Sources for the Study of the Schools of Nisibis, 149–150. 62 The term “mattni’ata debavla’ei” is mentioned by R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 41. For a survey of scholarship on this term, and a new evaluation of its implications, see: Cohen, “In Quest of Babylonian Tannaitic Traditions,” 271–303. 63 See: Cohen, “In Quest of Babylonian Tannaitic Traditions,” 271–303. See also: Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia, 90-91; Goodblatt, “The Jews in Babylonia”, 83. 14 chapter one connection with baraitot that R. Hoshaya (third generation) learned in Nehardea. I have not found any basis for this claim either.64 A systematic analysis of the halakhic methodology which underlies the halakhic rulings, instructions, derashot, customs and interpretations of late Nehardean amoraim (around 350 halakhic traditions) do not support the notion that this literature is reflective of early Babylonian tradition. In reality, the opposite is true. A large portion of Nehard- ean halakhah and interpretation throughout the fourth and the beginning of the fifth generations is based on a given sage’s reasoning or on considerations which tend to change from situation to situation, and not on earlier sources. This phenomenon is especially noticeable in the halakhic rulings and other such literature attributed to two fourth century Nehardean sages—R. Hama and Amemar. The halakhic rulings of these two sages are characterized by a “flexible” approach to halakhah, an approach which takes into account the circumstances of the situation at hand, even if this at times causes the sage to deviate from the accepted tannaitic or early amoraic halakhah. On occasion these deviations from normative halakhah are so obvious that expressions of surprise or criticism are raised in the Talmud itself. Even in cases where we do find Nehardean halakhah to be connected with earlier traditions, these traditions are tannaitic sources parallel to those found in the Mishnah, Tosefta or Yerushalmi, or are parallel to earlier amoraic sources. In other words, they exhibit no special connection to the halakhic traditions of earlier Nehardean amoraim or early Babylonian halakhah. Furthermore, we have found a significant number of cases in which the rulings of late Nehardean amoraim contradict, occasionally even systematically, the earlier Nehardean traditions attributed to Samuel and R. Nahman. The proofs that earlier scholars presented to support their theories regarding this matter turn out to be insufficient. Many of these proofs were based on general impressions arising from the literature, or at times on guesswork, and not on any systematic analysis of all of the literature attributed in the Bavli to late Nehard- ean amoraim, or a comparison of this literature with that attributed to their contemporaries (or with Palestinian halakhic traditions).65 At

64 See below, appendix B. 65 See for instance the sole proof which served Funk as the basis for his claim as to the existence of a Babylonian Mishnah connected with the “Nehardeans say” (b. Betzah 6a), below, chapter three, section 4.1., pp. 51–52. Similarly, see the sole source introduction 15 other times, the evidence upon which scholarly claims rest is based upon unnecessary interpretation of sources, or on a priori assumptions.66 These claims and their faults will be examined throughout the chapters of this book.

3.2. Differences in Legal Methodology This book presents a systematic analysis of the entire halakhic corpus ascribed to each late Nehardean sage mentioned in the Bavli (including ascriptions found only in manuscripts) and a comparison of these ﬁndings with other contemporary sages. This comparison, an approach used by scholars in their research into Babylonian amoraim, allows us to better understand the nature and distinct features of the halakhic methodology which characterizes these late Nehardean amoraim. This analysis includes an examination of the following genres of statements attributed to these amoraim: halakhic decisions—in both concrete and academic cases,67 logical conclusions and analogies, proofs brought from earlier sources, interpretations, as well as a few other genres of literature.68 Due attention will also be paid to the legal basis upon which their disputes are based.

that served Yaavetz and Zuri in their characterization of late Nehardean amoraim, below, chapter two, section 2.1. 66 See for instance the evidence muered by Bacher and Yudelowitz, below appendix B or the proofs brought by Zuri and Yaavetz as to the connection between late Nehardean halakhah and the halakhot of Samuel and R. Nahman, below, chapter two, section 1, pp. 104–106. Another example is Zevieli’s confusion between the meaning of the term “the Nehardean say” (amrei neharde’ei) and the term “the Nehard- eans go according to their own reasoning” (neharde’ei leta’amayhu). Based on this identi- ﬁcation, Zevieli concluded that R. Hama was the collator of all literature ascribed to “the Nehardeans say.” For a critique see below, chapter three, section 4.1., p. 51. 67 It is customary for scholars to distinguish between halakhic statements and decisions made by amoraim in the framework of an academic discussion of a theoretical issue, and rulings issued by them in court cases or actual questions brought before them for a decision. See for instance: Guttman, “She’elot Akademiot BaTalmud,” 43; Ben-Menahem, “Judicial Deviation,” 34. Nevertheless, research into the study and halakhic decisions made by Babylonian amoraim has not brought evidence to support such a distinction. Our ﬁndings have indicated that the patterns of thought and learning among amoraim were consistent and did not depend upon the venue in which the question posed arose: theoretical or actual. See for instance: B. Cohen, “Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet” [Heb.], 31. See also below, chapter two, sections 4.3., pp. 55–66; chapter three, section 2.3., pp. 119–122. 68 In certain cases I have analyzed the methods of Nehardean amoraim in light of similar phenomena described in general legal studies. Of course, due caution must be exhibited in comparisons of this nature (see: Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, 34). On the contribution and application of these legal disciplines to the study of rabbinic 16 chapter one

Our analysis has led us to conclude, that in contrast to a commonly held assumption among talmudic scholars and historians, we cannot speak of any “Nehardean school” which coalesced around a local halakhic tradition stemming from the pre-talmudic period or thereafter. Moreover, in our opinion we cannot even speak of late Nehardean amoraim as having any homogeneous style of learning or decision making. Indeed, the opposite is true. Despite the fact that they operated in the same geographical region and during the same historical period, late Nehardean amoraim differ from each other in the methods through which they make halakhic decisions and in the halakhic thinking that underlies their rulings. In truth, it seems that in many cases a sage’s rulings depended more on his personal leanings, and perhaps on other external factors, and less on his inherited halakhic tradition from Nehardea or elsewhere. It turns out therefore that we must relate to Nehardean amoraim as a heterogeneous group, distinct one from the other in terms of legal thought and its application, much in the same way that amoraim from different geographical regions differ from each other. Uncovering the methodological approaches that characterize a given amora’s statements often affords a better scientific understanding of the passage in which the statement is embedded. This tends to be especially true in passages that have some difficulty or lack of clarity. Analysis of isolated passages is not always sufficient because at times it is possible to provide a more accurate understanding of a sage’s specific statement by understanding it in light of statements made by the same sage in other places. A broad description of a sage’s methodology occasionally opens the possibility for an alternative understanding of one of his specific statements. Thus we can avoid a common problem in the scholarly study of rabbinic literature—the unnecessary emen- dation of a rabbinic statement, or the ascription of part of the statement to interpolations by later editors. This is often a tool used by the modern scholar in order to solve certain difficulties.69 Through better methodology, see mainly: Halbertal, Interpretive Revolutions [Heb.], 168–203; Mosco- vitz, Talmudic Reasoning, 33–37; Elman, “Hercules and the Halakhic Tradition,” 7–41; Hayes, “Legal Truth,” 73–121 and n. 73; B. Cohen, “Rami bar Hama in Contrast to Rava” [Heb.], 149–184; Ben-Menahem, “Talmudic Law: A Jurisprudential Perspec- tive,” 877–898. 69 On difficult passages as a sign of later editing see for instance: Halivni, Sources

and Traditions [Heb.], 4:8 (“strained interpretations are an ouststanding sign . . . that the sources have not been presented to us in their original formulation”); Feldblum, introduction 17 understanding of the methods of these amoraim, we can solve these difﬁculties in other ways. There are other important consequences to our ﬁndings which we shall describe as we proceed.

3.3. The Late Nehardean Amoraim We shall now proceed with a brief introduction to the late Nehardean amoraim which this work describes in depth. The main attributes, distinguishing characteristics, literary phenomena etc. associated with each of these sages (or in one case, with a group of sages) are brieﬂy outlined here. Support for these descriptions, bibliographical references and in general greater depth of analysis can be found in each of the chapters devoted to these ﬁgures.70

3.3.1. “The Nehardeans Say” (Chapter Three) The halakhot ascribed to “the Nehardeans say,” present a unified and coherent halakhic approach, focusing mainly on concrete issues of daily halakhah. They are mostly concerned with financial matters, and less occupied with matters of religious prohibitions. As far as the literary setting of these statements, in the overwhelming majority of cases, “the Nehardeans say” respond to the statements of earlier amoraim with whom they essentially agree. In such cases they expand the applicability of the earlier halakhah, find support for it from the Mishnah, explain the halakhah, use it in decision making, or find exceptions to its applicability. Even in their halakhic disputes with other amoraim, they basically agree with the previously stated halakhah. What seems to be a disagreement with the earlier opinion can in actuality be understood as an extension of the applicability of that halakhah. Put sharply, “the Nehardeans say” almost always react to earlier statements and very rarely initiate their own literature. This phenomenon is manifested in the very wording of their statements. In nearly every case in which they dispute an earlier opinion, their opinion cannot be understood outside of the context of the previous statement. In other words, since

“Mishnah Yetera,” 14 (“In general, it is possible to say that the sign of a late passage or late material is that the difﬁculties raised are weak and the resolutions are strained”). 70 Throughout this book, my analysis of late Nehardean amoraim does not follow chronological order, but rather the amora’s literary contribution and halakhic impact. In each chapter I reexamine the dating of the amora discussed. For a table that summarizes the chronology of these amoraim see above, section 1.2., p. 10. 18 chapter one they usually expand the applicability of the previous opinion (with phrases such as “even in case X” or “even because of X”), one must know the previous opinion in order to even understand what the Nehardeans are speaking about. In three cases a halakhic ruling issued in a concrete case is ascribed to them, but this ruling is nothing but the application of a halakhah found in the Mishnah. Even fewer are the cases in which the Nehardeans’ statement is stated apodictically. “Nehardeans say” statements almost never open a discussion, nor are they based on reasoning and logic alone. These characteristics exist in sharp contrast with statements attributed to R. Hama and Amemar, other Nehardean amoraim who were active during the second half of the fourth century.

3.3.2. R. Zebid of Nehardea (Chapter Five) Evidence points to R. Zebid of Nehardea as having been rosh yeshiva in the local yeshiva in Nehardea and to have died before 375/376. The literature attributed to R. Zebid of Nehardea has certain characteristics which distinguish him from other late Nehardean amoraim. First, R. Zebid of Nehardea’s literary contributions in the Bavli are not documented in a direct manner. Rather, his statements are always transmitted by one of two amoraim who were subordinate to him—R. Kahana of Pum Nahara or Amemar. The report of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s responses to other amoraim is nearly always stated in a retroactive fashion, in ﬁrst person, using the expression, “I stated my tradition in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea and he said [to me].” This expression is usually used in the Bavli to describe a student reporting a ruling, halakhah or opinion in front of his master (or another elder sage) in order to receive his teacher’s opinion. Second, the content of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s statements differs from those ascribed to other late Nehardean amoraim. (1) R. Zebid of Nehardea typically responds to an amoraic tradition recited in front of him by providing an alternative version of the tradition. In all of these cases the statement is ascribed to Nehardean amoraim (Sam- uel, R. Nahman or R. Hama). R. Zebid of Nehardea’s responses are usually worded in the following manner: “You (pl.) recite it that way, we recite it this way.” Deeper analysis of these passages demonstrates that the versions of amoraic statements put forth by R. Zebid of Nehardea oppose the versions found among his contemporaries in Babylonia. This phenomenon is most noteworthy on b. Kiddushin 72b where Amemar stands in front of R. Ashi and insists upon the correct- introduction 19 ness of the version of a statement attributed to Samuel which he heard from R. Zebid of Nehardea, despite the fact that this version disagrees with the version of the statement taught in “the house of R. Kahana,” “the house of R. Papa,” and “the house of R. Zebid.” It seems that as a Nehardean, R. Zebid of Nehardea had access to alternative versions of statements made by his predecessors in Nehardea, and especially by those of sages who lived slightly before his time. This could explain the special respect which Amemar accorded these statements. Third, R. Zebid of Nehardea tends to critique or reject interpretations, opinions or halakhic rulings that do not accord with the context or halakhah found in the tannaitic source. In other words, his halakhic opinions tend to stay close to those found or reﬂected in tannaitic sources. His approach to interpretation stems from an assumption, described by modern legal scholars, that a judge or interpreter is subject to the law found in sanctioned sources. In this way R. Zebid of Nehardea differs sharply from other late Nehardean amoraim especially R. Hama and Amemar.

3.3.3. R. Dimi of Nehardea (Chapter Six) R. Dimi of Nehardea was a ﬁfth generation Babylonia amora, who according to geonic chronicles stood at the head of the yeshiva in Pumbedita for three years, until his death in 388. Most of his contributions to the talmudic record are in areas of halakhah which would occur within the framework of daily life. In almost all of the literature attributed to him (70%) R. Dimi of Nehardea disputes amoraim who preceded him, including Nehardean amoraim (Rav and Samuel, R. Yohanan, R. Nahman, Abbaye, Rava and R. Papa). Analysis of these passages demonstrates that he disputes with the previously presented opinion based on his own reasoning, and not based on traditional sources or even on local traditions. In addition, in a few cases R. Dimi of Nehardea disagrees with a halakhah stated by an earlier amora, and presents the opposite tradition, using the term “teaches the opposite” (“matni ipkha”). This predisposition stands in stark contrast with that detected in “the Nehardeans say” traditions, in which “the Nehard- eans” tend to expand the application of the earlier opinion. Disputing earlier opinions based on logic is also characteristic of R. Hama and Amemar. Nevertheless, in the case of R. Dimi of Nehardea, there is no indication that his reasoning contradicts tannaitic traditions, as is the case with R. Hama and Amemar. 20 chapter one

3.3.4. Amemar and R. Hama (Chapters Two and Four) R. Hama was active in Nehardea during the fifth generation of amoraim and died in 377. Amemar was active during the second half of the fourth century; the date of his death is estimated to the beginning of the fifth century. Amemar was clearly the dominant halakhic figure among late Nehardean amoraim (he appears in the Bavli about 200 times), and his activity and halakhic influence seems to have extended beyond the borders of Nehardea to Mahoza and other places as well. Amemar and R. Hama are documented in the Bavli mainly as judges and legal instructors (appearing in the house of the exilarch, in court cases and in public expositions). Analysis of their corpus of halakhah reveals that they share a similar halakhic methodology, even though this methodology is more noticeable in terms of both quality and quantity with regard to Amemar. Both amoraim exhibit a critical approach to normative sources (tannaitic sources and early amoraic statements). They both employ independent legal reasoning and a keen ability to navigate between different circumstances. This causes them to deviate at times from the accepted tannaitic or amoraic halakhah.71

71 Recently, Elman noted that towards the end of the Sasanian period Zoroastrian law also gave consideration to changing circumstances even if this caused the change of earlier Sasanian law. See Elman, “Scripture Versus Contemporary Needs,” 159–163. From her analysis of Persian legal terminology found in the Bavli, Macuch, “Iranian Legal Terminology,” 91–101, concluded that Babylonian amoraim were aware of the legal processes in Persian courts, and were even influenced by them (ibid., 100). While it is true that halakhic rulings which are adjusted based on circumstances are not necessarily influenced by external legal processes, the fact that the same phenomena existed in the Iranian legal system does support the existence of such tendencies among Babylonian amoraim. As to the comparison between the methods of study employed by Babylonian amoraim and those of the Syrian Christian schools from the end of the fifth century and onwards, it seems that there are not only differences in their interpretive techniques, but also in their areas of interest. Recently, Adam Becker, “The Comparative Study of ‘Scholasticism’”, 103, wrote, A simple comparison of the content and method of study at the schools points to striking differences. In contrast to the rabbinic academies, there was no legal dimension to the East Syrian study. . . . Apart from church canons, the East Syr- ians composed almost no legal texts and did not seem to have been interested in law, nor is there evidence that they were acquainted with contemporary Jewish law. Similarly, as we know, the rabbis did not produce texts in any of the multiple genres in which the East Syrians composed, nor is there significant evidence that they were aware of East Syrian learned literature, such as East Syrian monastic and theological literature or texts employing Greek philosophical logic. We can add to Becker’s conclusion, that the distinctions between rabbis and Syrian Christians with regard to literary contribution and interpretive methodology also exists when we compare the Christians with the saboraim, who operated in the sixth and seventh centuries. For a discussion concerning the literature of the savoraim see introduction 21

These characteristics match the approach termed by modern legal scholars, “legal realism.” Reading their statements, the reader is marked by the impression that the halakhah in Nehardea, under the guidance of R. Hama and Amemar, was more dependent upon the personality and legal methodology of the individual judge than upon the theoretical halakhah contained in the normative sources. This is especially true of Amemar, who at times intentionally rules in opposition to a mishnah, a baraita, an early halakhic tradition (including those issued in the name of Samuel and R. Nahman) or in opposition to the rules of halakhic decision making accepted in his time. Testimony to this phenomenon can be found in the large number of difficulties that R. Ashi raises against Amemar (about forty cases) and the resolutions provided by Amemar (or the stam on his behalf ) which typically offer strained interpretations of the tannaitic sources used by R. Ashi as refutations. At times Amemar avoids any direct answer to R. Ashi, and rather states, “I did not hear of it (that is to say, it is not reasonable to me).” Modern scholars have also had difficulty in explaining these phenomena, and have systematically preferred not to accept the ascription of these resolutions to Amemar (or R. Hama). Instead, scholars have ascribed these statements to interpolations made by late editors. In our opinion, before explaining these statements away as later interpolations, we should take into account the strong possibility that these interpretations stem from Amemar’s halakhic audacity and the authority which he enjoyed. This boldness and authority is even reflected in Amemar’s well-known statement, “a sage is greater than a prophet” (b. Bava Batra 12a).72 In a series of important studies, Yaakov Elman demonstrated that external factors such as the Manichaean polemics in Mahoza in the fourth century (where Amemar was active, beyond his activity in Nehardea), could exert an influence on an Amora’s rulings.73 These mainly: Cohen, “The Saboraic Halakhah” [Heb.], 161–214; Elman, “The World of the ‘Saboraim’”, 383–415. 72 See below, chapter two, section 5.3., pp. 95–97. The connection between an amora’s personality and his literary contribution to the Talmud has been demonstrated elsewhere. See: A. Cohen, Mar bar Rav Ashi [Heb.], 22–27; B. Cohen, “Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet” [Heb.], 14. It is also a phenomenon well-documented in general legal literature, where the judge’s personality is often thought to be one of the dominant factors in determining the course of his rulings. 73 See above, footnote 34, and below, chapter two, p. 97 footnote 269. Indeed, a number of sugyot state explicitly that Amemar’s ruling, which contradicts the tannaitic tradition, stems from the changing circumstances in his locale. See, for instance, Amemar’s halakhic rulings in actual cases, below, chapter two, section 4.3. pp. 55–65. 22 chapter one religious polemics centered around the question of the authority of various leaders to interpret their holy scriptures, and to apply them to their daily lives. This understanding finds expression in Mani’s own writings. Elman demonstrated that the religious atmosphere of the surrounding culture permeated the statements of R. Nahman and Rava. In my opinion, the surrounding religious culture, whose impact was felt by the Jewish community in Mahoza, may have also served as a contributing influence upon the legal thinking and world outlook of Amemar.

4. Broader Implications Ensuing from this Study

4.1. Deviation from the Halakhic Tradition and Strained Interpretations of Tannaitic Texts Above, I noted a tendency among modern talmudic researchers to resolve difficulties in amoraic statements by ascribing these statements, or at least parts thereof, to later editors. Here, I will focus on how this tendency comes into fruition with some of the strained interpretations found in Amemar’s statements. In about five percent of Amemar’s approximate 200 appearances in the Bavli he is portrayed as interpreting a tannaitic source. In and of itself this paucity of tannaitic interpretation is noteworthy when compared with other amoraim, and even Nehardean amoraim, who more frequently are found interpreting tannaitic sources. In all of these cases Amemar’s interpretations are highly strained. Most of Amemar’s rulings and halakhic dicta simply do not accord with the halakhah found in tannaitic sources. The difficulties that traditional commentators raised on these statements often led to even more strained resolutions, and in many cases they were forced to limit an interpretation or ruling of Amemar to a narrow circumstance. Needless to say, these interpretations do not tend to accord with simple readings of the sources themselves. Talmudic researchers have had difficulty in accepting these passages as they are presented, and have tended, as I stated above, to resolve

However, caution must be taken in this approach, see: Hayes, Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, 8–9. It should be further noted that this study presents a broad picture of the halakhic methodology of Amemar and the later Nehardeans, based on a systematic analysis of their literary contribution. I believe this picture remains true, even if some of the rulings might have been caused by political, social or religious circumstances. See, for instance, below, chapter four, p. 148. Furthermore, these important studies tend to support the ﬁndings presented here. See, for instance, below, chapter two, p. 97 footnote 270, and chapter four, p. 148. introduction 23

Amemar’s unusual methodology by either emending his statements, or by ascribing them or parts thereof to a later editor. A founda- tional assumption among modern talmudic researchers is that strained interpretations and statements ascribed to amoraim are a sign that the words may not accurately reflect what the amora actually said, and that later interpolations may have crept into his statement. This assumption results in an attempt to reconstruct the original words of the amora. For our purposes, we should note that the multiplicity of attempts to resolve in such a manner the difficulties found in Ame- mar’s statements attest to how difficult it was for scholars to accept that the source of these passages, as they are in front of us, might have indeed been Amemar himself. In my opinion this type of solution is often unnecessary in the case of Amemar. The two phenomena that we have noted in connection with Amemar—the fact that his rulings contradict tannaitic tradition and the existence of strained interpretations to tannaitic sources—are interrelated. I shall explain. The main literary contribution of the amoraim was their interpretation of the Mishnah, both as a goal unto itself and as a means to resolve contradictions. This was a multi-faceted activity and it included: interpretations of the Mishnah’s words, halakhot and measures, identification of various viewpoints, explanation of the reasons that lay behind the halakhot, deductions from the Mishnah’s language, and more. Analysis of the passages in which Amemar is documented as interpreting a tannaitic source reveals that his motivation was not to explain the tannaitic source for its own sake. Rather, Amemar’s interpretations were a result of his need to resolve the tannaitic source such that it would not contradict his own ruling. In nearly all cases in which Amemar interprets a tannaitic source, his interpretation comes as a result of a difficulty raised upon him in an encounter with his student, R. Ashi. In other words, Amemar’s strained interpretations are a result of the circumstances in which they arose.74 A halakhic ruling that contradicted tannaitic or early amoraic tradition caused a difficulty to be raised, usually by R. Ashi, which in turn led Amemar (or at times the anonymous editor, the stam) to suggest a strained interpretation in an attempt to resolve the contradiction.

74 The geonim were already troubled by the “strained resolution” (shinnuya dekhika) offered by an amora as a result of a difﬁculty raised on his opinion by another amora. This is an issue that we will discuss in greater depth in chapter two, sections 4.6 (a)–(b), pp. 84–86. 24 chapter one

This phenomenon explains why it is specifically Amemar who offers such a large number of strained interpretations. The consistency with which Amemar acts throughout a wide variety of situations, including his interactions with his contemporaries, leads to the obvious conclusion that these passages are a reflection of Amemar’s style of learning. In other words, at times the level of their difficulty indicates that the words of an amora are actually a reliable witness to their amoraic source. As Halivni has stated, “the academic approach leaves the difficulty and does not remove it. Rather, it explains the source of such a difficulty and how it arose.”75 In sum, there is not always a need to “resolve” Amemar’s or other late Nehardean amoraim’s statements by emending their words or by ascribing parts of their statements to interpolations by later editors; rather it is possible to understand their origins as we have suggested here. Our study into amoraic interpretation, halakhah and discourse reveals that the tendency of an amora to offer a strained interpretation to a tannaitic text, or a tendency to rule in opposition to tannaitic tradition, is an individual matter, and does not characterize all Babylonian amoraim or the entire Babylo- nian Talmud in the same way. I have not found any basis for Hanina Ben-Menahem’s claims that Babylonian amoraim—in contrast with Palestinian amoraim—are characterized by an overall tolerance of deviations from the rulings found in accepted sources.76 Ben-Menahem writes: The Jerusalem Talmud is usually opposed to judicial deviation from the law and strives to understand and account for early traditions reflecting such deviation . . . . Overall, the Jerusalem Talmud rejects the possibility of judicial deviation from the law. In contrast, the Babylonian Talmud is unconcerned by early traditions reflecting deviation from the law and does not attempt to bring the practice of judicial deviation within the limits of rules . . . Generally speaking, the Babylonian Talmud accepts the possibility of judicial deviation from the law and at times even views such deviation favourably.77 It seems to me that we must, at the least, temper Ben-Menahem’s broad generalization concerning all Babylonian amoraim and the entire Bavli. Study of the methodology of Babylonian amoraim does not sup-

75 Halivni, Introduction to Sources and Traditions, 33. 76 See: Ben-Menahem, “The Respective Attitude” [Heb.], 113–134; ibid., Judicial Deviation, 181–182; ibid., “The Judicial Process,” 428–430. 77 Ben-Menahem, “The Judicial Process,” 428. introduction 25 port such broad conclusions. My study of the halakhic methodology and interpretation of Nehardean amoraim shows that the phenomenon of amoraim deviating from accepted halakhic sources is not found consistently even among the yeshiva heads in a single geographical location over a period of over 150 years. There are contradictory tendencies in halakhic rulings and commentary found in Nehardea throughout the talmudic period. We have, for instance, the baraitot of “Tanna D’Bei Shmuel” (first half of the third century), and the statements of R. Sheshet (second half of third century), “the Nehardeans say” and R. Zebid of Nehardea (first half of the fourth century) which can all be characterized, each in his own way, by a trend towards halakhic conservatism. These statements all exhibit a high degree of dependence upon tannaitic and early amoraic tradition. In contrast, R. Nahman, R. Hama and Amemar exhibit exact opposite tendencies, relying systematically upon logic and independent reasoning as a source of halakhah, even when this leads them to contradict earlier tradition. It is impossible to draw general conclusions from the few examples brought by Ben-Menahem,78 and until examination of the entirety of the literature of the significant amoraim is undertaken we can at best arrive at a general impression.79

4.2. The Historical Accuracy/Reliability of Amoraic Statements This study bears impact upon one of the largest questions in the academic study of the Bavli: how historically reliable are the ascriptions of statements to speciﬁc amoraim found in the Bavli? There are scholars who

78 More than half of the examples that Ben-Menahem uses to demonstrate the phenomenon of deviation from normative law in the Bavli are taken from R. Nahman (b. Jacob) or Amemar: b. Bava Qamma 96b (99–100); b. Ketubbot 63b (107–109); b. Bava Qamma 96b (112–113); b. Bava Qamma 116b (113–118); b. Ketubbot 94b (151–152); b. Bava Batra 34b–35a (153–154); b. Bava Qamma 116b–117a (73–74). It is not merely coincidental that the examples of deviation from normative law are focused on these two amoraim, who can indeed be characterized by halakhic rulings that contradict the tannaitic or early amoraic halakhic tradition. However, it is methodologically problematic to draw such a broad conclusion from such a limited sample. For analysis of the methodology of R. Nahman in contrast with R. Sheshet see: Cohen, “Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet” [Heb.], 11–32. A similar problem exists in regard to Shalom Albeck’s article, “The Nature of Decision Making,” 29–7. Albeck defines the totality of amoraic methodology of decision making based on four examples (!), and recognizes only two main ways of creating halakhah: tradition (masoret) and logic (sevara). 79 For another critique of Ben-Menahem’s findings from a different methodological viewpoint see: Hidary, Legal Pluralism in the Talmud, 19. 26 chapter one systematically doubt whether we can accept the ascription of amoraic statements found in the Bavli.80 The past generation of scholars attempted to develop tools by which we can determine the accuracy of the Bavli as an historical source. How can we maintain the proper caution in gleaning historical information from such an ahistorical source? To aid in this matter, scholars have focused on the division of the sugya into historical layers, the development of the talmudic dialectics from the early amoraic period to the later period,81 talmudic terminology,82 analysis of the hierarchical relationships between amoraim,83 the con- ceptual differences between the amoraim concerning biblical figures or

80 See for instance: Green, “What’s in a Name?” 77–96; Neusner, “Evaluating the Attributions of Sayings to Named Sages in the Rabbinic Literature,” 93–111; ibid., “From History to Hermeneutics,” 200–227; Kraemer, Responses to Suffering, 12–13. The question of the authenticity of amoraic statements was at times brought up by scholars as a result of some talmudic passages in which the amoraim themselves raise such doubts. See: Jacobs, “How Much of the Babylonian Talmud is Pseudepigraphic?” 46–59; Stern, “Attributions and Authorship,” 28–51. Nevertheless, many questions concerning the interpretation of these passages and their implications for other amoraic statements remain unresolved. See: Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:21; Jacobs, Structure and Form, 6; Hayes, Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, 14–15. 81 See: Kraemer, The Mind of the Talmud, 68–69, who writes: The evidence speaks against the conclusion that argumentation is a vast fabri- cation. This is so, first of all, because the argumentation left from the first two amoraic periods, as I have defined them, is characteristically distinct one from the other. Early argumentation tends to be brief and direct. Objections depend on earlier authoritative sources. No argumentation is quoted by amoraim during these generations, and no comments on the process of argumentation are produced. In contrast, in the middle generations far more argumentation remains, and it is often for more lengthy and elaborate. Objections often depend on human logic alone. Dozens of argumentational sequences are explicitly quoted by amoraim, and a few comments on the process of argumentation are produced. These differences suggest that the formulation of these traditions precedes the hand of a final editor and most likely derives from the approximate periods to which they are attributed. For a reaction see: Elman, “Argument for the Sake of Heaven,” 261–282 82 The terminology used in the Bavli is not uniform, which makes it difficult to ascribe it strictly to a late editor. On this issue see: A. Cohen, “Bikoret Hilkhatit Le’Umat Bikoret Sifrutit,” 346 n. 75; ibid., “On the Phrase “Lo Shemia Li,” 467–472; Kalmin, “Quotation Forms in the Babylonian Talmud,” 167–187; Rovner, “Rhetorical Strategy,” 179 n. 4; Elman, “How Should a Talmudic Intellectual History be Written?” 378; Henshke, The Original Mishnah [Heb.], 275 n. 75–; Hayes, Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, 12. Similarly, there are terms that are connected to the existence of formal academic structures that are ascribed to amoraim of a specific generation with a specific meaning, which again makes it difficult to assume these terms were the creation of later editors. See: Goodblatt, “Talmudic History,” 37–38; Gafni, “A Generation of Scholarship” [Heb.], 219 n. 86. 83 See: Kalmin, “Collegial Interaction,” pp. 383–415; A. Cohen, “Was Age the Decisive Criterion of Subordination Among the Amoraim?” 289 n. 39. introduction 27 events from the distant past,84 the amoraic reaction to religious polemics and their openness towards external religious influence,85 parallels to amoraic halakhah in Zoroastrianism,86 the delineation of varying approaches in later generations as to the halakhic traditions transmitted in the name of Rav and Samuel,87 and many more.88 The fact that Babylonian amoraim present consistent methodology— as do, in certain cases, these amoraim in the Yerushalmi—supports the general reliability of the ascription of amoraic statements to the historical figures who issued them. Our analysis of the methodology of the sages of Nehardea, as well as other amoraim, maintains the claim that Babylonian amoraim can be characterized as having different methods of learning which are accurately documented within the Talmud’s dialectics. Scholars have demonstrated that the talmudic sugya is made up of sources that derive from different times and different places,89 and it seems, in light of our research, that the transmitters of this information preserved the material that originated with individual amoraim in a

84 See: Kalmin, The Sage; ibid., Jewish Babylonia, 12–17; ibid., “The Formation and Character,” 840–876. Kalmin demonstrated the existence of such differences even between Babylonian and Palestinian amoraim as they are found in the Bavli. This phenomenon can demonstrate the reliable documentation of Palestinian sources in the Bavli. See: Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia, 16. Kalmin was aware of the great caution that needs to be used in dealing with this matter, and the problem of drawing a general conclusion as to all Palestinian sources found in the Bavli. 85 See: Elman, “A Tale of Two Cities” [Heb.], 3–39; ibid., “The Socio-Economics of Babylonian Heresy,” 80–127; ibid., “Acculturation to Elite Persian Norms,” 31–56; ibid., “Middle Persian Culture,” 165–197. 86 See: Elman, “Up to the Ears,” 95–149; ibid., “The Babylonian Academies” [Heb.], 31–55; ibid., “Returnable gifts,” 139–184; ibid., “The Other in the Mirror: Iranians and Jews View One Another” [forthcoming]. 87 Kalmin, “Changing Amoraic Attitudes,” 83–105. 88 Even the distinct phrases and linguistic style used by amoraim (in both Tal- muds) served as a basis for this type of analysis. See: Weiss, The Talmud in Its Develop- ment [Heb.], 7–8; Weiss, Lekorot Hithavut Ha-Bavli, 6. See also Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:381–382, who writes, “It is obvious that there were patterns of speech that were distinctive to certain amoraim, and are used in their statements in numerous places… This phenomenon is a sign of an amora’s original and personal style” (my emphasis). 89 Numerous studies have dealt with this issue and this is not the place to mention them all. See mainly: Frankel, “Towards an Introduction to the Talmud,” 113–124; Albeck, “Le’Arikhat HaTalmud HaBavli,” 14–26; ibid., Introduction to the Talmud [Heb], 557–575; Weiss, Mekhkarim BaTalmud, 56–85; ibid., Studies in the Literature of the Amo- raim [Heb.], 232–250; Rosenthal, “Pirqa De'Abbaya,” 97–109; ibid., “Arikhot Kedu- mot,” 155–204; Kalmin, “The Formation and Character of the Babylonian Talmud,” 840–857. 28 chapter one relatively accurate fashion.90 Frequently, systematic analysis reveals an amora’s distinct methodology, style of interpretation, method of drawing a conclusion, or creation of analogy. Therefore, the claim that the halakhic methodology or interpretation of an amora (and not just an abstract idea or halakhah that is ascribed to them) was created by a later editor(s) seems to be far-fetched. As Elman writes, There are also studies indicating that profiles may be compiled of the exegetical style of many amoraim, or that expressions are specific to one authority… Is this a pseudograph, or perhaps, as we might expect, links were dropped from chains of transmission? Are all such cases pseudo- graphs? That is hardly likely.91 Richard Kalmin reached a similar conclusion based on his findings concerning the hierarchical relationships and other phenomena, a conclusion that is all the more so correct for our case: Virtually anything is possible when speculating about the activity of ancient editors, and mathematical certainty on this issue is beyond our grasp . . . This theory (i.e. that views the Talmud as primarily the work of later editors—B.C) requires us to posit editors of unbelievable sophistication and thoroughness. In the absence of ancient models for such editors, I prefer to view the above phenomena as the product of genuine historical processes rather than the work of outstanding geniuses centuries ahead of their time.92

90 We are aware, of course, that the statements were edited and their precise wording would have been changed over the course of time. See for instance: Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:12–13. What we are claiming here is that the halakhic content and methodology of the amoraim was preserved. On the difference between the content and methodology which was preserved, and the wording and literary format, which frequently changed, see: Jacobs, Talmudic Argument, 6. See also: Zussman, “VeShuv LiRushalmi Nezikin,” 109 n. 205. 91 Elman, “Intellectual History,” 378–379. This topic is not necessarily connected to the larger topic of the editing of the Bavli. In four places in his epistle, R. Sherira Gaon claims that the Bavli was a result of each generation adding its own comments to the talmudic record (pp. 62, 66, 68, 69). In contrast, Rashi ascribes to R. Ashi and Ravina a one-time editing of the entire Talmud (Rashi, Bava Mezi’a 86a, s.v. sof hora’ah). Even if there were late editors (as Rashi would claim), evidence indicates that they left their sources in a state that was faithful to their original. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of this study. For an analysis of the differences between Rashi and R. Sherira Gaon’s approaches to the editing of the Talmud, and a reevaluation of the relation between the two see: B. Cohen, “Rashi’s Historiographical Comments” [Heb.], 63–67. For a summary of the different theories about the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, see: Goodblatt, “The Babylonian Talmud”, 307–318. 92 Kalmin, “Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity as a Source for Historical Study,” 199. introduction 29

If these conclusions were drawn with regard to halakhic ideas or other concepts, they are all the more so true when it comes to issues of methodology or interpretation of individual amoraim. Moreover, the division of amoraic and stammaitic (late)93 material into distinct historical layers cannot, in my opinion, be the only consideration in deciding the source and accuracy with which a stam ascribes words to an amora. The separation of amoraic strata from the later anonymous stratum naturally brought with it the attempt to explain the words of the amora in a manner or context different than that provided by the stam. This was done out of the assumption that the stam’s interpretation was not necessarily faithful to the amoraic original.94 However, despite the historical distinction between amoraic statements and stammaitic commentary, which is principally correct, we must caution against the creation of a principle that a stammaitic interpretation or explanation of an amora’s statement is never accurate. Despite the fact that stammaitic interpretation is late, at its core lays content which might be early. As Zussman has written, “Much of the logic or additions [put forth by later editors] has origins in early traditions. Thus, the order of the material’s being edited into layers…or the means of its transmission . . . is not an accurate test as to the dating of the material.”95 Similarly, not every amoraic statement

93 On the dating of the anonymous stratum (stammaim) of the Babylonian Talmud as post-amoraic, see: Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:21–23; Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara, 76–104; idem, “Aspects of the Formation of the Talmud,” 339–360; Kalmin, “The Formation and Character of the Babylonian Talmud,” 840–876; A. Cohen, “The Saboraic Halakhah,” 161–214. Compare: Brody, “The Anonymous Talmud and the Words of the Amoraim” [Heb.], 193–232. 94 See the traditional rabbinic and academic literature cited by Friedman, “A Critical Study of Yevamot X” [Heb.], 287–293. 95 Zussman, “Veshuv LiRushalmi Nezikin,” 110 n. 210. See also: Halivni, Introduc- tion to Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 33, who writes, “Even though our general claim is that the stammaim are late, we should not dogmatically posit that everything . . . that is stammaitic is not from the amoraim and we should not draw historical conclusions from this.” Similarly, see: Urbach, HaHalakha, 226; Halivni, Introduction to Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 1–2, 95–96, 111–114. According to Urbach, the name “Sabora” as in “Saboraim,” which means “logic,” is a result of the fact that the Saboraim did not invent their own logic or reasoning, but rather transmitted the logic (sevara) of the amoraim. Halivni essentially agrees with Urbach, although Halivni relates more to the dialectical literature. See: Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 5:18. According to Halivni not all of the saboraic dialectics have their roots in amoraic discourse, for in the course of the material’s long transmission, many of the matters became confused (see ibid., 22–24). We should also note that Urbach’s and Halivni’s opinions are related to the halakhic content of the saboraic comments, which do not, according to their opinion, contain any halakhic innovations. There are, nevertheless, assumptions 30 chapter one can be perceived as stemming entirely from the amora himself, for it is possible that later elements accrued to it during its transmission throughout the talmudic period. In my opinion, each case must be examined on its own, with an eye toward the distinct manner of learning that characterizes the amora throughout talmudic literature.96 Recognition of the legal/halakhic methodology of an amora affords us a greater ability to critically determine how accurate a reﬂection the stammaitic interpretation of the statement is of the amora’s actual opinion. This is the critical methodology that has guided me in my earlier research, and it is the underlying basis of this book as well.97

and logic found in saboraic literature, which were not employed by the amoraim themselves, and which therefore seem to have originated with the saboraim. See: A. Cohen, “The Saboraic Halakha” [Heb.], 161–214. 96 There is also, of course, the possibility that the stammaim, when attempting to reconstruct the reasoning which lies behind earlier amoraic statements, were correct in their interpretation, even if they did not have authentic traditions that served as sources to these explanations. Halivni, Introduction to Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 33, noted this possibility. In any case, whether there is an early tradition that serves as a source of the stammaitic interpretations, or whether these originated in a later period, my suggestion is that on top of the criteria that scholars have already proposed, a given amora’s halakhic methodology must also be taken into consideration when determining whether a statement originates with the amora or with a later editor. 97 See: B. Cohen, “Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet” [Heb.], 11–32; ibid., “Rami bar Hama in Contrast to Rava” [Heb.], 149–184. introduction 31

Appendix A: Sages Active in the Environs of Nehardea During the Saboraic Period

Geonic chronicles describe two sages as active near Nehardea during the saboraic period. According to R. Sherira Gaon, at the end of the Sasanian period, during the persecutions led by Hormizd IV (588 C.E.), a yeshiva was established “in the area of Nehardea” in the district of Fīrūz Šāpūr (Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 99). According to R. Sherira, the founder and first head of this yeshiva was Rav Mari son of R. Dimi (he also served as rosh yeshiva of Pumbedita in a later period). The yeshiva was named “the House of R. Mari” (bei rav mari) after this sage, and continued to be called so until R. Sherira’s time (ibid., 100). For an analysis of the political events which served as the background to the foundation of this yeshiva at the end of the saboraic period see: Brüll, “The History of the Establishment of the Babylo- nian Talmud,” 210; Halevy, Dorot ha-Rishonim, 6:38; Kaplan, Redaction, 337–342. There are various suggestions in scholarly literature as to the identity of Fīrūz Šāpūr, see: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 362–364. To the bibliography cited there we should add: Fiey, Assyrie Chrétienne, 3:230–231. Based on this text, Isaac Halevy proposed to identify Nehardea as Firuz Šapur (Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 6:38). However, Kaplan noted that the identification of the two is problematic: “To identify . . . Nehardea as Firuz Šapur is to disregard the very careful and exact writing of R. Sherira, who in no other instance designates Firuz Šapur as Nehardea” (Kaplan, Redaction, 341). Nevertheless, for the purpose of our argument, whether Firuz Šapur is indeed al-Anbar, Nehardea or Pumbedita (see: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 362– 364), there is no effect on the conclusion presented above. Another sage who is documented as having a connection with an area close to Nehardea, is also connected to a different place in his personal appellation—R. Ahai of Be Hatim. He is dated to approximately the beginning of the saboraic period (see: Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 6). During his discussion of the literary contribution of the Saboraim to the Bavli, R. Sherira presents, among others, the example of R. Ahai of Be Hatim: “such as . . . R. Ahai of Be Hatim, about whom we say in ‘he explained [the word] veziklag. And Be Hatim is a city near Nehardea” (Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, French recension, 70). Scholars have tended to identify R. Ahai of Be Hatim who is mentioned, according to R. Sherira Gaon on b. Gittin 7a (manuscripts and printed editions read: “R. Aha of Be Hozai,” see Dikdukei Sofrim Hashalem, ad loc), 32 chapter one with R. Ahai (with no appellation) who appears about twenty times in the Bavli. This identification served as the basis for understanding the nature of the saboraic contribution to the Bavli in general, and the status and authority of R. Ahai of Be Hatim in particular. See: Brüll, “The History of the Establishment of the Babylonian Talmud,” 191– 195 and n. 27–29; Lewin, Rabbanan Savora’i, 13–15; Graetz, History of the Jews [Heb.], 2:454; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 4:3–4; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 6:56–60; Kaplan, Redaction, 313; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Ve’amoraim, 1:135. The only scholar who took exception with this identification was Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 443–444, who identified R. Aha as a seventh generation amora. Without any basis whatsoever, Brüll, “The History of the Establishment of the Babylonian Talmud,” 191–195 and Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 9:8 n. 1, identified R. Ahai of Be Hatim with R. Ahai bar Huna, who died in 514/515 C.E. (Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 98). In the only passage in which R. Ahai of Be Hatim is found in the Bavli (according to the testimony of R. Sher- ira Gaon) the literary characteristics of his interpretation are similar to those found in other Saboraic passages. These characteristics differ from those found in amoraic literature, including Nehardean amoraic literature. For an expanded treatment of this subject see: A. Cohen, “The Saboraic Halakhah” [Heb], 206 n. 195. The existence of an actual yeshiva in Nehardea (and not in its sur- roundings) is mentioned again only in the geonic period, in the beginning of the seventh century. At its head stood Mar Rav Hanina of Be-Gihara (Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 100). See: Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia, 342. introduction 33

Appendix B: “When R. Hoshaya Came from Nehardea, He Came and He Brought a Tannaitic Teaching with him”

This expression (ki ata rav hoshaya minehardea, ata ve-ayte matnita be’yadeh) appears four times in the Bavli (b. Shabbat 19b=ibid. 145b; b. Bet- zah 26b; b. Bekhorot 17a; b. Niddah 21a). All of these cases discuss a third-generation amora of Babylonian extraction who was in Pal- estine, R. Hoshaya, and came to Nehardea and learned baraitot which he subsequently quoted (for an identification of this amora see: Bacher, Tradition und Tradenten, 207 and n. 10; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 1:116; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 221; Schwartz, Jewish Settlements [Heb.], 240 n. 4). What are the origins of the tannaitic material that R. Hoshaya found in Nehardea? Bacher and Yudelowitz posited that the early fourth century Nehardean yeshiva was the source of these baraitot, and that amoraim from elsewhere were not familiar with these sources (see above, footnote 54). These two scholars based their theory on the above line, as well as on the stam’s explicit testimony, according to which one of these baraitot was not known to another amora (see: b. Shabbat 19b). Albeck went a step further. Based on a few literary characteristics found in collections of baraitot recited by amoraim in the Talmud, Albeck, (Mekhkarim Babraita Ubatosefta, 18; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 28) concluded that these baraitot originated in Baby- lonia during the talmudic period: The baraitot transmitted by amoraim differ from the baraitot that were transmitted anonymously in that the former are usually short, contain no disputes and do not mention the name of any tanna, whereas the latter are longer, contain disputes and mention the names of tannaim. The content and form of the baraitot transmitted by amoraim testify that they were later creations and that they were transmitted according to the name of the amora who taught them or arranged them, whereas the anonymously transmitted baraitot were older, and they begin with, “Our Rabbis taught,” or just “It was taught.” (Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 28) Albeck’s claim that these baraitot are “later creations whose origins do not lie with the tannaim during the mishnaic period” (Albeck, Mekhkarim Babraita Ubatosefta, 18) is based, therefore, on broadly derived evidence, and not on a focused examination of the halakhah presented 34 chapter one in this (Nehardean) collection of baraitot. Albeck came to the same conclusion in relation to the collection of baraitot termed “Tanna of the House of Samuel” (Tanna D’bei Shmuel) found in both Talmuds. However, our examination of the material reveals that for every baraita “brought” by R. Hoshaya, there is a parallel in a tannaitic tradition contained in either the Mishnah, Tosefta or Yerushalmi (a fact not examined by Bacher, Yudelowitz or Albeck). This demonstrates the broad dispersion and recognition of this tannaitic material, at least in Palestine (if not among Babylonian amoraim). Below is a survey of our findings in this matter. The baraita of R. Hoshaya found on b. Betzah 26b is identified as “the tannaitic teaching (matnita) of Bar Kap- para of the South” (mattnita debar kappara midaroma) on y. Betzah 3:4,62b (see: Lieberman, HaYerushalmi Kifshuto, 458; ibid., Tosefta Kifshuta, 5:967; Albeck, Mehkarim Babraita Ubatosefta, 68). The halakhah in the baraita of R. Hoshaya found on b. Shabbat 19b is found in t. Shabbat 1:21 (ed. Lieberman, 5) as well as t. Eduyyot 1:9 (ed. Zukermandel, 455–456). See: Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 3:20–21. In connection with the halakhah found in R. Hoshaya’s baraita on b. Bekhorot 17a, see m. Bekhorot 2:5, as well as t. Bekhorot 2:6 (ed. Zukermandel, 536). R. Hoshaya’s baraita on b. Niddah 21a has a parallel in t. Niddah 4:1 (ed. Zukermandel, 644) and in a statement made by R. Yohanan in the name of R. Shimon bar Yohai, y. Niddah 3:1, 50c. Our findings with regard to these baraitot accord with our conclusions regarding the connection of the “Tanna of the House of Samuel” baraitot found in Nehardea in the beginning of the amoraic period with the Palestinian halakhic tradition. About seventy percent of the halakhot found in these baraitot reflect the Palestinian tannaitic halakhic tradition. This is true even in cases in which scholars have claimed that the baraita uses a literary style or phrase reflective of late tannaim or early amoraim. See Cohen, “In Quest of Babylonian Tanaitic Traditions”, 271–303. The general picture that emerges when we examine all of the halakhic material found in Nehardean baraitot throughout the talmudic period is that their origins lie in Palestine and that the Pal- estinian halakhic tradition exerted significant influence on the halakhot of Nehardean amoraim. Saul Lieberman, Hayerushalmi Kifshuto, 458, and Joshua Schwartz, “Southern Judea and Babylo- nia”, 188–190; ibid, Jewish Settlements [Heb.], 240–244, noted the identification between the halakhah found in R. Hoshaya’s baraita which he brought from Nehardea with the baraita of Bar Kappara introduction 35

“from the South” (see above). From this identiﬁcation, Lieberman posited a general connection between Nehardea and the yeshiva in Lod in Palestine or its sages in the mishnaic or talmudic period. How- ever, as stated above, there is a clear similarity between the halakhot found in the R. Hoshaya baraitot and the tannaitic tradition found in Palestinian halakhah in the Mishnah, Tosefta and Palestinian amoraic literature, and not just the literature which might have originated in Lod. In any case, for the issue at hand here we should emphasize that all of this evidence undermines the theory of the Babylonian origins of the halakhot found in the baraitot that R. Hoshaya brought from Nehardea.

CHAPTER TWO

AMEMAR

1. “I am of the Elders of Nehardea”: The Time and Status of Amemar in Nehardea

1.1. Dating Amemar’s Rabbinic Activity In chronologies and historiographies of the Babylonian amoraim, Amemar is identified as the last sage to be active in Nehardea during the Sasanian period.1 His name is absent from the lists of academy heads found in the geonic chronologies,2 and therefore the precise date of his death is unknown. Scholarly attempts to date Amemar’s activity in Nehardea have usually been based on his association with other sages mentioned in the Bavli and in the geonic chronicles. Many of these attempts were based on assumptions which must be reexamined in light of recent advances in our understanding of the terminology in the Bavli and the Bavli’s portrayal of the hierarchical relationships between Babylonian amoraim.3 Reexamination of the sources in which we find Amemar’s statements and references to his activity allow us to date him to the second half of the fourth century and the early part of the fifth. There is also growing evidence that despite Amemar’s absence from the geonic lists of academy heads, he did serve as the head of a local yeshiva in Nehardea during this period. We will begin by examining the proofs that serve as a basis for our postulation as to when Amemar lived, and then we will turn our attention to a reevaluation of earlier scholarly examinations concerning this issue.

1 In the post-talmudic period there were two sages active near Nehardea, but not in Nehardea itself. See Appendix A. 2 On the nature and reliability of the chronological information concerning the talmudic period found in Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim and the The Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on see above, chapter one, p. 1 footnote 2. 3 For a bibliography on the subject, see chapter one, p. 9 footnotes 38–39. 38 chapter two

1.1.1. Subordination to Fifth Generation Amoraim In one source in the Bavli, Amemar reports to R. Ashi concerning a conversation that he had with with R. Zebid,4 academy head at Pumbedita until his death in 385 C.E.5 In another source, Ame- mar retroactively reports of his having communicated to R. Zebid of Nehardea a halakhah taught in the name of R. Hama, “[when] I stated the teaching in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea, he said to me . . . .” ([ki ] amrita lishma’ata kameh de-rav zevid minehardea, amar [li] . . . ). 6 This source demonstrates that Amemar was subject to R. Zebid of Nehardea’s authority, and was perhaps even his student.7 R. Zebid of Nehardea was head of a local yeshiva in Nehardea8 and died sometime before 375 C.E., while R. Papa was still alive.9 In addition, Ame- mar quotes two traditions in the name of R. Dimi of Nehardea,10 who according to the geonic chronologies stood at the head of the academy in Pumbedita until his death in 388 C.E.11 In sum, the fact that Ame- mar’s intellectual activity is documented as occurring during the life of R. Zebid, R. Zebid of Nehardea, and R. Dimi of Nehardea helps us to establish that the early part of his rabbinic career occured during the second half of the fourth century.

4 b. Betzah 22a. 5 See Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; The Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 89. 6 b. Bava Metzi’a 73b. 7 The expression, “I stated my tradition in front of X” is commonly used in the Bavli to signify a younger sage reporting a halakhic tradition in front of a more senior sage, one with greater authority than the reporter. For example, R. Elazar in front of Samuel (b. Ketubbot 77a); R. Huna the son of R. Joshua before Rava (b. Eruvin 63b); R. Papa who “states” in front of Rava (b. Pesahim 60b); R. Ashi who “states” in front of R. Kahana (b. Bava Metzi’a 35a; ibid. 92a; b. Bava Qamma 24b); R. Kahana who is often found reporting traditions in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea (for instance b. Bava Qamma 16a; ibid. 71b; b. Bava Metzi’a 69a); R. Mordecai who reports a tradition in front of R. Ashi (b. Ketubbot 87a). For a discussion of the hierarchical relationship between the reporter and the sage in front of whom he reports see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 83, n. 91. 8 See the discussion below, chapter five, section 1, p. 153. 9 See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], p. 176, n. 160. See also below, chapter five, p. 153. 10 b. Gittin 19b (following Mss. Munich 95, Saint Petersburg 187 RNL Eur.1, Vati- can 130 and Vatican 140): “Ravina said: Meremar said to me (amar li ): thus said Amemar in the name of R. Dimi of Nehardea [hakhi amar Amemar mishmeh de-rav dimi minehardea]);” b. Hullin 51b: “Amemar said [amar] in the name of [mishmeh] R. Dimi of Nehardea.” These formulae (and the like) reflect a situation in which a pupil quotes a halakhic tradition in the name of his master, or a lesser sage quotes his superior. See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 102. 11 For the year of R. Dimi of Nehardea’s death, see Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; The Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 90. amemar 39

1.1.2. The Subordination of Sixth Generation Amoraim to Amemar Further proof that Amemar’s career began during the second half of the fourth century is that sixth generation amoraim act as his junior and as subject to his authority. Amemar appears frequently with Mar Zutra and R. Ashi, and in all cases his name precedes theirs—“Amemar, Mar Zutra and R. Ashi”.12 In the overwhelming majority of instances in which the Bavli cites multiple names, the Babylonian editors were zealous in listing the elder amora first.13 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Amemar was the eldest of the three.14 Indeed, this fact also emerges from the Bavli’s portrayal of the hierarchical relationship between Amemar and the other two sages.15 Furthermore, there are signs that even the exilarch, Huna b. Nathan,16 who lived during the sixth generation of amoraim,17 was subject to Amemar’s authority.18 Research into the interpersonal relationships between Babylonian amoraim has demonstrated that age was the primary factor in determining the hierarchy between sages. This inter-amoraic hierarchy was fixed throughout the sages’ lives and was not dependent upon the official

12 See: b. Berakhot 44b; ibid. 50b; ibid. 55b; Shabbat 50b; Pesahim 103b; Ketubbot 61a; ibid. 63b; Bava Metzi’a 22a; Niddah 20a. 13 See: Kalmin, “Collegial Interaction,” 386; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 127; ibid., “Was Age the Decisive Criterion of Subordination Among the Amoraim?” 288. 14 See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 127, 175–176. 15 Mar Zutra: Mar Zutra quotes a halakhic tradition in the name of Amemar (b. Kiddushin 79b), and was judged by him (b. Shevu’ot 30). R. Ashi: R. Ashi “sat before ( yativ kameh) Amemar” (b. Menahot 37b), quoted a halakhic tradition in his name (b. Eruvin 39b) and presented him with questions and objections more than 30 times in the Talmud (see below, footnote 260). See below for examples. 16 See: R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 91. It is unclear whether R. Sherira based his claim on an earlier non-talmudic source or derived it from the Tal- mud. See: Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate [Heb.], 200–206; Herman, The Exilarchate in the Sasanian Era [Heb.], 112–118. 17 Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 431, dates Huna b. Nathan to the fifth and sixth generations. It should be further noted that Huna b. Nathan is depicted in the Talmud as subordinate to R. Ashi, a sixth generation amora, to whom, according to R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon 91, everyone in his generation— including other academy heads and exilarchs—was subordinate. For further analysis of R. Ashi’s status among his colleagues, see: A. Cohen, “Was Age the Decisive Cri- terion of Subordination Among the Amoraim?” 297–301. 18 Huna b. Nathan regularly quotes halakhic traditions in the name of Amemar (b. Gittin 19b; b. Bava Batra 55a; b. Bava Batra 74b; b. Zebahim 19a). Huna b. Nathan’s subordination to Amemar is demonstrated in b. Kiddushin 72b where Amemar permits him to marry a woman from Mehozyatta. For an analysis of this tradition, see below, chapter five, pp. 161–163. 40 chapter two role of either sage.19 Thus, the fact that Mar Zutra and R. Ashi of the sixth generation20 were subject to Amemar’s authority demonstrates that he was the senior of the three and aids us in setting a late fourth and perhaps even early fifth century date for his intellectual activity.

1.1.3. Amemar Died During R. Ashi’s Lifetime In one tradition found in the Bavli, Amemar is purported to have died while R. Ashi was still alive, meaning before 427 C.E.21 According to this source, Amemar died shortly after a conversation that his son, Mar bar Amemar, had with R. Ashi. Thus the latest date in which Amemar could have been active is R. Ashi’s death.22 However, the fact that Amemar was already a notable sage in the days of R. Zebid, fifty years before R. Ashi died, and the fact that we must assume that Amemar had already reached a certain age before he began to appear in the presence of R. Zebid, makes it difficult to imagine that he lived right up until Rav Ashi’s death.23 Similarly, the fact that Amemar was older than Mar Zutra, who died somewhere between 413–417 C.E., makes it likely that Amemar died before Mar Zutra during the first decade of the fifth century C.E.

19 See: A. Cohen, “Was Age the Decisive Criterion of Subordination Among the Amoraim?” 279–313. 20 Mar Zutra headed a local academy in Nareš (see: A. Cohen, “Was the Amora Mar Zutra Head of the Yeshiva in Pumbeditha?” [Heb.], 201–232), a city located in the district of Sura (see: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 262–264). Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5, dates Mar Zutra’s death between the years 413–417 (depending on which version is used). R. Ashi headed the academy in Sura, and afterwards that in Mata Mehasya, for a period spanning “close to sixty years”, until his death in 427 (Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 94). Mata Mehasya was in the vicinity of Sura (Oppenheimer, ibid., 421) and at the end of the talmudic period the names of these two places became synonymous (see A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 147, n. 22). 21 b. Bava Metzi’a 68a. 22 See: Halevy, Dorot ha-Rishonim, 6:69; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 1:229; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 114, n. 5. 23 The notion that Amemar lived for over eighty years is unlikely in light of our knowledge of the typical life-span of the Babylonian amoraim. See A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 105–106. In medieval writing concerning the Babylonian amoraim (especially the chronology put forth by Rashi) and in modern scholarship, there was a posit that some amoraim lived up to 100 years or more. These medieval commentators and modern scholars neglected to take into account the problems that such theories create with regard to the hierarchical relationships between the amoraim. On this issue see, B. Cohen, “May You Live to One Hundred and Twenty,” 221–235. amemar 41

In light of all of the above facts, we now turn to examining the previous scholarly attempts to identify and date Amemar.

1.1.4. Reassessing Earlier Scholarly Assumptions Scholars have posited dates for Amemar’s life ranging all the way from the first half of the fourth century until the second half of the fifth century, a gap of over 150 years. We will examine one at a time the problematic scholarly assumptions that have led to such a great disparity. R. Yehiel Halperin suggested that Amemar was identical with Ame- mar b. Mar Yanuka, who according to R. Sherira Gaon, was executed in 470 C.E.24 This identification is impossible due to the large gap in years (over one hundred) between R. Zebid of Nehardea’s death (before 375 C.E.)—with whom Amemar interacts—and Amemar b. Mar Yanuka’s death. Furthermore, this identification can obviously not be reconciled with the report that Amemar died before R. Ashi died, a fact I have discussed above.25 According to Heinrich Graetz, Amemar inherited R. Ashi’s position as academy head in Mata Mehasya after the latter’s death in 427 C.E.26 Graetz’s supposition is mistakenly based on the identification of Amemar—who was R. Ashi’s teacher and a member of the 5th–6th generation of amoraim—with R. Yemar, the student of R. Ashi,27 who according to geonic chroniclers, did function as academy head in Mata Mehasya for the five years following R. Ashi’s death (427–432 C.E.).28 Subsequent scholars clarified that Amemar and R. Yemar are two different amoraim, who operated at different times and in different places.29 Furthermore, as is obvious, Graetz’s theory

24 Halperin, Seder Hadorot, 72–73. Concerning the date of Amemar b. Mar Yanuka’s death see R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 96–97. Concerning the political background of this period and the decrees issued against the Jews, see Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 49–50. 25 See Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 6:68–73. 26 Graetz, Divre Y’mei Yisrael, 2:448. 27 R. Yemar seems to have been approximately R. Ashi’s age and older than Rav- ina, who was a student/colleague of R. Ashi. See A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 166–167. Despite the proximity in age, R. Yemar acted as a subordinate to R. Ashi, and seems to have been his student. See Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 434. 28 See Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 94. 29 See A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 144–145, n. 6. A passage in b. Bava Qamma 79a proves that Amemar and R. Yemar are two different sages. See below, pp. 89–91. 42 chapter two cannot explain the Bavli’s description of Amemar having died while R. Ashi was still alive. Solomon Funk claimed that Amemar died in 420 C.E. but did not provide any proof for this assertion.30 A different suggestion as to the dating of Amemar was put forth by Jacob Zuri and Benjamin Zevieli, both of whom identified Amemar as one of the rabbis referred to in the phrase, “the Nehardeans say.” According to both scholars, the halakhic opinions ascribed to these sages reflect those of Amemar as well.31 However, careful comparison of Amemar’s opinions and legal methodology with those reflected in the “the Nehardeans say” traditions makes this identification difficult. Analysis of these traditions will demonstrate that they reflect a manner of thinking and a method of study that is not identical and for the most part opposite from that put forth by Amemar.32 Jacob Zuri and Benjamin Zevieli’s suggestion also raises chronological difficulties. In his study of local traditions in talmudic Babylonian, David Goodblatt demonstrated that “the Nehardeans say” traditions can be ascribed to a group of sages active in Nehardea in the beginning of the fourth century C.E.33 Goodblatt was aware that this supposition is contradicted by an anonymous tradition found in b. Sanhedrin 17b which identifies “the Nehardeans say” with R. Hama, who was older than Amemar.34 Chronologically speaking, if “the Nehardeans say” could not possibly be identified as R. Hama, then how could they be identified as Amemar? Furthermore, as I have stated above, the talmudic evidence concerning the hierarchical relationships between Amemar and the fifth generation amoraim limit Amemar’s activity to

30 Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 2:111–112. 31 Zuri, Rav Ashi [Heb.], 15; Zevieli, “Amre’i Neharde’ei,” 49. 32 See below, chapter three, section 3(a), pp. 123–124. 33 See: Goodblatt, “Local Traditions in the Babylonian Talmud,” 194. 34 See: ibid., 200, n. 21. Albeck raised the possibility that there were two sages active in the fourth century who went by the name R. Hama, but Albeck himself was doubtful as to the veracity of this claim. See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 408. Basing himself on Albeck, Goodblatt suggested that the first R. Hama would chronologically fit with the time of the “Nehardeans.” Goodblatt writes, “The earlier one, if he existed, would fit the chronological limits perfectly” (Goodblatt, ibid.). However, it seems highly unlikely that there were two sages who went by this name in the fourth century. We have dedicated a separate discussion to this issue, see chapter four, section 1. pp. 127–138. Concerning the seniority of R. Hama over Amemar see: Albeck, ibid., 426. R. Hama’s identity is dealt with more fully in chapter four, section 1.1.1, pp. 130–138. amemar 43 the second half of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, but not before that period.35

2. Did Amemar Head a Rabbinic Yeshiva?

During the period in which Amemar lived, there were several outstanding centers of rabbinic activity in Babylonia:

Pumbedita During Amemar’s lifetime there were two academy heads in Pumbe- dita. (1) Rafram (the ﬁrst) served as academy head after R. Dimi of Nehardea’s death in 388 C.E. until 395 C.E.36 (2) R. Kahana succeeded Rafram upon his death and served as academy head until 411/414 C.E.37

Mata Mehasya 38 According to R. Sherira Gaon, R. Ashi began his tenure as academy head in Mata Mehasya approximately 20 years after the death of R. Nahman b. Isaac in 356 C.E.39 R. Sherira Gaon writes: And in all of these years after the death of R. Papa (died in 375/376 C.E.–B.C.) R. Ashi was the gaon in Sura, and [then] he came to Mata Mehasya and served as academy head for close to sixty years. He died in 427 C.E.40 It turns out, therefore, that R. Ashi’s tenure as academy head in Mata Mehasya began relatively early, when he was still subject to the authority of Amemar.41

35 See above, sections 1.1.1.–1.1.2., pp. 37–40. 36 See Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 90. R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 96 cites another amora by the name of Rafram who stood as head of the academy in Pumbedita after R. Ashi; this Rafram died in 443. For an attempt to identify the sages in this Babylonian passage see: Kalmin, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, 25–26. 37 In The Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 90, the date is 414. In contrast, in Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5, the date of his death is 411. It is doubtful if this R. Kahana served as R. Ashi’s master. See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 106–107. 38 Mata Mehasya is considered to have been a suburb of Sura. See above n. 20 39 See Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5 (in the list of variants); Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 89. 40 R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on (French redaction), 90–94 in passim. 41 This is not in and of itself surprising, for under certain circumstances it was permitted for a disciple to issue a halakhic instruction during the lifetime of his master. This was possible, for instance, if the disciple was outside of the master’s vicinity, or 44 chapter two

Sura There is ample evidence to demonstrate that Meremar served as academy head in a local academy in Sura.42 Meremar is estimated to have died approximately twelve years before R. Ashi, in about 415 C.E.43

Nareš Mar Zutra served as academy head in the local academy in Nareš, located next to Sura.44 His death is estimated to have occurred sometime between 413 and 417 C.E.45 There are many talmudic sources which demonstrate that Amemar had contact with Mar Zutra and that Amemar was the latter’s senior.46 There is ample evidence in the Bavli that Amemar’s rabbinic activity occurred in Nehardea. Primarily, this location emerges from Ame- mar’s own testimony, “I am [among the elders] of Nehardea” [ana (mi-savei de) Nehardea ana].47 Amemar is documented as issuing halakhic rulings in Nehardea, thereby demonstrating his status and legal authority in that region. For instance, Amemar attempts to restore the Ten Commandments into the Nehardean liturgy48 and in Nehardea on

if he received permission from his master. The Bavli (b. Eruvin 62b –63a) reports that “R. Hisda instructed in Kafri during the lifetime of R. Huna.” Similarly, “R. Ham- nuna instructed in Harta de-Argiz during the lifetime of R. Hisda.” These two examples relate to cases where disciples issued instructions during the lifetime of their teachers in small villages near Sura (R. Huna and R. Hisda’s location), but not in their teacher’s own city. For an analysis of this passage see: B. Cohen, “How Many R. Hamnuna’s in the Babylonian Talmud?” 101–103. Another example of such a phenomenon is R. Aha son of Rava and R. Gebiha of Be Katil, two sages who served as academy heads and issued instructions outside of R. Ashi’s location, despite their subordination to him. R. Aha son of Rava served as academy head in Pumbedita and died eight years before R. Ashi in 419; R. Gebiha of Be Katil inherited his position as academy head in Pumbedita and continued to serve in this capacity until his death in 433. Concerning their subordination to R. Ashi, and their activity as academy heads during R. Ashi’s lifetime see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 209. 42 For an extended discussion of this matter, and especially the assumptions that led scholars to conclude that Meremar died around 440 C.E. see, A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 144–180, especially his conclusions, 178–180. 43 Concerning the evidence that Meremar served as head of a local academy in Sura see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 145, 149–150, 184–186. 44 Concerning the evidence that Mar Zutra was located in Nareš see: A. Cohen, “Was the Amora Mar Zutra Head of the Yeshiva in Pumbeditha?’ [Heb.], 201–232. 45 Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5. 46 See above, section 1.1.2., p. 39. 47 b. Bava Metzi’a 16b (= Bava Metzi’a 35a); b. Bava Batra 31a. This evidence will be examined below, section 4.4.2., pp. 74–77. 48 b. Berakhot 12a. amemar 45 the festival of Sukkot he is found setting the correct passages for the Torah reading.49 He is also presented as acting as a judge in Nehardea.50 However, the Bavli also presents him as being active in Mahoza, and three of his halakhic rulings are connected with that place.51 The question that remains is whether along with Amemar’s status and authority in Nehardea (and Mahoza) he also served as a rosh yeshiva. As stated above, Amemar’s name is absent from the list found in the geonic chronlogies, the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon and Seder Tannaim veAmoraim. This absence led scholars to conclude that Amemar did not serve as an academy head.52 For instance, Isaac Hirsch Weiss writes explicitly, “Amemar is not mentioned among the academy heads. Nevertheless, it seems that he acted as a rabbi in Nehardea and enacted decrees there . . . for he was the head of the court in Nehardea.”53 Moshe Beer deﬁned the issue as “problematic,” due to the fact that “R. Sherira Gaon did not list Amemar among the academy heads.”54 In contrast, Heinrich Graetz, Wilhelm Bacher, Solomon Funk, Jacob Obermayer, Isaac Halevy, Aaron Hyman, and Jacob Nahum Epstein all agreed that Amemar did serve as the head of a local academy in Nehardea.55 Their conclusion was based on the assumption that if Amemar is portrayed as acting with halakhic status

49 b. Sukkah 55a. 50 b. Rosh HaShanah 31. Scholars have described a tendency of Amemar to rule according to local Nehardean tradition, a fact that adds to the other evidence that Amemar was located in Nehardea. See the scholarly literature surveyed below, section 4.1., pp. 51–52. However, caution must be taken when addressing this matter (see below, section 4.2., pp. 52–55). 51 See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 426. See: b. Shabbat 95a; b. Eruvin 104a; b. Rosh HaShanah 31b; b. Qiddushin 72b. 52 This is a common assumption in historical and talmudic scholarship. For a reexamination of the issue, see: B. Cohen, “Local Academies in Talmudic Babylonia’ [Heb.], 470–471 n. 168. 53 Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:184 n. 4; Yudolowitz, Hayyei HaYehudim Bizman Hatal- mud, 81–82. 54 Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate [Heb.], 194 n. 41. In another place Beer raised the possibility that the latter did serve as an academy head, but he remained doubtful concerning this possibility. See ibid., 177, n. 64. 55 Graetz, History of the Jews, 2:606; Bacher, Die Agada der Babylonischen Amoräer, 146; Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 2:97; Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonien, 255; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 6:69; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 1:228; Epstein, Mevo’ot Lesi- frut HaAmoraim, 129. The same argument was put forth by some scholars in regard to Avuha de-Shmuel (Samuel’s father) in Nehardea, at the very beginning of the second century. See above, chapter one, p. 4, footnote 16. 46 chapter two and authority in Nehardea, he can be assumed to have served as academy head as well.56 After analysis of the range of talmudic sources related to Amemar, it seems that the second opinion, that Amemar did serve as a rosh yeshiva, should be accepted, but for reasons that differ from those previously put forth. Elsewhere, I have demonstrated that the absence of a sage’s name from the geonic lists of academy heads is not sufﬁcient to prove that the sage did not serve as the head of a local yeshiva/ study circle.57 In that study I dealt at length with the talmudic evidence that four Babylonian amoraim from the third and the beginning of the fourth century did indeed serve as heads of their local yeshivot (R. Ada bar Ahaba; R. Sheshet; R. Hamnuna I and R. Hamnuna II), despite the fact that their names are absent from the geonic lists of academy heads. Among the evidence for the existence of such an academy, we can cite the following phrases, “The rabbis of the school of R. Sheshet (rabbanan de-vei Rav Sheshet)”; “the academy of R. Hamnuna” (be midrasha de-Rav Hamnuna). We can also cite the fact that the rabbis sat in front of R. Ada bar Ahaba or Rav Hamnuna ( yativ kammeh de-Rav Hamnuna/ Ada bar Ahava), and other such instances as evidence for the existence of an academy with the named sage at its head. These prove the existence of pedagogic frameworks in Nehardea (R. Sheshet), in Sura and Harta de-Argiz (R. Hamnuna) and in Pumbedita (R. Ada bar Ahaba). From all of this evidence it is clear that establishing whether or not a sage served as an academy head in a certain region cannot be solely based on the geonic chronicles. Seder Tannaim veAmoraim and the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon focus on the main academies in Sura (and its successor in Mata Mehasya) and Pumbedita. Determining whether a given sage served as an academy head must be based on talmudic evidence and not just the geonic chronicles.58 Indeed, the evidence supports the supposition that Amemar did serve as the academy/study circle head in in Nehardea. Below are the main proofs for such a conclusion.

56 See: Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 6: 69; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 1:228. 57 B. Cohen, “Local Academies in Talmudic Babylonia’ [Heb.], 447–471. 58 Ibid., 470–471. amemar 47

2.1. “R. Ashi was Sitting in Front of Amemar” (Rav Ashi hava yativ kameh de-Amemar) In one place in the Bavli R. Ashi is documented as “sitting” in front of Amemar, using the Aramaic term “yativ.”59 The expression “X sat ( yativ) in front of Y” and other similar expressions, signiﬁy an academic setting in which the one sitting is the student, or at least the younger sage, and the one in front of whom he is sitting is the elder of the two.60 In a number of other places in the Bavli R. Ashi is portrayed as subject to the authority of Amemar.61 Rav Ashi is portrayed in a similar fashion in the Bavli as “sitting” in front of other sages who are documented in the geonic chronicles as being academy heads.62 As earlier scholars have pointed out, the sage whom others sit in front of is always documented as being the head of either a central or local academy. On this subject, Isaiah Gafni writes, “It seems that the sage in front of whom others sit is the sage who stands at the head of the given academy; ‘in front’ of him sit all of the other sages.”63 Hence, this instance in the Bavli documents that Amemar served as head of an academic setting.

59 b. Menahot 37b. A similar phrase can be found in the printed edition of b. Megilah 7b. However, in all manuscripts the reading is “in front of R. Kahana.” This reading is possible in light of the fact that R. Ashi was R. Kahana’s student. For talmudic evidence concerning the relationship between R. Ashi and R. Kahana, see at length: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 76–77, n. 56. 60 See mainly: Gwirtzman, “Hamunah ‘Yativ’ Umashmauto,” 9–10; Beer, “The Emergence of the Talmudic Academy in Babylonia” [Heb.], 99; Abramson, ed., Mavo HaTalmud, 19; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 224; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 200; Kalmin, “Collegial Interaction in the Babylonian Talmud,” 392 and n. 35; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 186. 61 See above, p. 39, footnote 15. 62 He “sat” in front of R. Kahana [b. Megillah 7b (according to the version preserved in all manuscripts; the printed edition reads “in front of Amemar”)], and he “sat” in front of Mar Zutra (b. Menahot 35b). 63 Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 201. It seems that this evidence points to the presence of other sages in the academic setting, beyond just R. Ashi. Gafni has demonstrated that in these types of literary formats the Bavli’s editors specify the names of those sages that participate in the discussion, and that names are never mentioned without some speciﬁc purpose. See: Gafni, Hayeshiva be-Bavel, 97–99; idem, “Con- cerning D. Goodblatt’s Article” [Heb.], 53–54; idem, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 201–203). 48 chapter two

2.2. Amemar as Judge In four cases in the Bavli, Amemar is documented as adjudicating court cases brought in front of him. One of these instances64 is described in the usual terminology and structure employed in the Bavli to describe court cases: (a) the story; (b) the case is brought before Amemar; (c) Amemar issues a ruling.65 In two other instances Amemar’s acting as a judge is not portrayed using the typical literary style used to por- tray court cases. Rather, these instances are described in the following ways: (1) “There was a woman who was subpoenaed to court in front of Amemar in Nehardea;”66 (2) “Amemar was sitting and adjudicating a case.”67 There is another instance in which Amemar’s ruling is reported by R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumi (II), a sage from the sixth generation:68 “R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumi said: ‘I was standing in front of Amemar and a woman came in front of him demanding a tenth [of her father’s] property, and I saw him . . .’ ”.69 In his analysis of all of the court cases found in Seder Nezikin of the Bavli (130 cases), Isaiah Gafni came to the conclusion that in the overwhelming majority of them (over 107 cases) the judge is known (mainly from geonic chronicles) to have been an academy head.70 This fact led Gafni to the important conclusion that the “academy and the court were not two separate and independent entities but rather one integral system, in which the legal system did not just stem from the sages’ academic study but was also executed within the same setting.”71

64 b. Shevu’ot 30b. 65 Concerning the literary style of “court cases” in the Bavli see: Segal, Case Citation in the Babylonian Talmud, 158–159; idem, “The Terminology of Case-Citation in the Babylonian Talmud,” 205–211; idem, “Variant Traditions of Cases in the Babylonian Talmud,” 1–4; Gafni, “Ma’asei Bet Din BaTalmud HaBavli,” 28. 66 b. Rosh HaShanah 31b. 67 b. Ketubbot 105b. 68 R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumi the ﬁrst is an amora of the third generation. See: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 3:893–894; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 297. However, from this passage it seems that there was another sage by the same name who lived in the sixth generation and was subordinate to Amemar [as is accepted in the hierarchical relationship signiﬁed by phrases such as “I was in front of X” (see below)]. This version is found in all manuscripts of the Bavli. Indeed, Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 3:894 and Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 297 both posited the existence of yet another sage with the same name in the sixth- seventh generation. 69 b. Ketubbot 69a. 70 Gafni, “Ma’asei Bet Din BaTalmud HaBavli,” 31, 33. 71 Ibid., 39. amemar 49

If Gafni’s conclusion is correct, Amemar’s legal activity strengthens our conclusion that Amemar was indeed the head of a local academy.

2.3. “[Once When] I was Standing Before Amemar” (hava ka’imna kameh de-Amemar) As mentioned above, R. Minyomi son of R. Nihumi reports in ﬁrst person concerning a court case brought in front of Amemar using the expression, “I was standing in front of Amemar” (hava ka’imna kameh de-amemar). This expression is found around thirty times in the Bavli.72 In each instance the expression is used to report a sage’s action or custom, with the goal of clarifying that sage’s halakhic opinion, an opinion which was not stated explicitly. The account is always provided by a younger sage reporting the actions of his elder, or by a student reporting the actions of his master (for instance: R. Hiyya b. Ashi concerning Rav;73 R. Anan b. Tahlifa concerning Samuel;74 Ravina concerning R. Jeremiah of Difte;75 R. Ashi concerning R. Kahana76). The expression “was standing in front of X” relates to actions that did not occur within an academic setting, for instance a report on a sage’s behavior during prayer,77 during a meal,78 while slaughtering,79 or while separating terumah and tithes.80 In our study of this term, we have determined that it is always used in reference to a central sage, one who served as rosh yeshiva of either a local or central academy [for instance: Rav (3 times);81 Samuel (twice);82 R. Yohanan (2 times);83

72 b. Berakhot 11b; b. Berakhot 24a; b. Berakhot 25a; b. Shabbat 37b; b. Shabbat 140a; b. Eruvin 102b; b. Pesahim 101a; b. Pesahim 106b; b. Yoma 87b; b. Sukkah 44b; b. Betzah 28a; b. Betzah 28b; b. Megillah 23b; b. Mo’ed Qattan 18a; b. Yevamot 101b; b. Ketubbot 61a (twice); b. Nedarim 7b; b. Zevahim 94a; b. Hullin 18b; b. Hullin 46a; b. Hullin 50a. 73 b. Berakhot 11b. R. Hiyya b. Ashi was a student of Rav. See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 196. 74 b. Pesahim 101a; b. Ketubbot 61a. 75 b. Berakhot 25a (according to manuscripts and medieval citations). Ravina (R. Ashi’s colleague) acted in a subordinate fashion to R. Jeremiah of Difte. See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 83–84. 76 b. Shabbat 37b (according to manuscripts and medieval citations). R. Ashi was R. Kahana’s (ﬁfth generation) most notable student. See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 427. 77 b. Yoma 87b. 78 b. Ketubbot 61a. 79 b. Hullin 46a; b. Hullin 76b. 80 b. Hullin 106a. 81 b. Berakhot 11b; b. Pesahim 106b; b. Zevahim 94a. 82 b. Pesahim 101b; b. Ketubbot 61a. 83 b. Megillah 23b; b. Mo’ed Qatan 18a. 50 chapter two

R. Huna (twice);84 Rava/Rabbah (3 times);85 R. Jeremiah of Difte (once);86 R. Ashi (twice)].87, 88 Indeed, the fact that later sages attempt to reconstruct an earlier sage’s halakhic opinion is a result of the earlier sage’s halakhic authority, as is seen by the fact that this term refers to academy heads. Thus, the term used in reference to Amemar is further proof that Amemar too served as an academy head at the local academy in Nehardea.

3. Summary and Conclusions

From our above discussion we can conclude that Amemar lived during the second half of the fourth century through the beginning of the fifth century C.E. This is evidenced by his interaction with sages of the fifth and sixth generations, and by the fact that he died while R. Ashi was still alive. We must, therefore, reject the claim that Amemar lived and functioned during the first part of the fourth century or that he continued to live during the second half of the fifth. Our conclusion also makes it difficult to accept the identification of Amemar as one of the group of sages that the Bavli calls “the Nehardeans say,” for this group lived in the first half of the fourth century. We also cannot identify Amemar as being the same sage that is otherwise called R. Yemar or Amemar bar Mar Yanuka, for these sages were active after R. Ashi’s death, whereas Amemar died while R. Ashi was still alive. Despite the fact that Amemar’s name is missing from the lists of academy heads found in the geonic chronicles, there is ample evidence that Amemar served in this capacity in the local yeshiva in Nehardea. It is not enough to simply cite the geonic chronicles as the sole evidence as to which sages stood at the heads of academies during the talmudic period. Rather, each case must be examined on its own merits, and especially with regard to the talmudic terminology

84 b. Shabbat 37b; b. Nedarim 7b. 85 b. Berakhot 24a; b. Betzah 28a; ibid. 28b. 86 b. Berakhot 25a. Concerning R. Jeremiah of Difte as head of a local academy, see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 205–206. 87 b. Eruvin 102b; b. Hullin 76b. 88 In one case (b. Hullin 46a), Ulla reports on the actions of R. Simeon b. Pazi, a Palestinian amora of the third generation (see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 258–261). R. Simeon ben Pazi inherited R. Joshua b. Levi’s position as head of the rabbinic academy in Lod. Concerning his status in Lod in the third century see mainly, Rosenfeld, Lod and its Sages [Heb.], 114–115 and n. 150. amemar 51 used in connection with that particular sage. In the case of Amemar, this analysis indeed leads to the conclusion that Amemar served as an academy head.89

4. The Halakhic Methodology of Amemar

4.1. Previous Scholarship: Amemar’s Conservative Halakhah It has been widely claimed by scholars that Amemar was a halakhic “conservative,” a sage who tended to rule based on earlier halakhic traditions, especially the local traditions found in Nehardea. Amemar—so it has been claimed—did not deviate from the halakhic traditions which he inherited from his amoraic predecessors. Ze’ev Yaavetz writes: Most of [Amemar’s] halakhot . . . refer to interpersonal legal matters . . . and just as R. Hama customarily ruled and those who followed him set the halakhah in accordance with his rulings, so too Amemar frequently paid heed to the halakhic rulings of the generations that preceded him, and ruled in accordance with them as well.90 Other medieval and modern historiographers and historians similarly highlighted Amemar’s dependence upon the halakhic tradition in Nehardea which preceded him. This dependence, so it has been claimed, is especially prominent when it comes to halakhic statements made in the name of Samuel, R. Nahman, “the Nehardeans say” and R. Zebid of Nehardea.91 Others went even further and construed Amemar to be a sage who collected anonymous local Nehardean rabbinic traditions and edited them.92 This understanding led to the conclusion that Amemar should be considered part of the group referred to in “the Nehardeans say” statements, and that the opinions ascribed to them should be ascribed to Amemar as well.93 Jacob Zuri writes:

89 From the second epistle of R. Sherira Gaon (see Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 126), which deals with the meaning of the title “Mar” attached to several Babylonian sages, it was argued that Amemar served as Exilarch. For a discussion of this possibility see: Herman, The Exilarchate in the Sassanian Era [Heb.], 111–112; A. Cohen, “Did Mar Zutra, the Amora, Serve as an Exilarch?’ (forthcoming), n. 87. 90 Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:126. 91 See mainly: Maimon, ed., Yihusei Tannaim VeAmoraim, 81; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:12; Zuri, Rav Ashi [Heb.], 15; Yudolowitz, Nehardea, 73; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 426. 92 Zevieli, “Amre’i Neharde’ei,” 49. 93 Zuri, Rav Ashi [Heb.], 15; Zevieli, “Amrei Neharde’ei,” 49. 52 chapter two

With the founding of Nehardea, legal halakhic traditions unique to this region were resurrected, traditions that stemmed from an earlier period in Nehardea. For the sages of Nehardea are considered one cohesive group, and various opinions scattered throughout the Talmud are ascribed to the sages of Nehardea as if they are one unity—“the Nehard- eans say.” This is how the Talmud refers to Samuel’s opinion, who was the head of Nehardea and to R. Hama . . . and similarly to R. Nahman and to R. Nahman’s opinion in conjunction with Amemar. We should especially pay attention to the way in which the Talmud attempts to demonstrate that one Nehardean sage’s opinion matches others from Nehardea; we frequently see the phrases, “the Nehardeans go according to their own reasoning.94 As we shall see, the proofs that scholars have used to demonstrate Amemar’s “conservative” tendencies and his dependence on Nehard- ean halakhic traditions are based on unproven assumptions and unnecessary interpretations of certain expressions ascribed to Amemar and the sages of his generation. In my opinion, study of Amemar’s halakhic methodology requires analysis of all of his halakhic literature and the comparison of his methodology with those of his contemporaries.95 As we shall see, such a study leads to a portrait of Amemar that is the exact opposite of that found in previous scholarly literature. Our analysis of the methodology that lies behind Amemar’s halakhic rulings will focus on four genres of halakhic activity attributed to him in the Bavli:

(1) Rulings in cases that came in front of him. (2) Halakhic decisions where he uses the technical term “hilkheta.” (3) Broad halakhic rulings, for instance those which begin, “one who wishes to . . .” (4) His interpretation of tannaitic sources.

4.2. A New Appraisal of Amemar’s Halakhic Methodology Amemar is portrayed in the Bavli as a sage who makes independent decisions, judging each case on its own merits. He employs a critical

94 Zuri, Rav Ashi [Heb.], 15. 95 I employed a similar methodology in my study of the tannaitic traditions transmitted by Samuel (“Tanna D’bei Shmuel ”) and in connection with R. Sheshet, R. Nah- man, Rami bar Hama and Rava. For an expanded treatment of these subjects, see: B. Cohen, “In Quest of Babylonian Tannaitic Traditions,” 271–303; B. Cohen, “Rav Sheshet’ [Heb.]; B. Cohen, “Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman’ [Heb], 11–32; B. Cohen, “Rami bar Hama in Contrast to Rava’ [Heb.], 149–184. amemar 53 stance vis à vis tannaitic and earlier amoraic tradition. When an earlier halakhic tradition (tannaitic or amoraic/Nehardean) does not match his legal reasoning, he does not hesitate to disagree with it, even if his ruling obviously contradicts the earlier halakhah or deviates from it. In many cases, he does not even explain or defend his opinion, despite the difﬁculties R. Ashi raises against him from earlier sources. Ame- mar’s critical approach to the halakhic tradition is similar in style to that which is termed “legal realism” by legal scholars.96 This description of Amemar’s methodology is based on the following ﬁndings. (a) Amemar tends to rule against the tannaitic halakhic tradition found in the Mishnah, in baraitot and in early amoraic traditions. At times his decisions do not match the accepted rules for deciding

96 There are several schools of “legal realism” but in common to them all is the notion that a judge is not subject to rulings, laws or precedents as a source for his decisions, and that his judgments are grounded in his own independent considerations and based on the specific circumstances of the given situation. This has been recently formulated by Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism,” 54, “All the Realists agreed that the law and legal reasons are rationally indeterminate . . . so that the best explanation for why judges decide as they do must look beyond the law itself. In particular, all the Realists endorsed what we may call “the Core Claim’ of Realism: in deciding cases, judges respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts of the case, rather than to legal rules and reasons.” See also the definition put forth by Brian Bix, A Dictionary of Legal Theory, 4: “. . . realists argued at the more basic and abstract level that legal rules could never determine the outcome of particular cases . . . that rules were at best short-hand statements of how judges have decided issues of this sort in the past, or shorthand predictions of how they are likely to decide such cases in the future.” Legal Realism accords independent reasoning to the judge in interpreting the laws as well: “The doctrines of legal realism or neo-realism, which accord absolute power to the judge in legal decisions, translate these viewpoints to a notion of legal interpretation, according to which the judge is free to interpret the text in any way he chooses” (Barak, Interpretation in Law [Heb.], 1:66). Extensive literature has been written concerning this approach since its spread in the United States in the twenties and thirties and this is not the place for a lengthy discussion. Below are references to a few recent significant studies which include broad bibliographies: Altman, Critical Legal Studies, 152–155; Lloyd, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 679–803; Schlegel, “Legal Realism,” 501–503; Green, “Legal Realism as Theory of Law,” 1915–2000. It should be emphasized that this legal approach grants a large degree of significance to the personality of the judge in rendering a decision. This was formulated by Jerome Frank, one of the leaders of this philosophical/legal movement: “If the personality of the judge is the pivotal factor in law administration, then law may vary with the personality of the judge who happens to pass upon any given case” (Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, 120). See also Thomas, The Judicial Process, 304–305. All three of these characteristics stand out in Amemar’s halakhic rulings, as we will demonstrate below. Nevertheless, a degree of caution in using legal realism to describe Amemar’s approach to law is in order. For instance, legal realism perceives law as being cloudy, unclear, and therefore it neutralizes the law as a source for legal decisions. In contrast, we have not found reflections of such a notion when it comes to Amemar’s approach to tannaitic or early amoraic sources. 54 chapter two halakhah in his generation. This phenomenon is most noticeable in the cases where R. Ashi acts surprised at Amemar’s rulings, and in light of Amemar’s refusal in six cases to even resolve the difficulty raised against his ruling, cases in which he evasively says, “I have not heard [that source] (that is to say, it is not reasonable to me)” (lo shemi’a li kelomar lo sevira li ). This approach also explains his forced—and at times extremely forced—interpretations of tannaitic sources.97 The circumstances in which Amemar was forced to interpret a tannaitic source (following his having contradicted a tannaitic or earlier amoraic opinion) are, in our opinion, the cause of these strained explanations. The very fact that scholars struggled to comprehend, each in their own way, Amemar’s interpretation of tannaitic sources, and the fact that they often ascribed these interpretations to the anonymous stratum of the Talmud, the “stam,” is further evidence to just how strained his interpretations often are.98 (b) Amemar consistently rejects the halakhic traditions of earlier Nehardean sages, especially those of Samuel.99 Even more radically, in two places Amemar announces, “I am among [the elders] of Nehardea, and I hold . . .” [ana (mi-savei de)100 Nehardea ana u-svira li . . .] and then he proceeds to rule, for various reasons, against their opinion.101 Simply stated, when the Nehardean halakhah disagrees with his opinion, he does not hesitate to rule against it. This halakhic methodology distinguishes Amemar from early Nehardean amoraim, sages of the third,

97 On the number of times that R. Ashi raised a difficulty on Amemar, and on their connection with the latter’s halakhic rulings, see below, section 5.2., p. 95. 98 Modern scholars of the Babylonian Talmud commonly posit that the presence of difficulties and strained interpretations ascribed to amoraic sages is a result of late interpolations by anonymous editors, and therefore these interpretations should not be ascribed to the amoraim themselves. I have dealt with this subject in various places throughout my research into the Babylonian amoraim; see chapter one, section 4.1., pp. 22–24. We have found a similar phenomenon in connection to R. Nahman (b. Jacob)’s rulings and his interpretations of tannaitic texts. In these cases as well, modern scholars have attempted to ascribe the difficult and strained passages to later editorial insertions. For an expanded treatment and a survey of scholarship on the topic see: Cohen, “Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman’ [Heb], 16–17 and n. 29. 99 For the evidence indicating that Samuel served as the head of the Nehardean school during the first half of the third century, see above, chapter one, section 1.2., pp. 5–6. 100 The words in brackets are based on several manuscripts, for instance Vatican 115, Oxford 366 and the Florence manuscript of b.Bava Batra 31a. This reading is also found in Judah ben Kalonymus of Speyer, see: Maimon, ed., Yihusei Tannaim VeAmoraim, 81. 101 b. Bava Metzi’a 16b (= b. Bava Metzi’a 35a); b. Bava Batra 31a. amemar 55 fourth and fifth generations. Specific examples of this phenomenon will be provided below, at the end of this chapter.102

4.3. Analysing His Rulings in Actual Cases There are nineteen instances in which Amemar issues a halakhic ruling for a situation which he confronted.103 The following are the technical/literary terms used by the Bavli to present these rulings: (A) “Amemar allowed . . . /permitted . . .” (9 cases) . . . (amemar shra/sharei; amemar akhshar le/be).104 These rulings are usually reported apodictically, without any explanation.105 (B) Court cases brought in front of Amemar (4 cases).106 (C) A retroactive report by a sage concerning Amemar’s halakhic ruling, issued when Amemar came to the sage’s region . . . “Amemar came to our place (and validated) . . .” [amemar ikla le’atrin (vedarish)] (2 cases).107 In these cases the use of the term “ikla” demonstrates that Amemar was not from the place in which he issued the ruling, either Sura/Mata Mehasya or Pumbedita (see below).108 In ﬁve other

102 For a comparison with his predecessors see below, section 5.1., pp. 92–93. 103 b. Berakhot 12a; b. Shabbat 95a; b. Eruvin 104a; b. Pesahim 30b; b. Sukkah 55a; b. Betzah 22a (twice); b. Yevamot 21b (= b. Yevamot 40b); ibid. 43a; ibid. 45b; b. Ketubbot 105b; b. Kiddushin 72b; b. Bava Metzi’a 65b; b. Bava Batra 165a; b. Hullin 80a. 104 b. Shabbat 95a; b. Eruvin 104a; b. Betzah 22a; b. Yevamot 21b (= b. Yevamot 40b); ibid. 43a; ibid. 45b; b. Kiddushin72b; b. Bava Batra 165a; b. Hullin 80a. 105 The term “apodictic” as used here implies a short literary formation which includes only terse explanations and statements (Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:96), in contrast with statements that include halakhic reasoning or justification. For a definition of apodictic statements in the Talmud see mainly: Halivni, “Whoever Studies Laws . . . ,” 302, n. 3; Kalmin, “The Post Rav Ashi Amoraim,” 169; Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:95–103. 106 b. Rosh HaShanah 31b; b. Ketubbot 69a; ibid. 105b; b. Shevu’ot 30b. In this count I have included rulings issued by Amemar which relate to concrete situations and not just cases which seem to have come in front of a court. 107 b. Pesahim 107a; b. Yevamot 45b. Amemar’s ruling found on b. Bava Batra 124b uses similar language but uses the verb “darash,” which is usually translated as “expounded”: “Amemar came to our place and expounded.” 108 This emerges from a study of the term “R. X came to . . .” in the Bavli. See: A. Cohen, “Towards the Historical Meaning,” 51–64. We should distinguish between instances in which a sage comes to a specific town such as “R. X came to Mahoza/ Sura/Damharya,” and cases where he comes to the house of another rabbi, be it the rabbi’s personal house or his study house. When Amemar comes to “our place” the meaning is the former, “our city,” as we can see from other instances of such a term in the Bavli (see: A. Cohen, ibid., 52, n. 6). This demonstrates that Amemar is not from the places referred to in those two instances. Furthermore, in both cases the sage reporting the incident is known to be from a different locality than Amemar. In the first case, the sage reporting is R. Aha son of Rava (b. Yevamot 45b; b. Bava Batra 124b, according to manuscript evidence) who was from Pumbedita. In the second case, the 56 chapter two

instances, there is a report concerning a ruling of his that took place in Nehardea or Mahoza, the center of his rabbinic activity.109 (D) Questions which arose in front of Amemar in which he was expected to issue a halakhic ruling: “Rav Ashi asked Amemar” (be’ah mineh rav ashi me-amemar) or “They asked Amemar” (ba’u mineh me-amemar) (2 cases)].110 Seventeen out of nineteen of Amemar’s halakhic rulings are based on logic as a halakhic or interpretive source, even if this causes his halakhic conclusions to deviate from the tannaitic or amoraic halakhic tradition.111 The discussion below will analyze some examples which demonstrate this phenomenon. We will begin by analyzing three cases in which Amemar’s halakhic decision disagrees with a halakhah found in the Mishnah. In the first two of these instances his rulings are connected specifically with Mahoza. Bavli, Shabbat 95a Our Rabbis taught: One who milks, sets milk [for curdling], and makes cheese, [the standard is] the size of a dried fig. If one sweeps [the floor], lays dust [by sprinkling water], or removes loaves of honey, if he does this unwittingly on the Sabbath, he is liable to a sin offering; if he does it deliberately, he is flagellated with forty [lashes], the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the Sages say: In both cases it is [forbidden] only because of mandated rest (shevut) . . .112 Amemar permitted sprinkling [the floors]113 in Mahoza.114 He said: What is the reason that the rabbis said [that it is forbidden]? [It is] lest

sages reporting are Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha the sons of R. Hisda and they are reporting to R. Ashi (b. Pesahim 107a), who is located in Sura/Mata Mehasya, see above, pp. 43–44. 109 See: b. Berakhot 12a; b. Shabbat 95a; b. Eruvin 104a; b. Sukkah 55a; b. Rosh HaShanah 31b. 110 b. Pesahim 30b; b. Betzah 22a. 111 b. Berakhot 12a; b. Shabbat 95a; b. Eruvin 104a; b. Pesahim 30b; ibid. 107a; b. Rosh HaShanah 31b; b. Sukkah 55a; b. Betzah 22a (twice); b. Yevamot 21b; ibid. 43a; b. Ketubbot 69a; ibid. 105b; b. Bava Metzi’a 65b; b. Bava Batra 165a; b. Shevu’ot 30b; b. Hullin 80a. 112 This baraita can be found in t. Shabbat 9:13 [ed. Lieberman, 39]. Compare the version found in y. Shabbat 7:2, 10b–10c. 113 In a Cairo Geniza fragment from the Antonin collection (Katz, ed., Ginze Talmud Bavli, 1:26 ) the word is “ziluf ” and it seems that the meaning is sprinkling of water. This is also the meaning of the root “zalakh” in Aramaic (above). See: Kohut, Arukh HaShalem, 3:294; Krauss, Talmudische Archäologie, 2:325; Levy, Wörterbuch, 1:539; Jas- trow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 1:401; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 414.] 114 Oxford 366 reads “on the Sabbath in Mahoza.” amemar 57

one come to level depressions [in the earthen floor]. Here [in Mahoza] there are no depressions [in the floor]. Amemar’s lenient ruling relates to the issue of sprinkling water on the floor. This practice is forbidden on Shabbat according to tanaitic tradition115 either because it is a derivative of the prohibited labor of “building” (according to the Bavli) or “threshing” (according to the Yerushalmi).116 Among the tannaim, no one disputed that sprinkling water was forbidden; the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the sages was only whether the prohibition was of toraitic or rabbinic origin.117 Amemar justifies his allowing the sprinkling of water on the floor by taking into account the special circumstances in his region “here (in Mahoza) there are no depressions [in the floor].”118 The tannaitic halakhah prohibited sprinkling, so Amemar would claim, only in a place where there were depressions. R. Menahem Hameiri, a medieval talmudic commentator, was himself perplexed by Amemar’s deviating from the halakhic tradition. His concern was that reasoning such as Amemar’s would allow leniency even in other places, and the tannaitic halakhah would be abandoned: “for we can raise a difficulty on Amemar’s actions, how could he not rule strictly in Mahoza lest others rule similarly in other places?”119 In order to solve this question, the Meiri was forced to explain Amemar’s ruling based on the assumption that in Mahoza none of the houses had floors with depressions and that we don’t prohibit such an action in Mahoza because of the situation in other cities.120 The tendentiousness of this assumption is a result of the difficulty that the Meiri had with Amemar’s deviation from standard tannaitic tradition.

115 See above, footnote 112. See also Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 3:140. 116 See Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 3:140. For an expanded discussion concerning the nature of the prohibitions mentioned in the baraita see Gilat, Studies in the Develop- ment of the Halakha [Heb.], 44–45. 117 See: Itzhaki, “Masorot Shonot Bi’Yshivot Sura u-Pumbedita,” 99 and n. 2. 118 The text itself does not explain why there were no depressions in the ﬂoors of the houses of Mahoza. Rashi and several modern scholars explained that the ﬂoors were made of stone. See: Krauss, Kadmoniyot HaTalmud, 1:340; Yudolowitz, Mahoza [Heb.], 27; Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 187. In contrast, Funk, Monumenta Tal- mudica, 1:294 ascribed the phenomenon to the elevation of the city, which prevented rainfall from gathering in the streets and houses. 119 See: Hameiri, Bet Habekhira, 3:355, s.v. mekhabed umerabetz. 120 Hameiri, ibid., s.v. kol talmid. 58 chapter two

In the following example Amemar again issues a ruling in Mahoza that ﬂouts tannaitic tradition: Bavli Eruvin 104a Mishnah: One may draw water using a wheel from the cistern of the Gulah on Shabbat and from the great cistern and from the Heker well on a festival. Gemara: Amemar allowed drawing water using a wheel in Mahoza. He said: Why did the rabbis forbid this? Lest he draw water for his garden or his ruin, but here there are no gardens or ruins . . . The prohibition of drawing water using a wheel on Shabbat (outside of the Temple) is found in the Mishnah and Tosefta, and is documented in ancient halakhic traditions stemming from the Second Temple period.121 The Mishnah allows drawing water on Shabbat only from the cistern of the Gulah,122 but not from the Heker well,123 from which it was permitted to draw only on a festival. As Aviad Stollman writes, “the permission to draw from these cisterns demonstrates that it was prohibited to draw from other cisterns, as the Talmud deduces in this passage, ‘In the Temple it is [permitted]; outside the Temple, it is not.’ ”124 The prohibition of drawing water on Shabbat is also found in Tosefta Eruvin 10:21 (ed. Lieberman, 139). Furthermore, Hanokh Albeck pointed out that apocryphal sources from the Second Temple period also prohibited drawing water on Shabbat.125 Based on these rabbinic and non-rabbinic sources, Aviad Stollman demonstrated that the prohibition is found in the very act itself, understood by rabbis and other Jews to be in and of itself prohibited on Shabbat, and not as it is perceived according to the later conception found in the Bavli and also present in Amemar’s words “lest he water his garden or ruin.” As Stollman writes:

121 See: Stollman, “Hashma’at Kol,” 86–93. 122 Concerning the Gula cistern see m. Middot 5:4. For the etymology of “Gula” see: Schwartz, “Be’er Ha-Qar’ [Heb.], 14–16; Lieberman, Studies in Palestinian Talmudic Lit- erature [Heb.], 521; Bar-Asher, “The Modern Study of Mishnaic Hebrew” [Heb.], 23; ibid., “The Nominal Patterns pūlā and puā in Mishnaic Hebrew” [Heb.], 409–410. 123 On “Hakra” see: Epstein, Mevo’ot Lesifrut Hatannaim, 322; Schwatz, “Be’er Ha- Qar’ [Heb.], 3–16; Stollman, BT Eruvin Chapter X [Heb.], 395. 124 Ibid., 380. 125 Albeck, “Das Buch der Jubiläen und die Halacha,” 8–9; idem, Shisha Sidre Mish- nah, 2:444. amemar 59

Examination of non-rabbinic sources such as Jubilees and the Damas- cus Covenant reveals that there was a basic prohibition against drawing water on Shabbat. Furthermore, it is likely that the prohibition of drawing water was understood in some tannaitic sources as an independent prohibition, and not one due to “muktzeh” or the prohibitions of carrying (and certainly not due to a prohibition lest one water his garden).126 Similar to the halakhic ruling we examined above, here too Ame- mar bases his lenient ruling on the special circumstances that exist in Mahoza, “here there are no gardens or ruins.” Stollman notes, correctly, that Amemar is the first to allow drawing water with a wheel without any reservations.127 In this aspect his ruling is distinguished from the halakhic rulings of others at the end of the amoraic period. According to Stollman, Amemar’s permissiveness was a result of the difficulty Babylonian Jews would have had in observing the earlier prohibition.128 Be that as it may, in our opinion Amemar’s ruling here is also part of a larger tendency of his to allow deviations from halakhic tradition. In the following source Amemar again rules against the Mishnah. His own ruling forced Amemar to provide a very difficult interpretation to the Mishnah, one which many commentators had great difficulty with. Bavli Yevamot 40b Mishnah: One who releases his levirate wife (halitzah)—he is prohibited from marrying her relatives and she is prohibited from marrying his relatives . . . she is prohibited from his father, his father’s father, his son, his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son. Gemara: It was asked: Did they prohibit relatives of the second degree in the case of the halutzah or not? . . . . Come and hear: And his son’s son. Is not this due to the levir through whom she is the wife of his father’s father? No; it is due to the deceased through whom she is his father’s father’s brother’s wife. But, surely, Amemar permitted the marriage of one’s father’s father’s brother’s wife! Amemar interprets [the mishnah] to refer to the son of the son of the grandfather. If so, [his son and his son’s son] are the same as his brother and his brother’s son. It taught both his paternal brother and his maternal brother.

126 Stollman, BT Eruvin Chapter X [Heb.], 378. 127 Stollman, “Hashma’at Kol,” pp. 85–86; idem, BT Eruvin Chapter X [Heb.], 390. 128 Ibid. 60 chapter two

The word which I have translated “permitted,” from the Hebrew root kśr, in the Aramaic binyan of aphel,129 appears eleven times in the Bavli,130 and in each case it is used to describe a lenient ruling given by an amora. In ﬁve of these cases it is stated explicitly that the ruling was given in an actual case, which strengthens the assumption that Amemar’s ruling was given under similar circumstances.131 Amemar’s lenient ruling does not only disagree with an explicit mishnah, but also a tannaitic tradition in R. Hiyya’s baraita found later in the passage and its parallel in the Tosefta (see below).132 Ame- mar allowed marriage between the halutzah [the woman released from levirate marriage] and the grandson of the levir. Beyond the fact that this is how Amemar ruled, there is no justiﬁcation found in this source for why Amemar ruled this way. It seems likely that it stems from his general understanding that “second degree incest prohibitions” are not prohibited in the case of the halutzah (they are prohibited only in the case of the divorcee).133 This ruling stands in direct contradiction with the mishnah (“and she is prohibited to his father . . . and his son’s son),”

129 See: Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 606. 130 See: b. Shabbat 145b; b. Yevamot 21b; ibid. 45b (twice); b. Bava Batra 128a; b. Bava Batra 155a; b. Sanhedrin 28a; b. Sanhedrin 29b; b. Hullin 18b; b. Hullin 19a. 131 See for instance: (1) b. Yevamot 45b Ravina said: R. Gaza said to me: R. Yose b. Abin came to our place, and there was an incident involving an unmarried woman and he validated [her]. [There was another incident] involving a married woman and he disqualified [her]. (2) Ibid. R. Aha the son of Rava said to Ravina: Amemar came to our place and he validated [the woman] whether she was unmarried or married. (3) b. Shabbat 145b R. Yemar validated secondary testimony in cases of a first-born. Meremar said about him: “Yemar permits first-borns.” 132 From the discussion between R. Ashi and R. Hillel (a sixth-generation amora, see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 433) in a parallel passage in b. Yevamot 21b, we can see that Amemar’s ruling contradicts a tannaitic tradition found in a baraita transmitted by Mar the son of Rabana/Ravina (see: Albeck, Introduction to the Tal- mud [Heb.], 368). This tannaitic tradition concerning “secondary incest prohibitions,” includes the levir’s son’s son. R. Ashi, who was attempting to resolve the difficulty that R. Hillel raised on Amemar, found no better answer than to respond, “Mar the son of Rabana/Ravina did not sign on [to the authenticity] of this tradition.” We should note that the discussion between R. Ashi and R. Hillel is solid evidence that Amemar’s halakhic ruling was known during Amemar’s period and that other amoraim ascribed it to Amemar. In contrast, there is no evidence that the interpretation ascribed to Amemar, “Amemar interprets [the mishnah] to refer to the son of the son of the grandfather” was known by others or was ascribed by others to Amemar himself. 133 See Hameiri, Bet Habekhira, 6:166, s.v. ule-amemar. amemar 61 which is explained according to Amemar and the interpretation of the stam as referring to the levir’s brother’s son. As the Ritba explains, “It means: that which it teaches ‘and his son’s son’ does not refer to the levir, but rather his father who is mentioned in the first clause [of the mishnah] and this is what it means to say: she is prohibited to his father and to his father’s son, who is the brother of the levir, and to father’s son’s son, who is the levir’s brother’s son”.134 The resolution of the mishnah ascribed to Amemar is forced and doesn’t match the actual language of the mishnah (as can also be seen from the y. Yevamot 4:8, 6a).135 This was already noted by the stam within the passage, “If so, [his son and his son’s son] are the same as his brother and his brother’s son.” The difficulty forced the stam to resolve that the two parts of the mishnah relate to two different types of brothers, one fraternal and one maternal. As stated above, Amemar’s ruling disagrees with a parallel halakhah found in the continuation of the passage and in a toseftan parallel t. Yevamot 6:4 (ed. Lieberman, 18): Four are obligated (forbidden) by the Torah and four are secondary to them: his father, his son, his brother, his brother’s son . . . . his father’s father, his mother’s father, his son’s son, his daughter’s son, behold these are secondary to them. This baraita cites “the [levir’s] son’s son” as being a case of secondary incest prohibitions.136 Concerning this source, Lieberman notes, “We can see from here that they prohibited secondary incest prohibitions for the halutzah. And in the Yerushalmi (4:8, 6a) they derived this from

134 Yafhan, ed., Hidushey HaRitba, 13: 161, s.v. amemar moki 135 Below is the Yerushalmi’s comments on this mishnah (based on the Leiden manuscript): She is forbidden to his father, his father’s father, his son, his son’s son, his brother, and his brother’s son. That is to say that they [prohibited] secondary incest relationships [in the case of the woman who performed halitzah]. And that is why it is stated: to his son, his son’s son, his brother, and his brother’s son. That is to say that they prohibited secondary incest relationshps in cases of halitzah. From the Yerushalmi’s discussion of this mishnah two conclusions can be drawn: (1) the words “his son’s son” found in the mishnah are interpreted according to their simple meaning to refer to the levir’s son’s son, and not to the levir’s father, the interpretation ascribed to Amemar in the Bavli. (2) That they prohibited secondary incest prohibitions in the case of the woman who performed halitzah. Concerning this conclusion see Lieberman’s quote brought below. 136 See also: R. Yehezkiel Abramsky, Tosefta im Perush Hazon Yehezkel, 4:50, s.v. ben bno. 62 chapter two the mishnah, unlike Amemar . . .”.137 Many medieval commentators also noted that Amemar’s interpretation of the mishnah is not possible in light of the toseftan baraita and its parallel in the Bavli.138 In sum, this is another example of Amemar ruling leniently in the face of contradictory tannaitic halakhah. Bavli Pesahim 107a: Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha the son of R. Hisda said to R. Ashi: Amemar139 once came to our place and we didn’t have any wine [for the ritual of havdalah]. We brought him beer but he would not recite the havdalah and he spent the night fasting. In the morning we troubled ourselves to bring him wine, and he recited the havdalah, and then he ate something. The next year he came back to our place, and we didn’t have wine and we brought him beer. He said: It seems that this is the wine of the region. He recited havdalah and ate something. Wine played a central role in Jewish ritual as early as biblical times, and it continued to do so through the Second Temple period, as can be seen in both rabbinic and non-rabbinic sources.140 In his commentary on this passage the Meiri writes, “Havdalah was established for it to be recited over a cup of wine.”141 The Meiri’s conclusion matches both tannaitic and amoraic tradition, where wine is mentioned as being used not only for kiddush (on the Sabbath and festivals), but with regard to havdalah as well (Bavli Pesahim 106a):142 [Our rabbis taught (Tanu Rabbanan):]143 “Observe the Sabbath day to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8)—Observe it with wine when it enters. I only know to do so when [the Sabbath] enters, how do I know to do so when it goes out? Scripture says, “the day.”

137 Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 6: 48 (emphasis mine). 138 See Shoshanah, ed., Tosafot Yeshanim HaShalem al Masekhet Yevamot, 145–146, s.v. amemar. 139 The Venice printed edition reads: “Rabin.” This is a difﬁcult reading for two reasons. First of all, it is the only evidence of such a reading. Second, there is a gap of two generations between Rabin of the fourth generation (see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 352–353) and Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha of the sixth-seventh generation (see below). 140 See: Tabory, The Passover Ritual [Heb.], 140–141. 141 Hameiri, Bet Habekhira, ed. M. Hershler, 3: 226, s.v. af-al-pi. 142 The version of the baraita brought here is based on Mirsky, ed., Sheeltot: Devarim, 5:74. David Henshke has demonstrated that this is the version of the text that was familiar to R. Judah b. Yehezkel in the second generation of Babylonian amoraim as well as to medieval commentators such as Rashi, Rif, Rambam and others. See Henshke, “On the History of Kiddusha Rabbah,” 196–209. 143 The text in brackets is based on Bavli manuscripts and the printed edition. amemar 63

Early Babylonian amoraim are also documented as requiring the use of wine, and rejecting the use of beer, for kiddush and havdalah: R. Hisda asked of R. Huna:144 Can one recite kiddush over beer? He said . . . . they reasoned . . . R. Hisda said to them: Thus said Rav: Just as one does not recite kiddush over it, so too one does not recite havdalah over it. It was also stated: R. Tahlifa bar Abimi said in the name of Samuel: Just as one does not recite kiddush over it, so too one does not recite havdalah over it.145 In accord with this tradition, Amemar refused to recite havdalah over beer when he came to Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha for his ﬁrst visit.146 Nevertheless, during his second visit, Amemar’s lenient halakhic tendencies came to the fore, and he recited havdalah over beer, in consideration of the circumstances of that region. Israel Ta-Shema noted that Amemar was the ﬁrst sage in Babylonia to explicitly allow the use of beer for havdalah, a ruling that contradicted the earlier halakhah: From all of this is it is clear that in the earlier tradition it was forbidden to exchange wine for another alcoholic alternative . . . It is mentioned in the Talmud that several amoraim were scrupulous to recite kiddush only

144 The text in brackets is based on Munich 6, Munich 95, JTS Rab. 1623 (EMC 271), Columbia T141 X 93, Oxford Opp. Add. fol. 23, Vatican 109, Vatican 125, and Vatican 134. In JTS Rab. 1608 (ENA 850) and in printed editions the reading is: “R. Huna from R. Hisda”. The latter seems to be the version also in Cambridge T-S F2 (2) 16. The version that I have quoted is preferable because questions formatted with this formula are used when the questioner is subordinate to the sage being questioned (see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 101, 104). This matches the general hierarchical relationship between R. Huna and R. Hisda. Geoffrey Her- man pointed out that there existed a tense relationship between these two sages, see: Herman, “The Relations between Rav Huna and Rav Hisda’ [Heb.], 263–279. Nev- ertheless, this does not overturn the evidence that when these two sages had contact, R. Hisda acted as R. Huna’s subordinate. R. Hisda raises difﬁculties on R. Huna (b. Pesahim 73a; b. Gittin 7a; b. Bava Qamma 74b; b. Bava Qamma 97a; b. Sanhedrin 72b), he asks him questions of halakhah ( y. Shabbat 1:1, 2c), he quotes halakhot in his name (b. Pesahim 101b; b. Bava Metzi’a 72), and is even considered a disciple of R. Huna, one who may not issue instruction while in his master’s presence (b. Eruvin 62b). 145 See also R. Yohanan’s statement on b. Pesahim 113a. 146 Based on their subordination to R. Ashi (see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 55–56), Beer posits that Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha were located in Sura/Mata Mehasya or at least in its proximity (Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 177). Nevertheless, from the language found in this passage (“R. Ashi came to our place”) it seems likely that all three did not reside in the same area. The phrase “our place” signiﬁes that R. Ashi was not from the same place as the other two sages. In the end, there is simply not enough information offered in the Talmud to arrive at a conclusive determination as to the geographical location of these two sages. 64 chapter two

wine . . . In contrast, we can see that after Amemar saw that beer was the “wine of the region” he agreed that one could recite havdalah over it.147 Other sources in the Bavli document that wine was scarce and expensive, at least in certain regions.148 It was replaced by beer,149 which was far less expensive.150 Amemar’s ruling recognized beer as “the wine of the region,” meaning it replaced wine in places where wine is difﬁcult to ﬁnd.151 This instance again demonstrates Amemar’s tendency to consider the circumstances of each case that came before him, and his willingness to set tradition to the side in cases of necessity.152 When

147 Ta-Shma, Early Franco-German Ritual Custom [Heb.], 222 (see also 227 and n. 14). For an extended discussion concerning the use of wine for kiddush and havdalah in tannaitic literature, and the changes that occurred in the amoraic period, see Elbogen, “Eingang und Ausgang des Sabbats,” 179–187, and especially 185; Goldsmidt, “Kid- dush VeHavdalah,” 48–53. 148 See mainly: Löw, Die Flora Der Juden, 1:134; Krauss, Talmudische Archäologie, 2:229; Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 93–94, 159–171. On the scarcity of wine in Babylonia during the geonic period see: Mann, “The Responsa of the Babylonian Geonim,” 314, 317. 149 The meaning of “shikhra” which I have translated here as “beer” has been discussed widely in scholarly literature. See for instance: Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 1:14–15 and n. 4; Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 172–173 and n. 52; Stol, “Beer in Neo-Babylonian Times,” 155–183; Broshi, “Date Beer and Date Wine in Antiquity,” 85–92. 150 See mainly: Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 171–180; Stol, “Beer in Neo- Babylonian Times,” 158. 151 See R. Samuel b. Meir, s.v. hemar medinah. R. Judah b. Benjamin Anav, a thir- teenth century Italian talmudic commentator also had difficulty with Amemar’s contradicting the halakhic tradition and offered a unique interpretation. He wrote (Mirsky, ed., Commentary by R. Judah b. Benjamin Anav, 595): “It seems to me that he recited havdalah over bread, for over beer one cannot recite havdalah or kiddush . . . for the greatest way to perform the mitzvah is over wine.” Concerning this interpretation Ta- Shma writes, “I have not seen this intriguing and original interpretation in any place” (Ta-Shma, Early Franco-German Ritual Custom [Heb.], 227). For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the reason such an original interpretation arises is that Amemar’s ruling so blatantly contradicts the halakhic tradition. 152 In y. Berakhot 8:1, 11d and its parallel y. Pesahim 10:2, 37c a similar halakhah appears in the name of R. Zera: “For R. Zera said: one can recite havdalah over beer.” It might be asserted, therefore, that Amemar’s ruling is based, directly or indirectly, upon R. Zera’s tradition. However, this possibility seems weak for two reasons: (1) there are no roots to this tradition in the Bavli, as was noted by Ta-Shma. Only the use of wine was permitted for the use in Havdalah (see above, p. 63). The only evidence for such a tradition in the Bavli is Amemar’s ruling, which was issued under unusual circumstances. (2) R. Zera’s position is not actually identical in terms of halakhah with that of Amemar. Whereas the former allowed the use of beer ab initio (see: ibid., 22), Amemar allowed it only in a case where wine could not be found. Indeed, when Amemar first arrived at the place of Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha he did not deviate from the normative tradition of reciting havdalah over wine, and rather chose not to recite havdalah at all. In light of this, it is unlikely that when amemar 65 he felt an obligation to rule against tannaitic and early amoraic precedent, he did not hesitate to do so.153 In two additional cases Amemar disagrees with an earlier amoraic halakhic tradition, and the typical rules of halakhic decision making. In both cases, R. Ashi raises difficulties against Amemar.154 I will demonstrate this phenomenon by illustrating one of the two. Bavli Bava Batra 165a Mishnah: A plain document—the witnesses’ [signatures] are on the inside; a folded one—the witnesses’ signatures are on the reverse. A plain document whose witnesses’ [signatures] are on the reverse [or] a folded [one] whose witnesses’ [signatures] are on the inside are both invalid. A plain document requires two witnesses and a folded one three. A plain document with one witness [only] or a folded [one] with two witnesses are both invalid.

later on he did recite havdalah over beer, he did so based on R. Zera’s tradition. In light of this, it seems that the burden of proof is upon one who wishes to claim that Amemar’s tradition is based on an earlier Palestinian tradition. Furthermore, even if Amemar’s ruling was based partially on an earlier tradition, this does not diminish the fact that his leniency went against the dominant strand of tradition found in tannaitic and early amoraic literature. 153 For another case in which Amemar rules explicitly in contrast the Mishnah, see below, pp. 87–88. Another example of a halakhic ruling by Amemar that contradicts an explicit tannaitic halakhic can be found on b. Berakhot 12a: Mishnah: The deputy high priest said to them [the priests]: Say one benediction, and they said the benediction and recited the Ten Commandments, the Shema, “And it shall come to pass if you hearken” . . . Gemara: R. Judah said in the name of Samuel: Outside the Temple they also wanted to read thusly, but they were stopped on account of the insinuations of the heretics. It was also taught in a baraita: R. Nathan says: They also wanted to read thusly outside the Temple, but they were stopped on account of the insinuations of the heretics . . . Amemar considered instituting [the Ten Commandments as part of the liturgy] in Nehardea. R. Ashi said to him: they were stopped on account of the insinuations of the heretics. This source documents Amemar’s attempt to include the Ten Commandments in the liturgy used in Nehardea. R. Ashi aborted this attempt by pointing out that the recita- tion of the Ten Commandments had already been stopped because of the “insinuations of the sectarians.” R. Ashi’s response to Amemar is based on Samuel’s tradition as well as that ascribed to R. Nathan in the baraita. This tradition also has a parallel in y. Bera- khot 1:1, 3c. Once again, Amemar is portrayed as ruling against the earlier halakhah, one whose source is Palestinian but was also accepted in an earlier period by Samuel in Babylonia. For a full analysis of this tradition, see: Hauptamn, Development of the Tal- mudic Sugya, 64–65; B. Cohen, “In Nehardea Where there are No Heretics,” 36–38. 154 This same phenomenon is present in his opposition to the opinions of earlier amoraim found in the halakhic decisions of Amemar. This issue will be discussed below. 66 chapter two

Gemara: It is understandable . . . but a plain document with one witness it is obvious [that it is invalid]. Abbaye said: It was only necessary to state this where there was one signature and one witness [whose testimony was provided] orally. Amemar validated [a document] with one witness’s signature and the oral evidence of another. R. Ashi said to Amemar: And what [about] the [view] of Abaye? He said to him: I did not hear [of it], that is to say, it is not reasonable to me. Concerning Amemar’s ruling, the Rashbam writes (s.v. Amemar): “Ame- mar validated a document with only one signature . . . and another witness who testified orally concerning the document. And it seems to me that Amemar ruled that the document was completely valid, even if this would cause the plaintiff to claim property from a third party, as if two witnesses had signed on the document . . . For when it says ‘he validated,’ it means completely.” R. Ashi raised a difficulty on Amemar, because the latter’s ruling disagreed with the earlier amora, Abbaye. Amemar’s ruling, as was pointed out by commentators, also disagrees with the halakhic tradition followed by the Palestinian amoraim cited in the Yerushalmi.155 Amemar’s response to R. Ashi, “I did not hear of it . . .” demonstrates that Amemar intentionally ignored Abbaye’s, and declined to offer any resolution to his halakhic position. This is the typical meaning of the phrase, “I did not hear of it (that is to say, it is not reasonable to me)” in all of its appearances in the Bavli. Concern- ing the term, Avinoam Cohen writes: The sage who employs this term did not wish to change his own opinion, despite the fact that according the normal rules of halakhic decision making, he should have retracted. In order to steer clear of this problem, he chooses to avoid any substantive response, and merely states, “[It is as if ] I did not hear of it.” In other words, he acts as if the other amora’s opinion had never reached him, and he is therefore exempt from resolving the difficulty.156 Again, we see that Amemar did not hesitate to issue a halakhic ruling based on his own reasoning, even if this caused him to deviate from the halakhic tradition. In this case, Amemar’s boldness is even greater,

155 y. Ketubbot 2:6, 26c. See the difﬁculty raised in the Shitah Mekubetzet, s.v. veyesh. However, Amemar’s halakhah does agree with the words of R. Jeremiah in the continuation of the paasage, 165b. 156 A. Cohen, “On the Phrase ‘Lo Shemi’a Li’ ” [Heb.], 470–472. See also: Henshke, “On the Conclusion of Megillat Ta’anit” [Heb.], 160 and n. 180. amemar 67 for he did not even bother resolving his opinion, and rather knowingly chose to ignore earlier amoraic tradition.

4.4. Analysing His Halakhic Decisions In this section we shall analyze Amemar’s halakhic methodology in cases where he disagreed with amoraim from earlier generations. Amemar’s rulings are presented as the last link in the talmudic passage, the link from which the ﬁnal halakhah is decided. Analysis of these decisions demonstrates—as it did in previous cases—that Amemar’s own logic and not accepted tradition is the basis of his halakhic rulings. Ame- mar felt justiﬁed in contradicting earlier amoraic halakhic tradition and the accepted halakhic methods of ruling prevalent among others of his generation. We have divided the discussion below based on the two different literary genres in which his rulings appear: (1) Cases in which the term “hilkheta” is used—“Amemar said: The halakhah (hilkheta) is . . .” (2) Cases employing the phrase, “I am among the sages of Nehardea, and it seems to me” ( ana [mi-save’i de] nehardea ana u-svira li . . . ).

4.4.1. “Amemar said: The halakhah is (hilkheta) . . .” 157 There are nine places in the Bavli in which Amemar is portrayed as uttering the phrase, “The halakhah is (hilkheta). . . .”158 These rulings, phrased in an apodictic style, without any justiﬁcation, are usually found after an amoraic debate in which Amemar rules according to one of the previous opinions.159 Ze’ev Yaavetz concluded that if

157 For the use of the term “hilkheta” and its prevalence among late amoraim see: Spiegel, “Amar Rava Hilkheta,” 206–214; A. Cohen, “On the Phrase ‘lo shemi’a li’ [Heb.], 469 n. 9; ibid., Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 161 n. 81. Concern- ing the use of “ve-hilkheta” in stammaitic passages see mainly: Frankel, “Beiträge zu einer Einleitung in den Talmud,” 269–270; Levine, Rabbanan Savora’i, 46–53; Spiegel, “Comments and Late Additions” [Heb.], 152–219; Friedman, “Glosses and Addi- tions” [Heb.], 432–434; Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:201. 158 b. Mo’ed Qatan 16a; b. Yevamot 92b; b. Ketubbot 83b; ibid. 97a; b. Gittin 36a; b. Kid- dushin 79b; b. Bava Batra 13b; ibid. 77a; ibid. 153a; b. Sanhedrin 31b; b. Hullin 53b; b. Hullin 62a. 159 This statistic also emerges from a survey of about seventy amoraic rulings found in the Bavli using the phrase, “R. X said: Hilkheta.” In nearly all of these cases the amora’s ruling determines the halakhah following a dispute between earlier amoraim. For an expanded treatment of this subject see: Spiegel, “ ‘Amar Rava Hilkheta’,” 206–214; A. Cohen, “The Phrase ‘lo shemi’a li’ ” [Heb.], 469 n. 9. This ﬁnding demonstrates that the halakhic decisor was aware of the two earlier opinions and that he was accepting one of them. 68 chapter two

Amemar ruled according to the decisions of earlier amoraim, it means that Amemar generally ruled according to priorly existing amoraic halakhic tradition.160 However, analysis of these sources actually leads to the opposite conclusion. In seven out of nine cases Amemar’s rulings are based on his own halakhic reasoning, even if this reasoning stands in opposition to early amoraic halakhah, the general rules of halakhic decision making, or an explicit halakhah found in a tannaitic source.161 In six of the cases, his decision is also accompanied by the phrase, “I have not heard it (that is, it is not reasonable to me)” (lo shemi’a li kelomar lo sevira li ). In all of them R. Ashi raises a difﬁculty on Amemar’s ruling, based on the fact that the ruling disagrees with either an earlier amora or the rules of halakhic decision making. His response, “I have not heard it [that is, it is not reasonable to me (lo shemi’a li kelomar lo sevira li )],” demonstrates that Amemar intentionally chose to ignore the source, and refused to offer a solution to his own stance.162 A few examples will sufﬁce to illustrate this phenomenon. In the following example, Amemar’s “hilkheta” statement contradicts a tannaitic halakhah found in a baraita. Bavli Mo’ed Qatan 16a . . . For the question was raised: If three people had excommunicated [someone], can three others come and release [the ban]? Come and hear: “One who has been excommunicated to the master is excommunicated from the disciple; but one who has been excommunicated to the disciple is not [considered as] excommunicated to the master. One who is excommunicated to his own town is also excommunicated to another town; but one who is excommunicated to another town is not [considered] excommunicated to his own town. One who

160 See: Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:126 n. 3. 161 This conclusion is afﬁrmed by an examination of all of the instances of the phrase “[and] I hold” ([u]sevira li ) ascribed to amoraim in the Bavli (around 40 cases). In all of these cases an amora presents in front of another sage of his generation, or one subordinate to him, a decision that accords with one of two opinions, tannaitic or amoraic, cited earlier in the passage. For instance: (A) b. Shabbat 47b: “I hold like R. Simeon b. Gamaliel” (R. Hama to one of the rabbis); (B) b. Eruvin 24a: “I hold like R. Nahman” (R. Huna bar Judah to Mar Judah); (C) b. Eruvin 68a: “I hold like R. Yohanan” (Rava to Ravina); (D) b. Betzah 22b: “I hold like the Nehardeans” (Amemar to R. Ashi). The halakhic decision made by the amora seems to be based on his own reasoning and not on another tradition. Even the language “I hold” indicates that the halakhic decisor prefers to use his own reasoning rather than simply rely on one of the earlier opinions. 162 See above, p. 66, near footnote 156. amemar 69

is excommunicated to the Patriarch [Nasi ] is excommunicated from all Israel; but one who is excommunicated to all Israel is not excommunicated to the Patriarch.163 Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says that if one of the disciples had excommunicated someone and died, his part is not nullified.”164 From this you can derive three points . . . that if three have excommunicated somone, three others may not come and release [the ban]. Amemar said: The halakhah (hilkheta) is: three who have excommunicated a person, three others can come and release [the ban].165 R. Ashi said to Amemar: But is it not taught: Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says that if one of the disciples had excommunicated someone and died, his part is not nullified. Does not this mean, that it cannot be nullified at all? No, [it means] not until another three come and release him.166 It is clear that according to the simple and straightforward reading of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel’s statement, if someone dies, it is impossible for others to undo his part in excommunicating another.167 The same halakhah is found explicitly in a baraita in Yerushalmi Mo’ed Qatan 3:2, 71d: “It was taught: If one of the rabbis who issued the ban died, they cannot release [the ban] for him.” Furthermore, as was pointed out by Noah Aminoah, Palestinian and Babylonian amoraim acted according to this tannaitic halakhah.168 Amemar’s lenient ruling—“three who have excommunicated a person, three others can come and release the ban”—contradicted the tannaitic halakhah, and caused great difficulty for talmudic interpret-

163 This baraita can be found with minor variants in y. Mo’ed Qatan 3:2, 81d. 164 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel’s opinion is not part of the baraita in the Yerushalmi. However, his opinion matches that found in an anonymous baraita in the continuation of the Yerushalmi: “It was taught: If one of the excommunicators died, they do not release him.” 165 The sentence “Amemar said . . . . they release him” is missing from Columbia X 893 T141. It is likely that this is due to a scribal error caused by the similarity with the line that appears before, “these three that excommunicate . . .”. In any case, it is clear from the continuation of the passage, where R. Ashi raises a difficulty on Amemar, that Amemar’s statement is an original piece of the passage. 166 The version preserved in the She’iltot (Mirsky, ed., Sheeltot: Bamidbar, 5:55) reads: “He said to him: “No, until another comes and releases him.” It is not clear who is the respondent to R. Ashi—Amemar or the stam. The doubt as to whether this is actually Amemar arises not only due to the lack of the words “he said to him” in most manuscripts, but also as a result of the terminology. The phrase, “is it not X?” . . . no Y” is often the sign of amoraic discourse that has been reconstructed by later editors. See: Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:6 n. 1. 167 Hayot, ed., Perush Masekhet Mashkin LeRabenu Shelomo ben HaYatom, 77. 168 See: Aminoah, The Redaction of Tractate Sukkah and Moed-Katan [Heb.], 338–339. 70 chapter two ers, medieval and modern alike. In light of Amemar’s ruling David Halivni went so far as to reconstruct the baraita and even an original version of Amemar’s statement. According to Halivni, the original baraita included an opinion of other sages who disagreed with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. These sages held that it is possible to nullify the part of the ban issued by the one who died. This opinion, according to Halivni, was the basis of Amemar’s ruling, and his response to R. Ashi as well. Halivni writes: It is not stated explicity in this passage that Amemar responded to R. Ashi with the words, “No, [it means] not until another three come and release him.” The absence of this line points to the possibility that the response attributed to Amemar is from the stam, whereas Amemar himself originally responded to R. Ashi that he rules like the sages. Thus even Amemar would agree that the meaning of “it is not nullified” is that it is not nullified at all. And this is stated in a baraita in the Yerushalmi 3:1 . . . “It was taught: if one of the excommunicators dies, they do not release him.169 The need for Halivni to suggest a reconstruction of Amemar’s answer underscores how difficult it is to understand how Amemar could rule so blatantly against tannaitic halakhah. Halivni himself was aware of the difficulty of his suggestion, for a tannaitic ruling that agrees with Amemar is not found in any source—neither in the baraita in the Bavli, nor in a parallel in the Yerushalmi. The stammaim were also not familiar with such a baraita. Noah Aminoah also sensed this great difficulty with Amemar’s ruling and tried to locate the source for his ruling in the baraita.170 The attempts of modern scholars to reject the passage’s presentation of its material and its attribution to Amemar is, however, unnecessary. In light of Amemar’s general tendencies in interpretation and halakhic rulings, it is quite likely that this is another case in which Amemar did not hesitate to issue rulings contradictory to tannaitic and amoraic halakhah. Indeed, the difficulty that interpreters had with Amemar’s ruling leads to the conclusion that his words have been preserved in their original form. There is no need to offer any other “solution,” therefore, to this passage.

169 Halivni, ibid., 550. 170 Aminoah, The Redaction of Tractate Sukkah and Moed-Katan [Heb.], 338–339. amemar 71

Bavli Bava Batra 13a–b Mishnah: They do not divide up a courtyard until there are four cubits for this [partner] and four cubits for this [partner]. Nor [do they divide up] a ﬁeld until it has nine kavs for this [partner] and nine kavs for this [partner] . . . . Nor [do they divide up] an eating hall, a watchtower, a dovecote, a cloak, a bathhouse, or an olive-press until there is sufﬁcient for this [partner] and for this [partner]. [This is the general rule: whatever can be divided and still be called by the same name, they divide; otherwise they do not divide.]171 Gemara: What if there is not enough for each partner? R. Judah says:172 [One partner] has the right to say [to the other], “You name a price [for my share] or let me name a price [for your share].” R. Nahman says: He does not have the right to say, “You name a price or let me name a price.” Amemar said: The halakhah is (hilkheta): [One partner] has the right to say [to the other], “You name a price [for my share] or let me name a price [for your share]. R. Ashi said to him: What about R. Nahman (who disagrees)? He said to him: I did not hear [of it], that is to say, it is not reasonable to me. Bavli Hullin 61b–62a R. Nahman said: If he was familiar with [these birds1 and their names: any bird that has one characteristic [of cleanness] is clean. But if he was not familiar with these birds and their names, any bird that has one characteristic [of cleanness] is unclean, but that which has two characteristics [of cleanness] is clean; provided he recognizes the raven. Amemar said: The halakhah is (hilkheta)—a bird that has one characteristic is clean, as long as it does not seize its prey.173 R. Ashi said: What about R. Nahman (who disagrees)? He said to him: I did not hear [of it], that is to say, it is not reasonable to me.

171 Concerning the sentence found in brackets see Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 2:962–963; Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 9:309. See also Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:16–17. Concerning the phrase “this is the general rule” in the Mishnah in comparison with the later, saboraic use of the phrase, see Ephrathi, The Savoraic Period [Heb.], 159–278. 172 A version preserved in E. Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot, 2:443, reads “R. Huna said.” 173 There are three reasons that make it likely that the words “as long as he does not seize its prey” were not part of Amemar’s original statement: (1) the change from Hebrew to Aramaic (see Friedman, “A Critical Study of Yevamot X,” 301). (2) Medi- eval commentaries testify explicitly that these words are a “saboraic” insertion into the passage. See Levine, Rabbanan Savora’i, 39. (3) The addition of these words creates many interpretive problems in understanding Amemar’s ruling. See R. Asher, Tosafot Harosh, Hullin, s.v. vehane’i mile’i. 72 chapter two

In both of these cases Amemar’s ruling disagrees with the opinion of R. Nahman, rosh yeshiva of Nehardea in the third generation.174 The passage from Bava Batra opens with a dispute between R. Judah and R. Nahman175 concerning shared ownership over a piece of land that is too small to be divided, according to mishnaic halakhah.176 Ame- mar rules in accordance with R. Judah, who holds that one partner can force the other to either sell his own share, or buy the other’s share. The question that R. Ashi poses to Amemar, “What about R. Nahman (who disagrees)?” reﬂects the tendency among amoraim to rule in accordance with R. Nahman in monetary matters.177 Amemar’s ruling, therefore, opposes the general tendency of his rabbinic contemporaries, as well as the ruling of another Nehardean sage. Again, Amemar does not resolve his refusal to rule in accordance with the norms, and rather chooses to evade the question by responding, “I have not heard of it” (lo shemi’a li ). Similarly, in the second passage Amemar rejects a ruling by R. Nahman. Whereas R. Nahman allowed one to eat a bird that has

174 Concerning R. Nahman’s geographical location and his service as head of a local academy in Nehardea see: Die Juden in Babylonien, 1: 132 and n. 2; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 5:416; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 3:933; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 299–300; Florsheim, “The Establishment and Early Development of the Babylonian Academies” [Heb.], 187–190; idem, “The Relationships Among Second Generation Babylonian Amoraim” [Heb.], 282. See also above, chapter one, p. 8, footnote 34. 175 Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 5:73–74 has demonstrated that the dispute between R. Judah and R. Nahman stems from a dispute among tannaim concerning the same issue. There are medieval commentators who wished to connect this debate with R. Judah’s opinion concerning the case where “this one benefits and this one lacks nothing” (based on b. Bava Qamma 20a –20b). According to this interpretation, the partner who requests dissolution of the partnership is the one who “benefits” whereas the other partner does not lose out for he will either receive the entire property or compensation for his half. See: Cohen, Bar Metzra, 11–12 n. 35. This interpretation encounters a difficulty when we uncover the chronological layers of development in the Bavli. The discussion concerning the abstract concept, “this one benefits and this one lacks nothing,” is found only in the later, anonymous stratum of the Talmud; the concept is not mentioned by the amoraim themselves. For an expanded discussion see: Halivni, ibid; A. Cohen, “The “Loss” Element in the Talmudic Sugya” [Heb.], 66 n. 27, 70–71; ibid., “If One Occupies Another’s Property Without his Permission,” 564–565 and n. 38. 176 See Perush Rabbenu Gershom Meor Hagolah, s.v. mai. See also: Albeck, The Laws of Property and Contract [Heb.], 495. 177 Concerning R. Nahman’s authority as a legal decisor and the tendency of rabbis of his generation to rule according to him in monetary matters see: B. Cohen, “Rav Sheshet in Contrast to Rav Nahman’ [Heb.], 14–15. Concerning the tendency of later amoraim to rule in accordance with him in monetary matters throughout the talmudic period see: E. Halivni, The Rules for Deciding Halakha in the Talmud [Heb.], 108–112. amemar 73 only one of the four signs of being a clean bird178 only if he was an expert in the identification and nomenclature of the unclean birds found in the Bible,179 Amemar allowed anyone, even a non-expert to eat a bird with only one sign of cleanness. In this case, R. Ashi’s question is simpler—how can Amemar rule against R. Nahman, the only prior opinion in this matter? Again, Amemar’s ruling opposes earlier amoraic Nehardean opinion. In the other two cases, Amemar’s ruling opposes that of Abbaye, a fourth generation amora who served as academy head in Pumbed- ita until his death in 337 C.E.180 Again, Amemar’s ruling perplexes R. Ashi, which was based on Abayye’s halakic view. One of these cases was discussed above, and therefore we will discuss the second case here. Bavli Ketubbot 93a –b But was it not taught: One who says to another, “I have no claim whatsoever on this field,” or “I have no concern in it” or “I entirely dissociate myself from it,” he has said nothing . . .181 The question was raised: What is the ruling if a kinyan [a symbolic acquisition] was executed [at the time of the renunciation]? R. Joseph said: [The kinyan is invalid since] it related to an abstract renunciation. R. Nahman said: [The kinyan is valid because] it related to the land itself. Abbaye said: R. Joseph’s statement is reasonable where [the partner] protested, but if he stood [silent], the kinyan must be regarded as relating to the land itself. Amemar said: The halakhah is (hilkheta) that [the kinyan] related to the land itself. R. Ashi to Amemar: Concerning [a case where he] protested or where he stood [silent]? What difference does it make?182

178 On these four signs see m. Hullin 3:6; Sifra Shemini 3:5, 50a–51a; t. Hullin 4:21–22 [ed. Zukermandel, 505]. See also: Brody, ed., Teshuvot Rav Natronai, 2:363. 179 See: Leviticus 11:14–20; Deuteronomy 14: 12–19. For a discussion of R. Nahman’s statement see: Dinnur, Hidushei HaRitzad, 4: 290–291, s.v. mah nesher. 180 On the date of Abbaye’s death see: R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 87. Concerning the problems with this date and the possible source upon which R. Sherira Gaon’s dating was based see: Brody, “The Sources for the Chronology of the Talmudic Period’ [Heb.], 87 n. 48. 181 This baraita can be found with minor variants in y. Ketubbot 9:1, 32d. 182 Munich 95 and Cambridge Taylor-Schechter NS 329.135 read “He said to him: what difference does it make?” 74 chapter two

In respect of [determining whether the law is] in agreement with R. Joseph. [Amemar] said: I did not hear [of it], that is to say, it is not reasonable to me. According to the halakhah in the baraita, a relinquishing of land done through the words, “I have no claim whatsoever on this ﬁeld,” or “I have no concern in it” or “I entirely dissociate myself from it,” is not of legal validity.183 R. Nahman and R. Joseph’s dispute concerns a case where along with one of these phrases there was also an act of formal acquisition (kinyan) performed symbolically with a scarf.184 Does the kinyan cause the act of relinquishing to become valid, despite the fact that proper legal phrasing was not used? R. Joseph does not accord any legal signiﬁcance to the act of kinyan, and therefore there was no legal relinquishing. R. Nahman, on the other hand, holds that the kinyan does cause the act to be effective. Abbaye limits the applicibality of R. Joseph’s ruling to a case where the partner protests against his own act of relinquishing. If the partner did not protest, the kinyan does cause the act to be effective.185 In this case Amemar rules in accordance with R. Nahman, and utterly ignores Abbaye’s provision of different contexts for R. Joseph and R. Nahman’s rulings. Again, R. Ashi assumes that Amemar should rule according to Abbaye,186 and therefore he asks him, “when he protests or when he is silent?” Amemar’s answer reveals that his ruling was knowingly issued despite Abbaye’s statement to the contrary.187

4.4.2. “I Am of [The Elders] of Nehardea” [ana (mi-savei de) nehardea ana] In two cases Amemar rules in opposition to a tradition attributed to “the Nehardeans say,” declaring, “I am of [the elders] of Nehardea, and I hold. . . . .”188 As a sage in Nehardea we would expect Amemar

183 See: Rashi, s.v. lo amar kelum. See also the reason provided in the Yerushalmi (above, n. 181), “for one cannot relinquish his rights by using this language.” 184 See: Ben-Pazi, The Halakhic Development of Ways of Land Ownership [Heb.], 225. 185 See: Dinnur, Hidushei HaRitzad, 2: 64, s.v. be’orer. 186 Concerning the tendency of later amoraim to rule according to Abbaye in six speciﬁc cases, summarized in the acronym y’”l kg”m see: Friedman, “A Talmudic Fragment” [Heb.], 47. 187 See Henshke (“On the Conclusion of Megillat Ta’anit” [Heb.], 160), who writes: “Amemar certainly knew Abbaye’s statement, for Abbaye was a leading amora who preceded Amemar by two generations. Therefore his disregard for Abbaye’s words must be interpreted as willful.” 188 b. Bava Metzi’a 16b (= b. Bava Metzi’a 35a); b. Bava Batra 31a. amemar 75 to rule according to the “Nehardeans”, but despite this, for various reasons he elected to rule against their opinion.189 This declaration, unique among Babylonian amoraim,190 underscores the place that reason and logic played in Amemar’s halakhic rulings. Amemar did not feel liable to tow the party line in Nehardea, and in cases where Nehardean halakhah did not accord with his own reason, he rejected it. It is not possible, therefore, to accept Ze’ev Yaavetz’s conclusion, based, among other considerations, on this phrase, that Amemar had a conservative halakhic tendency and tended to rule according to local Nehardean tradition.191 We shall examine this issue through analysis of these two passages. Bavli Bava Batra 31a One says, “[This land belonged] to my father,” and the other says, “It belonged to my father,” this one brings witnesses to prove that it belonged to his father, and the other brings witnesses to prove that he used it for the period of hazakah. Rabbah said:192 Why would he have lied? If he had wanted, he could have said [without fear of contradiction], “I bought it from you and had the use of it for the period of hazakah.”

189 On b. Bava Batra 153a Amemar rules according to the “Nehardeans say” in a dispute they have with Rava. Nevertheless, we should note that Amemar doesn’t explicitly rule according to the Nehardeans, but rather states, “the halakhah is not according to Rava.” Furthermore, it is possible that his ruling here is connected to the fact that R. Nahman ruled the same way. In other words, this case cannot serve as proof that Amemar ruled according to the Nehardeans because of a general tendency to rule according to their position. 190 I have not found another passage in the Bavli in which a sage announces that despite his being from a certain place, or his being a disciple of certain sage, he rules, based on his own reasoning, against their tradition. The cases most similar to that of Amemar are the ﬁve instances in which R. Nahman transmits a tradition in the name of Samuel and then immediately disagrees with it: “R. Nahman said in the name of Samuel . . . . And R. Nahman himself said . . .” (b. Shabbat 124b; b. Yevamot 67b; b. Ketubbot 56a; b. Gittin 34a; b. Bava Metzi’a 39a). However, in contrast with the case of Amemar who speaks in the ﬁrst person, the cases involving R. Nahman and Samuel are phrased by the editors in the third person. It is also doubtful whether R. Nahman was actually Samuel’s student. See Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 2:414; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 3:930; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 74 n. 46; B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet [Heb.], 1–18. Nevertheless, his connection with Samuel’s rulings is well-documented. See mainly: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 298–299. Similar to Amemar, R. Nahman was also known for his bold halakhic rulings. See: B.Cohen, “Rav Sheshet in Contrast to Rav Nahman,” 14–17. This can explain why he deviated from Samuel’s halakhot. 191 Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:125 n. 19. 192 “Rabbah” is the reading found in Paris 1337, Ascorial G-I-3, Vatican 115, the Venice printed edition and in medieval commentaries. Munich 95, Hamburg 165, Florence 7 and Oxford Opp. 249 (369) read, “Rava.” Concerning the superiority of 76 chapter two

Abaye said to him: We don’t evoke the consideration “why would he have lied” in a case where there are witnesses. So the occupier said again, “Yes, it did belong to your father, but I bought it from you, and what I meant by saying that it belonged to my father was that I felt as secure in it as if it had belonged to my father.” Can he make a claim and then make a different claim or not? Ulla said: He is allowed to make a claim and then make a different claim. The Nehardeans say: he is not allowed to make a different claim. Amemar said: I am of [the elders]193 of Nehardea, and I hold that he may make a different claim. Modern scholars have raised many questions concerning the sources and literary structure of this passage.194 For instance, was the case brought here an actual court case that came in front of Rabbah or an academic/intellectual question brought into the rabbinic academy? Why are Rabbah and Abbaye active in the first half of the passage whereas in the second half the respondents are Ulla and the “Nehard- eans”? What is the relationship between this passage and an identical situation that is described in b. Bava Batra 33b? These questions are not directly relevant to our discussion here, and therefore we will focus on Amemar’s decision, which relates to the dispute between Ulla and the Nehardeans. In this passage Ulla and the Nehardeans argue about whether a person who makes one legal claim can retract and then make a different claim. Ulla claims that a person can make one claim and then retract his original claim in order to solve a problem created by the issuing of his first statement, even though his second claim contradicts, in a certain manner, his original claim. In contrast with Ulla’s more lenient stance, the Nehardeans reflect a more stringent opinion, one which does not allow any retraction from an earlier statement made to the court.195 Amemar disagrees with the Nehardeans’ ruling. Again, the first reading see: Kalmin, The Sage, 182 and n. 28; Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:51 and n. 1; Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:283. 193 The words in brackets were added based on Munich 95, Vatican 115, Florence 7 and Oxford Opp. 249 (369). 194 See mainly: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 2:917; Weiss, Studies in the Literature of the Amoraim [Heb.], 317–318 and n. 15; Albeck, Introduction to the Tal- mud [Heb.], 575 n. 52, 664–665; Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:284; Etz-Hayim, Sugyot Mukhlafot, 154–168. 195 See Rashbam, s.v. de-samikh alah kede’avhati. Concerning this principle see: Zuri, System of Actions [Heb.], 1:158; Gulak, Yesode’i HaMishpat Ha’ivri, 4:74–75; Albeck, Evi- dence in Talmudic Law [Heb.], 128–134. amemar 77

Amemar’s halakhic opinion is based not on precedent, but simply on his own halakhic reasoning. He does not perceive any obligation as a Nehardean to rule according to the Nehardean halakhic tradition. Amemar’s leniency is typical of the halakhic activity which we have seen attributed to him in the earlier examined passages, and it seems to be his lenient tendencies that again govern his thinking here. The second passage we shall examine is similar in nature. Bavli Bava Metzi’a 35a The Nehardeans said: An evaluation is returnable for twelve months. Amemar said: I am of Nehardea, I hold that an evaluation is always returnable. The halakhah (hilkheta) is: an evaluation is always returnable, because it is said, “And you shall do that which is right and good” (Deuteronomy 6:18). According to the Nehardeans, a person whose land has been expro- priated in order to recover a debt can reclaim his land for up to one year. In contrast with their limitation, Amemar sets no limits on the original owner’s right to reclaim. The anonymous author of the final line rules in accordance with Amemar, connecting his ruling with the well-known ethical principle, “You shall do that which is right and good.”196 As in the other case, the Nehardean halakhah is rigid and unforgiving, whereas Amemar’s position is less formal, more flexible and takes into consideration the rights of the litigant (in the first case, the claimant and in the second case the person wishing to reclaim his land).

4.5. Rulings Employing the Formula: “One who wishes to . . .” In eight cases197 in the Bavli Amemar issues a broad halakhic ruling which begins with the phrase, “One who wishes to,” “One who. . .,”

196 See Sifre Deuteronomy 79 (ed. Finkelstein, 145); t. Sheqalim 2:5 (ed. Lieberman, 205). There is a significant amount of literature concerning this principle, its application in the talmudic and post-talmudic period, and its relevancy to Amemar’s ruling. The following is not an exhaustive list: Gulak, History of Jewish Law [Heb.], 1:123–125; Silberg, Principia Talmudica [Heb.], 99–110; Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, 1:52–53; Moryal, “HaYashar VeHatov,” 92–99; Aratin, That Which is Good and Right [Heb.]; Cohn, Human Rights, 13; Albeck, Principles of Talmudic Private Law [Heb.], 14–15; Elon, Jewish Law [Heb.], 1:512–515; Rosenthal, “For the Most Part,” 189–204; Urbach, The Sages, 292. 197 b. Yevamot 103a (twice); b. Ketubbot 86a; b. Gittin 19b; ibid. 40a; b. Kiddushin 73b; b. Menahot 34a; b. Hullin 57b. 78 chapter two or “Those x . . .” (ha’i man de . . . /ha’i de . . . /man de . . . /ha’i X/hanei X).198 Scholars have identified this term as typically accompanying a halakhic ruling based on reason and logic and not on an earlier source.199 This same rule applies to the cases in which Amemar uses such language— his rulings are based on reason and logic and not on another rabbinic source. However, when it comes to Amemar there is an additional characteristic to halakhic rulings begun with this type of language. In five of these cases his ruling contradicts on earlier tannaitic or amoraic source.200 To demonstrate this phenomenon we shall examine a few representative examples. Bavli Hullin 57b –58a Amemar said: As to the eggs of a bird that was a terefah, those of the first set are forbidden but the subsequent ones are permitted, for they are the product of two causes [the hen and the rooster]. R. Ashi raised this objection against Amemar. But they agree that the egg of a bird that was terefah is forbidden because it developed in what was forbidden (Mishnah Eduyyot 5:1).201 In that case the bird was fertilized through friction in the dust. Amemar prohibits, based on his own logic, the first eggs of a chicken found to be a terefah (an animal with a fatal wound or illness), but allows eggs laid subsequently, a ruling that contradicts an explicit mishnah from Eduyyot.202 The basis for this ruling is that those that were inside the chicken when the chicken became a terefah are prohibited for they became a terefah with her (Rashi, s.v. deshikhla kama). In contrast, the eggs laid henceforth are valid, for both she and the rooster caused them to be, and in a case where a permitted and a forbidden thing cause something to grow, it is permitted (Rashi).203 Amemar’s leniency contradicts the mishnah from tractate Eduyyot, as R. Ashi notes.

198 For an analysis of this term see: Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:64 n. 43. 199 This phenomenon has most frequently been documented in connection with R. Nahman (b. Jacob). See for instance: Graetz, History of the Jews, 2:556–557; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:158–160 and n. 9–13. 200 b. Yevamot 103a (twice); b. Gittin 19b; ibid. 40a; b. Avodah Zarah 71a; b. Menahot 34a; b. Hullin 57b. In one case (b. Bava Qamma 90a) we have found that his ruling accords with a tannaitic tradition. 201 This halakhah can be found in t. Eduyyot 2:5 (ed. Zukermandel, 458). 202 The word shikhla has been interpreted as a noun stemming from the root “shakhal” with the meaning “pregnant.” See: Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 8:51; Dalman, Aramäische- Neuhebräisches Handwörterbuch, 419; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 4:532; Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 2:1559. 203 According to Kaplan, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, 117 the original statement of Amemar did not include the words “where both this and this are the amemar 79

Rabbi Judah says: there are six instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and stringent rulings by Beth Hillel . . . An egg found in a [bird’s] carcass: If the like of it were sold in the market, it is permitted, and if not, it is forbidden, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. And Beth Hillel forbids it. But they agree in the case of an egg found in a terefah [bird] that it is forbidden since it had its growth in a forbidden condition. Despite their disagreement concerning the eggs found in a carcass (an animal that died without proper slaughtering), both Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that eggs found in a terefah are in all cases forbidden. The explanation found in the mishnah is that “it had its growth in a forbidden condition”—that is to say, “the egg is like a part of the chicken, and therefore when the chicken became a terefah, the egg becomes forbidden as well.”204 Amemar’s ruling stands in stark opposition to the tannaitic halakhah. The author of the passage (it is unclear whether the final line of the passage is Amemar himself responding, or the stam responding on his behalf 205) is forced to contextualize the mishnah in an unusual situation, “the bird was fertilized through friction in the dust.” Even if this response should be attributed to a later editor, the necessity for its existence clearly demonstrates the great difficulty in Amemar’s ruling.206 causes” but was rather phrased in a brief and apodictic manner, without the words “in a case of two it is permitted/prohibited.” This was so, according to Kaplan, at least until the period of R. Aha and Ravina who reworded the earlier discourse between Amemar and R. Ashi. Amemar’s original statement would have read: “Amemar said: The eggs of a terefah: the first laying is prohibited; henceforth it is permitted.” Com- pare: Rubenstein, “Explanations of Tannaitic Sources” [Heb.], 299–300. Recently, Rubenstein has demonstrated that the general principle, “in a case of two causes it is permitted/prohibited” (ze veze gorem mutar/asur) is not found in tannaitic or early amoraic literature and that it is first mentioned by Abbaye and Rava, members of the fourth generation of Babylonian amoraim, as an explanation of tannaitic sources. Later, it became prevalent among the stammaim. See ibid., 292–304. In any case, whatever Amemar’s original statement was, it is clear that his ruling was in opposition to tannaitic tradition. 204 Tosafot Yom-Tov on Mishna Eduyyot 5:1, s.v. mipne’i. See also: Albeck, Shisha Sidre Mishnah, 4:303. 205 See: Kaplan, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, 117. 206 In the continuation of that passage, Ravina presents a tradition slightly different from the discourse between Amemar and R. Ashi. Concerning the source of these two versions see mainly: Rubenstein, Lekheker Siddur HaTalmud, 45; Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:563; Albeck, “Lekheker HaTalmud,” 164; idem, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 506. We should emphasize that even according to the version presented by Ravina there is a disagreement between Amemar’s ruling and the tannaitic source, and the resolution of that difficulty is based on a strained interpretation of the mishnah. Moreover, in Ravina’s presentation, there is even the suggestion that 80 chapter two

Bavli Yevamot 103a Amemar said: When a levir submits to halitzah he must press down his foot [to the ground].207 R. Ashi said to Amemar: Was it not taught “[halitzah is valid] whether he was standing, sitting or reclining.”208 [He said to him:]209 Say: and in all these cases, only if he pressed his foot [to the ground]. Amemar further said: One who walks on the upper side of his foot (likhta) cannot submit to halitzah. R. Ashi said to Amemar: But was it not taught: “Supports of the feet [are valid]” does not [this signify] that he may submit to halitzah with a support!210 No; [the meaning is] that he may give it to another person who is allowed to submit to halitzah [with it.] Neither of Amemar’s rulings accords with tannaitic halakhah, and R. Ashi notes this by offering refutations of both with two parts of the same baraita. This baraita has a parallel in Tosefta Yevamot 12:10 (ed. Lieberman, 42–43): If she performed halitzah with a sandal that had been made smaller but that can hold most of the foot, with a shoe that had been torn but covered most of the foot, with a sandal made of wood, with a sandal of sinews, with one of felt or with the artiﬁcial leg of a cripple, or with a support for the feet, or with a leather sock, or if she performed halitzah with a sandal that is too big, whether he is sitting, standing or lying . . . her halitzah is valid. The contradiction between Amemar’s ruling and the tannaitic halakhah is particularly blatant in the second halakhah. The meaning of the word “likhta” in Aramaic is not entirely clear.211 Nevertheless, all commentators agree that the word is connected to a defect in the foot that prevents the one submitting to halitzah from pressing his foot

the reading of the mishnah must be emended in order to resolve Amemar’s ruling. For an analysis see: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:563. 207 In Hilkhot R. Alfasi [see: JTS Rab 692 (Friedman, ed., Halakhot Rabbati, 2:164b)] and in textual readings preserved by the geonim (see: Lewin, ed., Otzar HaGeonim, 7:201) the following is added: “Another version: to straighten his legs.” See: Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 1236. 208 This baraita can also be found in t. Yevamot, 12:10 (ed. Lieberman, 42–43). 209 The words in brackets are based on the Moscow Ginsberg COD. 594 and Munich 141. 210 This halakhah is a quote of the ﬁrst half of the previous baraita. See above, n. 208. 211 See: Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 620. amemar 81

firmly on the ground.212 In other words, Amemar’s second ruling stems from his first ruling, that in order to submit to halitzah one must be able to press his foot to the ground. R. Ashi responds that if tannaitic halakhah allows even one whose legs drag on the ground and who propels himself with leg supports then a person need not be able to press his foot to the ground during halitzah. The author of the resolution (either Amemar or the stam) is forced to resolve that the baraita allows a healthy person to submit to halitzah while using leg supports that are the property of the one with the defective feet. Obviously, this explanation does not accord with the simple meaning of the baraita, as was already noted by Lieberman.213 A similar problem arises with regard to Amemar’s first ruling. According to Amemar, the man submitting to halitzah must press his foot to the ground at the time of the halitzah.214 The halakhic reasoning for this ruling is “so that it should be recognizable that she is the one removing his shoe, for sometimes the shoe belonging to the court [typically used during halitzah, B.C.] is larger than the man’s foot, and it might look as if his foot is coming out without the man’s

212 See: Lewin, ed., Otzar HaGeonim, 7:201–202; Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 5:35; Dalman, Aramäische-Neuhebräisches Handwörterbuch, 216; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmu- dim und Midraschim, 2:498; Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 2:705. 213 Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 6:132, 133. Geonim and medieval commentaries understood Amemar as contradicting m. Yevamot 12:1, “If she performed halitzah with a shoe, the halitzah is valid . . . if from the knee and below, the halitzah is valid; if from the knee and above, the halitzah is invalid.” This interpretation assumes that the words in the mishnah, “from the knee and below” refer to a person whose leg has been amputated, an interpretation that emerges from the continuation of the passage (see: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 494). According to this interpretation of the mishnah, the disagreement between Amemar and the mishnah is as follows: “Since, if his leg has been amputated, halitzah is still valid if performed on the stump that remains below the knee, all the more so if his leg is still whole, but is merely twisted [the halitzah is valid]. So then how can Amemar say that one who walks on upturned feet, his halitzah is invalid” (Lewin, ed., Otzar HaGeonim, 7:201). Despite the various attempts to resolve the difﬁculties between Amemar and the tannaitic sources, some medieval authorities rejected Amemar’s statement from being halakhically valid. See the Rif (Friedman, ed., Halakhot Rabbati, 2:164b): There are those who wish to say that the halakhah is not according to Ame- mar . . . for we have taught in a mishnah, “from the knee and above, the halitzah is invalid; from the knee and below it is valid.” But we do not agree, for if we did, Amemar would disagree with the mishnah, and it is impossible to say that Amemar disagrees with a mishnah. 214 On the meaning of the word “dakhas” see: Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 3:35; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 1:390; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 325. 82 chapter two power, unless he presses his foot to the ground.”215 Nevertheless, this halakhah too does not accord with tannaitic halakhah, which allows halitzah to be performed while the man is lying down, an act not typically performed by one who is simultaneously pushing his foot onto the ground.216 This problem forces the passage’s editor(s) to resolve by adding to the baraita that in all situations the man was pushing his foot to the ground, a resolution that again does not accord with the simple meaning of the baraita.

4.6. Amemar’s Interpreation of Tannaitic Sources Historians of the talmudic period have portrayed Nehardean amoraim from the ﬁrst through the sixth generation as all belonging to one “school” with one general methodology. This methodology comes to the fore—so it has been claimed—in their interpretation of tannaitic sources. An example of this claim is that put forth by Jacob Zuri, according to whom Nehardean amoraim differed from Suran amoraim in that the former engaged more intensely in interpretation of tannaitic sources. Zuri writes: Only the Nehardeans engaged in interpretation of the Mishnah. Our examination of both talmudim reveals that Nehardeans were more occupied with interpreting the Mishnah and other tannaitic material than were the Surans. The labor of interpreting the intention of the Mishnah characterizes the Nehardeans, whereas the Surans barely engage in this activity . . . The Nehardean amoraim developed this endeavor with great dedication. Samuel, the foremost Nehardean amora, began to teach his students to occupy themselves with interpretation of the Mishnah . . . From him his students and his students’ students learned . . . From all that we have seen we can conclude that the Nehardeans and Galileans were foremost in interpreting the Mishnah. Sages from the south were less engaged in this study, and even less than them were the Surans.217 Zuri’s conclusions are based mostly on an examination of amoraic literature up until the third or fourth generation of amoraim. Further- more, even the examples presented by Zuri are from amoraim whose

215 Yam shel Shlomo, s.v. amemar. See also Nimuke’i Yosef, s.v. lemidhese, who explained, “in order that she should trouble herself to remove his shoe, for occasionally the shoe which is owned by the court is bigger than his foot, and it looks like it comes off on its own if he doesn’t press his foot a little bit.” 216 As Lieberman demonstrates (Tosefta Kifshuta, 6:135). 217 Zuri, Toldot Darche Halimud, 77, 83, 98. amemar 83

Nehardean provenance is questionable218 (such as: R. Judah, Rabba, Abbaye, Rava, R. Papa). Similar conclusions were reached by Meyer Dov Yudolowitz in his work on the yeshiva in Nehardea. After surveying the findings that emerge from the literature of Nehardean sages through the third/ fourth generations, Yudolowitz concludes: “All of these proofs demonstrate conclusively that Nehardea was a treasury of mishnahs and other tannaitic material . . . It might not even be an exaggeration to say that the academy at Nehardea was in a class of its own when it came to the study of Mishnah.”219 In our opinion, more caution is due when positing the existence of a methodology that characterizes a given sage or group of sages. Before such a theory can be suggested, we must systematically analyze all literature ascribed to the sage or group of sages in the Talmud. When it comes to Amemar, such analysis demonstrates that not only are there relatively few cases where Amemar interprets a tannaitic source, but that in the cases where Amemar does engage in such activity, his interpretations differ methodologically from those of Nehardean amoraim who lived before the third generation. In general, a major contribution of the amoraim is their interpretation of the Mishnah, not just in cases where they needed to resolve difficulties, but also as a goal in and of itself.220 There are many aspects to their commentary, including the interpretation of difficult words, the content, the measures of volume, weight, and distance, identification of broad principles, the reasons behind the Mishnah’s halakhot, extrapolations, using the Mishnah as proof and many others.221 This trend only began to wane after the death of R. Ashi, a phenomenon which led Hanokh Albeck to reevaluate the meaning of the famous talmudic dictum: “R. Ashi and Rabina were the end of instruction (hora’ah)” (b. Bava Metzi’a 86a). Albeck writes:

218 Ibid., 83–85. 219 Yudolowitz, Nehardea [Heb.], 73. 220 See for instance: R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of Rav Sherira Ga’on, 50; Frankel, Mavo HaYerushalmi, 28b–31a; Rappaport, Erekh Millin, 206–208; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:6; Melamed, An Introduction to Talmudic Literature, 330; Sh. Safrai, “Amora,” 865; Goldberg, “The Babylonian Talmud,” 325; Urbach, HaHalakha, 101–102. 221 On the treatment of tannaitic sources by amoraim see mainly: Bacher, Tradi- tion und Tradenten, 94–119, 243–254, 255–277; Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:330–394; Melamed, An Introduction to Talmudic Literature, 330–394; Urbach, HaHalakha, 101–121. 84 chapter two

Accordingly, when it was stated, “R. Ashi and Rabina were the end of instruction,” it means that in their days sages ceased to offer new interpretations or justifications for the halakhot in the Mishnah. The sages who followed them did not limit the tannaitic halakhah in order to draw new conclusions, by using terms such as, “it was only taught under X condition” and other such terms. This finding is confirmed through an examination of the statements of the post-R. Ashi and Rabina amoraim.222 Examination of Amemar’s literary/interpretative contribution to the body of tannaitic interpretation and the comparison of his contributions with those of early Nehardean amoraim yields the following two conclusions. (a) Amemar is not found interpreting tannaitic material in an academic setting or manner. Amemar is generally portrayed as a judge, and his major contribution to talmudic literature is in issuing rulings in concrete cases (see above). In only nine cases is Amemar found interpreting tannaitic texts (about five per cent of his overall literature),223 and even in these cases it is not certain that the words should be attributed to Ame- mar himself, or to later editors. This lack of interpretation of tannaitic sources is noteworthy not only in comparison with earlier Nehardean amoraim—Samuel, R. Sheshet and R. Nahman224—but even in comparison with his contemporaries, those sages who served as academy

222 Albeck, “Sof HaHora’ah,” 75. See also: Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 2:124–125; A. Cohen, “On the Non-Chronological Location of Mar Bar Rav Ashi’s Statements in the Babylonian Sugyot” [Heb.], 64 n. 62. Compare: Kalmin, The Post Rav Ashi Amo- raim, 92–98. Kalmin’s ﬁndings are based on sages, such as Ravina, Rafram, R. Aha son of Rava, whose identiﬁcation as post-Rav Ashi is doubtful. See: Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 20 n. 23. A similar phenomenon exists also in connection with the treatment of aggadic sources by post Rav Ashi amoraim. See Bacher, Die Agada der babylonischen Amoräer, 147. Compare: Halivni, Sources and Traditions, 1:17. 223 This count includes cases in which it is not certain whether Amemar is the original author of the interpretation (see also below): b. Shabbat 95a; b. Shabbat 128a; b. Eruvin 104a; b. Rosh HaShanah 31b; b. Betzah 22a; b. Yevamot 40b; b. Bava Qamma 79a; b. Bava Metzi’a 58b; b. Bava Batra 173b. 224 Samuel’s role in interpreting the Mishnah has been the subject of many studies. This is not the place for an in-depth examination of the subject. See: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1: 212–234; Weis, “The Controversies of Rab and Samuel and the Tosefta,” 288–297; Bokser, Samuel’s Commentary on the Mishnah; ibid., Post Mishnaic Judaism in Transition; Gordis, The Exegesis of Mishna and Baraita of Rav and Samuel [Heb.]; Kelman, The Amoraic Oqimta “Hacha B’ma’i Asiqinan [Heb.], 41–89. Concerning the characteristics of R. Nahman and R. Sheshet’s (Nehardean amoraim of the third generation) interpretations of tannaitic sources see mainly: B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet [Heb.], 148–206, 234–278; ibid., “Rav Sheshet in Contrast to Rav Nahman,” 11–32. amemar 85

heads during the fourth century (Rava,225 R. Papa,226 Mar Zutra227 and R. Ashi228). (b) Even in the cases where Amemar does interpret a tannaitic source, he does so either in order to solve a difﬁculty raised on one of his halakhot, or to issue a halakhic ruling.229 In other words, Amemar’s explanation of tannaitic sources was not initiated with the goal of clarifying the words of the tannaim, but rather its goal is to bring tannaitic halakhah in line with his concrete rulings that contradict it. The amoraim, geonim and rishonim were aware that occasionally a contextualization brought in the Talmud as a resolution to a difﬁculty between an amora and a tanna is a “strained resolution,” one that does not match the simple meaning of the Mishnah, and therefore, cannot be relied upon for issues of practical halakhah.230 Furthermore, post-talmudic authorities came up with

225 Rava’s broad role as interpreter of tannaitic sources has been the subject of many studies. We will cite here just a few noteworthy examples: Funk, Die Juden in Baby- lonien, 2:71–73; Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:381–391; Goldberg, “The Use of the Tosefta and the Baraitha of the School of Samuel by the Babylo- nian Amora Rava” [Heb], 144–157; Henshke, “Abbaye and Rava,” 187–193; Elman, “Rava and Palestinian Systems of Midrash Halakha” [Heb], 217–242. 226 Concerning R. Papa’s methodology in tannaitic interpretations see mainly: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 391–393; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:116– 117; Shif, The Contribution of Rav Pappa [Heb.], 42–137; Kelman, The Amoraic Oqimta “Hacha B’ma’i Asiqinan [Heb.], 190–228. 227 In contrast with Rava and R. Papa, there are far fewer studies that have dealt with Mar Zutra, a sage from the ﬁfth generation who served as academy head of the local academy in Nareš. (Concerning his role as academy head see: A. Cohen, “Was the Amora Mar Zutra Head of the Yeshiva in Pumbeditha?’ [Heb.], 201–232). On his interpretation of tannaitic sources see Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:438; Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate, 192 n. 26. 228 R. Ashi’s role in interpreting tannaitic sources has also been the subject of many studies. See mainly: Zuri, Rav Ashi [Heb.], 115–116; Kraemer, Stylistic Characteristics of Amoraic Literature, 143–148; Kelman, The Amoraic Oqimta “Hacha B’ma’I Asiqinan [Heb.], 229–250. According to Bacher, R. Ashi’s main contribution was in editing the earlier amoraic interpretations of the Mishnah. See: Bacher, “Ashi,” 187; Bacher, Die Agada der Babylonischen Amoräer, 144. 229 Other scholars have offered explanations for why amoraim would interpret the Mishnah in such a strained fashion. For examples see: Zuri, Darkhei Halimud, 87; A. Cohen, Mar Bar Rav Ashi [Heb.], 233–235; Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 4:17–18 n. 28; Kelman, The Amoraic Oqimta “Hacha B’ma’I Asiqinan [Heb.], 33–35. More references can be found below, footnotes 232, 234. In the case of R. Nahman’s explanations of the Mishnah, we have found similar phenomena to those described here in relation to Amemar. See: B. Cohen. “Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman,” 16 n. 29. 230 See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 545–556; Dinari, “The Attitude to the Talmudic ‘Shinuya’ ” [Heb.], 108–117 and n. 109. The problem of strained resolutions was explicitly addressed in a geonic responsum found in the Cairo Geniza. See: Assaf, Teshuvot HaGeonim, 63–66. In this source, the gaon mentions three cases of strained resolutions, including one that rises as the result of a contradiction between an amora’s opinion and the tannaitic source. See ibid., lines 11–13. There are a few cases in the Bavli in which the amoraim express their disapproval towards forced 86 chapter two

parameters for when to determine that a resolution was genuine and therefore reliable for matters of halakhah, and when it was strained and unreliable.231 Indeed, the problem of “strained” interpretations is one of the central problems faced by modern talmudic scholars, and many suggestions have been offered to explain it.232 The fact that Amemar’s interpretations (or those attributed to him by the stam) are brought almost exclusively after a tannaitic source has been presented as a difficulty against him (by R. Ashi) is enough to explain why his interpretations are so strained. When evaluating Amemar’s interpretation of tannaitic texts we must, therefore, keep in mind the circumstances in which these interpretations arose. Below we will analyze some representative examples of Amemar’s interpretation of tannaitic sources. We will begin with cases in which an interpretation ascribed to Amemar follows a difficulty raised on him from a tannaitic source. Altogether there are nine such cases;233 in eight of these cases the interpretation comes as a result of a difficulty raised by R. Ashi and in the ninth case the difficulty is raised by R. Yemar. In all cases the interpretation is “strained.” However, it is not certain that Amemar himself is the author of all of these interpretations or whether some of them were ascribed to him by the editors of the passage, the stam. The doubt as to the accuracy of the ascription of these interpretations to Amemar himself is a result of the tendency of modern critical scholars to assume that strained interpretations are often signs of editorial insertion into amoraic passages.234 There is also

interpretations of tannaitic materials. See, for instance, Albeck, “Le’arikhat Hatalmud Habavli”, 1–2; ibid., Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 545–556. See also the literature cited below in footnote 232. However, it was not dealt with in a systematic way as in Geonic Literature and in the rishonim. 231 Dinari, “The Attitude to the Talmudic “Shinuya” ’ [Heb.], 108–117; Urbach, “Tradition and Halakha”, 159. 232 See Halivni, Sources and Traditions, 3:13, “In our opinion the “problem’ of strained passages in the Talmud is the basic problem with which talmudic scholarship must deal.” This topic has been the focus of many scholarly studies. On top of those referred to in footnotes 229–230, we can add: De Vries, Studies in the Development of the Talmudic Halakah [Heb.], 129–141; Silberg, Principa Talmudica [Heb.], 16–22; Albeck, Law of Property and Contract [Heb.], 13–65; Halevy, “Pshitta Arguments,” 129– 140; Goldberg, “The Use of the Tosefta and the Baraitha of the School of Samuel by the Babylonian Amora Rava’ [Heb], 144–157; Goldberg, “Lehitpathut Hasugya BaTalmud HaBavli,” 101–113; A. Cohen, “Al Hitpathut HaNeti’ot HaHilkhatiot,” 107–129; Alexander, Transmitting Mishnah, 77–116. 233 We have dealt with six of these cases above. Below is a full list: b. Rosh HaShanah 31b; b. Betzah 22a; b. Moed Qatan 16a; b. Hullin 57b –58a; b. Yevamot 40b; ibid. 103a (3 times) b. Ketubbot 100b; b. Bava Qamma 79a. 234 Concerning strained intepretations as indications late editing, see for instance: Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 4:8 (“strained interpretations are an outstanding amemar 87 a certain lack of clarity within the manuscript traditions whether the respondent is Amemar himself, or the editors responding on his behalf. I shall demonstrate this with a few examples. Bavli Ketubbot 100b Mishnah: If an assessment by the judges was one sixth more or less [than the actual value] the sale is nullified. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: If so, then what advantage is the power of the court? Rather, if a bill of inspection was drawn up, even if they sold the value of a maneh for two manehs, or the value of two manehs for one maneh, the sale is valid.235 Gemara: Amemar said in the name of R. Joseph: A court that sold [an estate] without a public announcement is deemed to have overlooked a law cited in a Mishnah and [their decision] must be reversed . . . R. Ashi raised an objection against Amemar: “If an assessment by the judges was one sixth more or less [than the actual value] the sale is nullified.” This implies that if for the actual value, the sale is valid. Does this not [apply even to a case] where no public announcement was made? No; [it applies only to one] where an announcement was made. But since the final clause [refers to a case] where an announcement was made [must not] the first clause [refer to one] where no announcement was made; for in the final clause it was taught: “If a bill of inspection was drawn up, even if they sold the value of a maneh for two manehs, or the value of two manehs for one maneh, the sale is valid.” The fact indeed is [that the first clause refers to a case] where no announcement was made, but there is no difficulty, for one ruling refers to objects concerning which public announcements must be made, while the other refers to objects concerning which no public announcements are made. According to Amemar there must be a public announcement before the sale of any orphan’s property and without such a public announcement the sale is nullified. In contrast, according to the simple meaning of the mishnah, a sale of a minor’s property is nullified only if there is an error in the evaluation. If there was no error, the sale is valid, even without a public announcement. If there was a bill of inspection, the sale is valid even if there was an error, and even if there was no public announcement.236 According to the resolution of this difficulty,

sign . . . that the sources have not been presented to us in their original formulation”); Feldblum, “Mishnah Yetera,” 14 (“In general, it is possible to say that the sign of a late passage or late material is that the difficulties raised are weak and the resolutions are strained”). 235 This halakhah can be found in the Tosefta with some variants, see: t. Ketubbot 11:3 (ed. Lieberman, 93–94). 236 See Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 6:361. See also: Albeck, Shisha Sidre Mishna, 3:127–128. 88 chapter two the first half of the mishnah deals with a case where there was an announcement—the sale is valid only if there was no error and an announcement was made prior to the sale, as Amemar demanded. The editor(s) themselves sensed the difficulty with this understanding of the mishnah and rejected it based on the end of the mishnah.237 In any case, we must question the provenance of the passage’s resolution—are these Amemar’s words or were they ascribed to him by the editors? Manuscripts do not provide any indication that the statement should be attributed to Amemar. Furthermore, the phrasing, “Does this not . . .” makes the possibility that Amemar’s words follow more unlikely. As David Halivni writes, “When the stam has a means by which to deflect the difficulty, it adds to the end of the previous statement the words, ‘is this not.’ ”238 Finally, even if Amemar is the author of the strained interpretation to the mishnah, it is not an interpretation that he initiated, but rather one created as a response to a difficulty raised on his ruling. The following case is similar: Bavli Yevamot 103a 239 Amemar further said: One who walks on the upper side of his foot (lahta) cannot submit to halitzah. R. Ashi said to Amemar: But was it not taught: “Supports of the feet [are valid]” does not [this signify] that he may submit to halitzah with a support! No; [the meaning is] that he may give it to another person who is allowed to submit to halitzah [with it.] We dealt with this source at length above, and therefore we will focus here on the subject at hand. The discrepancy between Amemar’s halakhah and the baraita is clear: how can Amemar disqualify halitzah performed on a levir who has a lame foot when the baraita allows even one who walks with supports to submit to halitzah? The resolution limits the halakhah found in the baraita to a special case, one that is clearly not the simple reading of the baraita, as has been noted by Lieberman.240 According to the resolution, the halitzah was performed on a fully able man who was using supports. Again, the interpretation of this tannaitic source is a result of Amemar [or the editor(s)’] need to resolve the discrepancy between the amora and the tannaitic halakhah.

237 See also the commentary of the Ramban (brought by the Ritba, s.v. v’ibayit ema). 238 Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 4:121 n. 9. 239 Variant readings of this passage were cited above, in footnotes 207–210, p. 80. 240 See above, near footnote 213. amemar 89

In the following passage we will see another strained interpretation offered by Amemar to a tannaitic source as a result of a difficulty raised upon him. However, in this case it is likely that Amemar himself is the author of the interpretion. Bavli Bava Qamma 79a Mishnah: If while he was pulling [a sheep or ox] out it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt. But if he had lifted it or taken it out of the owner’s domain and it died, he is liable. If he gave it as the firstborn redemption for his son, or to his creditor, or to an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian, or a hirer, and one of them was pulling it out and it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt. If [one of them] had lifted it up or taken it outside the owner’s domain, he is liable.241 Gemara: Amemar asked: Did they institute [acquisition] by pulling for guardians or not? R. Yemar said: Come and hear: If he gave it as the firstborn redemption for his son, or to his creditor, or to an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian, or a hirer, and one of them was pulling it out and it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt. Does this not mean that the guardian was pulling it out, thus proving that they did institute [acquisition] by pulling with guardians? He said: No the thief was pulling it out. [He said to him: The thief ?!]242 But was not this already stated in the first clause? He said to him: There it was stated in regard to a thief stealing from the house of the owners, whereas here it is stated in regard to a thief stealing from the house of a guardian. R. Ashi said to him (= Amemar):243 Do not reject such difficulties, for what difference does it make whether the thief stole from the house of the guardian or from the house of the owners? Rather, it must mean that the guardian was pulling it out, thus proving that they did institute [acquisition] by pulling with guardians.

241 A parallel can be found in t. Bava Qamma 7:19 (ed. Lieberman, 34). 242 The words in brackets are found in Hamburg 165, Ascorial G-I-3. The word “thief ” as part of the question, is found written between the lines of the Florence manuscript, in Munich 95, and in Archivio Storico Comunale Fr. Ebr. 14. 243 Vatican 116 reads: “R. Asi”. R. Asi/Ati was an amora of the sixth generation and was subordinate to R. Ashi. See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 426. The reading “R. Ashi” is preferable due to the fact that discussions between R. Ashi and Amemar are common throughout the Bavli. Moreover, the reading R. Asi/Ati is rendered less likely since this sage is rarely mentioned in the Bavli. Concerning the general phenomenon of the R. Ashi/R. Asi variant see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 225. 90 chapter two

It was also stated: R. Elazar said: just as they instituted pulling for purchasers, so too they instituted pulling for guardians It was similarly taught in a baraita: just as they instituted pulling for purchasers, so too they instituted pulling for guardians. Amemar asks a question to which an answer can be found in m. Bava Qamma 7:6 and in the baraita found at the end of the passage. Accord- ing to the simple meaning of this mishnah, the first half deals with a case in which a thief stealing something from the owner’s property becomes liable should the animal die. The second half of the mishnah deals with a case when the thief is liable if he gave the animal to either a priest to redeem his son, a creditor or a guardian, all while the animal was still on the original owner’s property. This is how the mishnah is understood in the Yerushalmi, and it is the basis of the tradition ascribed to R. Elazar (and its parallel in the Yerushalmi244) and the baraita found at the end of the Babylonian passage.245 As Howard Levine explains: According to the mishnah, even if the slave does not lift the animal up or take it out of the owners’ property, but rather gives it to a priest or a guardian, etc., and they lift the animal up or take it off the owners’ property, the thief is liable, for his actions aided in taking the animal off the owners’ property . . . And even though this halakhah was stated mainly in connection with the liability of the thief, we can indirectly learn that the sages did institute pulling as a means of acquisition for a guardian, as the gemara infers . . . Certainly, when the mishnah states, “If while he was pulling [a sheep or ox] out it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt,” it can be inferred that the guardian does not acquire the animal until he pulls it off the owners’ property. We can infer that they did institute pulling as means of acquisition for guardians.246 In light of this, Amemar’s interpretation of this mishnah is perplexing, and R. Ashi criticizes and rejects it. According to Amemar the words “if he gave it as the first born redemption for his son” means that if the owner gave his property to the priest, creditor or a guardian, whereas the words “he was pulling it and going out” refer to the thief. Rashi interprets, “This is what it means: the owner gave it to a priest for redemption of his first born etc., and a thief came and

244 y. Shevu’ot 8:1, 8b. 245 See y. Bava Qamma, 7:6, 6a (Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 28). For a discussion of this passage see: Levine, Studies in Mishnah Pesachim [Heb.], 278. 246 Levine, Studies in Mishnah Pesachim [Heb.], 277–278. See also Albeck, Shisha Sidre Mishna, 4:39. amemar 91 stole it, and then the thief was pulling it out . . .”.247 This is a very difficult interpretation of the mishnah, for it creates a repetition of that which was already taught in the first half of the mishnah. This leads R. Yemar to raise a difficulty on Amemar, “The thief ! But was not this already stated in the first clause?” Subsequently, R. Ashi raises a difficulty on Amemar’s resolution to R. Yemar’s question, “Do not reject such difficulties, for what difference does it make whether the thief stole from the house of the guardian or from the house of the owners?”248 In contrast to the previous cases, it seems that in this case Amemar himself is the author of the strained interpretation to the mishnah. There are two reasons to make this assumption here. First of all, some manuscripts read, “He [Amemar] said to him” as part of the interchange. Second, R. Ashi’s response is directed at Amemar in the second person, “Do not reject such difficulties.” Amemar’s interpretation is brought here as part of his rejection of the answer provided by R. Yemar to Amemar’s question.249 This again demonstrates the creativity of Amemar’s interpretations, and the fact that these interpretations arose as a result of the need to bring tannaitic sources into accord with his own halakhic rulings.

5. Summary and Conclusions

5.1. Halakhic Rulings Amemar’s main contribution to Babylonian rabbinic literature is his halakhic rulings (60% of the literature attributed to him).250 His

247 Rashi, s.v. lo ganav. See also: Melamed, Talmud Bavli im Tirgum Ivri, 125. 248 The Tosafot (s.v. tiknu meshikhah beshomrin) were aware of another difficulty with Amemar’s interpretation of the mishnah. If the mishnah was really speaking of an owner who turned his property over to a priest or a creditor, the latter become owners and not guardians. Again, the strained resolution of the Tosafot is testimony to the great difficulty with Amemar’s interpretation of the mishnah. 249 This passage portrays an unusual occurrence in terms of the typical hierarchical relationships between Babylonian amoraim. When R. Ashi was present during the debate between Amemar, his senior, and his student, R. Yemar, R. Ashi acted in an unusual manner and intervened in favor of the student, stating “do not reject him” with unconvincing distinctions. The likely explanation for this unusual occurrence is that R. Yemar enjoyed a special status within R. Ashi’s Yeshiva. Concerning this relationship see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 166–169. 250 Around ninety of Amemar’s appearances in the Bavli (out of a total of around 150) are halakhic rulings. This count does not include descriptions of his behavior, aggadic sermons, or legends told about him. The following is a list of passages in 92 chapter two halakhic methodology can be characterized as unusually flexible; he is portrayed as taking into account the specific conditions found in his place and time, even if his ruling forces him to deviate from normative sources or the halakhic rules sanctioned in his time. The overall picture is of a sage who did not perceive himself as consistently subject to the halakhic tradition, a sage willing to use his own reason as a source of halakhah and interpretation. When compared with early Nehardean sages—R. Sheshet, “the Nehardeans say,” and R. Zebid of Nehardea—Amemar’s “legal realism”251 makes him stand out as a unique sage in his time and place.252 This finding precludes us from

which Amemar issues a halakhic ruling: b. Berakhot 12a; b. Berakhot 25a; b. Shabbat 95a; b. Eruvin 80a; b. Eruvin 104a; b. Pesahim 30b; b. Pesahim 107a; b. Rosh HaShanah 31b; b. Sukkah 55a; b. Betzah 22a (three traditions); b. Moed Qatan 16a; b. Yevamot 21a (=b. Yevamot 40b); b. Yevamot 22a; b. Yevamot 43a; b. Yevamot 45b; b. Yevamot 92b; b. Yevamot 103a (two traditions); b. Ketubbot 21b; b. Ketubbot 69a; b. Ketubbot 83b; b. Ketubbot 86a (two traditions); b. Ketubbot 97a; b. Ketubbot 100b; b. Ketubbot 105b; b. Gittin 13b; b. Gittin 19b (two traditions); b. Gittin 36a; b. Gittin 39a; b. Gittin 69b; b. Kiddushin 10a; b. Kiddushin 72b; b. Kiddushin 73b; b. Kiddushin 79b; b. Bava Qamma 70a (two traditions); b. Bava Qamma 90a; b. Bava Qamma 115a; b. Bava Metzi’a 16b; b. Bava Metzi’a 35a; b. Bava Metzi’a 65b; b. Bava Metzi’a 73b; b. Bava Metzi’a 74a; b. Bava Metzi’a 81a; b. Bava Metzi’a 86b; b. Bava Metzi’a 108b; b. Bava Batra 11a; b. Bava Batra 13b; b. Bava Batra 31a; b. Bava Batra 45a; b. Bava Batra 48b; b. Bava Batra 77a; b. Bava Batra 107a; b. Bava Batra 124b; b. Bava Batra 127a; b. Bava Batra 145a; b. Bava Batra 150a; b. Bava Batra 153a; b. Bava Batra 165a; b. Bava Batra 174a; b. Sanhedrin 29b; b. Shevu’ot 28a; b. Avodah Zarah 48a; b. Menahot 34a; b. Menahot 66a; b. Hullin 8b; b. Hullin 45b; b. Hullin 46b; b. Hullin 50b; b. Hullin 51b; b. Hullin 52a; b. Hullin 53b; b. Hullin 57b; b. Hullin 62a; b. Hullin 63a; b. Hullin 76b; b. Hullin 80a; b. Arakhin 22a; b. Niddah 66b. 251 For a description of legal realism and its comparison with Amemar’s halakhic methodology, see above, pp. 53–54, footnote 96. 252 Amemar’s methodology is striking when compared with the anonymous “the Nehardeans say” traditions which date from the first half of the fourth century. The “Nehardeans say” traditions tend to focus on the application of tannaitic and early halakhah and its expansion. Their halakhic rulings in concrete cases are based on logical conclusions drawn from the Mishnah (see chapter three, section 2, pp. 106–109). Amemar’s methodology also differs from that of R. Zebid from Nehardea, of the fifth generation. The latter sage exhibits a high degree of sensitivity to the textual traditions reflected in sanctioned sources. This sensitity is manifested in several manners: (1) R. Zebid is critical of interpretations that are not harmonious with the context of the tannaitic sources, and he tends to reject such interpretations (see below, chapter five, section 2b [p. 158 and pp. 167–169]). This tendency stems from an a priori notion that an interpreter is subject to the original text, and is not free to interpret according to his own will (concerning this tendency in legal literature in general see below, chapter five, p. 167, near footnotes 76–79. (2) R. Zebid exhibits a strong connection to the local halakhic tradition in Nehardea. This manifests itself in his precision in readings of early amoraic Nehardean traditions; he tends to “fix” versions recited by his contemporaries or predecessors (see above, chapter five, section 2a [pp. 156–158]). This demonstrates the intense sense of obligation that R. Zebid felt towards his predecessors in Nehardea, an opposite tendency from that which we have detected in our amemar 93 accepting the general scholarly characterization of Amemar as having “conservative” halakhic tendencies, a sage who typically based his rulings upon official sources of halakhah, mainly those from earlier generations in Nehardea.253

5.2. Interpretations of Tannaitic Sources In contrast to Nehardean amoraim up until the ﬁfth generation (Sam- uel, R. Nahman, R. Sheshet, “the Nehardeans says”) or the sages of his own generation (R. Papa, and R. Ashi) there are relatively few interpretive traditions ascribed to Amemar (nine cases, 5% of the literature attributed to him).254 In light of this, it is hard to accept the claim that the Nehardean sages up until the sixth generation should be viewed as a “school of thought” intensely engaged in interpretation of tannaitic sources.255 As is the case with “the Nehardeans says” and R. Hama, there are extremely few interpretations of tannaitic sources attributed to Amemar.256 Furthermore, even in the few cases where the

study of Amemar. These findings concerning R. Zebid highlight Amemar’s halakhic “audacity,” which is encapsulated in his aggadic saying, “A sage is greater than a prophet.” We shall examine this source below. 253 For a survey of scholarship on this issues see above, section 4.1., pp. 51–52. It should be emphasized that such a trend in legal rulings is also found in general legal literature, as stated by Aharon Barak, The Judge in A Democracy, 3–5: The role of the judge is to understand the purpose of law in society and to help the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is a living organism. It is based on a factual and social reality that is constantly changing . . . The judge has an important role in the legislative project: The judge interprets statutes. Statutes cannot be applied unless they are interpreted. The judge may give a statute a new meaning, a dynamic meaning, that seeks to bridge the gap between law and life’s changing reality . . . The court fulfills its role as the junior partner in the legislative project. It realizes the judicial role by bridging the gap between law and life. 254 See above, section 4.6(a), pp. 82–84, footnote 223. 255 For a survey of scholarship on this issues see above section 4.6., p. 82. 256 See above, section 4.6(a), p. 85. Seemingly, it would be possible to connect this phenomenon to the fact that Nehardea was on the periphery of rabbinic Babylonia, while the main academies of Pumbedita and Sura stood at its center. Accordingly, we might suggest that Amemar’s contribution to rabbinic literature was selectively summarized by a contemporary or later editor located in one of the central academies; his codificatory contributions were preserved and his interpretations were omitted. However, it is difficult to accept this suggestion for several reasons: (1) The literary contributions of other amoraim who served as academy heads in local academies throughout the talmudic period and during Amemar’s lifetime [R. Sheshet in Šilhe and Nehardea, R. Hamnuna the II in Harta De-Argiz, R. Papa in Pumbedita (after Abbaye’s death and the move of the academy to Mahoza), Mar Zutra in Nareš and others] include a substantial amount of interpretations of tannaitic texts. There is no reason to assume that an editor would have omitted Amemar’s interpretations at the 94 chapter two interpretation of a source is attributed to Amemar, the interpretation is not initiated by Amemar in an attempt to clarify a tannaitic text (as is common among Babylonian amoraim). Rather, it is a forced response to a difficulty raised upon one of his rulings.257 In our opin-

same time that he included those of others. If the editors located in the central academies were selective with regard to which material of Amemar or other Nehardeans to include in their record of learning, why weren’t they selective with regard to the other local academies? Furthermore, Pumbeditan and Suran amoraim in the centural academies in this period were actively engaging in the interpretation of tannaitic sources (see above, section 4.6[a], p. 85), and therefore I see no reason to ascribe to them a selective editing out of interpretive material that came from elsewhere. In contrast with the case of R. Zebid of Nehardea (below, chapter five, p. 170, n. 90), the issue at hand here is the possibility of the selective editing of the literary material attributed to Amemar (i.e. the inclusion of halakhic rulings and intentional omission of interpretation of tannaitic sources) which eventually reached the editors in the central yeshivot. In the case of R. Zebid of Nehardea the issue was the paucity of any literary material brought in his name in the Talmud. (2) There are more than thirty instances in which Amemar is portrayed as being in contact with R. Ashi, in which the latter was subordinate to the former and learning from him (see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 77 n. 59). For a full list of all these cases, see below, footnote 260. If Amemar also produced literature which interpreted tannaitic sources, R. Ashi, who was head of the central academy, would have been likely to document this literature, as were documented hundreds of questions that were asked of him by other contemporary sages. It might also be possible to surmise that there is a connection between the desctruc- tion of Nehardea during the lifetime of R. Nahman and R. Sheshet of the third generation and a change in the academic focus that seems to have occurred in the beginning of the fourth generation, the time of the “Nehardeans say” traditions. We should note that a similar connection has been drawn between the persecution of Jews at the end of the talmudic period (during the time of Yazdgerd II—438–457, see Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 49–51) and a change in the patterns of learning within the rabbinic academies that occurred, or at least seems to have occurred during this period. See for instance: Brüll, “The History of the Establishment of the Babylo- nian Talmud” [Heb.], 206–207; Kaplan, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, 293. However, it seems that this suggestion can be considered no more than a conjecture. The comparison with the delicate political situation of Babylonian Jews at the end of the talmudic period is problematic for in truth we know little of how the persecutions effected the rabbinic academies. Kalmin, “The Post-Rav Ashi Amoraim,” 172 n. 44 has offered some considerations as to why this possibility should be rejected. He soundly concludes (73, n. 44): In general, in explaining the formation of the Talmud, or any other rabbinic work, it seems preferable to search first for explanations that arise out of the internal logic of the work itself, rather than for explanations that originate outside the text. Indeed, it seems likely that the genre of literature attributed to Amemar is simply representative of Amemar’s actual literary activity, and is not the result of outside circumstances, be they editorial or political. Amemar seems not to have engaged in interpretation of tannaitic sources because he was in general critical of and independent from sanctioned halakhic sources. 257 See above, sections 4.6(a)–(b), pp. 84–85. amemar 95 ion, therefore, we must understand his methods of interpretation as being the result of the context in which they were put forth.258 The fact that Amemar frequently ruled against earlier halakhic sources puzzled modern scholars, causing some of them to propose that at least some of these rulings were not issued by Amemar but were interpolations by later editors.259 However, there is no need for such a suggestion. In light of general characteristics found in Amemar’s literature, it is our opinion that Amemar’s rulings and his interpretations as they have been transmitted are generally reflective of Amemar’s original words. The difficulty with his rulings and interpretations is found so frequently, that it seems more likely that this is simply the way in which he engaged in his halakhic and interpretive activity and not that these are words attributed to him in a later period. Understanding this characteristic of Amemar’s rulings and tannaitic interpretations brings light to the consistent difficulties raised upon him by R. Ashi (in close to forty cases).260 This critique was described briefly by Jacob Zuri, “and so too we find R. Ashi frequently criticizing Amemar.” Zuri did not elaborate as to the nature of this critique. Analysis of the difficulties that R. Ashi raised on Amemar reveals an obvious connection to the above findings. In about 80% of these cases R. Ashi’s difficulty follows a halakhic ruling or interpretation offered by Amemar which contradicts an earlier halakhah (tannaitic or amoraic), or one that at least deviates from the earlier source’s simple meaning.261

258 See above, sections 4.6(a)–(b), pp. 84–85. A similar phenomenon has been documented in connection with R. Nahman of the fourth generation and Mar bar R. Ashi of the seventh. See: A. Cohen, Mar bar Rav Ashi [Heb.], 228–236; B. Cohen, “Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman” [Heb.], 16 n. 29. 259 See for instance, above p. 70, near footnote 169. 260 Below is a list of all of these cases: b. Berakhot 12a; b. Berakhot 30b; b. Shabbat 128a; b. Eruvin 24b; b. Pesahim 103b; b. Rosh HaShanah 31b; b. Betzah 22a (three traditions); b. Betzah 23a; b. Moed Qatan 16a; b. Yevamot 43a; b. Yevamot 92b (two traditions); b. Ketubbot 21b; b. Ketubbot 69a; b. Ketubbot 83b; b. Ketubbot 97a; b. Gittin 13b; b. Kiddushin 72b; b. Kiddushin 79b; b. Bava Qamma 70a; b. Bava Metzi’a 65b; b. Bava Batra 13b; b. Bava Batra 145a; b. Bava Batra 153a; b. Bava Batra 155b; b. Bava Batra 165a; b. Bava Batra 173b; b. Sanhedrin 31b; b. Shevu’ot 30b; b. Avodah Zarah 71a; b. Menahot 34a; b. Hullin 53b; b. Hullin 57b; b. Hullin 62a. 261 Below are the ﬁnal eight cases in which R. Ashi’s criticism stems from reasoning and not from a more authoritative source: b. Ketubbot 21a; b. Ketubbot 69a; b. Gittin 13b; b. Bava Qamma 70a; b. Bava Batra 145a; b. Bava Batra153a; b. Bava Batra 173b; b. Avodah Zarah 71a. 96 chapter two

5.3. The Source of Amemar’s Unique Halakhic Characteristics It seems that the two phenomena described above, which are also characteristic of “legal realism,”262 an approach to legal decision making described by modern legal scholars, stem from Amemar’s bold personality. Legal scholars have noted that the personality of a judge, particular those who espouse a “realistic” approach to law, can be decisive in his rendering of legal decisions.263 Amemar’s legal boldness is particularly noteworthy when we take into consideration his actions as portrayed in certain sources. For instance, in six instances Amemar intentionally ignores authoritative halakhic sources which contradict his ruling. When confronted with this contradiction he responds, “I have not heard it (meaning, it is not reasonable to me” [lo shemi’a li kelomar lo sevira li ]).264 In two other cases Amemar employs his own reasoning to rule against a local Nehardean tradition, stating, “I am from [the elders] of Nehardea, and I hold . . .” [ana (mi-Savei de) neharde’a ana, u-svira li . . . ]. This type of statement is unique to Amemar in the Bavli.265 Amemar’s halakhic boldness and independence seems also to be connected to his famous derashah, which presents the sage as being of a greater authority than even the prophet: Amemar said: And a sage is greater than a prophet, as it is said, “And a prophet has a wise heart”266 (Psalms 90:12). Who depends upon whom? The lesser is dependent upon the greater.267 Alon Goshen-Gottstein notes that this idea is unique to Amemar in rabbinic literature.268 Concerning the legal theory that would emerge from Amemar’s statement, Ephraim Urbach writes:

262 For a comparison between legal realism and Amemar’s halakhic methodology see above, p. 53, footnote 96. 263 See above, section 4.2, p. 53 n. 96. 264 For a discussion of these passages, see above, section 2.4.2. 265 See above, section 4.4.2., pp. 74–76. 266 I have translated the verse to match its midrashic meaning. 267 b. Bava Batra 12a. 268 Goshen-Gottstein, “ ‘The Sage is Superior to the Prophet’ ” [Heb.], 42. How- ever, see y. Avodah Zarah 2:8, 41c and Urbach, The World of the Sages, 29. The simple meaning of the verse is “Let us bring wisdom (into) our minds.” The word which Amemar midrashically interprets as “prophet” is the Hebrew word “let us bring” (venavi) See: Clifford, “What does the Psalmist ask,” 66. Concerning Amemar’s interpretation see: Bacher, Die Agada der Babylonischen Amoräer, 146 n. 17. amemar 97

For a prophet relies upon God when issuing his prophecy, whereas a sage issues his statement relying upon his own opinion. The authority accorded to the sage which replaces prophecy does not stem from any institution, just as prophecy itself is not institutional. It is also not dependent upon lineage, such as the priesthood. The importance of sages stems from the fact that they preserve the traditions received from earlier generations, from their ability to interpret and explain these traditions and from their innovative reasoning which allows them to offer solutions to problems that arise from the reality which they faced.269 The preferability of the sage over the prophet ﬁnds manifestation, according to Urbach, in the former’s ability to interpret and innovate through the means of his own independent reasoning, as opposed to the prophet who is dependent upon God. If we compare Amemar’s statement with his own halakhic methodology, it is clearly not acci- dental that such a derashah is attributed to such a sage. Throughout the Bavli his rulings are creative, innovative and based on his own reasoning.270 However we understand the preference of the sage over the prophet, it seems that this idea is signiﬁcant when understanding the background to Amemar’s halakhic activity.

5.4. Amemar’s Date and Status Amemar is not mentioned in the list of academy heads found in the geonic chronologies and historiographies. The theories as to the date of his rabbinic activity span a large gap of time, from the beginning of the fourth century to the middle half of the ﬁfth. Whereas some scholars posit that Amemar was part of the group referred to as “the Nehardeans say” (the beginning of the fourth century) others date him as late as R. Yemar (432 C.E.), and others even later, through the time

269 Urbach, HaHalakha, 173 (emphasis mine). See also: Urbach, The World of the Sages, 29. 270 It is possible that Amemar’s statement is connected to Manichaean polemics which circulated in Mahoza during Amemar’s period. These polemics centered around the claim that sages of other religions did not have the authority to interpret the Holy Scriptures or to expound upon them and apply them to their everyday lives. The claim was put forth by Mani himself, see: Asmussen, Manichaean Literature, 12; Gardner & Lieu, eds., Manichean Texts, 266. In a series of important articles, Yaakov Elman demonstrated the effect that the turbulent religious environment in Mahoza had upon fourth century halakhic literature, especially Rava. See: Elman, “Accultura- tion to Elite Persian Norms,” 38–56; Elman, “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages,” 166–192; Elman, “Mahoza and Pumbedita” [Heb.], 5–26. It is possible that similar pressures acted upon Amemar in Nehardea or Mahoza. 98 chapter two of Amemar Mar bar Yanuka (470 C.E). Reanalysis of this topic, based mostly on Amemar’s interaction with the sages of the ﬁfth and sixth generation of Babylonian amoraim, allows us the precision to date his activity to the second half of the fourth century and the beginning of the ﬁfth. The absence of Amemar’s name from the geonic chronologies has also led to differences of opinion among modern historians as to whether Amemar served as head of an academy in Nehardea. In our opinion, the absence of his name cannot serve as the basis for a decision in this matter. Rather the question must be dealt with based upon the talmudic evidence, and especially the talmudic terminology customarily used in connection with the head of a yeshiva/study circle. Seder Tannaim veAmoraim and the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, the two geonic chronologies, focused mainly on the central academies that operated during the talmudic period: Sura/Mata Mehasya and Pumbedita. The existence of “local” yeshivot/study circles throughout the third and fourth centuries is mentioned explicitly in the Bavli, and at the head of these academies stood sages unmentioned in the geonic chronologies. The terminology used in the Bavli in connection with Amemar, terms such as “sat in front of ” ( yativ kameh), “I was standing in front of ” (hava ka’imna kameh), “court cases” and others lead to the strong possibility that Amemar indeed headed a local academy in Nehardea. CHAPTER THREE

“THE NEHARDEANS SAY”

1. Early Babylonian Halakhic Traditions?

There are forty-ﬁve passages in the Bavli in which a halakhic tradition is ascribed to an anonymous group of sages using the term, “the Nehardeans say” (amrei Neharde’ei).1 The Bavli itself contains no direct biographical information regarding this group, and varying suggestions have been offered by scholars concerning the period in which this group of sages was active, their identity and their halakhic methodology.2 It is especially difﬁcult to glean any historical/biographical information concerning this group due to the fact that all of the traditions ascribed to them are of a halakhic nature and are phrased

1 This includes all appearances of the phrase, “the Nehardeans say” (Neharde’ei amrei) or “say the Nehardeans” (amrei Nehrade’ei) in the Bavli. It does not include parallel passages, or multiple appearances within one passage. It also does not include appearances of the phrase, “the Nehardeans go according to their own reasoning” (Neharde’ei le-ta’amayhu) or the word “the Nehardeans/Nehardea/in Nehardea” with the verb “act” (avde’i) whose meaning differs from that of the phrase under discussion here. See Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 189–190. The list also does not include “the amoraim of Nehardea” mentioned in b. Sanhedrin 17b, see below, p. 125, footnote 126. The following is the complete list: b. Berakhot 43a; b. Shabbat 129a (twice); b. Shabbat 134a; b. Eruvin 41b; b. Betzah 6a (=b. Betzah 22a); b. Mo’ed Qatan 19b; b. Mo’ed Qatan 27b–28a; b. Yevamot 45b; b. Yevamot 52a (=b. Kiddushin 12b); b. Ketubbot 6a (manuscripts); b. Ketub- bot 20a; b. Ketubbot 43b; b. Ketubbot 56a; b. Ketubbot 87a (=b. Ketubbot 100b; b. Gittin 52b; b. Bava Metzi’a 108b); b. Sotah 40a; b. Gittin 34b; b. Bava Qamma 46a; b. Bava Qamma 70a (=b. Shevu’ot 33b; b. Bekhorot 49a); b. Bava Metzi’a 16a (=b. Bava Metzi’a 35a); b. Bava Metzi’a 36b; b. Bava Metzi’a 66b; b. Bava Metzi’a 104b (=b. Bava Batra 70b); b. Bava Metzi’a 108a (three times); b. Bava Batra 31a; b. Bava Batra 35b; b. Bava Batra 37b; b. Bava Batra (twice=b. Arakhin14b); b. Bava Batra 40a–40b; b. Bava Batra 144a; b. Bava Batra 147a; b. Bava Batra 153a; b. Sanhedrin 30b; b. Sanhedrin 31a; b. Sanhedrin 41b; b. Shevu’ot 7a; b. Shevu’ot 43b; b. Avodah Zarah 30a–30b; b. Arakhin 22b; b. Arakhin 23b. 2 Traditionally the “Nehardeans say” have been identified with R. Hama based on the anonymous testimony found on b. Sanhedrin 17b. We will discuss the reliability of this source below, p. 125, footnote 126, and in chapter four, section 3(b), p. 150. This was the approach adopted by medieval talmudic historiographers. A different claim is that “the Nehardeans say” is an appellation for Nehardean amoraim that lived throughout the talmudic period. This claim does not accept the identification of the “Nehardeans say” with R. Hama found in the Bavli. See below, section 1(a). 100 chapter three apodictically,3 a literary form which does not allow one to glean historical information.4 In his study of the “Nehardeans say” traditions, David Goodblatt concluded that this term refers to a group of anonymous sages active in Nehardea during a single period, namely the first half of the fourth century C.E.5 Based on a comparison of this group with “the sages of Caesarea”—a group mentioned about 140 times in the Yerushalmi6— Goodblatt suggested that the “Nehardeans” were a type of rabbinic guild that operated in Nehardea.7 The halakhic traditions ascribed to this group represent a consistent halakhic approach,8 one which focused on practical halakhot observed in daily life.9 With the noted exception of Goodblatt’s study, the “Nehardeans say” traditions have not yet been examined in-depth by modern scholars of Babylonian amoraim. In some studies it is possible to find a few general remarks which assume that these traditions stem from a pre-talmudic Babylonian halakhic tradition, or from local traditions in Nehardea which existed at the beginning of the talmudic period, namely during the period of Samuel. These claims are based on overall impressions that arise, or seem to arise from the literature, and not from an in-depth study of the traditions themselves or from a comparison with traditions ascribed to contemporary sages. Below, we will examine the talmudic material that has been used as a basis for these claims, and afterwards we will analyze the interpretive and halakhic methodology reflected in the “Nehardeans say” traditions themselves. The first modern scholar to paint a broad characterization of the “Nehardeans say” traditions was Solomon Funk. As part of his book on Babylonian Jewry during the talmudic period, Funk attempted to

3 Concerning the meaning of “apodictic statements,” see above, chapter two, section 4.3., p. 55, near footnote 105. 4 See: Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 206–207. 5 See: ibid., 194. 6 Concerning the “Sages of Caesarea” see mainly: Bacher, “Die Gelehrten von Caesarea,” 298–310; Frankel, Mavo HaYerushalmi, 123; Lieberman, “The Talmud of Caesarea” [Heb.], 9–12; Levine, Caesarea, 95–97; Oppenheimer, “Batei Midrash in Eretz-Israel” [Heb.], 81; Oppenheimer, “Those of the School of Rabbi Yannai” [Heb.], 137; Miller, Sages and Commoners, 403–404. 7 Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 206. 8 Zuri, Rabbi Yosi bar Hanina, 9–10; Zuri, Rav Ashi, 15; Zevieli, “Amrei Neharde’ei,” 48–49; Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 206. See our conclusions below, section 2. 9 See: Zevieli, “Amrei Neharde’ei,” 50; Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 195. “the nehardeans say” 101 identify proto-talmudic Babylonian halakhic traditions.10 According to Funk, the “Nehardeans say” traditions are part of this early corpus of literature.11 However, the only proof that he offered is based on his interpretation of a source from b. Betzah 6a: Rava said: If he dies on the first day of a festival, [only] Gentiles may occupy themselves with his [corpse], [but] if on the second day [of the festival], Israelites may occupy themselves with his [corpse], and even on the two festival days of the New Year, but the same is not true with respect to an egg. The Nehardeans say: The same holds true even with respect to an egg; for what do you think: Perhaps [the month of ] Elul will be intercalated? Surely R. Hinena b. Kahana said in the name of Rav:12 From the days of Ezra and onward we do not find Elul ever intercalated.13 According to Rava the second day of festivals observed outside of the land of Israel and the second day of Rosh Hashanah are equivalent only when it comes to burying a corpse. They were lenient in this matter because of the need for burial. However, when it came to allowing one to eat on the second day of Rosh Hashanah an egg laid on the first day, they were not lenient because the two days of Rosh Hashanah were treated as if they were “one holy day,” and an egg laid on a festival day may not be eaten until the festival is completed.14 The “Nehardeans say” were more lenient and allowed even the egg laid on the first day to be eaten on the second, for “according to the Nehardeans even when it comes to the egg the second day of Rosh Hashanah is considered to be completely non-sacred.”15 As we shall

10 Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 1: IV–V n. 2 (appendix). 11 Ibid. 12 Goetingen 3 reads: “R. Hinena said in the name of Rav.” Vatican 134 reads: “But did not R. Kahana say in the name of Rav.” 13 There are two signs that the section which I have placed in a smaller font is not an original part of the “Nehardeans say” statement and was imported to this passage from b. Rosh Hashanah 19b. First, this section is in Aramaic whereas the remainder of the tradition is in Hebrew. Second, this justification is not found in the parallel passage on b. Shabbat 139b. This was also the conclusion of Abraham Weiss and Israel Francus. See below, footnote 15. 14 Rashi, s.v. mah sh’eyn ken bebetzah. See also R. Menahem Hameiri, Bet HaBekhira, s.v. amar Rava. The prohibition of eating an egg on the two festival days of Rosh Hashanah due to the same principle can be found on b. Betzah 4b, where it is also ascribed to Rav and Samuel. See also, Aminoah, Tractate Betzah, 45. 15 R. Menahem Hameiri, s.v. hakhi garsinan; Rashi, s.v. af bebetzah. Weiss, Studies in the Literature of the Amoraim [Heb.], 103 and Francus, Research on the Composition and Com- pilation of the Tractate Besa [Heb.], 189, suggested that the opinion of the “Nehardeans say” was dependent upon a statement of Rabbah made elsewhere. Francus writes, “In my opinion, the Nehardeans do not provide any justification for their ruling. They 102 chapter three demonstrate below,16 the “Nehardeans say” traditions frequently add on to the applicability of a previously stated halakhah (“The same holds true even with respect to an egg”), based on a shared opinion, in this case that burial is allowed on the second day of a festival and on the second day of Rosh Hashanah. Funk makes two basic assumptions which serve as the basis for his dating of the “Nehardeans say” and their connection with the Baby- lonian halakhic tradition: (1) The lenient opinion of the Nehardeans contradicts the explicit halakhah found in the Mishnah and Tosefta,17 because it reflects an early Babylonian halakhic tradition. (2) If the Nehardeans disagree with tannaitic tradition, then the Nehardeans must themselves be an early group, active in Babylonia during the tannaitic period.18 We will begin with Funk’s second claim, concerning the dating of the “Nehardeans say” to the tannaitic period. In the above passage it seems quite clear that the halakhic opinion of the “Nehardeans say” refers to Rava’s statement and not to a tannaitic source,19 and this is how the tradition was understood by fifth and sixth generation amoraim who relate to this dispute.20 Even if were we to accept that the certainly hold like Rabbah (b. Betzah 5a) that the rule regarding one period of holi- ness was nullified with the decree of Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai, that it was possible to accept testimony concerning the new month all day long. The section beginning ‘for what do you think’ until ‘intercalated’ was transferred here from Rosh Hashanah 19b.” In any case, this does not affect the understanding of the Nehardeans’ halakhah which Funk claims to reflect an early Babylonian tradition. Indeed, Weiss’s and Fran- cus’s analysis of the passage concretizes the opposite—the Nehardeans’ halakhah is dependent on an early amoraic tradition. 16 See the discussion below, section 2.1., pp. 109–115. 17 See m. Eruvin 3:7–8; t. Eruvin 4:2–3 [ed. Lieberman, 104–105]. It seems that Funk was referring to the opinion of R. Yose in the Tosefta (and the sages in the Mishnah) according to which the two days of Rosh Hashanah are one unit of sanctity. On R. Yose’s opinion see Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 2:365–366; Goldberg, The Mishnah: Treatise Eruvin [Heb.], 93–94; Safrai, Mishnat Eretz Israel: Tractate Eruvin, 113–116. 18 Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 1: IV n. 2 (appendix). 19 See Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 194 n. 8, who writes: According to Funk, the Nehardeans in this passage debate with Palestinian tannaim and thus must be contemporary with the latter . . . I note that the passage in question actually records a debate between Rava and the Nehardeans. 20 This can be seen from the discussion between Rabina and R. Ashi on b. Betzah 6a, as well as the discussion between Amemar and R. Ashi on b. Betzah 22b. In the second case, Amemar rules against Rava’s opinion, and in his reply to an objection raised upon him by R. Ashi, Amemar responds, “I hold as the Nehardeans who say ‘even an egg.’ ” This also emerges from a conversation between Rabina, R. Ashi’s colleague, and R. Mordecai, R. Ashi’s student, in the second case. In this source R. Mordecai testifies in front of Rabina that R. Ashi rejected the view of the “Nehardeans say,” “the nehardeans say” 103

Nehardeans’ opinion represents a proto-talmudic Babylonian source that disagrees with the Palestinian tannaitic tradition, this fact alone does not mean that the Nehardeans themselves lived during the tannaitic period. Amemar, for instance, frequently disagrees with tannaitic tradition despite the fact that he is a late amora who lived during the second half of the fourth century.21 Based on a number of pieces of evidence, David Goodblatt demonstrated that the “Nehardeans say” lived during Rava’s period. He writes: . . . the termini a quo for statements attributed to the Nehardeans range from the early third to the early fourth century. The termini ante quem range from the early fourth to the early early fifth centuries . . . When views attributed to Nehardeans are juxtaposed with views of masters who predate the early fourth century, the Nehardean view consistently appears last. Moreover, the master whose statements are most often combined with those of the Nehardeans is Rava, who flourished in the first half of the fourth century. All this suggests that neharde’e designate a group of masters who were contemporaries of Rava . . . In short, the traditions introduced by amre neharde’ei are all datable to one period: the first half of the fourth century.22 Similarly, there is no proof for the claim that the opinions of “the Nehardeans say” represent early Babylonian halakhot. Analysis of Palestinian tannaitic tradition demonstrates that the opinions of Rava and “the Nehardeans say” with regard to festivals and Rosh Hasha- nah can both be found in the Mishnah and Tosefta, and that the same debate continued to exist during the amoraic period, with Rav, Samuel and Rabbah.23 As a general rule, when a connection exists between the halakhic stances of the “Nehardeans say” and earlier tradition, the “Nehardeans say” traditions tend to be based upon Pal- estinian tannaitic traditions or earlier amoraic traditions without any sign of a connection with a proto-talmudic Babylonian tradition. A similar claim as to traces of proto-talmudic Babylonian traditions was put forth by Funk in connection with the Tanna D’bei Shmuel baraitot.24 and ruled like Rava. Both passages demonstrate that late amoraim perceived there to be halakhic debate between “the Nehardeans say” and Rava. 21 On the dating of Amemar, see above, chapter two, section 1.1, pp. 37–42. A large gap in time, even of several generations can exist in the names attached to amoraic disputes in the Bavli. For a discussion of this issue see: B. Cohen, “Rav Hamnuna,” 111–112. 22 Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 194. 23 See above, footnote 15. 24 See: Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 1:62. 104 chapter three

However, Funk did not present any proof for such a claim with regard to this group either. In contrast, our analysis of the tannaitic halakhot reﬂected in the collection of Tanna D’bei Shmuel baraitot yielded the exact opposite conclusion—these halakhot are highly dependent upon the Palestinian halakhic tradition.25 A similar conclusion was reached in our study of the Tanna D’bei Levi baraitot, and the halakhic teachings of Samuel’s father (Abba b. Abba). Both collections of traditions show a distinct connection with Palestinian halakhic traditions.26 In light of all this, we can conclude that one who wants to claim that there is a connection between the “Nehardeans say” traditions and a proto- talmudic Babylonian halakhah must bring more substantive proof as to such a connection. Another claim was raised by Ze’ev Yaavetz and Jacob Zuri who posited that the halakhic traditions reﬂected in statements by Samuel and R. Nahman, both Nehardean amoraim, left their mark on the “Nehardeans say” literature.27 Thus, for instance, in his survey of late talmudic Babylonian academies, Yaavetz described the “Nehardeans say” statements as carrying “the spirit of Samuel, the forefather of the sages of their region, who stood in their midst.”28 Despite these broad claims, the only proof presented in their research is a passage from b. Bava Batra 7b. After a halakhic ruling issued by R. Hama, Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha the sons of R. Hisda (sixth generation amoraim29 who were subordinate to R. Ashi30) report to R. Ashi that R. Hama’s ruling was part of a local halakhic tradition from Nehardea that originated with Samuel. This source reads: “Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha the sons of R. Hisda said to R. Ashi: the Nehardeans go according to their own reasoning (neharde’ei leta’amayhu), for R. Nahman said in the name of Samuel . . . .”. Yaavetz and Zuri identify the “Nehardeans” in this source with the “Nehardeans say” (amrei neharde’ei) traditions, whose roots, according to Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha, are found in local traditions

25 B. Cohen, “In Quest of Babylonian Tannaitic Traditions,” 271–303. 26 Ibid., 297 n. 145, 298–299 n. 150. 27 Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:162–163 and n. 2; Zuri, Rav Ashi, 15. A similar claim was put forth by Zevieli, “Amrei Neharde’ei,” 49. The main proof that he offers is identical to that which is discussed below with regard to Zuri and Yaavetz. 28 Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:162–163. 29 Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 437. 30 For evidence that Mar Kashisha was subordinate to R. Ashi see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 55–56. “the nehardeans say” 105 stemming from R. Nahman in the name of Samuel.31 This is the proof, according to Yaavetz and Zuri, that Samuel’s opinions are embedded in the “Nehardeans say” traditions. To emphasize, their evidence for this claim relies on the identiﬁcation of “the Nehardeans say” (amrei neharde’ei) with “the Nehardeans go according to their own logic” (neharde’ei leta’amayhu) in the Bava Batra passage.32 However, this identiﬁcation is unnecessary for two reasons:

(a) The phrase “the Nehardeans go according to their own reasoning” which is found here and in one other place in the Bavli33 refers to the Nehardean amoraim specifically identified in those passages. This includes amoraim who lived throughout the talmudic period (Samuel, R. Nahman, R. Hama and Amemar). The meaning of this phrase is therefore, “sages from Nehardea.”34 In contrast, “the Nehardeans say” is an appellation that relates to a specific group of sages, one with a defined halakhic methodology and tradition that differs from the four Nehardean sages35 mentioned above. This group was active during a specific time, namely the first half of the fourth century.36

31 Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:163 n. 2; Zuri, Rav Ashi, 15. 32 This is also how the passage is interpreted by Zevieli, “Amrei Neharde’ei,” 49. 33 b. Bava Batra 124b. In this passage the term is ascribed to Ravina: “R. Aha the son of Rava [Rava in Hamburg 165 and Munich 95] said to Ravina: Amemar came to our place and expounded: A ﬁrst-born takes a double portion in the loan but not in the interest. He said to him: the Nehardeans follow their own reasoning, for Rabbah said . . . and R. Nahman said . . .” In this source, R. Aha the son of Rava reports to R. Ashi concerning a halakhic ruling issued by Amemar when he came to his place. According to the geonic talmudic chronologies, R. Aha the son of Rava was the rosh yeshiva in Pumbedita after the death of R. Kahana (d. 409 or 414 C.E.) until his own death in 419 (STA, 5; ERSG, 90). Ravina, who is mentioned here in the presence of R. Aha the son of Rava, is a colleague of R. Ashi. He is located in Mata Mehasya, and seems to have served as the head of a local academy in Difte after R. Ashi’s death (see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 135–136) until his own death in 440 (on the date of his death see ibid., 232). As in the passage we discuss in the text, here too Ravina makes use of the term, “the Nehardeans follow their own reasoning” in reference to speciﬁc sages who rule in a certain way, namely Amemar and R. Nahman. 34 See: Goodblatt, “Local Tradition,” 189–190. 35 Concerning the halakhic methodology that distinguishes the “Nehardeans say” from other Nehardean amoraim, see below, section 3(a), pp. 123–124. 36 See: Goodblatt, “Local Tradition,” 190. According to Halivni (Sources and Tradi- tions [Heb], 7:10) the words “for R. Nahman said in the name of Samuel” are not part of Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha’s statement to R. Ashi. Accordingly, the connection between the “Nehardeans” (or the “Nehardeans say” according to Yaavetz and Zuri) and the halakhic tradition transmitted by R. Nahman in the name of Samuel is created by the stam, and is not from the amoraic period. 106 chapter three

(b) A description of the characteristics of the “Nehardeans say” traditions requires broad analysis of all of their literature in the Bavli; it is not sufficient to characterize their entire corpus of literature based on one source. This type of analysis, which lies at the heart of this chapter, does not affirm Yaavetz and Zuri’s claim. We have found there to be halakhic connections between the “Nehardeans say” traditions and a broad group of Babylonian amoraim including: R. Ada b. Ahavah and R. Kahana,37 Rabbah,38 R. Yohanan,39 Abbaye and Rava.40 Further proof against their claim is that in many places the halakhic stance of the Nehardeans disagrees with traditions attributed to R. Nahman or Samuel.41 This is a result of the distinct halakhic approach reflected in “the Nehardeans say” traditions, as we shall explain below.

In sum, the two proofs that have been presented in scholarly literature as to the connection between the collection of halakhot attributed to the “Nehardeans say” and a proto-talmudic Babylonian tradition are both weak. These proofs are based on a priori assumptions or on unnecessary interpretations of talmudic sources. Therefore, we now turn to a systematic analysis of the “Nehardeans say” traditions found in the Bavli and a comparison of these traditions with those attributed to their contemporaries.

2. A Characterization of Their Halakhic Rulings and Their Relationship to Earlier Sources

Analysis of the “Nehardeans say” statements in the Bavli reveals several consistent methodological characteristics. These characteristics are noteworthy when contrasted not only with contemporary sages but even when compared with Nehardean sages of the ﬁfth and sixth generations. In a majority of cases (around 60%), the opinion of “the Nehardeans say” is presented as a reaction to earlier amoraic statements and not as the beginning of discussion of an issue, a new interpretation of a tannaitic source or a matter of a similar nature. The “Nehardeans say”

37 b. Berakhot 43a. 38 b. Eruvin 41b. 39 b. Eruvin 66a. 40 b. Mo’ed Qatan 19b. 41 See below, section 2.1. “the nehardeans say” 107 statements essentially accept the amoraic halakhot found earlier in the passage, and build upon their applicability, decide the halakhah in matters under dispute, interpret and define earlier halakhot, or identify exceptions.42 This phenomenon exists mostly in connection with their halakhic disputes with other sages (a total of thirteen cases).43 In their halakhic disputes, the “Nehardeans say” tend to rule according to a halakhic foundation accepted by their amoraic predecessors, and merely expand and add to its applicability. They do not reject previous halakhic statements, as is common in amoraic debates.44 This phenomenon exists in ten out of thirteen cases where they dispute other sages in halakhic matters.45 This phenomenon is also manifested in the literary language and style through which their statements are presented. Their disputes are presented through inclusionary terms which relate to all situations, for instance, “[And the Nehardeans say:] even in/even because of/also in the following/in all of these cases” (afilu be . . ./afilu mishum . . ./af bezo u-bezo/bekhulhu . . .).46 Similarly, their opinion almost always appears at the end of a passage as a conclusion, “and the Nehardeans say,” the verb “say” (amrei) coming after the sage’s name as is typical when the Talmud presents an opinion that disputes a prior opinion.47 There are six additional passages in which “Nehardeans say” traditions advance the applicability of amoraic halakhah, explain it or support an amora by use of a mishnah (not in the framework of a halakhic

42 In the following cases they use the term “vehilkheta” to render a decision on halakhah that was debated by earlier amoraim: b. Mo’ed Qatan 19b; b. Ketubbot 43b; ibid 56a; b. Bava Batra 153a. In the following they interpret or define an earlier opinion: b. Shabbat 129a; b. Sanhedrin 41a. In the following they find an exception to a rule: b. Bava Qamma 46b; b. Bava Batra 35b. 43 b. Berakhot 43a; b. Shabbat 129a; b. Betzah 6a; b. Bava Metzi’a 108a; b. Bava Batra 144a; ibid 147a; b. Sanhedrin 30b; b. Sanhedrin 31a; b. Shevu’ot 43b; b. Arakhin 22b. 44 For an analysis of the legal methodology reflected in halakhic disputes and interpretation between various pairs of amoraim throughout the talmudic period see: Weis, “The Controverseries of Rav and Samuel,” 288–297; Goldberg, “R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish’ [Heb.], 109–116; Goldberg, “Derakhim shel Tzimzum Makhlokot,” 135–153; Henshke, “Abbaye and Rava” [Heb.], 187–193; B. Cohen, “Rav Sheshset and and Rav Nahman,” 11–32; ibid., “Legal Analogies,” 149–184. Among all of the amoraic disputes analyzed in these studies the phenomenon that we have described here in connection with “the Nehardeans say” is absent. 45 B. Berakhot 43a; b. Shabbat 129a; b. Betzah 6a; b. Bava Metzi’a 108a (twice); b. Bava Batra 31a; b. Bava Batra 144a; b. Bava Batra 147a; b. Sanhedrin 30b; b. Sanhedrin 31a; b. Shevu’ot 43b; b. Arakhin 22b. 46 A similar phenomenon is found in the literature ascribed to Mar bar R. Ashi. See: A. Cohen, Mar bar Rav Ashi [Heb.], 221–222. 47 See: Friedman, “A Critical Study of Yevamot X” [Heb.], 349; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 31 n. 38. 108 chapter three debate).48 In three other concrete cases their halakhic rulings are based on logical conclusions drawn from the Mishnah.49 These literary/halakhic characteristics are almost completely absent when we compare these traditions with the presence of these characteristics in statements attributed to other sages from their generation: Abbaye (8%), Rava (10%), Nahman b. Isaac (12%), R. Papa (10%) and R. Zebid (less than 1%).50 These characteristics are even unusual in comparison with other contemporary Nehardean sages: R. Hama, R. Hanan of Nehardea, R. Dimi of Nehardea, R. Zebid of Nehardea, Rabbah bar R. Huna Zuti of Nehardea and R. Shimi of Nehardea.51 Moreover, their legal methodology is more extreme than

48 b. Shabbat 129a; b. Eruvin 41b; b. Yevamot 45b; b. Bava Qamma 46b; b. Bava Metzi’a 36b; b. Sanhedrin 41b. 49 b. Gittin 34b; b. Bava Metzi’a 104b; b. Arakhin 23b. In the following seven cases an apodictic statement attributed to the “Nehardeans say” begins a halakhic discussion and is not connected directly to an earlier source: b. Ketubbot 20a; ibid 87a; b. Bava Qamma 70a (twice); b. Bava Metzi’a 104b; ibid 108a; b. Bava Batra 37b; b. Bava Batra 40a. 50 The comparison was based on a representative sample of halakhic disputes attributed to the heads of the central academies who were active during the time of the “Nehardeans say.” The appearance of the literary form (“R. X said”) throughout the Talmud was checked by use of the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project. Below is a summary of the findings: [A] Abbaye: The above-described phenomenon is found in 12 out of the 160 disputes in which Abbaye participates: b. Shabbat 71a (twice); b. Eruvin 97b; b. Bava Metzi’a 13a; b. Bava Metzi’a 20a; b. Bava Batra 100b; b. Bava Batra 119b; b. Menahot 24b (twice); b. Menahot 80b (twice). We should note that in the literature ascribed to Abbaye we have found 26 cases in which Abbaye’s opinion includes the expression: “even if you say it is R. X” (afilu teyma rabbi peloni hi). However, the meaning of this phrase is not the same as that under discussion here. “Even if you say it is R. X” is used in the context of academic discussions of tannaitic sources, and in most cases it carries with it no practical or overt halakhic implications, in contrast with the term we are discussing here, which usually has halakhic significance. [B] Rava: This phenomenon is found in 40 (including parallels) out of 380 of Rava’s halakhic debates. [C] R. Nahman b. Isaac: Found in 5 out of 40 of his halakhic disputes (b. Berakhot 5b; b. Berakhot 6b; b. Berakhot 27a; b. Berakhot 32b; b. Bava Batra 126a). [D] R. Papa: Found in only 10 out of around 100 of his halakhic disputes: (b. Berakhot 44b; b. Shabbat 141a; b. Yoma 83b; b. Ketubbot 61a; b. Bava Batra 20a; b. Bava Batra 128a (twice); b. Horayot 13b; b. Zevahim 12a; b. Bekhorot 61a). [E] R. Zebid: once out of around 18 cases: (b. Bava Batra 44b). 51 Among the Nehardean sages mentioned above, this phenomenon is found in connection with only two of them. It exists once in connection with R. Shimi of Nehardea (b. Yoma 6a) out of seven of instances. It exists twice in connection with R. Dimi of Nehardea (b. Shabbat 127a; b. Horayot 2a) out of twenty of his appearances in the Bavli. For the sake of comparison, we also examined R. Sheshet, a Nehard- ean sage from the third generation. Out of seventy of his disputes with other sages, “the nehardeans say” 109 that of R. Hama and Amemar who succeeded them. In contrast with the “Nehardeans say,” the halakhic rulings of these two sages does not reveal any connection whatsoever to those who preceded them. On the contrary, their rulings are characterized by a large degree of independence from tannaitic and early amoraic halakhic traditions, and they often adopt a critical stance vis à vis these traditions. We will return to this matter at the end of this chapter. Below we will demonstrate the characteristics that typify “Nehard- eans say” statements by examining several representative examples. We will begin with the halakhic methodology that can be found in ten of the thirteen debates between the “Nehardeans say” and other sages.52 We will analyze three representative examples:

2.1. Halakhic Debates Between “the Nehardeans say” and Other Sages Bavli Bava Metzi’a 108a R. Judah said (in the name of Rav):53 If one takes possession (akhzik)54 [of an estate lying] between [the fields belonging to] brothers or partners, he is an impudent man, but they cannot remove him. And R. Nahman said: They can remove him; but if it is only on account of the right of preemption, they cannot remove him. The Nehardeans said: They can remove him even if it is because of the right of preemption, for it is said, “And you shall do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 6:18). This passage presents three disputing opinions, from the most limiting opinion, that of R. Judah, to the most expansive and radical opinion, that of the “Nehardeans.”55 According to Rashi’s interpretation, which has been adopted by modern scholars as well,56 the debate refers to “a field that is being purchased through a land-tax agreement and the fields of two brothers lie next to it on each side.”57 According to this

we didn’t find a single occurrence of the phenomenon. For a general analysis of R. Sheshet’s disputes with other sages, see B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet [Heb.], 148–195. 52 For a full list of sources see above, footnote 43. 53 “In the name of Rav” is absent in all manuscripts. 54 Concerning the legal implications of the term “possess” in this context see: Elman, “On Sasanian Agricultural Policy,” 128. 55 All interpretations of this passage, both medieval and modern are based on this point of analysis. 56 See for instance: Graetz, Geschichte der Juden, 252 n. 4; Newman, The Agricultural Life of the Jews, 195–196. 57 See also Tosafot HaRosh, s.v. ve’i mishum (“it concerns a case where he received it from the king in return for taska, and R. Judah said . . .”); R. Nissim Gerondi, s.v. hai 110 chapter three interpretation, the verb “takes possession,” which refers to the purchase of land,58 is connected to recognition by the Persian authorities as to the ownership of the possessor by his paying the land-tax. Indeed, talmudic sources reveal that all land in Babylonia was considered to be in the possession of the Sasanian monarch, and the right to use his land depended upon payment of the land-tax, called the taska.59 Lack of payment of this tax would cause seizure of the land from its owners by the Persian authorities.60 In light of this fact, Jacob New- man describes the historical background to this debate in the following manner: From the foregoing it appears that people would seek to take advantage of the Persian law which confiscated land for failure on part of the owner to pay Taska, and by that means attempted to evade the Jewish law of pre-emption possessed by neighbours. On the other hand, this instance throws a light on the power vested in the hands of the Jewish authorities; for even in such cases where the intruder was acting strictly within his rights according to Persian law the Jewish authorities possessed the power of ejecting him . . . The reason for the Persian authorities not interfering with the action of the Jewish authorities in this matter is, no doubt, because it was a matter of indifference to the government as to who held the field, so long as the Taska was paid.61 It seems that according to R. Judah one who possesses land that borders fields owned by two brothers or two partners is “impudent,” but the Jewish authorities cannot force him off his field for he has acted in a legal manner, and the brothers do not have a legal claim against him.62 R. Nahman, in contrast, holds that they can force him off his land, “for he has acted unjustly to possess land between [other fields man (“here we are dealing with a person who takes possession of ownerless property in order to give the give the taska”). 58 See above, 54. 59 See: Newman, The Agricultural Life of the Jews, 161–168; Krauss, Paras VeRomi, 269–270; Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 228–229; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 133. Newman’s conclusions were adopted by Ellis, Agriculture and the State in Ancient Mesopotamia, 173–174. Concerning the etymology of the word taska see: Rosen- thal, “A Contribution to the Talmudic Lexicon’ [Heb.], 190 n. 26; Sokoloff, Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 508. 60 Concerning the socio-economic consequences of this phenomenon see: Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 133. 61 Newman, The Agricultural Life of the Jews, 196. 62 See for instance Tosafot HaRosh, s.v. ve’i mishum, (“R. Judah says that we can’t remove him, for if he had desired it, he would have made sure to get it from the king himself.”) See also: Tzubel and Dimitrovski, Talmud Bavli im Tirgum, 209; Artin, That Which is Good and Right [Heb.], 45. Newman, The Agricultural Life of the Jews, 193, “the nehardeans say” 111 owned] by two brothers.”63 Nevertheless, according to R. Nahman the brother or partner cannot remove the one who possesses the land based on a claim of “the law of preemption.” As the Tosafists explain, “for if he [the brother or partner] had desired the land why did he not acquire it earlier? Why did he wait? It is not so impudent for another to take it.”64 R. Nahman presents a claim somewhere in between the extremes of R. Judah and the Nehardeans: he does allow the brothers or partners to remove the one who possesses the field based on a legal/moral claim, but not based on the general law of preemption. In contrast, the Nehardeans basically accept R. Nahman’s stance that it is possible to remove the one who possesses the field, but in their opinion they can even do so by invoking the rule of preemption. Their ruling is based upon the tannaitic halakhah, “and you shall do what is just and right.”65 This then is an example of the Nehardeans identifying with earlier amoraic halakhah (R. Nahman) and expanding its application, in this case by invoking the halakhic justification, “and you shall do what is just and right.” Bavli Berakhot 43a R. Adda b. Ahavah said: Over kasharta66 the blessing is, “Who creates fragrant woods,” but not over the oil in which it has been steeped. R. Kahana says: Even over the oil in which it is steeped, but not over the oil into which it has been ground. The Nehardeans say: Even over the oil in which it has been ground.

understands the basis of R. Judah’s ruling as lying in Persian law which grants the king all legal right to possess land based on the payment of the taska. 63 Tosafot, s.v. hai man (“for he now separates the two, and since they are brothers or partners, it is fitting for them to remove him so that they can be adjacent to one another”). See also Tzubel and Dimitrovski, Talmud Bavli im Tirgum, 209. 64 Tosafot HaRosh, s.v. ve’i misham. See also Tzubel and Dimitrovski, Talmud Bavli im Targum, 209. Compare Rashi, s.v. lo mesalkinan leh. We have preferred Tzubel and Dimitrovski’s interpretation according to which R. Nahman is dealing with one case and two different claims, and not with two cases and two different claims, as Rashi explained (and Newman following him, The Agricultural Life of the Jews, 195). Whichever interpretation is correct, there is no significant difference for our point here. 65 Much has been written about the source, meaning, application and limitation of the principle, “And you shall do what is just and right.” See for instance: Silberg, Prin- cipa Talmudica [Heb.], 99–110; Moriel, “HaYashar VeHatov,” 92–99; Albeck, Principles of Talmudic Private Law [Heb], 14–15; Elon, Jewish Law [Heb.], 1:512–513; Rosenthal, “For the Most Part” [Heb.], 189–191. Concerning the application of this halakhah by the Nehardeans in the case discussed here see Urbach, The Sages [Heb.], 292. 66 For identification, see below, footnote 71. 112 chapter three

As in the previous passage, so too here there is a dispute between three sages: R. Adda b. Ahavah, R. Kahana and “the Nehardeans say.” Due to the fact that the Bavli usually presents disputing opinions in chronological order,67 we must assume that the two named sages lived before the “Nehardeans say,” who, as mentioned above, lived during the first half of the fourth century.68 R. Adda b. Ahavah should thus be identified as a second generation amora, one of Rav’s students.69 The identification of R. Kahana is more problematic; it is possible that this R. Kahana was a member of the second or third generation of amoraim.70 The dispute is concerning whether the blessing “who creates fragrant woods” is recited over various mixtures of kasharta. As in the case we examined above, the passage begins with the most limiting opinion and ends with the most expansive one. R. Adda b. Ahavah holds that one blesses “who creates fragrant woods” only over kasharta itself, a mixture of oil and the fragrant wood,71 because the wood is still present when it is in this type of mixture.72 However, if it has been steeped,73 according to R. Adda b. Ahavah this blessing is no longer

67 Kalmin, “Collegial Interaction,” 131; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 174–175 and n. 152; ibid., “Was Age the Decisive Criterion,” 288; ibid., “Non-Chronological Sugyot,” 75–91. 68 Concerning the dating of the Nehardeans see above, section 1, pp. 99–106. It might seem possible to question this assumption based on cases such as those we are analyzing now, where the opinions are organized from the most limiting to the most expansive and not by chronology. However, the special character of these “Nehard- eans say” statements, which tend to be based on halakhic statements of earlier amoraim mitigates this problem. In light of this strong tendency, it seems likely that the amoraim mentioned here did live before the Nehardeans, or at the least were members of the same generation. 69 And not as R. Adda b. Abba (Ahavah) the student of Rava, a member of the fifth generation of amoraim. Concerning R. Adda b. Ahavah the student of Rav see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 193. It seems that in contrast with R. Adda b. Abba, Rava’s student in Mahoza, R. Adda the first, the student of Rav, was the head of a local academy in Sura or Pumbedita. See: B. Cohen, “Local Academies” [Heb.], 458–462. 70 On the identity of these two sages see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 203, 295. 71 See mainly: Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 7:353; Löw, Die Flora der Juden, 1:131– 132; Sokoloff, Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 607. There are those who have identified kasharta with keshot, one of the spices used in making incense in the Temple (see: b. Keritot 6a and parallels). However, Löw and Feliks reject this identification: Löw, Die Flora der Juden, 1:131; Feliks, Trees [Heb.], 99. 72 See: Shittah Mekubetzet, s.v. hai kashrata. 73 These products have been interpreted according to how the fragrance was processed. See Löw, Die Flora der Juden, 1:131–132; Ben-Shem, ed., Sefer Hanner, 95; Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 7:353. “the nehardeans say” 113 recited, “since only the oil can be seen.”74 R. Kahana holds that even when steeped the blessing can be recited, but not if it has been ground, “for when the spices have been ground we don’t consider them as being essentially present.”75 The “Nehardeans say” accept in principle that the blessing “who creates fragrant woods” applies to a case where the kasharta was steeped, but they, based on the same halakhic principle as that which underlies R. Kahana’s ruling,76 add that the blessing can be recited even when ground, “since the spices are in the mixture, and have not been removed, we consider it as if it is essentially present.”77 The halakhic ruling of the Nehardeans is presented, as in the previous case, as sharing a foundation with that of their predecessors, and as adding on to the earlier statement. In other words, it is presented as a reaction to and an expansion of the last opinion. Bavli Shevu’ot 43b Samuel said: If one lent a thousand zuz to his neighbor, and he took as a pledge the scythe-handle, if the scythe-handle was lost, the thousand zuz are lost; but in the case of two handles, we do not say this. But R. Nahman said: even two handles, if he lost one, he loses five hundred [zuz], if he lost the other, he loses the whole [loan];78 but in the case of a handle and a bar [of silver] we do not say this.

74 Rashi, s.v lo. 75 Shittah Mekubetzet (above, footnote 72). 76 The halakhah according to which the blessing “over fragrant woods” is recited over all wood which emits a pleasant odor is a result of amoraic discussion in both Talmudim (see for instance: y. Berakhot 6:6, 10d; b. Berakhot 43b). See also: Ofir-Shem- esh, “Hashpa’at Tahalikhe Yitzur HaBesamim al Birkhotehem,” 594. This halakhah is derived in the Bavli from a baraita which is not found in any Palestinian source: “They raised an objection: One does not recite ‘blessed is the one who creates fragrant woods’ except upon persimmon . . . and in all cases on myrtle” (b. Berakhot 43a). The version in Halakhot Gedolot and the Venice manuscript (Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot, 1:136) reads: “on the myrtle and all that is like it.” The halakhah that one recites this blessing over any fragrance that comes from a tree is stated explicitly in Halakhot Gedolot, “and upon anything that comes from a tree we bless ‘blessed is the one who creates fragrant woods’ and upon anything that comes from a grass we bless, ‘blessed is the one who creates fragrant grasses.’ ” For the definition of a tree in the context of this halakhah see: Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 2:635; Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, 180–182. 77 Shittah Mekubetzet (above, footnote 72). 78 Ms. Munich 140 reads: “he loses five hundred.” The Venice manuscript reads: “if he loses one handle, he loses five hundred, if he loses the other he loses five hundred.” 114 chapter three

The Nehardeans say: even in the case of a handle and a silver bar, if he lost the silver bar, he loses half [the loan],79 if he also lost the handle, he loses the whole [loan].80 In this passage there are again three opinions, in this case all three from Nehardean sages81—Samuel, R. Nahman and “the Nehardeans say.” And again, they are presented from the most limiting to the most expansive. According to Samuel, if the lender loses the pledge he loses his ability to collect upon the loan, even if the pledge was worth far less than the loan. The legal basis of Samuel’s ruling is that the lender took the pledge on behalf of the entire loan, and therefore in the case of the loss of the pledge the borrower can say, “you loaned me only the basis of my pledge—if the pledge is lost, so is your money.”82 However, if the lender took two of the same items as a pledge (“two handles”) the loss of one of them does not entail a loss of the entire debt. As Rashi explains, “for he didn’t specify that one was for half the loan and the other for the other half. Rather he took both of them as one pledge.”83 R. Nahman holds that if one takes two of the same pledge for one loan, we can assume that he took each object as a pledge for half the loan.84 We cannot make such an assumption, however, if

79 Ms. Venice reads: “he loses that which it is worth” and in between the lines the word “half ” is added. On the difficulty of this reading see the Ramban, s.v. Nehardea amre. 80 Ms. Vatican 140 reads: “If he loses the bar he loses five hundred; if he loses the handle he loses five hundred.” Ms. Munich 95 additionally reads: “If he loses the handle, he loses half his money; if he loses the bar he loses it all.” 81 The geographical location of Samuel in and R. Nahman in Nehardea is well- documented in the Bavli and in the geonic chronologies. See above, chapter one, section 2., pp. 7–8. 82 This is the wording of the baraita that appears later in the passage, according to R. Akiva. Concerning the halakhic connection between Samuel’s position and the baraita see: Gulak, History of Jewish Law [Heb.], 70–71; Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:315–317. Dinnur, Hidushei HaRitzad, 3:338, s.v. amar Shmu’el, also sees the legal basis of Samuel’s position as being found in the words of R. Akiva in the baraita. According to Dinnur, the rule concerning the lender who accepts a pledge is the same as that governing a paid guardian who is obligated if the object he is watching is stolen or lost. Therefore, when the lender loses the pledge, he has lost the right to claim the amount of the loan. However, this explanation of the baraita, which is based completely on the interpretation of the stam to the baraita and the words of Samuel, is not necessary, and it is doubtful if this is the simple meaning of the baraita. See: Friedman, Talmud Arukh, 1:316–317; Henshke, The Original Mishna [Heb.], 30. 83 Rashi, s.v. aval tartei. 84 Rashi, s.v. ve-Rav Nahman: “and even though he did not explicitly state [this] it can be assumed that he accepted one [pledge] for half the loan and the other [for the other half] and if he loses one, he loses half.” “the nehardeans say” 115 he took two different objects, for instance a handle and silver.85 The opinion of the Nehardeans is even more extreme than that of Samuel and R. Nahman. They expand the halakhah to include even a case where two different objects were given as pledges. The assumption is that the number of objects given as pledges is commensurate with an equal proportion of the loan, and there is no need to take into consideration what the pledge actually was. Their ruling is composed of total acceptance of Samuel’s opinion, “if the handle of the saw was lost, the thousand zuz are lost,” and R. Nahman’s opinion as well, “even two handles.” In other words, whereas the other two sages employ legal reasoning to limit the applicability of the general rule stated by Samuel (including Samuel, who himself limited this applicability), the “Nehardeans” applied it to all cases, without any exceptions.

2.2. Reactions to Statements by Earlier Sages A similar phenomenon exists with regard to the methodology of the “Nehardeans say” reﬂected in six additional passages. In these passages they react to the words of an earlier amoraic sage, but not in the context of a halakhic debate.86 Here we will present three examples: Bavli Eruvin 41b They asked of Rabbah:87 If he needs to relieve himself what should he do? He said to them: Human dignity is great for it sets aside all negative commandments in the Torah. The Nehardeans say: If he was clever, he would go into the boundary [to relieve himself], and once he has come in, he is in. According to the mishnah, one who has been removed against his will on the Sabbath from his Sabbath border limits can only walk four more cubits from the point at which he ﬁnds himself.88 Despite this prohibition, Rabbah/Rava responds to the question posed to him that one may go beyond these four cubits in order to relieve himself.89

85 Rashi, s.v. aval kata ve-niskha: “We don’t say that he accepted the bar for half [the loan] since this is something with which the loan could be repaid, he accepted it for whatever its value is.” 86 See above, footnote 48. 87 Ms. Munich 95 and Ms. Vatican 109 and some rishonim read: “Rava”. 88 The explanation for this halakhah is found in t. Eruvin 3:11 [Lieberman, ed., 101]: “the length of his body and his outstretched arms is four [amot].” See also: Lieber- man, Tosefta Kifshuta, 3:347–348; Goldberg, The Mishna Treatise Eruvin [Heb.], 101. 89 Metzger, ed., Perushe’i Rabbenu Hanan’el LeMasekhet Eruvin, 92. 116 chapter three

The Nehardeans add to this answer; one who is allowed to go out of his four cubits in order to relieve himself can under the same circumstances reenter his original Sabbath border limit,90 from where he will be able go two thousand cubits in each direction,91 as he could when he began the Sabbath. This instance again demonstrates the “Nehardeans say” tendency to comment on earlier amoraic halakhah, based on their essential agreement with it. The following case demonstrates this phenomenon in a slightly different manner. Here the “Nehardeans say” do not only agree with the earlier amoraic opinion, they even bring proof for it from a tannaitic source. Bavli Bava Metzi’a 36a–b It was stated: One guardian who gave to another guardian: Rav said: He is not liable; R. Yohanan said he is liable. Abbaye said: According to Rav’s view . . . and according to R. Yohanan’s view . . . R. Ami was sitting and reciting this discussion. R. Abba b. Memel raised an objection against R. Ami: Rami b. Hama raised an objection: If one deposited money with his fellow, and he bound it up and slung it over his shoulder [or] entrusted it to his minor son or daughter or improperly locked [the door] before them, he is liable, because he did not guard [it] in the manner of guardians. The reason [he is liable] is that they were minors; but if they were adults, he is exempt. Why? Let him say to him, ‘It is not my desire that my object should be in the hands of another person’! Rava said: He who makes a deposit does so with the understanding that his [the guardian’s] wife and children [might end up guarding it].92 The Nehardeans say: This may be deduced too [from a precise reading of the mishnah], for it teaches, “or entrusted it to his minor son or daughter . . . he is liable;” but if [he entrusted it] to his adult son or daughter, he is not liable. It follows that if [he had entrusted it] to others, whether adults or minors, he is liable. For if otherwise, the mishnah should have simply stated: “minors:” conclude from it. Various aspects of this passage have been discussed frequently by modern scholars. Our discussion will focus on the last part of the passage,

90 See: Rashi, s.v. ayal let’huma. 91 Metzger, ed., Perushe’i Rabbenu Hanan’el LeMasekhet Eruvin, 93. 92 Rami bar Hama’s objection is missing in Ms. Vatican 115 and the resolution, “all who deposit . . .” is presented as R. Ami’s resolution to R. Abba bar Memel’s dif- ﬁculty, from the previous discussion. “the nehardeans say” 117 the part that includes Rami b. Hama’s objection, Rava’s resolution, and the response of “the Nehardeans say.” From the mishnah (m. Bava Metzi’a 3:10) Rami b. Hama raises an objection againt R. Yohanan who holds, according to Abbaye, that a guardian who gives the object he is supposed to be guarding to another guardian is liable because the owner can say, “I did not want my deposit to be in another’s hands.”93 His objection is based on a precise reading of the words “his minor sons and daughters” from which he deduces that if he gave the object to “adults, he is exempt. Why? Let him say to him, ‘It is not my desire that my object should be in the hands of another person.’ ” Rava,94 rejects Rami b. Hama’s objection by responding that it is normal for a person to give objects entrusted to them to the members of their household to watch. Therefore, even though the owners don’t know these people and have not entrusted them with their property, the depositor must take into account that the guardian may act in this way. He has no legal claim against the guardian, “I did not want my deposit to be in another’s hands.”95 The “Nehardeans say” essentially agree with Rava, and point out that it is possible to derive this assumption through a precise reading of the mishnah. The fact that the mishnah speciﬁes “his minor son or daughter” demonstrates that the guardian is exempt only if he gives the object to his own children, and not to a different adult.96 Here too the “Nehardeans say” comment on the words of an earlier amora, based on common halakhic ground.

93 It seems that the explanation, “I don’t want my deposit to be in another’s hands” is the original explanation of R. Yohanan. See: Dor, The Teachings of Eretz Israel [Heb.], 60–66; Henshke, The Original Mishna [Heb.], 313–317; Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 5:128–129; Halivni, Introduction to “Sources and Traditions,” 18. 94 Rami bar Hama is a third-fourth generation Babylonian amora, who appears about 175 times in the Bavli. Rava, a member of the fourth generation, is Rami bar Hama’s main disputant and he is found relating to him in about 40% of Rami bar Hama’s appearances in the Bavli. The fact that in all of these cases with only one exception (b. Bava Qamma 70) Rava corrects, rejects or critiques Rami bar Hama is a phenomenon that requires explanation. Rava does not hesitate to use biting and cyni- cal language in his criticism of Rami bar Hama. For instance, “How much worry and anxiety is a person [such as Rami b. Hama] spared whom the Master [of all] helps” or “according to his sharpness goes his error,” or “because of his sharpness, he didn’t analyze it.” Analysis of the disputes between these two sages reveals a distinct contrast between their methodologies and explains the background to Rava’s consistent criticism of Rami bar Hama’s conclusions. For an expanded discussion see recently: B. Cohen, “Rami bar Hama in Contrast to Rava” [Heb.], 149–184. 95 See for instance: Rashi, s.v. al daat. 96 Rashi, s.v. dayka nami. 118 chapter three

Bavli Bava Qamma 46b–47a (For) R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha: From where do we learn that judges should give first consideration to the plaintiff? As it is said: “Whoever has any matters, let him come to them” (Exodus 24:14) [implying]: let him bring his matters [first] before them.97 The Nehardeans say [in the name of R. Nahman]:98 Sometimes they give first consideration to the defendant. In what case? Where his property would otherwise depreciate in value.99 According to the halakhic tradition transmitted in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha, the plaintiff presents his proofs first in all cases of financial claims. Rashi explains: For instance, Reuben sues Shimon for a maneh that he lent him in front of witnesses or by means of a document. And Shimon responds, ‘you took from me, return to me what you seized,’ or ‘you took a pledge and it was lessened in value because you used it.’ First [the judges] listen to Reuven’s claim and take the maneh from Shimon. Afterwards, they listen to Shimon’s claim to discuss the matter of his property having been seized [or the issue of] the pledge.100 The “Nehardeans say” agree in principle with the earlier halakhah, but they note (through a tradition cited in the name of R. Nahman) that there are exceptions to this rule—“sometimes they give first consideration to the defendant.”101 The stam, by use of the term “heikhi

97 This halakhah can also be found in y. Sanhedrin 3:8, 21b. 98 The words in brackets were added based on all manuscripts of the passage. 99 There are two reasons to posit that the stammaitic analysis which opens with the words, “In what case? (heikhi damei)” was not originally part of the “Nehardeans say” reaction to the words of R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha, but is a later addition meant to clarify when the judges are to give consideration to the defendant first. The first reason is the switch from Hebrew to Aramaic (see: Friedman, “A Criti- cal Study of Yevamot X,” 301–302). Second, many scholars have pointed out that the term “heikhi damei” in the Bavli is a savoraic addition. See mainly: Weiss, The Babylonian Talmud as a Literary Unit [Heb.], 241 n. 85; A. Cohen, “The Development of the ‘Loss Element’ ” [Heb.], 66–67 n. 27. 100 Rashi, s.v. she-eyn nizkakin. Other interpretations for Rabbah bar Avuha’s words have been offered, as was noted by R. Shlomo Luria, Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kamma, 104, s.v. amar rav nahman. For a survey of these interpretations see: Otzar Mefarshe’i HaTalmud al Mesekhet Bava Qamma, 2:669–670. However, these variant interpretations are not relevant for our discussion here. 101 It seems that the statement by the “Nehardeans say” in the name of R. Nah- man was originally made in connection with the halakhic tradition transmitted by R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha. Their statement is not an independent literary tradition which was added here by a later editor as a reaction to the words of Rabbah bar Avuha (known as ha’avara). There are two main reasons to suppose this: (1) the response of the “Nehardeans say”—“Sometimes they give first consideration to the defendant” “the nehardeans say” 119 damei,”102 explained the Nehardeans’ position by suggesting a case in which the court would first hear and adjudicate the defendant’s claim: “where there are merchants who wish to buy the property for a large sum and they will be leaving tomorrow. Alternatively, in a case where the value of his land is diminished due to the suit, for others see him in distress, and if they were to give back to him that which was seized or his pledge, he could sell them and pay them off.”103 In sum, the Nehardeans agree in principle that the plaintiff ’s case should be considered first, but they note that there are exceptions.

2.3. Rulings Issued in Concrete/Theoretical Cases In line with their methodology which we outlined above, so too their rulings issued in three concrete/theoretical cases are based on tannaitic sources.104 Again, the halakhic traditions mentioned earlier in the passages serve as the basis for their rulings.105 It seems that this tendency in “the Nehardeans say” rulings is consistent and does not depend on

cannot stand alone without the statement of Rabbah bar Avuha (which is typical in the ha’avarot phenomena in the Bavli). (2) The “Nehardeans say” statements’ are generally characterized as responding to earlier sources, and there is no reason to assume that this case is different (see below, p. 123, footnote 118). 102 See above, footnote 99. 103 Rashi, s.v. deka zilei. 104 See above, footnote 49. 105 This phenomenon is noteworthy when compared with the halakhic literature of other sages from this period, including other sages from Nehardea. The comparison here is based on the halakhic decisions rendered by Rava, R. Papa and R. Hama in concrete cases or in academic questions. With regard to other contemporary sages we have either not found any halakhic decisions rendered in concrete cases or only a few (two or three cases), which makes it difﬁcult to arrive at any methodological conclusions. Below are the results: (1) Rava: from a sample of 63 halakhic rulings (all of which begin with the term “a certain someone . . . came in front of Rava”) we have found twenty rulings that are connected to tannaitic sources. This number is based on Rava’s halakhic decisions and not all of Rava’s talmudic statements. We should emphasize that the trend in Rava’s rulings is the exact opposite of the trend we have detected in the Nehardeans’ rulings. When it comes to Rava reason is often invoked as a source of halakhah and interpretation, and this often causes a change from the earlier halakhah. This ﬁnding accords with the conclusions of Henshke and Urbach as to the general methodology of Rava. See: Henshke, “Abbaye and Rava’ [Heb.], 187–193; Urbach, HaHalakha, 208–216. (2) R. Papa: Four out of thirteen halakhic rulings rendered by R. Papa are based on tannaitic sources (again, this takes into accounts only his halakhic rulings and not all of his literary contributions). (3) R. Hama: One of his eight halakhic rulings is based on a tannaitic source. For another difference between the methodology of “the Nehardeans say” and that of other Nehardean sages, see below, section 3(a), pp. 122–125. 120 chapter three the nature of the question or issue which they address (academic or concrete).106 Below we will present two of the three examples which demonstrate this phenomenon: Bavli Gittin 34b Mishnah: Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so and any name that he has;” “the woman so-and-so and any name that she has,” because of tikkun olam.107 Gemara: There was a woman whom [most] called Miriam and a few called Sarah. The Nehardeans say [the get should read]: “Miriam and any name that she has” and not “Sarah and any name that she has.”108 Generally, court cases are presented in the Bavli with a tri-partite literary structure: (A) a description of the case [“a certain man . . .”]; (B) the case is brought in front of a sage [“X came in front of Y” (ata lekameh de-x)]; (C) the sage issues a ruling.109 In this passage the second part of the structure is missing. This makes it unclear as to whether the Nehardeans ruling was issued as part of an actual court case or as part of an academic discussion.110 It is also possible that the absence of part B is due to the rarity in the Bavli of a case being brought in front of a group of sages.111

106 Scholars usually assume that there may exist a qualitative difference between a ruling rendered by a sage in an academic setting and a ruling offered in an actual case that came in front of him. See for instance: Guttman, “She’elot Akademiot,” 43; Ben-Menahem, Judicial Deviation, 34. When it comes to the rulings rendered by the “Nehardeans,” while it is likely that they relate to a case which came in front of them, it is not certain if their rulings were issued in this same setting. See below. 107 For a comparison of the version of this halakhah preserved in the Mishnah with that preserved in the baraitot in the Tosefta and Talmudim see: Feldblum, Talmudic Law and Literature [Heb.], 151–152. 108 In Aras 889 and Oxford Bodleian 2851, 21 [45–49] the sentence, “and not Sarah and any name she has” is missing. 109 See mainly: Segal, Case Citation, 158–159; Gafni, “Ma’ase’i Bet Din,” 28; Ben- Menahem, Judicial Deviation, 33–40. We are not including here a description of cases which are described with the words, “It happened that . . . .” or “the case came in front of X” or “X did such and such an act.” For a discussion of all of these literary forms, see: Segal, Case Citation, 22–23. 110 For a general discussion of the problem see: Gafni, “Ma’ase’i bet Din,” 28–29. 111 From an examination of about six hundred cases of the second element found in the Bavli above (“he came in front of . . .”) we can easily see that the case is usually brought in front of a single judge. However, there are three cases (in the printed edition of the Bavli) where the following is found, “He came in front of the rabbis” (b. Betzah 19a; b. Bava Batra 74a; b. Hullin 48b). In manuscripts there are three addi- “the nehardeans say” 121

The socio-historical setting which serves as the background to this mishnah from Gittin upon which the Nehardeans’ ruling is based has been explained in several different ways. Joseph Dinnur, for instance, explains, “Originally, when Israel observed the laws and customs of the Gentiles, they would exchange their Hebrew names with Gentile names.”112 According to Saul Lieberman, people changed their names “due to duress. For instance, they were escaping governmental authorities, or violent creditors . . . the exiles would change their names, their wives’ names and the names of their home towns. Out of fear and duress they would adopt new names in their new places.”113 Meyer Feldblum explained the changing of names in the mishnah as being a result of the forcing of the husband to divorce his wife. The sages feared that husbands would change their names or their wives’ names intentionally in order to invalidate the get.114 In any case, “originally” husbands could simply write their wife’s current name in the get, without having to cite her previous name. Rabban Gamaliel decreed that due to tikkun olam, the “repair of the world,” the husband must write the wife’s current name and “any name she has.”115 If we understand the “Nehardeans say” ruling here in light of their typical methodology, it seems that their ruling is derived from the Mishnah. According to the “Nehardeans say” there is no difference between a case where the wife’s name is X and in another place and time they called her Y and a case where in one place most people call her X and some call her Y. Just as in the case referred to directly in the mishnah the husband must write, “and any name that she has,” so too in the case brought in front of them, the Nehardeans rule that the husband must write, “Miriam and any name that she has.” While there are various explanations for what exactly must be written in the get and the meaning of tikkun olam in this context, what is clear

tional such instances: b. Mo’ed Qatan 14b (Ms. London Harl. 5508); b. Ketubbot 95b (Mss. Vatican 130, Munich 95); b. Bava Metzi’a 22a (Ms. Firenze). These ﬁndings should be compared with court cases cited in the Yerushalmi. See: Beer, “About the “Hevaraya” [Heb.], 94–95 n. 133. 112 Dinnur, Hidushei HaRitzad, 2:106, s.v. barishona. 113 Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 8:895. 114 Feldblum, Talmudic Law and Literature [Heb.], 151–152. 115 According to Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 8:895, the words “and any name she has” are exactly what is written in the get. The intention is not that the get must actually include all of the alternative names of the husband and wife. For a similar interpretation see: Feldblum, Talmudic Law and Literature [Heb.], 152. 122 chapter three is that the Nehardeans’ ruling is, as usual, based directly on tannaitic halakhah.116 Bavli Bava Metzi’a 104b A certain man once leased a ﬁeld from his neighbor. He said to him: “If I do not cultivate it, I will give you a thousand zuz.” He left a third uncultivated. The Nehardeans say: The law is that he should pay him three hundred thirty-three and one-third zuz. But Rava said: It is an asmakhta, and an asmakhta does not cause acquisition. The ruling of the “Nehardeans say” accords with the tannaitic halakhah in the Mishnah which obligates the sharecropper to pay the owner from the best of his land according to the original deal.117 As in the previous case, they expand the tannaitic halakhah and implement it in a further case.

3. Summary and Conclusions

Three main conclusions emerge from the above discussion. (a) The “Nehardeans say” halakhic rulings relate to traditions which preceded them, be they tannaitic or amoraic. This phenomenon is manifested in the following two areas which encompass most of their literary activity found in the Bavli. I. When the “Nehardeans say” dispute other sages, they do not reject the earlier halakhic stance by presenting an opposite or different opinion. Rather they share a halakhic basis with the earlier ruling but continue to expand its applicability. In other words, their dispute is not with regard to a principled acceptance of the earlier halakhah, but rather with how far that halakhah can be expanded. This phenomenon is found in ten of the thirteen cases in which the Nehardeans debate other sages. II. Their connection with earlier halakhic tradition is also detectable in their reaction to earlier amoraic statements, halakhic rulings and judgments issued in concrete cases. They tend to offer decisions in matters disputed by earlier generations, explain earlier statements, support them through precise readings of the Mishnah or ﬁnd excep-

116 See for instance: R. Isaiah Detrani, Piske’i Rid, s.v. amre’i neharde’ei. For other interpretations see for instance: Tosafot, s.v. ve-hu de-it’hazak; Feldblum, Talmudic Law and Literature [Heb.], 252. In any case, exactly how this halakhah is derived from the Mishnah does not affect our conclusions above. 117 See: Newman, The Agricultural Life, 49–50; Solodukho, “On the Question of the Social Structure of Iraq,” 39–40. “the nehardeans say” 123

tions to the previous halakhic tradition (tannaitic source, amoraic statement or amoraic ruling). These phenomena can be detected in nine cases.118 These findings make it difficult to accept the claim that the source of the “Nehardeans say” traditions is proto-talmudic Babylonia. On the contrary, their halakhic rulings and statements demonstrate a very high degree of dependence upon traditions found in the Mishnah, which is certainly a Palestinian source. Furthermore, there is no correlation between their rulings and opinions and those of earlier Nehardean sages, Samuel and R. Nahman, as was claimed by Ze’ev Yaavetz and Jacob Zuri. In many cases we even find them espousing an opinion that disagrees with that of Samuel or R. Nahman. In truth, they seem to have been eclectic in their agreement with earlier amoraim, not exhibiting any special dependence upon or connection with certain amoraim from certain locales.119 This finding is particularly noteworthy when we compare the “Nehardeans say” with two outstanding later Nehardean sages— R. Hama and Amemar. The halakhic opinions and statements of these two amoraim are of an exact opposite nature to those of the “Nehard- eans say.” In their rulings and halakhic statements they tend to be critical of the earlier halakhic tradition. R. Hama and Amemar consistently decide halakhah by employing their own reason as a source of authority or interpretation, even if it leads them to disagree with earlier halakhic tradition. These sharp differences underscore the fact

118 One might claim that the distinct nature of the literary contribution of the “Nehardeans say” traditions in the Bavli—which consist mostly of reactions to the words of earlier amoraim—is the result of the activity of a late editor who received these statements from the periphery (fourth century Nehardea) and then arranged them in whatever existing talmudic passage he saw fit. If this theory were correct, these passages would not reflect the actual activity of the “Nehardeans say” but rather the selection of their literature done by a later editor. However, this possibility seems unlikely to me. It doesn’t explain why an editor would specifically treat “Nehardeans say” material in this manner, when he did not treat in such a manner material that reached him from other peripheral areas during the same time frame (Nareš, Difte and others). Furthermore, this problem is even more acute when we compare the “Nehardeans say” material with that attributed to other fourth century Nehardean amoraim, whose literary contributions are not phrased in this way. I have dealt with this matter above in chapter two, pp. 93–94, footnote 256. In addition, in many cases, it is clear that statements attributed to “Nehardeans say” cannot stand as independent literary units without the previous discussion, a phenomenon which doesn’t exist in other cases where scholars have suggested that material was transferred from one context to another. I discuss such an example above, pp. 118–119, footnote 101. 119 See above, section 2.1. 124 chapter three that we cannot speak of a “Nehardean halakhic philosophy,” or some unified position adopted by all Nehardean sages, as was sometimes assumed by modern scholars. (b) David Goodblatt claimed that the halakhic traditions attributed to the “Nehardeans say” can be characterized as dealing with halakhot connected to daily living.120 Indeed, most of their traditions are focused on economic matters, and very few on issues of religious prohibitions.121 In our examination of this literature we have found only four cases (around 9% of the total corpus)122 in which they offer an interpretation of a tannaitic source. In three out of four of these cases their interpretation is an indirect result of their attempt to render a decision in a halakhic matter or to resolve a difficulty in one of these sources. It is not part of any independent initiative to explain tannaitic literature as its own goal.123 They share this characteristic with Amemar.124 (c) In light of all of this, we can offer another consequence as to the identification of the amoraim included, or thought to be included, in the “Nehardeans say” traditions. Aaron Hyman, Jacob Zuri, and Meyer Yudilowitz posited the “Nehardeans say” refers to all Nehardean amoraim active throughout the talmudic period, and especially Ame- mar.125 However, we have found that the “Nehardeans say” traditions adopt a unified approach which is not identical and is often opposite of that put forth by Amemar. The identification of the “Nehardeans say” with Amemar is simply untenable, not just due to the chronological gap between the two groups, but also because of their very different

120 See: Zevieli, “Amrei Neharde’ei,” 50; Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 195. 121 See: Goodblatt, ibid. 122 b. Shabbat 133b; b. Mo’ed Qatan 27b; b. Bava Metzi’a 36b; b. Arakhin 23b. 123 In one passage (b. Mo’ed Qatan 27b–28) the Nehardeans limit the applicability of the Mishnah by using the term “it was not taught except in a case of . . .” (lo shanu ela) when there is no inherent difficulty in the mishnah or need to resolve a difficulty on an earlier amora. Their interpretation seems to contradict the simple meaning of the mishnah, as can be seen when we understand the mishnah in light of other sources, including R. Elazar’s explanation in the Bavli and Rav’s in the Yerushalmi (y. Mo’ed Qatan 3:9, 83d). For a discussion of these sources see: Rubin, The End of Life [Heb.], 201. It seems likely that the Nehardeans’ interpretation of this mishnah could be a result of their desire to adjust the mishnah’s halakhah with their local practice. See: Aminoah, The Redaction of Tractate Sukkah and Moed-Katan [Heb.], 393. If this is correct, then this is the only talmudic tradition attributed to the “Nehardean say” in which their teaching might be connected to the concrete halakhic needs of the Jews of Nehardea. However, this possibility remains no more than a conjecture. 124 See above, chapter two, section 4.6. 125 See above, section 1, pp. 104–105. “the nehardeans say” 125 approach to interpretation of rabbinic traditions, its sources and development. The same can be said when we compare their approach with that of other sages from their period. We shall return to this point in the fourth chapter, where we will focus on R. Hama. There we shall discuss the statement found on b. Sanhedrin 17a which identifies the “Nehardeans say” with R. Hama.126

126 Concerning the identification of “the Nehardeans say” with R. Hama, see the discussion below, chapter four, section 3(b), p. 150. This passage served as the basis for the traditional understanding that the “Nehardeans” refers to R. Hama, an approach adopted mostly by medieval talmudic historiographers. See for instance: Abramson, ed., Mavo HaTalmud, 127; Portnoy, ed., Halikot Olam, 9; Filipowski,ed., Yuhasin ha-Shalem, 168; Hillel, ed., Halichot Eli, 219; Halperin, Seder HaDorot, 2:279. However, it is doubtful whether the “Nehardeans” who are identified in the talmudic passage as being R. Hama are to be considered synonymous with the “Nehardeans say” discussed here. In manuscripts and geonic readings of the passage in Sanhe- drin, the term appears in various forms such as: “amoraim in/of Nehardea” and not “the Nehardeans say.” Thus, in Ms. Karlsruhe/Roechlin 2, Ms. Florence and printed editions the reading is: “amoraim in Nehardea” (amora’e be-Nehardea). In Halakhot Gedolot, ed. Hildesheimer, 12, and in Ms. Munich 95 the reading is: “amoraim of Nehardea” (amora’e de-Nehardea). This reading is also found in the Yemenite manuscript of Sanhedrin see: Sabato, A Yemenite Manuscript of Tractate Sanhedrin [Heb.], 311. A similar reading (amora’e de-Nehardea) is found in two mss. of Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim which were published by Alexander Marx, “Neue Texte des Seder Tannaim we-Amoraim”, 158, lines 23–24; 166, line 18. Although these two texts were not originally part of Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim and added sometime later (see: Abramson, “Letoldot Nosakh ‘Seder Tannaim VeAmoraim’ ”, 218–219, 225–229), they serve as text witnesses of b. Sanhedrin 17a. In the version quoted by Samuel b. Hofni Gaon the reading is “Nehardeans say” (Neharde’ei amrei) See: Abramson, ed., Mavo HaTalmud, 127. The fact that almost no early textual witness reads, “the Nehardeans say” brings Goodblatt to the following conclusion: My major objection to the theory . . . is that the identification given at Sanh. 17b does not seem relevant. The latter passage does not equate Hama with amre’ei neharde’ei, no matter which variant we adopt. None of the variants has the substantive “Nehardeans” as the subject of the verb “say”. Even the reading “they say in Nehardea” is closer to another formula (“in Nehardea they say”) than to the one under discussion here. If the author of the passage at Sanh. 17b wished to identify amre’e neharde’ei, why did he not cite this formula explicitly? I can think of no reason except that he did not intend to refer to it at all. Indeed, many of the expressions mentioned in the list in Sanhedrin are not found elsewhere in the Talmud, which causes Abramson to conclude, “It is possible that the list is not entirely composed from our Talmud. We find that some of the appellations are not found in our Talmud at all, for instance, ‘the Pumbeditans say,’ a phrase absent from the rest of the Talmud . . . Also ‘the elders of Sura’ which is not found elsewhere” (Abramson, ed., Mavo HaTalmud, 118–119). Additionally, the historical accuracy of this list, or at least parts of it, can itself be doubted. See the discussions in the following studies: Frankel, Mavo HaYerushalmi, 123a; Epstein, Mevo’ot Lesifrut HaAamoraim, 292–305; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 125–126; ibid., “Local Traditions,” 197–201; Beer, “Man Inun HaRubin,” 149; Abramson, ed., Mavo HaTalmud, 118–123. See also below, chapter four, section 3(b) p. 150.

CHAPTER FOUR

RAV HAMA

1. Identity and Dating

1.1. Previous Scholarship There are many questions concerning the identity and dating of R. Hama that have not been clariﬁed by scholars and traditional commentators. The core problem is that scholars have not even been certain how many sages bore the name R. Hama during the talmudic period, a matter which we will deal with at length below. In general, many previous scholarly studies need to be reexamined. As we shall see, close examination of the Bavli’s terminology and its portrayal of the hierarchical relationships between Babylonian amoraim will serve as a great aid towards clarifying these matters. In this chapter we will also reexamine several questions concerning the chronology of other amoraim who lived during the early Babylonian amoraic period. A more accurate date for these other amoraim, will help in dating R. Hama as well. We will begin our discussion with the most basic question of all: how many sages named R. Hama were active in Babylonia during the fourth century C.E.? R. Abraham Zechut, R. Yehiel Halperin, Isaac Hirsch Weiss, Zvi Kaplan, Hanokh Albeck, Moshe Beer and Isaiah Gafni all suggested that there were two sages with this name active in Babylonia during the fourth century.1 According to this theory, the ﬁrst of these sages was active during the beginning of the century. The second is the amora mentioned in geonic chronicles as heading the Pumbeditan academy2 and as having died in 377.3 In contrast, Heinrich Graetz, Isaac Halevy, Aaron Hyman, Jacob Zuri, Ze’ev Yaavetz and Meir Yudelewitz

1 Filipowski, ed., Yuhasin ha-Shalem, 140; Halperin, Seder HaDorot, 139; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:180 n. 16; Kaplan, “Hama,” 8:291; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 409; Beer, “Notes on Three Edicts Against the Jews” [Heb.], 35; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 254. 2 For a discussion of the evidence found in the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon concerning where R. Hama served as academy head, see below, footnote 4. 3 See Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 89. 128 chapter four all identiﬁed only one sage with the name R. Hama. This sage was the academy head in Pumbedita, but was also active in Nehardea4

4 Several passages in the Bavli lead to the conclusion that R. Hama was located in Nehardea. (1) In b. Bava Batra 7b Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha report to R. Ashi that as a Nehardean, R. Hama ruled in accordance with R. Nahman and Samuel: “the Nehardeans go according to their own reasoning . . . for R. Nahman said in the name of Samuel . . .” (2) In b. Betzah 29b (according to the reading preserved in manuscripts, see below, footnote 61) R. Hama agrees with a derashah of Rabbah bar R. Huna Zuti that was given in Nehardea. R. Hama states, “Go out and see how many sieves are being used in Nehardea.” From R. Hama’s familiarity with Nehard- ean practice, it can be deduced that this was his home town. (3) In b. Sanhedrin 17b there is a tradition identifying a list of anonymous nicknames for sages with known sages. This passage identifies the “amoraim of Nehardea” (for the various readings of this text, see chapter three, footnote 126) with R. Hama. The fact that this passage identifies R. Hama with an anonymous group of “Nehardeans” (on this group see above, chapter three, section 1., pp. 99–106) points to the fact that there is a connection between R. Hama and Nehardea. This is true even if we doubt the accuracy of this tradition. (4) Furthermore, it is even possible that R. Hama served as academy head in Nehardea. R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 89–90, places R. Hama as an academy head in Nehardea. He writes: And after Nahman b. Isaac several geonim ruled in Pumbedita. R. Hama in Nehardea (Hama be-Nehardea) And he died in 377 and that is what we say . . . And after him ruled R. Zebid in Pumbedita . . . and after him ruled R. Dimi of Nehardea. This reading, “R. Hama in Nehardea” is found in all manuscripts belonging to the French recension and also in all manuscripts cited in the edition of Margaret Schlüter, ed., Auf welche Weise wurde die Mishnah geschrieben? 226. A similar reading (rav hama be-nehardea) is found in Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5 according to Ms. Neubauer I (see: Neubauer., ed. Medieval Jewish Chronicles, 1:183; Kahana., ed. Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5 n. 84). Even if this version is not original and added by a copyist based on Rav Sherira’s Epistle, it serves as an additional text witness to Rav Sherira’s testimony mentioned above. Support for this possibility can be found in a close reading of the list of Pumbeditan academy heads presented by R. Sherira after the mention of R. Hama. Why would R. Sherira mention that R. Zebid was academy head in Pumbedita (according to all versions of the Epistle), if R. Hama, mentioned immediately before, served as academy head in the same place? Proof of this is that in the case of R. Dimi of Nehardea, who served as academy head in Pumbedita, R. Sherira Gaon does not mention where he served, since he inherited his place from R. Zebid who served in Pumbedita. See: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 2:457. The medieval chroniclers who cited the date of R. Hama’s death based on the Epistle were familiar with this version as well. See: Cohen, ed., The Book of Tradition by Abraham ibn Daud, 35; Idelman, ed., Hemdah Genuzah, 26a; Filipowski,ed., Yuhasin ha-Shalem, 140. In contrast, the Spanish recension of the Epistle reads, “R. Hama in Pumbedita” (Rav Hama be-Pumbedita), and according to the position of the name within the list, he would have been academy head in Pumbedita, not Nehardea. Most scholars assume that this is the correct version. See for instance: Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 2:101; Graetz, History of the Jews [Heb.], 2:594–595; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 5:503; Zuri, The Reign of the Exilarchate [Heb.], 210; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:180; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 254. Compare: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 2:456–457. For our purposes, even if R. Hama served as academy head in Pumbedita towards the end of his life, this does not overturn the fact that he is essentially a Nehardean rav hama 129 during the fourth century. 5 David Goodblatt was doubtful as to which of these two suggestions was correct.6 Other scholars have suggested identifying R. Hama with various other sages from earlier generations, sages called R. Hama but with an appellation attached to their names. Isaak Marcus Jost identified R. Hama with a figure that is mentioned only once in the Bavli (b. Sanhedrin 52b), (Rav7) Hama b. Tobiah.8 Jost did not offer any proof for this identification. Eli Ahdut suggested identifying R. Hama with R. Hama bar Guria, one of Rav’s students, and a member of the second generation of Babylonian amoraim.9 The existence of two sages by the name of R. Hama active in the fourth century is based on only one source, found on b. Sanhedrin 46b. Below I will reassess the evidence that can be gleaned from this source. I will also deal with the basic assumptions that led to the conclusion that there was more than one sage with this name. It is my opinion

sage, based on the talmudic evidence cited above. We should note that R. Hama’s connection with Nehardea is established even if the French recension of the Epistle is understood as meaning “R. Hama of Nehardea” (rav hama mi-nehardea, and not “be-nehardea”) as the Epistle has been understood by scholars, even though there is no support for this reading in the manuscript evidence. In other words, even this reading of Rav Sherira’s text would serve as evidence for R. Hama’s locality—Nehardea. 5 See Graetz, History of the Jews [Heb.], 2:594–595; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 5:503; Hyman. Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 2:456; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:121–122; Zuri, The Reign of the Exilarchate [Heb.], 198; Yudolowitz, Nehardea, 80. 6 Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 200 n. 21. 7 The word in brackets is found in Mss. Munich 95, Florence, Yad Harav Herzog 1, and Karlsruhe-Roechlin 2. This passage contains a story in which (Rav) Hama b. Tobiah sentences a priest’s daughter to death for fornication. R. Joseph objects vehemently. It is not clear when these two sages lived. According to Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 2:123, R. Joseph in this passage is a savora, and he therefore dates the entire story to the post-amoraic period. Funk’s conclusion is based upon the assumption that the Jews did not have the power to execute during the fourth century. Other scholars read this story as occurring during the third generation of Babylonian amoraim, under the assumption that R. Joseph is the sage who served as academy head in Pumbedita and died in 323. See: Man, “Sekira Historit,” 205–206; Hyman. Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 2:461; Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate [Heb.], 64; Gafni, Babylonian Jewry and Its Institutions [Heb.], 57 and 110 n. 22–23. Neusner, A History of the Jews In Babylonia, 4:199 n. 3, raises doubts as to whether we can date the event at all, due to the fact that R. Hama bar Tobiah appears only one time in the Bavli. In any case, whether this event occurred during the savoraic period or during the third generation of Babylonian amoraim, it is clear that we cannot identify (Rav) Hama b. Tobiah with the R. Hama under discussion here who was an amora of the ﬁfth generation, as we shall explain below. 8 See: Jost, Geschichte des Judenthums, 2:197. 9 See Ahdut, “Jewish-Zoroastrian Polemics” [Heb.], 20. On the dating of R. Hama bar Guria see mainly: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 198. 130 chapter four that during the fourth century there was only one sage by the name of R. Hama, the sage that is known to us from the geonic chronicles as heading the academy in Pumbedita. This conclusion concurs with our analysis of R. Hama’s methodology. Halakhic traditions ascribed to R. Hama show a consistent methodology (in comparison with earlier and contemporary sages) and they reﬂect a singular halakhic tradition. This is a subject we will return to at the end of this chapter.

1.1.1. How Many Rav Hama’s Are in the Babylonian Talmud? We will begin by analyzing the passage from b. Sanhedrin 46b which aroused scholars to question R. Hama’s identity and time period: King Shapur said to R. Hama: Where is [the commandment concerning] burial mentioned in the Torah? He was silent and didn’t respond. R. Aha b. Jacob said: Has the world been given over to fools?! He should have answered, “For you shall surely bury him” (Deuteronomy 21:23). This source has been frequently discussed by scholars due to the information it provides concerning the Zoroastrian prohibition of burial in the ground.10 The question directed at R. Hama has been interpreted as being part of a polemical debate that occurred in the presence of the Sasanian king.11 According to the accepted chronology, R. Aha b. Jacob, the sage who responds to R. Hama’s silence, is a third generation sage,12 thereby creating the following chronological problem: R. Aha b. Jacob can easily be identified as a sage from the third generation, one of R. Huna’s students . . . However, there are several sages who bear the name R. Hama. The assumed candidate would be R. Hama, an amora from the fifth generation . . . However, this is a difficult assumption to make. It is difficult to assume that these two sages (i.e. R. Aha b. Jacob and R. Hama, B.C.) lived during the same period and that R. Aha would respond to R. Hama’s words.13 There have been two suggestions offered by scholars to solve the chronological problems presented in this passage. According to the more accepted solution, the sage named R. Hama mentioned here is a member of an earlier generation in the fourth century, and is

10 See mainly: Beer, “Notes on Three Edicts Against the Jews” [Heb.], 25–37; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 254; Ahdut, “Jewish-Zoroastrian Polemics” [Heb.], 19–26. 11 See Ahdut, ibid., 21. 12 For a discussion on this scholarly assumption see below. 13 Ahdut, ibid., 19–20. rav hama 131 not identical with the well-known R. Hama, who is identified in the geonic chronicles as heading the academy in Pumbedita during the fifth generation.14 The first to make such a suggestion was R. Abraham Zacuto.15 It was accepted later by R. Yehiel Halperin, who added, “I don’t know who [this] R. Hama is.”16 Later scholars supported this theory as well.17 A different solution was offered by Eli Ahdut as part of his discussion of the historical sources concerning the Zoroastrian-Jewish polemics found in the Babylonian Talmud. In his opinion, R. Hama mentioned in this passage is R. Hama bar Guria, a second generation Babylonian amora. We should assume that the passage refers to one of the sages named R. Hama, from either the second or third generation of Babylonian amoraim . . . and that R. Aha bar Jacob, who was from his (R. Hama’s) generation, or the generation that follows, responded to his actions. There are two possible sages who bear this name. The first is R. Hama bar Guria, a sage from the second generation, and the other is R. Hama son of Rabbah bar Avuha, of the third generation . . . It seems that we are dealing with the second of these two, R. Hama bar Guria, one of Rav’s students . . . R. Aha bar Jacob, of the third generation, criticizes R. Hama’s behavior during his confrontation with the king, which happened a generation earlier. If our assumption is correct, the Shapur referred to here is Shapur I.18 Ahdut’s suggestion is difficult to accept, for it is well-known that the talmudic editors did not abbreviate the names of amoraim and omit their full appellations, unless the sage was mentioned earlier in the passage.19 There is no reason to assume that the transmitter of this story deviated from the normal rules and abbreviated “R. Hama bar Guria” to “R. Hama.” In general, the editors of the Talmud dilligently distinguish between sages with the same name by using additional appellations, such as identifying their father or place of origin. That such is the case is affirmed by an examination of the hierarchical relationships between Babylonian amoraim, their appearances in the Yerushalmi and talmudic terminology. R. Hamnuna is not to be identified with

14 See above, footnote 4. 15 Filipowski, ed., Yuhasin ha-Shalem, 140. 16 Halperin, Seder HaDorot, 139. 17 See above, footnote 1. 18 Ahdut, “Jewish-Zoroastrian Polemics” [Heb.], 20–21. 19 A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 238 and 254–255. 132 chapter four

R. Hamnuna of Babylonia (rav hamnuna de-bavel) or R. Hamnuna the elder (rav hamnuna sava).20 R. Nahman is not to be identiﬁed with R. Nahman b. Isaac, or with R. Nahman bar R. Huna.21 R. Zebid is not R. Zebid of Nehardea.22 R. Aha is not R. Aha son of Rava, or R. Aha son of Rav.23 These are just a few of such examples. Therefore, there is no room, in my opinion, to suggest that R. Hama and R. Hama bar Guria are one and the same sage. Furthermore, the assumption that R. Aha b. Jacob is a third-generation amora did not merely serve as the basis upon which to identify R. Hama in this passage with R. Hama bar Guria. It is even what ultimately caused Ahdut to date the event to the beginning of the amoraic period (the second generation). According to Ahdut, the conversation between R. Hama and Shapur occurred before R. Aha b. Jacob’s period, under the assumption that an older sage would not critique one younger than him.24 However, this assumption does not accurately reﬂect the hierarchical relationships that existed between Babylonian amoraim. Richard Kalmin and Avinoam Cohen both have demonstrated that sharp rebukes and critiques between sages of the same generation are found commonly throughout the Talmud. Masters are found rebuking their students and elder sages are found rebuking younger, subordinate sages. For instance, R. Zera against R. Jeremiah (b. Shabbat 10a), R. Yohanan against R. Elazar (b. Hullin 19b), R. Yosef against Abbaye (b. Sukkah 26b), or Meremar against R. Yemar (b. Shabbat 145b=b. Bekhorot 36a).25 In light of this, it is not necessary to assume that R. Aha b. Jacob was younger than R. Hama, and that he was critiquing him for an event that occurred a generation earlier. In addition to all of this, there is no evidence found elsewhere in the Bavli which would lead us to assume that R. Aha b. Jacob was a third generation amora. To clarify the identity of R. Hama, we therefore must reexamine the issue of the identity of R. Aha b. Jacob.

20 See Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 283; B. Cohen, “How Many Rav Hamnuna’s in the Babylonian Talmud,” 95 n. 1. 21 See: B. Cohen, “Rashi’s Historiographical Comments,” 58. See below, chapter ﬁve, p. 153, footnote 1. 22 See: See Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 407–408. 23 A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 217–253. 24 Ahdut, “Jewish-Zoroastrian Polemics” [Heb.], 20. 25 See Kalmin, Sages, Authors and Editors, 156–162; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 170. rav hama 133

1.1.2. A Reexamination of the Dating of R. Aha bar Jacob Examination of the hierarchical relations between R. Aha b. Jacob and other sages of the third through ﬁfth generations reveals that he should be considered a fourth generation amora, and not a third. R. Aha b. Jacob continued to be active through the ﬁfth generation.26 Below I will present the main proofs that serve as the basis for this conclusion:

(a) On two occasions R. Aha bar Jacob quotes halakhic traditions in the name of third generation amoraim—R. Nahman and R. Zera.27 These traditions are quoted using the formula, “X said

26 A similar conclusion was reached by Frankel, Mavo HaYerushalmi, 62b and Bacher, Die Agada der Babylonischen Amoräer, 137–138. However, the prooftext they used does not actually provide evidence for their conclusion. Frankel and Bacher based their dating on only one passage, b. Bava Qamma 40a. In this passage Rava praises R. Aha b. Jacob in front of R. Nahman and deems him a “great man.” In the continuation of the passage R. Nahman is depicted as testing R. Aha b. Jacob in a matter of halakhah, thereby creating the impression that the latter was subordinate to R. Nahman, a sage of the third generation. However, R. Aha b. Jacob’s subordination to R. Nahman (bar Jacob) in this passage can be explained in a different manner, without assuming that he was younger than R. Nahman. This behavior can be explained in light of the great authority that R. Nahman enjoyed during his own generation. Even sages older than R. Nahman, those belonging to the second generation, act as his subordinates. On this issue see: A. Cohen, “Was Age the Decisive Criterion of Subordination Among the Amoraim?” 310–313; B. Cohen. “Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman,” 14–15. In any case, Frankel and Bacher’s placement of R. Aha b. Jacob in the fourth generation (younger than R. Nahman) seems to be correct, even if it is based on different evidence that shall be outlined below. 27 b. Yoma 55a; b. Bava Batra 52a. On the dating of R. Nahman and R. Zera see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 233, 298. In another passage, b. Berakhot 22a, R. Aha b. Jacob transmits a halakhic statement in the name of “our Rabbi,” who is identiﬁed by Rashi as Rav (s.v. mishum rabbenu). If R. Aha b. Jacob quotes Rav, the former must be a second generation amora. However, there are several doubts concerning this source. (1) Mss. Munich 95, Oxford Opp. Add. Fol. 23, and Paris 671 read: “R. Abba bar Aha.” This reading is also found in the parallel in the Palestinian Talmud ( y. Berakhot 3:4, 6c). In the Palestinian Talmud, the quote is brought in the name of Rabbi [ Judah the Prince], and not Rav. R. Abba bar Aha is a Palestinian amora from the ﬁrst generation, who frequently quotes traditions in the name of Rav. Based on these considerations, it seems likely that this version of the Bavli, R. Abba bar Aha, is the correct reading. See also: SH. Albeck, Mishpekhot Soferim, 27–28; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 1:15; Ch. Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 616–618. (2) Even were we to accept the reading, R. Aha bar Jacob, we cannot conclude from such a formula that R. Aha b. Jacob had direct contact with Rav. With quotation formulas such as these, “He said in the name of . . .” (amar mishmeh) it is not conclusive or necessary that the sage quoting heard the words directly from the sage being quoted. For a discussion of this issue see: B. Cohen, “Re-Examining One Tal- mudic Rule” [Heb.] (forthcoming). 134 chapter four

that Y said” (amar X amar Y ) and “X said in the name of Y” (amar X mishmeh de-Y ).28 These formulae are used in the Bavli either by a student who quotes his teacher or by a younger sage who quotes his elder.29 (b) In describing his debates with other sages and his halakhic practice, the Talmud consistently presents R. Aha bar Jacob’s name after the names of third and fourth generation amoraim (R. Sheshet, Rabbah/Rava; Abbaye; “the Nehardeans say” and R. Shezbi).30 Since the Bavli usually presents groups of amoraim in chronological order,31 it can be concluded that R. Aha b. Jacob was a member of the fourth generation. (c) If R. Aha b. Jacob was indeed a member the third generation and a student of R. Huna, as it is usually assumed, it is exceedingly strange that R. Aha b. Jacob is never portrayed as interacting or engaging with members of the second and third generations.32 Fur- thermore, his dialogues are with members of the fourth generation and even more often with members of the ﬁfth generation, who act as his subordinates. Due to the talmudic tradition which ascribes a long life to R. Aha bar Jacob,33 we can explain the following passages in which he has contact with ﬁfth generation amoraim, contemporaries of R. Hama.

28 This is the version found in all manuscripts with the except of Ms. London Harl. 5508 of the passage in Yoma, in which the words “R. Zera said” are missing. 29 See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 74, 102; B. Cohen, “Re- Examining One Talmudic Rule” [Heb.] (forthcoming). Kalmin, “Quotation Forms,” 170 n. 10, listed instances of the “R. X said in the name of R. Y” in which the gap between the later sage and the sage being quoted was large enough that he could not have heard the quote directly from the earlier sage. Our conclusion is all the more so afﬁrmed according to Kalmin’s conclusions. There is some evidence that in cases of this formula the earlier sage was already not alive by the time he was quoted. See most recently: A. Cohen, “On the Redaction of the Sugya,” 72 and n. 56. In light of this, R. Aha bar Jacob’s activity would take place even after R. Nahman’s death in 320. This fact accords with our ﬁndings above. The quoting sage in these cases, R. Aha bar Jacob, is younger than R. Nahman and R. Zera. 30 Rav Sheshet: b. Hullin 17b; Rabbah/Rava: b. Shabbat 87b; b. Pesahim 29a; b. Menahot 35b. Abbaye: b. Shabbat 102b; b. Rosh HaShanah 6b. “Amre’i Neharde’i: b. Sotah 40a. Rav Shezvi: b. Hullin 56a. 31 For bibliographical references see above, chapter two, section 1.1.3., p. 39, footnote 15. 32 The only source that connects R. Aha b. Jacob with a third-generation amora is b. Bava Qamma 40a. In this source R. Aha b. Jacob acts subordinate and younger than R. Nahman b. Jacob, a member of the third generation. For analysis of this source, see above, footnote 26. 33 b. Eruvin 63b. rav hama 135

(1) R. Papa testifies that he “sat” before R. Aha b. Jacob: “R. Papa said: I was sitting in front of ( yativ kameh) R. Aha bar Jacob.” 34 Formulae of this nature in the Bavli are commonly used to describe a student who “sits” ( yativ) in front of his master, or even one peer sitting in front of another, as long as the one sitting is subordinate to the one in front of whom he is sitting.35 In another instance, R. Papa asks R. Aha b. Jacob a question concerning a halakhic tradition transmitted in the name of Rava.36 (2) The exilarch asks R. Aha b. Jacob to judge Bar Hama for having killed a man.37 During the ensuing discussion, R. Papa/Papi38 inter- venes in defense of Bar Hama.39 R. Papa was the academy head in Nareš, close to Sura, during the fifth generation of Babylonian amoraim until his death in 375.40 In contrast, the identity of the sage mentioned in the second source is not certain, for the source may refer to R. Papi and not R. Papa. In any case, R. Papi is also an amora of the fifth generation, who seems to have been the academy head of a local academy in Pumbedita, after the death of Abbaye in 337.41 (3) R. Aha son of R. Ika (R. Aha b. Jacob’s sister’s son), raises a difficulty against R. Aha b. Jacob in his presence [“R. Aha bar Jacob said . . . R. Aha son of R. Ika, his sister’s son raised a difficulty against

34 b. Hullin 33b. 35 For bibliographical references see above, chapter two, section 1.2., p. 47, footnote 60. 36 b. Ketubbot 86a. 37 b. Sanhedrin 27a–b. R. Aha bar Jacob’s name is found in Mss. Yad Harav Herzog 1, Munich 95 and the geniza fragment Taylor-Schechter T-S F2 (1) 173. This reading is also found in geonic literature, see: Toibsh, ed., Otzar HaGeonim, 14:220; Kohut, ed., Arukh HaShalem, 4:202 and in Rif, Ms. JTS Rab 692 (see: Friedman, ed., Halakhot Rabbati of R. Isaac Alfasi, 2:176). Ms. Florence and the printed editions read, “R. Abba bar Jacob,” a difﬁcult reading. R. Abba bar Jacob is a Palestinian amora of the third generation (see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 213), whereas the passage from Sanhedrin relates to an event that occurred in Babylonia about two generations later, in the presence of the exilarch and R. Papa/Papi. Concerning the preference of the version, “R. Aha bar Jacob” in this passage see: ibid., n. 213; Herman, The Exilarchate in the Sasanian Era [Heb.], 225 and n. 1057. Ms. Karlsruhe-Roechlin reads: “R. Aha son of R. Ika”. 38 Mss. Florence and Karlsruhe-Roechlin read: R. Papa. Mss. Yad Harav Herzog 1, Munich 95 and Cambridge T-S F2 (1) 173 and the Italian fragment Archivio Storico Comunale Fr. Ebr. 25 read: “R. Papi”. This is also the version found in the Rif, JTS Rab. 692 (see note above). On this variant see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 77 n. 57. 39 For an analysis of this event see mainly: Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate [Heb.], 62–64, and the bibliographical references found on p. 63, nn. 21–22. 40 See: Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, French rescension, 89. On the geographical location of R. Papa in Nareš see: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 262–264. 41 See: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Ve-Amoraim, 3:1031; Gafni, “Ma’ase’i bet Din,” 33 and n. 37. 136 chapter four

him (eitiveh)”].42 R. Aha son of R. Ika is a Babylonia amora from the ﬁfth generation of Babylonian amoraim.43 (4) R. Elazar of Hagrunya and R. Aha b. Tahlifa44 “chance upon” (ikal’u) the house of R. Aha son of R. Ika, in the place of R. Aha b. Jacob.45 The three debate whether to ask halakhic advice from R. Aha b. Jacob, who is the local authority. All three of these amoraim are ﬁfth generation Babylonian, and in this passage they appear as subordinate to R. Aha b. Jacob, their elder.46

1.1.3. Summary and Conclusions The above evidence leads to the conclusion that R. Aha b. Jacob was a member of the fourth generation of Babylonian amoraim. He is documented in the Bavli as being younger and subordinate to members of the third generation, most of his discourse is with members of the fourth generation, and he continues to engage with members of the ﬁfth generation. This conclusion undermines any problem of a “chronological gap” between the time of R. Aha b. Jacob and R. Hama in b. Sanhedrin 46b. If this conclusion seems so obvious, we must ask the question, from where did the notion that R. Aha was a third generation amora spring? The dating of R. Aha b. Jacob to the third generation is based on one tradition in the Bavli, found on b. Yevamot 64a. In this source, R. Aha b. Jacob reports on his presence at the “pirka,” a public learning ses- sion, held by R. Huna.47 From this one source, scholars concluded that R. Aha b. Jacob was a student of R. Huna’s (academy head in Sura, d. 297),48 and a member of the second generation of Babylonian amoraim.49 However, this conclusion is not necessary. The presence of a sage at a pirka led by another sage does not attest to his being a student of the sage leading the public learning. Rather, an examination of the sages who are described as being present at a

42 b. Ketubbot 74b. 43 Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 1:124; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 404–405. 44 Manuscripts read: “R. Aha bar Tahlifa”. Printed editions read, “Abba bar Tahlifa.” 45 b. Eruvin 63a. 46 Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 404–405. 47 On the text see also below, footnote 59. 48 Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, French rescension, 83. 49 See Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:45; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 1:128; Zuri, Rav, 195; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 276–277. rav hama 137 pirka shows that the sage attending the pirka can be a student of the pirka leader (R. ‘Awia and Abbaye in front of R. Joseph;50 Rava bar R. Hanan in front of Rabbah),51 a student/colleage (R. Hamnuna in front of R. Hisda)52 or a younger sage subject to the leading sage’s authority (Rabbah bar bar Hana in front of R. Judah;53 Meremar or R. Yemar in front of R. Phinehas bar Ami;54 the “elders of Nazunya” in front of R. Hisda).55 We have even found instances in which a sage attending another sage’s pirka is of an equal status to the expounding sage (Rabbah and R. Joseph in front of R. Sheshet).56 Even outstanding sages of high status were expected to attend the pirka in order to honor the sage expounding.57 R. Aha b. Jacob may have been present, indeed, at R. Huna’s pirka, but there is not much at all we can learn from this source concerning the hierarchical relationships between the two. Furthermore, even were we to accept the assumption that R. Aha b. Jacob was a student of R. Huna’s, when R. Huna died (around 300), R. Aha b. Jacob had not yet reached the age of “instruction.” Based on a survey concerning the number of years between the death of a master and his student in the Bavli, Avinoam Cohen discovered the following significant fact: There is actual documented discussion in the Bavli between amoraim who died more than thirty years after their masters. However, the Tal- mud almost never reports of any actual conversation between the student and the master in cases where the students died forty to sixty years after their masters. This phenomenon is connected, in my opinion, with the age at which a sage was considered to be fit for “instruction.” Sages who outlived their masters by more than forty years would have been quite young while their teachers were still alive, almost certainly under the age of “instruction.” Evidently, the transmitters of talmudic discussion did not see fit to preserve in their protocols the questions and difficulties raised by a student under this age.58

50 b. Berakhot 28b. Concerning the fact that R. “Awia was R. Joseph’s student, see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 355. 51 b. Menahot 40a. 52 b. Kiddushin 25a. On the hierarchical relationship between R. Hamnuna and R. Hisda see: B. Cohen, “How Many Rav Hamnunas,” 100–106. 53 b. Shabbat 148a. 54 b. Pesahim 100a. 55 b. Kiddushin 25a. 56 b. Eruvin 65b. For an analysis of this tradition see: B. Cohen, “Local Academies,” 455–457. 57 Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 209–210. 58 A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 75. 138 chapter four

The gap in years between R. Huna and R. Aha b. Jacob may be the reason the two are not found engaging in discussion. It may also be the reason R. Aha b. Jacob does not transmit any halakhic statements in the name of R. Huna and that no other evidence is found connecting the two, besides the retroactive statement of R. Aha b. Jacob that he was present at R. Huna’s pirka. Our conclusion, therefore, must be that R. Aha b. Jacob was young when R. Huna died, younger than the age of “instruction.”59 In sum, R. Hama is a Nehardean sage, who according to R. Sher- ira Gaon served as academy head in Pumbedita after the death of R. Nahman b. Isaac in 356 until his death in 377.60 The idea that there is another fourth century sage with an identical name is almost certainly incorrect for it is based on an unnecessary interpretation of a passage in b. Sanhedrin 46b. The various attempts to identify R. Hama with R. Hama bar Guria or (Rav) R. Hama b. Tobiah from earlier periods are not, in my opinion, reasonable, for they contradict the normal editing style of the talmudic editors, as well as the typical portrayal of the hierarchical relationship between Babylonian amoraim.

59 The word savei in the testimony of R. Aha b. Jacob concerning his presence at the pirka of R. Huna (Amar Rav Aha b. Yaakov: Shitin savei havena) does not provide deﬁnitive evidence as to his age at the time. In Aramaic, the word savei can also mean, “sages,” and not necessarily “elders.” See mainly: Dalman, Aramäische-Neuhebräisches Handwörterbuch, 281; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 3:463; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 782. R. Aha b. Jacob’s testimony relates to the presence of sages, not elderly sages, at the pirka of R. Huna, as was noted correctly by Mirsky, “Types of Lectures,” 382. 60 On the date of R. Nahman b. Isaac’s death see: Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5 (in the list of variants); Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 89. On the date of R. Hama’s death see: Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 89. rav hama 139

2. Halakhic Methodology

R. Hama appears twenty-nine times in the Bavli61 (including appearances in manuscripts).62 These traditions include apodictic statements,63 descriptions of his customs,64 his halakhic rulings [which occur in his house,65 in the Exilarch’s house,66 or within a public exposition (“R. Hama expounded”)]67 or judgments issued in concrete cases (there are two collections of R. Hama’s rulings—b. Bava Batra 6b–7b68 and b. Kiddushin 9a). Among all of R. Hama’s contributions to talmudic literature, he is portrayed as interpreting the Mishnah on only one occasion.69 The description of R. Hama in scholarly literature reﬂects these ﬁndings, and it can be found in the works of Solomon Funk,

61 b. Berakhot 22b; b. Shabbat 47b; b. Yoma 75a; b. Mo’ed Qatan 10a; ibid. 12a; b. Kid- dushin 8b–9a (twice); b. Ketubbot 86a (twice); b. Gittin 89b (twice); b. Bava Metzi’a 65a; ibid. 69b; ibid. 73b; ibid. 85b; b. Bava Batra 6b–7b ( four times); ibid. 29a; ibid. 148b; b. Sanhedrin 17b; ibid. 46b; b. Shevu’ot 48a; b. Avodah Zarah 30a; b. Bekhorot 27a; ibid. 52b. To this list we may add an additional instance, b. Betzah 29b. In light of chronological considerations and manuscript evidence, it seems likely that the text should read, “R. Hama,” as opposed to the version found in the printed editions, “R. Nahman”. “R. Hama” appears in Mss. Goetingen 3, London (Harl. 550), Vatican 109, Vatican 134, Munich 95 and the geniza fragment, Oxford 2678. On the chronological considerations see: Yudolowitz, Nehardea, 81. Albeck also prefers this reading, see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 420. Compare: Efrati and Itzhaki, Masekhet Yom Tov, 165 n. 8. 62 R. Hama’s name is found in additional three times in manuscripts or in the printed edition of the Babylonian Talmud, but it is doubtful whether these reﬂect an accurate reading of those passages. The following are the three passages in which he appears in manuscripts: (1) b. Yoma 75b. All manuscripts read “R. Hama bar Hanina,” but the printed edition reads: “R. Hama.” The reading “R. Hama bar Hanina” is preferable for it is far more likely that a copyist would change R. Hama bar Hanina, a lesser-known sage into R. Hama by removing “bar Hanina” than that a copyist would add “bar Hanina” to the well-known R. Hama. The presence of this reading in all manuscripts makes this even more certain. (2) b. Nazir 20a. Printed editions read “R. Hama said to R. Hisda.” Mss. Munich 95 and Moscow/Ginzberg read, “Rami bar Hama said to R. Hisda.” A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 106, preferred the latter reading based on chronological considerations and the hierarchical relationship between the sages in this passage. (3) b. Berakhot 52b. Printed editions read “R. Hama said about (kari aleh) [R. Sheshet].” All manuscripts read, “Rami bar Hama said about . . . ” 63 b. Ketubbot 86a; b. Bava Metzi’a 73b. 64 b. Berakhot 22b; ibid. 50a; Bava Metzi’a 79b; b. Bekhorot 27a. 65 b. Shabbat 47b. 66 b. Mo’ed Qatan 12a. 67 b. Mo’ed Qatan 10a. On the meaning of the verb “darash” as signifying a public speech, see: Gafni, “Public Sermons in Talmudic Babylonia” [Heb.], 123 and n. 15. 68 See: Epstein, Mevo’ot Lesifrut Hatannaim, 213; Segal, Case Citation, 92–94. 69 b. Bava Batra 148b. 140 chapter four

Isaac Hirsch Weiss, Isaac Halevy, Aaron Hyman, Ze’ev Yaavetz, Meir Dov Yudelewitz, Hanokh Albeck and David Goodblatt.70 There are sixteen cases in the Bavli in which R. Hama issues a halakhic ruling. Ten are in the realm of prohibitions (Sabbath, holidays, marital law and the prohibition of lending with interest), including one that is found only in manuscripts.71 Six are concerned with monetary matters (including inheritance and wills).72 In these rulings R. Hama makes extensive use of legal/halakhic reasoning, and demonstrates a keen ability to navigate between different situations and conditions. Due to the consideration he gives to the special conditions that arise in each circumstance he tends to rule leniently in matters of prohibitions. We shall explain. In all ten of R. Hama’s rulings concerning matters of prohibitions, he rules leniently based on his own reasoning as a halakhic source, or based on his interpretation of earlier sources (Mishnah, baraita, or early amoraic statement).73 In two cases his leniency even goes so far as to contradict an explicit tannaitic tradition.74 Even in cases where R. Hama’s relies on tannaitic tradition, he always adopts, based on his own reasoning, the more lenient position.75 Similarly, four of his six rulings in monetary matters are based on his own reasoning as a halakhic source,76 and two are based on an early amoraic tradition.77 The overall picture is of a sage who generates independent rulings and does not exhibit a strong dependence upon authoritative sources. In this, his character is similar to that of Amemar (see below, section 3[a], p. 149). We shall now turn to a few representative examples of R. Hama’s literature, including both halakhic rulings and in interpretation. We will begin with two cases that describe a practice or halakhic ruling of R. Hama in connection with interest.

70 Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien, 2:87; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:180; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 5:503; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 2:457; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:122; Yudolowitz, Nehardea, 80; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 409; Good- blatt, “Local Traditions,” 200 n. 21. 71 b. Shabbat 47b; b. Mo’ed Qatan 10a; ibid. 12a; b. Betzah 29b; b. Gittin 89b; b. Kiddushin 9a (twice); b. Bava Metzi’a 65a; ibid. 69b; b. Bekhorot 27a. 72 b. Bava Metzi’a 73b; b. Bava Batra 6b–7a ( four times); b. Shevu’ot 48b. 73 b. Shabbat 47b; b. Betzah 29b; b. Mo’ed Qatan 10a; ibid. 12a; b. Kiddushin 9a (twice). 74 b. Bava Metzi’a 65a; ibid. 69b. 75 b. Shabbat 47b; b. Betzah 29b. These ﬁndings support Richard Hidary’s conclusion regarding R. Hama’s pluralistic view of halakha as it is expressed in his famous statement in b. Shevu‘ot 48b. See: Hidary, “Right Answers Revisited”, 238–244. 76 b. Bava Metzi’a 73b; b. Bava Batra 6b–7a (three times). 77 b. Bava Batra 7a; Shevu’ot 48b. rav hama 141

Bavli Bava Metzi’a 69b R. Hama used to hire out a zuz for a peshita per day. [As a result] his money disappeared. He reasoned: How does this differ from a spade?78 But this is not accurate: the spade is returned, and its depreciation is known; whereas the coins themselves are not returned, nor can their depreciation be estimated.79 Traditional commentators were puzzled by R. Hama’s practice of “hiring out” money, and the halakhic justification attributed to him (“how does this differ from a spade?”). The Ritba summarizes this suc- cinctly, “How could R. Hama make such a mistake? How could he compare [lending] money to [lending] a spade?”80 Modern researchers have likewise been puzzled by this story, and one scholar even went so far as to define R. Hama’s actions as “simple evasiveness and most perplexing.”81 The basic assumption made by all commentators is that R. Hama tried to evade the prohibition of interest,82 whether he did this by using “the language of hiring and not the language of lending,”83 or “he accepted upon himself responsibility in case of unforeseeable circumstances, and that’s why he thought it was permitted,”84 or perhaps some combination of these two justifications.85

78 Ms. Hamburg 165 reads: “He holds it is like a spade.” A geniza fragment (Ginz- berg. Geonica, 2:360) reads: “At first what did he hold? It is like the case of a spade.” 79 Ms. Ascorial G-I-3 adds: “and if you say, they themselves are returned, when it comes to a spade its depreciation is known, coins are not themselves returned, and their depreciation is not known.” Ms. Munich 95 reads: “And if you say, they themselves are returned, the depreciation of a spade is known, whereas the depreciation of coins is not known.” Concerning the meaning of this version see: Gulak, “Banking in Talmudic Law” [Heb.], 161. 80 Ritba, s.v. zuzei lo hadrei. 81 Globus, “Ribit,” 39; Eliash, “Kave’i Yesod,” 53, “the main difficulty that arises in connection with this story is . . . how could the academy head of Pumbedita in the fifth generation of Babylonian amoraim think that he was not transgressing the prohibition of interest?” 82 See, for instance: Globus, “Ribit,” 39; Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 211– 212; Neusner, A History of the Jews [Heb.], 5:319–320; Cohn, “Usury,” 16:30–31. 83 Rashi, s.v. mogar zuzei. See also R. Zecharyah Agamati (Levine, ed., Sefer Haner, 116). His interpretation was adopted by Gulak, “Banking in Talmudic Law” [Heb.], 161 and Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 212. 84 Tosafot, s.v. mogar zuzei. 85 See: Tzubel and Dimitrovski, Talmud Bavli im Tirgum, 127–128. For another attempt to interpret R. Hama’s actions see: Eliash, “Kave’i Yesod,” 53–54. Gulak, “Banking in Talmudic Law” [Heb.], 161, notes a potential connection between R. Hama’s behavior and a halakhah found in t. Bava Metzi’a 4:2 (ed. Lieberman, 81), which he interpreted as allowing one to “hire” money to a moneychanger under certain economic conditions. Compare: Eliash, “Kave’i Yesod,” 46–47. Gulak concludes that the Bavli was not familiar with this toseftan halakhah. In our opinion, it is doubtful 142 chapter four

Indeed, the Talmud itself reads the fact that R. Hama lost his zuzim as a punishment for having transgressed the prohibition of interest, “they were lost, as we say later on: those who lend with interest lose their money.”86 The analogy between borrowing zuzim and borrowing a spade that the Talmud ascribes to R. Hama is rejected by the stam for two reasons: Zuzim are not themselves returned to the owner, for the “hirers” are completely responsible for them, and it is just like a loan. And furthermore, even if the coins themselves are returned and the hirer did not accept responsibility for them, in any case, their devaluation is not known. Therefore, that which he takes as his wages for use of his money is interest.87 Whatever R. Hama’s justiﬁcation might have been, this case demonstrates in an extreme way how much R. Hama was willing to deviate from the accepted halakhic tradition, based on the halakhic reasoning ascribed to him. Bavli Bava Metzia 65a Mishnah: One may increase rent-charge [not paid in advance] but not purchase price [not paid in advance]. How so? If his fellow rented him his courtyard, and said to him, “If you pay me now, the cost is ten selas per year, but if you pay me on a monthly basis, the rent is one sela per month,” this is permitted. However, if he sold him his ﬁeld, and said to him, “If you pay me now it is yours for 1,000 zuz, but if you pay me at the time of threshing it will be 1,200 zuz,” it is forbidden. Gemara . . . . R. Nahman said: An increased credit price (tarsha) is permitted. Rami b. Hama raised an objection against R. Nahman: “But if you pay me at the time of threshing it will be 1,200 zuz,” it is forbidden. He replied: There [the increase] was stipulated; here no stipulation is made.

whether there is even any similarity between R. Hama’s actions and the tannaitic halakhah, see: Globus, “Ribit,” 39 n. 2. Even Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 9:192–193, who made a similar suggestion, was forced to interpret the passage in the Bavli in a different manner altogether, one that deviates from the simple meaning of the source. In any case, our conclusion regarding the “audacity” of R. Hama is correct even if we accept this possibility. According to all interpretations, his actions in this passage reﬂect his tendency to rule leniently, as we stated above. 86 Rashi, s.v. kalu zuzei. See also Levine, ed., Sefer Hanner, 11, “since R. Hama transgressed, the money disappeared.” 87 Ritba. Hidushey HaRitba, Bava Metzi’a, s.v. zuzei lo hadrei beynayhu. rav hama 143

R. Papa said: The increased credit price (tarsha) which I take is permitted. Why? Because my beer will not spoil, [and] I do not need the money; hence, I am only doing a favor for the purchaser. . . . R. Hama said: My increased credit price (tarsha) is certainly permitted. Why? They are pleased that it shall remain in my ownership, because wherever they go they are exempted from taxation and the market is held up for them. This source, whose various historical and legal aspects have been discussed frequently in scholarly literature,88 presents R. Hama’s ruling with regard to the tarsha which he practiced. The etymological origins of the word tarsha are unknown.89 Nevertheless, it is customarily assumed to be a type of sale through credit, in which the owner of the merchandise benefits by not receiving payment for the goods until the time when the market price has gone up. An interpretation ascribed to Rabbenu Hananel explains, “He gives him the produce in Heshvan, and he stipulates that the buyer should pay him in Iyyar, at the greater value of the produce in Iyyar.”90 This type of sale on credit is explicitly prohibited by the Mishnah, and by a tannaitic tradition in the name of R. Judah found in the Palestinian Talmud.91 R. Hama (like R. Nahman and R. Papa) offers a halakhic justification for his leniency, one which is meant to circum- vent the prohibition,92 “for they are pleased that it shall remain in my ownership, so that wherever they go they are exempt from taxation and the market is held up for them.” Many traditional commentators had difficulty with R. Hama’s justification. For instance, the Ramban objected, “for if so, this is real interest. For he gives him that which is worth a hundred and he gets back one hundred and fifty. There is no benefit for them when it comes to the taxes, unless the taxes are [an equal benefit] to the extra that they give him over their value, and this

88 See below, footnotes 91–92 and 95. 89 See Sokoloff, Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 519. 90 Domb, ed., Perush Rabenu Hanan’el, 129. This interpretation has also been adopted by scholars, see: Krauss, Talmudische Archäologie, 1:370–371; Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 4:99; Globus, “Ribit,” 34; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 2:200; Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, 558; Gamoran, “Credit Transactions in Geonic Times,” 70. 91 y. Bava Metzi’a 5:6, 75b. see also: Globus, “Ribit,” 34 and n. 3: A. Cohen, The Development of the Prohibition Against Usury, 71–73. 92 See Globus, “Ribit,” 34; Weiss, Dor Dor Vedorshav, 3:182; Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 205–206. 144 chapter four doesn’t seem to be true.”93 The Ramban, like many other commentators, was forced to explain R. Hama’s actions based on the assumption that responsibility for the merchandise stayed with R. Hama, and was not transferred to the buyers at the point of the sale.94 However, if we interpret R. Hama’s action based on the justification provided in the Talmud itself, it seems that his lenient halakhic position was based on the assumption that the buyers benefit from being exempt from taxes and from having the market held up on their behalf,95 both results of the goods still being sold under R. Hama’s name. The added price they pay is not understood as being in return for a delayed payment.96 In other words, the special benefits accrued to the buyers allow a deviation from the normally stringent halakhah and allow R. Hama to act leniently. Bavli Bava Metz’ia 73b: R. Hama said: One who gives his fellow money to buy wine for him, and he negligently fails to purchase it for him, he must compensate him as it is sold in the area of Walašpat (= Vologesias).97 Amemar said: I stated this ruling before R. Zebid of Nehardea, and he said: (when R. Hama made his statement)98 it referred only to unspecified wine, but not to a particular wine, [for] who knows that he could have bought it for him? R. Ashi said: Even for unspecified wine it is also not [correct]. Why? Because it is an asmakhta, and an asmakhta does not acquire.99 According to R. Hama, the promise made by the agent to buy wine for the purchaser is obligatory, and can serve as the basis for a law-

93 Ramban, Milhamet Hashem, s.v. amar haketuv. See also Talmid HaRif in the Shitah Mekubetzet, s.v. amar Rav Hama, “and if you should say, is it permitted to loan to one’s fellow with interest for this reason, that the merchant will benefit from the coins.” 94 See, for instance Rashi: s.v. amar Rav Hama; Tosafot, s.v. naktei lahu shuka. 95 On the scope of the exemption of Babylonian amoraim, including R. Hama, from taxes see: Krauss, Paras VeRomi, 272–273; Newman, The Agricultural Life of the Jews, 181; Beer, “Were the Babylonian Amoraim Exempt from Taxes and Customs?” [Heb.], 257–258; ibid., The Babylonian Amoraim [Heb.], 225–226. 96 See Ritba (above, footnote 87) 530, s.v. amar Rav Hama. See also: Beer, The Baby- lonian Amoraim [Heb.], 205–206; Beer, “Were the Babylonian Amoraim Exempt from Taxes and Customs?” [Heb.], 257–258. 97 For this identification see: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 456–460. 98 The words in parentheses are missing in Mss. Florence, Hamburg 165, Munich 95 and Ascorial G-I-3. According to this reading, the interpretation of R. Zebid of Nehardea is not based on a tradition transmitted under the name of R. Hama, but rather it is his own reasoning. See: Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:238 n. 2. 99 The explanation for R. Ashi’s statement seems to be later than R. Ashi himself. See: Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:239. rav hama 145 suit if the agent is “negligent” and does not keep his promise: “If Reuven gives money to Simon to buy for him an unspecified type of wine . . . and Simon is negligent and does not buy it for him. He (Simon) must pay him the value of wine as it is sold in the area of Vologe- sias, the place where wine is sold.”100 The compensation, according to R. Hama, is that Simon must buy wine for Reuven at the price found in the port of Vologesias, even if that price is higher than the amount that Reuven originally gave.101 This city has been identified by scholars as being close to Mahoza. It served as an area of trade from the first century C.E. According to other evidence bound in the Bavli from the fourth century, it was known especially for its wine markets.102 The Ritba explains the reasoning behind R. Hama’s ruling: For even though the agent did not at all accept upon himself the responsibility to pay, since the purchaser gave him money to acquire the merchandise, and if it had not been for that agent’s promise he would have bought it himself or used other agents, and he relied on that agent and he gave him the money relying on the fact that the agent would buy it, therefore the agent must compensate him for the amount that the purchaser lost as a result of the agent’s [not keeping his] promise. For with the benefit that the agent derived by the purchaser relying upon him and giving him his money, the agent becomes liable to repay him, as is the rule with a guarantor.103 R. Hama’s reasoning again perplexed commentators: “I have not found anyone who agrees with him or his reasoning. All halakhic authorities in the end ruled that in such a case the purchaser has nothing against the agent except a legal complaint [that cannot result in a monetary claim].”104 What puzzled commentators is that R. Hama’s reasoning contradicts a tannaitic halakhah found in t. Bava Metzia 4:22 (ed. Lie- berman, 86) and in y. Bava Metzia 5:3, 10c:

100 Levine, ed., Sefer Hanner, 120. 101 See the various explanations of the rishonim collected in Otzar Mefarshei Hatal- mud, v. IV, 509–510. 102 b. Bava Batra 98a. See: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 456–460. 103 Ritba, s.v. ulekulho perushei. See also: Kaplan, Divre’i Talmud, 1:269; Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 6:239. Lifshitz, Promise [Heb.], 14 and 16–17, linked R. Hama’s statement with the ruling of the sages of Nehardea that “an asmakhta does acquire.” Lifshitz’s suggestion is based on the assumption that the explanation that the Talmud provides for R. Ashi, who disagrees with R. Hama, is original to R. Ashi. However, see Halivni who due to literary and halakhic considerations doubts whether this is so. 104 R. Moses Margalit, Mareh Panim, on y. Bava Metzi’a 5:3, 10c, s.v. hada amrah. 146 chapter four

It was taught: One who gives money to his friend to buy at half price, and afterwards he says, “I didn’t buy it,” he has nothing but a complaint (taromet) . . . R. Isaac said: that is to say, one who causes his friend’s money to be inactive (hamevatel kis havero), he has nothing against him but a complaint.105 R. Isaac, a third generation Palestinian amora who also spent time in Babylonia,106 derived from the baraita (hada amara)107 that there is no monetary claim against an agent does not perform his mission even if this causes the sender to lose out on a potential gain.108 This is the exact opposite halakhah of R. Hama. In order to prevent R. Hama’s statement from deviating from halakhic tradition, commentators had to explain it differently. According to their explanation, the original agreement between the purchaser and his agent included an explicit commitment by the agent to compensate the purchaser from his own account should he not acquire the wine.109 Without such a stipulation, so it is claimed, R. Hama would never have ruled against the tannaitic tradition. As is explained by R. Moshe Margoliot in his commentary on the Palestinian Talmud, “If it had not been the case that he stipulated that if he didn’t buy it he would compensate him for his loss, R. Hama would never have ruled this way on his own, for this is a case of one who causes his friend’s money to be inactive.110 David Halivni rightfully rejected this explanation for the simple reason that “such a stipulation is not mentioned in the Talmud, and since it is not mentioned, it is likely that it did not take place.”111 According to Halivni, R. Hama’s ruling is a result of an intentional deviation from tannaitic halakhah. After rejecting the possibility that R. Hama’s reasoning (and R. Ashi’s) stems from the laws concerning the “asmakhta,” Halivni summarizes:

105 The reading is based on Ms. Ascorial of the Yerushalmi. See: Lieberman, Yerushalmi Neziqin, 61. 106 See Frankel, Mavo HaYerushalmi, 106b; Bacher, Agadot HaAmoraim, 2, 1:189; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 2:782–783; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 252–253. 107 The term “hada amara” in the Yerushalmi signiﬁes a logical conclusion or explanation, and is parallel to the term “zot omeret” (in the Bavli). See: Moscovitz, The Terminology of the Yerushalmi [Heb.], 165. 108 This is Lieberman’s explanation, see: Tosefta Kifshuta, 9:206. See: Zuri, Treatise of Hebrew Civil Law [Heb.], 1:133–134. 109 See for instance, the Rosh, s.v. amar Rav Hama, who writes, “this is a case where he stipulates with him, that if he doesn’t buy it, he will give him his own wine. For if this were not so, we hold that one who causes his friend’s money to be inactive, has nothing against him but a complaint.” 110 R. Moses Margalit, Mareh Panim, s.v. hada amrah. 111 Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 6:239. rav hama 147

If you say, if so, that there was no asmakhta then what is R. Hama teaching? . . . We can say that he is disagreeing with the objection raised by the rishonim, “How is this any different from one who causes his friend’s money to be inactive.?” R. Hama’s innovation is that the agent is liable for he is like a guarantor, since the purchaser relied upon him, “and gave him his money for this reason. Therefore he is liable to pay the loss that he caused through his guarantee.” And R. Ashi disagrees and holds that he is not similar to a guarantor.112 The two above attempts to explain R. Hama’s statement are based on the assumption that R. Hama knew the Palestinian tannaitic halakhic tradition. However, the varying solutions to the problem go in different paths. Traditional commentators were forced to reinterpret what the actual agreement between the purchaser and his agent were in order to prevent R. Hama from disagreeing with the tannaitic tradition. In contrast, Halivni suggested understanding R. Hama’s statement as being based on reasoning that opposes the halakhic tradition. In light of R. Hama’s general halakhic tendencies, Halivni’s suggestion seems to us to be the more plausible. As we have demonstrated in the previous two cases, R. Hama can be characterized as ruling based on his own reasoning, even if this leads him into conﬂict with prior halakhic tradition. However, even if we accept the possibility that R. Hama was not in this case familiar with the earlier halakhic tradition (expressed in the baraita and in R. Isaac’s statement), this case still demonstrates his willingness to employ his own reasoning as a source of halakhah. We have indeed found this to be the case in other places—R. Hama’s rulings were based on his own reasoning as a source of halakhah without any connection to previous tradition.113 The following source demonstrates this phenomenon in connection with R. Hama’ interpretation of a mishnah, the only time he is found interpreting a mishnah in the Bavli. We shall now discuss this case and the conclusions that we believe can be drawn from it: Bavli Bava Batra 148b Mishnah: A dying person who assigns all of his property to others: If he leaves a small amount of land for himself, his gift counts. If he does not leave a small amount of land for himself, his gift does not count.114

112 Ibid. 113 See b. Gittin 89b; b. Kiddushin 9a (twice); b. Bava Batra 6b–7a (three times). 114 This halakhah is parallel to m. Peah 3:7. 148 chapter four

Gemara: R. Joseph b. Minyomi115 said in the name of R. Nahman: A dying person who assigns all of his money to others and then gets well cannot change his mind for we are concerned lest he has money in another country. And the mishnah which taught, “if he does not leave himself a small amount of land his gift counts,” in what case is this so?116 R. Hama117 said: When he says, “all of my property.” Mar b. R. Ashi said: In a case where it is presumed (that he doesn’t own any other property).118 This halakhic tradition ascribed to R. Nahman contradicts the halakhah found in the mishnah, as was perceived by the stam. Whereas according to R. Nahman a dying person who writes away all of his money to others and then gets better cannot retract, according to the mishnah he can.119 On this halakhah Yaakov Elman remarks, “Later amoraim and subsequently the rishonim had difﬁculty with this halakhah, for it in essence annuls the halakhah found in the mishnah, as the Tal- mud itself states. How can R. Nahman’s ruling be resolved with the mishnah?”120 Elman solves this problem by noting that R. Nahman’s ruling may be based on a parallel Sasanian law.121 In another place we have found the existence of this tendency in disputes between R. Nahman and R. Sheshet.122 In the Talmud itself, R. Hama and

115 Ms. Vatican 115 reads, “R. Adda bar Minyomi.” In the Bavli when a sage is quoted using the formula, “R. X said in the name of (amar mishmeh) R. Y” usually X is a student of Y, or at least a younger subordinate sage (see above, footnote 29). In light of this, the reading R. Adda bar Minyomi quoting a tradition in the name of R. Nahman, is difficult to accept. R. Adda bar Minyomi is a fifth generation amora (see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 403), subject to the authority of Ravina (ibid), who was himself a student of Rava and a member of the fourth-fifth generation in Mahoza (see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 95). Furthermore, the reading, “R. Joseph bar Minyomi” is also preferable in light of the fact that this amora studied in front of R. Nahman, and regularly quotes halakhic traditions in his name (see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 356). 116 The reading in Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot, 2:515 is “Why? We should be concerned lest he has property elsewhere?” 117 Ms. Vatican 115 reads, “R. Ashi.” Mss. Florence and Paris 1337 read, “R. Nahman”. 118 The words in brackets are missing in all manuscripts. 119 See: Gulak, Legal Documents in the Talmud [Heb.], 157 n. 13. R. Yaron also posited that this tradition contradicts an halakhic decision made by R. Nahman elsewhere. See: Yaron, Gifts in Contemplation of Death, 75. 120 Elman, “The Babylonian Academies” [Heb.], 49. 121 Elman, (above, footnote 120), 49–50. 122 B. Cohen, “Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet,” 11–32. rav hama 149

Mar b. Rav Ashi123 interpret the mishnah against its simple meaning to prevent it from contradicting R. Nahman.124 R. Hama limits the mishnah to a case where the dying person explicitly stated that that he was transferring all of his property, thereby revealing that he does not own property elsewhere that we might not know about.125 His forced interpretation of the mishnah is a result of his need to resolve the dif- ﬁculty brought against R. Nahman from the tannaitic source.

3. Summary and Conclusions

(a) R. Hama’s halakhic rulings exhibit a high degree of independence from earlier halakhic tradition, tannaitic or amoraic. His abstract and concrete rulings demonstrate a halakhic “ﬂexibility” grounded in his own halakhic/legal thinking. Moreover, he is willing to be lenient even if this causes a deviation from tannaitic or amoraic halakhah. Simi- larly, in the one case in which he is found interpreting the Mishnah, his interpretation is forced and does not accord with the Mishnah’s simple meaning. Formally speaking, there are methodological similarities between the halakhic rulings and interpretations of R. Hama and those of Ame- mar. Both sages base their rulings and their halakhic behavior upon independent decision making, judging each case on its own merits, even if this causes them to deviate from earlier halakhic tradition. The distinctiveness of their methodology is reﬂected in the level of surprise that their statements frequently caused traditional commentators and modern scholars. Another similarity between the two is that they are rarely, if ever, portrayed as engaging in academic interpretation of tannaitic sources. Most of their contribution to the talmudic corpus is in the realm of halakhic rulings. Their rulings and interpretations show few signs of sensitivity to the simple meaning of tannaitic sources. In this way they are similar to R. Nahman and differ from R. Sheshet

123 Mar bar Rav Ashi infrequently offers interpretations of tannaitic sources and when he does so, it is for reasons similar to those which motivate R. Hama (see: A. Cohen, Mar bar Rav Ashi [He.], 234–236. Compare with the above, chapter two, section 4.6(b), pp. 85–86. 124 See Elman, (above, footnote 120), 49–50. For a discussion of this mishnah and its interpretation in the Yerushalmi (y. Pe’ah 3:4,17d ) see: B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet [Heb.], 64–65. 125 See: Levine, ed., Sefer Hanner, 312. 150 chapter four and R. Zebid of Nehardea. Nevertheless, despite their similarities, we cannot ignore the qualitative and quantitative differences between R. Hama and Amemar. Amemar’s critique of earlier sources is more prominent. In his rulings, judgments and halakhic actions Amemar tends to rule explicitly against tannaitic or early amoraic tradition, or in opposition to the accepted rules of halakhic decision making (especially in statements which begin with the word “vehilkheta”). This tendency can be sensed in the numerous difficulties that R. Ashi raises on Amemar from official and authoritative sources. In many of these Amemar either offers a strained interpretation of a source, or ignores it altogether, refusing to resolve his opinion with the other source (“I have not heard it; that is to say, it is not reasonable to me.” [lo shemi’a li kelomar lo sevira li]). The methodology reflected in R. Hama’s contributions to talmudic literature also differs from that of R. Sheshet of the third generation, as well as from the methodology of “Nehardeans say” of the fourth. R. Sheshet is conservative in his halakhic rulings and interpretations; he exhibits a high degree of dependency upon earlier tradition, similar to what is characterized as “legal formalism.”126 The “Nehardeans say” traditions are also highly based upon earlier halakhah, which they attempt to expand to cover a broader scope of cases.127 (b) These findings are consequential with regard to our accepting the accuracy of an anonymous tradition in b. Sanhedrin 17b which identifies a list of nicknames with specific sages. Among these iden- tifications is the identification of “the amoraim of Nehardea”/the Nehardeans say”128 with R. Hama.129 The problem with this tradition is that, as we have stated above, the halakhic traditions attributed to the “Nehardeans” exhibit unified, singular tendencies which do not in any way match those attributed to R. Hama or Amemar (or other Nehardean sages of their generation who are identified by name). Our analysis of the methodology of these amoraim strengthens Goodblatt’s doubts concerning the accuracy of the talmudic identification found in tractate Sanhedrin.

126 See mainly B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet, XVII; idem, “Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman,” 12–14. 127 See above, chapter three, section 2, pp. 106–122. 128 This appears differently in different manuscripts. See chapter three, p. 125, footnote 126. 129 See chapter three, p. 125, footnote 126. rav hama 151

(c) We have found no basis for the claim that there were two R. Hama’s active in Babylonia during the fourth century. The evidence for this claim was based on an a priori assumption as well as unnecessary interpretations of talmudic sources. The notion of two R. Hama’s similarly fails due to our ﬁndings concerning the consistency of R. Hama’s methodology. The high degree of consistency in the rulings attributed to R. Hama throughout the Talmud, and the distinctiveness of his methodology among Nehardean sages from the third, fourth and ﬁfth centuries (with the exclusion of Amemar, who is similar to R. Hama) imply that there was only one sage in this period named R. Hama, since it is highly unlikely that two different sages who just happen to have the same name would also just happen to have the same halakhic methodology.

CHAPTER FIVE

RAV ZEBID OF NEHARDEA

1. “I Reported the Statement before R. Zebid of Nehardea, and He Said to Me”: The Indirect Reports of R. Zebid’s Statements

R. Zebid of Nehardea was a ﬁfth generation Babylonian amora.1 Although he is not listed in the geonic chronologies as an academy head, there is talmudic evidence that he did head a local academy in Nehardea.2 A source from the Bavli indicates that he died before R. Papa, who died in 375/376 C.E.3 This source reads: “R. Kahana eulogized R. Zebid of Nehardea in Pum Nahara. R. Papa said: It was the day of hearing [about his death] and it is as if he was in his presence.”4 According to this source, R. Kah- ana, a ﬁfth generation amora (and R. Ashi’s teacher)5 eulogized R. Zebid of Nehardea in Pum Nahara,6 and R. Papa responded to the

1 See: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim VeAmoraim, 1:381; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 407–408. The fact that R. Zebid (with no appellation; academy head in Pumbedita, died 385/386, see: Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 90) and R. Zebid of Nehardea are different amoraim can be proven from a passage in b. Kiddushin 72b. On this topic see mainly: Maimon, ed., Yihuse’i Tannaim VeAmoraim, 80–81; Filipowski,ed., Yuhasin ha-Shalem, 131; Halperin, Seder HaDorot, 115; Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 6:70–72; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:122 n. 6; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 1:381; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 407; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 176 n. 160. There is also a clear difference in localities and dates of death. As stated, R. Zebid of Nehardea headed a local academy in Nehardea and died in 375 C.E., whereas R. Zebid (with no appellation) stood as academy head in Pumbedita during the same period, and died in 385 C.E. 2 Concerning R. Zebid of Nehardea’s service as academy head, see below, near footnotes 14–15. 3 Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 89. 4 b. Mo’ed Qatan 27b. 5 See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 413, 427; A. Cohen, Ravina and Con- temporary Sages [Heb.], 76–77 n. 56, 106–107. 6 Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonien, 194, 192 placed Pum Nahara on the western banks of the Tigris, near the cities Nu’mānīya and Neharpanya, whereas according to Neubauer, La Géographie du Talmud, 366, Pum Nahara was close to Nehardea. In contrast, based on a different assessment as to the location of Nu’mānīya and Neharpa- nya, Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 371, identiﬁes Pum Nahara as being in southern Babylonia, west of the Euphrates, close to the city Kūfa. 154 chapter FIve eulogy.7 Therefore, R. Zebid of Nehardea must have died before R. Papa in 375/376. R. Zebid of Nehardea does not appear frequently in the Bavli, only twelve times in the printed edition8 and an additional three appearances in manuscripts.9 His statements are transmitted by one of two amoraim, both of whom were subordinate to him: R. Kahana or Ame- mar.10 His statements are reported in retroactive language by one of these two sages who use the following formula: “I stated the [previous] tradition in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea. [He said to me . . . ]” [amrita li’shma’ata kameh de-rav zevid minehardea (amar li)].11 There are thirteen such cases. This formula is used in the Bavli to describe a student reporting a ruling, halakhah or opinion in front of his teacher (for instance: R. Judah who “states” in front of Samuel, or R. Ashi who “states” in front of R. Kahana) in order to receive his teacher’s reaction to the statement.12 In four cases R. Zebid of Nehardea is documented as having responded to the report with a counter-tradition: “[I stated

7 See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 176 n. 160. The reading “R. Papa” is based on Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot, 1:449 as well as Mss. London Harl. 5508 (400), Munich 140, Munich 95, Oxford Opp. Add. Fol. 23, Vatican 134 and testimony found in rishonim. Mss. Columbia X893 T 141, Vatican 108 and the Pezaro printed edition read: “R. Papi”. This is a common variant in Bavli manuscripts. See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 77 n. 57. R. Papi was a contemporary of R. Papa (see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 418–419) and therefore this variant has little effect on the dating of R. Zebid of Nehardea. 8 b. Yevamot 18b; ibid. 48b; b. Ketubbot 40a; b. Kiddushin 72b; b. Bava Qamma 16a; ibid. 71b; b. Bava Metzi’a 69a; ibid. 73b; b. Bava Batra 136a; b. Sanhedrin 69b; b. Avoda Zarah 63b; b. Arakhin 6a. 9 b. Bava Qamma (based on Ms. Hamburg 165); b. Bava Batra 76b (based on Mss. Paris 1337 and Vatican 115); ibid. 114a (based on Ms. Vatican 115). Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 6:71–72 claimed that there are two additional passages in which R. Zebid of Nehardea is mentioned (b. Ketubbot 63b and b. Betzah 22a). Despite the fact that Halevy was aware of the fact that R. Zebid and R. Zebid of Nehardea are different amoraim he didn’t bring any support for his opinion concerning these two cases. In these two cases, there is no support in any textual witness for the claim that the sage is R. Zebid of Nehardea. Rather, it is clearly R. Zebid (with no appellation). 10 In one case (b. Kiddushim 72b) a tradition in the name of R. Zebid of Nehardea is reported by the stam (see below). For a potential explanation of this phenomenon, see below, section 3, p. 170, near footnote 91. 11 The ten passages are: b. Yevamot 18b; ibid. 48b; b. Ketubbot 40a; b. Bava Qamma 16a; b. Bava Qamma 71b; b. Bava Metzi’a 69a; ibid. 73b; b. Bava Batra 136a; b. Sanhedrin 69b; b. Avoda Zarah 63b; b. Arakhin 6a. There are two additional cases in manuscripts: b. Bava Batra 76b (Mss. Paris 1337 and Vatican 115); ibid. 114a (Ms. Vatican 115). 12 See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 73 n. 40, and 157; ibid., “The contrastive term,” 56–57. rav zebid of nehardea 155 my tradition in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea. He said to me . . . ]: You (pl.) teach it this way, we teach it this way.” [atun matnitu la . . . anan matnenan la]13 These words are used to describe contradictory traditions of amoraic statements that originate in different geographical regions. This indirectly demonstrates that the speaker and his teacher are from different centers of learning in talmudic Babylonia, in this case Nehardea and Pum Nahara.14 As Avinoam Cohen has written elsewhere: . . . This phrase is used to express a difference of opinion between the academies (or schools of thought) of the parties to the dialogue; it means: You (pl.), in your academy, learn this tradition thus; but we, in our academy, learn it otherwise or with reference to a different matter. The parties are not representing themselves here, but the academy or school of thought to which they belong (and which they tend to support).15 In another study I dealt at length with the phenomenon of “local academies,” academies which supplemented the central academies known to us from the geonic chronologies.16 The names of the amoraim who served in these institutions as academy heads are absent from the geonic chronologies, the Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon and Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, due to the fact that the authors of these works focused on the central academies of the period: Sura (and its successor in Mata

13 b. Yevamot 18b; b. Bava Batra 136a; b. Sanhedrin 69b; b. Arakhin 6a. The verb “matni”/“matnu” is a technical literary term, used to cite variant traditions or even passages which originate in different sources in the amoraic period. For a discussion of the formation of these sources in the Bavli, see below, section 3(a), pp. 171–173. 14 The evidence that R. Kahana (ﬁfth generation) headed a local academy in Pum Nahara is found mostly in the retroactive testimony of R. Ashi: “When we were in the house of R. Kahana [he said to us] [it was asked of us] (ki havenan bei rav kahana amar lan/ibai’ya lan)” (b. Berakhot 39a; ibid. 42a; b. Bava Qamma 95b; b. Hullin 97b and others). This description which appears 33 different times in the Bavli, is usually used in cases in which the sage testifying is a student in his master’s house (for instance R. Nahman with Rabba b. Avuha; Rava with R. Nahman; Abbaye with Rabbah, and others). See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 192 n. 38. On the meaning of the term “the house of R. X” (in its various manifestations, including “When we were in the house of R. X”) as a signiﬁer of an academic institution at the head of which R. X stood, see: Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 215; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 142–154; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 218. See also above, chapter one, p. 5. 15 A. Cohen, “The contrastive term,” 48. That R. Zebid of Nehardea is from Nehardea is also obvious from the appellation attached to his personal name. This was discussed at length in chapter six, section 1, pp. 177–178, near footnotes 4–6. 16 B. Cohen, “Local Academies,” 447–471. 156 chapter FIve

Mehasya) and Pumbedita.17 My conclusion was based on a variety of terms which indicate a formal educational setting in connection with Nehardean amoraim (mainly during the fourth century) who are not named as academy heads in the geonic chronologies.18 The plural pronouns which R. Zebid of Nehardea uses to phrase his counter- traditions, “You (pl) . . . We” indicate the existence of a local center of instruction headed by R. Zebid of Nehardea (similar to that known from Pum Nahara).19 Together with other evidence found in the Bavli, the use of this phrase indicates the existence of Rabbinic Instruction in Nehardea, already in the beginning of the fourth century.20

2. Analysing His Responses and Reactions to Earlier Amoraic Statements

Despite the paucity of material attributed to R. Zebid of Nehardea, analysis demonstrates that there is a consistent methodology to his responses and reactions to reports stated in front of him. The same methodology is not found among other late Nehardean amoraim. We will begin by presenting our main ﬁndings, and afterwards we will discuss the talmudic passages themselves. (a) Analysis of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s statements reveals a sage whose contribution to the talmudic tradition is expressed mainly in his preservation of early amoraic Nehardean traditions (seven cases).21 In these cases, R. Zebid issues reports concerning alternative versions of traditions with which he is familiar, or he corrects the versions transmitted by R. Kahana or Amemar22 in the name of early Nehardean amoraim (Samuel, R. Nahman and R. Hama). R. Zebid of Nehardea’s accounts of earlier Nehardean amoraic statements are unique. They present a version of the halakhah under discussion that differs or directly contradicts the parallel tradition preserved by other notable

17 See above, chapter two, section 2, p. 46. 18 I have dealt with this issue at length in chapter two, section 2, p. 46. 19 On the existence of a local academy in Pum Nahara, see above, footnote 14. 20 See above, chapter one, chapter one, sections 1.1.–1.2., pp. 4–8. 21 See: b. Yevamot 18b; b. Kiddushin 72b; b. Bava Metzi’a 69a; ibid. 73b; b. Bava Batra 136a; b. Sanhedrin 69b; b. Arakhin 6a. 22 See: b. Kiddushin 72b (in the name of Samuel); b. Yevamot 18b (in the name of Samuel); b. Bava Metzi’a 73b (in the name of Rav Hama); b. Bava Batra 136a (in the name of Rav Nahman); b. Sanhedrin 69b (in the name of Rav Nahman); b. Arakhin 6a (in the name of Rav Nahman). rav zebid of nehardea 157 sages. These traditions of R. Zebid of Nehardea are reported in the Bavli in the following manner:

I. R. Zebid of Nehardea frequently reports to R. Kahana of alternative versions of statements made in the name of Nehardean amoraim. The formula in these cases is: “You teach it (atun metnitu) this way . . . [but] we teach (anan matnenan) it this way.” 23 The verb “matni” in the Bavli means “to teach/to recite,”24 and it is a term reserved for the repetition and transmission of amoraic statements.25 As stated above, the fact that both uses of the verb are in the plural indicates that R. Zebid of Nehardea’s tradition contradicts the halakhic tradition found in R. Kahana’s academy, Pum Nahara.26 Furthermore, analysis of these cases demonstrates that the traditions known to R. Zebid of Nehardea contradict not only the traditions of R. Kahana from one of the local academies, but even the halakhic traditions stemming from the outstanding amoraim of the centers of learning in Sura, Pumbedita and Mahoza during the fourth century (for instance: R. Zera, Rava, R. Papa, R. Huna son of R. Joshua). II. In one instance, Amemar insists upon ruling in a concrete case in accordance with a halakhah transmitted in the name of Samuel, despite the fact that Samuel’s tradition contradicts a parallel halakhah found in “the house of R. Kahana,” “the house of R. Papa,” and “the house of R. Zebid.” The Stam justiﬁes Amemar’s halakhah by the fact that he heard this version of the tradition from R. Zebid

23 These sources will be discussed below. A similar phenomenon is cited in the Palestinian Talmud by the term “there are those who say” ([ve]it de-amrin), which cites an alternate version of an amoraic statement. See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 558–559; Moscovitz, The Terminology of the Yerushalmi [Heb.], 54–55. The difference between this term in the Yerushalmi and “matni” in the Bavli is that in the Yerushalmi the term usually refers to relatively inconsequential matters (meanings of words, identities of those involved in stories and other such matters) and not halakhic traditions. See: Moscovitz, The Terminology of the Yerushalmi [Heb.], 54–55. 24 See: Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 8:249; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 4:655; Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, 2:1681–1682; Sokoloff, Diction- ary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 1221–1222. 25 See mainly: Lewy, “Introduction to the Commentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin,” 102 n. 1; Bacher, Tradition und Tradenten, 239; Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 1:682; Weiss, The Talmud in Its Development [Heb.], 194, 197. For more discussion on this issue see below, section 3(a), pp. 171–176. 26 See above, section 1, p. 155. 158 chapter FIve

of Nehardea.27 This demonstrates the great amount of respect that Amemar, who was subordinate to R. Zebid of Nehardea and perhaps even his student, had for the latter’s traditions. This is in opposition to R. Ashi who disagrees with this tradition.

Israel Lewy and Wilhelm Bacher demonstrated that alternative versions of amoraic statements (designated by the terms “matni”/“matnu”) are rare among Babylonian amoraim until the third generation, but become common by R. Zebid of Nehardea’s generation.28 However, a comparison of this phenomenon as it occurs with other sages and as it occurs with R. Zebid of Nehardea demonstrates that there are certain characteristics of this sage’s alternative traditions that do not exist for the others. These shall be discussed below (in section 3[a]). (b) In four different instances, R. Zebid of Nehardea critiques an opinion or an interpretation reported to him by R. Kahana based on either the context of the tannaitic source being interpreted or upon its literal meaning.29 This critique is based upon the underlying assumption that an interpreter is subject to the literal meaning of the text he is interpreting, and that a ruling or interpretation offered by a sage must accord with the earlier source’s language. This theory of interpretation has been described in general legal theory as well.30 It should be emphasized that the above two phenomena are unique to R. Zebid of Nehardea in comparison with other late Nehardean amoraim. We will return to this subject at the end of the chapter. We shall now analyze the talmudic passages themselves. Bavli Yevamot 17b–18b R. Huna said in the name of Rav31: a woman awaiting levirate marriage who dies: he (the levir) is permitted to her mother32. . . . And R. Judah said33: a woman awaiting levirate marriage who dies: he (the levir) is forbidden to her mother. . . .

27 b. Kiddushin 72b. 28 See: Lewy, “Introduction to the Commentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin,” 3–12; Bacher, Tradition und Tradenten, 578–589. 29 b. Yevamot 48b; b. Bava Qamma 16a; ibid. 71b; b. Avoda Zarah 63b. 30 For a discussion of this approach in legal theory, see below near footnote 76, p. 167. 31 In Ms. Vatican 114 the words “in the name of Rav” are missing. 32 This halakhah is found with similar wording in t. Yevamot 6:3 (ed. Lieberman, 17–18). In y. Yevamot 2:1, 3c and parallels it is ascribed to R. Elazar. 33 In Ms. Oxford 367 and rishonim the words “in the name of Rav” are added. See Dikdukei Sofrim Hashalem, n. 77. rav zebid of nehardea 159

Abbaye said to R. Joseph: R. Judah’s opinion is really Samuel’s as it is taught in a mishnah: “A woman awaiting levirate marriage whose brother marries her sister—in the name of R. Judah b. Bathyra they said: They say to him wait until your brother does the deed” (m. Yevamot 4:9),34 and Samuel said: the halakhah is like R. Judah ben Bathyra. (He said to him35): If it is Rav’s, so what? (He said to him36): Rav’s statement here disagrees with his statement elsewhere. . . . R. Kahana said: I stated the tradition in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea. He said [to me37]: You (pl.) teach it this way, we teach it this way: R. Judah said in the name of Samuel: a woman awaiting levirate marriage who dies: he (the levir) is forbidden to her mother. Bavli Arakhin 6a R. Nahman said in the name of Rabba b. Avuha [who said it the name of Rav38]: One who says, “This sela is dedicated to charity,” he is permitted to exchange it . . . R. Ami said in the name of R. Yohanan: it is permitted both for oneself and for someone else.39 R. Zera said40: It was taught only where he said: “[I take] upon myself ” but if he said: “Behold this [sela will go to charity],” then he is obligated to give this sela. Rava raised a difﬁcult: On the contrary! The opposite is logical. If he said: “Behold this [sela]” he may use it for himself, so that he may be responsible for it, but if he said: “[ I take] upon myself,” he should not [be permitted to exchange it]. But the fact is it makes no difference. . . . R. Kahana said: I stated the tradition in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea. He said [to me]41: You (pl.) teach it this way, we teach it this way: R. Nahman said in the name of Rabba b. Avuha who said in the name of Rav: One who says, “This sela is dedicated to charity,” he is permitted

34 This halakhah is found with minor variations in t. Yevamot 6:4 (Lieberman, ed. 18). 35 The words in brackets are found in Mss. Oxford 367, Moscow COD. 595, Munich 95, Vatican 114, Vatican 111 and in the geniza fragment T-S F2(1) 11 and in ms. Leningrad-Antonin 497. 36 The words in brackets are missing in Mss. Oxford 367, Moscow COD. 594, Vatican 111 and Leningrad-Antonin 497. 37 The words in brackets were added in Mss. Moscow COD. 594 and Vatican 114. 38 The words in brackets are based upon Mss. Oxford 370, London BL Add. 25717 (402), Oxford Bodl. Heb. C.21 (2666) 24 and Vatican 120. The reading in Munich 95 and Vatican 119 matches the reading of the printed edition. 39 In Ms. Munich 95 R. Ami’s statement in the name of R. Yohanan is missing. 40 Ms. Munich 95 reads “Zeiri.” 41 The bracketed words are based upon Mss. Oxford 370, and Oxford Bodl. Heb. C.21 (2666) 24. The Venice printed edition reads: “He said.” In Mss. London BL Add. 25717 (402), Munich 95, Vatican 120 and Vatican 119 the words, “he said to me” are missing. 160 chapter FIve

to exchange it both for himself, or for someone else, whether he had said: “[I take] upon myself ” or “Behold this [sela].” Examination of all of the cases in the Bavli of the formula “When I stated the tradition in front of R. X” ([ki] amrita lishma’ata kameh de-x amar [li]) demonstrates that the tradition recited in front of the sage was a ruling, halakhah or opinion that originated with a sage of the same generation or one older. It was recited in order to receive that sage’s opinion concerning the validity and accuracy of the statement.42 In the above two cases R. Kahana reports to R. Zebid of Nehardea concerning a halakhic tradition transmitted in the name of earlier amoraic sages. R. Zebid of Nehardea responds with a variant version of the tradition, which disagrees not only with the version known to R. Kahana from Pum Nahara, but also with those from other centers of rabbinic learning. We shall now explain in greater detail. In the ﬁrst passage, Abbaye derives from a statement of Samuel’s made elsewhere that the opinion, “a woman awaiting levirate marriage who dies: he (the levir) is forbidden to her mother” did not originate with R. Judah but rather with Samuel. Moreover, from Abbaye’s response to R. Joseph in the continuation of the passage, it is clear that both Abbaye and R. Joseph were familiar with a version of the halakhah attributed to R. Judah, and not Samuel. In contrast, R. Zebid of Nehardea reports to R. Kahana that he is familiar with a tradition in which the halakhah is explicitly attributed to Samuel. Albeck explains: According to one tradition Samuel didn’t explicitly say “a woman awaiting levirate marriage that dies. . . ,” rather they learned that this was his opinion by deducing it from another of his statement’s, “the halakhah is according to R. Judah b. Bathyra” . . . but according to R. Zebid of Nehardea’s tradition, Samuel said so explicitly.43 A similar phenomenon occurs in the second source. The ﬁrst half of the passage opens with the statement of R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha in the name of Rav. There are three interpretations to this statement: (1) R. Ami in the name of R. Yohanan: “It is permitted both for oneself and for someone else.” (2) R. Zera: (“it was stated only when”) he said ‘upon me,’ but not if he said ‘Behold this.’ ” (3) Rava: his critique of R. Zera and his conclusion: “it makes no difference.” The version of the statement presented by R. Zebid of

42 See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 157 and n. 70. 43 Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 466 n. 21. rav zebid of nehardea 161

Nehardea differs from that presented by R. Kahana of Pum Nahara, as well as from that presented by his predecessors—R. Ami, R. Zera and Rava. In other words, in contrast to the traditions of the sages of Sura, Pumbedita and Mahoza from the second through fourth generations,44 all of whom add on to the original halakhah of R. Nah- man, R. Zebid of Nehardea includes all three in one halakhic/literary formula. The tradition related by R. Zebid of Nehardea to R. Kah- ana of Pum Nahara reveals that he was familiar with the other version of R. Nahman’s statement, the one that R. Kahana recited. It is likely that he was familiar with the statements of R. Ami, R. Zera and R. Yohanan as well. The following source is even clearer in demonstrating this phenomenon. Bavli Kiddushin 72b Mishnah: Ten genealogical statuses came up from Babylonia: Priests, Levites, Israelites, disqualified priests, converts, free slaves, mamzers, netins, shtuki and asufi (two different types of foundlings). Gemara: R. Judah said in the name of Samuel: these are the words of R. Meir, but the sages say: all lands are under the presumption of being genealogically fit.45 Amemar allowed Huna b. Nathan to marry a woman from Mahozy’ata. R. Ashi said to him: What do you hold? That R. Judah said in the name of Samuel: these are the words of R. Meir, but the sages say: all lands are under the presumption of being genealogically fit. But in the house of R. Kahana they didn’t teach this way. And in the house of R. Papa they didn’t teach this way, and in the house of R. Zebid they didn’t teach this way.46

44 The activity of R. Zera (the ﬁrst or second) in Babylonia is mainly in Sura and Pumbedita and most of his contact is with sages from these two places (R. Huna, R. Hisda, R. Joseph, R. Safra and Abbaye). See: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 1:387, 398–399; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 233–234. According to R. Sherira Gaon, Rava was academy head in Mahoza, as well as Pumbedita after Abbaye’s death in 337. See: Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 88. 45 This halakhah is also stated in the name of Rav in b. Kiddushin 76b. N. Aminoah posits that both traditions stem from Nehardea. See: Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Qiddushin [Heb.], 24–25. 46 Mss. Oxford Opp. 248 (367) and Vatican 111 read: “But in the house of R. Kahana they didn’t teach this way. And R. Papa and R. Zebid didn’t teach this way.” Ms. Munich 95 reads: “He said to him: R. Papa and R. Zebid teach this way. Even so, he didn’t accept this from him for . . . ”. According to this version, it is Ame- mar who tells R. Ashi that R. Papa and R. Zebid teach according to his position, and it is R. Ashi who doesn’t accept Amemar’s claim. The version preserved in the printed edition seems preferable, as was already noted by Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 407 n. 410. 162 chapter FIve

Even so, he didn’t accept this from him, for he had heard it in the house of R. Zebid of Nehardea. Amemar allowed the exilarch Huna b. Nathan,47 who was younger and subordinate to him,48 to marry a woman from Mahozyata.49 His ruling is based on a tradition in the name of Samuel according to which all lands are presumed to be genealogically ﬁt. Traditional commentators and modern scholars alike have noted that this lenient tradition with regard to the genealogy of lands outside of Babylonia, is not only unique to Samuel, but contradicts other halakhot attributed to Samuel as well.50 Indeed, R. Ashi counters Amemar’s ruling with the fact that this tradition was not taught in the schools51 of R. Zebid,52

47 Evidence of Huna b. Nathan’s subordination to Amemar can be found in other passages, for instance: b. Gittin 19b; b. Bava Batra 74b; b. Zevahim 19a. See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 77 n. 59. 48 On Huna b. Nathan as exilarch see: Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 91. The Bavli itself contains no evidence that he served as exilarch, an absence that led to differences of opinions among scholars as to R. Sherira Gaon’s source of information. See: Beer, The Babylonian Exilarchate [Heb.], 200–206; Herman, The Exilarchate in the Sasanian Era [Heb.], 112–118. 49 It is unknown why Huna b. Nathan required permission to marry a woman from “Mahoz’yata”. If this is a reference to Mahoza, then Mahoza lay within the region of Babylonia with regard to issues of lineage. See: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 189 n. 40; idem “Lineage Boundaries of Babylonia” [Heb.], 173–187; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 121–125. This problem led several researchers to conclude that “Mahoz’yata” mentioned in this source was a city which lay outside of these boundaries. See: Eshel, Jewish Settlements in Babylonia [Heb.], 144–145; Neubauer, La Géographie du Talmud, 380; Neusner, A History of the Jews, 5:56 n. 3. Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonien, 174 connected the permission that Huna b. Nathan needed to wed with the large number of converts found in Mahoza, which might have caused concern regarding the purity of their lineage. 50 See b. Kiddushin 69b; ibid. 71a. See also: Epstein, Mevo’ot Lesifrut Hatannaim, 98; Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Qiddushin [Heb.], 25–26; Kalmin, The Sage in Jewish Society, 55–56; Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia, 183. 51 Concerning the use of the term “the house of R. X” as a reference to a bet midrash/disciple circle, see mainly: Bacher, Tradition und Tradenten, 608; Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction, 108–155; ibid., “New Developments in the Study of Babylonian Academies” [Heb.], 31–38; A. Cohen, “Towards the Historical Meaning Hidden in the Phrase “Rabbi So-and-So Happened to Come to” [Heb.], 59–62 63–64. 52 Concerning R. Zebid’s service as academy head, see above, section 1, p. 155, near footnotes 14–15. rav zebid of nehardea 163

R. Papa53 or R. Kahana,54 and that in those places, the opposite was taught.55 According to the stam, Amemar insisted upon his opinion only because he had heard it from R. Zebid of Nehardea.56 Based on what we know of R. Zebid of Nehardea from his other contributions to talmudic literature, it should not surprise us that here too he reports a variant tradition stemming from other early Nehardean amoraim. As a Nehardean, R. Zebid may have had access to traditions that were perceived to be more reliable, at least in the eyes Amemar, who relied upon them when issuing a halakhic ruling.57 R. Zebid of Nehardea and Amemar enjoyed a close relationship, and it is possible that Amemar was even his student. Another passage in the Bavli describes Amemar reporting to R. Zebid of Nehardea concerning a halakhic tradition in the name of R. Hama,58 implying that Amemar was younger than and subordinate to R. Zebid of Nehardea.59 In the fourth example, R. Zebid of Nehardea presents an alternative version of a statement by R. Nahman. In this case R. Kahana raises an academic question in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea based on a tradition in the name of R. Nahman with which he is familiar. R. Zebid of Nehardea corrects the version, thereby removing the basis for the problem. Unlike the previous cases, in which R. Kahana recites a tradition in the name of R. Nahman in order to receive R. Zebid of Nehardea’s opinion concerning the statement, here he introduces a halakhic question based on one of R. Nahman’s statements.

53 According to geonic chronologies, R. Papa served as academy head in Nareš, a city close to Sura, until his death in 375. See: Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 89. 54 There were multiple sages by the name of R. Kahana. It seems that the sage referred to here was a member of the ﬁfth generation, R. Ashi’s teacher. This R. Kah- ana headed a local academy in Pum Nahara, and died some time between 370–380. See: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 413; A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 107. 55 See Rashi, s.v. veha be Rav Kahana: “for in the house of R. Kahana they didn’t teach that Samuel taught that way, rather as he said above, all lands are assumed to be disqualiﬁed, and R. Judah said in the name of Samuel ‘all lands are dough (i.e. mixed up)’ ” see above, footnote 50. 56 Rashi was aware that this source proves that R. Zebid of Nehardea is not identical with R. Zebid without an appellation (Rashi, s.v. Rav Zebid mi-Nehardea). See above, footnote 1. 57 See discussion below, section 3(a). 58 b. Bava Metzi’a 73b. 59 See above, p. 154, near footnote 11. 164 chapter FIve

Bavli Bava Metzi’a 68b–69a: Mishnah: One may not set up a shopkeeper on the condition of receiving half the profit, or give him the money to buy produce on the condition of receiving half the profit, unless he pays him his wage as an (unemployed) laborer.60 Gemara: Our rabbis taught: How much are his wages? Whether great or small, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah says: Even if he only dipped his bread into his brine, or he ate only a dried fig, those are his wages.61 R. Shimon b. Yohai says: He pays his full wages . . . R. Nahman said: the halakhah is in accordance with R. Judah, and the halakhah is in accordance with R. Yose b. R. Judah, and the halakhah is in accordance with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. A debt document was issued against the children of R. Ilish. In it was written, “half profits and half loss.” Rava said: R. Ilish was a great man, and he would not have fed [another person] with something forbidden. It must be taken to mean: either half profit and two thirds loss; or half loss and two thirds profit. R. Kahana said62: I stated this ruling before R. Zebid of Nehardea.63 Perhaps R. Ilish had dipped his bread into his brine, and R. Nahman said, the halakhah is according to R. Judah? He said to him: It was not stated that such is the halakhah, but that [all proceed on the same] principle (shittah ittmar). The mishnah prohibits a contract between partners whereby the storekeeper sells the owner’s produce or uses his money in order to buy and sell produce, in a case where the owner receives not only the principal, but also half of the profit.64 This agreement, known in the Bavli as the “iska,”65 is prohibited because it is considered interest. It is only permitted if the owner of the produce or money pays the storekeeper also for his labors. Gulak explains: According to the law, the one selling the produce and the investor share equally in the iska, and moreover, the one selling is operating alone. Therefore, his participation in the project is greater than that of the

60 It is likely that the word “unemployed” was added based on a baraita in the Bavli (“It was taught: as an unemployed worker”) or on R. Meir’s words in t. Bava Metzi’a 4:11 (Lieberman, ed., 83). See: Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 2:956; Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 9:200; Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 6:229. 61 This baraita can be found with variants in t. Bava Metzi’a 4:11 (Lieberman, ed., 83). 62 Ms. Florence reads: “R. Papa.” 63 This is the reading preserved in Mss. Florence, Hamburg 165 and Munich 95. On the preferability of this reading see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 409–410. 64 See: Albeck, Shisha Sidre Mishnah, 4:85. 65 On the “iska” mentioned in the Bavli see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 409–410. rav zebid of nehardea 165

investor. Therefore, the profit cannot be equally divided between the two of them, in order that the seller not be construed as working for the investor as wages for the investor’s loan, for this would be interest. . . . However, the investor and the seller can stipulate to split the profits and losses; and if they agree to split them evenly, the investor must pay the seller for his work in selling the produce, so that this is not interest for half of the money of the iska which he gave him as a loan.66 As far as how much wages the investor must give the seller, there are three tannaitic opinions found in a baraita (R. Meir, R. Judah and R. Shimon). According to the most lenient opinion, that held by R. Judah, it is sufficient for the seller to eat with the investor for it to be considered as if he was paid, and to allow the iska: “Even if he only dipped his bread into his brine, or he ate only a dried fig, those are his wages.”67 R. Ilish, a fourth generation Babylonian amora,68 was involved in an iska, in which he took half the wages and shared half the losses. The assumption that “R. Ilish was a great man, and he would not have fed [another person] with something forbidden” leads Rava to explain the agreement in a strained manner, one with unusual stipula- tions, which do not seem to have been written in the actual document. R. Kahana tried to explain R. Ilish’s actions in another way, based on R. Judah’s halakhah found in the baraita. R. Kahana assumes, based on R. Nahman’s ruling, that this is the halakhah. Concerning R. Zebid of Nehardea’s response, “it was not stated that such is the halakhah, but that [all proceed on the same] principle (shittah ittmar),” David Halivni writes: R. Zebid responds to R. Kahana that R. Nahman’s words were not prop- erly transmitted. R. Nahman “didn’t say that such was the halakhah,” that is to say he didn’t say “halakhah, halakhah, halakhah,” rather he stated a common principle (shittah). R. Nahman stated, “R. Judah, R. Yose son of R. Judah and R. Shimon ben Gamaliel all stated their words based on a common principle.”69

66 Gulak, Yesode’i HaMishpat Ha’ivri, 2:197. 67 This is the version of R. Judah’s statement as found in the Tosefta (see above, footnote 61). See also: Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 9:200. 68 Hyman, Toldot Tannaim Veamoraim, 3:981; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 373. 69 Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 6:230. 166 chapter FIve

In the Bavli a shittah is used to group together a collection of sages who agree on an underlying principle.70 Different types of comparisons between the different opinions, are signiﬁed by various different technical terms (such as, “R. X made his statement in the same method as R. Y” [rabbi peloni be-shitat rabbi almoni]; “They said the same thing” [amru davar ehad]; “That of R. X is like that of R. Y” [atya de-rabbi peloni ke-rabbi almoni]; or “X and Y, they all agree that” [peloni u-peloni, kulhu sevira le’hu]).71 Both Palestinian and Babylonian amoraim are found grouping tannaim into one coherent shittah, although R. Yohanan and Abbaye engage in this activity most frequently.72 R. Zebid of Nehardea “corrects”73 the halakhic tradition recited in front of him by R. Kahana in the name of R. Nahman. According to R. Zebid of Nehardea, R. Nahman cited all of the tannaim who share a common (lenient)74 position, but not that the halakhah is set in accordance with this position.75 As was the case in the previous instances, so too here the version of the amoraic statement preserved by R. Zebid of Nehardea differs from that preserved by R. Kahana. However, unlike the previous cases in which the “correction” of R. Kahana’s version was made in the midst of an academic discussion, here the “correction” was made as an alternative interpretation of R. Ilish’s actions.

70 See mainly: Kosman, “ ‘Shittah’ as a Method of Study” [Heb.], 103; Moscovitz, “Amru Davar Ehad,” 281–282. 71 On the similarity between the terms “they all agree that” and “they said the same thing” see: Kosman, “’Shittah’ as a Method of Study” [Heb.], 111; Moscovitz, “Amru Davar Ehad,” 256–261; ibid., “Kulhu Sevira Lehu,” 321–341. 72 For a precise accounting of these terms see: Kosman, “ ‘Shittah’ as a Method of Study” [Heb.], 106; Moscovitz, “Amru Davar Ehad,” 252; ibid., “Kulhu Sevira Lehu,” 310. 73 See also Halivni’s comments, brought above. 74 See for instance the comments of the P’nei Yehoshua, s.v. eleh shitah. R. Zebid of Nehardea’s response is unclear, and it is not possible to determine the precise version in which R. Nahman’s original statement concerning the relation between the various tannaim was worded. See: Moscovitz, “Kulhu Sevira Lehu,” 309 n. 2. 75 Post-talmudic authorities developed the general principle that the halakhah is not set according to the “shittah.” See: Kosman, “ ‘Shittah’ as a Method of Study” [Heb.], 122–123; Moscovitz, “Kulhu Sevira Lehu,” 314 n. 29. R. Nahman’s statement (according to R. Zebid of Nehardea’s reaction) has been interpreted in accordance with this principle, as if he wished to reject these tannaitic positions from being accepted halakhah (see for instance the Tosafot: s.v. eleh shittah itmar). However, Kos- man demonstrated that the amoraim that delineated the “shittah” did not intend to reject these positions from halakhah (see Kosman, ibid., 123). rav zebid of nehardea 167

We will conclude with one example (out of four) where R. Zebid of Nehardea rejects a halakhic opinion, because it does not accord with the context of a tannaitic source or with its literal meaning. R. Zebid of Nehardea’s critique stems from an underlying assumption that a textual interpreter is subject to the text itself (and not the opposite) and that any interpretation or halakhic ruling which flows from the text must accord with the literal meaning of the text or with its original context. This basic demand placed upon the interpreter finds expression in legal theory. Thus Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin describe the position of an interpreter in the following way: “If one is interpreting, one is seeking the author’s intended meaning. When one is construct- ing a meaning that may not be the meaning intended by the author of the signs in question, one is not interpreting but establishing a rule.”76 More specifically, Francis Benion writes, “. . . the first linguistic canon is that an Act or other legislative instrument is to be read as a whole, so that an enactment within it is not treated as standing alone but is interpreted in its context as part of the entire instrument.77 This approach demands that each word or sentence be interpreted based on its context. As Robert Summers defines, “How the words in issue fit with the rest of the sentence in which the words appear . . . how the sentence in which the words in issue appear fits with the rest of the specific pararagraph or specific section involved.”78 According to this hermeneutical theory, it is impossible to separate the text from the environment in which it was created, as Aaron Barak writes, “A word in a statue is a creature of its environment. Its character is a function of its context.”79 An interpretation’s validity is tested—according to R. Zebid—by reading it in close proximity to the tannaitic text and its language. This textual approach stands in stark opposition to the shared approach of Amemar and R. Hama.80 We shall now demonstrate. Bavli Yevamot 48b Our rabbis taught: It is permitted to retain uncircumcised slaves, the words of R. Ishmael. R. Akiva says: It is not permitted. R. Yishmael said to him: Behold the verse says: “And the son of your handmaiden

76 L. Alexander & E. Sherwin, Demystifying Legal Reasoning, 139. See also Barak, Interpretation in Law [Heb.], 1:43. 77 Benion, Understanding Common Law Legislation, p. 107. 78 Summers, “Statutory Interpretation,” 413. See also Bennion, Statutory Interpreta- tion, 558–559; Cohen, The Law [Heb.], 215–216. 79 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, 101. 80 See the discussion below, section 3(b), pp. 175–176. 168 chapter FIve

shall rest” (Exodus 23:12)! He said to him: That verse refers to one who buys a slave at sunset (before the Sabbath) and does not have time to circumcise him . . . 81 R. Joshua b. Levi said: One who buys a slave from a gentile, and the slave refuses to be circumcised, he may bear with him for twelve months. [If by that time he had] not been circumcised, he must re-sell him to gentiles.82 The rabbis stated this tradition in front of R. Papa: In accordance with whose view? Not in accordance with that of R. Akiva, since he stated [that uncircumcised slaves] may not be retained. R. Papa said them: It may be stated even according to be the view of R. Akiva; for this applies when no definite consent has ever been given; but where definite consent had once been given it has already been given. R. Kahana said: I stated my tradition in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea. He said to me.83 If so, instead of R. Akiva replying “That verse refers to one who buys a slave at sunset” he should rather have given this reply! He gave him one of the two available solutions.84 The passage opens with a baraita that presents the dispute between R. Ishmael and R. Akiva. R. Akiva rules stringently, allowing a slave- owner to retain slaves only if they submit to circumcision. R. Joshua b. Levi allows an owner to retain a non-circumcised slave for twelve months, with the understanding that during this period his masters will try to convince him to submit to circumcision. This ruling seems to contradict that of R. Akiva, and the “rabbis” raise a difficulty on it from the baraita. R. Papa attempts to resolve this difficulty by interpreting R. Joshua b. Levi in light of R. Akiva’s opinion.85 According to R. Papa, R. Joshua b. Levi referred only to a case in which the

81 This baraita is found with variants in Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, Bo 16 (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 53). 82 This halakhah is found in y. Yevamot 8:1, 8d. See: Urbach, The World of the Sages [Heb.], 168 n. 131; Dor, The Teachings of Eretz Israel [Heb.], 135–136. 83 Mss. Munich 95, Vatican 111, Moscow-Ginzberg 1017 and Moscow-Ginzberg 594 do not have the words “he said to me.” 84 The geniza fragment Cambridge Add. 3207 reads, “He said to me: he gave him one of two solutions.” This unique reading and the manuscripts that lack these words create the possibility that the answer, “he gave him one of two possibilities” was stated by R. Zebid of Nehardea himself. In any event, even according to this version, the tradition stated in the name of R. Zebid of Nehardea is an interpretation whose intention is to solve the contradiction between the baraita and R. Papa. A similar response of R. Zebid of Nehardea is found in the continuation of the passage, where Rabin reports in the name of R. Ilai concerning an alternate version of the halakhah as it was reported by R. Kahana in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea. R. Zebid of Nehardea’s response there is identical to his response in the first case. 85 R. Joshua b. Levi’s opinion does not accord with that of R. Ishmael. This was noted by Dor, The Teachings of Eretz Israel [Heb.], 134 n. 39. According to Dor, the fact that the objection was raised specifically based on R. Akiva’s statement is a result rav zebid of nehardea 169 slave originally agreed to be circumcised, but later recanted. He is given twelve months in which to change his mind again. In contrast, R. Akiva forbade retaining slaves who never agreed to be circumcised.86 R. Zebid rejects the interpretation of his colleague, R. Papa, because it doesn’t fit with the textual context of the baraita: were this actually the opinion of R. Akiva, he would have used it in his response to R. Ishmael, rather than responding as he did,87 “that verse refers to one who buys a slave at sunset.” In his critique of R. Papa, R. Zebid exemplifies his typical sensitivity to the nuances of the text, its wording and its context.88

of the fact that the halakhah was determined according to his opinion, already during the talmudic period. 86 We have interpreted the passage according to the ﬁrst interpretation of Rashi, s.v. hekha delo paskah, because it matches the parallel statement of R. Yohanan and R. Joshua ben Levi in the Yerushalmi. See: Dor, The Teachings of Eretz Israel [Heb.], 135–136. R. Hai Gaon, Sefer Ha-Mekah Ve-Hamimkar, 1:21b, interpreted R. Papa’s statement slightly differently. In any case, the difference between these two interpretations has no bearing on our discussion. On these two interpretations see: Albeck, Prin- cipals of Talmudic Private Law [Heb.], 162–163; Finkelstein, Proselytism [Heb.], 77–78. 87 See: Hai Gaon, Sefer Ha-Mekah Ve-Hamimkar, 1:21b. See also Rashi, s.v. lishanei leh. 88 We can demonstrate R. Zebid of Nehardea’s close reading of the tannaitic text also through the example of the following passage from b. Avodah Zarah 63a–b: [R. Sheshet objected]: A man can say to his donkey-drivers and workmen, “Go and eat for this dinar,” or “Go out and drink for this dinar,” and he need not be concerned [about their eating and drinking the produce of] the Sabbatical year or libated wine. But if he said to them, “Go out and eat and I will pay,” “Go out and drink and I will pay,” he must be concerned [about their eating and drinking the produce of ] the Sabbatical year, tithe or libated wine R. Papa said: Here it is when he paid him the dinar in advance. R. Kahana said: I stated this teaching in the presence of R. Zebid of Nehardea. He said to me (this is the reading in Ms. JTS Rab. 15, Paris 1337, JTS 44830 [Abramson., ed. Tractate Abodah Zarah, 110] and rishonim [as it is always the case in the Bavli where the previous ruling, halakha or opinion is stated explicitly in the sugya before the formaula: amrita lishma’ata kame de . . .]): If that were so, then instead of the words “Go out and eat and drink and I will pay,” he should have said “Go out and eat, go out and eat and I will make an accounting.” He said to him: Read, “Go out and I will make an accounting.” This baraita appears in t. Demai 5:14 (Lieberman, ed. 89–90) and y. Demai 6:12, 25 with minor variations. According to the halakhah found in the beginning of the baraita, if the employer gave his employee a dinar to buy food or drink and the employee used the money to buy Sabbatical produce, untithed produce or libated wine, the employer need not be concerned that his money was used to buy forbidden food. However, if the employer pays the storekeeper directly for the forbidden food or drink that the employee bought, it is considered as if the employer paid his employees with Sabbatical produce, untithed produce or libated wine (see: Lieberman, Tosefta Kifshuta, 1:256). R. Papa understands the baraita as dealing with a case where the employer paid the storekeeper in advance for the food or drink. R. Zebid of Nehardea rejects this interpretation based on a close reading of the tannaitic text being interpreted. The words, 170 chapter FIve

3. Summary and Conclusions

R. Zebid of Nehardea’s literature is composed of indirect reports of his reactions to the sayings of amoraic predecessors. These reports are provided by two sages subordinate to him—R. Kahana of Pum Nahara and Amemar—who wish to receive R. Zebid of Nehardea’s opinion concerning these statements. The term used in these cases is: “I stated the tradition in front of R. Zebid of Nehardea.” R. Zebid of Nehardea’s statements never initiate new discussions, raise new questions or start new passages. Due to his literary position as a respondent, he appears at the end of passages, as the completing element.89 The fact that other amoraim initiate their contact with R. Zebid of Nehardea does not mean that R. Zebid did not himself contribute in other ways to the talmudic tradition;90 rather these are the only contributions of his that were documented in the talmudic record.91

“and I will pay” imply that that he has not already paid (Rashi, s.v. ve-ani pore’a). If so, how can the baraita be understood as R. Papa interpreted it, that the employer paid the storekeeper in advance? The resolution of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s objection forces R. Kahana to either correct the text or reinterpret it (Kaplan, Redaction, 211) in a strained manner (see Rashba, s.v. ve-ika l’medak). On this passage see: Kalmin, “The Stam and the Final Generation of Amoraim,” 31–32. 89 Compare with the literary contribution in the Bavli of Mar bar Rav Ashi, A. Cohen, Mar bar Rav Ashi [Heb.], 254–258. 90 As for the reason why a similar explanation cannot be applied in regard to Amemar’s unique legal methodology and literary contribution to the Bavli, see above, chapter two, section 5.2., p. 93, footnote 256. 91 Due to the lack of speciﬁc details, we can only venture a general theory to explain the lack of documentation of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s statements in the Bavli. We should note that we have found a similar phenomenon in connection with R. Sehorah, a third generation amora, whose halakhic statements, all made in the name of R. Huna, are quoted indirectly by Rava. See: Albeck, Introduction to the Tal- mud [Heb.], 302. It is possible that in the case of R. Zebid of Nehardea the phenomenon is due to the fact that he was from Nehardea at a time when the main centers of rabbinic activity were in Mahoza, Sura and Pumbedita (see: R. Sherira Gaon, Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 87–94. See also: B. Cohen, “Local Academies” [Heb.], 447 n. 2). Scholars have noted that there are signs that some editing of rabbinic texts occurred in the central academies from the fourth through seventh generations. See for example: Halevy, Dorot Harishonim, 5:480–490, 499–502; Weiss, The Babylonian Talmud as a Literary Unit [Heb.], 41–45; ibid., Studies in the Literature of the Amoraim [Heb.], 172–175; Kaplan, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, 242 ; Hay- man, “From Tiberias to Mehoza”, 117–148. Goodblatt, “Local Traditions,” 210 claimed that this could explain the anonymous appellation given to a group of sages in the fourth generation—“the Nehardeans say” (similar to “the sages of Caesarea” in the Yerushalmi). If Goodblatt’s suggestion is correct, then we can use the same phenomenon to explain the indirect reporting of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s statements. If we compare R. Zebid of Nehardea with other late Nehardean amoraim whose statements are not typically reported in an indirect fashion, we can see that these other amoraim rav zebid of nehardea 171

Analysis of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s literature reveals two signiﬁcant phenomena when compared with the literature of other late Nehard- ean amoraim:

(a) Most of the material attributed to R. Zebid of Nehardea is composed of unique versions of sayings made by earlier Nehardean amoraim (seven cases).92 The version of traditions that is reported in his name in the Talmud differs from or explicitly contradicts the parallel traditions as they are reported by R. Kahana in his academy, or in other centers of rabbinic learning during the period. Most of the traditions are reported retroactively by R. Kahana with the term “You teach [it this way] . . . where as we teach it [this way.]” We have not found a similar phenomenon with later Nehardean amoraim.93 Talmudic scholars have demonstrated that from the fourth generation and onward variant versions of amoraic statements become increasingly prevalent. The Talmud presents such alternative versions

are indeed documented (in either the Bavli or the geonic chronologies) as being active in other geographical regions besides Nehardea (R. Hama, R. Dimi of Nehardea, and Amemar). In contrast, evidence points to the fact that R. Zebid of Nehardea was active solely in Nehardea; it was there that he headed a local academy and he died there as well (see above). He is not documented as being active in any other locality. A similar phenomenon exists in connection with some Palestinian amoraim. Based on his study of Palestinian amoraim and their geographical localities, Ben-Zion Rosenfeld demonstrated that the literary contribution of sages that lived in peripheral areas was less than those of their colleagues who lived in the population centers. See: Rosenfeld, “Places of Rabbinic Settlements” [Heb.], 57–103. It is likely that this is connected to the location of not just the sages themselves, but the later editors. Concerning this phenomenon, Rosenfeld writes, “rabbinic literature was redacted in the urban centers, mainly Tiberias and it was these centrally located sages who decided whose statements and the names of those who stated them were entered into the talmudic record. In other words, it is possible that there were statements by less centrally-located sages that were not preserved, and other sages whose names were not recorded who lived in the villages” (ibid., 90–91). Compare: Miller, Sages and Commoners, 11, who posits that a relatively small documented contribution to the talmudic record by certain sages was not caused by their geographical marginality but rather by the simple fact that they were not significant contributors to rabbinic learning. However, this claim is difficult when it comes to R. Zebid of Neharda. Despite the paucity of his appearances in the Talmud, he is documented as a sage with significant social stature. Other sages present their traditions in front of him in order to receive his opinion as to their value or to hear his versions of earlier amoraic halakhic traditions. 92 See above, section 2(a), pp. 156–158. 93 R. Dimi of Nehardea is found quoting alternate traditions using the following term “(and) R. Dimi of Nehardea teaches the opposite” (matni ipkha). On the difference between these traditions and those of R. Zebid of Nehardea see below, chapter six, section 2.2(b), pp. 180–181. 172 chapter FIve of early amoraic statements through the terms “matni” or “matnu.”94 The joining of this verb with the pronouns “You [atun] (pl.)” and “we [anan],” as well as the names of amoraim (“R. X teaches . . . R. Y teaches”) or names of places (“In Sura they teach . . . In Nehardea they teach”) has been interpreted by scholars as a literary phrase, signifying the redaction of traditions and even edited passages from different sources in the Babylonian academies during the amoraic period.95 The existence of such variant versions was a result of their having been freely worded by the professional reciters (garsanim)96 who transmitted them orally as they traveled place to place throughout the talmudic period. This phenomenon was described by Jacob Zussman: Although the sages were meticulous in accurately transmitting their statements (“to say them in the same language their rabbi used”), and they worked diligently not to confuse one sage’s statements with those of another, it was impossible to prevent mistaken and alternative traditions . . . This is not because they were not precise (or “because they lied”) but rather because when it comes to oral transmission, this is always the case . . . The lack of restrictions when it came to the precise wording of amoraic statements is conspicuous to any critical examiner, who can see that “they were not precise when it came to language or literary style.” Frequently, opposite versions were transmitted, and in response there arose “corrections.” This is all the more so true when it comes to the dialectical discourse, as is well-known.97 Other scholars claimed that this phenomenon was a result of intentional reworking of amoraic statements, both by oral transmitters98

94 On the increasing prominence of variant versions from the third and fourth generation and onward see: Lewy, “Introduction to the Commentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin,” 103–110; Bacher, “Talmud,” 15. See also the literature cited below. 95 See mainly: Lewy, “Introduction to the Commentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin,” 101–102; Horovitz, “The Composition of the Talmud,” 115; Bacher, “Talmud,” 15; Bacher, Tradition und Tradenten, 578–589; Kaplan, Redaction, pp. 242–243; Albeck, “Le- Arikhat Ha-Talmud Ha-Bavli,” 14; Weiss, The Talmud in Its Development [Heb.], 200–201; Urbach, Ha-Halakha, 217–218; Halivni, Introduction to Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 106. 96 The “tanna’e” was responsible for the transmission of tannaitic material (Zussman, “Torah She’be’alpeh,” 240–241) whereas the “garsa’e” was responsible for transmitting amoraic material (see: Rosenthal, “Rabbanan De’Siyyuma,” 58; Zussman, “Torah She’be’alpeh,” 268 n. 33). See also: Epstein, “Seridei She’iltot”, 472. 97 Zussman, “Torah She’be’alpeh,” 268–269 n. 34–35. A similar explanation has been put forth by other scholars, see for instance: Lewy, “Introduction to the Com- mentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin” [Heb.], 104; Albeck, “Le-Arikhat Ha-Talmud Ha- Bavli,” 14; Weiss, The Talmud in Its Development [Heb.], 14. 98 See: Halivni, Introduction to Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 106; Weiss, Ha-Talmud Ha-Bavli, 121–124. rav zebid of nehardea 173 and by the amoraim themselves.99 David Halivni argues that these changes were made knowingly by “talmudic transmitters” (garsanim). He writes: The transmission of rabbinic sayings was not mechanical, like a recording. . . . which records exactly what was stated, without any omissions or additions. The living memory of a human being is not the memory of a machine. When it comes to the oral transmission in the Talmud there is “creative transmission,” which mixes the opinions of the transmitter with the original material that he is transmitting, even in cases where he might not realize what he is doing. The wording of amoraic statements—including halakhic statements—was for a time not completely set, due to the changes which it underwent during its transmission. The same statement was worded differently in the third century, for example, from the way it would have been worded in the sixth century, for in between it underwent a process of “ripening.” It was reworked and refashioned by oral transmitters . . . they transformed the sources (mekorot) to traditions (masorot).100 These problems make it difﬁcult to determine the source and reliability of these traditions. As was stated by Abraham Weiss: With regard to the accuracy of these readings, it is difﬁcult to make any determinations. We cannot say that in all cases where the differing versions do not contradict one another, that both versions are accurate, and one sage said it in one way and one said it another way, and they don’t dispute. Similarly, when there is a contradiction between the different versions it is not certain that one is not accurate. For even when they can co-exist it is possible that one or even both are not accurate, and for some reason two versions arose. On the other hand, it is possible that even when they contradict each other, both were originally accurate. For it is possible that the author changed his mind after issuing his original statement, and version A transmits his words before he changed his mind, and version B after he changed his mind . . . And in truth, there is almost no place in the Talmud where we can make a conclusive decision regarding this matter.101

99 See: Lewy, “Introduction to the Commentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin” [Heb.], 101. For an expanded discussion of the motivating factors that lay behind the revis- ing of amoraic statements (for instance, as a result of a difﬁculty in the statement, or a desire to bring the statement into accord with the halakhic ideas of a later amora) see: Weiss, Ha-Talmud Ha-Bavli, 119–120. 100 Halivni, Introduction to Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 153 (emphasis mine). 101 Weiss, Ha-Talmud Ha-Bavli, 119. See also Zussman, “Torah She’be’alpeh,” 278 n. 69. 174 chapter FIve

These difficulties exist in the specific cases we have discussed in this chapter as well. The indirect report of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s alternative traditions, made by amoraim subordinate to him, and the absence of parallel amoraic traditions in the Palestinian Talmud, make it difficult to trace the source and development of these traditions. Never- theless, it is reasonable to assume that a Nehardean sage, who quotes by name local sages who lived not long before him,102 would transmit traditions whose significance and accuracy are no less, and perhaps even greater,103 than those transmitted by amoraim in other academies. It is not an accident, in my opinion, that the reports in the name of R. Zebid of Nehardea are specifically of Nehardean traditions which contradict the versions preserved by other sages of his period. The accuracy of the traditions ascribed to R. Zebid of Nehardea is reflected in the great authority which Amemar accords them when he issues a ruling based on a unique tradition of R. Zebid of Nehardea in the name of Samuel. In this case Amemar insists upon his opinion, despite the fact that it is contradicted by a version of the same statement preserved in the academies of R. Zebid, R. Papa, R. Kahana and possibly also R. Ashi.104

102 The two examples of this are traditions transmitted either in the name of R. Nahman (b. Bava Batra 136a; b. Sanhedrin 69b; b. Arakhin 6a) or R. Hama (b. Bava Metzi’a 73b). R. Hama was active in Nehardea and died in 377 (see above, chapter four, section 1.1., p. 128, footnote 4) during the same period as R. Zebid of Nehardea. Further- more, there is evidence that statements recorded with the term, “When I stated my tradition in front of R. X” were recited soon after the original statement became known (see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 157). This supports the claim that there was overlap in the years in which the two were active, which in turn strengthens the possibility that R. Zebid of Nehardea could interpret the statement based on his own personal knowledge. Rav Nahman was situated in Nehardea (and Mahoza), see above, chapter one, pp. 7–8, footnote 34. According to Seder Tannaim veAmoraim, 5 he died in 320. A gap of ﬁfty years between the sage quoting and the sage whom is quoted is not unusual. R. Judah quotes Rav—gap of 52 years (247, 299); R. Huna quotes Rav—gap of 50 years (247, 297); R. Hisda quotes Rav—gap of 62 years (247, 309); R. Nahman quotes Samuel—gap of 66 years (254, 320); R. Ashi quotes R. Papa—gap of 52 years (375, 427). For an expanded discussion see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 74 and n. 47. 103 The fact that R. Zebid of Nehardea presents unique traditions ascribed to Nehardean amoraim might raise the possibility that these traditions were his own “inventions”, invented for various reasons, and that they are not based in actual earlier sources. See above, section 2(a) I, p. 157. However, in absence of proof for this theory, we prefer to accept the sources as they are presented. Furthermore, the chronological consideration cited above, as well as Amemar’s attitude towards R. Zebid of Nehardea’s tradition, weakens the possibility that they were his inventions. 104 For a discussion of this source, see above, pp. 161–163. rav zebid of nehardea 175

Furthermore, despite the existence of variant traditions among third generation and onward Babylonian amoraim, there are three significant characteristics which distinguish the case of R. Zebid of Nehardea: (1) In contrast with those of R. Zebid of Nehardea, the variant versions of other Babylonian amoraic statements are not focused specifically on statements of earlier amoraim from the same academy or locality (Rabbah and R. Joseph in relation to a statement of R. Oshaya, Rav and R. Asi; R. Nahman bar Isaac in relation to a statement of R. Yohanan; Amemar in the name of Rabbah/Rava; Mar Zutra in the name of R. Joseph or Samuel, and others).105 (2) The traditions transmitted by R. Zebid of Nehardea are mostly attributed to amoraim who lived close to his era. There are no large chronological gaps between him and those whom he quotes, as there frequently are in the variant traditions, quoted by other Babylonian amoraim, of earlier sages. (3) R. Zebid of Nehardea’s traditions are presented using a unique literary formula, not found in the other cases. This formula presents a contrast between his version and those of the other sages from his era. In contrast, when other amoraim debate the correct version of statements made by earlier amoraim, the debate is between two singular sages, often active in the same academy (Rabbah and R. Joseph; R. Papa and R. Zebid; Mar Zutra and R. Ashi; Mar Zutra son of R. Huna to Ravina, and more).106 (b) In four of his reactions to the statements of his predecessors, R. Zebid of Nehardea remains close to a literal reading of the tannaitic text. He rejects an interpretation or halakhah that does not easily accord with the textual context or the language of the tannaitic halakhah under discussion. His critique flows from an overall approach to interpretation which demands the subordination of the interpreter to the text, a hermeneutic approach that has been outlined in general legal theory. In this way, R. Zebid of Nehardea’s approach is similar to that of R. Sheshet, a Nehardean amora from the third generation, although the latter’s approach is more nuanced.107 R. Zebid of Nehardea’s approach

105 For a survey of these cases, see: Lewy, “Introduction to the Commentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin” [Heb.], 104–110. 106 See: ibid. 107 See: B. Cohen, Rav Sheshet [Heb.], 83–116; ibid., “Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman” [Heb.], 13. It is likely that these differences are a result of the fact that there are more Rav Sheshet traditions than R. Zebid of Nehardea traditions. 176 chapter FIve differs from what we have identiﬁed with the “Nehardeans say” traditions, despite the fact that both approaches tend to be conservative. The “Nehardeans say” expand the application of their predecessors’ halakhot, out of a shared base of halakhic agreement; no such characteristic exists with regard to R. Zebid of Nehardea. Another difference between the two is that the “Nehardeans say” statements are embedded in discussions concerning practical matters of halakhah, whereas R. Zebid of Nehardea participates in intellectual/academic discussions which do not necessarily have any practical halakhic conclusions. R. Zebid of Nehardea’s approach differs strikingly from that of R. Hama and Amemar (both Nehardean amoraim), both in terms of interpretation and in terms of halakhic decisions. In over two hundred cases, there is not one case where either R. Hama or Amemar rejects an interpretation or halakhic ruling because it does not accord with the language or context of a tannaitic source. On the contrary, they frequently offer strained interpretations of tannaitic texts, and Ame- mar systematically rules against tannaitic or early amoraic halakhah. (c) There is scant biographical information concerning R. Zebid of Nehardea. From their retroactive reports, we can glean that R. Kahana and Amemar were his subordinates in Nehardea. It is possible that Amemar’s insistence on ruling in matters of halakhah in accordance with one of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s versions of Samuel’s statements indicates that Amemar was even his student.108 However, as I have pointed out elsewhere, R. Kahana does not seem to be one of R. Zebid of Nehardea’s students: The four times in which the latter responds to R. Kahana, “You teach it thus, [but] we . . . teach it . . . ,” indicate, as we have seen, that they were not members of the same academy; they were certainly not master and pupil.109 The plural language found in these cases [“You (pl.) teach . . . We teach”] indicates the existence of centers of rabbinic learning in Nehardea and Pum Nahara. This evidence joins with other corroborating evidence testifying to the presence of Rabbinic Instruction in Nehardea which already existed shortly after its destruction in 259 C.E.110

108 See above, p. 154, near footnote 11. 109 A. Cohen, “The contrastive term,” 56–57. 110 On the destruction of Nehardea, see above, chapter one, pp. 7–9. Zuri, The Reign of the Exilarchate [Heb.], 234 described R. Kahana’s testimony as to R. Zebid of Nehardea’s traditions as “an attempt by the Nehardean sages to restore Nehardea to her glory and independence, which was at the time diminishing.” It is unnecessary to state that there is no evidence in the sources themselves for such a theory. CHAPTER SIX

RAV DIMI OF NEHARDEA

1. His Era and Location

According to the geonic chronologies, R. Dimi of Nehardea headed the academy in Pumbedita for three years after the death of R. Zebid until his own death in 388.1 This fact, as well as the two instances in which Amemar2 quotes one of his sayings, conclusively lead to dating R. Dimi of Nehardea to the ﬁfth generation of Babylonian amoraim.3 His connection with Nehardea is evident from the appellation attached to his name.4 Analysis of sages with names of places attached to their names demonstrates that rather than these places signifying where the sage originally came from, they denote the ﬁxed center of the sage’s activity during his lifetime (for instance: Rava of Parziqiya, Rava of Barneš, R. Ukba of Mešan, R. Jacob of Nehar Peqod, R. Kahana

1 See Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 5; Epistle of R. Sherira Gaon, 90. 2 b. Gittin 19b: “Ravina said: Meremar said to me: Amemar said in the name of R. Dimi of Nehardea [hakhi amar amemar mishme de-rav dimi minehardea]” (according to Mss. Munich 95, St. Petersburg RNL Evr. 1 187, Vatican 130 and Vatican 140); b. Hullin 51b: “Amemar said in the name of R. Dimi of Nehardea [amar amemar mishme de-rav dimi minehardea].” In statements phrased in this manner a younger sage quotes an older sage. See above, chapter four, section 1.1.2(a), pp. 133–134. 3 See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 231 n. 73 and compare Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 361 who dates him to the fourth generation. Albeck’s dating is based on a source in which the identity of R. Dimi of Nehardea is doubtful, due to a problem with the chronology reﬂected in the passage. See: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 210 n. 137. 4 That R. Dimi of Nehardea and R. Dimi without an appellation are different sages can be proven from a passage found on b. Avodah Zarah 11b, where R. Dimi of Nehardea transmits an opposite version of a statement attributed to R. Dimi (“matni ipkha” [see below, p. 192 n. 85]). See: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 1:333; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:122–123 n. 11. Concerning the appellations that the talmudic editors use to distinguish between amoraim with the same name, see above, chapter four, section 1.1.1, pp. 131–132. R. Abraham Zekhut, Filipowski, ed., Yuhasin ha-Shalem, 123–124, identiﬁed R. Dimi (without an appellation) in b. Shabbat 63b as being R. Dimi of Nehardea. However, the phrase, “When R. Dimi came” [ki ata rav dimi], which notes the arrival of a sage in Babylonia from Palestine makes it certain that this is not R. Dimi of Nehardea. As for the meaning of the term ki ata X, see: Goodblatt, “The Babylonian Talmud”, 288; Safrai and Maeir, “An Epistle Came from the West,” 505. Concerning the identity of R. Dimi in this passage, see: Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 360. 178 chapter six of Pum Nahara, R. Aha of Difte).5 This conclusion also holds true with regard to Palestinian amoraim.6 This fact strengthens the general claim by scholars that the appellation “of Nehardea” attached to R. Dimi’s name is evidence that he was a resident in Nehardea, except for the short period of time during which he served as academy head in Pumbedita.7

2. His Halakhic Methodology

2.1. Previous Research R. Dimi of Nehardea’s methodology has never been systematically analyzed, although Louis Ginzberg and Ze’ev Yaavetz did make two brief remarks concerning the subject. According to Ginzberg, R. Dimi of Nehardea exhibits “creativity and openness” in his halakhic rulings.8 Yaavetz noted that R. Dimi of Nehardea’s halakhic statements focus on matters of practical halakhah and attempt to derive actual halakhic rulings from the dialectical discourse taking place in the bet ha-midrash.9 Yaavetz presented three pieces of evidence to support this characterization: 1) Two halakhic rulings phrased using the term, “and the

5 This conclusion is based on an examination of the location of amoraim who have place names attached to their first names in the talmudic record. For an expanded discussion of the issue see: A. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages [Heb.], 208. The conclusion is true even in cases where a sage has one place-appellation despite the fact that it is known from the geonic chronologies that he headed an academy in a different location (for instance: R. Gebiha from Be Katil, who was academy head in Pumbedita, or Raba Tosfa’ah who was academy head in Mata Mehasya). See: ibid., 208 n. 129. 6 See: Rosenfeld, “Places of Rabbinic Settlements” [Heb.], 102–103. His conclusions are based on both talmudic and epigraphical evidence. 7 See: Bacher, “Nehardea,” 9:208; Zuri, Rav Ashi [Heb.], 13; Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:122; Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 290 n. 40. Compare: Yudolowitz, Nehardea [Heb.], 81. A ruling issued by R. Dimi of Nehardea in a case that occurred in Be Hadya (b. Yevamot 121a) served as a source for Hyman to conclude that R. Dimi of Nehardea served as “the head” in Be Hadya (Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 1:333). This source tells of a man who drowned in Karme, and whose body was removed from the water three days later in Be Hadya. R. Dimi of Nehardea allowed his wife to marry another man. Without relating to Hyman’s conclusion, which does not seem to me to be necessary, the location of these two cities is unknown, and it does not contribute to our discussion here. See: Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica, 470, 478–479. 8 Ginzberg, “Dimi of Nehardea,” 4:604 (“Dimi seems to have confined himself to the cultivation of the Halakah”). 9 Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:123. rav dimi of nehardea 179 halakhah is” (“ve-hilkheta”).10 2) An halakhic ruling issued by R. Dimi of Nehardea’s which is phrased in a collective manner, “One who wants to . . .” (“hai man de . . .”).11 3) An halakhic ruling of his issued in an actual case.12 Indeed, the literature attributed to R. Dimi of Nehardea does not exhibit any characteristics whatsoever of the academic dialectics that are typical of other fourth and fifth generation Babylo- nian amoraim. For instance, we do not find R. Dimi of Nehardea explaining the reasoning which underlies tannaitic halakhah, he does not emend tannaitic sources or solve contradictions between tannaitic halakhot. Nor does he identify specific sages as being the author of anonymous halakhot found in the Mishnah or in baraitot. He does not create halakhic midrash, nor does he ask academic halakhic questions.13 His engagement in practical halakhah and the lack of a demonstrated interest in academic interpretation of tannaitic sources is similar to those qualities which characterize the “Nehardeans say,” R. Hama and Amemar, whereas it differs from the literature attributed to R. Zebid of Nehardea.

2.2. A Reevaluation The description of R. Dimi of Nehardea brieﬂy offered by Ginzberg and Yaavetz is generally accurate, and we shall demonstrate this more concretely below. Nevertheless, analysis of his literature reveals another characteristic that distinguishes him from other late Nehard- ean amoraim. In nearly every passage in which he appears, R. Dimi of Nehardea takes one side in a dispute and uses his own reasoning to reject a tannaitic or amoraic tradition. We shall explain. R. Dimi of Nehardea appears in twenty passages in the printed edition of the Bavli,14 and two additional times in manuscripts.15 In most of these

10 b. Bava Batra 138b; b. Niddah 46a. 11 b. Bava Batra 63b. 12 b. Yevamot 121a. See: Yaavetz, Toldot Yisrael, 8:123 n. 2–3. 13 This analysis is based on a comparison of R. Dimi of Nehardea’s literature with the literature attributed to amoraim who served as academy heads in the main centers of rabbinic activity during a parallel period (Rava, R. Papa, Mar Zutra and R. Ashi). 14 b. Pesahim 110b; b. Rosh HaShanah 20a; b. Mo’ed Qatan 12a; b. Yevamot 121a; b. Bava Batra 21a (twice); ibid 22a; ibid 63b; ibid 91a; ibid 138b; b. Avodah Zarah 11b; b. Horayot 2a; b. Menahot 35a (twice); ibid 37b; b. Hullin 15b; ibid 51b; ibid 111a; ibid 113a; b. Nid- dah 46a 15 b. Shabbat 127a (Mss. Oxford Opp. Add. Fol. 23, Cambridge T-S F2(2) 56, Cam- bridge T-S F2(2) 75 and the Soncino printed edition); b. Gittin 19b (Mss. Munich 95, St. Petersburg RNL Evr. 1 187, Vatican 130 and Vatican 140). 180 chapter six cases he presents a halakhic opinion that is opposed to the opinion of earlier sages, including other Nehardean amoraim: Rav and Samuel,16 R. Yohanan,17 R. Nahman,18 Abbaye,19 Rava20 and R. Papa.21 There are only three cases in which a statement of his begins a passage; in these cases the statement uses the expression, “One who wishes to . . .” (ha’i man X)22 or “These two who . . .” (hanei be trei de . . .).23 All these phenomena appear in sixteen (over 70%)24 of his appearances in the Bavli. Thus we can divide his literary contribution to the Bavli into two separate corpora: (a) R. Dimi of Nehardea’s opinions are usually concise contradictory reactions to a statement made by a previous amora, with whom he disagrees based on his own reasoning. In two cases his halakhic stance contradicts tannaitic halakhah.25 In ﬁve cases his halakhic disputes with earlier amoraim are expressed in such concise language that his words could not be understood were they not presented in the context of and in contrast with the earlier opinion.26 These reactions are phrased as brief remarks made on the statements of others. For instance: “R. Yohanan said . . . and R. Dimi of Nehardea said: more than . . .” (b. Shabbat 127b); “And Abbaye said . . . R. Dimi of Nehardea said: Since it is recognizable, it is not necessary” (b. Menahot 35a). In these cases, without the statements of R. Yohanan and Abbaye, R. Dimi of Nehardea’s words would not be intelligible. Similar literary phrasing appears in the debates involving “the Nehardeans say,” but with a critical distinction: whereas the “Nehardeans say” tend to expand the application of the halakhah stated by the previous sage,27 R. Dimi of Nehardea rejects it. (b) In four additional cases, R. Dimi of Nehardea reverses the order of the positions mentioned in statements of earlier amoraim. These cases are denoted by the use of the term “[R. Dimi of Nehardea] teaches

16 b. Mo’ed Qatan 12a (Samuel); b. Bava Batra 91a (Rav); b. Horayot 2a (Samuel); b. Hullin 15b (Rav); ibid 113a (Samuel). 17 b. Shabbat 127a. 18 b. Bava Batra 138b. 19 b. Menahot 35a (twice). 20 b. Bava Batra 21a (twice). 21 b. Hullin 51b; b. Niddah 46a. 22 b. Bava Batra 63b; b. Menahot 37b. 23 b. Gittin 19b. 24 b. Shabbat 127a; b. Pesahim 110b; b. Mo’ed Qatan 12a; b. Yevamot 121a (twice); b. Gittin 19b; b. Bava Batra 138b; b. Horayot 2a; b. Menahot 35a (twice); ibid 37b; b. Hullin 15b; ibid 51b; ibid 111a; ibid 113a; b. Niddah 46a. 25 b. Gittin 19b; b. Menahot 37b. 26 b. Shabbat 127a; b. Bava Batra 21a (twice); b. Menahot 35a (twice). 27 See above, chapter three, section 2. rav dimi of nehardea 181

the opposite” (“matni ipkha”).28 In two of these cases the reversed statement taught by R. Dimi of Nehardea in the name of R. Joshua ben Levi or R. Dimi (without an appellation) has a parallel tradition in the Yerushalmi29 and in another case, R. Dimi of Nehardea transmits a tannaitic tradition, which is partly found in the Yerushalmi.30 We should note that a similar phenomenon exists in connection with R. Zebid of Nehardea (as we demonstrated in the previous chapter); in five cases he transmits an early amoraic statement in a different version introduced with the term “matni.”31 Nevertheless, there are several critical differences between the R. Zebid of Nehardea cases and those of R. Dimi of Nehardea. First of all, R. Zebid of Nehardea’s traditions are not quotes of the previous statement in the opposite order, but rather contradictory traditions or traditions containing within them two or more traditions. In contrast, what R. Zebid of Nehardea transmitted as one tradition, was taught by his contemporaries as two separate traditions.32 Second, R. Zebid of Nehardea’s traditions are ascribed to Nehardean amoraim, mainly those close to him in place and time (Samuel, R. Nahman and R. Hama),33 whereas the traditions transmitted by R. Dimi of Nehardea are ascribed to amoraim removed from him in terms of time and location: R. Joshua ben Levi (first generation, Palestinian);34 R. Hanan bar Rava in the name of Rav (second generation, Babylonian);35 R. Dimi (second-third generation, Palestinian-Babylonian).36 Third, in contrast with the case of R. Zebid of Nehardea, both of the “reversed” traditions transmitted by R. Dimi of Nehardea (in the name of an earlier amora) have a full or partial parallel in the Yerushalmi.37 This strengthens the possibility, suggested by earlier scholars, that R. Dimi of Nehardea’s traditions are based on a Palestinian source.38 The prevalence of Palestinian traditions among fourth and fifth generation Babylonian amoraim has been well-documented by scholars, and the case of R. Dimi of Nehardea is another example of this phenomenon.39 Fourth, in

28 b. Rosh HaShanah 20a; b. Bava Batra 91a; b. Avodah Zarah 11b; b. Hullin 111a. 29 b. Rosh HaShanah 20a. The parallel tradition is found in y. Rosh HaShanah 3:1, 58d. The second case is b. Avodah Zarah 11b whose parallel is found in y. Avodah Zarah 1:4, 39d. Both traditions are discussed below, section 2.3., pp. 187–192 and footnote 85. 30 See below, footnote 85. 31 See above, footnote 28. 32 For an analysis of these traditions see below in section 2.3., pp. 187–192 and footnote 85. 33 See above, chapter ﬁve, section 3(a), p. 174 and footnote 102. 34 b. Rosh HaShanah 20a. 35 b. Bava Batra 91a. 36 b. Avodah Zarah 11b. 37 See above, footnote 29. 38 For a discussion of these sources, see below, pp. 187–192, and in footnote 85. 39 See recently: Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia, 174–186 and the bibliographical literature cited on p. 249, n. 6. Elsewhere I have discussed the inﬂuence that tannaitic tradition 182 chapter six

contrast with R. Zebid of Nehardea, only one of R. Dimi of Nehard- ea’s traditions (out of four) is presented in opposition to the other amoraim of his generation or of those preceding him.40

2.3. Analysis of Sugyot We will demonstrate the above characteristics by analyzing ﬁve representative examples of R. Dimi of Nehardea’s halakhic rulings. In these examples we will see the following phenomena: (1) R. Dimi of Nehardea disputes his amoraic predecessors, including those from Nehardea. (2) His halakhic positions are based on his own reasoning and not on earlier sources. (3) The halakhic issues that he discusses relate to concrete halakhic topics that would typically arise in daily life. Bavli Mo’ed Qatan 12a R. Hama bar Guria said in the name of Rav: The halakhot regarding the festival [week] are like the halakhot regarding the Kutim. What is the legal import [of this statement]? R. Daniel son of Ketina said (in the name of Rav41): It is to say that they are sterile and one cannot learn one from one the other, as Samuel said42: they [may] coat a pitcher (kuzta) with pitch but they may not coat a jug (havita). R. Dimi of Nehardea said: they [may] coat a jug with pitch but they may not coat a pitcher. One master was concerned for the loss and one master was concerned for the exertion [on the festival week]. The debate between Samuel and R. Dimi of Nehardea was redacted into this passage by the editors as an example of how the laws of the

had on Nehardean halakhah already by the beginning of the amoraic period. See: B. Cohen, “In Quest of Babylonian Tannaitic Traditions,” 271–303. Concerning the transmission of rabbinic traditions from Palestine to Babylonia (and vice versa) see mainly: Friedman, Talmud Arukh [Heb.], 2:9–13; Rosenthal, “The Transformation of Eretz Israel Traditions” [Heb.], 7–48; Zussman, “Torah She’be’alpeh,” 269, 292– 293; Safrai and Maeir, “An Epistle Came from the West,” 497–531. 40 See below footnote 76. 41 The words in brackets are missing in Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot, 1:417 and Mirsky, ed., She’iltot: Devarim, 5:112. 42 Ms. Munich 95 reads: “Abbaye said.” The reading “Samuel” found in all other manuscripts, geonim and rishonim is preferable, not only because Munich 95 is unique, but also because a parallel found in y. Mo’ed Qattan 2:2, 81b is also ascribed to Samuel. rav dimi of nehardea 183 festival week are “sterile and one cannot learn one from the other.”43 Samuel allows one to coat a kuzta44 (“a small container”)45 but not a jug.46 R. Dimi of Nehardea disagrees with Samuel, and holds that during the festival week it is permitted to coat a jug but not a pitcher. According to the stam, the source of the variant rulings of these two amoraim are differing halakhic considerations: while Samuel is concerned about allowing too much exertion during the festival, R. Dimi of Nehardea is concerned with ﬁnancial loss. Accepting the stam’s interpretation, we can see that this is a case in which R. Dimi of Nehardea disagrees with his predecessor based on his own halakhic reasoning. Bavli Bava Batra 21a (And) Rava said: If there is a teacher of children who is learned and there is another who is more learned, we do not remove the ﬁrst. [What is the reason? (mai ta’ama?)]47 For fear that [the second when appointed] will become careless.

43 See: Kopfer, ed., Perush Rashi LeMasekhet Moed Qattan, 37, s.v. ve’en lemedot: “With regard to these laws, we don’t say—this case is similar to this case.” Concerning the phrase, “they are sterile” (akarot hen) see also: Urbach, HaHalakha, 119–120; Tabory, Jewish Festivals [Heb.], 74. Tabory demonstrates that actions are permitted or forbidden during the festival week based on the purpose of the labor and not, as is the case with Shabbat, based on the nature and quality of the action. Thus, a certain action can be permitted in one context whereas it is forbidden in another. 44 The “kuz” was a clay jug with a small receptacle, used mostly for the storage of wine. The pitching was designed to minimize the absorption of wine (or another manner of leaking) through the walls of the vessel or the prevention of its evaporation. See: Krauss, Talmudische Archäologie, 2:291 and 612 n. 668; Brand, Klei HaHeres Besifrut HaTalmud, 129–130 and 207–210. 45 Hayot, ed., Perush Masekhet Mashkin LeRabenu Shelomo ben HaYatom, 55. See also: Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 4:210; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 1:302; Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 1:618; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylo- nian Aramaic, 557. 46 This position is ascribed to Samuel also in the Yerushalmi (above, footnote 42) but the justiﬁcation for it being allowed is that it is an activity done for the needs of the festival week itself. See: Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Sukkah and Moed-Katan [Heb.], 323. 47 The words in brackets are based on Mss. Oxford Opp. 249 (369), Paris 1337, Hamburg 165 and Ascorial G-I-3. The presence of these words increases the likeli- hood that the explanations were added by the stam to the original amoraic statements. Concerning this issue in general, D. Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 7:239, who writes, “In general, we can assume that the sage who authored the statement did not ask the question, ‘What is the reason?’ (for even without these words we know that what follows is an explanation), but rather they were added by a later hand, and in this way the later editor signiﬁed that the explanation was not added by the author of the statement. However, at times we have found that only the words, ‘What is the reason?’ were added by the stam, whereas the explanation itself originated with the statement’s author.” 184 chapter six

R. Dimi of Nehardea said: all the more so he would exert himself [if appointed] for “the jealousy of scribes increases wisdom.” Rava further said: If there are two teachers of children, one who is learned but is not precise and one who is precise but not so learned, we appoint the one who is learned and not precise. [What is the reason?] Mistakes correct themselves in time. R. Dimi of Nehardea said: we appoint the one that is precise but not as learned, for once a mistake enters, it has entered [forever]. In this source there are two cases in which R. Dimi of Nehardea disagrees with Rava based on his own reasoning. Both cases are concerned with the qualifications of teachers of small children (makrei yanukei/makrei dardakei).48 In the first case, Rava rules that one should not remove a less learned teacher in order to replace him with a teacher with broader knowledge of rabbinic traditions (“degaris t’fe”).49 According to the reasoning ascribed to Rava,50 removal of the original teacher could cause other teachers to be constantly concerned lest they lose their jobs to more qualified teachers. Ultimately, this would cause a deterioration in the level of instruction, “for if so, the new teacher will also say: if they find one more qualified than me, they will remove me. And he will not be able to focus on his work.”51 R. Dimi of Nehardea disagrees with Rava, claiming (according to the reasoning

48 The verb “makrei” in the afel binyan, comes from the root “kra,” and in these cases means a “teacher of Bible.” See: Bacher, Die Exegetische Terminologie, 195; Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 5:231; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 4:368; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 702–703. On the makrei yanukei/makrei dardakei during the talmudic period see: Arzt, “The Teacher in Talmud and Midrash,” 35; Gerhardsson, Memory and Manuscript, 60 n. 1; Morris, A History of Jewish Educa- tion [Heb.], 1:177; Aberbach, Jewish Education [Heb.], 36; Gafni, The Jews of Babylonia [Heb.], 107–108; ibid., “On the Education of Children in the Talmudic Era” [Heb.], 73 n. 27. 49 On the meaning of the word “garas” in the Bavli see Zussman, “Torah She’be’alpeh,” 356–357, who writes, “its meaning is ‘to grind in one’s mouth’ like a person chewing and chewing again that which is in his mouth. That is to say, ‘he constantly repeats his teaching orally.’ ” Bacher, Die Exegetische Terminologie, 34, also provides a similar definition. To Zussman’s bibliography we can add: Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 2:369–371; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 3:361– 362; Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 1:270; Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 303. 50 Concerning the provenance of the explanation provided for Rava’s statement, see above, footnote 47. 51 Mirsky, ed., She’iltot: Devarim, 5:7–8. Compare Rashi, s.v. dilma atei le’itrashulei. rav dimi of nehardea 185 ascribed to him) that a teacher who fears that a more qualified teacher will replace him will work harder to become more learned.52 Similarly, R. Dimi of Nehardea disagrees with Rava in the second case. Rava prefers “a teacher who is extremely learned, even if he is not careful when teaching the children that they should not make mistakes” (Rashi, s.v. degaris velo diyek).53 In contrast, R. Dimi of Nehardea prefers the teacher who is precise with his students, even if he is not as knowledgeable, “for once a mistake enters, it is there forever.” Moshe Aberbach explains: According to Rava, it is better to appoint a shallow teacher who will teach a large amount of material and we need not be concerned lest his shallowness cause his students to lack precision in their learning for . . .” a mistake will be corrected on its own.” That is to say, sooner or later his students will learn to correct their own mistakes. In contrast, R. Dimi of Nehardea prefers a teacher who teaches less biblical or rabbinic material but does so with precision, for otherwise students will learn mistakes that will accompany them perpetually.54 In this tradition R. Dimi of Nehardea completely disagrees with Rava. Scholars have demonstrated that Rava’s halakhic opinions became dominant among amoraim of his generation and those that followed, and even among the editors (stammaim) of the Bavli.55 However, this dominance does not seem to have impacted upon R. Dimi of Nehardea, as we can see from these two cases. The same phenomenon can be detected in his two disputes with Abbaye which appear in the passage which we shall now examine. Bavli Menahot 35a (And) Abbaye said: the shin of the tefillin—it is a halakhah from Moses on Sinai, that the groove must reach the stitches. R. Dimi of Nehardea says: as long as it is recognizable, this is not necessary. (And) Abbaye said: the parchment [for the Scriptural portions] of the tefillin must be examined, lest there is an imperfection and the writing must be perfect and it would not be so.

52 Shittah Mekubetzet, s.v. vehashita. See also She’iltot, ibid. Compare Rashi, s.v. vekol sheken. However, the precise interpretation of the passage does not impact the issue we are discussing here. 53 See also: Abramson, Talmud Bavli im Targum Ivri, 35. 54 Aberbach, Jewish Education [Heb.], 48. 55 See: B. Cohen, “Rami bar Hama in Contrast to Rava” (Heb.), 181 n. 145. 186 chapter six

R. Dimi of Nehardea said: this is not necessary, for the pen would detect [any flaw]. In these two halakhot concerning tefillin, the two lenient rulings of R. Dimi of Nehardea contradict the halakhic reasoning of Abbaye. They are presented in the passage as brief responses to Abbaye’s opinion; as independent literary sources R. Dimi of Nehardea’s statements would be unintelligible.56 This phenomenon exists in nine other cases in which R. Dimi of Nehardea disputes other amoraim.57 In the second case, Abbaye obligates the scribe to examine the parchment of the scroll before he writes the text of the tefillin, to ensure that no flaw in the quality of the parchment impairs the com- pleteness of the letters.58 The background to Abbaye’s concern is the tannaitic halakhah which mandates the writing of complete letters. This is stated in a baraita found in the Bavli, “ ‘And you shall write them’ (Deuteronomy 6:9)—that their writing should be perfect.”59 In contrast, R. Dimi of Nehardea rules leniently and does not demand a prior examination of the parchment, reasoning that, “when he writes he will be able to tell if the stylus goes over the parchment well. Thus he does not need to check it beforehand.”60 R. Dimi of Nehardea’s first dispute with Abbaye exhibits a similar phenomenon. According to Abbaye, the base of the letter shin (in the tefillin worn on the head) must reach the stitching at the base of the tefillin, until the point of the bridge (the “titura”).61 The source of

56 Indeed, Abbaye’s statements appear twice elsewhere in the Bavli (b. Shabbat 28b and 62a) and in neither case does R. Dimi of Nehardea’s opinion appear. In contrast, there are no parallels to R. Dimi of Nehardea’s opinion, nor even a similar halakhic stance in a tannaitic or amoraic source attributed to another sage. This phenomena is unique also in regard to “the Nehardean say” traditions, and it seems highly unlikely that this is a result of the activity of a late editor. See above, chapter three, p. 123, footnote 118. 57 See above, section 2.2(a), p. 180. 58 See R. Isaiah De-Trani, s.v. Rav Dimi minehardea. 59 b. Shabbat 103b. See also Rashi, s.v. tam and shalem kehilkheta. A parallel can be found in Sifre Deuteronomy 36 (ed. Finkelstein, 65): “And you shall write them”—perfect writing.” This reading of the midrash is also found in the two geniza fragments published by Menahem Kahana, The Genizah Fragments of the Halakhic Midrashim [Heb.], 259, 260. 60 R. Isaiah De-Trani, ibid. 61 We have interpreted this source according to the Rosh, s.v. ve’amar Abbaye. In contrast, the commentary attributed to Rashi, s.v. vetzarikh sheyagia haritz, interprets Abbaye’s saying as referring to the ridge between the compartments on the teﬁllin worn on one’s head. rav dimi of nehardea 187

Abbaye’s halakhah is not clear, but it is likely that an earlier tradition stands behind his words, just as is the case with the first half of his statement, “the shin of the tefillin—it is a halakhah from Moses on Sinai.”62 In any case, R. Dimi of Nehardea is lenient and holds that the tefillin are valid even if the stitching does not reach the bridge, “since it is recognizable (the ridge on the base of the shin)—it is not necessary.” We now turn our attention to R. Dimi of Nehardea’s transmission of alternative versions of earlier amoraic statements through use of the word “recite” (matni). Four statements which are taught by R. Dimi of Nehardea in a reversed order are ascribed to amoraim distant from him in both place and time.63 These traditions are preceded by the term “teaches the reverse” (matni ipkha). In only one of these cases is his tradition presented in opposition to a version known to earlier amoraim. The term “matni” in the Bavli should be interpreted to mean “teach” or “recite”64 and it is used specifically in connection with variant versions of amoraic statements.65 There is a lack of clarity with regard to the nature and source of these different and sometimes contradictory traditions, both related to the same sage, and different suggestions as to how these traditions developed have been suggested by scholars.66 Of the four traditions ascribed to R. Dimi of Nehardea two seem to be connected to a Palestinian tradition found in the Yerushalmi, strengthening the possibility that at least in these two traditions, R. Dimi of Nehardea based his version either directly or indirectly upon a Palestinian source. We should also note that in contrast with his halakhic rulings, his traditions stated in the name of earlier amoraim are based in earlier sources (see below). It seems that the difference between the two is a result of the fact that statements transmitted in the name of earlier amoraim are by their very nature rooted in earlier sources, whereas this is not necessarily so when it

62 For a discussion of this term and concept see: Safrai, “Halakha LeMoshe Misi- nai,” 11–38. 63 See above, pp. 180–181. 64 See: Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem, 8:249; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 4:655; Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 2:1681–1682; Sokoloff, A Diction- ary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 1221–1222. 65 See mainly: Lewy, “Introduction to the Commentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin” [Heb.], 102 n. 1; Bacher, Die Exegetische Terminologie, 239; Epstein, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text [Heb.], 2:682 n. 2; Weiss, The Talmud in Its Development [Heb.], 194, 197. 66 See the bibliography presented above, chapter five, section 3(a), pp. 171–173. 188 chapter six comes to his own halakhic opinions. Due to the importance of these findings in understanding the source of R. Dimi of Nehardea’s statements, we will focus on these two cases. Bavli Rosh Hashanah 20a –b [Like that which] R. Joshua b. Levi said: They intimidate witnesses with regard to reporting the new moon which has appeared in its proper time in order that the month may be intercalated, but they do not intimidate witnesses with regard to reporting the new moon which has not appeared in its proper time in order to sanctify it. Is this so? Did not R. Judah the Prince send to R. Ami: Know that in the days of R. Yohanan he used to teach us: they intimidate witnesses with regard to reporting on the new moon which has not appeared in its proper time in order to sanctify it, and even though they have not seen it they may say, We have seen it. Abbaye said: There is no contradiction: the one rule holds good for Nis- san and Tishrei, the other for the other months of the year. Rava said: This teaching which Rabbah bar Samuel taught follows the [opinion] of the “others,” as it has been taught . . . R. Dimi from Nehardea teaches it in the reverse: They intimidate witnesses with regard to reporting the appearance of the new moon which has not appeared in its proper time, in order that the month may be sanctified, but they do not intimidate witnesses with regard to reporting the new moon which has been seen at its proper time in order that the month may be intercalated. What is the reasoning? This case looks like a lie, whereas this case does not look like a lie. The core of this passage consists of two traditions ascribed to R. Joshua ben Levi concerning a court which wishes to direct the testimony of witnesses, with the goal of sanctifying the new moon on the date that the court believes to be appropriate [based on considerations of the public welfare].67 According to the first tradition, the court is permitted to “intimidate” the witnesses who did see the new moon at the appropriate time (on the thirtieth day) that they should not testify, in order that the following day should be sanctified, and thereby the month be intercalated.68 In contrast, in the opposite case, the court is not allowed to intimidate the witnesses so that they should testify that they saw the new moon on the thirtieth day, when in fact they did not see it.69 As Rashi writes, “they intimidate the witnesses concerning a

67 For a discussion of the meaning of “public welfare” in talmudic literature, see: Tabory, Jewish Festivals [Heb.], 27–28; Stern, Calendar and Community, 166. 68 See: Tabory, Jewish Festivals [Heb.], 27. 69 Ibid. rav dimi of nehardea 189 new moon that was seen in its proper time on the thirtieth day so that the witnesses should be silent in order that the month should become intercalated. But they do not intimidate the witnesses on the thirtieth day to say that they did see it and testify falsely, and that therefore we need to sanctify the day. [They would want to do this] in order to separate Shabbat from Yom Kippur.”70 The stam detects a contradiction between this halakhah and the tradition stated by R. Judah the Prince (the second [nesi’a])71 in the name of R. Yohanan, according to which the court can intimidate the witnesses into testifying that they have seen the new moon at its proper time (even when they have not seen it) in order to prevent the intercalation of the month. After two contextualizing comments by Abbaye and Rava, R. Dimi of Nehardea’s reverse version of R. Joshua ben Levi’s statement is presented, introduced by the term “matni ipkha.” Accord- ing to this version of the statement, which matches the halakhah transmitted in the name of R. Yohanan, R. Joshua ben Levi permitted intimidating the witnesses into testifying that they saw the new moon on the thirtieth day (even though they did not see it) but did not allow the court to intimidate the witnesses in order to prevent them from testifying that they saw it on the thirtieth day, when in actuality they did see it. The stam explains R. Dimi of Nehardea’s reasoning, “This case looks like a lie, whereas this case does not look like a lie.”72 Seemingly, we could ascribe the reversal of R. Joshua ben Levi’s statement to R. Dimi of Nehardea himself. There are several reasons why we could envision R. Dimi of Nehardea reversing the original version. First of all, he may have wanted to bring it into accord with the Palestinian tradition transmitted in the name of R. Yohanan (which was explained by Abbaye and Rava73).74 Alternatively, he may have

70 Rashi, s.v. meayamin al haedim and ve’eyn meayamin. 71 See mainly: Halevy, Dorot ha-Rishonim, 5:346; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 2:612; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 245. 72 See: Metzger, ed., Perush Rabenu Hananel LeMasekhet Rosh Hashanah, 59, s.v. Rav Dimi minehardea. 73 It seems that the statements of Rava and Abbaye did refer originally to the statements of R. Joshua ben Levi and R. Yohanan and that they were not transferred to our passage from another context. This is also the assumption that underlies Halivni’s analysis, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 3:387–388. However, even if originally Abbaye and Rava’s statements were not made in this context, this has no effect on our discussion below. 74 R. Yohanan’s teachings are known to have had signiﬁcant impact upon Baby- lonian amoraim of the fourth and ﬁfth generations, and not just Rava. See: Dor, The 190 chapter six reasoned “this case looks like a lie, whereas this case does not look like a lie.”75 It is clear that Abbaye and Rava were familiar with the version of R. Joshua ben Levi’s statement as found in the beginning of the passage, which makes R. Dimi of Nehardea’s version unique and perhaps casts further doubt upon its originality/authenticity.76 How- ever, the weakness of this theory lies in the fact that there is a parallel to R. Dimi of Nehardea’s version in y. Rosh Hashanah (1:3, 58c): R. Zera, R. Imi in the name of R. Joshua ben Levi: they may confuse (me’am’emin) [the witnesses] concerning the [new moon] in order to intercalate it, but they may not confuse [them] concerning a [new moon] which was not seen in order to sanctify it. R. Abba and R. Hiyya in the name of R. Joshua ben Levi: they may confuse [them] concerning a [new moon] that was not seen in order to sanctify it, but they may not confuse [them] concerning the [new moon] that was seen in order to intercalate it. The meaning of the word “me’amemin” has been interpreted in several different ways. There are those who understood the word to mean, “to cause the witnesses to stutter”77 while others interpreted the word to mean “to join together against other witnesses with ‘heaps of

Teachings of Eretz Israel [Heb.], 15–16 n. 7 (Abbaye), p. 16, n. 1 (Abbaye), p. 36, n. 12 (Rabin), p. 66–73 (R. Zebid), p. 79ff (R. Papa). 75 Concerning this phenomenon see: Friedman, Talmud Arukh [Heb.], 2:12 n. 38, and the bibliographical references cited there. Recently, Zussman, “Torah She’be’alpeh,” 277–278, wrote the following: The amoraim knew well that they were dealing with sources whose precise wording was “flexible,” sources transmitted orally in variant versions, and that there was always the possibility of a mistake. Therefore, in all cases of a contradiction or difficulty of any nature, it was possible to fix the reading of the text. Just as they received variant versions and just as sources were mixed up by those who transmitted them, so too the amoraim intentionally changed tannaitic and amoraic traditions when they felt the necessity. 76 This is the only case (out of four) in which one of his traditions is presented in opposition to the tradition of an amora of his own generation or of the preceding generations. This tendency differs sharply from the case of R. Zebid of Nehardea. Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 3:388, noted that R. Dimi of Nehardea’s version accords with the halakhah found in a baraita of Rabbah bar Samuel which appears earlier in the passage: “And has not Rabbah bar Samuel taught: it might be that just as they intercalate the year when necessary, so too they intercalate the month when necessary? Scripture says, ‘This month shall be for you the first of months’ (Exodus 12:2)—see it as it is and sanctify it’ ” (compare: Sifra Emor Parsha 10:5, 100a; y. Rosh HaShanah 3:1, 58c). From this baraita we can deduce that while the court does not intercalate the month when it deems necessary, it can sanctify the new month out of necessity. This accords with R. Dimi of Nehardea’s version of R. Joshua ben Levi’s statement. 77 Kossovski, Concordance to the Talmud Yerushalmi [Heb.], 6:429. See also: Rabinowitz, Sha’are Torath Eretz Israel, 276–277. rav dimi of nehardea 191 difficulties.’ ”78 Whatever the precise meaning of the word, it is clear that it describes a process whereby the court actively prevents the witnesses from testifying, a parallel activity to that described in the Bavli.79 Previous scholars noted the similarity between the two traditions transmitted in the name of R. Joshua ben Levi in the Bavli and the Yerushalmi (R. Abba and R. Hiyya bar Abba in the Yerushalmi80 and R. Dimi of Nehardea in the Bavli), and even posited a Palestinian source for R. Dimi of Nehardea’s tradition. According to A. Weiss, “It seems that the authors of the passage in the Bavli were familiar with R. Zera and R. Ami’s version of R. Joshua ben Levi’s statement, whereas R. Dimi himself recited the statement according R. Ba and R. Hiyya’s version.”81 Noah Aminoah commented upon this similarity as well, “The connection between the Palestinian passage and that in the Bavli is easily noted, especially since the Bavli also contains two versions of R. Joshua ben Levi’s statement.”82 Aminoah concluded that R. Dimi of Nehardea was familiar with the version of R. Joshua ben Levi’s statement preserved by R. Abba and R. Hiyya.83 The possibility that a Palestinian source lay behind R. Dimi of Nehardea’s version of the R. Joshua ben Levi statement, accords with the general familiarity that fourth-fifth generation amoraim seem to have had with Palestinian sources.84 In sum, a parallel exists in Palestinian literature for one of the four cases in which R. Dimi of Nehardea presents an alternative version

78 Kohut, ed., Arukh Hashalem,6:216; Levy, Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midra- schim, 3:663. Compare: Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, 2:1089. 79 See R. Moshe Margoliot, P’nei Moshe. See also: Lewy, “Introduction to the Com- mentary on Yerushalmi Nezikin” [Heb.], 106 n. 13. 80 R. Hiyya mentioned here seems to be R. Hiyya bar Abba, a sage of the third generation who learned from R. Joshua ben Levi and regularly transmits statements in his name. See: Frankel, Mavo HaYerushalmi, 81b-82b; Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve- Amoraim, 2:435; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 236–237; Rosenfeld, Rabbi Joshua ben Levi [Heb.], 357–361; ibid., Lod and its Sages [Heb.], 144 n. 285. In contrast, it is more difﬁcult to identify the R. Abba mentioned here, for there are several sages among early Palestinian amoraim who bear that name. A likely suggestion is that this is R. Abba of the second-third generation of Palestinian amoraim. On the dating of this amora see: Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, 1:5; Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], 210–211. It is interesting to note that both amoraim, R. Hiyya bar Abba and R. Abba, are of Babylonian origin. 81 Weiss, The Talmud in Its Development [Heb.], 195. 82 Aminoah, The Redaction of Tractate Betzah [Heb.], 248. 83 Ibid., n. 4. On the similarity of these two traditions see also: Halivni, Sources and Traditions [Heb.], 3:388. 84 See above, footnote 39. 192 chapter six to an early amoraic statement. The existence of such a parallel raises the possibility that R. Dimi of Nehardea did not invent his variant traditions but rather drew them from earlier sources. Indeed, there is a partial Palestinian parallel for another case in which R. Dimi of Nehardea transmits an amoraic statement in the reverse order.85

3. Summary and Conclusions

In most of the cases in the Bavli in which R. Dimi of Nehardea disputes other amoraim, he rejects their views based on opposite halakhic reasoning, or on halakhic considerations that lead to a different halakhic conclusion. His statements are usually phrased using distinct literary terminology to express his differences with the previous opinion. Fur- thermore, his opinions are presented as brief responses which could

85 Below I will briefly present the passage in the Bavli and the parallel in the Yerushalmi for R. Dimi of Nehardea’s tradition. b. Avodah Zarah 11b reads: R. Hanan bar Rav Hisda said in the name of Rav, and others say that R. Hanan b. Rava said in the name of Rav: There are five appointed temples of idol- worship: they are: The Temple of Bel in Babel, The Temple of Nebo in Kursi, Tar’ata which is in Mapog. Sarifeia which is in Askelon, and Nishtra which is in Arabia. When R. Dimi came he added: the marketplace of Eyn Bekhi; the Nidbekha in Acre. R. Dimi of Nehardea taught the reverse: the marketplace of Acre; the Nidbekha in Eyn Bekhi. R. Dimi of Nehardea transmits the tradition first presented by R. Dimi in a reverse fashion, citing the marketplace in Acre and the altar in Baalbek in Lebanon (on the identification of these places see: Lieberman, Greek and Hellenism in Jewish Palestine [Heb.], 252 and n. 95; Friedheim, Paganism and Pagan Rituals [Heb.], 62 and n. 144 and 274 n. 205). The tradition transmitted by Rav concerning established sites of idolatry relates to cities whose characteristics were defined by their established centers of worship (see: Blidstein, Rabbinic Legislation on Idoltary [Heb.], 105; Safrai, “Fairs in the Land of Israel” [Heb.], 139–158). The marketplace of Acre—the version of the statement transmitted by R. Dimi of Nehardea—is also mentioned in a baraita found in y. Avodah Zarah 1:4, 39d, whose halakhah is similar to that discussed here: “And it was also taught: there are three marketplaces: the marketplace of Gaza, the marketplace of Acre and the marketplace of Botna, and the most outstanding of them is that in Botna.” Similar to R. Dimi of Nehardea’s version, this Palestinian tradition recognizes the marketplace of Acre as being a center of idolatry of a high enough degree to forbid Jews from entering there. As Blidstein explains: “the marketplace mentioned is specifically one whose idolatrous characteristics dominate all that is done there, penetrating deep into the consciousness of the participants” (ibid., 116). As to the nature of the worship that occurred in the marketplace of Acre see: Friedheim, “The Cult of Tyche in the Land of Israel” [Heb.], 49. For our purposes, what is crucial is that there is a partial parallel to R. Dimi of Nehardea’s version of the statement in Palestinian literature. rav dimi of nehardea 193 not be understood without the previous statement. The main contribution of R. Dimi of Nehardea is not, therefore, in the creation of new halakhot, but in the application of his own reasoning to existent halakhot with which he disagrees. In this sense, R. Dimi of Nehardea is similar to Amemar who also uses independent halakhic reasoning as a source of halakhah. Both amoraim are also similar in that they are willing to disagree with earlier Nehardean amoraim. Nevertheless, there are two salient differences between them:

(1) Amemar tends to rule according to the circumstances of each individual situation, even if his reasoning leads him to contradict tannaitic or early amoraic tradition, or the rules of halakhic decision-making typically employed in his day. In contrast, R. Dimi of Nehardea’s halakhic rulings are less audacious as he tends to disagree only with those amoraim who preceded him. (2) The literary contributions of Amemar (and R. Hama) vary more widely in genre than do those of R. Dimi of Nehardea. They include actual court cases, public expositions (“darash”), halakhic rulings in concrete cases, customs, interpretations of tannaitic sources (although these are few) and more. Even in their disputes with other amoraim, Amemar and R. Hama’s statements are not phrased in such a way that they cannot be understood on their own, as is the case with R. Dimi of Nehardea. In addition, there are four traditions ascribed to R. Dimi of Nehardea in which he transmits statements of earlier amoraim in reverse order, through use of the term “matni ipkha.” There are parallels in Palestinian literature for two of these traditions, a fact which raises the possibility that in at least these cases R. Dimi of Nehardea based his reversal on an early source with which he was familiar. A similar phenomenon exists in connection with R. Zebid of Nehardea, although there are salient differences between the two, which we discussed above.

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INDEX OF HEBREW AND ARAMAIC TERMS afilu be/afilu mishum/af bezo u-bezo/ kallah 3 bekulhu 107 [ki] amrita lishma’ata kameh derav x amar [li] afilu teyma rabbi peloni hi 108–109 n. 50 154, 160, 169 n. 88 amar X amar Y/amar X mishmeh de-Y/amar ki ata rav hoshaya minehardea, ata ve-aytei X: hakhi amar Y 29, 38 n. 7, 10, matnita be’yadeh 33–35 133–134 and n. 27, 148 n. 115 ki ata rav x 177 n. 4 amar X: hilkheta 67 and n. 159 ki havenan bei X 155 n. 14 amora 4–5 and n. 18 amora’e be-nehardea 125 n. 126 lo shemi’a li, kelomar lo sevira li 21, 54, amora’e de-nehardea 125 n. 126, 68, 71–73, 96, 150 128 n. 4 amrei neharde’ei 99 and n. 1 mai lav X? 69 n. 166, 88, 183 n. 47 amrita lishma’ata kameh de-X 154–155, mai ta’ama 183 n. 47 174 n. 102 makrei 184 n. 48 amru davar ehad 166 makrei yanukei/makrei dardakei 184 ana [mi-savei de]nehardea ana 44–45, malakh 1–2 n. 4 54–55, 74–77, 96 mar (rabbinic title) 51 n. 89 asmakhta 144, 146–147 matni ipkha 19, 171 n. 93, 177 n. 4, ata lekameh de 120 and n. 111 181, 187, 189, 193 atun . . . matnitun . . . anan . . . matni/matnu 155 n. 13, 157, 158, matnenan . . . 154–156, 157, 176 171–172, 181, 187 atya de-rabbi X ke-rabbi Y 166 matnita 12 mattnia’ata debavla’aei 13 be’ah/ba’u mineh 56 mattnita debar kappara midaroma 34 bei midrasha de-rav X 46 meturgeman 4 n. 18 bei rav X 5, 157–158, 162–163 neharde’ei amrei 99 n. 1, 99–100, darash 139 n. 67 103 devet/devei/bei rav-shila 4 neharde’ei avdei 99 n. 1 d’vei Shmuel tannu 5–6 n. 14 neharde’ei leta’amayhu 8 n. 34, 99 n. 1, [d]garis t’fei 184 104–105 and n. 33, 128 n. 4 garssan/garssanim 172–173, peloni u-peloni kulhu sevira lehu 166 184 n. 49 pirka 3, 136–138 hada amara 146 and n. 107 rabbanan dekesarin 11 n. 52 ha’hu gavra 120 rabbanan devei rav X 46 hai man de . . . /hai de . . . /man de . . . /hai rabbanan d’naveh 11 n. 52 X . . . /hanei X . . . 77–78, 179–180 rabbanan d’vei rabbi yanai 11 n. 52 hakhi amar X mishmeh de-Y 38 n. 10 rabbi X be-shitat rabbi Y 166 hanei devei shmuel tannu 5–6 n. 23 rav X mi-mimakom Y 177–178, and hava ka’imna kameh de-X 49–50, 98 n. 5 heikhi damei 118 n. 99 resh metivta 3 hora’ah 83–84 rosh yeshiva 3 ikla X levei/le’atrin/lemakom Y 5 n. 20, sabora/saboraim 29 n. 95 55 n.108, 63 n. 146, 105 n. 33 savei 138 n. 59 212 index of hebrew and aramaic terms shinuya [dekhika] 85–86 [ve] hilkheta (in stammaitic passages) 67 shittah ittmar 165–166 n. 157, 107 n. 42, 179 shma’ata/shma’ateta 12 [ve]it de-amrin 157 n. 23 shmu’a 12 X shra/sharei/akhshar le/be 55, 60 tanna d’vei levi 104 tanna/tannu/tannei d’vei Shmuel 5–6, 13, yativ kameh 6, 39 n. 15, 46, 47, 98, 135 24, 34, 104 yativ kumi 6 n. 25 tanna’ei 172 n. 96 ze veze gorem 79 n. 203 [u]sevira li 68 n. 161 zot omeret 146 n. 107 INDEX OF SELECTED AMORAIM/SABORAIM

Abuha de-Shmuel n. 190, 95–97, 66, 95–97 and activity in Nehardea 4 n. 6 n. 269 R. Adda b. Ahava I chronological location 37–43 chronological location 112 confused with “the Nehardean pupil of Rav 112 say” 42–43 R. Adda b. Ahava (Abba) II confused with Amemar bar Mar chronological location 112 n. 69 Yanuka 41 pupil of Rava 112 n. 69 confused with R. Yemar 41 R. Adda b. Minyumi died during R. Ashi’s lifetime 40–41 chronological location 148 n. 115 geographical location 44–45 subject to the authority of halakhic rulings in actual Rabina 148 n. 115 cases 55–66 R. Aha b. Jacob halakhic rulings issued in Nehardea and the exilarch 135 67–82 chronological location 133–136 halakhic rulings issued in Sura, does not interact with second and Mahoza or Pumbedita 55–56 third generation amoraim 134 interpretation of tannaitic present in R. Huna’s pirka 136–138 sources 84–91, 93–94 and n. 256 quotes halakhic tradition in the legal methodology compared name of third generation with Nehardean amoraim 84 amoraim 133–134 (Samuel, R. Sheshet, subordinates to R. Nahman 133 R. Nahman), 92–93 and n. 252 and n. 26 (R. Zebid of Nehardea), 176 superior to R. Aha son of (R. Zebid of Nehardea), 193 R. Ika 135–136 (R. Dimi of Nehardea) superior to R. Elazar of Hagrunya literary contribution compared with and R. Aha b. Tahlifa 136 sages from his generation 84–85, superior to R. Papa/Papi 135 93–94 n. 256 R. Aha son of Rava live contact with R. Zebid (with no confused with R. Aha son appellation) 38 of Rav 132 methodology compares with legal geographical location 55 n. 108 realism 53–54 n. 96, 95 headed the yeshiva/study circle in name is absent from the list of Pumbedita 44 n. 41 academy heads in the Geonic subordinates to R. Ashi 44 n. 41 chronicles 45 R. Ahai of Be Hatim (sabora) referred to as neharde’ei leta’amayhu chronological location 31 (in amoraic tradition) 105 comparison of his literary served as exilarch? 51 n. 89 contribution with those of the status in Mahoza and saboraim 31–32 Nehardea 44–45, 55–56 identiﬁed as R. Ahai (with no subordinates to R. Dimi of Nehardea appellation) 31–32 38 and n. 10, 177 and n. 2 identiﬁed as R. Ahai bar Huna 32 subordinates to R. Zebid of location of Be-Hatim Nehardea 38, 154, 163 Amemar superior to (R.) Huna b. Nathan 39, active after the time of R. Hama 42 162 boldness personality and halakhic superior to Mar Zutra 39 and rulings 21 and n. 72, 75 and n. 18, 162 214 index of selected amoraim/saboraim

superior to R. Ashi 39 n. 15, 47 193 (Amemar, R. Hama, superior to R. Minumi the son of R. Zebid of Nehardea), 180 R. Nihumi 48, 49 (“the Nehardeans say”) tends to reject the halakha in has no interpretive traditions of tannaitic traditions 53 tannaitic sources 179 tends to reject the halakha of earlier headed a local yeshiva/study in Nehardean sages 54–55 Pumbedita 177 tends to rule leniently in matters of his alternative versions of early amoraic prohibition 55–56, 57, 59, 60, 62, statements in comparison with 63, 69, 77 R. Zebid of Nehardea 180–182 total number of appearances in the historical significance of the Bavli 19, 91 n. 250 appellation attached to his name yeshiva/study circle 43–50 (of Nehardea) 177–178 and yeshivot/study circles during his time n. 5–6 43–44 not to be confused with R. Dimi R. Ashi (with no appellation) 177 n. 4 Ashi—Asi frequent variants in number of appearances in the manuscripts 89 n. 243 Bavli 179 consistently raises difficulties against parallel traditions of his alternative Amemar’s halakhic rulings 53–54, versions in the Palestinian 95 and n. 260 Talmud 188–192 and n. 85 died after Amemar 40–41 superior to Amemar 177 and n. 2 head of a yeshiva/study circle tends to reject amoraic halakha based in Sura/Mata Mehasya 40 n. 20, on his own reasoning 180, 192 41, 43–44 year of death 177 instructed during the lifetime of Amemar 44 R. Gebiha of Be Katil interpretation of tannaitic sources 85 geographical location 178 n. 5 n. 228 (role of ), 85 (compared to headed the yeshiva/study circle in Amemar) Pumbedita 44 n. 41 pupil of R. Kahana 153 subordinates to R. Ashi 44 n. 41 rav ashi ve-ravina sof hora’ah 28 n. 91, 83–84 R. Hama subordinates to Amemar 39 n. 15, 47 and Shapur II 130–132 subordinates to Mar Zutra 47 n. 62 and the exilarch 139 superior to R. Gebiha of Be comparison of legal methodology with Katil 44 n. 41 “(the) Nehardeans say” 123–125 superior to Mar Yanuka and Mar comparison of legal methodology with Kashisha the sons of R. Hisda 63 Amemar 149 n. 146 comparison of legal methodology with superior to R. Aha son of Rava 44 R. Dimi of Nehardea 193 n. 41 comparison of legal methodology with superior to R. Yemar 91 and n. 249 R. Zebid of Nehardea 176 superior to Rabina II 105 n. 33 confused with (Rav) Hama b. year of death 20 Tobiah 129 younger than Mar Zutra 39 confused with R. Hama b. Guriah 129 R. Dimi of Nehardea could be identified as “(the) cites alternative versions of early Nehardeans say”? 124–125 and amoraic statements 180–181 n. 126, 150–151 geographical location 177–178 geographical location 128 n. 4 and n. 7 how many R. Hama’s? 130–138, halakhic methodology 178–193 150–151 halakhic methodology in comparison identified as one of neharde’ei with late Nehardean amoraim le-ta’amayhu 105 index of selected amoraim/saboraim 215

interpretation of tannaitic interpretive methods in comparison sources 139 with Amemar (94 n. 258), legal methodology 139–149 R. Hama (107 n. 46, 149 n. 123) practical rulings 139–140, 149 interpretive methods of tannaitic total number of appearances in the sources 94 n. 258, 107 n. 46 Bavli 139 literary contribution 11 n. 49 R. Hamnuna II literary contribution in comparison with headed a local yeshiva/study circle 46 R. Zebid of Nehardea 170 n. 89 identiﬁcation 131–132 personality and literary contribution instructed in Harta de-Argiz during 21 n. 72 the lifetime of R. Hisda 44 n. 41 Mar Zutra literary contribution in comparison cites alternative versions of early with late Nehardean amoraim 95 amoraic statements (with n. 256 comparison to R. Zebid of subordinates to R. Hisda 44 n. 41, Nehardea) 175 137 died after Amemar 40 R. Hisda geographical location 40 n. 20, 44 instructed in Kafri during the lifetime interpretation of tannaitic sources 85 of R. Huna 44 n. 41 n. 227 subordinates to R. Huna 63 n. 144 literary contribution compared to superior to R. Hamnuna 44 n. 41 Amemar’s 85 and n. 227, 93 n. 256 yeshiva/study circle 2 literary contribution compared to R. Hoshaya (amora) R. Dimi of Nehardea 179 n. 13 chronological location 33 subordinates to Amemar 39 n. 15, 40 origin of halakha in baraitot he superior to R. Ashi 47 n. 62 “brought from Nehardea” 33–35 tendency to rule according to local R. Huna traditions 11 n. 50 his pirqa 138 n. 59 the title “Mar” attached to his quotes halakhic traditions in the name name 51 n. 89 of Rav 174 n. 102 year of death 40 n. 20, 44 R. Aha b. Jacob’s master? yeshiva/study circle 40 n. 20, 44 year of death 136 younger than Amemar 40 Meremar R. Kahana geographical location 44 and n. 43 academy head in Pumbedita 43 year of death 44 academy head in Pum-Nahara 153, yeshiva/study circle 44 and n. 43 155 n. 14, 163 n. 54 R. Mari son of R. Dimi (sabora) R. Ashi’s Master? 43 n. 37, 47 n. 59, founder of the a yeshiva in Fīrūz 163 n. 54 Šāpūr 31 evidence for heading a local yeshiva/ head of a yeshiva in Pumbedita 31 study circle 155 n. 14 R. Minumi the son of R. Nihumi subordinates to R. Zebid of Nehardea chronological location 48 154 identiﬁcation 48 n. 68 subordinates to R. Zebid of Nehardea subordinates to Amemar 48, 49 but was not his student 176 year of death 43 R. Nahman Samuel’s pupil? 75 n. 190 Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha sons of bold halakic rulings 75 n. 190 R. Hisda referred to as neharde’ei leta’amayhu chronological location 104 (in amoraic tradition) 105 geographical location 56 n. 108, 63 superior to R. Aha b. Jacob 133 n. 146 and n. 26 subordinates to R. Ashi 63 n. 146, 104 authority as legal decisor among Mar bar Rav Ashi amoraim (in monetary chronological location 94 n. 258 matters) 72 and n. 177, 133 n. 26 216 index of selected amoraim/saboraim

methodology compared to Papi—Papa frequent variants in R. Hama 149 manuscripts 135 and n. 38 methodology compared to R. Zebid subordinates to R. Aha b. Jacob 135 of Nehardea 156 gap of years between his year of Rabina (Rava’s Pupil) death and R. Zebid of Nehardea chronological location 148 n. 115 175, 181 geographical location 148 n. 115 geographical location 7–8 and n. 34 subject to the authority of Rava 148 halakhic impact on late Nehardean n. 115 amoraic traditions? 14, 51–52 superior to R. Adda b. interpretation of tannaitic sources Minyumi 148 n. 115 54 n. 98 Rabina (R. Ashi’s Student/Colleague) Neharde’ei le-ta’amayhu geographical location 105 n. 33 confused with “the Nehardeans subordinates to R. Ashi 105 n. 33 say” 105 year of death 105 n. 33 identity 105–106 Rami b. Hama “(the) Nehardeans Say” chronological location 117 n. 94 chronological location 102–103 halakhic disputes with Rava 117 n. 94 halakhic debates with other relationship with Rava 117 n. 94 sages 109–115 Rava identified as R. Hama 124–125 and halakhic disputes 117 n. 94 n. 126, 150 halakhic dominance among identity 100–106 later amoraim and stammatic is their literary contribution a result of passages 185 late editorial activity? 123 n. 118 head of the yeshiva/study circle in methodology compared with other Pumbedita/Mahoza 161 n. 44 Nehardean sages 108–109 interpretation of tannaitic sources 85 methodology compared with other and n. 225 sages 108, 119 n. 105 literary contribution in comparison to reactions to statements by earlier Amemar 85 amoraim 115–119 relationship with Rami b. reflect Babylonian tannaitic Hama 117 n. 94 traditions? 100–104 study method in midrash rulings issued in concrete/theoretical halakha 10 n. 48 cases 119–122 superior to R. Ada b. Ahava (II) total number of appearances in the 112 n. 69 Bavli 99 n. 1 superior to R. Papa 38 n. 7 younger than R. Yemar 41 n. 27 superior to Rabina 148 n. 115 (the) Sages of Caesarea R. Papa geographical location and unified head of yeshiva/study circle in halakhic traditions 11 n. 52 Nareš 135, 163 n. 53 (the) Sages of Naveh interpretation of tannaitic geographical location and unified sources 85 n. 226 halakhic traditions 11 n. 52 literary contribution in comparison Rafram I with Amemar 85 n. 226 attempt to identify the sages in the Papi—Papa frequent variants in bavli 43 n. 36 manuscripts 135 and n. 38, Succeeded R. Dimi of Nehardea 154 n. 7 as rosh yeshiva/study circle in subordinates to R. Aha b. Jacob 135 Pumbedita 43 year of death 135 year of death 43 R. Papi Rafram II head of the yeshiva/study circle in attempt to identify the sages in the pumbedita 135 bavli 43 n. 36 index of selected amoraim/saboraim 217

Papa—Papi frequent variants in older than Rabina (the student/ manuscripts 135 and n. 38 colleague of R. Ashi) 41 n. 27 rosh yeshiva/study circle in Pumbedita subordinates to R. Ashi 41 and after R. Ashi 43 n. 36 n. 27, 91 n. 249 succeeded R. Ashi in Mata Samuel Mehasya 41 R. Nahman’s master? 75 n. 190 year of death 41 impact on R. Nahman’s halakhic rulings 75 n. 190 R. Zebid (with no appellation) impact on Amemar’s halakhic chronological location 153 n. 1 traditions? 51ff. headed a local yeshiva/study in opinions embedded in “the Pumbedita 153 n. 1 Nehardeans say” halakhic not to be confused with R. Zebid of traditions? 105 ff. Nehardea 153 n. 1 interpretation of Mishnah 84 n. 224 R. Zebid of Nehardea amoraim “sitting” in front of alternative versions of amoraic Samuel 6 and n. 24 statements compared with sages referred to as neharde’ei leta’amayhu from his generation 174–176 (in amoraic tradition) 105 cites alternative versions of early year of death 12 and n. 56 amoraic traditions 156–166, yeshiva/study circle 5–6 170–175 shananim (reciters) 5–6 and n. 23 died during R. Papa’s lifetime 153 tanna/tannu/tannei d’vei Shmuel/ d’vei geographical location 153 n. 6, 155 Shmuel tannu 5–6 and n. 14, 13, and n. 15 24, 34, 104 headed a local yeshiva/study 155–156 his father (Abuha de-Shmuel) 4 n. 16, his traditions are reported in the Bavli 13 indirectly 154–156, 170 in geonic chronologies 1–2, 12 historical signiﬁcance of the R. Sheshet appellation attached to his name geographical location 6 (of Nehardea) 155 n. 15 headed a yeshiva/study circle 6, 46 methodology compared to late legal methodology compared with Nehardean amoraim 92 n. 252 late Nehardean amoraim 175, (Amemar), 150 (“[the] Nehardeans 149–150 (R. Hama), 108–109 (“the say”), 175–176 (“[the] Nehardeans Nehardeans say”), 84–85 (Amemar) say”, R. Hama and Amemar), Rabbah and R. Joseph “sittin” in his 180–182 (R. Dimi of Nehardea) pirka 137 not to be confused with R. Zebid year of death 10 (with no appellation) 153 n. 1 R. Shila responses and reactions to earlier and the “amora” 4 amoraic statements 156–170 yeshiva/study circle 4–5 superior to Amemar 154 R. Simeon b. Pazi superior to R. Kahana 154 chronological location 50 n. 88 tends to criticize an early amoraic headed a local yeshiva/study circle opinion or an interpretation based in Lod 50 n. 88 on the context 158, 167–169 and n. 88, 175–176 R. Yannai total number of appearances in the members of his yeshiva/study Bavli 154 circle and their uniﬁed halakhic very few statements documented in traditions 11 n. 52 his name 170–171 n. 91 R. Yemar R. Zera approximately R. Ashi’s age geographical location 161 n. 44 41 n. 27 interacts mainly with Pumbeditan or confused with Amemar 41 Suran amoraim 161 n. 44 SUBJECT INDEX

Academies maximum lifespan 40 and n. 23 structure and characteristics 1 n. 3, methods of study in comparison with 3–4 and n. 7–8 the Syrian Christian schools 20 terms designating the existence of n. 71 academic settings 3–6 research methods of legal in the tannaitic period methodology 15–16 and n. 68, (in Babylonia) 1–4 and n. 12, 14 24–25 and n. 78 and Babylonian tannaitic rules of subordination: traditions 13–14 “[once] when I was standing before local amoraic traditions 11–15 X” 49–50 divisions into “schools” 11 and “[when] I stated the tradition in n. 52, 82 front of x” 38 and n. 7, local of yeshivot/study circles 46–47, 154–155, 160 155–156, 153 and n. 1, 163 n. 54; “X said in the name of Y” 38 n. 10, alternative versions of amoraic 39 n. 15, 39 n. 18, 133–134 statements 157–158, 171–176, “X said: Y said to me” 38 n. 10; 180–181 “x said: when we were in the Amoraim house of Y” 155 n. 14 and knowledge of legal process in “X sat before Y” 39 n. 6, Persian courts 20 n. 71 15 n. 15, 46, 47, 98, 135 and oral traditions in the east when X was judged by Y Christian schools 13 n. 61 135 and personal criticism 132 when X raises difficulties or asks are usually presented in chronological questions from Y 135–136 order 39 and n. 15, 112 X instructed during the lifetime of Babylonian tannaitic traditions 13 his master 44 n. 41 chronology of late Nehardean when X instructed Y 161–162 amoraim 9–10 strained interpretations of tannaitic citing alternative/contrasting versions sources 127–138, 131–132, of early amoraic statements 153 n. 1 157–158 and n. 23, 160–166, 171–176, 180–182, 187–192 Babylonian Talmud and n. 85 reliability of amoraic divisions into schools 11 and n. 52, statements 25–30 82–83 division of amoraic and stammaitic documentation of shakla vetaria materials 28–30 between student and master academic discussions 47 n. 63 137–138 editors location in urban centers identification when appellation is 170–171 n. 91 attached to personal names editors were zealous in listing the 22–24, 128 n. 4, 131–132, 177–178 elder amora first where multiple and n. 4 names are cited 39 identity of: “(the) Nehardeans say” selective activity of late editors 93 100, 105, 124–125 and n. 126; n. 256, 123 n. 118, 170–171 n. 91 R. Hama 127–138 rav ashi ve-ravina sof hora’ah 28 n. 91, interpretive and argumentation 83–84 techniques 10–11 linkage between personality and Geonic Chronologies literary contribution 21 n. 72 establishment of the yeshivot in local halakhic traditions 12–13 Babylonia 1–3 and n. 12 subject index 219

head of yeshivot/study circles is consistent in actual or theoretical mentioned in Geonic Chronicles: problems 15 n. 67, 55–65 Abbaye 73, 135, 161 n. 44; Mar research methods 15–16, 82–83 Rav Hanina of Be-Gihara 32; scientiﬁc understanding of amoraic Mar Zutra 40 and n. 20; rulings and interpretation 15–25 R. Aha son of Rava 44 n. 41; Legal Studies R. Ahai bar Huna 32; R. Ahai of legal realism 53 n. 96 Be Hatim 31–32; R. Ashi 40 connection between personality and and n. 20, 41, 43; R. Dimi of legal rulings 53 n. 96 Nehardea 38, 43, 177; R. Gebiha and Amemar’s ruligs 53 n. 96 of Be Katil 44 n. 41; R. Hama context 167 127, 128 n. 4, 174 n. 102, 138; caution needed when comparing with R. Huna 2 and n. 6; R. Joseph amoraic rulings 15 n. 68 129 n. 7; R. Kahana 43 and n. 37, use in this study 15 n. 68, 53 n. 96 105 n. 33, 163 n. 54; R. Nahman 8 n. 34, 174 n. 102; R. Nahman Nehardea b. Isaac 43, 138; R. Papa 43, Abuha de-Shmuel 4 n. 16; 135, 153, 154, 163 n. 53; R. Zebid R. Sheshet 6; R. Mari son of (with no appellation) 153 n. 1, Rav Dimi 31; R. Ahai of Be 38; R. Zebid of Nehardea; Rafram Hatim 31–32; Mar R. Hinana of (I–I) 43 and n. 36; Rav Mari son Be-Gihara 32; Amemar 44–45; of R. Dimi 31; Samuel 12 R. Hama 128 n. 4; R. Dimi reliability of Seder Tannaim ve-Amoraim of Nehardea 177–178; 1 n. 2 R. Shila 4–5; Samuel 5–6; reliability of the Epistle of R. Sherira R. Nahman 7–8 n. 34 Gaon 1 n. 2 Ammianus Marcellinus 9 n. 37 sof hora’ah 28 n. 91 Babylonian tannaitic use of the term malakh 1–2 n. 4 traditions 11–12, 13–15 destruction and the passage of destruction 7 amoraim to Šekansiv, Šilhe and earliest documentation of rabbinic Mahoza 7–8 instruction 4–6 geographical location 1 n. 1 Late Nehardean Amoraim local traditions 11–12 differences in legal location of: methodology 17–22 Papa b. Natzer 7 and n. 30 tendancy to reject local halakhic passage of amoraim to Šekansiv, Šilhe traditions 54–55, 65–66, 71–73, and Mahoza 7 75–77, 106, 109–111, 113–115 re-establishment 8–9 chronology 9–10 has a uniﬁed halakhic tradition or Legal Methodology legal methodology? 15–22, 24–25, and external factors 21–22 and 82–83 n. 72–73, 94 n. 256 origins of tannaitic materials 13, and personality 95–97, 21 and n. 72 33–35, 104 and strained interpretations of tannaitic sources 22–25, 54, Saboraim 82–91, 93–95, 118–119, 167–169 literary contribution 29 n. 95 and the division of amoraic and dialectics 29 n. 95 stammaitic materials 28–30 and amoraim, different and the reliability of amoraic methodology 29 n. 95 statements 25–30 sages active “near Nehardea” 31–32 differences and contrasting methods 15–22, 92 n. 252, Tannaitic Halakha 82–83, 108–109, 119 n. 105, Babylonian origin 11–12, 14, 33–35, 122–124, 149–150, 171 n. 93, 99–106 175–176, 180–182, 193 rejected 53–54, 55–65, 68–70, in previous research 10–12 78–82 INDEX OF BABYLONIAN TALMUD SOURCES

b. Arakhin 6 n. 24, 92 n. 250, 99 n. 1, 108 n. 50, 113 n. 76, 133 n. 27, 137 107 n. 43, n. 145, 108 n. 49, 124 n. n. 50, 139 nn. 61–62, n. 64, 155 122, 154 n. 8, n. 11, 155 n. 13, 156 n. 14 nn. 21–22, 174 n. 102 b. Betzah 5 n. 20, 6 n. 26, 14 n. 65, b. Avodah Zarah 78 n. 200, 92 n. 250, 33–34, 38 n. 4, 49 n. 72, 50 n. 85, 95 n. 260–261, 99 n. 1, 139 n. 61, 55 nn. 103–104, 56 nn. 110–111, 68 169 n. 88, 177 n. 4, 179 n. 14, 181 n. 161, 84 n. 223, 86 n. 233, 92 nn. 28–29, n. 36, 192 n. 85 n. 250, 95 n. 260, 99 n. 1, 101 n. 41, b. Bava Batra 8 n. 34, 21, 25 n. 78, 102 n. 15, nn. 19–20, 107 n. 43, 39 n. 78, 39 n. 18, 44 n. 47, 54 n. 45, 120 n. 111, 128 n. 4, 139 n. 61, nn. 100–101, 55 nn. 103–104, 140 n. 71, n. 73, n. 75, 154 n. 9 nn. 107–108, 56 n. 111, 60 n. 130, 67 b. Eduyyot 34, 78–79 n. 204 n. 158, 74 n. 188, 75 n. 189, 76, 84 b. Eruvin 5 n. 20, n. 23, 8 n. 34, 38 n. 223, 92 n. 250, 95 nn. 260–261, n. 7, 39 n. 15, 44 n. 42, 45 n. 51, 49 96 n. 267, 99 n. 1, 104, 105 n. 33, n. 72, 50 n. 87, 55 nn. 103–104, 56 107 nn. 42–43, 45, 108 nn. 49–50, n. 109, n. 111, 63 n. 144, 68 n. 161, 120 n. 111, 128 n. 4, 133 n. 27, 139 84 n. 223, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 260, 99 and n. 61, n. 69, 140 n. 72, nn. 76–77, n. 1, 106 nn. 38–39, 108 n. 48, n. 50, 145 n. 102, 147 n. 113, 154 nn. 8–9, 134 n. 33, 136 n. 45, 137 n. 56 n. 11, 155 n. 13, 156 nn. 21–22, 162 b. Gittin 5 n. 20, 31, 38 n. 10, 39 n. 47, 174 n. 102, 179 nn. 10–11, n. 18, 63 n. 144, 67 n. 158, 75 n. 190, n. 14, 180 n. 16, n. 18, n. 20, n. 22, 77 n. 197, 78 n. 200, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 24, 181 nn. 260–261, 99 n. 1, 108 n. 49, 139 n. 28, n. 35 n. 61, 140 n. 71, 147 n. 113, 162 b. Bava Metzi’a 5 n. 20, 38 nn. 6–7, 40 n. 47, 177 n. 2, 179 n. 15, 180 n. 21, 44 n. 47, 54 n. 101, 55 n. 103, n. 23–25 56 n. 111, 63 n. 144, 74 n. 188, 75 b. Hagigah 000 n. 190, 83, 84 n. 223, 92 n. 250, 95 b. Hullin 38 n. 10, 49 n. 72, nn. 79–80, n. 260, 99 n. 1, 107 n. 43, n. 45, 108 50 nn. 87–88, 55 nn. 103–104, 56 nn. 48–50, 121 n. 111, 124 n. 122, n. 111, 60 n. 130, 67 n. 158, 77 139 n. 61, n. 63, 140 nn. 71–72, n. 197, 78 n. 200, 86 n. 233, 92 n. 74, n. 76, 154 n. 8, n. 111, 156 n. 250, 95 n. 260, 120 n. 111, 132, n. 20, n. 22, 163 n. 58, 174 n. 102 134 n. 30, 135 n. 34, 155 n. 14, 177 b. Bava Qamma 25 n. 78, 28 n. 7, 41 n. 2, 179 n. 14, 180 n. 16, n. 21, n. 29, 63 n. 144, 72 n. 175, 78 n. 200, n. 24, 181 n. 28 84 n. 223, 86 n. 233, 92 n. 250, 95 b. Keritot 112 n. 71 nn. 260–261, 99 n. 1, 107 n. 42, 108 b. Ketubbot 6 n. 26, 8 n. 34, 25 n. 78, nn. 48–49, 117 n. 94, 113 n. 26, 134 38 n. 7, 48 n. 67, 69, 49 n. 72, n. 32, 154 nn. 8–9, n. 11, 155 n. 14, n. 74, n. 78, n. 82, 55 n. 103, n. 106, 158 n. 29 56 n. 111, 67 n. 158, 75 n. 190, 77 b. Bekhorot 33–34, 99 n. 1, 108 n. 50, n. 197, 86 n. 233, 92 n. 250, 95 132, 139 n. 61, n. 64, 140 n. 71 nn. 260–261, 99 n. 1, 107 n. 42, b. Berakhot 39 n. 12, 44 n. 48, 108 nn. 49–50, 121 n. 111, 135 49 nn. 72–73, n. 75, n. 81, 50 n. 36, 136 n. 42, 139 n. 61, n. 63, nn. 85–86, 55 n. 103, 56 n. 109, 154 nn. 8–9, n. 11 n. 111, 65 n. 153, 92 n. 250, 95 b. Kiddushin 5 n. 23, 6 n. 26, 18, 39 n. 107, 99 n. 1, 106 n. 37, 107 n. 43, n. 15, n. 18, 55 nn. 103–104, 67 index of babylonian talmud sources 221

n. 158, 77 n. 197, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 61, 150, 154 n. 8, n. 11, 155 n. 13, n. 260, 99 n. 1, 137 n. 52, n. 55, 156 n. 21, 174 n. 102 139 and n. 61, 140 n. 71, n. 73, b. Shabbat 5 n. 20, 6 n. 24, 33–34, 45 147 n. 113, 153 n. 1, 154 n. 8, 156 n. 51, 49 n. 72, n. 76, 50 n. 84, 55 nn. 21–22, 158 n. 27, 161 n. 45, nn. 103–104, 56 n. 109, n. 111, 162 n. 50 60 n. 130, 68 n. 161, 75 n. 190, 84 b. Makkot 000 n. 223, 92 n. 251, 95 n. 260, 99 n. 1, b. Megillah 47 n. 62, 49 n. 72, n. 83 101 n. 13, 107 nn. 42–43, n. 45, 108 b. Me’ilah 000 n. 48, nn. 50–51, 124 n. 122, 132, b. Menahot 39 n. 15, 47 n. 59, n. 62, 134 n. 30, 137 n. 53, 139 n. 61, 77 n. 197, 78 n. 200, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 65, 140 n. 71, n. 73 n. 75, 177 n. 260, 180 n. 50, 134 n. 30, 137 n. 4, 179 n. 15, 180 and n. 17, n. 24, n. 51, 179 n. 14, 180 and n. 19, n. 26, 186 n. 56, n. 59 n. 22, nn. 24–25 b. Sheqalim 000 b. Mo’ed Qatan 49 n. 83, 87 n 158, 99 b. Shevu’ot 39 n. 15, 48 n. 64, 55 n. n. 1, 106 n. 40, 107 n. 42, 121 106, 56 n. 11, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 260, n. 111, 124 nn. 122–123, 139 n. 61, 99 n. 1, 107 n. 43, n. 45, 139 n. 61, nn. 66–67, 140 n. 71, n. 73, 153 n. 4, 140 n. 72 179 n. 14, 180 n. 16, n. 24 b. Sotah 99 n. 1, 134 n. 30 b. Nazir 139 n. 62 b. Sukkah 5 n. 20, 45 n. 49, 49 n. 72, b. Nedarim 49 n. 72, 50 n. 84 555 n. 103, 56 n. 109, n. 111, 92 b. Niddah 33–34, 92 n. 250, 176 n. 10, n. 250, 132 n. 14, 180 n. 21, n. 24 b. Ta’anit 66 n. 156, 74 n. 187 b. Pesahim 5 n. 20, 38 n. 7, 49 n. 72, b. Temurah 000 n. 74, nn. 81–82, 55 n. 103, n. 107, b. Yevamot 49 n. 72, 55 nn. 103–104, 56 n. 108, nn. 110–111, 63 nn. 107–108, 56 n. 111, 60 nn. 144–145, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 260, nn. 130–132, 67 n. 158, 75 n. 190, 134 n. 30, 137 n. 54, 179 n. 14, 180 77 n. 197, 78 n. 200, 84 n. 223, 86 n. 24 n. 233, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 260, 99 n. 1, b. Rosh HaShanah 5 n. 20, 45 108 n. 48, 136, 154 n. 8, n. 111, 155 nn. 50–51, 48 n. 66, 55 n. 106, 56 n. 13, 156 nn. 21–22, 158 n. 29, 178 n. 109, n. 111, 84 n. 223, 86 n. 233, n. 7, 179 nn. 12–13, 180 n. 24 92 n. 250, 95 n. 260, 134 n. 30, 179 b. Yoma 4, 5 n. 20, 49 n. 72, n. 77, n. 14, 181 nn. 28–29, 34 108 nn. 50–51, 133 n. 27, 139 b. Sanhedrin 42, 60 n. 130, 63 n. 144, nn. 61–62 67 n. 158, 92 n. 250, 95 n. 260, 99 b. Zevahim 49 n. 72, n. 81, 108 n. 50, nn. 1–2, 107 nn. 42–43, n. 145, 108 162 n. 47 n. 48, 125 and n. 126, 128 n. 4, 129–130, 135 n. 37, 136, 138–139