Defense and Industry. Romania Can Not Be a Relevant Regional Player Without a Modern Army and a Strong Security Industry

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Defense and Industry. Romania Can Not Be a Relevant Regional Player Without a Modern Army and a Strong Security Industry Defense and industry. Romania can not be a relevant regional player without a modern army and a strong security industry Policy paper elaborated by the New Strategy Center - March 2016, Bucharest - In September 2015, the New Strategy Center launched a series of debates and meetings under the title ”Defense and Industry Strategic Forum”, aiming to create a platform for dialogue between institutions and the private sector, as well as to identify solutions in this field. From September 2015 to February 2016, the New Strategy Center organized eight debates and workshops. The main topics referred to the acquisition projects of fighting technique by the Romanian Army in the next decade, the need of restructuring and reorganization of the defense industry in order to become again a strategic industry, the possibility of strengthening technology partnerships between world large weapons companies and the national defense industry, the relaunching of national production of combat equipment following the strategic acquisition projects that Romanian Army will undertake, the resumption of weapons export and the inter-institutional cooperation for a viable export strategy, as well as the enhancement of the political and military strategic partnerships that Romania has due to the increasing technological and industrial cooperation in the defense field. We need a coherent public policy in the security field, as well as we need medium and long term strategies to be undertaken and carried through by all the political forces, regardless of the successive governments in power. Because Romania is above political sympathies, above the left or right orientation. 1 Premises ▪ In the new geostrategic context of the early 90s, marked by the end of the Cold War, the national defense industry has not been considered a priority any more. The companies belonging to the national defense industry have been trasferred from a centralized economy to a market economy without the necessary legislative and institutional foundations for such a complex process being established. ▪ The downfall of both the national and international orders has caused the loss of important financial resources necessary for the implementation of strategies and restructuring plans, resulting in unemployment, default on loans, impossibility of upgrading technology, gradual decline of research, development and engineering capabilities, disqualification for NATO standard products, and the impossibility of accessing loans or financial guarantees. ▪ There is still a major gap between the state companies and the Western companies, caused by aging technological and human resources. Also, the state industry is dependent on the export of traditional products and outdated technologies, as well as on the import of raw materials and subcomponents. Many of the traditional subcontractors have been disbanded, declared insolvent or bankrupt, or they are no longer performing in the security sector. ▪ The debts of state companies to local, social and state budgets have increased, exceeding in some cases the value of the company assets. They own land/buildings for which are paying taxes, but which have no connection with the production process any more. ▪ The implication of the political factor has hindered the profound change and often has altered the quality of management. ▪ The Public Private Partnership (state - private security industry) is fragile, the private sector often playing the role of subcontractor for foreign companies and providing assistance in the integration of new equipments on existing platforms. ▪ The defense and security field is over-regulated, with unconform and unorganized laws and stipulations, often confusing, contradictory, and impeding the activity. ▪ The unpredictability of government funding for coherent multi-annual acquisition programs affected both the state and private industry. The practice of fulfilling too ambitious or even unrealistic requirements comparing to resources resulted in supplying the army with expensive products more than once, while the products interoperability was questionable. ▪ The state non-involvement was visible also in the military research underfunding and a quasi- public-private cooperation in this field. An inter-institutional strategy to determine a coherent research and security technologies development process is lacking. Not any major national project has been developed during the last 25 years in order to properly equip the army and to relaunch the export of based on advanced technology Romanian products. 2 History ▪ In 1989, the national defense industry has almost 100 companies with about 130,000 employees, and the Romanian arms export turnover reached $800 million. After successive reorganizations, 22 state-owned enterprises work today, 15 being grouped within CN ROMARM SA, a company under the Ministry of Economy. The security industry is also represented by 17 private companies. The part that belongs to the state still needs an objective assessment and restructuring, which is quite difficult due to the local political interests or, sometimes, the trade union pressure. There are companies that hardly survive in the absence of orders, but there are also companies with important export contracts, with similar activities. These companies might merge, but often the temptation to keep the boards of directors is too big, most of the members being appointed on subjective criteria, as a reward for political services, without having the professional training in order to be able to take useful decisions for the companies they lead. Moreover, the unions have a strong influence, even though there are far fewer employees (about 5,900). The workforce is aging, the average being 53 years, while the constant lack of orders from the state accelerated the departure of many competent employees to the private sector or abroad. ▪ All the companies lack the adequate technology, and the ammunition and weapons are manufactured using equipments and technology from the 60s - 70s, in the best case from the 80s, which negatively reflects on the products competitiveness for export (in other cases, as SC Pirochim Victoria, the equipments are from 1936, and in UM Sadu the cartridges are packed manually). The state investments in technology for the defense industry were very poor. Also, the state lost control over the production of strategic elements like powder, Romania depending on imports from Serbia. A modest investment started in 2015 with €400,000 for the resumption of powder production in Făgăraş, hindered by bureaucracy. Its duration can not be predicted given that the total amount is estimated at around €60 million. ▪ Romania has a weak internal market for the armament industry, a deficiency aggravated by the lack of predictability of the Defense Ministry funding programs. The economic crisis has forced the Defense Ministry to reconsider the procurement plans and the acquisitions were sporadic, based on the Minister of Defence power of persuasion and his relation with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance rather than on a real procurement plan. This had some major negative effects. Firstly, the army did not follow, most of the times, a multi-year planning process, which impaired the logistics and the interoperability of systems (equipping the battalions with different communications systems, deficient in terms of interoperability and maintenance costs, and equipping the motorized infantry brigades with various combat systems, as MLI and Piranha fighting vehicles). Secondly, these deficiencies were overlapped by the temptation to include unjustified requirements for the products, becoming impossible or too expensive to integrate the old equipments with the new products, which also had to last longer and meet the future challenges. In some cases, this approach has led to purchasing overpriced products, with major problems in the theaters of operation. This was the case for Piranha transporter: a different kind of turrets were requested and, in the end, the final product was more expensive because Romania has actually paid the research and development costs to the producing company. 3 ▪ Another vicious approach is the practice of (re)allocating the funds between ministries at the end of the year, which causes a conjectural and disarticulated reaction and generates much higher future costs. In December 2015, the ground forces bought 60 Iveco trucks in order to reduce the huge shortage they were facing. The acquisition was not part of a truck procurement strategy for the whole army (the number being very small compared to the total needs estimated at 10,000 trucks) but it was determined only by an immediate opportunity created by some year-end funds that had not been originally scheduled. Given such a sizeable demand, a coherent multi-annual program would be 100% justified and could also provide a chance to the domestic industry. Instead, a cyclical approach and the absence of centralized procurement strategies give no guarantee that the next products will not be manufactured by another producer, a situation which will have a negative impact on the maintenance costs and interoperability. ▪ Not least, the sporadic financing, the unpredictability of procurement costs, the decreasing amounts allocated for exercises and trainings, that characterized the period of massive budget cuts, have affected the maintenance process in terms of rhythm and consistency. The security industry, especially the private industry, has lost orders for the maintenance
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