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Montenegro Political Outlook for 2021 Vojin Golubovic

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Montenegro Political Outlook for 2021 Vojin Golubovic ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 36, No. 1 (ME) January 2021 Montenegro political briefing: Montenegro Political outlook for 2021 Vojin Golubovic 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Montenegro Political outlook for 2021 After a turbulent 2020, it seems that 2021 will be just as dynamic and uncertain when it comes to the political scene in Montenegro. The change of government that took place in the previous year will have consequences in 2021, which can be reflected in both domestic and foreign policy. The new government will face a number of challenges, and the fact that cohabitation will continue in Montenegro for a few more years, further complicates the situation. The political scene in Montenegro in 2021 will undoubtedly be determined by events such as the political response of the recent ruling party and now the strongest opposition Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), local elections in Montenegro's second largest municipality - Niksic, and expected squabbles within the parliamentary majority. Also, in 2021, it is difficult to expect more significant progress in terms of various aspects of government functioning compared to the previous one. On the foreign policy scene, one can expect the continuation of the undertaken commitments on the issue of European integration. Political action of the new government The power won by the ideologically diverse opposition will be put to a great test during 2021. However, it seems that this exam will not result in a question of confidence in the government itself, but rather in the face of continued pressure under which different parts of the new government will find themselves during the year. First of all, this statement is referred to the various crises that can be caused by the fact that there is currently a cohabitation system in Montenegro (because the President of Montenegro is from the opposition DPS). In such a system, there can be a series of crises when the president does not want to sign laws or acts passed in parliament, leading consequently to an attempt of new new government to marginalize the president himself. Nevertheless, the political system in Montenegro is such that in various domains (defense, Judiciary, etc.) requires the cooperation of two, currently conflicting parties. The first disagreements (such as the illegal or at least questionable passing of a number of laws in the Parliament at the end of December 2020 when a quorum was not provided, as well as the non-signing of the passed laws by the President of Montenegro who considered it unconstitutional) had shown that expectations about crises in political functioning seem quite real. Additionally, political intolerance between the highly divided political public on the pro- Montenegrin bloc and the ruling bloc gathered around a coalition that has repeatedly shown 1 intolerance towards its own state and its symbols (led by the current Prime Minister and with the blessing of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro) refer to the political instability during the coming period. In addition, the initial behavior of the new government, which announced experts in all positions, indicates that there will be none of that, but that it will continue what the people have Just criticized - party employment, nepotism and the like. Therefore, a crisis could be expected in state-owned enterprises, the education sector and the state administration, so that the new government can more easily implement the policy of hiring "suitable" and sow fear of dismissal of "unsuitable". In addition, for any failure, incompetence, or crisis, it is possible to blame the old government for producing a "catastrophically bad situation". Such rhetoric could be expected. The local elections in Niksic may be a reflection of the parliamentary elections This division into the Montenegrin and pro-Serbian blocs will probably be reflected in those situations when it should not be reflected in normal circumstances, ie. in local elections. The fact that local elections are planned in Niksic in March indicates that the results of these elections will be largely the result of unsettled national passions aroused after the parliamentary elections, and not so much the treatment of local issues, perceptions of local development or the presence of any strategy for Niksic municipaluty. The new government sees the local elections in Niksic as an opportunity to confirm the results achieved in the parliamentary elections, so that "taking over" the government in this city from the DPS would mean, above all, victory in the psychological war with the former government. Therefore, it is possible to expect that during these elections there will be national rhetoric and the formation of similar coalitions as during the state parliamentary elections. Undoubtedly, the Democratic Front, which led a coalition of pro-Serbian parties in the previous elections, will now form a similar coalition with the aim of strengthening its political position and possibly gaining the mayor position in this city after the elections. Also, one can expect the same composition of other coalitions that won power in the parliamentary elections. It is almost certain that these parties will invoke their closeness to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and it is possible to expect support from that religious organization in any form. However, when it comes to pro-Montenegrin parties, a slightly different performance can now be expected. Unlike the state parliamentary elections, when the DPS ran almost 2 independently, a broad coalition with the parties that make up the pro-Montenegrin bloc can be expected in the local elections, despite various ideological divergences. Therefore, it is possible to expect a broad coalition with the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party, the Patriotic Committee Alliance and possibly the Social Democratic Party with which the DPS is furthest away. Defeat in these elections would mean a possible further weakening of the party and the loss of its membership. Although making a comparison with the state parliamentary elections is inappropriate, it should be noted that the coalitions that make up the new government in the parliamentary elections received over 7,000 votes more than the DPS in this municipality with total voting body of 58,000. Certainly, the DPS in a broad coalition can expect a much better result, but the question is whether that will be enough to win. Real reform of the strongest political party? The DPS, which remains the single strongest political party, now part of the opposition, is facing most important decisions on the party's future. What is clear is that if this party wants to continue to participate as the most important political factor in Montenegro, it must undergo significant reforms within the party itself. This primarily refers to the different structure of human resources at the very top of the party, bearing in mind that a large number of current personnel are associated with corrupt practices. Whether the party has the tendency to reform from within will be shown by an extraordinary congress that can be expected at the end of January. Namely, some radical changes have been announced within the party, which should primarily refer to the much stronger role of young people who are not burdened by the corruption. However, the question is whether such changes, if they occur, will be peacefully accepted by the old cadres, or whether the resistance will result in the loss of cadres in the party. In any case, if only "cosmetic changes" take place without radical cuts in the party, it is very likely that the progressive electorate will abolish further support for the party and turn to other parties. Nevertheless, the results of the previous parliamentary elections appear to be a sufficient warning for party leaders. When it comes to the party's policy on foreign relations, it is likely that it will remain unchanged, because this policy was the main trump card of this party in the previous period and its most successful policy. At the domestic level, this party should be expected to unite with democratically oriented parties that do not support the current government. 3 No changes in foreign policy The new government will not pursue a different foreign policy than the previous government. Not because it would not want to (because a large part of the new government is negative towards integration and favors closeness with Russia, unification with Serbia, etc.), but because it simply cannot be otherwise. Losing support from European officials, due to any negative tone towards Brussels or NATO, would be a big blow for the new government, which would face a crisis and probably a loss of political power. Therefore, foreign policy was determined even earlier, and any deviation from Euro-Atlantic integration would be counterproductive. However, the new Prime Minister's daily flirtation with Serbia, and the Democratic Front's clear focus on pro-Russian and pro-Serbian interests, can lead to quarrels from time to time. However, the current capacities of the new government are not such that they could give up European integration and NATO membership. Although some parties in power would probably like to. Therefore, the current year will be one of the most interesting in the political era of parliamentary democracy in Montenegro. There are many conflicting parties and many conflicting interests. However, it seems that the new government will find a way to meet the needs of all those involved. And it will do it without hesitation with everything it has criticized so far – even party employment and nepotism if necessary. 4 .
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