THE ORIGINS of the WAR Overview of the Ottoman Empire on the Eve

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR

Overview of the Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the War

At the beginning of 1853, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a great power, despite contrary claims by Ottoman offi cialdom. Its very exis- tence depended on the balance of power prevailing in Europe. Con- stant wars with Russia since 1768 and revolts throughout the empire from Serbia, Greece, and Egypt to Kurdistan had weakened the Otto- man state. By this time, however, the Ottoman Empire had become an important market for European great powers and had to be defended against its main adversary, Russia. Th e Ottoman Empire had not taken part in the post-Napoleonic Vienna conferences; it was not a member of the Concert of Europe and did not play a role in European politics as such. It had become the object of the so called “Eastern Ques- tion”. Its participation in the 1841 Straits Convention did not make it a member of the European state system either, but rather the empire became subordinate to the European system.1 In fact, European diplomacy had long forgotten when the Ottoman Empire had last taken any initiative in European politics. One notable exception was during the crisis concerning Hungarian refugees in 1849, when Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800–1858), supported by Britain and France, refused to hand over Hungarian revolutionaries to Austria and Russia. Th is decision was to prove very benefi cial indeed for the standing of the Ottoman Empire in European public opinion, which exerted con- siderable infl uence during the Crimean War thanks to war reporting and telegraph communication. For many of his contemporaries, Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–1861) appeared as a weak and indecisive person, with a “melancholic” face. Th e weakness and indecision of Abdülmecid meant that every movement

1 Th is was clear from the form of address of the Padishah as “His Highness”, while European protocol demanded “His Majesty”. Th e Ottoman Sultan or Padishah became “His Majesty” in the Treaty of Paris of 1856, but still he was not an equal party to the system. See J. C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System”, Middle East Journal XV, 1961, p. 151.

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to reform was applied half-heartedly and then compromised, in the interests of the “Old Turkish” party, the enemies of reforms. In con- CHAPTER TWO trast, Butrus Abu-Manneh portrays a diff erent Abdülmecid:

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR Th rough his tutor on the one hand and his mother on the other, it is believed that Sultan Abdülmecid at a young age was exposed to Naqsh- bandi-Mujaddidi belief and that orthodox Islamic ideals formed the Overview of the Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the War foundation of his convictions and socio-political outlook, which natu- rally aft er his rise and for some years to come continued to refl ect itself in his actions.2 At the beginning of 1853, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a great power, despite contrary claims by Ottoman offi cialdom. Its very exis- However, such a strictly orthodox Islamic outlook is not compatible tence depended on the balance of power prevailing in Europe. Con- with his way of life, characterised by attraction to women and heavy stant wars with Russia since 1768 and revolts throughout the empire drinking, and by his benevolent attitude toward Western customs and from Serbia, Greece, and Egypt to Kurdistan had weakened the Otto- methods. man state. By this time, however, the Ottoman Empire had become an On the other hand, it is not easy to establish a permanent dichotomy important market for European great powers and had to be defended of “old Turkish” and “reformist” parties within the bureaucracy; in against its main adversary, Russia. Th e Ottoman Empire had not taken most cases the real reason for opposition or support within the Otto- part in the post-Napoleonic Vienna conferences; it was not a member man elite regarding any particular reform or measure was not a mat- of the Concert of Europe and did not play a role in European poli- ter of principle, but rather a question of personal intrigues and petty tics as such. It had become the object of the so called “Eastern Ques- interests. Th e same person who followed a policy of reforms could tion”. Its participation in the 1841 Straits Convention did not make it oppose those very reforms when out of offi ce. Th e classic example is a member of the European state system either, but rather the empire the best-known reformer himself, that is, Reşid Pasha, whose jealousy became subordinate to the European system.1 In fact, European diplo- of Âli Pasha, one of his protégés, made him oppose the recognition of macy had long forgotten when the Ottoman Empire had last taken equal political rights for non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. any initiative in European politics. One notable exception was during Grand viziers, ministers and governors did not stay long in their the crisis concerning Hungarian refugees in 1849, when Grand Vizier offi ce because the Sultan would yield to the infl uence fi rst of one party, Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800–1858), supported by Britain and France, then another, reshuffl ing the ministries and military positions all the refused to hand over Hungarian revolutionaries to Austria and Russia. time. Th ese reshuffl es were also due to the rival infl uences of the great Th is decision was to prove very benefi cial indeed for the standing of powers. Abdülmecid knew some French and liked to talk about poli- the Ottoman Empire in European public opinion, which exerted con- tics and life with ambassadors such as the British ambassador Strat- siderable infl uence during the Crimean War thanks to war reporting ford Canning, who had great infl uence in Istanbul. Promoted to the and telegraph communication. peerage as Viscount Stratford de Redcliff e in 1852, he was destined to For many of his contemporaries, Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–1861) play an important role before and during the war. However, his over- appeared as a weak and indecisive person, with a “melancholic” face. Th e bearing character turned many people against him, and in the 1850s weakness and indecision of Abdülmecid meant that every movement he also began to lose faith in his main protégé within the Ottoman

1 Th is was clear from the form of address of the Padishah as “His Highness”, while 2 Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Cen- European protocol demanded “His Majesty”. Th e Ottoman Sultan or Padishah became tury (1826–1876), Istanbul: Th e Isis Press, 2001, p. 83. Abu-Manneh (op. cit., p. 84) “His Majesty” in the Treaty of Paris of 1856, but still he was not an equal party to the has also argued that “when Sultan Abdülmecid rose to the Sultanate, both the Palace system. See J. C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System”, and the Porte appear to have been motivated by the ideals of Orthodox Islam, perhaps Middle East Journal XV, 1961, p. 151. more than at any time before”.