This article was downloaded by:[NEICON Consortium] On: 18 July 2008 Access Details: [subscription number 781557263] Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Europe-Asia Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713414944 Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy Vladimir Gel'man a a European University, St Petersburg

Online Publication Date: 01 August 2008 To cite this Article: Gel'man, Vladimir (2008) 'Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy', Europe-Asia Studies, 60:6, 913 — 930 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/09668130802161165 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130802161165

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 O:10.1080/09668130802161165 DOI: I SN06-16pit SN16-47online/08/060913-18 1465-3427 ISSN print; 0966-8136 ISSN hc a utrcie 43 ftevt n o 1 u fte40sasi h State the in seats party, 450 the leading of out Russia’s 315 (UR), won and Russia vote United the Duma of of 64.3% received congress just the had which 2007 December 17 On in regime authoritarian dominant discussed. party-based on the also a emphasis of for are building special prospects Russia the the a The in with control. some analyse engineering centralised 2000s, institutional combined and will the and party in elites regime I Russia political political in of authoritarianism. role system Russia’s the party-based party new term and the second of personalist formation Putin’s both of of end elements the by Still, Dir evdv,tepiemnse oton rsdn ldmrPtn,adthe and Putin), Vladimir the president president of (outgoing the minister officialdom: chairman Russian prime in the posts Medvedev), top three (Dmitry the for candidates UR nominated United power, of party While the government. extinct, become Russia’s ( to of Russia about were hierarchy and parties Kremlin informal opposition the major and the by formal controlled the effectively party Putin’s into became However, in incorporated parties disappeared level. political all politics—virtually sub-national Instead, democratic and and Russia. electoral of national the heart in the very actors at competition—the major both became they arenas, 2000s parliamentary the in contrast, By development. at ytmwsgetyfamne,bcuealsget fRsi’ electoral Russia’s of segments all because Russia’s First, fragmented, Europe. greatly Eastern was the in system systems of party evidence party post-communist clear Putin’s with was in comparison government) This party list. not period. (if party Yel’tsin’s politics with JR party comparison of the in influence Russia on the ran of rise ministers spectacular of chairman pro- cabinet the another (JR, of post, the leader Russia official the top Just Mironov, Another Sergei party, by Putin. ran Kremlin occupied by elections was led 2007 Council, was Federation the the which during of list, ministers party of UR cabinet the the on of members four and executives NTHE at oiisi usa rmCompetition From Russia: in Politics Party usasprysse nte19sdmntae eea itntv etrsin features distinctive several demonstrated 1990s the in system party Russia’s lcin edtowesbfr hseet e nMso.Tecongress The Moscow. in met event, this before weeks two held elections dny Rossiya Edinaya 1990 S , OIIA ATE IN PARTIES POLITICAL Duma ,oewemnl oiae h adcp fprypolitics. party of landscape the dominated overwhelmingly ), BrsGylv.Bsdsta,6 u f8 einlchief regional 85 of out 65 that, Besides Gryzlov). (Boris o.6,N.6 uut20,93–930 – 913 2008, August 6, No. 60, Vol. LDMRGEL’MAN VLADIMIR rnsi usasprysystem party Russia’s in Trends UOEAI STUDIES EUROPE-ASIA oHierarchy to paelvy Rossiya Spravedlivaya R SI UFRDFO THEIR FROM SUFFERED USSIA ª 08Uiest fGlasgow of University 2008 ,adytaohrmme of member another yet and ), under- Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 072.25 5.34 parties Parliamentary 6.8 10.7 7.6 Notes: parties* Electoral 2007–2008 2007 2003–2007 2003 2001–2003** 2000–2001 1999 1996–1999 1995 1994–1995 1993 Year 2000s a the form in politics to party potential Russia’s enough words, have other not In do it. together to acting alternative UR legislative meaningful of than of number party other effective the the parties 1, by State Table held the in monopoly in presented the parties data of the back to background swung According to the votes pendulum power. against popular the switched 2000s, fragmentation for system the low competed During to party elections. parties parliamentary breaking 43 Russia’s 1995 After when the rule, during mid-1990s, 547–48). one-party the pp. in Soviet-style 2006, hyper-fragmentation of (Gel’man equilibrium effect the pendulum-like politics, party a beyond demonstrated and and 2000s. national above two late both stayed the received Finally, by 1990s over elections. partisans together 2007 the loyal December in representation and became the who 2007–2011), in parliamentary executives, vote and sub-national the enjoyed of (2003–2007 92% longer parties terms almost and no legislative parties four small politicians of consecutive dozens non-party only of competition and bizarre the coalitions, the of arena, in Instead actors them. parliamentary reasons, legitimate with only in competed and these the trends became 2000s, sub-national electoral GEL’MAN For Parties the VLADIMIR opposite. especially In 2006). national the unconsolidated. and quite Hale as were national regarded politics 2004a; correctly party in is Golosov system role 2006; party volatility major sectoral Russia’s (Gel’man or electoral a regional politics played by of electoral backed also who level (mainly politicians groups) support high non-partisan party interest than Third, very other demands. resources voter the possessed in elasticity Second, great over-supplied. demonstrated were markets 914 *fe h salsmn fUie usa orprimnayprisUiy ahradAlRussia, party. Fatherland–All single a parties—Unity, as parliamentary calculated four Deputy—are People’s Russia, and United Russia of of Regions voting. establishment list the party of 546). **After basis p. the on (2006, *Calculated Gel’man upon heavily culcmoiino alaetr ate nteState the in parties parliamentary of composition actual State respective of Duma oacrandge,tednmc fprypltc nps-oitRussia post-Soviet in politics party of dynamics the degree, certain a To et)frec epciepry h fetv ubro lcoa ate sbsduo h results the upon based is parties electoral of number effective The party. respective each for seats) h ffcienme fprisi acltdas: calculated is parties of number effective The Duma Duma E lcin,adteefcienme fprimnayprisi ae pnthe upon based is parties parliamentary of number effective the and elections, FFECTIVE fe 03dopdt .7adte o19.Teeoe all Therefore, 1.92. to then and 1.97 to dropped 2003 after N ME OF UMBER AL 1 TABLE P RISIN ARTIES ¼ P 1 v i 2 Duma R hr ‘ where , USSIA nrsetv er.Tedt draws data The years. respective in 1993–2008 , v stesaeo oe o State (or votes of share the is ’ 1.92 1.97 4.7 7.8 5.7 8.53 Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 ntttoso te nunilatr bt oetcaditrainl.N wonder No upon international). based and are domestic that (both constraints actors with influential balances. faced or other checks are or without they institutions countries however, their govern regimes, to established like In would world the in rulers All considered. be will Russia the in Finally, dynamics prospects. regime political and on and trends politics Russia’s (PRI) and party-based party with Party political of with differences Revolutionary effects of parallels and Institutional role similarities some a the the on draw with under focus and I Putin, Mexico system Then, under in party formation. framework. politics authoritarianism new its this party the in of within of factors dynamics leaders institutional features the Russia’s on of emphasis of analysis context special an choices post-Soviet present and the I in strategies questions. Second, building these the regime to authoritarian analyse answers of and seeks varieties party-based dominant contribution examine a I This for become prospects First, Russia? power’, the of in are what party regime And ‘the elite? authoritarian as ruling known the Russia, of United tools major especially and, such be as politics parties might post-Soviet argument and same Soviet Russia’s the as but too, 2000), suggests. non-democracies, (Lipset became some democracy for 2000s for large relevant ‘indispensability’ the parties and the on by political in agreed was largely of regime are not) scientists or Political non-democratic party-based. democratic Russia’s increasingly emerging (whether while 1990s Russia’s dubbed that Russia’s the been conclude non-party-based, in in has may regime world, routine One political the became 2006). in nascent fraud, states (Schedler electoral other authoritarianism’ many least) ‘electoral for alongside not resources which, but state politics, (last electoral of international and intimidation abuse and and voters, blatant pressure administrative Domestic toward The coverage, unfair. media 2008). competitive one-sided as purposes, Stoner-Weiss to) election them & limited regarded widely McFaul not observers 2005; major certainly Russia’s (Fish of (although destruction sharp elections including the with The institutions, coincided forthcoming). party politics dominant democratic Remington of a & as outcomes Reuter UR its 2006; of the maintain rise (Gel’man control beyond to to and resources rulers means elections and the during to extra-constitutional power tied state uses closely employs and and by freely dominance; established regime; is that authoritarian party an a of as defined be can This party. to condition led sufficient) of fragmentation not (although position party necessary democracy. the of the is for which a decline through competition, to the party system) of raced rather, decline party system equilibrium: the of non-democratic party fragmentation new moderate the Russia’s (involving in of Unlike equilibrium and 2). democratic pendulum Moldova Table post-Soviet (see in the those kinds or different Ukraine, Europe of Eastern of opposition decline systems of continuing party the extinction) post-communist and total levels; parliamentary a and of not electoral dominance (if the emerging at the power trends: of inter-related party two the of amalgamation an as developed h n o i usaeprec hstr nprypltc?Wyddpolitical did Why politics? party in turn this experience Russia did how and Why State 2007 triumphant the After h at? taeiso uhrtra eiebidn n h rmi’ choice Kremlin’s the and building regime authoritarian of strategies party?: Why AT OIISI USA915 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY Duma lcin,U nlytre noadominant a into turned finally UR elections, Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 1 LDMRGEL’MAN VLADIMIR 916

TABLE 2 RESULTS OF THE STATE DUMA ELECTIONS, 1999–2007

1999 2003 2007 Elections Number Party list Seats, total Number Party list Seats, total Number Party list Seats, total Party/block of lists vote, % (PR þ SMD) of lists vote, % (PR þ SMD) of lists vote, % (PR)

Turnout, % 61.8 55.75 63.66 Fatherland–All Russia (FAR) 13.3* 68 (37 þ 31) Unity 23.3** 73 (64 þ 9) United Russia (UR) 37.6 225 (120 þ 105) 64.30 315 LDPR 6.0*** 17 (17 þ 0) 11.5 36 (36 þ 0) 8.14 40 Motherland 9.0 37 (29 þ 8) Just Russia (JR) 7.74 38 KPRF 24.3 113 (67 þ 46) 12.6 52 (40 þ 12) 11.57 57 Yabloko 5.9 20 (16 þ 4) 4.3 4 (0 þ 4) 1.59 0 Union of Right Forces (SPS) 8.5 29 (24 þ 5) 4.0 3 (0 þ 3) 0.96 0 Other parties below threshold 20 25 (0 þ 25) 17 15.5 33 (0 þ 33) 5 4.59 0 Independent candidates 105 (0 þ 105) 60 (0 þ 60) N/A Total 26 94.7 450 23 94.5 450 11 98.9 450 Parties over 5% (7%) threshold 6 81.2 4 70.7 4 91.75 Against all lists 3.3 4.7 N/A Invalid votes 2.0 0.8 1.1

Notes: *Taken over by ‘United Russia’. **Transformed into ‘United Russia’. ***Listed as ‘Zhirinovskii’s Bloc’. Sources: McFaul (2005, p. 69) and http:\\www.vybory.izbirkom.ru, accessed 12 January 2008. Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 emlylyo ltsadmse otesau u eie repcieo its of irrespective regime, quo status the to like. the masses and long- leadership the and of ensure to qualities elites had personal they performance, of Third, media). loyalty (such the among entities and elite. coordination term organisational NGOs the independent alternative groups, of all interest for of segments parties, co-optation opportunities all to as or on any demolition had will the prevent by the their they to elites impose over had to First, control of order they administrative three-fold. continuity in Second, their agenda was and of policy stability instruments and task political the the This strengthen for his regime. and electoral and bases monopolise political Putin successful long-term considerations, emerging short-term establish to these Russia’s to Beyond due trap. sought same intention outcome associates little the had this into elites post-Yel’tsin falling the avoid of 2003), ( Shvetsova Unity to 2003; vehicle, Sakwa coalition political 2003; able McFaul own though loose its Even was manufacturing entourage. and a his then campaigning and presidential established Yel’tsin and Kremlin of parliamentary survival which 1999–2000 the very the the elites, threatened of and eve subordinated elections the formerly on shift some Russia’ a of of produced ‘Fatherland–All turnover experience loyalty presidential the 2005; Russia, (Hale as In in suggests succession, forthcoming). revolution’) Remington leadership ‘orange & of Ukrainian Reuter terms the strategies, in (especially This conquer’ states risky leaders. and post-Soviet was rather regional ‘divide which was using and elite, it manoeuvre, oligarchs fragmented for but of deeply room states. a clans Yel’tsin with left and post-Soviet constellation faced cliques other was multiple due it from around citizens but from Russia’s organised as of performance, effect eyes learning poor well the the its in as unpopular by to heavily driven Yel’tsin was was regime under personalist choice Yel’tsin’s this experience extent, own great a this Russia’s To 47–88), 2000? and pp. long-term. 1999 the 2003, in (Geddes rational very regimes in be military longest-lived might and the strategy and usually deliberate Kremlin the personalist are invested to regimes 2008. with authoritarian contributed Kremlin in party-based comparison succession greatly that the leadership fact which the 2000s, the beyond party, Given regime the dominant authoritarian of Russia’s a the of course building Russia, continuity end into the United the by efforts of In arenas rise thorough parliamentary rule. turn and spectacular unsuccessful electoral Putin’s authoritarian the the several with of dominated Russia’s which despite coincided power’, power’, 2000s of personalist, of the ‘party largely ‘parties in Putin was pro-Kremlin under regime 1990s establish ‘hybrid’ to the its While attempts ‘colour a in building. exhibited co-called regime Yel’tsin Russia of authoritarian respect, under wave this of the In pattern Kyrgyzstan. during distinctive and rather 2003–2005 Ukraine period states Georgia, the post-Soviet in of some revolutions’ in Union, different although military destroyed Soviet regimes, employ authoritarian were the and and personalist them of of bases party-based spectrum collapse wide power the a personalist, Upon demonstrated different dominance. between on of form distinction strategies in authoritar- which useful of successful regimes, studies a more authoritarian Comparative often governments. offer constraints their these are remove ianism to to nations able alternatives are and eliminate they if states and scratch established from building newly regime authoritarian in leaders that h i h rmi hoeti taeyatrPtnsuepce iet oe in power to rise unexpected Putin’s after strategy this choose Kremlin the did Why AT OIISI USA917 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY Edinstvo Clo & (Colton ) Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 1 LDMRGEL’MAN VLADIMIR 918 oenet(mt 02 eigo 03.Tu,U salse t parliamentary its established State UR the Thus, in 2003). Remington majority 2002; a (Smyth gained government party newly-born The Duma Russia’ Unity. ‘Fatherland–All movement, coalition sponsored regional-based following formerly the the ( of of takeover’ result ‘hostile a as emerging achieved steps. an into conscious was regime and non-party-based deliberate dominance a of authoritarian turning The party-based efforts venture. organisational this as Russian for major well vital over as the were engineering control the of institutional of and for monopolisation recentralisation political the assets, advantageous the Even economic and very to growth period. economic was due unprecedented compensation Russia building state, long Putin’s regime relatively of authoritarian significant environment a Kremlin’s a required political with also the investment it though Kremlin, political the of to benefits amount large-scale and long-term the bring of nature non-ideological elite political control. and maintain of bureaucratic would the mechanisms reinforcing it mutually and through to 2006); recruitment Gel’man and perform 2006; due consolidation flexibly Hale and 2003; implementation (Hanson effectively party could and dominant it 2007); adoption (Greene of open quo discouragement policy to and status enhance patronage could the due political it to efficient power respects: both alternatives other of to three due in would loss legitimacy rulers authoritarianism regime’s the for the party-based instrumental of ‘soft’ and risk functional a very Also, the be 1971). without (Dahl toleration lower contestation could of political it alternative Indeed, costs less authoritarianism. of thus regime’s personalist and ‘hard’ prevention the coercive than less above-mentioned Kremlin was the the but three for loyalty; control, all costly long-term of monopolist solve building the successfully of and could coordination, establishment party- It ‘soft’ the the elite. a and Kremlin the problems: to the of alternative both for An segments attractive high. more various much incredibly looked were regime authoritarian repression of based of costs victims the become setting to could incentive no had enterprise. regimes class risky ruling authoritarian a Russia’s such citizens, personalist launch ordinary than fact ‘hard’ often international the more given of in repression also, danger And succession. the elites leadership with of that case faced in be threat turmoil the could political for and diminish regimes need isolation would the such which from disobedience, apparatus, apart major coercion quite of Kremlin: large-scale toward the a coercion which for of in costly use investment Turkmenistan, be intense huge the would or through strategy Belarus masses this and But of elites them. of manner loyalty the the version different base ‘hard’ in would two a was authoritarianism, between option personalist choose One with building. because of to comparison regime instrument, in had authoritarian equilibrium long-term useful rulers of their least strategies Russia’s lose the to Thus, was vulnerable authoritarianisms. most 2000s, other are early kind the this of by regimes Russia in emerged had tcetoVy Rossiya Otechestvo–Vsya n20,tepryo oe,Uie usa a salse ntefr fa of form the in established was Russia, United power, of party the 2001, In might building regime authoritarian of strategy this of choice the while However, post-communist Russia’s in 15), p. (1971, Dahl Robert by elaborated terms the In which regime, authoritarian personalist a of version ‘soft’ a perspective, this From n nqioal upre ital l il rpsdb ui n his and Putin by proposed bills all virtually supported unequivocally and n w ml alaetr rusb h Kremlin- the by groups parliamentary small two and ) Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 at ytmi etrudrto hog h rtrao ate’lylyt the to loyalty parties’ of criteria the through new Russia’s understood Rather, better Russia. in is regime system authoritarian party-based party a of conditions in oiissc s‘etvru ih ate’ ms esscdepris,‘programmatic Kitschelt parties’, 1990; cadre Mair 1954; versus (Duverger ‘mass like the parties’, and right democratic parties’, in clientelist versus versus parties ‘left of as classifications traditional such of polities use the questionable Putin made power Vladimir the President to alternative Russia’s electoral viable of a power. present rate of could party party approval other no high success, UR’s the (Remington ensured from to ranging Kremlin factors, campaigns many the While unfair elections. to parliamentary 2007 loyalty the during and dominance discipline party Smyth own 2006; UR’s increased only ml at niisvr rbeai Wlo 06.Fnly h eetrfr fthe of reform recent the Finally, 2006). of (Wilson survival problematic the State rendering very thus entities altogether, party State prohibited able small were were 2007 2005 and from rules December new existing (blocs) these previously the of coalitions to 46 according in formation of in the participate squeeze out to 15 politics: to managed only party 2007 significantly while by of reform difficult, parties parties very market Russian This become political Russia’s conditions. has to new on parties barrier political the law parties, entry to federal political the according for new raised re-register electoral requirements to The The membership had 7%. and which competition. to organisational State party many 5% the toughened of from in increased field representation legislatures the parliamentary shrinking for threshold further toward UR. oriented to alternatives meaningful exceptions, some produced with longer all dominance: no almost regional in politics achieved majorities the regional 2007 established joined turn, by forcefully in and chief Russia, or legislatures United voluntary regional regional power. either of party of them the the Remington of of & survival most 2005, ranks Reuter that 2007; further early (Goode wonder UR in No and to forthcoming). loyalty elections their appointment on gubernatorial depended the largely of non- executives reversed: on abolition or the were UR Kynev than after 2004b; incentives other (Golosov parties But on vehicle entities. regional support political their party its many based Kremlin’s) served power: often the in and governors of governors Also, than votes party regional 2006). (rather by the of their captured for were as share success they merely if significant limited well a a performed branches only gained local represented the UR it Despite elections, 2004a). 2003–2004 legislatures (Golosov legislative regional in periphery in the that UR over of control fact performance political the centralised improve win to and order in irrelevant. systems UR’s became electoral was it only to Not than alternatives 2007). also more (Golosov but acquired legislature strengthened, soon national dominance the UR parliamentary in super-majority’: seats led ‘manufactured the rules of a parliamentary two-thirds of internal formation of the the changes during institutional to votes further of and 37.6% districts received member list party Russia United State the 2003, In dominance. h mrec fprimnay einl n lcoa oiac ftepryof party the of dominance electoral and regional, parliamentary, of emergence The rm20 h rmi ntae e aeo ntttoa hne,wihwere which changes, institutional of wave new a initiated Kremlin the 2003 From State the and Kremlin the 2001–2003, In Duma Duma lcin,btteipii olto oiyo h at fpwri single- in power of party the of policy coalition implicit the but elections, lcoa ytm(h hf rmmxdt at itrpeetto) not representation), list party to mixed from shift (the system electoral tal et 07,btas epdtepryo oe ngiigiselectoral its gaining in power of party the helped also but 2007), . AT OIISI USA919 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY Duma Duma lcin lo r-lcinparty pre-election Also, election. anhdarfr fregional of reform a launched Duma n otregional most and tal et 1999) . Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 2 LDMRGEL’MAN VLADIMIR 920 ottersasrgrls fteotoeo ol.Fo h esetv fcorporate of perspective the From polls. therefore of and outcome list, legislative party the the several of in regardless served included seats not who their were lost districts) MPs single-member experienced the in (mostly terms party parliamentary UR’s hnrcie oti apo;ams l h eta at paau a lobeen also has apparatus party central State the State 2007 all and 2003 the almost resigned’ Before the Gazprom; replaced. ‘voluntarily in of Petersburg), post wake St a from received the then associate in large Putin example, long-term a (a For by Bespalov time. but to management time its Duma from could by be and them personnel not can and replace owned power management easily its are of Remington hired assets which party company, & whose the holding controlled multi-sectoral firm Thus, (Reuter who a 553). rulers, management to p. extra-party compared 2006, routine as (Gel’man served everyday decision-making officials strategic of Kremlin key officials charge the party ‘external UR forthcoming), in Kremlin-based While as leadership. merely described party organisation the be party were of could UR’s independent it was models, way: which two different governance’, these rather organisation, a Unlike intra-party (Kitschelt in business. favouritism clientelist developed family-run and for a are a loyalty typical to they is personal similar alternative, fact, democracies, on An based in new is governance. 1911): in which corporate (Michels parties in ago nascent century control many a managerial trends almost These to bureaucratic like. ‘oligarchy’ similar its the as and established agenda apparatus) dubbed policy party were strategy, (or electoral nominations, managers in over own parties control party’s political well-established a many world, In perspective. the comparative a in ideology, traced easily party organisation, aspects—party political important over party three government. the control in party of their and features Russia maximise major in to affected power undoubtedly order of distinction in This officials 2006). top (Hale arenas by crafted was Unity, (purely this While Kremlin. ieet R swl sispeeesr,OrHm sRsi ( Russia essentially is was Home public power Our gain of predecessors, to its parties as order Russia’s well of in as genesis politicians UR, The by different: vote. created popular were a world through the office in parties political Most Russia United ate’ n hr,iseeis hc nld h omns at fteRussian the of Party Communist (SPS, Forces the Right include which enemies, (KPRF, Federation its third, and parties’; Party Democratic (Liberal its LDPR second, Russia, 119– Zhirinovskii’s Russia; of pp. Vladimir United 2005, JR, party, (Wilson dominant include the which pie liberty first, satellites, multi-layered the layers: of take hierarchical kind will three of a with I as independent 50), analysis system fully further party is of Russia’s Russia sake present today’s to the in for party administration), political presidential no the fact, (in dichotomy on not foecmae at raiainwt hs ffim,tobscmdl ol be could models basic two firms, of those with organisation party compares one If h e at ytmi h aig ntdRsi,isstlie n t enemies its and satellites its Russia, United making: the in system party new The lcincmag h hi fteU xctv omte,Alexander committee, executive UR the of chair the campaign election iea’odmkaihsaapriaRossii partiya Liberal’no-demokraticheskaya ou rvk Sil Pravykh Soyuz omnsihsaaPriaRsiso Federatsii Rossiiskoi Partiya Kommunisticheskaya dhoc ad Duma lsicto ol ebsdo otnu and continuum on based be would classification ) lcin,oe hr ftefre ebr of members former the of third a over elections, and ) Yabloko . ,adsm te ml ‘pocket small other some and ), ahdmRossiya dom Nash tal et 99— model 1999)—a . ,teUinof Union the ), and ) Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 novdi h rcs fcbntfrain u hnPtnpooe h virtually the proposed Putin when but formation, actively cabinet rather be of to remains process intention resignation its power the the announced upon in of UR 2004, ministers, involved party February of In cabinet the leaders. Kasyanov’s the Mikhail UR of of beyond of role aspirations Moreover, the the affiliation. despite party arenas, limited to electoral than importance and rather secondary fortunes and, of parliamentary personal posts federal (even executive their top by members to rewarded party while This due occasionally rank-and-file government: only partners. UR, were party MPs) autonomous joined of its officials as terms executive than in regional asymmetry rather especially, great followers a needed obedient officials produced Kremlin as top the politicians bluntly, it party put to implementation: and here. adoption exception ideologically policy an their not of was power Russia to (continuity breakthrough 2007); quo the (Greene status than counterparts the rather distant of rule) preservation party the (whether dominant prefer regimes of also party the would dominant not) include or under would authoritarian parties which opposition and perspective, coalition, hand, comparative one consensus the for the anti-regime obstacles on major negative KPRF, creates a pro- parties opposition. these disunited of example, between the (for formation distance for policy dimensions unavailable large was issue the that of Indeed, manoeuvre political axis for other pro-market room any wide and for pro-statist between true located continuum is also Western it left–right is positions: the policy This on its parties. of point orientation zero UR voter the circumstances, median these near the Under of 2007). programmatic merits (Popova the the converge the enjoyed to of the demonstrated positions elections analysis Against policy parliamentary a product in-depth for 1995–2003 power. the trend a than An in as of parties shrunk. rather ideology Russia’s party has of of asset rhetoric role the market the an electoral of uncertainty, Russia’s was success transitional in in non-ideology the decline to a UR’s of (Hanson contributed run background maintenance it short regime because the long-term liability, for in necessary however, is 2003); ideology party that argued Putina! plan oiino ao oiyise eandvgeadidfiie uigte20 State deliberately its 2007 the while and During Putin, indefinite. openly to and UR personally vague remained and that Duma issues regime policy wonder political major as on Russia’s No not position but to change. quo loyalty status political its the of manifested of preservation the instrument for instrument an an as clientelist- UR of needed officials coalition loose of a model the become follow have to would chances electoral factions. few 1999 based it had the rather, have during likely governance’: would Unity speculate, ‘external power might defeated even of One had party and Kremlin. the Russia the conflict, tolerated, Fatherland–All by and is if regulated disciplined that strictly factionalism highly is though, or party a the dissent into within power internal discussion of no clientelism. party organisation: personalist the and centralised turned oligarchy more soon bureaucratic was governance’ both model ‘External governance’ with ‘external comparison the in party, efficient the within management and control ial,tegnsso h at fpwrdoe tt lyasbriaerl in role subordinate a play to it doomed power of party the of genesis the Finally, h eei ftepryo oe loaetdislc fielg.Tpstate Top ideology. of lack its affected also power of party the of genesis The lcincmag,U’ ao lgnws‘oefrPtnspa! (‘ plan!’ Putin’s for ‘Vote was slogan major UR’s campaign, election vs niWsenise)(e’a 06 .54.Telc fielg aeUR gave ideology of lack The 554). p. 2006, (Gel’man issues) anti-Western . ) ihu pcfi eeec otecneto hs‘ln.Sm rtc have critics Some ‘plan’. this of content the to reference specific without ’), AT OIISI USA921 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY Yabloko n P,o h te Glmn20) na In 2005). (Gel’man other the on SPS, and oou za Golosui Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 2 LDMRGEL’MAN VLADIMIR 922 omteronprylss[uha h LNpryldb h omrdpt hi of chair deputy former the by to led parties party SLON opposition the of as factions [such lists dissident goal party technologies. of second political own encouragement of their the array form the of wide a from pursuit used ranged Kremlin the the They of and numerous, Manifestations been Federation). also have Russian the of Party usetefis olwr eosrtdsvrltmsbtente19 State 1995 the between to times Attempts several 2005). demonstrated (Wilson of (‘ were parties oppositions the elections goal spoiler given the by first (especially votes weaken the basket their to pursue one splitting second, in by and two eggs colours uncertainty); many various the served to too transitional ‘projects’ substitute placing of or avoid Kremlin-driven background reserve and top These a power form them. of of to building party first, to involvement the exclusive—goals: in alternatives mutually also active not fake but basic—and parties of or dominant of record loyal building the of presidential strong in only a not the officials executive exhibited of Russia branch Post-communist others a and role. Russia same as Just the Satellites: performed serve Russia in whole informally a as did itself politics only party not but party ‘state-party’: ‘party-state’ Soviet as administration, a labelled as dominant the be characterised could to best the dominance was UR contrast 2003), which sharp (Geddes rule, regime Party In Communist authoritarianism. of for experience consequences party-based certain making—produced emerging policy in Russia’s role secondary its and ideology, room little leaving thus government 2004), to politics. (Sakwa approach party technocratic Putin’s for ostensibly vein, was similar making a policy In and 1986). Story 1973; (Purcell process oenet eeyapoe rpsl ntae ytepeietadhscbntof cabinet his of and branches president and the levels by all (‘ dominant initiated in technocrats The members proposals coincided its 1997). approved presidentialism of merely (Weldon where presence government, decades pervasive Mexico, the Shevchenko for in despite 1999; regime PRI, that (Huskey party, authoritarian to agencies party-based similar and a was of power, actors with by-product It presidential a other 2005). was of overwhelming Fish degree role 2004; notoriously large the a its diminished to and which making design 2006).] policy unpopular (Kynev on institutional reform, for ever UR this Russia’s lowest responsibility of [After the effect was 2005. political negligible elections January of legislative The in regional challenge launched in reform the State performance benefits UR’s the up social through as take policy such to governmental policies, pushed forced party it which exercised was opposite, power means the and Quite of no 551–52). party by pp. the and 2006, by was UR, (Gel’man posts to policies these governmental than held on they rather influence but president UR, the of members to Shoigu, were Sergei subordination Trutnev) ministers Yuri and and Zhukov, Alexander Gordeev minister Alexei prime than members (deputy During other four cabinet symbolic. governments, choice the merely (2007–2008) no of was Zubkov’s had government Viktor power the and of (2004–2007) in party Fradkov’s presence the its UR, and of without support, part cabinet unanimous the his formed on who influence minister, serious prime any new the as Fradkov Mikhail unknown hs etrso ntdRsi sadmnn at—etra oenne,non- governance’, party—‘external dominant a as Russia United of features These lkIaaRybkina Ivana Blok technicos )rte hnsriga e cieatri h policy-making the in actor active key a as serving than rather ’) )adte20 alaetr apin(h People’s (the campaign parliamentary 2003 the and ’) Duma Duma Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 oiainfrte20 rsdnileeto,isftr steKelnsreserve Kremlin’s the Medvedev’s as endorsed future parties) its satellite election, parliamentary other a presidential 2007 as unclear. two given 2008 became established December UR, and the prospects: became the toward for JR UR and in criticism to nomination vote (alongside blow the Although their and of huge of Putin. 7.74% party, a basis to received dealt major JR loyalty it the election personal 2007, party lost October unquestionable leg’ party in their his ‘left list partisanship, party and the of UR Mironov record and the previous JR, lead a to for with to KPRF politicians the support State many from electoral for 2007 ranging Ark’ attract for the ‘Noah’s not of potential a did became eve strong party the this a the although On 2006–2007 showed ‘if able elites, supporters. the leg’, was regional it ‘left communist in of where its debut many segments areas, of some influential Russia’s manner in attract Just the successful to relatively in 2006). was substitute (Maksimov elections its legislative numb’ vehicle, as regional Kremlin act becomes major would leg the JR right remain leg’, political should a ‘right Kremlin UR of its chief while establishment or the that the Surkov, new announced towards Vladislav extensive even step the Russia. employed strategist, major in of and a system formation position as two-party perceived policy The ‘managed’ been leftist Gartung). has its Valerii rhetoric, declared socialist chair, which Russia, party Just the Pensioners party, of of Party activism the political and party, ‘Motherland’ ( post-Rogozin the Mironov, Sergei the of 9.1% State won the in ‘Motherland’ party parliamentary expectations: a and established initial Communists, and the exceeded vote for and eligible success vote nationalist the under electoral diminishing and campaign towards its Rogozin publicised oriented Dmitri much was politicians, and slogans popular (‘ funded populist auspices, by well ‘Motherland’ its led Its the was Under Glaz’ev. which Sergei 187). established elections, p. parties 2003 2005, the nationalist before (Wilson and opposition’ left the ‘inventing small in active very parties). liberal for vote Union, European non-Kremlin the the split in formerly membership to prospective of aiming Russia’s of takeover slogan the hostile under elections a the as to (such 2006)], parties (White party-mates former Yabloko n oslttecmuitvt.I 06 h rmi ntae h egro three ( of power merger Life of the party of initiated the Party Kremlin to the reserve parties—the 2006, a satellite In as vote. established both communist act previously the to completely split intended to was was and which who party, satellite Babakov, a Alexander leader. businessman 2006). party (Titkov of the Kremlin post the the by to from legislative subordinated resign replaced regional to several forced was in was without He registration Rogozin 2006 and denied control: in Rogozin being expelled finally, of ‘Motherland’ was elections: campaigning Kremlin’s to and nationalist led 2004 aggressive the party March the his Then, of escaped ranks. election party’s presidential ‘Motherland’ the the from in of ran Glaz’ev leaders permission, the however, aty pensionerov Partiya nte20steKeln aiga vrupyo oeta aelt ate,was parties, satellite potential of oversupply an facing Kremlin, the 2000s the In h rcptt ieadfl f‘ohrad e h rmi noaohrventure, another into Kremlin the led ‘Motherland’ of fall and rise precipitate The ycelvIrnv hc a nte20 State 2003 the in ran which Igrunov, Vyacheslav , woelaesi a lorpae u oteuncontrolled the to due replaced also was leadership (whose ) eortcPryo Russia of Party Democratic AT OIISI USA923 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY Yabloko hnVaii ui none i decision his announced Putin Vladimir When . hc a nte20 State 2007 the in ran which , Duma aty zhizni Partiya Duma Duma lcin gis his against elections Rodina onatrthis, after Soon . lcin,polls elections, )coalition ’) ,ldby led ), Duma Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 ul egdlylyt h rmi.I at hrnvkiadhsale lydtwo played allies proposals his governmental and and Zhirinovskii presidential major the fact, very endorsed in In the they its Kremlin. First, with From the roles. rhetoric asset. important to populist Kremlin loyalty and nationalist fledged long-standing combined fully and successfully party valuable this most beginning, the probably was 2 LDMRGEL’MAN VLADIMIR 924 RdmntdRsi’ oiia cn,adalrmiigeiescin aehdto had have sections elite remaining and all for Kremlin and the threshold 2003): scene, became (Gel’man political the Russia elites Russia’s of in in consensus’ dominated competition ‘imposed UR political increase the 2000s, to prohibition an due the the limited in as and very Second, registration, such coalitions. party electoral 2000s, by for on accompanied rules the was tough and of representation, 2005) parliamentary changes Fish 1990; unfavourable institutional (Linz was definition presidentialism the by strong politics of opposition background dying for institutional a the of State 2003 First, manner opposition the time. Russia’s the after of in evident collapse became the arena, which affected political parties, factors major the Two influence from 2005). their (Gel’man disappear lost both species to 2000s dramatically ready the only in appeared not a contrast, oppositions but had By political system. communist) liberal party later and Russian and communist emerging anti-communist, the on (first impact opposition decisive political 1990s, the In death? after life there is Opposition: arena. political Russia’s some in Still, remained extinction. autonomy possible the and political from survival sought between autonomy that choice (relative) parties a was and this subordination fact, with in complete faced Kremlin: were between UR choice beyond difficult politicians provided Party a and competition parties. 1980s party satellite the shrinking take for in Russia to incentives decline in aimed additional PRI’s However, of 126). which wake p. parties, the 2005, in (Wilson satellite also especially 1990s of and opposition, number real 1994) the a Cothran from promote 1966; votes to Cockroft channels & the various (Anderson Also, used its dissent in milieus. organised repression social and over with targeted co-optation Poland in dealing over preferred in regime regimes control authoritarian parties political communist party-based Christian of Mexican some channels or Leonid recall as peasant under Germany loyal might Ukraine East established one as which 129–50), Europe, such pp. Eastern states, 2005, post-Soviet (Wilson the other Kuchma at some always were Besides liberals perspective. fake as well selected as parties against left fake campaigning disposal. as fake the LDPR Kremlin’s negative of besides and Yet, number Kremlin’s else). 2005) a somebody the or Dubin nationalists, in communists & ‘oligarchs’, LDPR they (Gudkov (be the targets voters of among use the demands effective With needed certain 203–09). longer given no pp. Kremlin important 2005, the the in (Wilson UR, services of number quo dominance LDPR’s a status parliamentary to Second, attractive the the 1999). was of threatening which May establishment party, in without nationalist president fake voters the a of impeach of image to an attempt presented the they as (such opposition the usaseprec fstlieprybidn sntuiu nacomparative a in unique not is building party satellite of experience Russia’s mn aelt ate,teLP ( LDPR the parties, satellite Among Duma Rmntn20)ad oeipraty lce eea ntaie of initiatives several blocked importantly, more and, 2003) (Remington Duma u t rsneo usaseetrlaearemained arena electoral Russia’s on presence its but , iea’odmkaihsaapriaRossii partiya Liberal’no-demokraticheskaya Duma lcin n otne over continued and elections ) Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 .%o h oe(isn20,p.9–0) oee,gvnteemerging the given However, 98–100). the pp. in allies 2005, liberal needed received (Wilson Kremlin SPS the the UR, vote of coverage, dominance TV the parliamentary positive State of and 1999 policies the support major 8.5% in Kremlin fruit of to semi- some Thanks and/or SPS Chechnya. regime of the bore political join niche strategy to the This Duma sought in a 228–29). which pp. changes but occupied 2005, significant government, (Gel’man the any always in without Russia, represented it not of was which Choice opposition, Democratic ‘exit’ an predecessor, adopt to marginalisation. communists of subsequent the exclusion of their provoke for to prospect could drive leading any arena probably Kremlin’s without political strategy the ‘ghetto’ the same making: from electoral the policy KPRF narrow and At the a politics 2006). on into (Kynev influence KPRF strong serious the relatively pushed was it elections time, regional in performance omnssrcie 15%o h oei h 2007 the the collapse: in total vote a from the bases of electoral could 11.57% and the that helped organisation received innovations immobilism its this second- communists major fact, preserve Soviet-style In any by to 2007). rejected led (Ponomarev KPRF was changes activists party party major party voters the provoke to USSR’, and appeal the party’s bureaucrats, The to 1990s. order ‘back the toward in as oriented organisation same was positions, the policy nearly its remained even strategy: But leadership KPRF’s 2004b). and the 2004a, change (Golosov not declined did also conditions 2000 these after elections regional in success uiesepe n h pitn fteeetrt hog h oiainof 2005, nomination (Wilson State the KPRF 2003 the the in through of vote its decline electorate of electoral half almost sharp the lost the large-scale It 222–65). to of pp. including led and splitting lists, communists, governors party pro-communist the alternative the on and pressure on Kremlin State opposition businesspeople, attacks television, ‘cosmetic’ on the vicious coverage a in negative target: into majority turned Kremlin State 2003 Kremlin-controlled which major the KPRF, During a 240–44). the pp. of 2002, of (March existence position very the undermined still the and fact, committees with parliamentary agreement State in of an of chairships reached position the even the sharing communists controlled about the faction 2000 Unity in (‘ group; the power’ ruling into the to ‘growing of turned of partner they slogan then the and under vlast regime 1996, vo quo as status early the as to mobilisation) ‘loyalty’ 2000s. of mass the anti-regime choice in decisive the success (of but any 89): 1970), parties p. (Hirschman opposition 1991, ‘loyalty’ Russian brought (Przeworski and them ‘voice’, means’ KPRF, of ‘exit’, what none the between by lies neither and strategies circumstances, oppose opposition longer these to no Under much and how actor. arena, political political the of of Yabloko role periphery elite became the While the it at choice: such. played no located with as (Tarrow damaged, opposition status protest the or left political elite co-opted consensus’ ‘imposed opposition-induced their the for 88–89), lost pp. likely have 1994, is or conflict role and subordinated fragmentation their on agree nietecmuit,Rsi’ ao iea at,teSS swl sits as well as SPS, the party, liberal major Russia’s communists, the Unlike h omns at fteRsinFdrto xase t oeta f‘voice’ of potential its exhausted Federation Russian the of Party Communist The lcin hntelbrl akdVaii ui n i iiayatosin actions military his and Putin Vladimir backed liberals the when election, )(e’a 05 p 3–5.Snete,teKR tepe ob junior a be to attempted KPRF the then, Since 234–35). pp. 2005, (Gel’man ’) o h P eeal orslete‘lsia rbe fayopsto . . . opposition any of problem ‘classical the resolve to able were SPS the nor AT OIISI USA925 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY Duma himn u agiiggiswr minimal: were gains bargaining But chairman. Duma lcin,teKR eaea became KPRF the elections, Duma Duma lcin,adKPRF and elections, lcin n its and election, Duma vrastanie Duma only Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 tls h nnilspoto ao pnos n h heto otl takeover hostile useless: was a it of However, Kremlin. threat the the to and ‘loyalty’ to sponsors, drove ‘exit’ significant major 2000s hardships These of its dangerous. the support more Despite became financial in the higher. 2004), lost much it (Hale were several building costs crisis: organisational party long-term in the brought investments but of strategy this conditions benefits, elites Under of term proposals. the fragmentation governmental was and crises strategy and multiple ‘exit’ 1990s presidential system the the all constraints, in virtually presidential these survival: opposed to for Russia’s Due path takeover. viable hostile in only a Kremlin via but the a party time, this become same coalition, the could At governmental limited. party offered fairly actively a were a building such coalition for very system for opportunities the parliamentary ally From a 2006). In useful (White success. 2000s electoral the achieve of changes political beginning, the from most suffered rmiscnuttoswt h rmi,wietears ftemjrprysponsor, hopes. party’s party the major State against 2003 the blow the of last in arrest the defeat was the 2003 while in Kremlin, Khodorkovskii the Mikhail with consultations its from semi- liberal of project very immediately the announced he that State when 2003 clear correct the will absolutely is after it was whether it Surkov or failed: party But political has a else. opposition the as It split survive something SPS). will the Force, into SPS for the 0.96% Civic transform whether against the polls predict the to party, at early the vote too satellite of the is of voters Kremlin 1.1% remaining new received (it The a electorate campaign. liberal Russia while negative ruled disoriented massive unsuccessfully were had a who initiated SPS actors and those that 1990s, by argued the revenge Kremlin seek the in to vain: attempt in an raised was was ‘voice’ it this However, United activities). such Kasparov’s from Gary as ( such Bolsheviks ( units non-partisan protest the Front radical of anti-regime Civic drift joined the authoritarian even by the and organised for freedoms, rallies UR political and defended Putin vigorously blamed country, party cost. The most any ‘voice’. at the to Kremlin State ‘loyalty’ 2007 the the Still, to of loyal course remained elections. the the and In and Chubais (the legislative privatisation Anatolii 1990s of manager sponsor regional architect party positions) the campaign major around policy during coalesced SPS new official the rhetoric of and a wing name influential leftist hired party’s liberals used the Belykh, 2005 (despite in Nikita actively and itself: chair, Bakov), reinvent GEL’MAN to Anton party VLADIMIR able energetic was new to SPS the the party leaders ranks, the previous elected party’s brought some the failure Although left this 237–38). activists and pp. and threshold, 2005, 5% (Gel’man State the collapse 2003 above organisational the squeeze In still to benefits. power unable of political party was of the share The strategy, lion’s limited. ‘loyalty’ fairly the SPS was the received making Despite decision minimal. on were SPS gains the liberals’ of influence the while occasionally, 926 Finally, Yabloko Yabloko asoany oseitky Partiya Bolshevistskaya Natsionalnaya b’dnny rzdnkiFront Grazhdanskii Ob’’edinennyi Yabloko h ao i o h ny eortcopsto at nRussia, in party opposition democratic only) the not (if major the , Duma eandasalpry hs eore eeisffiin to insufficient were resources whose party, small a remained Duma aiu om fifra olto nodrt salwup’ ‘swallow to order in coalition informal of forms various lcin httelbrl’hsoia iso a exhausted. was mission historical liberals’ the that elections Duma lcin hni aldt rs h %trsod a a was threshold, 5% the cross to failed it when election, Duma euisadrgoa ciit ettepryranks, party the left activists regional and deputies lcin oee,teSSsdel hfe from shifted suddenly SPS the however, election, Yabloko Yabloko n dadLmnvsNational Limonov’s Eduard and ) peiul,teSSsae away stayed SPS the (previously, ) ytmtclyadunequivocally and systematically oacag fsrtg:from strategy: of change a to Yabloko Yabloko Duma Yabloko andltl benefit little gained lcinteSPS the election ae deep a faced oeshort- some Yabloko ’s Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 aae ytesaeocas(ih20,p.5–8,prybsdauthoritarian status party-based the challenge 57–58), not do pp. they if 2005, only (Fish parties the non-dominant from officials tolerate rarely politics to is state tend party party regimes dominant of the the autonomy beyond by of politics degree damaged democracies’ the ‘uncommon in in degree the While also in state. but only not competition, lies difference party crucial of the KGB 2007), (Greene his similarities during some exhibit Putin Vladimir 2006). to (Ryzhkov 1980s familiar the the under was in Germany which service East of regime, experience communist the to GDR’s referring openly system’, party ‘Dresden 90.Hwvr rtc ftenwprysse rwmn aall ihthe with Remington parallels & Reuter many 2006; draw (Gel’man system PRI State party former under and new Mexico (Pempel forthcoming), the democracies’ in the ‘uncommon regime of under as authoritarian Sweden critics labelled or dominant However, Democrats of usually Liberal kind are 1990). this the which in compared under and Japan Democrats, activists 2006) in Social party (Surkov those UR years with 10–15 system before next dominance party party speech UR the Russia’s preserve for his to in least intention In trends Kremlin’s at the time. current announced the Given over Surkov 2006, disease. that maintained February chronic assume be a might having could party one it system dominant alternatives, of a of symptoms of regime. become lack emergence could political the the Putin nascent and under the competition Russia party of in of pains seen demise growing be the protracted could contrast, the Russia By Yel’tsin’s of in manifestation politics the party as competitive of development early The not is Kremlin the for good is effective what development. an However, political the Russia’s run. as of for extinction long seen good the the equally in be and result in thorough even cannot parties Kremlin’s might activism opposition parties the political summarise, became an over To protests control such politics. comprehensive street party perceptions cities, competitive whose trends major for public regional oppositions, these substitute Russia’s non-party in though and/or disloyal in Even profile of national politics. visible rise opposition low of in the of pie and stagnation provoked multi-layered presence deep the potential the of symbolical mobilisation bottom became demonstrated Their the weak survival at system. place very legislatures, their party found party’s they the Russia’s best, At vote, 2000s. the the form. of current its 1.59% in least modest at a questionable, receiving 2007 the In after bleaker. even looked prospects its State either. and elections, successful shift legislative the to not regional Bolsheviks, turned was several National ‘voice’ Petersburg) the to St and Front ‘loyalty’ in Civic from example, United (for the alongside branches protests (Kynev regional street elections and legislative activists regional Subsequent party most that some 239–40). in indicated pp. failure grand clearly 2005, party’s 2006), (Gel’man the shift as strategic such events, this of consequence natural hl aydmnn at ytm ne eortcadatoiainregimes authoritarian and democratic under systems party dominant many While soecnse oeo poiinpriswsal oscr hi oiin during positions their secure to able was parties opposition of none see, can one As Duma lcin,teprywsmrl np n t apinapa a bleak: was appeal campaign its and inept merely was party the elections, ocuin ewe eioadteGDR? the and Mexico between Conclusion: AT OIISI USA927 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY Yabloko Duma seetrlptnilwsehutd Although exhausted. was potential electoral ’s euyVaii yho vndbe ta it dubbed even Ryzhkov Vladimir deputy Yabloko a eidrgsrto in registration denied was Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 oha,D (1994) D. Cothran, (2003) M. McFaul, & T. Colton, al .(1971) R. Dahl, uegr .(1954) M. Duverger, ooo,GV 20)‘fbioaneblsisv:knesy ooo et adumskikh na mesta Appointments’, v Gubernatorial Putin’s golosov of Puzzle ‘The konversiya (2007) P. bol’shinstvo: Goode, ‘Sfabrikovannoe State (2007) to Impediments G.V. and Golosov, Politics Electoral Regional Wrong? Went ‘What (2004b) G.V. Golosov, nesn .&Ccrf,JD 16)‘opainadCnrli eia Politics’, Mexican in Control and ‘Cooptation (1966) J.D. Cockroft, & B. Anderson, the under Petersburg happen St will at seen. University Russia be European in to competition remains or Medvedev party and dominance. to 2007) Putin one-party return of (Greene erode a generations to modernisation political not tend run, or social 2006) long whether Way and the But & economic In (Levitsky indefinitely. as ‘linkages’ survive international such cannot factors systems comparative party exogenous regimes party the these authoritarian shocks, Russia’s party-based that exogenous non-communist of demonstrates the and major state communist alongside without both current not changed of the experience easily certainly be that be but could fact cannot GDR, opponents, the system impotent the Despite and and democracies’. weak Mexico ‘uncommon and between a satellites, somewhere of hierarchy pocket placed satellite Kremlin-controlled its its and GEL’MAN with party, dominant which system, VLADIMIR Europe, party dominant the Russia’s Eastern beyond sense, in this activism regimes In repressive parties. political most organised the in excluded of authoritarianism one completely party-based probably However, achievements) was 2007). major GDR without Greene actively the though 1994; (PAN) (even Cothran Party decades 1986; for Action (Story arena National political right-wing the in the operated and like repressive, parties overly not autonomous was some authoritarianism party-based Mexican Yet, regime. quo 928 ooo,GV (2004a) G.V. Golosov, (2007) Transformation (ed.) The Politics’’: V. Power ‘‘Dominant Gel’man, to Pluralism’’ ‘‘Feckless ‘From (2006) V. Gel’man, (2005) M.S. Fish, e’a,V 20)‘usasEie nSac fCness htKn fCnoiain’ in Consolidation?’, Species?’, of Dying A Kind Russia: in What Opposition Consensus: ‘Political (2005) of V. Gel’man, Search in Elites ‘Russia’s (2003) V. Gel’man, eds .(2003) B. Geddes, Praeger). 2000 and 1999 Sociology Comparative of Journal yoah,i e’a,V e. 20) p 39–58. 365–99. pp. (2007), (ed.) V. Gel’man, in vyborakh’, 2008. April 2003–2004’, 17 accessed Russia, www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0337.pdf, in Centralization Rienner). Lynne nvriya tPtrbr Press). Petersburg St at University System’, Party Russia’s of 226–46. Wiley). te,A e’a,V es (2003) (eds) V. 29–50. pp. Gel’man, Routledge), & A. Steen, Politics Press). University AnAbr nvriyo ihgnPress). Michigan of University Arbor, (Ann oyrh:PriiainadOpposition and Participation Polyarchy: eorc ealdi usa h alr fOe Politics Open of Failure The Russia: in Derailed Democracy aaim n adCsls hoyBidn n eerhDsg nComparative in Design Research and Building Theory Castles: Sand and Paradigms oiia tblt n eorc nMxc:Te‘efc Dictatorship’? ‘Perfect The Mexico: in Democracy and Stability Political Wsigo,D,BoknsIsiuinPress). Institution Brookings DC, (Washington, oiia ate:TerOgnzto n ciiyi h oenState Modern the in Activity and Organization Their Parties: Political oiia ate nteRgoso usa eorc Unclaimed Democracy Russia: of Regions the in Parties Political rtieetrlnitilvRsi,2003–2004 Rossii, v tsikl elektoral’nyi Tretii Democratization oua hieadMngdDmcay h usa lcinof Election Russian The Democracy: Managed and Choice Popular ,1 p 11–28. pp. 1, 7, , References ltsadDmcai eeomn nRussia in Development Democratic and Elites OASPlc Memos Policy PONARS 3 ,p.545–61. pp. 4, 13, , NwHvn aeUiest Press). University Yale Haven, (New uoeAi Studies Europe-Asia otSve Affairs Post-Soviet 3,aalbea:http:// at: available 337, , S eesug European Petersburg, (St Cmrde Cambridge (Cambridge, Budr CO, (Boulder, International NwYork, (New 1 ,pp. 3, 21, , (Westport, 9 ,pp. 3, 59, , (London, Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 cal .&Soe-es,K 20)‘h yho h uhrtra oe:HwPutin’s (2007) How I. Ponomarev, Model: (1990) Authoritarian (ed.) the T. of Pempel, Myth ‘The (1911) (2008) R. K. Michels, Stoner-Weiss, & M. McFaul, ucl,SK 17)‘eiinMkn nAtoiainRgm:TertclIpiain rma from Implications Theoretical Regime: Authoritarian in ‘Decision-Making i (1973) dumskikh S.K. na Purcell, sorevnovaniya elektoral’nogo modeli (1991) A. i Przeworski, strategii ‘Programmnye (2007) E. Popova, (2005) (eds) R. Sakwa, & Z. Gitelman, S., White, in System’, ‘Electoral (2005) M. McFaul, (2002) L. ‘‘noga’’’, March, ‘Zhiznennaya (2006) V. Maksimov, (1990) (ed.) P. Mair, hvhno .(2004) I. Shevchenko, yho,V (2006) V. Ryzhkov, ist ..(00 TeIdsesblt fParties’, of Indispensability ‘The Presidentialism’, (2000) of S.M. Perils Lipset, ‘The (1990) J.J. Linz, eigo,T 20)‘ui,teDm,adPltclPris,i esrn,D e. (2003) (ed.) D. Herspring, in Parties’, Political and Duma, the ‘Putin, (2003) T. Remington, reformy of prizmu Dimension International skvoz’ the Rethinking vzglyad Leverage: versus regionakh: ‘Linkage (2006) rossiskikh L. Way, v & S. partii Levitsky, ‘Politicheskie (2006) A. (1999) Kynev, G. Toka, & R. Markowski, Z., Mansfedlova, H., Kitschelt, (1999) E. Huskey, (1970) A.O. Hirschman, Eurasia’, Post-Soviet in Revolution Russia’, (2006) and in Autocracy, Party H. Democracy, Liberal Hale, a Cycles: Building ‘Regime of (2005) Challenge H. the Hale, and natsionalizma’, ‘Yabloko russkogo (2004) ‘Svoeobrazie (2005) H. B. Hale, Dubin, & L. Gudkov, etr ..&Rmntn .(otcmn)‘oiatPryRgmsadteCmimn Problem: Commitment the and Regimes Party ‘Dominant (forthcoming) T. Remington, & O.J. Duma’, Reuter, State Russian the in Support ‘Presidential (2006) T. Remington, (2003) (eds) W. Political Reisinger, Russian & of Decline V. the Hesli, and Ideology of End The Democracy: ‘Instrumental (2003) S. Hanson, Demise’, PRI’s the and Politics Patronage Competition: ‘Creating (2007) K. Greene, celr .(d)(2006) (ed.) A. Schedler, aw,R 20)‘lcin n ainlItgaini usa,i el,V esne,W (eds) W. Reisinger, & V. Hesli, in Russia’, (2004) R. in Sakwa, Integration National and ‘Elections (2003) R. Sakwa, onl nvriyPress). University Cornell Democracy Back’, Russia Holds Crackdown eia aeStudy’, Case Mexican 156–95. pp. America (2007), Latin (ed.) and V. Gel’man, in godov’, 1995–2004 vyborakh prezidentskikh 2008. April 17 accessed 08/21/CPRF.html, 6 Politics Russian in Developments Press). 2008. April 17 accessed www.newizv.ru/print/52204, Ashgate). Studies usa atIpret uueUncertain Future Imperfect, Past Russia: Change’, Regime sistemy’, izbiratel’noi Cooperation Inter-Party Press). and Representation, Competition, States Press). University Cambridge (Cambridge, Politics World 2008. April 17 accessed 345.pdf, Papers Working h aeo ntdRussia’, United of Case the 5–32. pp. 1, 31, 163–85. pp. (2003), (eds) W. Reisinger, & V. Hesli, in Parties’, Press). University Cambridge 20) p 121–41. pp. (2003), 2008. April 17 accessed ryschkow, Cmrde A avr nvriyPress). University Harvard MA, (Cambridge, 6 ,p.993–1020. pp. 7, 56, , rfrnei ote16 dto,NwYr,Fe Press). Free York, New edition, 1962 the to is (reference h o ate nRsi:Dmcay eeaim n h State the and Federalism, Democracy, Russia: in Parties Not Why ui:Rsi’ Choice Russia’s Putin: h omns at nPs-oitRussia Post-Soviet in Party Communist The 8 ,p.133–65. pp. 1, 58, , rsdnilPwri Russia in Power Presidential oiia ate:AScooia td fteOiaci edniso Modern of Tendencies Oligarchic the of Study Sociological A Parties: Political tahvelik Strakh h etErpa at Systems Party European West The PF cea eona zavtra segodnya, vchera, CPRF: 4,aalbea:http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/ at: available 345, , eorc n h akt oiia n cnmcRfrsi atr Europe Eastern in Reforms Economic and Political Market: the and Democracy oprtv Politics Comparative Cmrde abig nvriyPress). University Cambridge (Cambridge, h eta oeneto usa rmGrahvt Putin to Gorbachev From Russia: of Government Central The lcoa Authoritarianism Electoral nomnDmcais h n-at oiatRegimes Dominant One-Party The Democracies: Uncommon xt oc,adLyly epnet eln nFrs raiain,and Organizations, Firms, in Decline to Response Loyalty: and Voice, Exit, Polis ol Politics World AT OIISI USA929 RUSSIA IN POLITICS PARTY ,p.145–60. pp. 6, , oprtv oiia Studies Political Comparative vial t http://www.inopressa.ru/spiegel/2006/11/13/15:17:24/ at: available , oeg Affairs Foreign h 9920 lcin nRsi:TerIpc n Legacy and Impact Their Russia: in Elections 1999–2000 The Bsnsoe agaeMciln,p.61–79. pp. Macmillan), Palgrave (Basingstoke, Lno,Routledge). (London, 6 ,p.28–54. pp. 1, 26, 8 ,p.379–400. pp. 4, 38, , Lna,M,Rwa n iteed,p.39–59. pp. Littlefield), and Rowman MD, (Lanham, Amn,N,M .Sharpe). E. M. NY, (Armonk, ora fDemocracy of Journal oy Izvestiya Novye Budr O yn Rienner). Lynne CO, (Boulder, vial t http://www.polit.ru/analytics/2007/ at: available , 7 ,p.68–84. pp. 1, 87, , ora fDemocracy of Journal Ofr,Ofr nvriyPress). University Oxford (Oxford, . Mnhse,Mnhse University Manchester (Manchester, Cmrde abig University Cambridge (Cambridge, 7Ags,aalbea:http:// at: available August, 17 , otCmuitPrySystems: Party Post-Communist ,1 p 51–69. pp. 1, 1, , r tContra et Pro eiltv tde Quarterly Studies Legislative 1 ,p.48–55. pp. 1, 11, , elg Institute Kellogg ,2 p 6–24. pp. 2, 9, , Ihc,NY, (Ithaca, (Cambridge, Europe-Asia (Aldershot, Putin’s , Downloaded By: [NEICON Consortium] At: 19:26 18 July 2008 edn .(97 Peiecaim nMxc’ nMiwrn,S hgr,MS es (1997) (eds) M.S. Shugart, (2006) & D. S. White, Mainwaring, in Mexico’, in ‘Presidencialismo (1997) J. Weldon, isn .(06 PrySse eeomn ne Putin’, under Development ‘Party-System (2006) K. Wilson, GEL’MAN VLADIMIR Informal Reform, Institutional Victory: the ‘Engineering of (2007) Success B. the Wilkening, and Power & of A. Parties Lowry, Out: R., Inside Smyth, from Capacity State ‘Building Parliamentary (2002) R. 1999 Smyth, The Coordination: Pre-election of Problem the ‘Resolving (2003) O. Shvetsova, 930 arw .(1994) S. Tarrow, isn .(2005) A. Wilson, (2006) A. Titkov, (2006) V. Surkov, (1986) D. Story, Adrht Ashgate). (Aldershot, rsdnils n eorc nLtnAmerica Latin 225–58. in Democracy and Presidentialism nvriyPress). University Federation’, Russian the in Regime Party Hegemonic a Affairs of Soviet Formation the and Institutions 213– Russia’, pp. in (2003), Agenda (eds) Reform W. President’s Reisinger, & V. Hesli, in ‘‘Primary’’’, Presidential 31. Elite an as Elections w.rdn.ukiapry.tl cesd1 pi 2008. April 17 accessed www.orodine.ru/kniga/party4.html, Press). University Cambridge www.edinros.ru/print.html?id h eia uigPry tblt n Authority and Stability Party: Ruling Mexican The 3 ,p.118–37. pp. 2, 23, , oe nMvmn:Sca oeet olcieAto,adPolitics and Action, Collective Movement, Social Movement: in Power h usa eortcParty Democratic Russian The ita oiis aigDmcayi h otSve World Post-Soviet the in Democracy Faking Politics: Virtual aty o4 Rdn’iokrestnosti i ‘Rodina’ No.4: Partiya ueeie—t oiihsi ioi konkurentosposobnosti sinonim politicheskii Suverenitet—eto ¼ 118 cesd1 pi 2008. April 17 accessed 111148, oiisadSociety and Politics Yabloko: Cmrde abig nvriyPes,pp. Press), University Cambridge (Cambridge, Mso,Pnrm) vial t http:// at: available Panorama), (Moscow, otSve Affairs Post-Soviet poiini aae Democracy Managed a in Opposition 0 ,p.555–78. pp. 4, 30, , NwYr,Praeger). York, (New vial t http:// at: available , 2 ,p.314–39. pp. 4, 22, , NwHvn Yale Haven, (New (Cambridge, Post-