14 February 2019

Julia Berghofer Policy Fellow, European Leadership Network

Towards a German Sonderweg?

The US’s suspension of the Intermediate- deploying new conventional or even nuclear- range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty has sparked tipped INF-range missiles in and an emotional debate in Germany. Secretary of Europe. State Mike Pompeo announced on 2 February that the US will immediately quit its obligations under the treaty, and will formally Washington’s INF suspension did withdraw after a notice period of six months, not come as a surprise for Berlin unless Russia comes back into compliance. A possible demise of the INF treaty has been a This would require the destruction of INF- tangible concern for German officials at least violating missiles, their launchers and since 2017, when the US administration associated equipment. If Moscow ceases to do informed Berlin they would be ready to delay so - and that’s the most likely scenario - “the their plans to abandon the treaty until after treaty will terminate”. German ministers and federal elections have been held in Germany. parliamentarians are now engaging in a After more than three years of ongoing dispute discussion that oscillates between calls for a over Russia’s assumed violation of the INF new disarmament movement and advocacy for due to its deployment of a prohibited ground- Nachrüstung (catch-up armament) in Europe. launched cruise missile SSC-8 (Russian code: While there is a growing threat coming from Novator 9M729) in Jekaterinburg and at the the Russian side, the debate does not reflect Kapustin Yar test site, and counter-allegations the political, technical, and legal obstacles for by the Russian side targeted at the US MK-41

launchers in Romania that could theoretically throw away, although the government tries to be used to carry cruise missiles, this may not avoid it. Members of the and have come as a surprise for Berlin. Neither is prominent politicians, immediately after the it surprising that Washington finally lost US suspension, started engaging in a vigorous patience in 2019, yet their decision to abandon debate about whether Germany and Europe the INF treaty leaves a bad taste, not only have to be open for “all options”, or whether because one of the last remaining bricks in the Europe needs a new disarmament initiative. global arms control wall (which has recently Some of their public statements are repro- become ever more fragile) is about to fall, but duced in the following paragraphs. also because European leaders will now be German defence minister von der Leyen warns plagued with the question as to whether they of a relapse into Cold War thinking; instead, want to see a return of US conventional or she calls for “new answers, new solutions”, nuclear-tipped missiles to the European vaguely referring to a “broad mixture” of theatre. And in the long-run, while the INF measures to be discussed and implemented demise is far from being the primary cause for within the framework of the Alliance.1 Her a new arms race, its fall will probably have counterpart in the Auswärtiges Amt, foreign detrimental consequences for the survival of minister , wants to see a new the New START treaty. global disarmament initiative. On February 1 he tweeted: “We don’t need a rearmament NATO’s double track decision: debate but comprehensive arms control”. Norbert Röttgen (CDU), chairperson of the when Pershing entered Germany foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag Nevertheless, the definite will of the US to calls for enhanced pressure on Russia and withdraw from the INF treaty is a shock for warns of naive considerations vis-à-vis many politicians and security analysts, which Russian intentions.2 , acting is not least due to Germany’s unique role secretary-general of the CDU, puts it a bit during the Cold War. The slightest considera- more frankly in directly criticizing the SPD’s tion of new US missiles on European territory, (and probably Mr. Maas’s) naïvety, and claims or even in Germany, evokes an unpleasant that “Germany should be clear that all options reminiscence of NATO’s double track decision remain on the table”. He added that “Russia’s in 1979 and the Nachrüstungsdebatte (catch- violation of the INF treaty must not be up armament debate) that was followed by rewarded by naive German foreign policy”. mass protestations at the beginning of the SPD secretary-general replied, 1980s. “Union parties quit Cold War ways of Deep concerns over the advanced Soviet SSC- thinking”. Earlier he tweeted, “I want no new 20 missiles, aimed at Western Europe and nuclear arms race”.3 with the capability to destroy NATO’s nuclear Others articulate their fear that Germany systems before they could even be used, led to could go for some kind of solo action, thereby Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s firm advocacy risking NATO cohesion. In that vein, Johann for US nuclear missiles in Germany. While Wadephul, deputy chairperson of the CDU/ this was an unpopular decision among large CSU parliamentary group, stated NATO parts of the population, and casted dark “should stand together”, while at the same shadows on his chancellorship, his view was time emphasizing, “there must not be a backed by a majority of Bundestag members German Sonderweg” (Sonderweg means a who voted in November 1983 in favor of the solo effort). He wants to avoid an arms race, deployment of nuclear-tipped Pershing-II said Mr. Wadephul, yet “no option should be ballistic missiles and BGM-109G Gryphon ruled out a priori”, whether they include sea- Block I ground-launched cruise missiles on and air-based systems, missile defence, or German soil. Large-scale demonstrations development of a ground-based system. His which culminated in half a million people marching in Bonn in October of 1983, 1. Welt Online, “Von der Leyen will ‘neue Lösungen’ im amongst them prominent peace leaders and Rüstungsstreit”, 4 February 2019, https:// www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article188246537/INF- intellectuals like Heinrich Böll, Joseph Beuys Vertrag-Von-der-Leyen-will-neue-Loesungen-im- and Günter Grass, built up public pressure but Ruestungsstreit.html. were not able to avert the Bundestag decision. 2. Deutschlandfunk, “CDU_Politiker Röttgen warnt vor Naivität gegenüber Russland”, 6 February 2019, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/nach-inf-ausstiegen- Some politicians want to engage cdu-politiker-roettgen-warnt-vor.1939.de.html? in a new Nachrüstungsdebatte drn:news_id=974021. 3. FAZ.net, “Die SPD spielt Putin in die Hände”, Browsing the German media today, a revival updated 3 February 2019, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/ of the Nachrüstungsdebatte - a debate on politik/inland/cdu-spd-spielt-putin-in-die-haende- rearmament measures - seems only a stone’s 16021952.html.

stance is backed by CDU/CSU foreign policy interest by the Chinese Politburo to join such spokesperson Jürgen Hardt.4 Some kind of treaty, not least due to president Trump’s bad cross-party initiative came from MPs Roderich habit of dumping agreements that he judges Kiesewetter (CDU) and Rolf Mützenich (SPD) detrimental for US national security. who jointly proposed in the Frankfurter Taking these aspects into account there is no Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung to convince reason to assume that new US missiles in Russia to move its SSC-8 weapons eastwards Europe could lead to negotiations on a until they cannot reach Europe anymore; the multilateralized INF successor. Hence the US in turn, should open its MK-41 Aegis main thinking behind a Nachrüstungsdebatte Ashore launchers for Russian controls in order 2.0 would consist in an effort to significantly to invalidate Russian allegations of an US raising deterrence measures vis-à-vis Russia, breach of the INF.5 with the obvious potential of maneuvering Europe towards increased tensions, dwindling Bipolar competition is over, and opportunities for dialogue and risk reduction, politicians have to accept it and perhaps escalation. Against this backdrop History, unpleasant as it is, tends to repeat it is understandable that parts of the German itself. However, there is no guarantee that the government has little appetite to let this same maneuver - deploying new Euromissiles debate grow. in Germany or Eastern Europe - would pro- At the same time, Mr. Maas’ wish for a new duce the desired results today. Drawing a line disarmament initiative sounds like an ana- between 1979 and 2019 means misinterpreting chronistic idea, too. There was a huge outcry or even ignoring the complex orchestra of among peace activists in the 1970s and 80s, interests, priorities, and technological capa- but German peace movement has lost its bilities in an emerging multipolar great power traction over the last decades. Only a handful competition that we face today. During the of activists meet at the Büchel air base every Cold War, a bipolar world was engaging in a year to protest against US B61 bombs brute arms race, wile trying to prevent a major stationed there; and climate change is more nuclear escalation. For this reason, the US and important today for the German population Russia as the key actors in that confrontation than a nuclear doomsday scenario. Also, there were open to agree on reduction and has already grown in the past few years a new confidence building measures - sometimes disarmament initiative that brought about the more, sometimes less. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons The idea behind the deployment of Euro- (TPNW), acting effectively on a global scale missiles in the 1980s was the creation of a but less visibly than it was true for the mass legal framework constraining Russian and protestations in the 80s. Any new civil society American capabilities, which proved to disarmament movement would unavoidably enhance European security and was a decisive align itself with the TPNW supporters. Taking step towards the end of the Cold War era. into account Berlin’s concerns that the TPNW There is no such thing looming on the horizon could undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty today: even if Washington and Moscow were (NPT), it is quite unclear what kind of disar- ready to talk about a new arms control mament movement Mr. Maas had in mind. agreement, this would have to involve at least Chinese INF-range weapons. Moscow started A deployment of new US missiles to raise concerns in 2007 as to whether abiding by the INF without having on board in Europe sounds more feasible countries like China would still meet Russian than it is security interests. China currently possesses Let aside considerations of a possible outcome the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles, around of new Euromissiles in the longer term, calls half of them being intermediate-range wea- for new US missiles in Europe to counter pons, and they are not bound by any legal Russian aggressions are potentially overloo- framework. But even if there were any king political, legal, and technological obsta- attempts and enough political will to cles and wide-ranging consequences for multilateralize the INF, there is probably little Europe as well as for Germany, that will necessarily result from such a decision. These 4. johann-wadephul.de, “Die NATO muss geschlossen include the following. bleiben” 1 February 2019, https://www.johann- wadephul.de/artikel/die-nato-muss-geschlossen- 1. Any deployment of conventional or nu- bleiben. clear-tipped ballistic or cruise missiles of 5. rolfmuetzenich.de, Mit diesem Vorschlag wollen intermediate range as part of a bilateral deutsche Politiker den INF-Vertrag retten, https:// agreement between Berlin and www.rolfmuetzenich.de/pressespiegel/diesem- Washington will necessarily require the vorschlag-wollen-deutsche-politiker-inf-vertrag-retten. approval by the Bundestag. As a

host country, Germany would need to nuclear weapons or their carriers will consent to the stationing of allied troops not be stationed in that part of Germany and weapons systems through a Status or deployed there”.7 of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The 4. There are no INF-range ground- weapons systems in question are of high launched weapons available for NATO significance for German security policy countries; they have all been destroyed as these systems would be capable of until the early 1990s. But the United reaching the territory of a nuclear- States is pressing ahead with the armed state, and could render Germany development of new capabilities. a possible target. Hence, a decision by There are three viable options, including the Bundestag would be indispensable. modification of an existing air-to-air 2. Generally speaking, it is possible to cruise missile towards a greater range; handle a stationing of new US ballistic/ modification of the Tomahawk sea- cruise missiles on German soil bila- launched cruise missile towards a terally. In case of INF-range capabilities, ground-launched capability; and the however, there should always be a development of a new type of cruise NATO consensus as allied countries missile. The first two options could be have adopted a common stance on these realized rather quickly. type of weapons; the more so since any deployment of intermediate-range mis- siles (and possible Russian counter- There will be no German reactions) would affect the security envi- Sonderweg ronment of all European NATO mem- Concerns have been raised that Germany bers. Especially a bilateral stationing could embark on some kind of Sonderweg, agreement of nuclear INF-range missiles whereas there seems to be confusion as to would mark a break with the actual what actually that means. Keeping in mind the strategy of the Alliance, while a change points listed above, a possible Sonderweg of this strategy requires a consensus would consist in deploying conventional or decision. Nevertheless, Eastern Euro- even nuclear-tipped INF-range missiles as pean countries like Poland and the Baltic part of a bilateral agreement with the United States tend to favor bilateralism over States and with the consent of the Bundestag, consensus when it comes to countering but lacking corresponding NATO consensus. A the Russian threat. This tendency could different Sonderweg scenario could involve a match recent US renunciation of German vote that hinders NATO consensus multilateralism, and could perhaps lead about the deployment of US INF-range to a division within NATO, which in turn missiles on the territory of one or more is in Moscow’s interest. European NATO members (and that is 3. A deployment of nuclear US INF-range possibly what politicians like Mr. Ziemiak and missiles on the territory of the former Mr. Wadephul are warning of). Warsaw Pact states would be a breach of The first option is unlikely to become a reality the NATO-Russia Founding Act, since there is no indication that a majority in that states, “The member States of the Bundestag would be ready to give its NATO reiterate that they have no inten- approval, especially when there is no NATO tion, no plan and no reason to deploy decision. A new disarmament movement nuclear weapons on the territory of new could support this stance, but would probably members”.6 A deployment in any of the not be a decisive aspect in the current former GDR Bundesländer would run situation. The deployment of any new counter to the Two Plus Four missiles, be it conventional or nuclear, would Agreement, stressing that after the significantly change risk perceptions in withdrawal of Soviet Forces from the Europe and Russia, and the political climate in territory of the former GDR, “units of Berlin is less confrontational vis-à-vis Moscow German armed forces assigned to than it is probably in Warsaw and the Baltic military alliance structures (…) may also capitals. Nevertheless, if the Bundestag were be stationed in that part of Germany, but to approve a stationing, a minimum condition without nuclear weapon carriers”, as would be an allocation of associated risks and well as, “Foreign armed forces and capabilities to a number of NATO members. 6. NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the 7. U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, Treaty on the Russian Federation, 27 May 1997, https:// Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, September www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 12, 1990, Article 5 (3), https://usa.usembassy.de/ official_texts_25468.htm. etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm

The other option, a German vote against a that Germany itself would host US INF-range NATO decision is no more realistic. Berlin missiles. A German Sonderweg is rather would certainly want to avoid a situation unrealistic, and any concerns that Berlin where it appears to act against NATO would risk NATO cohesion through raising its solidarity. voice against new Euromissiles underestimate In sum, the most likely scenario would be a Germany’s utmost fear of a further rift within stationing of new US conventional cruise the Alliance. For the foreseeable future, there missiles in one or more European countries, will be no serious Nachrüstungsdebatte in the following a bilateral agreement or backed by Bundestag - at least not one that will lead to an Alliance consensus. In the latter case, new missiles in Germany - and even less are Germany would rather align itself with a we likely to see Berlin embarking on a NATO stance, while there are no indications Sonderweg.

Recently published - Bruno Tertrais, « The death of the INF Treaty - Nicolas Mazzucchi, « Perspectives in gas secu- or the end of the post-Cold war era », note rity of supply: the role of Greece in the Medi- n° 03/2019, 4 february 2019 terranean », note n° 08/2018, 24 mai 2018 - Bruno Tertrais, « La mort annoncée du traité - Juan José Riva, « The Impact of Organized FNI ou la fin de l’après-Guerre froide », note Crime on Peacekeeping Operations: The Case n° 02/2019, 1er février 2019 of Minustah in Haiti », note n° 07/2018, 9 - Jean-Luc Racine, « La communication dans April 2018 le domaine de la ‘dissuasion stratégique’ : le - Régis Genté, « La question libérale en Rus- cas de l’Inde et du Pakistan », note sie », note n° 06/2018, 22 mars 2018 n° 01/2019, 21 janvier 2019 - Valérie Niquet, « Testing Times for Security in - Isabelle Facon, « La communication dans le East Asia: Evaluating one Year of the Trump domaine de la ‘dissuasion stratégique’ : le cas Presidency, » note n° 05/2018, 19 March de la Russie », note n° 23/2018, 19 décembre 2018 2018 - Isabelle Facon, « Le ‘discours du 1er mars’ de - Bruno Tertrais, « Coexistence pacifique dans Vladimir Poutine : quels messages ?, note l’Arctique ? La Russie, laNorvège et l’archipel n° 04/2018, 12 mars 2018 du Svalbard », note n° 22/2018, 10 décembre - Valérie Niquet, « Chinese Objectives in High 2018 Technology Acquisitions and Integration of - Isabelle Facon, Bruno Tertrais, « La Russie et Military and Civilian Capabilities: A Global l’emploi des armes nucléaires : le sens des Challenge, note n° 03/2018, 7 March 2018 propos de Vladimir Poutine lors de Valdaï- - Benjamin Hautecouverture, « L’interdiction 2018 », note n° 21/2018, 5 novembre 2018 des armes chimiques en question », note - Loïc Trégourès, “ Serbie-Kosova : options et n° 02/2018, 6 mars 2018 scenarios », note n° 20/2018, 12 octobre 2018 - Nicolas Mazzucchi, « 2018, année charnière - Gilles Boquérat, « india’s response to China’s pour l’Europe dans le cyber ?, note assertiveness over the seas », note n° 19/2018, n° 01/2018, 22 janvier 2018 October 1, 2018 - Benjamin Hautecouverture, « Why must the - Antoine Bondaz, Jean-François Heimburger, sanctions against Pyongyang be strength- “La marginalisation du Japon dans le dossier ened ? », note n° 22/2017, 19 December 2017 nord-coréen”, note n° 18/2018, 17 septembre - Mohamed Ben Lamma, « Face au chaos li- 2018 byen, l’Europe se cherche encore », note - Nicolas Mazzucchi, « China and Europa elec- n° 21/2017, 14 décembre 2017 tricity networks : strategy and issues », - Benjamin Hautecouverture, « Pourquoi il faut note 17/2018, 12 septembre 2018 renforcer les sanctions contre Pyongyang », - Nicolas Mazzucchi, « La Chine et les réseaux note n° 20/2017, 6 décembre 2017 électriques européens : stratégies et enjeux - Benjamin Hautecouverture, « Crise nucléaire économiques, note n° 16/2018, 11 septembre nord-coréenne : que peut faire l’UE ? », note 2018 n° 19/2017, 15 novembre 2017 - Eric Hazane, « Sécurité numérique des objets - Emmanuelle Maitre, « Le couple franco- connectés, l’heure des choix », note allemand et les questions nucléaires : vers un n° 15/2018, 3 septembre 2018 rapprochement ? », note n° 18/2017, 7 no- - Emmanuelle Maitre, « La communication vembre 2017 dans le domaine de la « dissuasion straté- - Monika Chansoria, « Indo-Japanese Strategic gique : le cas des Etats-Unis », note Partnership : Scope and Future Avenues », n° 14/2018, 6 août 2018 note n° 17/2017, 19 September 2017 - François Christophe, « La crise centrafricaine, - Antoine Vagneur-Jones, Can Kasapoglu, révélateur des nouvelles ambitions africaines « Bridging the Gulf: Turkey’s forward base in de la Russie », note n° 13/2018, 26 juillet Qatar », note n° 16/2014, 11 August 2017 2018 - Patrick Hébrard, « Pérennité du groupe aéro- - Nicolas Mazzucchi, Les données sont-elles naval : enjeux stratégiques et industriels », une marchandise comme les autres ? », note note n° 15/2017, 10 août 2017 n° 12/2018, 25 juillet 2018 - Régis Genté, « Le jeu russe en Libye, élément - Thrassy N. Marketos, « Eastern mediterra- du dialogue avec Washington », note nean energy geostrategy on proposed gas ex- n° 14/2017, 26 juillet 2017 port routes », note n° 11/2018, 4 July 2018 - Antoine Vagneur-Jones, « Global Britain in - Emmanuelle Maitre, « Kazakhstan’s nuclear the Gulf: Brexit and relations with the GCC », policy: an efficient niche diplomacy?, note note n° 13/2017, 18 July 2017 n° 10/2018, 1st July 2018 - Stéphane Delory, Can Kasapoglu, « Thinking - François-Albert Stauder, « Tchad : une nou- Twice about ’s Missile Trends : the Threat velle République sans état de droit, note is Real but Different than Predicted », note n° 09/2018, 12 juin 2018 n° 12/2017, 29 June 2017

The Foundation for Strategic Research is an independent research centre. It conducts studies for French government departments and agencies, Eu- ropean institutions, international organizations and companies. It contri- butes to the strategic debate in France and abroad.