DOCSLIB.ORG

An Overview of Arms Transfers and Armed Violence in the Horn of Africa (2010-2015)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
An Overview of Arms Transfers and Armed Violence in the Horn of Africa (2010-2015) Armed and insecure An overview of arms transfers and armed violence in the Horn of Africa (2010-2015) www.paxforpeace.nl Colophon September 2016 ISBN: 978-94-92487-02-5 NUR 689 PAX2016/07 Authors: Daniel Mack and Frank Slijper Editing: Susan Clark and Daan Kayser Cover photo: Nuba Reports: SPLA-North rebels in Sudan, 2015 Other photos: ACLED, AU UN IST photo/Tobin Jones, Enough/Amanda Hsiao, Nuba Reports, David Stentley, Yannick Tylle, UK DFID/Pete Lewis, UN photo/Stuart Price, US DoD/Staff Sgt. Joseph Araiza, Alan Wilson. Graphic design: Het IJzeren Gordijn PAX would like to thank the following people for their invaluable input and support: Roos Boer, Jessica Dorsey, Alexandra Hiniker, Louise Khabure, Nico Plooijer, Hans Rouw, Kathelijne Schenkel, Jelena Sporin, Jeremy Wheatley and Wim Zwijnenburg. About PAX PAX works with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence and to build just peace. PAX operates independently of political interests. www.paxforpeace.nl P.O. Box 19318 3501 DH Utrecht, The Netherlands [email protected] Armed and insecure An overview of arms transfers and armed violence in the Horn of Africa (2010-2015) Foreword arge numbers of people from the Horn of Africa were born during conflict and have been witness to the constant danger of violence. Many of them have been forced to flee their homes. Millions of people are internally displaced within the nation they /were born in, have resettled in neighboring countries, or have fled overseas to Europe and North America. The abundance of weapons in the region, and the continued flow of weap- ons to and within the Horn of Africa is certainly not the sole cause of violence, but their wide availability and poor arms trade controls clearly aggravate the level of conflict. This report gives a unique overview of how armed conflict and arms trade are interrelated in the Horn of Africa. It shows how violence and poor governance go hand in hand, while it is civilians that pay the price. In efforts to build more peaceful societies, governments in the Horn of Africa should be more accountable on their arms procurement; at the same time exporting states should adhere to much stricter norms, such as those set in the UN Arms Trade Treaty. In fact, the level of problems facing the region makes one wonder what good more arms to a region already engulfed in violence could possibly do. As a South Sudanese colleague recently said in despondency: “Please educate me on how adding more arms to the situation in South Sudan will help bring peace, reduce the tension we currently see, and give us hope for a stable country!” Jan Gruiters, General Director PAX 4 PAX ! Armed and insecure PAX ! Armed and insecure 5 List of Abbreviations ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia AOAV Action On Armed Violence ATT Arms Trade Treaty AU African Union CCM Convention on Cluster Munitions CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product HRW Human Rights Watch HSBA Human Security Baseline Assessment (Small Arms Survey) ICC International Criminal Court ICG International Crisis Group IDP Internally Displaced Person IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle IHL International Humanitarian Law JEM Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan) LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MBT Mine Ban Treaty MIC Military Industrial Corporation (Sudan) MRL Multiple Rocket Launcher 6 PAX ! Armed and insecure MSF Médecins Sans Frontières NISAT-PRIO Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers at the Peace Research Institute OCHA Oslo OHCHR Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) RECSA Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade SAF Sudanese Armed Forces SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition SPLM/A-N Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army - North SRF Sudan Revolutionary Front SSDM/A South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army TFG Transitional Federal Government (Somalia) UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UN United Nations UNDP UN Development Programme UNSC UN Security Council UNAMID African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan (until 2011) UNMISS UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (from 2011) PAX ! Armed and insecure 7 Contents Foreword 4 List of Abbreviations 6 Contents 8 Introduction 14 Armed Conflicts andArmed Violence 22 1. Sudan 22 Weapon Use 25 Military Spending and Holdings 30 Arms Transfers 31 Arms Embargoes 37 International Arms Control Mechanisms 39 Spotlight: Children killed and maimed in South Kordofan 40 2. South Sudan 44 Armed Conflicts andArmed Violence 45 Military Spending and Holdings 49 Arms Transfers 50 Arms Embargoes 55 International Arms Control Mechanisms 56 Spotlight: An Armed Newborn—Pre-independence Arms Holdings and Transfers 57 3. Uganda 62 Armed Conflicts andArmed Violence 64 8 PAX ! Armed and insecure Weapon Use 68 Military Spending and Holdings 68 Arms Transfers 70 International Arms Control Mechanisms 75 Spotlight—Uganda and South Sudan: a Troubled Friendship 76 4.Kenya 80 Armed Conflicts andArmed Violence 81 Weapon Use 86 Military Spending and Holdings 86 Arms Transfers 87 International Arms Control Mechanisms 91 Spotlight: Diversion and illicit trafficking in the seat of the Nairobi Protocol 91 5. Ethiopia 96 Armed Conflicts andArmed Violence 97 Military Spending and Holdings 101 Arms Transfers 103 Arms Embargoes 105 International Arms Control Mechanisms 6. Eritrea Armed Conflicts andArmed Violence 113 Weapon Use 113 Military Spending and Holdings 115 Arms Embargoes 116 Arms Transfers 117 International Arms Control Mechanisms 118 Spotlight: Burning Borders 119 7. Somalia 124 Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence 126 Weapons Use 131 Military Spending and Holdings 134 Arms Embargoes 135 Arms Transfers 136 International Arms Control Mechanisms 141 Spotlight: Autonomy and Violence: Somaliland and Puntland 141 8.Djibouti 146 Armed Conflicts and Armed Violence 148 Weapon Use 149 Military Spending and Holdings 150 Arms Transfers 153 International Arms Control Mechanisms 154 Spotlight: Spillover from Yemen 155 Conclusions and Recommendations 158 PAX ! Armed and insecure 9 Agents of Political Conflict in Africa (Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data [ACLED] Project) Political Conflict by Agent Type Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Inter1 Government Forces Rebels Political Militias Communal Militias Rioters Protesters Civilians External Forces # of Conflict Events 1 100 200 300 400 492 Conflict Agent Type Communal Militias N.B.: ACLED does not include Government Forces civilians as agents of conflict as Rebels they do not actively take part in Political Militias conflict events. Rioters 10 PAX ! Armed and insecure Protesters External Forces Agents of Political Conflict in Africa (Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data [ACLED] Project) Political Conflict by Agent Type Year 1997 1998 Map 1 1999 Agents of Political2000 Conflict in Africa (2010-2015) 2001 Source: Armed 2002Conflict Location and Event Data [ACLED] Project:2003 http://www.acleddata.com/ visuals/maps/dynamic-maps/2004 2005 N.B.: ACLED does not include civilians as agents of conflict as they2006 do not actively take part in conflict event 2007 2008 2009 2010 Agents of Political Conflict in Africa 2011 (Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data [ACLED] Project)Inter1 Government Forces Political Conflict by Agent Type Rebels Political Militias Year Communal Militias 1997 1998 Rioters 1999 2000 Protesters 2001 2002 Civilians 2003 2004 External Forces 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Inter1 # of Conflict Events Government Forces Rebels 1 Political Militias Communal Militias Rioters 100 Protesters Civilians 200 External Forces 300 # of Conflict Events 1 400 100 200 492 300 Conflict400 Agent Type 492 Conflict Agent CommunalType Militias Communal Militias : ACLED does not include N.B.: ACLED does not include GovernmentGovernment Forces Forces N.B. civilians as agents of conflict as Rebels they do not actively take part in Political MilitiasRebels civilians as agents of conflict as conflict events. Rioters Protesters Political Militias they do not actively take part in External Forces conflict events. Rioters ProtestersPAX ! Armed and insecure 11 External Forces Egypt Sudan Chad !Khartoum !Abyei Central African Republic South Sudan !Juba Uganda Dem. Rep. Congo !Kampala Rwanda Burundi Tanzania 12 PAX ! Armed and insecure Saudi Arabia Map 2 Horn of Africa Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti. Eritrea !Asmara Yemen !Khartoum Gulf of Aden Djibouti !Djibouti Ethiopia !Addis Ababa !Juba Somalia !Mogadishu Uganda Kenya Indian Ocean !Kampala !Nairobi Tanzania PAX ! Armed and insecure 13 Introduction arge swathes of the Horn of Africa have suffered from prolonged armed violence. Sustained security and stability may often seem like a mirage in the region, as conflict, armed violence and terrorism have become tragically commonplace in recent decades. / Civilians unacceptably bear the brunt, with thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of people displaced in recent years as a direct consequence of armed violence. A closer look at some of the areas deemed ‘islands of calm’ in the sub-region reveal that their security is only relative to the ‘rough sea’ around them. Very few, if any, of the armed conflicts and major patterns of armed violence in the Horn of Africa are purely national phenomena. Rather, most often have a regional or trans-border dimension, sometimes with neighbouring countries involved militarily in other countries. There are, of course, major differences between the countries, and in some cases major differences within a country.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • An Analysis of the Afar-Somali Conflict in Ethiopia and Djibouti
    Regional Dynamics of Inter-ethnic Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of the Afar-Somali Conflict in Ethiopia and Djibouti DISSERTATION ZUR ERLANGUNG DER GRADES DES DOKTORS DER PHILOSOPHIE DER UNIVERSTÄT HAMBURG VORGELEGT VON YASIN MOHAMMED YASIN from Assab, Ethiopia HAMBURG 2010 ii Regional Dynamics of Inter-ethnic Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of the Afar-Somali Conflict in Ethiopia and Djibouti by Yasin Mohammed Yasin Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree PHILOSOPHIAE DOCTOR (POLITICAL SCIENCE) in the FACULITY OF BUSINESS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES at the UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG Supervisors Prof. Dr. Cord Jakobeit Prof. Dr. Rainer Tetzlaff HAMBURG 15 December 2010 iii Acknowledgments First and foremost, I would like to thank my doctoral fathers Prof. Dr. Cord Jakobeit and Prof. Dr. Rainer Tetzlaff for their critical comments and kindly encouragement that made it possible for me to complete this PhD project. Particularly, Prof. Jakobeit’s invaluable assistance whenever I needed and his academic follow-up enabled me to carry out the work successfully. I therefore ask Prof. Dr. Cord Jakobeit to accept my sincere thanks. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Klaus Mummenhoff and the association, Verein zur Förderung äthiopischer Schüler und Studenten e. V., Osnabruck , for the enthusiastic morale and financial support offered to me in my stay in Hamburg as well as during routine travels between Addis and Hamburg. I also owe much to Dr. Wolbert Smidt for his friendly and academic guidance throughout the research and writing of this dissertation. Special thanks are reserved to the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Hamburg and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) that provided me comfortable environment during my research work in Hamburg.
    [Show full text]
  • Redalyc.COORDINATOR's NOTE
    UNISCI Discussion Papers ISSN: 1696-2206 [email protected] Universidad Complutense de Madrid España Alaminos, María-Ángeles COORDINATOR'S NOTE UNISCI Discussion Papers, núm. 33, octubre-, 2013, pp. 9-11 Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=76728723002 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 NOTA DE LA COORDINADORA / COORDINATOR´S NOTE María-Ángeles Alaminos 1 UCM / UNISCI The current crises in Sudan and South Sudan highlight the need for discussion and reflection on the key issues surrounding South Sudan’s secession from the North. This collection of articles considers those crises emerging between and within the Sudans and seeks to understand both Sudanese and South Sudanese internal dynamics and the way they relate to the external influence of major powers. The history of Sudan, formerly the biggest African country and often considered “a microcosm of Africa”, has been characterized by inequality between the center and the peripheries and by protracted internal conflicts that have shaped the country since its independence from British and Egyptian rule in 1956. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), brought an end to the second civil war in Sudan and granted the people of Southern Sudan the right to self-determination through a referendum.
    [Show full text]
  • Improving Institutional Capacity for Early Warning
    IfP-EW Cluster: IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR EARLY WARNING IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR EARLY WARNING SYNTHESIS REPORT Terri Beswick January 2012 This initiative is funded by the European Union About IfP-EW The Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action (IfP-EW) is a consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission. It draws on the expertise of 10 members with offices across the EU and in conflict-affected countries. It aims to develop and harness international knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to ensure that all stakeholders, including EU institutions, can access strong, independent, locally derived analysis in order to facilitate better informed and more evidence-based policy and programming decisions. This document has been produced with financial assistance of the EU. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of IfP-EW/Clingendael and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the EU. To learn more, visit http://www.ifp-ew.eu. About Clingendael Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, is a training and research organisation on international affairs. Within Clingendael, the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) conducts research on the connections between security and development with a special focus on integrated/comprehensive approaches to conflict prevention, stabilisation and reconstruction in fragile and post-conflict states. Specialising in conducting applied, policy-oriented research, linking academic research with policy analyses, the CRU translates theoretical insights into practical tools and policy recommendations for decision-makers in national and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organisations. The CRU was founded in 1996 as a long-term research project for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focusing on the causes and consequences of violent conflict in developing countries and countries in transition.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights Abuses in Sudan Over the Month of March 20161 Overview
    Human Rights Abuses in Sudan over the Month of March 20161 Overview During the month of March 2016, SUDO (UK)’s network of human rights monitors have reported and verified 65 incidents of human rights abuses across Sudan involving nine Sudanese states, whilst one such abuse was recorded in South Sudan relating to the arrest of two prominent Sudanese politicians who had participated in the National Dialogue by the security services of the Government of South Sudan. Monitors submitted a further two reports verifying the presence of a heavily armed group in North Darfur that is allegedly linked to ISIS in Libya, in addition to the troop movement of the Rapid Support Forces in South Kordofan. Enclosed within the 65 reports pertaining to human rights abuses, SUDO (UK) has assessed that various forces under the authority of the Government of Sudan2 were responsible, as individual entities, for 50 instances of human rights abuses, whilst various militias known collectively as Janjaweed were responsible for ten abuses. Unknown parties committed five such abuses, the various armed opposition movements four3, and the South Sudanese security service one such abuse. Once again it is worth stressing that multiple actors colluded in various incidents resulting in the fact that multiple perpetrators can be responsible for the same incident, hence 70 perpetrators have been identified for 65 human rights abuses. The 65 reports detail the following: the death 37 civilians and the serious injury of 59; the rape of 14 females including nine minors; the arrest of 28 persons including one detainee being held in a toxic container at the Sudanese Armed Forces Headquarters in Demazin; 15 reports of aerial bombardment resulting in the minimum use of some 160 bombs; the direct targeting of 30 civilian villages, which have been identified by monitors leading to the destruction of 15 of those villages; five incidents pertaining to press freedom with four newspaper confiscations; three dispersions of peaceful protest; and the denial of external travel to five persons.
    [Show full text]
  • India's Prospects in the Area of Ballistic Missile Defense
    РАБОЧИЕ МАТЕРИАЛЫ WORKING PAPERS МОСКОВСКИЙ ЦЕНТР КАРНЕГИ CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER Petr toPychkanov IndIa’s ProsPects In the area of BallIstIc MIssIle defense: a regIonal securIty PersPectIve 32012 WORKING PAPERS № 3 • 2012 PETR TOPYCHKANOV INDIA’S PROSPECTS IN THE AREA OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: A REGIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE МОСКОВСКИЙ ЦЕНТР КАРНЕГИ CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER The Working Papers series was founded in 1999. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment or the Carnegie Moscow Center. Carnegie Moscow Center Russia, 125009 Moscow, Tverskaya ul., 16/2. Tel: +7 (495) 935-8904 Fax: +7 (495) 935-8906 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.carnegie.ru Electronic versions of all Carnegie Moscow Center publications may be found at: http://www.carnegie.ru The Carnegie Moscow Center is an independent public policy research institution that promotes intellectual collaboration among Russian and international scholars and policy experts and provides analysis on a wide range of political, economic, and social issues. The main vehicles for its work are its publications and seminars. Working Papers provide readers with access to the main current research on Russian and Eurasian domestic and foreign policy. The series includes intermediate results of research and articles for immediate release. You may send your comments to the email address above. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or the Carnegie Moscow Center. The publication is distributed freeofcharge.
    [Show full text]
  • ERITREA Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem (M), Aged 21, Army Soldier Estifanos Solomon (M), Army Driver Two Male Army Officers (Names Not Known)
    PUBLIC AI Index: AFR 64/001/2005 07 January 2005 UA 03/05 Forcible return / Fear of torture or ill-treatment / Detention without charge or trial ERITREA Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem (m), aged 21, army soldier Estifanos Solomon (m), army driver Two male army officers (names not known) Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem, Estifanos Solomon and two army officers were reportedly forcibly returned from Djibouti to Eritrea on 28 December 2004. They are being detained without charge at an unknown location and are at risk of torture or ill-treatment. Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem is a member of the Afar ethnic group which inhabits areas in both Djibouti and Eritrea. He was born in Djibouti, although his family live in Eritrea. On 26 December he and the three other men drove from the southwest Eritrean town of Assab to Obock town in Djibouti, where they were detained by the Djiboutian army. Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem was refused permission to stay in Djibouti, despite being a Djiboutian citizen. The three other men reportedly requested asylum in Djibouti but were summarily handed over to Eritrean military officers on 28 December, who forcibly returned them to Eritrea the same day. The three were denied the right to have their asylum application properly determined or to contact the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Djibouti. Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem was unlawfully conscripted into the Eritrean army as a child soldier in 1997 when he was 14 years old. He had unsuccessfully applied recently to be demobilized on medical grounds after receiving eye injuries and shrapnel wounds during the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia.
    [Show full text]
  • Country of Origin Information Report Somalia July 2008
    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT SOMALIA 30 JULY 2008 UK BORDER AGENCY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE 30 JULY 2008 SOMALIA Contents Preface LATEST NEWS EVENTS IN SOMALIA, FROM 4 JULY 2008 TO 30 JULY 2008 REPORTS ON SOMALIA PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 4 JULY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.04 ECONOMY ................................................................................................. 2.01 Currency change, 2008 ................................................................ 2.06 Drought and famine, 2008 ........................................................... 2.10 Telecommunications.................................................................... 2.14 HISTORY ................................................................................................... 3.01 Collapse of central government and civil war ........................... 3.01 Peace initiatives 2000-2006 ......................................................... 3.14 ‘South West State of Somalia’ (Bay and Bakool) ...................... 3.19 ‘Puntland’ Regional Administration............................................ 3.20 The ‘Republic of Somaliland’ ...................................................... 3.21 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................... 4.01 CONSTITUTION .........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Avoiding Another War Between Israel and Hezbollah
    COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah By Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War ABOUT THE SCOWCROFT MIDDLE EAST SECURITY INITIATIVE The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region. Through all of the Council’s Middle East programming, we work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs at www.atlanticcouncil.org/ programs/middle-east-programs/. May 2020 ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-099-7 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. This report is made possible by general support to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................2
    [Show full text]
  • China's Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations
    China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations The modular transfer system between a Type 054A frigate and a COSCO container ship during China’s first military-civil UNREP. Source: “重大突破！民船为海军水面舰艇实施干货补给 [Breakthrough! Civil Ships Implement Dry Cargo Supply for Naval Surface Ships],” Guancha, November 15, 2019 Primary author: Chad Peltier Supporting analysts: Tate Nurkin and Sean O’Connor Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report. 1 Contents Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 4 Methodology, Scope, and Study Limitations ........................................................................................................ 6 1. China’s Expeditionary Operations
    [Show full text]
  • Romanian Military Attachés in London and Their Diplomatic Value (1919-1939)
    Romanian Military Attachés in London and their Diplomatic Value (1919-1939) Marusia Cîrstea* ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Available Online June 2014 The article emphasizes the fact that the military represented an important Key words: component of the connections between Romania and England in the Romania; interwar period. Military attachés played an important role in maintaining Great Britain; military connections between the two countries: Nicolae Arion, Matila Military attachés; Military objectives; The Romanian General Gheorghiu.Costiescu Ghika,In their Radu diplomatic R. Rosetti, activity Ion theyAntonescu, supported Nicolae the following:Rădescu, Staff. RomaConstantinnia being Sănătescu, recognized Gheorghe in England Niculescu, in actual Gheorghe fact; providing Dumitrescu, good reports Ermil for English businessmen; developing Great Britain’s economic interests in Romania; acquainting Romania with the organization and fighting technique of the British army; closer cooperation between the two armies (British and Romanian); building common military objectives (such as the Ta șaul military port), and others. 1. Introduction The military represented an important component of the connections between London and Bucharest in the interwar period, Romania being interested in developing its military potential with a view to defending its national borders. Examining the political and military circumstances in the area, the Romanian army’s General Staff reached the following conclusion: “Reunited Romania is in a much more difficult situation than in the past, as all its frontiers are threatened by the surrounding states. This threat comes from either a desire for retaliation on the part of Hungary or Bulgaria, who cannot accept being dispossessed of certain territories they owned, or from the propaganda tendencies of the Bolshevik regime, eager to expand its influence as far west as possible”.
    [Show full text]
  • Msm Land System Division
    LAND SYSTEM MSM DIVISION DEFENCE TECHNICS: DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT | PRODUCTION | SPARE PARTS | SERVICE & MAINTENANCE | MODERNIZATION ABOUT US MSM GROUP MSM GROUP Ltd. was established in 2015 by transformation of MSM Martin Ltd., which dealt with The resources and competencies: construction, development, production and sales mainly with military material. MSM Martin Ltd. was 1. Development of the product and the production process included complete documentation founded in 2004 on the base of MSM Ltd. In next years the MSM Martin Ltd. took over several military 2. Engineering construction of product including the prototype production and the pre-serial testing companies located in the middle of Slovakia, and built on its traditional manufacturing activities in 3. Production line, tools and jigs engineering construction, and production military and civil production. 4. Production of various types of small, middle and large caliber ammunition and associated charges, Due to ZVS company inclusion into the group structure we can state that the origin of MSM GROUP fuses and primers for guns and cannons. Deliveries with all of necessary documentation, and Ltd. comes back to 1927 when then Škoda Works in Plzeň, as a monopoly producer of ammunition certificates technics decided to build so called „spare factory“ in Slovakia. The company was totally destroyed 5. Services during the ammo life cycle: Testing, Revision, Modernization, Life cycle prolongation, during the World War II, and it took several years while the production was restored to such extend, Disassembly, Ecological disposal that its products were supplied not only for the Ministry of National Defense, but for many countries 6. In the case also the production line development, production and the transfer with whole necessary worldwide as well.
    [Show full text]
  • World Air Forces Flight 2011/2012 International
    SPECIAL REPORT WORLD AIR FORCES FLIGHT 2011/2012 INTERNATIONAL IN ASSOCIATION WITH Secure your availability. Rely on our performance. Aircraft availability on the flight line is more than ever essential for the Air Force mission fulfilment. Cooperating with the right industrial partner is of strategic importance and key to improving Air Force logistics and supply chain management. RUAG provides you with new options to resource your mission. More than 40 years of flight line management make us the experienced and capable partner we are – a partner you can rely on. RUAG Aviation Military Aviation · Seetalstrasse 175 · P.O. Box 301 · 6032 Emmen · Switzerland Legal domicile: RUAG Switzerland Ltd · Seetalstrasse 175 · P.O. Box 301 · 6032 Emmen Tel. +41 41 268 41 11 · Fax +41 41 260 25 88 · [email protected] · www.ruag.com WORLD AIR FORCES 2011/2012 CONTENT ANALYSIS 4 Worldwide active fleet per region 5 Worldwide active fleet share per country 6 Worldwide top 10 active aircraft types 8 WORLD AIR FORCES World Air Forces directory 9 TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT FLIGHTGLOBAL INSIGHT AND REPORT SPONSORSHIP OPPORTUNITIES, CONTACT: Flightglobal Insight Quadrant House, The Quadrant Sutton, Surrey, SM2 5AS, UK Tel: + 44 208 652 8724 Email:LQVLJKW#ÁLJKWJOREDOFRP Website: ZZZÁLJKWJOREDOFRPLQVLJKt World Air Forces 2011/2012 | Flightglobal Insight | 3 WORLD AIR FORCES 2011/2012 The French and Qatari air forces deployed Mirage 2000-5s for the fight over Libya JOINT RESPONSE Air arms around the world reacted to multiple challenges during 2011, despite fleet and budget cuts. We list the current inventories and procurement plans of 160 nations.
    [Show full text]