RESTRICTED THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA PART 2 (The Allied Invasion) DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT, NEW YORK 1950 RESTRICTED FOREWORD This account of the operations in North Africa from 8 November 1942 to 13 May 1943 has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on material furnished by the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, and other War Department agencies. Valuable information has also been obtained from the publications of the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, in acknowledging indebtedness to others it is not de­ sired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors or for any conclusions drawn. This and other pamphlets on World War II are constantly being revised as additional information becomes available. It will be appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or discrepancies, or who have comments or suggestions for the im­ provement of the subject matter, will communicate them to: The Professor of Military Art and Engineering, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. March 19.1,.7 ARMY-USMA, WE:ST POINT, N.Y.-2300 2-Z-50 RESTRICTED THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA PART 2-THE ALLIED INVASION INTRODUCTION-·- The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declara­ tion of war against the United States by Germany and Italy brought this country into the world conflict. Immediate action was necessary to coordinate with our allies, and especially with Great Britain, the strategy that would govern the future conduct of the war and the control that should be exercised over it. In a report to the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, stated: On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the series of discussions which then followed resulted an agreement not only regarding the immediate strategy for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of a method for the strategical command and control of British and American military resources. Probably no other Allied action, in the field or otherwise, has exerted as powerful an effect on the con­ duct of this war as the prompt establishment of a prescribed pro­ cedure for achieving unity of effort through the medium of the Com­ bined Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction of the leaders of their respective governments. At this first conference the President and the Prime Minister, with the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, made the decision that Allied resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan. In discussions following the conference a tentative target date for an operation across the English Channel was set for the summer of 1943. Some consideration was given to the possibility of an emergency diversionary assault at a much earlier date if this became necessary to save the situation on the Russian front. As further studies were made, shortage of landing craft for launching a cross­ Channel operation, and shortage of supplies for maintaining one, militated against putting the plan into effect. At the same time, the reverses suffered by the British in North Africa and the con- 1 2 tinued need for some diversion to assist the Russians brought under consideration the possibility of mounting an assault against the French territory in North Africa in 1942, with consequent postpone­ .. ment of a major cross-Channel operation until a later date. Despite considerable American military opinion in favor of ad­ hering to the original plan, the final decision in favor of the invasion of North Africa, as an alternative to an attack across the English Channel, was made in July 1942, following Prime Minister Church­ ill's second visit to Washington. The date for the landings was fixed in September; they were to take place in November. Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower* had been sent to London in June 1942 as Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). On 14 August 1942 he received a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which appointed him Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. His mission under this assignment was to direct combined military operations against French North Africa-Operation Torch-as early as prac­ ticable with a view to gaining, in conjunction with Allied forces in the Middle East, complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. At the same time he retained command of ETOUSA (until 4 February 1943). Meanwhile Rommel was making the drive that took him to El Alamein and the gates of Alexandria, and other Axis forces were driving across the Don River toward the Caucasus Mountains and the rich oil fields near the Caspian Sea. The Middle East seemed clearly within Hitler's grasp, and the situation in the Mediterranean was exceedingly dark. In the Pacific, Japanese forces had reached what was to be the high-water mark of their advance. Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands had been occupied; Port Moresby in New Guinea, the jumping-off point for Australia, was threatened; Burma had been overrun; and India was under sea and air attack. The tide of Axis aggression was at its height, and the Allies were everywhere on the defensive, struggling to hold open their important sea routes of communication. But the Allied high command knew that large convoys were on the way to Egypt and should arrive in time. These reinforcements for General Montgomery were expected to provide him not only with the means with which to stop Rommel but also to carry out his part of a great Allied pincers operation, the western jaw of which would be the British and American forces to be landed in French North Africa. Thus the Battle of El Alamein was expected • The ranks of officers as given throughout this narrative were those held at the time. 3 to divert Axis attention from the newly selected theater of opera­ tions, and, subsequently, the British Eighth Army was to constitute the eastern jaw of the pincers designed to crush all Axis opposition in Africa. So the plans for the invasion were continued despite the apparently adverse situation in Egypt. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS It appeared that the following strategic advantages would accrue from the occupation of French North Africa: 1. The first advantage would be the clearing of the Mediterranean supply route. Allied convoys would be able to move along it under the protection of land-based aircraft. They could reach Egypt and the Suez Canal by a sea route that is 2300 miles long (measured from Gibraltar), or 10,000 miles less than that around the Cape of Good Hope. The distance from the United Kingdom to India and to our newly established Persian Gulf Command would also be greatly shortened. 2. The occupation of French North Africa would make the block­ ade of the Axis powers virtually complete. All shipments of food and other supplies from Africa to Germany and her satellites would cease. 3. Another possible route for the invasion of continental Europe would be secured, thereby forcing the Germans to withdraw troops from the Russian front to defend this invasion route. 4. The control of French North Africa by the Allies would make Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East safe from an invasion from the west. 5. Dakar would no longer be a threat to South America. 6. If the occupation of French North Africa could be carried out without fatally embittering the French troops and authorities in that region, it would make possible the reconstitution of the French Army in preparation for its return in force to the homeland. However, the Allied forces were faced with many problems which, if aggravated, might seriously impair the success of the operation. The reaction of Spain and Vichy France, and of French North Af­ rica itself, would have a vital bearing on coming events. Axis air­ fields in Sicily and Sardinia enabled the enemy to dominate that section of the Mediterranean between Tunisia and Italy and pro­ hibited the successful movement of Allied convoys through this area, known as "bomb alley." Since Spain herself was pro-Axis, there was a real danger that the Germans would strike through that coun- 4 try against Gibraltar. Undoubtedly the Axis would occupy the whole of France to forestall an Allied landing on the French Medi­ terranean coast and to attempt to gain control of the French fleet at Toulon. The Germans would probably try to seize Tunis and Bizerte in order to retain control of the Sicilian channel, an opera­ tion that would be relatively easy for them because of the short supply lines from their bases in Sicily and southern Italy. Last, but not least, because of other commitments throughout the world Allied planners were faced with a critical shortage of trained troops and vital supplies and equipment, particularly landing craft and shipping, which would definitely limit the size of the operation. Quoting from an official report : Thus the strategic conception of sweeping the Axis from North Africa, and establishing Allied control from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, necessitated an operation on a scale of such magnitude that, once initiated, it would have to be followed through with all the force and shipping that the situation demanded. It would be the major Allied operation of 1942 and 1943. POLITICAL BACKGROUND No clear picture of the military operations in French North Africa can be obtained without some understanding of the political events that accompanied, and sometimes even overshadowed, the military aspects of the campaign.