Vietnam : a Case of Military Obsolescence in Developing Countries
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This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Vietnam : a case of military obsolescence in developing countries Wu, Shang‑su 2018 Wu, S.‑s. (2018). Vietnam : a case of military obsolescence in developing countries. The Pacific Review, 32(1), 113‑130. doi:10.1080/09512748.2018.1428676 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/103295 https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1428676 This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in The Pacific Review on 27 Feb 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09512748.2018.1428676 Downloaded on 28 Sep 2021 07:07:34 SGT Page 1 of 24 The Pacific Review 1 2 3 Table 1 the Comparison of Chinese and Vietnamese MBTs 4 5 Nationality Types Firepower: Mobility: Power-to-Weight Rate Armour 6 Main Gun 7 Vietnam T-62 115mm 14.5hp/ton Steel 8 9 T-55AM3 105mm 25hp/ton (Estimated) Reactive 10 T-55/54 100mm 14.44hp/ton Steel 11 Type-59 100mm 14.44hp/ton Steel 12 China Type 99 125mm 27.77hp/ton Reactive with 13 Type 98 125mm 25hp/ton add-on module 14 Type 96 125mm 24hp/ton 15 16 For Peer Review Only 17 18 Table 2 the Comparison of Chinese and Vietnamese Artillery Systems 19 20 Nationality Type Classification Calibre Maximal Range 21 Vietnam M-107 Self-propelled Gun 175mm 32km 22 23 2S3 152mm 18.5km 24 2S1 122mm 15.3km 25 M-101 Towed howitzer 105mm 11.2km 26 27 M-102 11.5km 28 Type-60 122mm 24km 29 M-30 11.8km 30 31 D-30 15.29km 32 M-46 130mm 27km 33 D-20 152mm 17.4km 34 35 M-114 155mm 14.6km 36 Type-63 Towed MRL 107mm 8.5km 37 38 BM-21 Self-Propelled MRL 122mm 20.5km 39 BM-24 240mm 16.8km 40 China PLL-09 Self-Propelled Gun 122mm 18-27km 41 42 PLZ-05 155mm 53km 43 Type 83 152mm 17.23km 44 Type 90 MRL 122mm 30km 45 46 PHZ-89 MRL 122mm 30km 47 PHL-03 MRL 300mm 150km 48 49 50 51 Table 3 the Comparison of Fighters between Vietnam and China’s Southern Theatre 52 Command 53 54 Fighter Vietnam Guangzhou Military Region, China 55 Generation (Combined with PLAAF and PLANAF units) 56 57 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email: [email protected] The Pacific Review Page 2 of 24 1 2 3 3rd Mig-21Bis/UM: 33; J-7s: 4 regiments and 1 brigade, about 150; 4 5 Su-22M/UM: 28 J-8s: 1 regiment about 24 6 7 4th Su-27SK/UBK: 11; Su-30MK2: J-11/B (Su-27): 4 regiments, about 96; J-10: 2 8 36 regiments and one brigade about 72; Su- 9 10 30MKK: 1 regiment about 24 11 12 13 14 15 16 For Peer Review Only 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email: [email protected] Page 3 of 24 The Pacific Review 1 2 3 Vietnam: A Case of Military Obsolescence in Developing Countries 4 5 6 7 Abstract 8 9 Military obsolescence affects the capability of all militaries as it relates to serviceability and 10 11 performance when countering potential opponents, and more specifically for developing 12 countries lacking strong indigenous defence industries. The gradual nature of this military 13 concern has not been studied systematically, in contrast to military modernisation. This 14 15 paper presents a synthetic framework composed of several indicators to examine military 16 obsolescence. VietnamFor hasPeer been selected Review for the application Only of the framework for its large 17 number of Cold War legacies and the strategic pressure from China. Hanoi’s ageing assets 18 19 would undermine its position vis-à-vis Beijing, and its defence investment is faced with the 20 dilemma of choosing to spend more on naval and aerial power, or ameliorate its army which 21 is technologically lacking compared to its Chinese counterpart. 22 23 24 25 Introduction 26 27 28 In contrast to military modernisation, military obsolescence has equal, if not more, potential 29 to destabilise the regional situation. All militaries have to deal with the unpleasant fact: all 30 equipment is ageing from the first day of service, and ageing assets will eventually 31 32 transform into obsolete ones without upgrades or replacement. Military obsolescence can 33 affect war capacity, deterrence, defence diplomacy, operations other than war (OOTW), and 34 even the safety of operators and other people. As military obsolescence weakens the 35 balance of power between a state and its potential enemy, it also has impacts on defence 36 37 diplomacy. Obsolete assets can pose technological obstructions for joint exercises, and 38 reveal a state’s poor defence management, thus potentially discouraging other countries 39 from further cooperation. When operational readiness is questionable due to obsolescence, 40 41 a military may fail to conduct OOTW well, and related accidents would pose threats to crews 42 and nearby populations. 43 44 Such a situation becomes salient when potential enemies achieve better modernisation. An 45 46 expanding gap of military capability among countries could undermine the stability, 47 especially for developing countries mainly relying on foreign sources, of which Vietnam 48 presents an example. Vietnam’s military modernisation can be traced back to the Cold War. 49 Although Hanoi received a lot of military supply, including sophisticated weapons, from 50 51 Moscow and Beijing during the Vietnam War in order to counter the superior American 52 military power, combat losses would have considerably eroded their capability. After the 53 Vietnam War, the Soviet Union systematically supplied various military assets to Vietnam’s 54 55 three services, and many of them, such as BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), were 56 1 57 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email: [email protected] The Pacific Review Page 4 of 24 1 2 3 relatively advanced at the time. Hanoi also absorbed some American arms from its capture 4 of Saigon (SIPRI 2017) (IISS 1979, 73-74). Simultaneously, related military doctrines were 5 developed as well. (Thayer 2009, 5) Therefore, by the end of the Cold War, Vietnam’s 6 7 military had not technologically fallen behind its neighbouring counterparts, including that 8 of China (IISS 1992, 145-147, 164-165). 9 10 In the post-Cold War era, limited financial capacity has constrained Hanoi’s efforts in 11 12 military modernisation. Vietnam’s difficult economic transformation towards a market 13 economy, along with the end of Soviet aid, restricted Hanoi’s ability to afford military 14 modernisation. As Hanoi pays attention to its maritime interests at present and Beijing 15 expands its influence in the South China Sea, it is natural for the former to concentrate its 16 For Peer Review Only 17 limited investment of military modernisation on naval and aerial assets. Despite its 18 significant military procurements in the last decade, Hanoi’s arsenal, especially the land 19 systems, is composed mainly of Cold War legacies. In contrast, Beijing has striven for 20 21 military modernisation since its open policy of the 1980s, meaning that the People’s 22 Liberation Army (PLA) has achieved technological superiority over its Vietnamese 23 counterpart. Vietnam’s ageing military assets may have impacts similar to its new 24 25 procurements on the regional security. As long as their intensive bilateral relations continue, 26 the military imbalance between these two states may entice the stronger to use force 27 against the weaker nation. 28 29 This paper will illustrate a synthetic framework for identifying military obsolescence, and 30 31 analyse the case of Vietnam. This paper will contribute to the research on military 32 modernisation by presenting another perspective. 33 34 35 36 The Synthetic Framework for Examining Military Obsolescence 37 38 Military obsolescence is usually neglected by academics and mass media that pay more 39 40 attention to modernisation, including defence technology and procurement. It is reasonable 41 for military build-ups to attract attention because technology within military acquisition 42 usually refers to potential intention and capability to affect the status quo, as technological 43 44 progression has significantly shaped warfare (Heitman 2004, 3-16; Tan 2014, 8-14). In 45 contrast, although assets already in service would not have an immediate impact, their 46 ageing would gradually erode a country’s military capability, and then the status quo. Since 47 48 obsolescence can be attributed to a lack of modernisation, the reasons behind obsolescence 49 can be explained with research on military modernisation. Buzan and Herring’s models of 50 arms dynamics signify that military obsolescence is likely to occur in less competitive 51 52 subjects and / or subjects beyond the interests of indigenous defence industries (Buzan and 53 Herring 1998, 81-118). Horowitz’s conditions for diffusion of military technology suggest 54 that military obsolescence could reflect constrained financial intensity or lack of 55 56 2 57 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email: [email protected] Page 5 of 24 The Pacific Review 1 2 3 organisational capacity. A comparison of the costs between adaption and non-adaption as 4 well as political decisions could also reveal various factors behind military obsolescence 5 (Horowitz 2010, 9-34).