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Networks and Regional Leadership in El'tsin's Russia: the Case of Eduard Rossel' in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 1989-1999

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Networks and Regional Leadership in El'tsin's Russia: the Case of Eduard Rossel' in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 1989-1999 Networks and regional leadership in El’tsin’s Russia: the case of Eduard Rossel’ in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 1989-1999 Thomas Carter UCL PhD I, Thomas Carter, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 1 ABSTRACT This thesis examines the regional leadership in Sverdlovsk Oblast between 1989 and 1999. Focusing on the identity of the regional governor, Eduard Rossel’, who rose to power at the end of the Soviet period and dominated the region throughout the El’tsin decade, the research considers the role and use of networks as critically important to the exercise of regional power. The research questions consider the nature of the political system that Rossel’ installed, focusing on how his involvement in different vertical and horizontal networks, both as patron and client, facilitated the construction of a personalised power system in this heavily industrialised region. It finds that the activation and use of different relationships at the numerous critical junctures that emerged in centre-regional relations during the El’tsin decade protected Rossel’’s grip over regional power, through use of a ‘boundary control’ model that ensured he was the only actor capable of leading the region in this decade. Whereas many previous studies of regional politics in the 1990s have focused on the development of institutions, this research considers that the ability of the Sverdlovsk leader to participate in, and lead, overlapping networks outweighed the consolidation of institutions, resulting in his personal domination of the regional political space. The thesis considers the effect of Putin’s recentralization programme on the personalised system of power that Rossel’ constructed, finding that the introduction of alternative routes to the centre weakened his position amongst the regional and inter-regional elites. 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 6 List of Tables and Figures ................................................................................................. 7 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 8 El’tsin’s Russia, elites and networks – a literature review.......................................... 10 The construction of federalism and regional politics in El'tsin’s Russia ................ 11 Regional regime building and individual leadership .............................................. 18 Continuation and change of regional elites in Russia ............................................. 23 Establishing the new rules of networks ................................................................... 31 Summary and Research Questions .............................................................................. 35 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 37 Chapter structure ......................................................................................................... 40 Eduard Rossel’ and the critical junctures of the 1990s ............................................... 44 Chapter 1 Exercising power through networks in the Russian regions .......................... 46 ‘Boundary control’ as a strategy for controlling the regional political space ............. 47 Elite theory and its application to Russian regions ..................................................... 57 The emergence of the ‘charismatic’ leader ................................................................. 62 Networks as the basis of the Russian social and political system ............................... 65 Summary of the model ................................................................................................ 69 Chapter 2 The rise of Rossel' in Sverdlovsk Oblast’, 1989-1991: replacing political networks in the final years of Communist rule ............................................................... 70 Power relations in the Russian regions 1989-1990 ..................................................... 71 Sverdlovsk Oblast regional authorities in the late-Gorbachev era .............................. 75 El'tsin as a source of political support in the period 1990-1991 ................................. 78 Preparing the ground for the future power system: the emergence of ‘unified power’ ..................................................................................................................................... 82 Rossel’ and the role of regional economic crisis in the foundation of his regional power ........................................................................................................................... 84 The August 1991 attempted coup and the installation of Rossel’ as Head of Regional Administration ............................................................................................................ 88 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 90 Chapter 3 The value of network relations in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Tatarstan . 93 Continuity or change: Luzhkov’s, Shaimiev’s and Sobchak’s rise to power ............. 94 The development of personalised regimes as a response to the end of the unitary state ..................................................................................................................................... 98 Relations with El’tsin – the influence of vertical ties ............................................... 101 The construction of power systems ........................................................................... 105 Horizontal and vertically downward networks – the value of local patronage ......... 109 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 116 3 Chapter 4 Building vertical networks without vertical integration: the monopoly of the El’tsin-Rossel’ relationship ........................................................................................... 118 The Rossel’-El’tsin interpersonal network as a form of learning how to deal with Moscow ..................................................................................................................... 120 Independently seeking resources – 1991-1993 ......................................................... 123 Severed ties – 1993-1994 .......................................................................................... 128 Changing course: patronage relations between the federal centre and Governor Aleksei Strakhov ....................................................................................................... 131 Putting political capital to work -1994-1999 ............................................................ 133 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 136 Chapter 5 Diversifying national-subnational linkages: Rossel’’s approach to competing networks and constructing cross-regional relations ...................................................... 138 Network competition ................................................................................................. 139 The Presidential Administration – rivalry for influence and domination ................. 141 Building new networks to influence the centre – Rossel’’s as leader of the greater Urals region ............................................................................................................... 148 Nemets v regione –international ties as a source of external legitimacy................... 151 Developing a national profile .................................................................................... 155 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 158 Chapter 6 Constructing the identity of patron: Rossel’ as the benevolent leader of Sverdlovsk Oblast’ ........................................................................................................ 159 Charismatic leadership and the cultivation of legitimacy ......................................... 160 Rossel’’s core support – the parochialization of internal political power ................. 163 Protecting regional industry ...................................................................................... 177 Electoral support from society .................................................................................. 180 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 183 Chapter 7 The battle for control of the regional capital: the Rossel’-Chernetskii conflict ....................................................................................................................................... 185 Emerging from the shadow of patron-client relations............................................... 186 A growing counterweight to power in the region – the trajectory of Chernetskii from client to opponent ...................................................................................................... 187 Local self-government in Russia and the grounds of governor-mayoral contest ..... 193 Ekaterinburg versus Sverdlovsk: a case of asymmetric
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