LA WYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CML RIGHTS UNDER LAW

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SEMINAR ON TBE LEGAL ASPECTS OF APARTHEID .

July 6-7, 1985

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Panel I: Opening Session and Overview

An Overview of Some Aspects of Constitutional a·nd Legal Structures in South Africa by Advocate Ernest Moseneke

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Co-Sponsors: Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers• Committee for Civil Rights under Law The Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association The Standing Committee on World Order Under Law of the American Bar Association •w

Papers presented at the Seminar on the Legal Aspects of Apartheid, co-sponsored by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section and the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., July 6-7, 1985.

Copyright 1985 by Southern Africa Project Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law ' ... ,, . Ernest Moseneke AN OVERVIEW OF SOME ASPECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STRUCTURES IN SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION .

JOHN LOCIIndependence, Locke stated the following .

"to this perhaps it may well be said that, the people being ignorant and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people is to expose. it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist if the people may set up a new legislative whenever they take offence of the old one,

To this I answer ~ Quite the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time or corruption, it is not an easy thing to get . them changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion

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in the people to quit their old constitutions has, in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kinqdom, in this and former aqes still kept us to, or after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brouqht us back aqain to, our old leqislative of Kinqs, Lords, and Commons, and whatever provo­ cations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes' heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line."

In South Africa, that, amonqst many other basic human riqhts, the democratic governmental process has been withheld from a substantial majority of its people, admits no doubt. Any fleeting historical study of South Africa constitutional and legal structures will readily support this mundane observa- tion. What is not equally certain, to some people at any rate, is whether the current constitutional initiatives or the "new deal" in South Africa constitute an extension of the democratic process to people who were before, not part of such a process. Argument has raged amonqst our countryr. men, and amonqst keen observers of the South African situation, on whether the current constitutional changes recently effected in South Africa, in the wordsof Locke, have "carried the people so far as to place 'them' in another line." Is our ruling class stuck in the quagmire by "slowness and aversion •.••..•..•.. to quit their old constitutions ?"

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In this paper I will attempt to address this issue by firstly sketching a brief historical background to South African constitutional structures and legislation. There­ after, I will attempt· to briefly touch upon the race laws which provide the major props to the apartheid edifice. I will also look at constitutional institutions which were created exclusively for people other than white, and in particular, Africans, "Coloureds" and Indians. Finally, I will set out the major features of the new South African Constitution Act, 1983, which has .brought into being a tricameral parliamentary system. In some quarters this new constitutional design has been heralded as a departure from the traditional apartheid, and yet in others, see it as a cosmetised entrenchment of exclusive white rule.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1909 the Westminister Parliament enacted the South Africa Act, which British legislation constituted the union of South Africa as a legislative union under the British Crown. Consequently, in 1910 a Westminister style unitary state with four provinces, namely, the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal and the Cape, came into being. The constitu- tional head of the Union was the King of England represented by a Governor-General. The ·executive power vested in an executive council or cabinet composed of the leader

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of the majority party prime minister and minister of State appointed from amongst the ranks of parliamentarians. The legislature consisted of an Upper House or a Senate, and a House of Assembly.

As a general rule franchise was restricted to adult white males, except in the provinces of Natal and the Cape. The historical reason for this difference is that prior to 1910, black people had no franchise whatsoever in the Transvaal(2) and the Free State(J). Whereas in the Cape Colony, franchise was extended to all regardless of race, subject to certain property qualifications<4>, and in Natal franchise was extended to blacks who satisfied certain • property and other qualifications(S). Accordingly with the formation of the Union, those blacks who were on the voter's roll in the Cape and Natal, needless to say that these were extremely few, continued to remain on the roll after the formation of the Union.

After 1910 one legislation after another was introduced to disinfranchise all the blacks who had remained on the voter's roll, so much so that by 1961, with the conversion of the South African state into a republic, all franchise which was accorded to Africans, "Coloureds" and Indians in Natal and the Cape, had been removed. In contrast

to this disinfranchisement_proc~ss, by 1961 full and un­ qualified franchise had been extended to both white males and females< 6>, moreover the qualifying age was reduced

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from 21 years to 18 years of age(7).

The aforesaid statutory disinfranchisement of Africans and "Coloureds" in the Cape was not without constitutional and judicial drama. · The constitutional crisis which had its early beginnings in Ndlwana v Hofmeyer N.O. and Others(8j and found fruition in the case of Harris and Others v the Minister of the Interior and Another(9) and of The Minister

of Interior v Harris( 10) was by and large caused by the Supreme Court's unfavourable judicial review of certain electoral laws passed by parliament to disinfranchise "Coloureds" and Africans. As a sequel to the crisis, the number and quorum of the Appellate Division judges were increased( 11 ). The size of the senate was also enlarged in order to ensure an easier passage of the aforesaid legislative progr·am directed at disinfranchise­ ment(12>·

The 1961 Republican constitution was accordingly the high water mark of a racist constitutional wave, to the absolute exclusion of all South Africas other than white. It came as a triumphant goal of the exponents of white republican supremacy.

The fifty years spun over the period 1910 wit the fcrmation of the union up until 1961 with the declaration of a republican government, brought into existence consolidated legislation which was intended to underscore and to be

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supportive of a system of government based on group identity, race and ethnicity. As it will be discerned from the legislation treated hereunder, a feverish legis­ lative program went underway to ensure an almost total · segregation of South African society.

RACE LEGISLATION .

One of the cardinal facets of government policy in South Africa, is the demarcation of distinct and separate areas . . of occupation and ownership of land by various races •

• In 1913 and 1936 respectively two Land Acts(l 3) were passed which prescribed so-called scheduled areas for occupation by African people. Acquisitions of rights or interest in such land by persons o·ther than Africans was and still is prohibited. The total area so demarcated constituted approximately 13% of the total South African land area. It was indeed these parts of South Africa which were later to be converted into so-called Black Homelands. In 1946, and Act(14 ) with by and large the same purpose, was passed in respect of "Coloureds".

In 1945 the Black "Urban Areas" Consolidation Act{lS) was passed. This legislation empowered a Minister of Government

to decid~ upon urban areas for exclusive occupaeion by Africans. It is indeed this very law which consolidated - 7 - legislation relating to the influx of African people into urban areas and set up the well-known Section 10 qualifi­ cations reinforced with criminal sanction for any African remaining in excess of 72 hours in our urban area unauthorisedly. The Group Areas Act< 16) on the other hand, empowered the government to divide the country or cities into separate areas for exclusive occupation by a particular ethnic or race group. This Act's point of departure is the division ~f the people of South Africa into three basic ethnic groups, being African, Whites and

Coloureds. The latter are once more subdivided into As~ans~ Chinese and Cape Malay groups, and so foth.

It is obvious that the basis of the policy of apartheid and its implementation, l·ies in the classification of person· in South Africa into particular population groups. From 1911 onwards, numerous legislative enactments were passed in an attempts to provide definitions of White, African, Coloureds and Asians, etc., in order to bring to an end uncertainty and confusion which sometimes flowed from previr· legisl~tion (17 ) During 1950 the Population Registration !£S( 1S) found its way into the statute book. This piece of legislation envisaged a uniform system of classification, the establishment of a population register and the issue of identity cards to citizens. In this legislation our law-givers were somewhat cryptic and to the point in defining a black person. The definition reads""someone who i~ or is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa". Uncertainty and •. ,,

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neqat~vism creeps in when the Act tries to define a Coloured as "someone who is not a White or a Black person" (sic!) A lesser amount of uncertainty is evinced when a White person is defined as "someone who in appearance obviously, is a White person, and who is not generally accepted as a Coloured person." A further portion of the definition of a White person indicates that any person classified as White can.only "freely or voluntarily admit that he is by descent a Black or Coloured" at the risk of losinq his White status. Up to this day our law reports contain a leqion of decided cases in which one or the other of our countrymen, were cauqht up in an all-important leqal battle of tryinq to establish what he or she is or is not racially(19 ).

The Prohibition of Mixed-Marriages Act(20) and Section 16 of the Immorality Act( 21 ) which prohibited ~arriage and sex across the colour line, have this year still, made their overdue exit from our statutory stage. Shortly thereafter the Political Interference Act( 22 ) followed.

It must however, be remembered that a large number of statute~ which have race as their point of departure, still adorn our statute books< 23 >.

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR BLACKS .

The two decades which went past between the 1961 Republican ., - 9 -

Constitution and the establishment of the tricameral parliament in 1983, brought about no significant consti- tutional innovations to the central democratic process in South Africa. Black exclusion remained prominent.

It was ac~ordingly imperative that a parallel constitu­ tional design, which would lend legitimacy to and justi­ fication for the denial of Black participation in the central constitutional framework be found. · The argument goes thus. South-Africa is a land of ethnic minorities.

On account of the plural nature of the South African society, it is necessary to provide separate constitutional and administrative structures which would ensure maximum development of each group along its own and separate lines. In this way, qroup domination would find no place. Separate identity and freedom would be ensured and preserved. Majority rule and democracy will triumph, albeit separately.

It therefor~followed logically that, barring the race classification scheme under the Population and Registrations ~< 24 ), all African peo~le had to be and were divided into eight tribal units. Each unit had certain tribal authorities exercising powers and performing certain limited functions and duties. The administrative hierarchy of each of the tribal units was based upon the traditional chieftianship system. Since all land allocated for occupation by Africans in rural areas, vested in the executive authority of South African government, which

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in this regard was deemed to be the trustee of African

people, certa~n powers ragarding control of such land was granted to each of the tribal units. That was the Bantustan policy in embryo. In 1959 the Promotion • of Bantu Self-Government Act(25 ) saw the light of day. Its primary aim was the promoting of self-government in the homelands created from 1951 <26 ). In further pursuance of the policy of Bantustanism or as they some­ times call it, "separate development", during 1963, one of the eight tribal units known as the Transkei .was accorded self-governing status within the Republic of South Africa<27 ).

The Bantustan policy took a major step further in 1971, when further legislation came into being, making provision for the establishment of legislative assemblies, executive councils (cabinets) and limited judicial powers for each of the other seven tribal units ( 2 8 )· . By 1 9 7 2 , seven of the eight tribal units had acquired self-governing status<29 ). Kwazulu, then had a legislative assembly but had not yet been established as a self-governing territory<30).

1976 the Transkei was declared "independant" from the Republic of South Africa. This was deemed to be a status higher than and distinct from mere self-governing status. In apparent full recognition of the Transkeian "independant" status, the Status of Transkei Act of

l21!( 3l) declared : ... - 11 -

"every person falling in any of the categories of persons defined in schedule a, shall be a citizen of the Transkei and shall cease to be a South African citizen".

This loss of citizenship by persons statutorily linked to a homeland, was hardly surprising. The Bantu Homeland Citizenships Act of 197o< 32 ) had by then decreed that every African person in the Republic of South Africa, was a citizen of one homeland or the other, irrespective of his place of birth or permanent residence at the time of the passage of the legislation. Theoretically, every African was allocated citizenship of and franchise in, one of the eight tribal units on the basis of some statutorily determined criteria. "Independence" finally terminated South African citizenship.

Shortly after the Transkeian "independence" in 1976, Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and Venda, were deemed to be independant by the South African government. In these instances the loss of citizenship by persons deemed to be citizens of those 'states' was the inevitable consequence. As it will appear clearly from the Supreme Court decision of Ex Parte Moseneke(JJ), not even the writer hereof, could escape the ongoing process of termi­ nating, by the stroke of a pen, the citizenship of millions of Africans in South Africa. Equally inevitable was the passage of legislative enactments which had to achieve certain re-distribution of land and resettlement of - 12 - people<34 ), all of which had to accord with the grand design of apartheid, I have tried to sketch hereabove,

I·n the minds of our law-givers, the wheel had turned the. full· circle. •. Each African person had been accorded franchise and citizenship in his or her homeland where he could exercise to the fullest all his or her aspirations, including political self-fulfilment. On this reasoning and design, a demand by Africans to be brought into the central constitutional patterns of South Africa, would amount to a second bite at the cherry.

As for Africans living in the urban areas of "White South Africa" separate development and control had to be maintained too. Firstly the inflow of Africans into urban areas had to be controlled. To facilitate such control, every African person had to carry identi­ fication documents, the well-renowned pass or reference book. Failure to possess or to produce it on demand was made criminally punishable.

Prohibition of entry into urban areas was re-enforced by imprisonment. In prosecution, the onus of proving the legality of such entry was placed upon the person who so enters.

Administrative participation of urban blacks was and is till being restricted to local authorities level.

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Prior to 1961, ·advisory boards were established in each African townsh~p< 3 S). In 1961 a further enactment made provision. for the establishment of local authorities within African, residential areas <36 >. The latest of all these local authorities legislation in black urban areas, is the Black Authorities Act of 1983. It will be noted that later legislation came into being almost at the same time as the creation of the new tricameral system. This new enactment goes no further than to accord to black town councils in black townships, the same powers as white town councils. Separate development in the urban scene. Save that no explicit source of revenue for the various black town councils seem to have been built into the legislation. Strange as it may sound, thus far goes African participation in the central constitutional design of south Africa.

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR "COLOUREDS" AND INO IANS

It will be r~ that the South Africa race classifi- cation laws display some indecision and ambivalence in regard to race.identity of "Coloureds". Coloureds are negatively categorised as persons who are neither Africans nor whites. Such ambivalence has not been lacking in our constitutional institutions relating to "Coloureds".

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The 1961 Republican Constitution made no provision for hte·administration representation of coloureds. Government

P,~icy vascillated between creatinq a "Colouredstan" or not. In 1976 a commission of enquiry into coloured 37 affairs < ) made • recommendation premised on total integration of "Coloureds" with whites in all spheres of life. However, in a white paper, followinq upon the recommendaitons, the qovernment on the one hand, rejected inteqration with "Coloureds" and on the other, declared that many of the commission's proposals were in keepinq wiht qovernment policy.

Be it as it may, the Coloured Person's Representative Council Act(JS) was promulqated. This enactment created an all "Coloured" representative council of 40 elected members and 20 qovernment nominated members. This s Cbuncil had limited leqi,lat.ive powers on matters relatinq to finance, local qovernment, healt.services,, education, social welfare, andsoforth relatinq to "Coloureds". It's predominant function was an advisory one to the qovernment on issues affectinq "Coloured" people. All Bills or leqislation of the Council was subject to assent by the South African State President.

This Representative Council was wrecked into disfunction by the "Coloured" Labour party w~ich was then the majority party of the Council. Moreover, the Council was used in a way quite unanticipated by the qovernment. The Labour Party used it as a forum to articulate grievances, demands, and points of view which were not exactly well •. - 15 -

"This could be the opening Gibbonian line of some future Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall, or who knows - Rise and Triumph of the Republic of South Africa. Will the Orwellian nightmare ultimately become reality in South Africa; or will the South African "New Deal" prove to be the beginning of a bright, bold, peaceful and democratic future for this country ?"

Only some salient features of this "New Deal" will suffice·.

The legislature of the new parliament is constituted ·by a tricameral body with separate chambers or houses for Whites, "Coloureds", and Indians. Each house is elected by members of the relevant racial group on the basis of universal franchise. Each house has exclusive legislative power over its "own af·fairs". Each legis­ lation, by a particular house and on "own affairs" is subject to the State President's certification that the subject matter of the legislation is indeed "own affairs" of that particular population group. The Supreme Court's review powers are specifically excluded from pronouncing on the validity or otherwise of the decision of the State President, on whether a matter is "own affairs•• or not. Broadly speaking "own affairs" include, social welfare, education, health services, housing, local government, agriculture, water supply, and finance in relation to own affairs.

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"Ge;e~al· affairs" are matters which are not "own affairs". ' '

In theo~y legislation on general affairs require the approval of all three houses of parliament. If a disagree­ ment as to the c~ntent of a particular Bill arises among the three houses, the President may refer such a Bill to the President's Council for reeommendaiton of the latter whether such a Bill or a particular version of the Bill should be presented for assent by the State President or not. Such recommendation by the President's council shall be binding upon the President. In practice, however, the President need.only the support of the majority of the Whtie chamber and of the President's Council to achieve the desired legislation. In this regard, the present provisio~s of the constitution ensure that the President would continually enjoy the support of the majority of at least the White chamber and of the President's Council. The President's Council is made up of 20 members designated by the White House, 10 members by the Coloured House and 5 members by the Indian Hosue. Further 25 members become appointed by the State President. In turn the State President is elected by an ~lectoral college made up of 50 members designated by the White Chambers, 25 members by the Coloured Chambers and 13 members by the Indian Chambers.

The executive authority vests in the President who, in regard to own affairs, acts on the advice of the Minister's Council (or mini-cabinet) of a particular Chamber. On general affairs, the President acts on ·. - 17 -

advice of the cabinet. The Cabinet is made up of ministers appointed by the President1 each beinq a head of a qovernment department on General Affairs and any member of the various minister's councils, so appointed by the President.

Amonqst other provisions, the followinq provisions may be amended only by a majority decision in each of the three houses of parliament, the constitution of the electoral colleqe for electinq a president, the term of office of the president, the basic division of leqislatim·, into "own affairs" and "qeneral affairs", the procedure and method of leqislatinq on qeneral affairs and the make-up of the president's Council.

The judicial authority vests in the Supreme Court of South Africa. However, all administrative duties and functions affectinq the administration-of justice fall under the control of the Minister of Justice. In this reqard it is noteworthy that a Judqe of the Supreme Court of South Africa is appointed by the executive arm of qovernment except that a Supreme Court Jduge may not be removed from office except by the State President upon an address from parliamentin the same session prayinq for such removal on the grounds of misbehaviour or 41 impropriety( ). No racial qualification is attached to the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge. In practice however, no black person, whether African, Coloured or Indian, has ever been appointed to this position. .· - 18 -

Lastly, the ·one striking feature of the new constitution is that, out of the 103 sections thereof, together with

• all the schedules thereto, reference to the control and administration of Africans, feature in only one section, which tersely provides that the control and administration of Bla.ck Affairs shall vest in the State President.

OVERVIEW .

1. The new constitution is focinded on the premise of group identity, race and ethnicity. Its tri-partite nature flows from the well-known apartheid precept of race differences which are believed by our law-givers, to be not only irre­ conciliable, but also fundamental and abiding. The new constitution is therefore not a departure from, but a built on the apartheid grand design.

2. The policy of the creation of "independant" and "self-governing" states for Africans, remains the cornerstone of the present constitutional package. Equally so remains the statutory loss of South African citizenship by millions of black South Africans.

3. The new constitution's deafening silence about the majority of the people of South Africa being - 19 -

Africans, can by no measure of imagination be deemed to be an·extension of democracy. If anything, the constitution eschews the central

constitutional and political problem ~f South Africa.

4. The authoritarian provision that black adminsitration and control vest in the President, is indeed entirely in keeping with the government's rule in respect of of black people. .Which rule is largely reinforced by an armoury of coercive ·legislation. In this regard the South African Security legislation, influx control measures and legislation in respect of forced removals immediately come to mind.

5. As for the internal workings of the new constitu­ tion itself, the "own affairs" and "general affairs" division of the legislative activity of parliament, is the inevitable and logical consequence of enforced maintenance of racial groupings. Indeed, most laws which are directed at such enforced division have, but for a few, retained their position in our statute books even after the advent of the new constitution.

6. Legislative and executive mechanism within the constitution ensures a continued safeguard of white interest and supremecy. Even in the event of a possible conflict between the view of the .. .• - 20 -

different groupings accommodated within the consti­ tutional design, white dominance would not be threatened •

• 7 •. The customary complacency towards the protection of human rights persistsin the new constitution. Whilst limited judicial review in regard to certain aspects of the constitution has been introduced, no judicially enforceable bill of rights is contained in the constitution. It is hardly surprising, since such a bill of rights would be mutually destructive, with the network of enactments which disregard the basic human rights of the majority of our people.

8. The constitution contains inadequate safeguards against the abuse of the executive powers. This singularly powerful position of the President is a source of concern, even amongst many enfranchised whites in South Africa.

9. It should be readily conceded that a fair proportion of white South Africans view the new constitution

as a first progressive step towards the ult~ate democratization and liberalization of the South African constitutional scene. For that reason and to that extent many have endorsed the constitution in principle. Some indeed see the new constitution as the kiss of death for apartheid inasmuch as the new contitution has set in motion a certain - 21 -

measure of power-sharing.

10. I wish to make the final observation that, if the current South African constitutional structures are anything to rely upon in evaluating possible future reformist measures by the government, there is alittle hope for peaceful and orderly change in our country. For as long as our law­ givers do not honestly address themselves to the principal political and constitutional issues

in ~outh Africa, it is hard to see how the majority of our countrymen will not claim for themselves John Locke's moral right of rebellion against laws which are overtly anti-democratic and severely violate basic human rights.

It falls outside the scope of this paper to treat the long-drawn and heroic struggle put up by the black people of South Africa to achieve a truly just, unitory,.... I(" democratic non-racial and economically fair society. Political violence from all sides is endemic in our country. No efforts should be spared, by us foremost and the rest of the world, not only in seeking a peaceful resolution of our problems but also in creating such a state and government as will honestly answer to the wishes of tpe majority of our countrymen, in a country whose natural beauty, human and physical resources, shall not be easily surpassed.

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Advocate's Chambers E 0 MOSENEKE . PRETORIA 1st July 1985 .. , .....

FOOTNOTES

1. Chapt.er XIX "Of the Dissolution of Governments" 2. The Transvaal Constitution Letters Patent, 1906-From the establishment of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and before only adult white males had the franchise. 3. The Orange River Constitution Letters Patent, 1907 the position was the same as in Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek or Transvaal. 4. For details of the property qualifications in the Cape see verlooren von Themaat-Staatsreq, 2nd Edition Chapter 19. 5. Staatsreq Chapter 19. Note that in Natal, Blacks also required "Certificate of Civilization" issued by the Governor of Natal and after 1910, the Governor-General of the Onion. 6. See 3(1) of the Electoral Act No. 46 of 1946.

7. Act No. 46. of 1946 was amended in 1958 (Act 30 of ~958) to reduce the qualifying age to 18 years. 8. 1937 AD 229. Ndlwana challenged the validity of the Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936, which was intended to take away the then existing franchise of Black males. 9. 1952(2) SA 428(A) also known as the 1st Barris case. Barris challenged the validity of Ac~6 of !951, which made provision for two separte voters rolls for Whites and Coloreds and limited the Colored increase of the voter's rolls. The AD declared this statute invalid on procedural grounds. 10. 1952(4) SA 769(A), the second Barris£!!!·

11. By Appellate Division Quorum Act 27 of 1955. 12. Senate Act 53 of 1955. 13. Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 and Land Act 18 of 1936. 14. Colored Persons Settlement Act 7 of 1946. 15. Act No. 25 of 1945. 16. Group Areas Act No. 77 of 1957 (as amended). ..,

17. See Cr onj e ( ??.) The South African Law of Per sons ~ Family ~ 2nd Edition, Chapter-Io:- 18. ·Population Reqistra·tion Act No. 30 of 1950. 19. See A. Suzman •aace Classification and Definition in Legislation of the Union of SA, 1910-1960• !£!! Juridica, 1960, 339-367 and cases referred to therein. 20. Act 55 of 1949. 21. Immorality Act No. 23 of 1957. 22. This act prohibited racially mixed political party membership.

I 23. e.g., Separate Amenities Act, Industrial Conciliation Act No. 28 of 1956 provides for job reservation, courts set aside for Blacks only - Act 38 of 1927 read with Act 9 of 1929, and many other ones. 24. Act No. 30 of 1950. 25. Act No. 46 of 1959. 26. Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951 introduced radical changes in the administration of Blacks and was the first statute .. overtly directed at Black •self-rule• in a homeland setup. 27. Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 1963. 28. Bantu Homelands Constitution Act 21 of 1971·. 29. Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa. 30. Presently Kwa-Zulu has accepted •self-governing• status. Bowev,r, their declared pol~ is that they would not opt for SA style independen~. 31. Act 100 of 1976 (See Sec. 6 on Citizenship). 32. Act No. 26 of 1970. 33. 1979 (4) SA 884(T). 34. For the very many relevant laws on this issue, see Rosten Edward, Nathan & Bosman Introduction to SA Law and Legal Theory, 1977, Chapter XIV. 35. In terms of Act 25 of 1945. ' ...

36. Orban Bantu Councils Act 79 of 1961. 37. Onder the chairmanship of Prof. Erika Theron, tabled in parliament in June 1976.

38. Act No. 49 of 1964. 39. Act No. 31 of 1968.

40. Prof. Harold Rudolph in~ vol. 101, Nov. 1984, p. 764. 41. On detailed discussion of the new constitution see ~ ~ Baulle, South Africa ~ Sh! Constitutional Option: ! Constitutional. Analysis, Cape Town . Juta B. Dean and o. van Zyl Smith (eds.) Constitutional Change in 2! Booysen & Van Wyk,Oie '83 Grondwet, Juta, Cape Town ------

moseneke