Towards a German Sonderweg?

14 February 2019 Julia Berghofer Policy Fellow, European Leadership Network Towards a German Sonderweg? The US’s suspension of the Intermediate- deploying new conventional or even nuclear- range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty has sparked tipped INF-range missiles in Germany and an emotional debate in Germany. Secretary of Europe. State Mike Pompeo announced on 2 February that the US will immediately quit its obligations under the treaty, and will formally Washington’s INF suspension did withdraw after a notice period of six months, not come as a surprise for Berlin unless Russia comes back into compliance. A possible demise of the INF treaty has been a This would require the destruction of INF- tangible concern for German officials at least violating missiles, their launchers and since 2017, when the US administration associated equipment. If Moscow ceases to do informed Berlin they would be ready to delay so - and that’s the most likely scenario - “the their plans to abandon the treaty until after treaty will terminate”. German ministers and federal elections have been held in Germany. parliamentarians are now engaging in a After more than three years of ongoing dispute discussion that oscillates between calls for a over Russia’s assumed violation of the INF new disarmament movement and advocacy for due to its deployment of a prohibited ground- Nachrüstung (catch-up armament) in Europe. launched cruise missile SSC-8 (Russian code: While there is a growing threat coming from Novator 9M729) in Jekaterinburg and at the the Russian side, the debate does not reflect Kapustin Yar test site, and counter-allegations the political, technical, and legal obstacles for by the Russian side targeted at the US MK-41 launchers in Romania that could theoretically throw away, although the government tries to be used to carry cruise missiles, this may not avoid it. Members of the Bundestag and have come as a surprise for Berlin. Neither is prominent politicians, immediately after the it surprising that Washington finally lost US suspension, started engaging in a vigorous patience in 2019, yet their decision to abandon debate about whether Germany and Europe the INF treaty leaves a bad taste, not only have to be open for “all options”, or whether because one of the last remaining bricks in the Europe needs a new disarmament initiative. global arms control wall (which has recently Some of their public statements are repro- become ever more fragile) is about to fall, but duced in the following paragraphs. also because European leaders will now be German defence minister von der Leyen warns plagued with the question as to whether they of a relapse into Cold War thinking; instead, want to see a return of US conventional or she calls for “new answers, new solutions”, nuclear-tipped missiles to the European vaguely referring to a “broad mixture” of theatre. And in the long-run, while the INF measures to be discussed and implemented demise is far from being the primary cause for within the framework of the Alliance.1 Her a new arms race, its fall will probably have counterpart in the Auswärtiges Amt, foreign detrimental consequences for the survival of minister Heiko Maas, wants to see a new the New START treaty. global disarmament initiative. On February 1 he tweeted: “We don’t need a rearmament NATO’s double track decision: debate but comprehensive arms control”. Norbert Röttgen (CDU), chairperson of the when Pershing entered Germany foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag Nevertheless, the definite will of the US to calls for enhanced pressure on Russia and withdraw from the INF treaty is a shock for warns of naive considerations vis-à-vis many politicians and security analysts, which Russian intentions.2 Paul Ziemiak, acting is not least due to Germany’s unique role secretary-general of the CDU, puts it a bit during the Cold War. The slightest considera- more frankly in directly criticizing the SPD’s tion of new US missiles on European territory, (and probably Mr. Maas’s) naïvety, and claims or even in Germany, evokes an unpleasant that “Germany should be clear that all options reminiscence of NATO’s double track decision remain on the table”. He added that “Russia’s in 1979 and the Nachrüstungsdebatte (catch- violation of the INF treaty must not be up armament debate) that was followed by rewarded by naive German foreign policy”. mass protestations at the beginning of the SPD secretary-general Lars Klingbeil replied, 1980s. “Union parties quit Cold War ways of Deep concerns over the advanced Soviet SSC- thinking”. Earlier he tweeted, “I want no new 20 missiles, aimed at Western Europe and nuclear arms race”.3 with the capability to destroy NATO’s nuclear Others articulate their fear that Germany systems before they could even be used, led to could go for some kind of solo action, thereby Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s firm advocacy risking NATO cohesion. In that vein, Johann for US nuclear missiles in Germany. While Wadephul, deputy chairperson of the CDU/ this was an unpopular decision among large CSU parliamentary group, stated NATO parts of the population, and casted dark “should stand together”, while at the same shadows on his chancellorship, his view was time emphasizing, “there must not be a backed by a majority of Bundestag members German Sonderweg” (Sonderweg means a who voted in November 1983 in favor of the solo effort). He wants to avoid an arms race, deployment of nuclear-tipped Pershing-II said Mr. Wadephul, yet “no option should be ballistic missiles and BGM-109G Gryphon ruled out a priori”, whether they include sea- Block I ground-launched cruise missiles on and air-based systems, missile defence, or German soil. Large-scale demonstrations development of a ground-based system. His which culminated in half a million people marching in Bonn in October of 1983, 1. Welt Online, “Von der Leyen will ‘neue Lösungen’ im amongst them prominent peace leaders and Rüstungsstreit”, 4 February 2019, https:// www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article188246537/INF- intellectuals like Heinrich Böll, Joseph Beuys Vertrag-Von-der-Leyen-will-neue-Loesungen-im- and Günter Grass, built up public pressure but Ruestungsstreit.html. were not able to avert the Bundestag decision. 2. Deutschlandfunk, “CDU_Politiker Röttgen warnt vor Naivität gegenüber Russland”, 6 February 2019, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/nach-inf-ausstiegen- Some politicians want to engage cdu-politiker-roettgen-warnt-vor.1939.de.html? in a new Nachrüstungsdebatte drn:news_id=974021. 3. FAZ.net, “Die SPD spielt Putin in die Hände”, Browsing the German media today, a revival updated 3 February 2019, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/ of the Nachrüstungsdebatte - a debate on politik/inland/cdu-spd-spielt-putin-in-die-haende- rearmament measures - seems only a stone’s 16021952.html. stance is backed by CDU/CSU foreign policy interest by the Chinese Politburo to join such spokesperson Jürgen Hardt.4 Some kind of treaty, not least due to president Trump’s bad cross-party initiative came from MPs Roderich habit of dumping agreements that he judges Kiesewetter (CDU) and Rolf Mützenich (SPD) detrimental for US national security. who jointly proposed in the Frankfurter Taking these aspects into account there is no Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung to convince reason to assume that new US missiles in Russia to move its SSC-8 weapons eastwards Europe could lead to negotiations on a until they cannot reach Europe anymore; the multilateralized INF successor. Hence the US in turn, should open its MK-41 Aegis main thinking behind a Nachrüstungsdebatte Ashore launchers for Russian controls in order 2.0 would consist in an effort to significantly to invalidate Russian allegations of an US raising deterrence measures vis-à-vis Russia, breach of the INF.5 with the obvious potential of maneuvering Europe towards increased tensions, dwindling Bipolar competition is over, and opportunities for dialogue and risk reduction, politicians have to accept it and perhaps escalation. Against this backdrop History, unpleasant as it is, tends to repeat it is understandable that parts of the German itself. However, there is no guarantee that the government has little appetite to let this same maneuver - deploying new Euromissiles debate grow. in Germany or Eastern Europe - would pro- At the same time, Mr. Maas’ wish for a new duce the desired results today. Drawing a line disarmament initiative sounds like an ana- between 1979 and 2019 means misinterpreting chronistic idea, too. There was a huge outcry or even ignoring the complex orchestra of among peace activists in the 1970s and 80s, interests, priorities, and technological capa- but German peace movement has lost its bilities in an emerging multipolar great power traction over the last decades. Only a handful competition that we face today. During the of activists meet at the Büchel air base every Cold War, a bipolar world was engaging in a year to protest against US B61 bombs brute arms race, wile trying to prevent a major stationed there; and climate change is more nuclear escalation. For this reason, the US and important today for the German population Russia as the key actors in that confrontation than a nuclear doomsday scenario. Also, there were open to agree on reduction and has already grown in the past few years a new confidence building measures - sometimes disarmament initiative that brought about the more, sometimes less. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons The idea behind the deployment of Euro- (TPNW), acting effectively on a global scale missiles in the 1980s was the creation of a but less visibly than it was true for the mass legal framework constraining Russian and protestations in the 80s. Any new civil society American capabilities, which proved to disarmament movement would unavoidably enhance European security and was a decisive align itself with the TPNW supporters.

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