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Violations Against Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Iran

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Violations Against Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Iran Rights Denied: Violations against ethnic and religious minorities in Iran © Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Centre for Supporters of Human Rights and Minority Rights Group International, March 2018. This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the publishers and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. Cover photo: A Kurdish man at Hawraman-at Takht, Iranian Kurdistan, Iran. © Roberto Cornacchia / Alamy Stock Photo Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights The Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights is a new initiative to develop ‘civilian-led monitoring’ of violations of international humanitarian law or human rights, to pursue legal and political accountability for those responsible for such violations, and to develop the practice of civilian rights. The Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights is registered as a charity and a company limited by guarantee under English law; charity no: 1160083, company no: 9069133. Centre for Supporters of Human Rights The Centre for Supporters of Human Rights (CSHR) is a non-governmental organ- isation established in the UK in 2013. Dr. Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2003, is one of its founders and the chair of the Centre. CSHR's main goal is to advance human rights in the Middle East, in particular Iran. Minority Rights Group International MRG is an NGO working to secure the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples worldwide, and to promote cooperation and understanding between communities. MRG works with over 150 partner orga- nizations in nearly 50 countries. It has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and observer status with the African Com- mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). MRG is registered as a charity and a company limited by guarantee under English law; charity no: 282305, company no: 1544957. Report designed by Staša Sukic. Material from this publication may be reproduced for teaching or other non-com- mercial purpoes, with appropriate attribution. No part of it may be reproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the prior express permission of the copy- right holders. Published March 2018. Printed in the UK on recycled paper. Table of contents 1 Introduction 5 2 History 7 3 Minority profiles 9 4 Legal framework 12 5 Violations of civil and political rights 15 Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment 15 Executions 19 Landmines 22 Minority languages 23 Religious freedom 24 Hate speech 27 Political representation 27 6 Violations of economic, social and cultural rights 29 Standard of living 29 Healthcare 30 Education 31 Documentation and access to services 32 Employment 34 Development-driven displacement 35 7 Conclusion and recommendations 37 Key findings ● While the repression and human rights violations by ● Ethnic minorities, including Arabs, Azerbaijani Turks the Iranian government are well documented, less at- and Baluchis, have been treated as second-class citizens, tention is paid to the specific situation of Iran’s ethnic targeted on the basis of their identity and sidelined and religious minorities. From hate speech and police from education, health care and other basic services. intimidation to denial of fundamental rights and oppor- Minority-populated regions such as Khuzestan, Kurdis- tunities, Iran’s minorities are routinely denied equal ac- tan and Sistan-Baluchestan remain underdeveloped, cess to justice, education, employment and political with higher poverty levels and poorer health outcomes. participation. These inequalities have contributed to profound discon- tent and resentment, reflected in the arrests of thou- ● While Iran’s Constitution guarantees religious free- sands of peaceful demonstrators in these regions. doms, it only extends these rights to Islam and three Prison data shows that at least three quarters of Iran’s other recognized religions – Christianity, Judaism and political prisoners are from ethnic minorities. Zoroastrianism – leaving practitioners of other faiths, including Bahá’í, Sabean-Mandaeans and Yarsanis, ● Despite some limited gestures of conciliation since the with no guaranteed protections. At the extreme end, election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013, hopes of a more in- members of religious minorities – in particular, Iran’s clusive and rights-based approach to Iran’s ethnic and re- sizeable Bahá’í community – have been vilified, ar- ligious minorities have yet to be realized. For this to be rested and even executed on account of their beliefs. achieved, Iranian authorities will need to embark on a They are frequently punished harshly with broad more comprehensive process of reform: this should in- charges of threatening public morality or national se- clude equitable economic development and political rep- curity, resulting in long prison terms and even death resentation for minorities, as well as the lifting of all sentences. restrictions on their religious and cultural rights. 1 Introduction Ethnic and religious minorities – including Arabs, Azerbaijani Turks, Baluchis, Kurds, Bahá’í, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and others – are a vital part of the Iranian national fabric. Despite their diverse histories, they share long experiences of marginalization and denial of basic rights, which in many cases go back to the birth of the Iranian state. For decades, the central government has imposed a homogeneous Iranian identity rooted in Persian language and culture and, since the 1979 Revolution, Shi’a Islam. This has resulted in the repression of minority languages, faiths and cultures, and to varying degrees the exclusion of ethnic and religious minorities from public life and the benefits of economic development. In his 2013 election campaign, President Hassan Rouhani has not improved significantly, with some of the worst vio- pledged to end patterns of discrimination against ethnic and lations continuing unabated or even increasing. religious minorities. His 10-point election platform con- tained a series of promises directed at minorities, including Minorities continue to be the targets of arbitrary arrest, and commitments to increase their public participation and em- are imprisoned and executed on political and national se- ployment, introduce mother tongue education in schools curity-related charges at disproportionately high rates. and universities, guarantee freedom of religion or belief, Many provinces in which ethnic minorities are concen- and prioritize the economic development of marginalized trated are impoverished and underdeveloped, and in some border areas. Rouhani won the election with overwhelming cases are still plagued by landmine contamination and support among minority voters and was re-elected for a sec- other legacies of war. Minorities are excluded from high- ond term in 2017. However, while there have been some level posts in the government, judiciary and military, and conciliatory measures since Rouhani’s entry to office, such are underrepresented in senior and mid-level posts in many as introducing minority language and literature degree fields of employment. While basic protections are in place courses at universities, the overall picture shows that the for the three constitutionally recognized minority religions, human rights situation of ethnic and religious minorities converts as well as adherents of non-recognized religions 6 Rights Denied: Violations against ethnic and religious minorities in Iran are vulnerable to harassment, arrest, hate speech Arab protesters, voiced demands specific to their and attacks on their places of worship. ethnic group.1 These developments are a stark il- lustration of the tensions that can result from long- The outbreak of nationwide protests in Iran, be- term marginalization and denial of rights of a ginning on 28 December 2017, symbolized the dis- significant segment of the population. content of many Iranians with the lack of progress on major economic, political and social This report is a comprehensive assessment of the grievances. Significantly, the protests encom- human rights situation of ethnic and religious mi- passed a number of major cities in minority-pop- norities in Iran since Rouhani’s election, covering ulated provinces, where disillusionment was roughly the period from 2013 to 2017. It discusses fuelled by patterns of discrimination, environ- the situation of minorities through the lens of civil mental degradation and economic neglect specific and political rights as well as economic, social and to minority areas. Many protesters chanted slo- cultural rights. Finally, it concludes with a series of gans in their own minority languages (Arabic, recommendations to improve respect for the rights Baluchi, Kurdish, Lur) and, in the case of some of minorities, directed at the Iranian government. 2 History Surrounded by Armenia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan, Iran is a highly diverse country home to a rich array of ethnic and religious groups, some of whose presence in the region goes back thousands of years. While many communities historically enjoyed their own regional spheres of influence and even autonomy, their recent history has been shaped by successive attempts by the Iranian state to impose a unified identity based in Persian culture and, since the 1979 Revolution, Shi’a Islam. This centralizing impulse has manifested itself in the attempted assimilation of minority cultures and
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