DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT

POLICY BRIEFING Is the financial crisis the only threat to Swaziland's regime?

Abstract Swaziland is one of the smallest African countries as well as the only absolute monarchy remaining on the continent. Its political system is an anomaly in , the most advanced and progressive region of the sub-Saharan region. The Swazi state has been mired in a deep financial crisis for the last two years. Given that a large segment of the population lives under the poverty line and that the HIV infection rate is one of the highest in the world, the effects of the financial crisis have been severe. The Swazi people, who have traditionally shown great reverence to their monarch, are growing increasingly critical, blaming the crisis on the government’s mismanagement. King Mswati III's eccentric lifestyle and apparent lack of consideration for the difficulties faced by his people have eroded the regime’s credibility. Political repression has grown. Given the lack of representation built into the country's political system, and the absence of checks and balances, the possibilities for political evolution in the absence of royal leadership are nearly inexistent. While the Swazi crisis has not made international headlines recently, the country's problems persist. The International Monetary Fund left the country in May and, if the announced South African bailout is not agreed by Swaziland due to its conditionality, a peak of the crisis may be expected in late 2012 or early 2013.

FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT INTERNAL USE ONLY

DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_274 September 2012 PE 491.438 EN Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

This Policy Briefing is an initiative of the Policy Department, DG EXPO.

AUTHOR: Fernando GARCÉS DE LOS FAYOS Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Policy Department WIB 06 M 077 rue Wiertz 60 B-1047 Brussels Feedback to [email protected] is welcome. Editorial Assistant: Györgyi MÁCSAI

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS: Original: EN

ABOUT THE PUBLISHER: Manuscript completed on 7 September 2012. © European Union, 2012 Printed inBelgium This Policy Briefing is available on the intranet site of the Directorate-General for External Policies, in the Regions and countries or Policy Areas section. To obtain paper copies, please send a request by e-mail to: [email protected].

DISCLAIMER: Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation, except for commercial purposes, are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and provided the publisher is given prior notice and supplied with a copy of the publication.

2 Is the financial crisis the only threat to Swaziland's regime?

Table of contents

1. THE LAST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY IN AFRICA 4

2. A SEVERE FINANCIAL CRISIS 7

3. SOME CONCLUSIONS, 10

INCLUDING A CONSIDERATION OF THE REGIONAL DIMENSION 10

3 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

1. THE LAST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY IN AFRICA Swaziland is the last absolute monarchy in Africa. In the hands of Mswati III, it is a small country — the second smallest country in mainland Africa1 — but located in the middle of one of Africa's two most economically and democratically developed regions: southern Africa2. Swaziland is in fact the only country in southern Africa where, despite regular elections, the political system is not based on the competition of political parties. In 1973, the then King Shobuza II — who reigned during sixty one years and father of the current King3 — decided to ban political parties, despite provisions in the country’s first Constitution, from 1968. His son, Mswati III, pushed his father's reform one step further after assuming power in 19864: State powers in Swaziland after long consultations, the king promulgated a new constitution in 2005 are concentrated in the that provided for regular elections for the majority of the parliamentarians, king's hands and those of but without political parties. His argument for the transformation was that the political elite connected the monarchy consolidates the country's unity, while democracy in the to the king. British5 / Western style only 'causes division'. In fact, the text of the 2005 Constitution is contradictory, as on the one hand it guarantees freedom of association, and on the other it bans political parties and consolidates the enormous powers of the king, including by preserving the state of emergency set up by the king's father in 1973.

The legal consolidation of this type of regime is particularly surprising in

southern Africa of the 21st century. As the BBC country profile describes

Swaziland, the country is 'an island of dictatorship in a sea of democracy'.

Swaziland's only two neighbours, the richer and the poorer

Mozambique, made successful transitions to democracy in 1994, each of

them coming from very different dictatorship backgrounds —

respectively, an racial regime and a Marxist-Leninist single-party

regime which went through a long civil war. Yet Swaziland's absolute

monarchy has survived, thanks to the traditional reverence paid by the

Swazis to their King, who has always been regarded as the ruler given by

God to them and who is assumed to always take the right decision for the

country. In a larger context, it should be noticed that Swaziland is a mono

ethnic state; a very rare example in Africa

Swaziland is in fact governed by a relatively small elite, either belonging to

1 Without counting the African island / archipelago states. Inland on the African continent, only Gambia has a smaller area than Swaziland's 17 363 sq km. 2 The other is arguably northern Africa. 3 The last 18 of which Swaziland was already an independent country 4 Mswati III was only 14 years old when his father died and a regency of two queens was established until he was 18.. 5 Swaziland was transformed into a British Protectorate after the (1899- 1902) and remained one until its independence in 1968. The Bantu Swazis willingly joined the British forces in the hopes of retrieving the lands that had been confiscated by the .

4 Is the financial crisis the only threat to Swaziland's regime?

the extensive royal family or traditionally connected with it through tribal The king enjoys an extensive leaders or others. The king's large personal fortune and the royal family's fortune that reinforces his business reinforce the monarch's real power. According to Forbes power. magazine, Mswati III is one of the world's richest monarchs. Although the royal house rejects this allegation, Forbes describes his personal fortune at around EUR 100 million. Moreover the king's official position and power are reinforced by his position as the commander of the army and all other security forces — a post he exercises actively, not simply in name.

Political parties and trade unions that oppose the absolute power of the

King or the governing political elite in any way are not allowed to be Dissidents and trade unions registered or — if they already have been — are simply de-registered are severely repressed. when their speech turns critical of the regime. This happened earlier this

year, when the new and reinvigorated Trade Union Congress of Swaziland

(TUCOSWA) received an official certification of its registration in January,

only to have it cancelled in March after its leaders pronounced themselves

in favour of a their members' boycott of the next general elections, due in

20136. TUCOSWA is the result of the merger of two powerful traditional

trade unions, the Swaziland Federation of Labour and the Swaziland

National Association of Teachers.

Nevertheless the Swazi political system provides for some sort of popular Elections are regularly held elections: the Swazi Parliament, the Libandla, is composed of two Houses. but without political parties. In its Lower House (House of Assembly), 55 of its 65 members are elected by popular vote, although the three candidates who run for election in each constituency or Tinkhundla (tribal community) are nominated by local councils led by the tribal leaders. In other words, the elections are not held on a political party basis, but rather present the best group of candidates as determined by the country’s elite. The other 10 members of the House of Assembly are appointed by the King, as are 20 of the 30 senators. The other 10 senators are appointed by the House of Assembly. The Swazi Parliament has five-year terms, and the next general elections to the lower House should be held before 19 September 2013. The main, outlawed opposition party, the People's United Democratic Political opposition is Movement (PUDEMO), is becoming gradually stronger and bolder. Along outlawed. with TUCOSWA, the party may, for the first time, be in a position in 2013 to defy the Tinkhundla electoral system by launching a credible boycott.

6 International support for Swazi trade unions is growing, as demonstrated at the meeting in London on 5 September on 'Swaziland: A Kingdom in crisis' organised by UK union Unison and South African ACTSA 7 CIVICUS 16 August 2012 http://www.civicus.org/media-centre-129/press-releases/1024- time-for-the-commonwealth-to-act-on-swaziland 8 http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Swazi-party-leader-killed-in-jail-20100506 9 http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/26620 10 The king probably refers here to the important casino industry of the country. This still prosperous, although the golden days, when South Africans had to cross the border to gamble, ended as soon as the puritanical apartheid regime was over.

5 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

Moreover Jan Sithole, a popular opposition leader who has been living in exile, recently appeared in the country announcing that he will be leading SWADEPA, a new organisation that wants to contest next year's election.

The large demonstrations in favour of democracy held in the capital,

Mbabane in April this year are an indication of a growing dissatisfaction Popular demonstrations among the people, at least in urban areas. However, supporters of the have been held in 2012, regime, and even some of the soft critics, have suggested that these prompted by political as popular demonstrations were at least partly a form of popular protest well as economic against measures imposed by the government of Prime Minister Sibussio motivations. Dlamini to cope with the country's major economic crisis. The

implementation of a 14 % added value tax, in particular, rankled many

Swazis. Moreover, the opposition has had a tactical advantage in

demonstrations this year, as the government wished to avoid being

condemned by South Africa and its ruling party, the African National

Congress (ANC). Similar demonstrations had taken place in Swaziland in

2011, and were met with fierce police repression, leading South Africa to

censure Swaziland. South Africa is extremely important for Swaziland in

many respects, and the ANC's condemnation on 14 April 2011 had even

included even indirect references to the distant past, when Swaziland

officials allegedly cooperated with the South African apartheid regime to

repress ANC militants in exile, despite Swaziland’s official disapproval of

apartheid.

Swaziland's human rights record is very poor: the repression of political The country's record of dissent is not limited to political parties and trade unions; it also applies, human rights is poor. for example, to the student union, the Swaziland National Union of Students (SNUS) whose president, Maxwell Dlamini, was again this summer detained and allegedly tortured. The SNUS general conference in mid-October may become another moment of confrontation between the government and the opposition. According to the NGO CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen participation) 'pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders are targeted using imprecise counter-terror legislation, including the Suppression of Terrorism Act (2008) and the draconian provisions of the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act (1938), which are regularly employed to inhibit the exercise of democratic and civic freedoms'7. A particularly disturbing example was the death in May 2010 of Sipho Jele whlist in prison after having been arrested apparently for simply wearing a PUDEMO T-shirt8. Concerning freedom of speech, censorship of media expressing criticism of the king or of the government's political or economic decisions is The media is censored. evident. However, the censorship is often unnecessary, as a number of the main media belong to the royal family or the state. Many outlets simply chose not to relay news about popular disagreements to avoid The Swazi diaspora abroad having to face the authorities. Many political activists and has become gradually businesspeople who disagree with the official line of the government engaged in politics. now live in South Africa. At the same time, members of the Swazi diaspora in other countries — which has generally been composed of

6 Is the financial crisis the only threat to Swaziland's regime?

economic migrants rather than political ones — are becoming increasingly engaged in politics.

The Danish Minister for Development, Mr. Christian Friis Bach, at the end

of the 2012 Danish EU Presidency saidin a letter to the Danish NGO Africa EU leaders have suggested Contact that the European Union is considering taking action against that measures could be Swaziland for its many recent human rights violations. He also said taken. “During a conversation with EU Commissioner for Development, Andris

Piebalgs, on May 28, I raised the issue of the worrying human rights

situation in Swaziland. The Commissioner shared my concern and said

that he was considering what action the EU should take.”9

Despite of the lack of political checks and balances in the Swazi political The judiciary system seems system, the judicial power seems to enjoy some freedom of manoeuvre. to enjoy some margin of On 31 July this year, the government decided suddenly and unilaterally to manoeuvre. fire 110 teachers from the national education system — including the president of the Swaziland Association of Teachers, Sigonbile Mazibuko — because they held an illegal strike demanding better conditions for their sector. Just three days later, on 3 August, the courts ordered the teachers' reinstatement and asked the government not to proceed with the planned dismissal of more teachers facing the same accusations. The court order seems to have been respected so far. In a move that may be related, King Mswati III decided to call for a 'Sibaya' — a traditional gathering of Swazi people who are asked to come from In August, the king took the the entire kingdom to listen what the monarch has to say — on 6 August. initiative of calling for a This is something quite exceptional, as the king had not called for a traditional 'Sibaya' 'Sibaya' since 2008. At the gathering the king analysed the various gathering. country's difficulties, asked for his people to propose solutions, blamed 'foreign forces' for the turbulence that the country is going through and explained some of the country's economic difficulties as the result of a diminution in tourism income10 due to the financial world crisis. Some analysts thought that the Prime Minister would be politically sacrificed to alleviate growing popular anger for the economic situation of the country, but this did not occur.

2. A SEVERE FINANCIAL CRISIS The country's economic difficulties have continued for almost two years. The country has faced two The nadir occurred at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012, when years of severe economic there existed the real — and widely reported — possibility that the crisis. country would go bankrupt. Although international attention on small Swaziland has since abated, the country's financial situation has not much improved, and the risk of bankruptcy remains very real. Analysts predict another crisis by the end of this year.

The fiscal crisis results from the global slowdown following the 2008

economic crisis. More than half of the country's receipts coming from the

Southern African Customs Union (SACU) have been severely reduced.

SACU is considered the world's oldest functional customs union. It

7 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

A dramatic reduction in celebrated its first centenary in 2010. The Union collects duties on local government receipts from products and customs duties on members’ imports from outside SACU, the Southern African and the resulting revenue is allocated to member countries in quarterly Customs Union (SACU) lies instalments, according to a disproportionate revenue-sharing formula that at the heart of Swaziland's benefits Member States other than South Africa. SACU's founding financial crisis. agreements were revised in 200211 in order to deepen the engagement between South Africa and the four other states — Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland12. Of SACU's five members, Swaziland is the country that has obtained the greatest benefit over the years from SACU: more than half of the Swazi national public revenues come from the Customs Union. In 2010 Swaziland’s GDP per capita — USD 3,538 — was less than half of that of South Africa13. This gap has been increasing, and the IMF projections show that by 2015 the ratio will be one to three.

The Swazi government has extensively relied on its central bank reserves

to cover the gap in public finances, although this has not sufficed. The With central bank reserves national reserves are well below the three-month amount suggested by dangerously low, the the IMF to all countries as a guarantee to cover import payments; it is also national currency may lose well below the macro-economic convergence indicators of the Southern its fixed exchange rate to African Development Community (SADC), the southern Africa economic the South African rand. regional integration organisation by definition, of which Swaziland has

been a Member State from its founding in 1992. Analysts have observed

that the rapid decline in Swaziland’s reserves could result in a complete

depletion in the next year and a half if the trend is not stopped14. One of

the principal worries is that the ongoing decrease of the central bank

reserves may also jeopardise the long-standing basis of the country's

economic stability: the peg of the lilangeni, the Swazi currency, to the

South African rand. Specialised media have already openly discussed this

possibility, damaging investors' confidence in Swaziland.

The dialogue between the government and the International Monetary Dialogue between the IMF Fund (IMF) was stopped in mid May, when the IMF recalled its advisory and Swaziland was halted in team to Washington because its recommendations were consistently not May, with the Swazi being followed. The dialogue has not been restored so far, and the government rejecting the situation has had serious consequences: the IMF was providing badly IMF's recommendations. needed assistance to Swaziland's Fiscal Adjustment Roadmap (FAR) and, most significantly, the Fund's withdrawal is perceived as very bad news for the country's ability to borrow money from the African Development Bank or from other international institutions in order to keep its public finances afloat.

11 http://www.sacu.int/main.php?id=468 12 The only alteration of SACU membership since its foundation in 1910 occurred in 1990, when Namibia joined following its independence from South Africa in the same year. 13 IMF 2011: GDP per capita, current prices. 14 Trade Mark Southern Africa, 6 July 2012 http://www.trademarksa.org/news/swaziland- govt-s-budgetary-obligations-deplete-reserves-further-0

8 Is the financial crisis the only threat to Swaziland's regime?

The IMF described the Swazi government's forecast of a 5 % annual

growth rate as 'optimistic' and predicted instead that the country’s GDP

would diminish by 2 % in 2012. The IMF's most essential recommendation

to the Swazi government is to trim 10 % (+/-7 000 persons) of its public

sector workforce by 2015. The Government is clearly worried about

agreeing to such a measure because of the potential unrest it might cause

and the toll that it might take on the regime's popular support. The

pressure exercised on the government by the civil service — thus far

successfully — has had also unexpected consequences among the ruling

elite: Swazi Members of Parliament, who had decided in 2011 a 10 %

reduction in their own salary in view of the country's troubled finances,

decided in March 2012 to reverse their decision, arguing that 'they were

the only ones in the country's public sector' who had taken a salary cut.

The number of Swazi people directly or indirectly dependent on public Swaziland is an agrarian sector jobs is very large. As recently argued by Johannes Manikela, country, yet allocates the President of the Federation of the Swazi Business Community (FEBSEC) lion's share of its public 'sixty percent of SMEs [small and medium enterprises] are at risk of failure resources to security. because they are not getting government tenders as before.' More important perhaps, it is surprising to see that a country whose economy is basically agrarian only allocates around 4 % of public spending to the agricultural sector, while 17 % is spent in the security sector, including all the security services15. The expenditures are often justified by the government in terms of national and international concerns over the (demonstrated) use of Swaziland as a passage route (from and further) by smugglers of illegal immigrants, drugs and light arms into South Africa. Loyalists to the King argue that the IMF is biased against Swaziland. A Loyalists to the king argue leading businessperson in the country, Paul Friedlander, noted earlier in that the IMF is biased. the year that 'considering the state of Europe's balance sheet, it's rather hypocritical for the IMF to come here wagging their finger when they are over there bailing out the West and indebting countless future generations'16. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister upon his return to the country on 19 July from the key African Union summit in Addis Ababa has taken a conciliatory approach, acknowledging to the press that 'we can't defy the IMF'17.

The government is also facing strikes in the health sector, where medical staff complains about the severe cuts, and the population at large is facing a shortage of drugs and medical supplies. This is particularly serious in

15 IRIN, Humanitarian news, UNCHA, http://www.irinnews.org/report/95479/SWAZILAND- IMF-walks-away-from-the-kingdom 16 Mail & Guardian Online, South Africa, 17 February 2012. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02- 17-swazi-meltdown-imminent 17 http://www.observer.org.sz/index.php?news=40995

9 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

The country is plagued by Swaziland because one in four of the adults of reproductive age is HIV shortages in medical positive, giving the country with the world's worst ratio of HIV infection. supplies and strikes in the AIDS is a human drama in Swaziland, as across the entire southern Africa health sector, while the AIDS region, where countries affected are paying a high social and economic crisis rages. price.

The South African bailout announced in 2011 for Swaziland, worth ZAR 2.4

billion (+/- EUR 250 million), also required an agreement between the IMF

and the Swazi Government, as well as clear improvements in the country's An announced South African democracy. The bailout would be in the form of a loan that would be bailout in 2011 has yet to repaid in five years starting only in 2015. However this operation was also materialise and is not well put on hold then. Recently there has been contradictory news about its perceived by South African final implementation: on 27 September there were reports about a political parties. statement of the South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in which

he announced that the first of the three tranches of this bailout would be

released this month. Later on the South African Treasury stated that any

release of the funds would require the completion of negotiations by the financial authorities of both countries. This is certainly a sensitive issue in South Africa since the ANC caucus in the National Council of Provinces 6 the upper House of the South African parliament - called in late August the South African Government to holdback any payments to Swaziland unless clear a political conditionality to move towards democracy is agreed by the Swazi government. This ANC caucus statement was greeted by the Democratic Alliance, the main opposition party in South Africa.

3. SOME CONCLUSIONS, INCLUDING A CONSIDERATION OF THE REGIONAL DIMENSION The big question is whether Swaziland's serious and continuous financial and economic crisis is only due to the low revenues from SACU or whether the government's mismanagement and lack of reasonable policies are also playing to blame. An ever-growing number of Swazi citizens believe The population is the latter are the main causes of the crisis, and that the blame cannot increasingly blaming the solely be attributed to SACU’s revenues or the classical issues related to inefficiency of the underdevelopment, as is often done when describing African economies. government, rather than the Corruption in Swaziland is a problem for example, but compared to the decrease of SACU receipts, majority of sub-Saharan countries and even to its neighbour Mozambique, for the crisis. the situation is not dreadful; the country was ranked 95 of 183 of the countries and territories analysed worldwide in 2011 by Transparency International18 — not good, but firmly in the middle. What many analysts identify as the chief problem of Swaziland is in fact the country's lack of checks and balances, or — formulated in another way — the lack of modern and efficient state institutions and policies, something which is inevitably linked to its lack of democratic progress.

18 http://www.transparency.org/country#SWZ

10 Is the financial crisis the only threat to Swaziland's regime?

Some 60 % of the 1.1 million of people in Swaziland live under the poverty line, and unemployment in the country is thought to be about 40 %. The king's luxurious lifestyle Under these circumstances, the king's luxurious lifestyle and that of his seriously undermines his thirteen spouses and of the extended royal family scandalise a number of credibility. Swazis, who now face severe economic difficulties. Although the king has taken measures to cull his widely publicised expenditures — by not celebrating his 44th birthday in 2012, for example, in the ostentatious way that he did in past years — many believe that his moderation has come too late. The Swazi magazine editor Bheki Makhubu, who has served jail sentences for his outspoken views, believes that 'the king has lost touch with his subjects'19. Makhubu may be right. Despite the king’s new restraint, his name has featured prominently in international media reports in 2012. In late April, the king received a jet as a gift from 'anonymous friends'20, possibly the same who had provided financial help to the state finances three months before for no known reason. Mswati III's attendance at the celebrations of the Queen Elisabeth II's Diamond Jubilee in London in May was also widely reported; given the economic troubles Swaziland is experiencing; this led to rebukes from British journalists as well as some Swazis21. Even more damaging to the monarch's reputation, three of the king's wives and 63 additional people travelled to Las Vegas in July for a shopping trip. And despite his country's travails, the king's attachment to his 'traditional' lifestyle has not diminished: on 3 September, the Umhlanga Reed Dance was again held before the monarch. This annual festivity gathers thousands of young women and girls, among whom the king usually chooses new wives to join his many others22.

Swaziland's absolute monarchy is an anomaly in 21st century southern

Africa, but it may be coming slowly to an end. The Swazi king and the

country's elite seem incapable or afraid of leading the country in any Mswati III and the country's transition towards a modern state. At the same time, the economic crisis elite may have lost their and the precarious financial situation of the government has not chance to regain their improved, even if the country is no longer making international headlines. former glory. King Mswati III may have lost the opportunity to reassume a revered

19 'will the cult of Swazi King Mswati ever end?' BBC 19 April 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17762749 20 Swaziland's King and the private jet', The Telegraph UK 25 April 2012 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/swaziland/9226528/ Swazilands-King-and-the-private-jet.html 21 'Guess who's coming to dinner? Anger over Queen's Jubilee bash guest list' the Guardian, UK 17 May 2012 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/swaziland/9226528/ Swazilands-King-and-the-private-jet.html 22 Reuters 3 september http://af.reuters.com/article/swazilandNews/idAFL6E8K357U20120903?pageNumber=1&v irtualBrandChannel=0 23 However, there was some debate on whether this was a South African or a SADC operation carried out by South African forces.

11 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

position among his people. More Swazis have grown critical of him and his government, even in the absence of access to international media reports about the kingdom's numerous problems. Mswati III has been proven to lack the feelings and intuition of his late father, King Shobuza II. Also very conservative, Shobuza II did not respect the letter of the 1968 Constitution, but he was known to be a good ruler, always ready to listen and seek council in a paternalistic manner, and believing that his subjects had the right to disagree with his government's decisions. Mswati III has had the higher education that his father lacked, but has been unwilling to accept citizens' disagreement. His inflexibility may be influenced by the political and economic elite surrounding him.

The South African bailout may not materialize because of the objections of

the South African main political parties to any agreement without an If the South African bailout is unequivocal political conditionality that the Swazi regime still rejects. If not implemented, the Swazi the bailout is not agreed the country's financial crisis will probably return crisis peak again. with strength towards the end of this year or the beginning of 2013. If this

happens it may trigger a more explosive situation that would, in turn,

force South Africa to intervene.

Swaziland's economic and political crisis is a matter of regional, or at least sub-regional, concern: The announcement of a South African bailout is the best proof of this, but if it can not be agreed the situation may become South Africa's traditional unsustainable. The new South Africa is a country that generally avoids foreign policy of non- interfering in other countries' matters. South African foreign policy intervention may be limited maintains the memory of the remarkable transition that the South African when there is instability in people and institutions made in the 1990s, from a racist apartheid system its immediate vicinity into a democracy, accomplished through national dialogue and without direct foreign intervention. This is what South Africa has also promoted across Africa over the last two decades — in Zimbabwe, Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and Madagascar, for example. However, South Africa's policy of non- intervention may be sorely tested by the situation in Swaziland, which is almost entirely surrounded by South Africa and quite dependent on its powerful neighbour. In Lesotho, which is entirely surrounded by South Africa, the South African military did intervene in 1998 after serious riots followed general elections; South African leaders were also concerned there that the water supply to nearby South African provinces might be halted23. There is some speculation that South Africa may soon decide to intervene in Swaziland if repression surpasses acceptable limits or if the country plunges into greater disorder. If social disturbances become too significant in Swaziland — either as a consequence of bankruptcy or a deep political crisis (or both) — it would be very likely that the South African people ask their government to assume its responsibilities as the major regional power, as it did in Lesotho. In that case the would not be permanently installed on Swazi soil, but it may well be needed temporarily to ensure that events in Swaziland do not exceed the tolerance levels of South Africans and/or that Swaziland does not become a source of instability for South Africa or the entire southern Africa region.

12 Is the financial crisis the only threat to Swaziland's regime?

Figure 1 Map of southern Africa

Source: United Nations

13