(Pro)testing heritage, (re)searching identity: uprising – studying national perspectives

Retrieved from Office Life Media

By: Dzmitry Sialitski [559242]

Supervisor: Nicky van Es

Tourism, Culture and Society Erasmus School of History, Culture & Communication Erasmus University Rotterdam

Master Thesis June 14, 2021 ABSTRACT

Protests in Belarus that started at the height of the presidential campaign in June 2020 and gained a massive scale in August have been going on for a year. Despite the suppression of large demonstrations, the conflict is actively unfolding in a symbolic 'world': conflicting sides – the pro-Soviet one backing by the government and the pro-democratic one represented by the protesters – try to undermine each other's cultural and ideological foundations, acting on the level of identity. Heritage – its mobilizing tool – is used both to attack and defend, given its political undertone. Young people as the future generation are an important target audience in this regard. Therefore, how and in what ways do both sides of the current protests in Belarus utilize heritage as a symbolic(-political) instrument, and how is this being negotiated by young in constructing a sense of national identity? The interview method has been adopted to assess the multi-layered interplay between heritage and national identity in the context of Belarusian protests. Based on thorough communication with ten respondents, the research results show that through heritage, conflicting sides establish contact with politically 'beneficial' eras and adapt their principles to existing needs. The pro-Soviet side, accordingly, turns to heritage of the USSR, precisely one of the Great Patriotic War, to expose protesters as Nazis. The pro-democratic side strengthens its position through traditional/pre-Soviet heritage, demonstrating that the 'roots' of Belarus are deeper than the USSR. To achieve dominance over defining Belarusianness, opponents 'paint public space' via heritage. The public art that protesters use as an additional means of symbolic 'hegemonization' is transformed into conflict heritage due to iconoclasms: its defense/restoration has become the crux of resistance. Moreover, heritage that has come to the fore during protests prompted the respondents to actively reflect on national identity, imbue it with new meanings and shift their position on the spectrum of Belarusian identity – such a model is presented in the thesis to provide the fluidity and dynamics characteristic of national identity as such.

Keywords: cultural contestation, heritage dissonance, conflict heritage, national identity, Belarus, protests, post-Soviet youth

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 4 Theoretical Framework ...... 8 National (as collective) identity: approaches, relation to politics, impact of heritage ..... 8 Primordialism and constructivism: can citizens intervene? ...... 8 Who controls the past…: national ‘mythology’, AHD, heritage dissonance ...... 11 Belarusian national identity: complex phenomenon with conflicting views on it ...... 17 Show me your heritage…: historical myths – political claims ...... 17 From narrowness and stiffness to pluralism and fluidity: Belarusian national identity as a spectrum ...... 22 Cultural(-political) contestation: the end justifies the means? Heritage, iconoclasm, media ...... 25 Cultural contestation, enactment, trauma: ‘culturalities’ of Belarusian protests ...... 25 Traditional versus social media: status quo versus identity (re)formation ...... 29 Methodology ...... 33 Analysis & Results ...... 38 Through official heritage to ‘official’ identity? Imposing before, legitimizing during, being alienated as a result of protests ...... 38 Before the protests: presence of ‘dissonance’ – absence of ‘convergence’ ...... 38 Means of defense and attack at the same time: official heritage during the protests – a shot in the head? ...... 41 Red-green flag: from neutrality to “violence, cruelty, lies, death, blood” ...... 41 Shield and the only safe topic: utilization of the GPW narrative/heritage – decoding the message .... 45 “They” instead of “us”: anti-effect of pro-Soviet identity ...... 48 Emerging from history, emerging during modernity, merging to protest: ‘un’offical heritage – ‘un’infying identity ...... 50 History does not repeat itself? Flag, language, identity – nation in imagination ...... 50 Unofficial heritage: utilizing, generating, integrating, strengthening ...... 53 White-red-white flag: a symbol to fight and (from now on) a symbol to unite ...... 53 Traditional customs: historical layers – modern appropriation – additional meanings ...... 56 Draw the image and draw identity: protest graffiti – underlying meanings, ‘traumatic’ consequences ...... 61 Collective ‘VirtuReal’: ‘ritual’ interaction in both dimensions ...... 65 From emigration to integration: transition on the spectrum – changes in thoughts, plans, perceptions ...... 68= Conclusion ...... 71 References ...... 76 Appendix A – List of Respondents ...... 96 Appendix B – Interview Guide ...... 97 Appendix C – Translated Instagram Post ...... 99

3 INTRODUCTION

On May 9, 2021, the ritual of taking the oath of allegiance to the state flag of Belarus took place in for the first time. With a hand on their hearts, four young Belarusians in front of vowed to respect the red-green flag that symbolizes their homeland for them. Lukashenko added that this flag unites all Belarusians (“Torzhestvennyy ritual”, 2021). Belarusian protesters who took to the streets in droves precisely nine months earlier would probably argue with that. They utilize the historic white-red-white flag, which refers to the period of the Belarusian national movement (Leshchenko, 2004). In the first days of protests, the white-red-white flag – main heritage of that era – was hoisted on the Motherland Monument – the central symbol and heritage of the USSR – thus clearly showing the anti-Soviet priorities of the protesters. Figure 1: White-red-white flag on the Throughout the months of protest, the Motherland Monument (photo by author) white-red-white flag has been hung in the windows, depicted via corresponding ribbons, and reincarnated into clothes of the same colors – for any white-red-white ‘manifestations’ protesters were fined or arrested (Isachenko and Kozenko, 2020). However, this flag remains a major protest symbol and continues to be used to express discontent. Again, on May 9, 2021, in , a 19-year-old girl was sentenced to 20 days in jail for wearing a face mask with it (“Zhitel’nitsu Vitebska”, 2021). However, as the above examples show, in addition to expressing discontent, the white-red-white flag also symbolizes a specific national identity; the red-green one refers to certain ideals and principles as well (Bekus, 2013). The above-described ‘binary’ in relation to flags sheds light on the fact that Belarusian identity is a complex and ambiguous phenomenon. On the one hand, this intricacy is explained by the fact that Belarus was part of multinational states that influenced it in terms of politics, religion, culture, and language (Posokhin, 2019). On the other hand, after gaining

4 independence, political forces intensified the struggle not only for power but also for setting and defining how Belarusian identity/Belarusianness should look ‘officially’ (Leshchenko, 2004). After a period of stagnation in this regard, the ‘allegations’ of rigged elections have merely provided the final straw that resulted in an identity crisis, where the pro-Soviet and pro-democratic sides came into an open battle. Heritage – one of the pillars of national identity (Smith, 2006) – acts as one of the leading ‘weapons’ utilized in this struggle. At the moment, when the protest marches are suppressed, most of the actual protesting continues through a complex interplay of resisting, destroying, and re-building Belarusian national identity, culture, and heritage. Considering the conflicting nature of Belarusian national identity, scientists (Bekus, 2013; Brzozowska, 2003; Hansen, 2006; Leshchenko, 2004; Marples, 1999; Way, 2010) have already paid attention to it, but this study can significantly supplement and expand the existing picture. First, the thesis plunges into the topic at a defining moment for identity, studying it as it proceeds and not after critical events, as was the case in the above works. The urgency of the research is complemented by its interdisciplinarity. Indeed, this thesis looks at identity through the lens of heritage, as it allows approaching issues of political and social concern (Harrison, 2013); nevertheless, given the multi-layered nature of the issue, touching on one layer inevitably opens up others. Therefore, this study also utilizes theories and concepts related to politics, nationalism, culture, and media – working across disciplines allows the thesis to look at the problem under study from a multifaceted and global perspective. In order to make this perspective glocal, first-hand, subjective, and lived experiences on the part of Belarusians are integrated here. Earlier, as the above studies show, Belarusian identity was often explored from a theoretical point of view, based not on empirical data but the reasoning of scientists or secondary data. Deep immersion in the context/discourse of national identity at the junction of emic and etic outlooks gives insights that are impossible to obtain merely theorizing. The emic 'portal' to the discourse is provided by young Belarusians – this age category is of interest for several reasons. Firstly, it was young people who took the oath described at the opening of the introduction, which shows that it is essential for

5 the government to influence their national identity. The protest struggle for young people as for the future generation is vital to assess from the perspective of their personal transformations. Second, post-Soviet youth is, in general, an interesting category for scientists: previous studies (Kasamara and Sorokina, 2015; Nikolayenko, 2008) show that Russian youth, for instance, feel nostalgia for the , having a utopian impression of it; Ukrainian youth are not so sentimental, they positively assess the USSR's collapse (Nikolayenko, 2008). However, their national consciousness increased precisely after revolutionary events, which provoked interest in the homeland's history and led to the renewal of national identity (Fournier, 2007). Determining the views of Belarusian youth in this regard can make the picture of post-Soviet youth research more holistic and attribute to the rightful conception of diversity inherent in former Soviet states. Moreover, revolutionary/conflict events periodically become a litmus test through which scholars (Bleibleh and Awadb, 2020; Bonacchi et al., 2018; Gori, 2013) examine the interplay between heritage and identity. In particular, this applies to the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the former side attacks rival's heritage to 'eliminate' people's identity (Bleibleh and Awadb, 2020). Accordingly, the latter side protects (and at the same time strengthens) both components through heritage conservation (ibid). In the context of Brexit, heritage has been used to legitimize one or another (pro-leave or pro-remain) political identity on social media (Bonacchi et al., 2018). The Belarusian case can significantly complement the (underrated) research 'triangle' of heritage, identity, and conflict, looking at it from the perspective of protests/demonstrations and, again, post-Sovietness. Therefore, in the light of the above-described focus of the thesis, its research question is formulated as follows: how and in what ways do both sides of the current protests in Belarus utilize heritage as a symbolic(-political) instrument, and how is this being negotiated by young Belarusians in constructing a sense of national identity? Smith (2006) calls heritage a "symbolic representation of identity" (p. 30), while Ross (2007) emphasizes that the power of symbols lies not in their explicit context but in how they are perceived in a particular political or social context. In order to uncover this perception in the eyes of young people, a qualitative

6 methodology was chosen. The author selected ten young Belarusians under 26 (the number of years Lukashenko has been in power) who participated in protests. Through enhanced communication between partners, interviews followed the path of transformations related to national identity of the respondents. Heritage became a 'compass' that, on the one hand, led this road; on the other hand, it showed additional directions associated with politics/symbolism. As a result, ten hours of data were collected and further processed via transcription, coding, and thematic analysis necessary to find repetitive patterns in the responses (Clarke and Braun, 2014). For the above process to be as efficient as possible and for the research question to be answered holistically, a theoretical framework covering a wide range of literature has been built. In the first section, the main focus is on national identity: however, in addition to describing prevailing approaches, the phenomenon is considered from the standpoint of collectivity and its influence on identity formation. A separate sub-section assesses the impact of history and heritage on this process: in particular, it describes how they are (politically) used to highlight specific historical periods/moments beneficial to national elites. Moreover, theoretical arguments are accompanied by concrete examples from Belarus to make the description more tangible. The second section is wholly immersed in the Belarusian context to demonstrate what heritage the conflicting sides rely on and examine how this is projected onto Belarusian identity. In addition, the section provides an overview of existing scientific models in this regard and presents an author's concept aimed at adding pluralism in the designation/modeling of Belarusian national identity. The overarching concept of the third section is 'cultural contestation' (Ross, 2007) – its essence fits the situation that has developed during the protests in Belarus, namely the struggle via/over heritage. However, given the interdisciplinarity of this research and the multi-layered nature of the topic, this section also describes the protest role of the media. On the one hand, in the current Belarusian context, the media work closely with history and heritage and function as a single political instrument. On the other hand, they are essential in terms of the discursive construction of identity during protests (Milan, 2015).

7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. National (as collective) identity: approaches, relation to politics, impact of heritage

1.1 Primordialism and constructivism: can citizens intervene?

Being raised already in antiquity (Martin and Barresi, 2006), the topic of identity is gaining popularity among scholars every decade (Côté, 2006). This interest applies to scientists who study protests as well: in different statuses – as precursors or consequences – identity processes play a vital role in the dynamics of demonstrations (Klandermans, 2014). The reason for this correlation is the psychosocial nature of the phenomenon, where personality and society are closely intertwined and mutually (re)constructed (Rogers, 2018). Despite the overlap between 'external' and 'internal', there is a scientific separation of individual and collective identity to more effectively explore both levels (Huang and Santos, 2011). However, the most effective situation is when the existing collectivity gives a person the opportunity to act in accordance with their personal identity: this is called 'identity convergence' (Snow, 2001). In the outlined context, it is crucial to highlight national identity since the nation is one of the most important and influential collectivities in an individual's life (Edensor, 2002; Thompson, 2001). However, given the disagreement over the nation's origins, scholars cannot come to a consensus on the nature of national identity. For a long time, the primordialist approach was dominant in science, where scholars (Gumilev, 2004; Shils, 1957) more often appeal to the concept of ethnicity and consider it a primary socio-anthropological quality. Nevertheless, there are also discrepancies within that approach: in the most 'rigid' form, primordialism gravitates towards the natural interpretations of ethnic groups. In particular, Pierre van den Berghe (1981, 2005) views ethnicity as a consequence of a human's genetic predisposition to kin selection and sees ethnic groups as extended kin groups. According to him, biological reasons determine the social manifestations of ethnicity.

8 However, other primordialists (Connor, 1994; Geertz, 2000) look at ethnicity from the point of view of socio-historical rather than biological factors and consider the former to be decisive in forming mutual attachment. Among the most prominent scholars who have developed this approach is Anthony Smith (1991, 1998, 1999), who, apart from ethnicity, also refers to the concept of nation. The scientist argues that the latter phenomenon is associated with the formation of modern society; however, he draws attention to the fact that the origins of nations lie in deep ethnic memory. Simultaneously, Smith (1999) recognizes the role of the intelligentsia as 'political archaeologists' who rediscover heritage for the modern community. Moreover, Smith (1991), among other things, sees common legal rights and duties and a common economy as components of national identity. Nevertheless, priority is given to history, culture, and ethnic roots as fundamental elements of national identity. This cultural and ethnic basis distinguishes the approach of Smith (1998) from constructivism, where the role of national elites is of the utmost importance. In particular, Gellner (1983), who was Smith's teacher, believes that nations arose due to the rational need of states to organize, order, mobilize, and unite their populations in order to govern them effectively. Thus, according to him, the building of nations is primarily a political process, which, nevertheless, is closely related to culture. Nationalism selectively and selfishly exploits pre-existing cultural wealth to create a culturally homogenized society (ibid). Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) define the 'invented traditions' as the primary agents of socialization and transmission of common values. Their crucial advantage lies not only in repetition but also in promoted continuity with the past, which facilitates the establishment of necessary norms of behavior. However, scientists (ibid) note that the connection of 'invented traditions' with the historical past represents only a particular version of the 'truth'. The selectivity of national elites concerning history is explicitly explained below. Therefore, in contrast to the primordialist beliefs in the objectivity of the ethnic basis, constructivists claim that this faith is created by national elites that manipulate history and culture according to their political interests. As a result, while members of a nation may not know each other, they share a particular image of

9 togetherness that allows Anderson (2006 [1983]) to speak of the nation as an 'imagined political community'. If we evaluate the constructivist approach in terms of the (post-)Soviet context, then indeed, the Soviet identity was built according to canons of constructivism (Johnston, 2011). However, after the collapse of the USSR, when new, re-created nations were born (McLean, 1998), identity building correlated more with the ethnosymbolic theory of Smith (1998). The national elites of post-Soviet countries then acted as ‘political archaeologists’ aimed at reminding citizens of their ethnic roots and thus reviving an identity distinct from the Soviet one (Brubaker, 2011). Belarus is no exception in this regard: in the early years of independence, there was reinstatement/popularization of pre-Soviet history and heritage to emphasize separatism and ‘regeneration’ of Belarusianness instead of Sovietness (Bekus, 2019). However, in both of the above-described approaches, an exceptional role is given to national elites, which thereby excludes ordinary citizens from the discourse of national identity. This viewpoint does not correlate with the conclusions of modern scientists about collective identity (Melucci, 1995; Snow, 2001). For instance, Melucci (1995) emphasizes that collective identity building is an interactive bilateral process where elements are constructed but through repetitive procedures of activating relationships that bind actors together and create a sense of ‘we-ness’. Participation in shared cultural activities organized in a bottom-up way enhances and reaffirms feelings of group identity (Ross, 2007). The emotional importance of such activities for community members proves the statements of other scientists (Billig, 1995; Melucci, 1995) about the role of emotions in the process of identity formation. The British historian Emerson (1960) even defines a nation as a body of people who feel that they are a nation. It logically follows from the above that a nation is not a static entity; on the contrary, it can reform in changing contexts (Ross, 2007). As national identity is fluid, dynamic, and can change over time (Palmer, 1999), the emerging new meanings may conflict with the existing ones, which, accordingly, causes an identity crisis and provokes its modifications (Edensor, 2002; Zhuojun and Hualing, 2014). This statement provides an argument in favor of the participation/contribution of citizens

10 in national identity construction since they can be the provocateurs of that crisis. Therefore, in modern times, the power of the elites is not sufficient to keep identity ‘under complete control’: a national protest, for instance, could provide room for change. However, in terms of appropriating and ‘recycling’ common history and heritage, the role of national elites remains critical because of the сhannels they command. The following section describes this process in detail.

1.2 Who controls the past…: national ‘mythology’, AHD, heritage dissonance

The concepts of identity and memory are not only closely related to but also depend on each other: a sense of continuity across time is maintained through memorization in any identity (Gillis, 1994); collective memory is one of the most important unifying factors (McDowell, 2016). However, as memory is highly selective (Gillis, 1994), national elites use it as 'plasticine' (Hutchinson, 2007) to influence and socialize members of the nation in such a way that they share a particular view and understanding of the past (Smith, 2006). In order to give that 'plasticine' the correct form, memory is materialized and objectified: the most apparent embodiment in this respect is historiography (Brockmeier, 2010). Dominant groups use their power to bring their interpretation of history to the fore, thereby minimizing the influence of minority groups (Goulding and Domic, 2009). Overall, history is rewritten every time a new national identity is forming to forge or reinforce it (Hall, 1994). History acquires an even more critical role in the context of an authoritarian or totalitarian regime: suffice it to recall the famous expression by George Orwell (1989) that 'who controls the past controls the future'. The regime uses representations of the past to disseminate well-formulated ideological messages to the population (Lowenthal, 1994). Considering that such messages are aimed at forming commonly held beliefs and transmitted mainly through the education system, they are called 'guiding fictions'. (Shumway, 1991). The Belarusian case confirms the pivotal role of history, as one of the first changes initiated by Alexander Lukashenko after coming to power was the rewriting of history textbooks (Goujon, 2010). The reason for the change was the aspiration to rehabilitate the Soviet regime

11 for Belarusians and thus promote the renewed values of the USSR (ibid). Therefore, with the help of history textbooks, the state legitimized the preferred narrative (Trošt, 2019). The creation of myths acts as one of the main ways to 'edit' national history (ibid): this process illustrates the significance of interpretation in the construction of national identity. Building on the ideas of Anderson (2006 [1983]), Said (1983, as cited in Billig, 1995) argues that nations, in addition to being 'imagined', are also interpretive communities. On the one hand, renewed (or mythologized) national narratives awaken pride among citizens, and on the other, they lay the foundation for loyalty to authorities (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Along with the glorification of historical achievements, nation-building myths solve the problem of comprehending (or suppressing, which is more typical for an authoritarian regime) problematic, dark, or even shameful events of the past, demonstrating them in a comfortable for the authorities way (Trošt, 2019). For instance, the narrative about the Great Patriotic War (this term was used in the USSR to refer to the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany; GPW) is central to the current Belarusian government. Accent on the war is intended to both praise the heroic deeds of people at that time and shift the focus away from unsightly Soviet repressions against Belarusian intelligentsia taking place just before the GPW (Marples, 2012). Trošt (2019) distinguishes four groups of nation-building myths, where the first group comprises foundation myths: they describe the history and roots of an ethnic group and emphasize its exclusive rights to a given territory. The second group aims to compare the group with the Others; the so-called myth of superiority highlights the qualities of the group that make it unique/distinct. However, uniqueness can also be emphasized by being included in a supreme cultural association that shares the same values and in which the Other is not included. When using during (not only current but also previous) protests the white-red-white flag and the coat of arms Pahonia, Belarusians refer back to the time of Belarus as part of the Grand and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This allusion is meant to emphasize Belarus' status as a nation of Europe and not a fragment of the Soviet Union (Ioffe, 2012). Thirdly, martyrdom is crucial for the history of a nation: in this kind of myth, the accent is put on stressing how often the

12 nation became a victim of expansion. The fourth and the last group – myths of renewal – describes how the nation overcame tyranny through revolution or military valor. On the one hand, this myth is essential for the Lukashenko regime, which insists that the Belarusian nation crystallized itself precisely through the victory over the Nazis (Leshchenko, 2008; Zadora, 2014). On the other hand, the present is where the myths of tomorrow are made, and therefore that myth is designed as feasible by protesters: opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya (2020) stated that they had already defeated tyranny (but the victory is stolen) and that the Belarusian nation had passed the point of no return. Despite the paramount role of history textbooks as sites of nation-building myths, the contribution of heritage in this regard is not depreciated (Trošt, 2019). Rampley (2012) calls it a form of mythification of history. Indeed, just as myths oversimplify historical reality, heritage ignores context, exposing the event out of the complex historical process and sanitizing controversial aspects of the past (Johnson, 1999). As heritage is considered an oversimplification of the past (Lowenthal, 1985), it is easier to emphasize a particular historical trajectory through it (Johnson, 1999; Pretes, 2003). Moreover, highlighting and consolidating specific aspects and values of the past via heritage helps national elites to transfer them into the future (Graham et al., 2000). Poria and Ashworth (2009) call that process heritagization: in this case, heritage is utilized as a resource to achieve specific social purposes. However, Smith (2006) proposes considering heritage directly as a process, without any additional definitions. According to her, this process already includes serving someone's interests and transferring particular values (ibid). Primarily, however, heritage is about meanings and representations created from them (Graham and Howard, 2008). A significant role in this regard is played by symbolism 'anchored' in heritage by people (Sørensen and Viejo-Rose, 2015), which confirms that layers of heritage are attributed, not inherent (Logan, 2012). Therefore, heritage should be perceived as an act of communication (Dicks, 2000) – primarily a political one; "to speak of heritage is to speak of politics" (Allcock, 1995, p. 101). The political undertone of heritage is emphasized by the dissonance inherent in it (Smith, 2006). However, unlike Smith (ibid), who sees this feature as an integral

13 component of heritage, Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996), who first drew attention to dissonance in heritage, argue differently. Indeed, they recognize that a certain level is typical for heritage as such; however, there are objects, practices, and places that are special because of the degree of manifestation of dissonance. For example, Tunbridge and Ashworth (ibid) highlight the situation where messages transmitted through heritage continue to be projected onto a society that already pursues different from the original goals. Hence, Tunbridge and Ashworth (ibid) came up with the concept of dissonant heritage to analyze heritage around which different communities or groups construct their own discourses, interpreting the past in various ways. However, Kisić (2017), while acknowledging the merits of the scientists named earlier, disagrees with the name of the concept since it makes it different from 'usual' heritage. Therefore, she proposes the concept of 'heritage dissonance', which she sees as a latent quality of any heritage activated at the moment of open conflict or the emergence of a new voice for that matter. National elites try to smooth out dissonance around heritage by promoting their interpretation of critical objects, practices, and places mainly through the education system (Kisić, 2017; Smith, 2006). Dominant groups' encode' heritage in such a way that citizens' decode' it in a way beneficial to the authorities (Hall, 1992, as cited in Gegner and Ziino, 2012). Smith (2006) calls this 'authorized heritage discourse' (AHD), thereby emphasizing the role of those in power in this regard; Harrison (2013) notes the link between the AHD and the creation of lists that represent the canon of heritage. Thus, based on the above, Harrison (ibid) proposes a dichotomy of official and unofficial heritage, where the former refers to a set of professional practices authorized by the state through some form of legislation, and the latter combines practices unrecognized in this way but represented through the 'language of heritage'. As with history, this ‘filtering’ function is powerful in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes where heritage plays a vital role in legitimizing a government (Hall, 1994). In this regard, the most effective type of heritage (especially when viewed from the perspective of a ‘young’ regime) is wartime heritage (Henderson, 2000). Given the connections between war and sacrifice, this event is used to increase solidarity within a group and create a sense of belonging using a top-down

14 approach (Ashworth, 2008; Henderson, 2000). However, tragedies, atrocities, and disasters, among other things, have the potential to disseminate political messages (Sharpley, 2009). This property is the reason why dark heritage is being used by the authorities to emphasize the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – an essential element of national ‘mythology’ (Ashworth, 2008; Poria and Ashworth, 2009). Rudling (2012), who researched the history of the Khatyn Memorial created in memory of the villages burned by the Nazis in Belarus, stated that the Lukashenko regime turned it into a major political instrument. Indeed, during a speech at the memorial in March this year, Alexander Lukashenko said that because of the genocide of the Belarusian people during the Great Patriotic War, Western countries have no right to preach Belarus (having in mind the post-protest reaction) (“My eto”, 2021). In this context, it is essential to emphasize the role of national museums, which also have the potential to spread messages of national identity (Kirshenblatt-

Gimblett, 1998). What is shown and what is Figure 2: Photos of Alexander Lukashenko in the Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War (retrieved from the website of the not shown in national museum) museums influences how society sees itself and how it presents itself to others (Ashley, 2005), making museums agents of national identity formation. Indeed, confirming the above, in Belarus, one of the leading national museums is the Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War (Official Website of the Republic of Belarus, n.d.b). Despite the specific historical period the museum is dedicated to, a separate stand in the exposition displays photographs of Alexander Lukashenko. Therefore, the museum spreads the message about Lukashenko as the guardian of calm and peace, without whom the country risks being threatened again ("Kriticheskiy vzglyad", 2014).

15 Overall, heritage, like history, is a reservoir of political argumentation for political forces in Belarus (Lindner, 2003, as cited in Bratochkin, 2012). Based on different historical periods and different heritage, variable approaches to national identity were formed in the country (Bekus, 2013), and the protests exacerbated the crisis in this regard. The following section elaborates on the complexity of the phenomenon of national identity in Belarus and presents the author's concept used to describe it.

16 2. Belarusian national identity: complex phenomenon with conflicting views on it

2.1 Show me your heritage…: historical myths – political claims

Considering the above-mentioned ambiguity of the Belarusian identity and different meanings/narratives projected onto it by different political forces, it was decided to adopt four groups of myths (Trošt, 2019) to more clearly represent this contradiction and better structure the section. The first and most significant element of national ‘mythology’ is the foundation myth. Paradoxically, both sides of the political confrontation refer to approximately the same historical period. According to official historiography, the myth is based on references to Kievan Rus, a medieval state that united mainly Eastern Slavs (Leshchenko, 2004). An alternative historical narrative focuses on the Polotsk Principality separated from Kievan Rus to become independent (ibid). Each of the sides has particular reasons for relying on these events. In the latter case, the separation and independence of the principality are used, firstly, to prove and validate Belarus' independence as its continuation. Secondly, myth emphasizes the centuries-old roots of the Belarusian nation and explains its rights to a given territory (Smith et al., 1998). Moreover, since heritage, as noted in the previous section, is a form of mythification of history (Rampley, 2012), ethnic origins are emphasized by traditional heritage – namely, folklore, ceremonies, and rituals developed at that time. For this reason, during the protests Belarusians perform a horovod – a traditional Slavic ritual dance ("V Minske na ploshchadi", 2020). Moreover, this adherence to traditions is Figure 3: Protesters on Independence Square in Minsk complemented by perform a horovod (retrieved from RIA Novosti)

17 promoting national costumes: in addition to being another 'proof’/embodiment of myth, they are viewed as an 'emblem' through which the sense of belonging is enhanced (Goodrum, 2005). Returning to the 'official' narrative, Kievan Rus, in this case, is considered the first phase of the foundation myth and the prototype of the Soviet Union, which appears to be the final stage of the myth: according to Alexander Lukashenko, who is a historian by education, Belarus would not have been formed without the appearance/influence of the USSR (Goujon, 2010). A commitment to that narrative is reflected in Soviet heritage that the regime utilizes. First of all, this concerns the official flag, which is an almost identical copy of the flag of Soviet Belarus (Ziętara, 2019). Given that the flag is a basic reminder/'banality' that should unconsciously maintain a particular national identity (Billig, 1995), the use of that symbol constantly brings Belarus back to/'freezes' in the USSR. However, the essence of banal nationalism is not in deliberately waving the flag but in 'unnoticeably' (constantly though) hanging it on public buildings (ibid). After the start of protests, in order to increase the 'impact' of the red-green flag and make it 'unforgettable', schools and universities, for instance, were obliged to hang it constantly on their buildings ("Shkoly obyazali", 2021). Nevertheless, there is also a signaling function of the unwaved flag aimed at the targeted distribution of a specific message among citizens; the symbol, in this case, must be noticed to efficiently convey the signal (Firth, 2011[1973]). However, in addition to banal nationalism (Billig, 1995), equally important agents of socialization are 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), which Belarus also inherited from the USSR. First of all, this concerns the military parade on Victory Day, which not only commemorates the victory over Nazism but also demonstrates the continuity with the Soviet past (Bekus, 2013). The same applies to the celebration of the Day – Belarus is the only post- Soviet country that has preserved this exclusively Soviet day in the holiday calendar ("Lukashenko: Belarus", 2019). Moreover, Belarus is also the only one in the post- Soviet space that celebrates Independence Day without any reference to sovereignty from the USSR (but with references to the GPW) (Ziętara, 2019).

18 In general, the ideology of the USSR, promoted by the current Belarusian authorities as a 'golden past' (Leshchenko, 2004), acquired the status of heritage, which, repeating the scenario of Cuba (González, 2016), the regime seeks to 'materialize'. The latter process is closely related to language, one of the pillars of national identity (Edwards, 2009). After coming to power, Alexander Lukashenko returned the dominant position to the (Soviet lingua franca): for instance, the number of first-graders studying in the decreased from almost 60 percent in 1994 (the year when Lukashenko became president) to five in 1998 (Bekus, 2013). The Belarusian language, which, accordingly, was actively used in the first years after the USSR’s collapse, is cherished by the opposition. Since that language became a symbol of nationalist aspirations, it acquired political 'status' (Hobsbawn, 1996). However, in addition to being a political language, the Belarusian language can also be called a heritage language. This definition is often used in relation to 'immigrant' languages and is viewed from the perspective of teaching children of immigrants their heritage languages and thus transferring cultural identity (Lee, 2002; Leeman, 2015). Considering the abundance of the Russian language in Soviet Belarus, the appeal to the Belarusian language as the main one in the post-Soviet country falls under the above definition. Moreover, this language refers to the ethnic roots that are appreciated within the alternative Belarusianness. The second myth – the myth of superiority – is already being built by opponents with references to different periods. As emphasized above, the opposition attach great importance to the periods of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: they are important not only from the perspective of imaginative geographies (Driver, 2013) to 'move' Belarus into the European context but also in terms of the inheritance of the political system (Bekus, 2014). Those countries were considered democratic for their time; focusing on them denotes a willingness to embody democratic values that are considered superior to those declared by the adversary (ibid). The white-red-white flag, which is considered national in ‘alternative’ Belarus, refers not only to the above historical periods but also to the period of the Belarusian

19 People's Republic1: this (also democratic) state was proclaimed under the white-red- white flag (Ioffe, 2012). As those who use the flag can complement it with their meanings (Guibernau, 1996), the white-red-white flag became a symbol of striving for freedom, independence, and democracy. However, in addition to their primary purpose as political symbols, flags can be utilized as tools of propaganda and control and as tools for the inclusion and exclusion of different social groups within the nation (Elgenius, 2011). The latter property is used by the official historiography, which builds a discourse around the white-red-white flag based on the events of the Great Patriotic War. In particular, current history textbooks emphasize that the flag was used by Nazi collaborators, whereas it is the victory over Nazism that is considered the superiority of the Belarusian people (Goujon, 2010). Therefore, highlighting these facts, on the one hand, demonstrates how the Belarusian authorities are trying to 'exclude' (Elgenius, 2011) those who use that flag from the nation; on the other hand, it is the example of how heritage dissonance (Kisić, 2017) is 'formed'. The sides of the political confrontation focus on different layers (Logan, 2012) of the white-red-white flag to draw attention to their own advantageous historical and political trajectory (Pretes, 2003). Moreover, the white-red-white flag is also an example of unofficial heritage (Harrison, 2013): at the beginning of the year, more than 100 thousand people demanded to recognize it as cultural heritage, but the Ministry of Culture stated that there was no reason for that (Shcherbakov, 2021). As the above views on the myth of superiority prove, its formation is closely related to the definition of the Other. In terms of official historiography, the myth continues the Soviet tradition, portraying the collective West as the Other and using references to the GPW to draw legitimacy (Fedor et al., 2017). Accordingly, this Otherness is also reflected in the myth of martyrdom: Belarusian history textbooks focus on every third Belarusian killed during that war (before Lukashenko came to power, however, statistics claimed fewer deaths) (Goujon, 2010). As in Belarus, there are about nine thousand GPW monuments and military graves (Official Website of

1 the state proclaimed in March 1918 on the territory of modern Belarus during the German occupation: given the military conditions, BPR was unable to create the full-fledged government but received recognition from some states; the republic existed for less than a year, then was liquidated by the .

20 the Republic of Belarus, n.d.a), heritage materializes this myth. Moreover, such an abundance of the GPW heritage is intended to emphasize the alienation of Western values for Belarus and adherence to Soviet principles as effective and leading to the victory over Nazism (Zadora, 2014). An alternative view of Belarusian identity, on the contrary, seeks to reject Soviet ideas and views the USSR as the Other (Smith et al., 1998). Heritage here also acts as the basis for such intentions and the primary embodiment of the myth of martyrdom, which focuses on the Belarusians who died due to Soviet repressions. The main object in this regard is Kurapaty: this is a forest area on the north-eastern border of Minsk, where mass graves of Belarusians who were shot by the NKVD (Soviet police secret agency) in 1937-1940 are located (Marples and Laputska, 2020). The remains of people in Kurapaty were found in the late 1980s, after which grave crosses were installed there (ibid). However, the current Belarusian authorities largely ignore this site, given that it portrays the Soviet Union in a bad light (ibid). In 2020, protesters brought this heritage back to the fore by marching towards it on the eve of Dzyady, the day of remembrance of the dead ("Marsh protiv terrora", 2020) and thus activating heritage dissonance (Kisić, 2017) concentrated within Kurapaty. The myth of renewal remains incompletely formed in the context of 'oppositional' Belarus since there was no event that would correspond to the description of that myth and politically correlate with the goals of the elites (the Belarusian People's Republic was liquidated; the collapse of the USSR took place without revolutionary events in Belarus). In this regard, military victories (for example, over Russia) during periods of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were seen as culminating moments (Leshchenko, 2004). However, as noted in the previous section, the protesters are moving towards a more explicit 'modeling' of that myth: conflict heritage described below can also contribute to this formation. Concerning official historiography, the above examples illustrate that victory in the Great Patriotic War is viewed as a liberation from tyranny and, accordingly, renewal of the nation. Overall, heritage is a kind of litmus test, with the help of which conflicting views on Belarusian national identity display themselves. In order to reflect and analyze this heterogeneity, scholars – both Belarusian and foreign – use specific

21 models: the most popular ones are examined below and supplemented with the author's version.

2.2 From narrowness and stiffness to pluralism and fluidity: Belarusian national identity as a spectrum

Most sсientists (Bekus, 2013; Brzozowska, 2003; Goujon, 2010; Hansen, 2006; Way, 2010) look at Belarusian identity from the perspective of those 'projects' that were designed by opposing political forces and, hence, come up with a binary model. The first side is called 'post-Soviet', 'pro-Lukashenko' or 'official' and is represented, respectively, by the red-green flag, the Soviet approach to history and wartime heritage as fundamental elements. The other side is considered 'European', 'democratic' or 'alternative' and is focused on the European part of Belarusian history, traditional heritage, and the white-red-white flag as national. Indeed, the binary model is scientifically convenient because comparing two sides gives more understandable results (Hansen, 2006). However, this approach leads to an inevitable reduction of complex reality, excluding all phenomena in between and ignoring interactions (Lastouski, 2011). Considering the above criticism, Kazakievič (2011) proposes four concepts of the Belarusian nation: the first one – ethno-cultural – is based on understanding Belarusians, first of all, as an ethnic group with an emphasis on a long common history, traditional culture, and the Belarusian language. For the cultural-and-political concept, traditional culture is also an essential factor; however, the importance of declaring an independent Belarusian state is emphasized as well. Therefore, the main difference between these two concepts is that in the former, Belarusians are considered a separate ethnos transformed into the nation, and in the latter, the Belarusian nation is defined as a community of citizens of Belarus with a common culture as a central element. Unlike the previous two, the next concept (accepted and developed by Lukashenko) considers Belarusian culture a continuation of the Soviet one, where Russification is accepted, victory in the Great Patriotic War is cultivated, and a nostalgic attitude towards the Soviet Union is encouraged. A vital role in the state- and-political concept (that is how it is called) is played by the government, which

22 determines the 'ideology of the Belarusian state' based on the above principles. The fourth concept – Russo-centrism – sees Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians as generally Russian people with common ethnic roots and religion. Kazakievič (ibid) admits the controversy and ambiguity of including the latter concept in the list, as it cannot be called Belarusian entirely. However, according to him, the historical experience of Belarus as a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union formed some Belarusians who advocate unification with Russia. Even though Kazakievič (ibid) considered the drawbacks of the binary model and proposed a more detailed one, this thesis would not benefit from using his concepts. The fact is that people's perceptions of national identity cannot be reduced to limited theoretical groupings due to their nuance and dependence on the context (Rohava, 2018). Moreover, clearly formulated categories or models give identity a stable character, which does not correspond to the above conclusions about the fluidity and variability of this phenomenon (Palmer, 1999). In order to represent national identity as a process, not a constant (Jenkins, 1996, as cited in Edensor, 2002) and to acknowledge the multiplicity and complexity of the phenomenon at hand, it was decided to portray Belarusian identity as a spectrum.

Pro-Soviet Hybrid

Repressed Pro-democratic

Figure 4: Belarusian national identity: spectrum (author’s design)

23 At opposite ends of this spectrum are the pro-Soviet and pro-democratic 'versions' constructed by political leaders/national elites. Space between is reserved for variations: for instance, hybrid or, as Ioffe (2007) calls it, 'Creole' version is above the center, combining characteristics from both sides – for example, respect for the Soviet achievements of Belarus and, at the same time, appreciation of traditional Belarusian culture. Nevertheless, the spectrum would be incomplete without indicating the so-called repressed identity (Babkou, 2005), which denotes those Belarusians who do not have clear feelings associated with nationality and still reflect on their place on the spectrum. Regarding protests, it is essential to note that they inevitably affect the spectral model: on the one hand, fluctuations and shifts within the spectrum increase during this period since demonstrations have always been occasions for the formation or renewal of identity (Eyerman, 2006). On the other hand, given the link between conflict and polarization of society (Alder and Wang, 2014), these shifts are often more drastic/strongly marked. Moreover, mobilizing identity tools become weapons against the rival in times of crisis (Way, 2010). The following section elaborates on the potential of heritage and media in this regard and present the concept of 'cultural contestation' (Ross, 2007) that illustrates the current situation in Belarus.

24 3. Cultural(-political) contestation: the end justifies the means? Heritage, iconoclasm, media

3.1 Cultural contestation, enactment, trauma: ‘culturalities’ of Belarusian protests

Having analyzed conflicts, Docherty (2001) concluded that they all occur simultaneously in three 'worlds' or, more specifically, involve the mobilization of three types of resources – material, social, and symbolic. This thesis focuses on the latter dimension, which touches on the cultural and emotional components of the confrontation. Сulture, as noted by Ross (2007), is always the lens to look at the conflict (Ross, 2007). The situation when the encounter takes place around cultural manifestations that address critical issues of group identity is defined as 'cultural contestation' (ibid). Most of the time, it revolves around heritage (Wagenaar and Rodenberg, 2018) because of the dissonance that provokes conflict (Kisić, 2017). Given that cultural contestations are aimed at inclusion or exclusion from the symbolic landscape of society, they can be no less brutal than military confrontations (Ross, 2009). Another reason for the fierce nature of such conflict is that the attack on objects, practices, or places fundamental for some but posing a ‘threat’ for others is perceived as an attack on identity (Wagenaar and Rodenberg, 2018). The Belarusian case confirms the above statements since cultural contestation has begun as a result of heritage dissonance embedded, first of all, in the white-red-white flag, which is vital for an alternative 'version' of Belarusian identity. After the outbreak of the protests, the layers carefully hidden by official history were 'unblocked' and, hence, provoked a severe conflict. Currently it revolves not only around the white-red-white flag but also around any white-red combination: for instance, at the end of March, a woman was fined 750 euros for such socks ("Skazali", 2021). Therefore, actions of the Belarusian authorities in relation to the white-red- white flag fall under the concept of iconoclasm: as it should be according to its 'canons', through the destruction of heritage, the regime is trying to erase its significance in the eyes of society (Zarandona et al., 2017). However, heritage derives much of its social impact because of the survival after attacks; continuing cycles of

25 destruction and reconstruction only increase the power of objects, practices, and places (Jaramillo, 2018). Mitchell (1987) notes that the destruction of a powerful image leads to the creation of a new image and accompanying narrative. However, the Belarusian authorities are taking iconoclastic actions not only in relation to the flag. The most striking example is the repeated attacks on graffiti ("Kommunal'shchiki unichtozhili", 2021; "V Minske kommunal'shchiki", 2020). Scholars (MacDowall, 2006; Merrill, 2015) are increasingly looking at them in the context of heritage to contribute to a broader critical turn in this regard and re- evaluate the relationship between heritage, preservation, and destruction. There is a link between cultural heritage and human rights, namely the right to cultural participation: graffiti can be seen as a manifestation of this right since they are created in the public space, for and by the people (MacDowall, 2006). In addition to the fact that graffiti are related to human rights, the connection with conflict brings them even closer to heritage: on the one hand, the clash becomes the generator/constructor of new heritage symbolizing what is happening; on the other hand, it affects the reinterpretation of existing heritage (Sørensen and Viejo-Rose, 2015). For instance, three years ago, graffiti with a stork and national ornament appeared in Minsk, but in February this year, given the importance of traditional culture for protesters, the ornament was painted over Figure 5: Graffiti on Dunin-Martsinkevich Street in Minsk after ("Tam zelenogo", 2021). and before painting the ornament (retrieved from TUT.BY)

26 Moreover, due to a link between graffiti and industrial elements, they fall under the category of 'emerging heritage', which also refers to heritage including technical or scientific components (Alves, 2014). In the small Belarusian town of Skidel, for similar graffiti (depicting the white- red-white flag and the coat of arms Pahonia), a criminal case was opened against a woman; graffiti, accordingly, were painted over (“Devushka risovala”, 2020). However, both the direct and indirect (through symbolism) relation of protest graffiti to cruelty/atrocity makes them the most marketable heritage (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996). Given this property, for example, South Africa and Northern Ireland utilized conflict heritage for tourism purposes, providing tours to memorials and sites of violence (Butler, 2010; McDowell, 2008). Apart from the ethical and moral controversy, the ‘freezing’ of contested heritage to some extent leaves the conflict unfinished and promotes a specific interpretation of it (McDowell, 2008). As for Belarus, photographs depicting protest graffiti were presented at the Amsterdam exhibition dedicated to events in the country already during the conflict in November 2020 (Arti et Amicitiae, 2020).

Figure 6: One of the graffiti for which a criminal case was initiated in Skidel (retrieved from Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus)

The display of a historical flag and conflict/protest graffiti can be viewed as cultural enactments (Ross, 2007), as they refer to manifestations that evoke emotionally significant cultural meanings ingrained in the collective memory. However, ritual performances (ibid) are even more potent in giving emotional

27 weight to unifying cultural elements. Alexander (2006) sees rituals as episodes of repetitive cultural communication where direct partners to a social interaction share a common belief in the validity of the communication's symbolic contents and accept the authenticity of each other's intentions. During this interaction, participants produce collective memories transmitted through time and generate solidarity/togetherness (Berezin, 2001), which motivates and moves actors (Eyerman, 2006). However, rituals also have a political function, disseminating powerful messages about the regime (Ross, 2007). As one of the varieties of rituals, Ross (2007) cites a pilgrimage, a journey to sacred places where people participate in certain activities that have a cult significance for them. In Belarus, after the start of the protests, a series of car rallies was launched, where supporters of the current government and pro-Soviet national identity, respectively, visit the GPW monuments and lay flowers at them ("Avtoprobeg", 2020). Given the sacredness of wartime heritage to the regime, such activity falls under the category of pilgrimage; the message that participants in these rallies are trying to spread is described during the analysis of research data. The above examples illustrate that the political crisis in Belarus has transformed not only into an identity but also into a cultural crisis – one of the main conditions for cultural trauma to occur (Alexander, 2008). Eyerman (2008) defines it as a fundamental threat to the established individual or collective identity. Having analyzed the September 11 terrorist attacks as a cultural trauma, Smelser (2004) concluded that its signs are initial shock and disbelief, widespread collective mourning (with a level of unpredictable emotionality), instantaneous feelings of indelibility, and intentional effort to commemorate the event collectively. During the protests in Belarus, there was an event that has the above signs – it is the story of Roman Bondarenko, who prevented the destruction of white-red- white ribbons (combined into a corresponding flag) in his yard and was beaten to death by the police ("V Minske umer", 2020). After the tragedy, a spontaneous memorial was formed near the protest graffiti located in that yard: Belarusians brought flowers, candles, and white-red-white flags there (Aleksandrovskaya, 2020). This example confirms that the connection with symbols makes the event more excruciating (Smelser, 2004).

28

Figure 7: Spontaneous memorial in honor of Roman Bondarenko in Minsk (retrieved from Meduza) However, the defining moment of cultural trauma is that such events by penetrating into the moral depths of people, trigger a wave of solidarity within the community (ibid). In Belarus, this was manifested, among other things, in the fact that on the evening of the tragedy with Roman Bondarenko people began to massively upload photos of white and red candles on social media ("Chto seychas", 2020). At the same time, state-controlled media, after an initial lack of reaction to the event, presented it as a fight in the yard without specifying the reasons for the conflict (“Nikak”, 2020; Stefanenko, 2020). In general, both in this situation and generally during Belarusian protests, the media play a crucial role in the confrontation between conflicting sides. The following section explicitly describes the functionality of traditional media in terms of delegitimizing the actions of demonstrators and the tools of social media as ‘maintainers’ of and contributors to collective identity.

3.2 Traditional versus social media: status quo versus identity (re)formation

In non-democratic regimes, such media channels as newspapers, radio, and television are most often controlled by the government to censor information coming into the public domain and not give a voice to opposition forces (Hale,

29 2018; Whitten-Woodring and James, 2012). Belarus has always been in low positions in the World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders, but in 2021 the country dropped another five positions, taking 158th place and becoming, accordingly, the most dangerous place for journalists in Europe (Reporters Without Borders, 2021). The drop in rankings was undoubtedly due to protests: independent journalists covering them prevented the regime from marginalizing protesters, which is the main task of traditional/state-controlled media in times of conflict (McLeod and Hertog, 1992; Shoemaker, 1984). Scholars (Chan and Lee, 1984; McLeod and Hertog, 1992, 1999) name a 'lens' through which state-controlled journalists look at uprisings the 'protest paradigm': most often, this paradigm shifts the focus from the demands of the demonstrators and the causes of the conflict to manifestations of violence. If there is no riots, the media focus on blocking the streets, social disorder, and general lawlessness (Brasted, 2005; Mourão, 2019). Moreover, the marginalization of protesters involves 'evaluating' their personal characteristics: one of the tactics of the protest paradigm involves portraying the demonstration as a 'freak show' (McLeod and Hertog, 1999). This comparison should expose the protesters as not corresponding to the majority, and therefore representing the position of a minor, deviant part of society (ibid). History also matters in terms of the delegitimization: groups of protesters can be compared to similar groups from the past that had a negative reputation in society (Hackett and Zhao, 1994). All of the above statements are confirmed by the work of state-controlled media in Belarus during the protests. The most frequently used method has become a historical comparison – however, Belarusian protesters are compared not with their past 'colleagues' but with the Nazis; the white-red-white flag from the designation of the collaborationists turned into the direct designation of the Nazis (MediaIQ, 2021). Nevertheless, before such a radical parallel, at the beginning of the protests, demonstrators were represented as drug addicts and drunkards, in line with the position of Alexander Lukashenko ("Lukashenko rasskazal o p'yanykh", 2020) and with the tactics described by McLeod and Hertog (1999). In addition, traditional media tried to radicalize protesters by portraying them as instigators of riots, but researchers (MediaIQ, 2021) note that such words were not supported by the

30 corresponding images. One-sided 'public polls' are also mobilized to generate negative attitudes towards protesters (McLeod and Hertog, 1992): however, three main state TV channels in Belarus look to the same people for comments ("Naydite, 2020"). Therefore, in terms of discourse, on the one hand, protesters are considered terrorists/Nazis, and on the other, freedom fighters – the latter stance is prevalent on the internet ("222 dnya", 2021). Authoritarian rulers worry that they cannot keep complete control over what happens on and through social media and the internet at large (Walker and Orttung, 2014). For this reason, in the early days of the Belarusian protests in August 2020, officials shut down access to the internet in the country (Newman, 2020). However, Piechota and Rajczyk (2015) note examples of Egypt or Libya to prove that this does not stop the revolution. Some media call Belarusian protests the world's first Telegram revolution because, during the days without regular access to the internet, that platform was easier than others to bypass blocking technologies and thereby gained popularity (Kupriyenko, 2020). As a result, it was Telegram that became the social media through which protesters received information and were mobilized (Internews , 2020). In addition to their information and coordination function, social media are essential in integrating citizens around topics that matter to them (Piechota and Rajczyk, 2015). Through its participatory nature, social media create a sense of togetherness that helps 'virtual' users overcome fear and discover hope in 'real' life (Poell and van Dijck, 2017). Moreover, given this sense of togetherness, social media can contribute to the construction of personal and group identity (Valenzuela, 2013). The dissemination of protest slogans, logos, and materials on social media forms a collective sense of self that is a manifestation of a collective identity (Gerbaudo and Treré, 2015). As an example, Gerbaudo (2015) cites changing the profile picture on social networks to a protest avatar: in his opinion, this illustrates how the quintessential form of self-representation is transformed into an act of identification with the collective, thus constructing 'we' people feel belongingness to. Interpersonal communication can be viewed as a ritual of interaction, where participation in social networking not only becomes a symbol and proof of group membership but also provides positive emotional energy (Milan, 2015).

31 Consequently, the ritual actions described by Alexander (2006) are essential not only in real but also in virtual space: the collective 'real' and 'virtual', when merging, complement and reinforce each other.

Figure 8: Examples of Facebook avatars supplemented with a white-red-white flag (retrieved from Facebook pages of photos’ owners with their permisson)

Therefore, to summarize the above, social media provides a discursive space where identities are constructed through the interaction of multiple individuals (Milan, 2015). As noted above, in Belarus, social media play a crucial role during protests: to provide an example in line with the above statements, many Belarusians have added a white-red-white flag to their Facebook avatars. The role of social media and the influence of traditional media on the formation of Belarusian identity is described in detail when analyzing the data obtained from respondents during interviews – this method was chosen to analyze the behavioral patterns of young Belarusians during the protests.

32 METHODOLOGY

The modern approach to heritage, as was emphasized above, implies that value is created not due to inherent meanings of an object, place, or practice, but due to the relationship emerging between them as actors and humans as those directly involved – Harrison (2013) calls this model dialogical, thus highlighting the role of dialogue in creating the meaning of heritage. Dicks (2000) urges to view heritage as an act of communication. In the light of the above approaches, the thesis with the research question formulated as 'how and in what ways do both sides of the current protests in Belarus utilize heritage as a symbolic(-political) instrument, and how is this being negotiated by young Belarusians in constructing a sense of national identity?’ should apply an interview as an act of communication that allows opening up layers attributed to heritage and evaluate their functionality. It is the discussion and interaction between an partners that can lead to (re)creation of how heritage is used, what values young Belarusians put into it, and how they affect the sense of national identity. Research on the construction of national identity also highlights interviewing as a suitable research method: in particular, Wodak et al. (2009) opted for interviews because they consider that phenomenon to be discursively constructed, dynamic and context-dependent, which also correlates with statements made in the theoretical framework. Overall, although interviewing is most commonly used to collect data in qualitative research (Creswell, 2007), this method has the most significant value in exploring the construction and negotiation of meanings in a natural setting (Cohen et al., 2007). Given the wording of the research question of this thesis, the use of interviews here has a reasonable basis. However, it is also necessary to decide on a specific interview format determined by the interview's purpose and the disciplinary perspective (DiCicco- Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). The most 'rigid' and limited in terms of format is a structured interview since, in this case, the researcher asks predetermined direct questions that require immediate answers and do not imply clarifications (Alshenqeeti, 2014). This thesis aims to explore people's views in greater depth, which means that the interview format should be more flexible: semi-structured interviews provide an opportunity to expand the interviewees' answers, allowing a

33 researcher to stay within the 'framework' relevant to the topic (ibid). Dialogue, in this case, revolves around prearranged agenda topics; however, with additional why and how questions, the interview can dive into unforeseen issues with remarkable insights (Adams, 2010). Therefore, semi-structured interviews gravitate towards a constructivist approach to research, given the latter’s focus on understanding the world of human experiences (Cohen & Manion, 1994, as cited in Mojtahed et al., 2014). Since this world is shaped through interaction (ibid), the interview should then be considered a human encounter, where both partners are engaged in dialogue, producing/constructing questions and answers through interpersonal discourse (Qu and Dumay, 2011). As Oakley (1998, as cited in Broom et al., 2009) writes, qualitative interviews are contexts where cultural practices and social values are not simply recorded but performed, contested, and thereby reinforced. Young Belarusians are involved in the protest context and have the necessary experience to gain a better understanding of it (Castleberry and Nolen, 2018). However, there are quite a few people who fall into that category. For this research to be effective and as unbiased as possible, criteria to select respondents were developed by the author. Firstly, this is the age: interviewees are from 18 to 26 years old (each of these ages is represented), which means that they were all born during the presidency of Alexander Lukashenko, who stays in power for 26 years. It was also crucial for the author that the respondents had been at different positions on the spectrum before protests: to present a diverse sample, the author contacted some people and texted them several probing questions to approximately understand their feelings and then further investigate them in interviews. The probing concerned precisely the pre-protest perception of Belarusianness: the author asked potential respondents to formulate what meanings they put into this concept and paid attention to the presence/absence of Soviet inclinations, references to other historical periods, and, in general, the clarity of the description of the phenomenon. That process mostly took place on social media, where the author searched for interviewees taking into account participation in the protests (judging by the photos on their Instagram or Facebook profiles) and presence of posts related to the

34 topic of national identity. However, sampling occurred both on- and offline: regarding the latter 'dimension', the author (the young Belarusian himself) approached people from his personal network. This was done not to interview them (avoiding potential biases) but to use their contacts (a snowballing technique) and find respondents who meet the research criteria, providing the claimed spectrum diversity. Consequently, as a result of the selection, ten young Belarusians were chosen to conduct interviews (six females, four males; with different professional backgrounds): four respondents had repressed national identity prior to protests, four more people were in the pro-democratic 'zone', one person gravitated towards pro-Soviet identity, and another respondent had hybrid national identity before demonstrations have started. The interviews lasted from 50 to 90 minutes, resulting in more than ten hours of data to analyze. The prolonged conversation time helped the author establish rapport with respondents and thereby get closer to the truth (Qu and Dumay, 2011). In addition to lengthy interviews, another advantage in building rapport is (approximately) the same age and origin of the author and respondents: this factor reduced the ‘status’ differential and made it easier for respondents to share information about such a sensitive topic as national identity (Byrne et al., 2015). At the same time, the author took into account that interviewees could adapt their answers not to lose face in front of a peer due to specific social and cultural norms they follow (ibid). However, the fact that the respondents are/were active on social media on issues of national identity/protests means that they want to share their feelings as they proceeds; the interview became an additional ‘channel’ in that regard. Being a young Belarusian gives the author another advantage in the study, as he entered it with extensive background information (Kendall, 2008). The thesis, therefore, is conducted at the intersection of emic and etic outlooks to combine merits of both and, hence, come up with unique insights. Despite the benefits, there are also some drawbacks to consider: in particular, certain things could be taken for granted by the author. This shortcoming was smoothed out via a detailed discussion of issues/topics during the interview.

35 As often happens during the coronavirus pandemic, interviews were conducted online: however, in this case, the reason was more political than epidemiological security. At the moment in Belarus, it is dangerous to talk about topics related to politics in public places; an online interview, on the contrary, allows a person to take part in the study from a convenient place, freely expressing themselves on all topics. The only condition that should be met is a high-bandwidth internet connection (Sedgwick and Spiers, 2009), which was monitored during this research. The topics and approximate questions raised during the interview were formulated in the interview guide; however, as expected, through additional clarifying questions, the dialogue sometimes proceeded in unexpected but relevant directions for the thesis. First, as noted above, based on the described feelings and attributed meanings, the position of the interviewee on the spectrum of national identity before and after the protests was determined. In a separate block, the influence of heritage on changes related to national identity was analyzed: through examples, interviewees reflected on the use of traditional heritage during protests and Soviet heritage during counter-protests; moreover, the respondents assessed the iconoclastic actions in relation to graffiti and flags. In general, the topic of flags was discussed separately: the interviewees described the transformation that the red-green and white-red-white flags went through and determined which of these symbols they consider national. Those respondents who have supplemented their Facebook avatars with a white- red-white flag described the reasons for doing so. As defined in the theoretical framework, social media activity was viewed from the point of view of contribution to the formation of national identity, namely, strengthening unity and togetherness. The death of Roman Bondarenko was viewed from the same perspective; however, in addition to that, the interviewees assessed the relationship of the event with cultural heritage. After all the interviews were completed, they were manually transcribed by the author. Although specific services allow this to be done automatically, with self- transcription, the researcher comes 'closer' to data, familiarizing with it, and thereby preparing themselves for further research stages (Castleberry and Nolen, 2018).

36 Thematical analysis (ibid) was chosen to identify, analyze, and report patterns within data: this method can be utilized to address most types of research questions, from those involving the views and opinions of people to those touching on the construction of different social subjects in specific contexts (Clarke and Braun, 2014). This thesis merges both of these examples, which confirms the suitable choice of that method. After familiarizing with the data, the author started the coding process, which is not just a way to reduce data, but an analytical process of highlighting interesting features relevant to research. Moreover, in addition to the surface meaning, the process was focused on the underlying meanings (for example, the author noticed the active use of the words 'we/our' and 'they/their' in relation to conflicting sides, which is essential in terms of national identity). Following this stage, the retrieved codes were examined to find recurring features and elements – those patterns then formed potential themes to showcase a bigger picture of the phenomenon. The 'candidates' themes were assessed in terms of their relationship with each other to eventually form the final list and present the research results as a coherent story (Castleberry and Nolen, 2018; Clarke and Braun, 2014). This story is structured around two overarching themes that correlate with the dichotomy described by Harrison (2013) – namely, official and unofficial heritage. The former includes (pro-)Soviet objects, practices, and places as the basis for a corresponding version of national identity. In the latter case, some of the analyzed practices cannot be called unofficial heritage entirely since they are recognized de jure; however, according to the respondents, they are not encouraged de facto, making it possible to describe them under that category. In order to approach the answer to the research question from a broader perspective, in addition to the protest use of heritage, each theme also includes a preface/sub- theme exploring and analyzing the state of affairs before the protests. This 'overture' is needed to demonstrate the transformations associated with interviewees’ national identity later on. A separate section is devoted to changes in this regard. However, the main focus of the following chapter is on heritage, through the lens of which the above processes are examined.

37 ANALYSIS & RESULTS

1. Through official heritage to ‘official’ identity? Imposing before, legitimizing during, being alienated as a result of protests

1.1 Before the protests: presence of ‘dissonance’ – absence of ‘convergence’

“Then I had the feeling that our history, the began with the emergence of the USSR”2. In this quote, Katsiaryna (18, female) describes her attitude to and perception of how the school was organized. Like other respondents, she draws attention to the fact that in history lessons, special attention was paid specifically to Soviet history. Kasia (22, female), for example, notes the following:

The largest block in history is dedicated to the Soviet Union and the Great Patriotic War, in particular. Why is not the exact amount given to the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania if these countries are of no less importance for Belarus?3

She also talks about how teachers forced her to join a state youth organization (like the Soviet Komsomol) under the threat that she would not graduate from school and that without that membership, she would not be able to enter the university. Other interviewees share similar experiences, noting that the reason for their reluctance to join the organization was the values and ideas propagated by it:

I despised them [organizations] because they had utterly gray, faceless ideas – they spoke in phrases from the Soviet Union. And it always shocked me so

2 Тогда у меня возникало ощущение, что наша история, история Беларуси началась с возникновения СССР. 3 Самый большой блок в истории посвящен Советскому Союзу и Великой Отечественной войне, в частности. Почему не такой же объем уделяется Речи Посполитой или Великому Княжеству Литовскому, ведь эти страны имеют не меньшее значение для Беларуси?

38 much because we live in the 21st century, and at these events, it seemed that you were back in the USSR.4 ~ Darya (24, female)

The respondents had (and still have) a mainly negative attitude to Soviet heritage: monuments to the controversial Soviet people (Felix Dzerzhinsky, Mikhail Kalinin) who, according to the interviewees, have nothing to do with Belarus, cause the most questions from their side. Respondents often mention the monument to Lenin on the main square of Minsk: for them, its presence in the central place of the capital means the presence of the Soviet Union as a central landmark for the country.

This shows in which direction the Belarusian society is going under pressure from the authorities. They propagandize Soviet values, although most young people and I do not like these values. This does not seem right, and I believe that it should not be like that. When something changes with us, it should be reconsidered.5 ~ Yauhen (20, male)

Thus, even before the start of the protests, Soviet heritage was ‘dissonant’ (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996) for respondents, as the values projected onto society with its help did not correlate with the personal values of the interviewees. Darya (24, female) confirms this by saying the following: "What the state suggested to boast of did not find any response in your soul”6. The lack of an emotional response is explained, among other things, by realizing the limitations of the (pro-) Soviet outlook on Belarusian history: that happened when the respondents independently studied that period and noticed that school history textbooks did not mention the mistakes of the USSR leadership during the GPW and for the most part ignored Soviet repressions against Belarusians (Goujon, 2010).

4 Я их презирала, потому что это были совершенно серые, безликие идеи – они говорили фразами из Советского Союза. И меня всегда так это шокировало, потому что мы живем в 21 веке, а на этих мероприятиях казалось, что ты вновь в СССР. 5 Это показывает, в какую сторону развивается белорусское общество под давлением властей. Они пропагандируют Советские ценности, хотя мне, и большинству молодежи, я думаю, эти ценности не по душе. Это неправильно, я считаю, что так быть не должно. Когда у нас что-то поменяется, это должно быть пересмотрено 6 То, чем предлагало хвастаться государство, не находило никаких откликов в душе твоей.

39 As a result of the above points, personal identity of the majority of respondents did not correlate with national identity promoted by the regime. Considering that ‘identity convergence’ (Snow, 2001) did not happen, after school interviewees described being a Belarusian as having a “territory of residence” (Marya, 26, female; Viktar, 21, male) or “a line in the birth certificate” (Darya, 24, female). Some of them (re)constructed/awakened their sense of national identity during student times (including through protests), but four out of ten still did not have clear feelings regarding their national identity before demonstrations. According to them, it was ‘asleep’. Nevertheless, the main national symbol – the red-green flag – did not elicit negative emotions from the respondents until the protests started; interviewees note that they had a neutral attitude towards it, accepting that flag as a fact or as a ‘background’ symbol:

It seemed, yes, we are Belarusians, and this is our flag. As with mother's milk, so from the school, you ‘absorb’ that this is our flag. Each country has its own flag, and we have this one.7 ~ Yan (19, male)

However, despite the acceptance, some respondents emphasize that they treated the red-green flag as a relic of the past, which remained from the Soviet Union, and therefore did not have a powerful emotional connection with it:

For me, it was like a grandmother in a not very stylish jacket standing at a bus stop. I do not hate my grandmother for that. I have to live, communicate with her, but I do not admire this image.8 ~ Katsiaryna (18, female)

Considering that the communication with the 'grandmother' occured almost daily, it was taken for granted and rarely commented upon by respondents (Billig, 1995). When referring in their answers to 'relatives' (in addition to the grandmother,

7 Казалось, да, мы белорусы, и это наш флаг. Как с молоком матери, так со школьной скамьи, впитываешь что это наш флаг. У каждой страны свой флаг, вот у нас такой. 8 Для меня это было как бабушка в не очень-то стильной куртке стоит на остановке. Я же не ненавижу бабушку за это. Я должна жить, общаться с ней, но я не восхищаюсь этим имиджом и этим образом.

40 this is also the aforementioned 'mother'), the interviewees thereby underline the meaninglessness of active and deep reflection on national identity due to the impossibility of choice or at least changes in the 'family'. Nevertheless, the protests that brought the red-green flag from the passive ‘background’ into the 'line of sight' prompted the interviewees to evaluate it and, accordingly, national identity in a different way. The meanings that respondents now put into the red-green flag are described in the following section focusing directly on protests.

1.2 Means of defense and attack at the same time: official heritage during the protests – a shot in the head?

1.2.1 Red-green flag: from neutrality to “violence, cruelty, lies, death, blood”

The quoted characteristics are Hanna's (23, female) answer to the question of what values she currently puts into the red-green flag. She emphasizes that there was no negativity or 'aggression' towards that flag before the protests on her part. However, all brutal actions against the protesters were accompanied by the red-green flag, which could not but affect the associations with it. Currently, the symbol evokes similar negative associations in all interviewees:

Now, when their flag is on the avtozak where people are beaten, it makes me absolutely disgusted. Now for me, it is a flag of cruelty, violence, and contempt for people. Those values were laid in the red-green flag by the current government.9 ~ Darya (24, female)

Both Darya and Katsiaryna highlighted the fact that during the protests, the red-green flag was hung on the avtozaks (cars used to deliver protesters to police stations) – in the opinion of the interviewees, this is the main symbol of violence, and therefore the current associations with the flag are justified. When speaking about the reasons the authorities hoisted the red-green flag on the avtozak, Marya

9 Теперь, когда их флаг стоит на автозаке, где избивают людей, он вызывает у меня полное отвращение. Теперь для меня это флаг жестокости, насилия и презрения к людям. И вот эти значения в красно-зеленый флаг заложила нынешняя власть.

41 (26, female), for example, believes that such a decision was made to respond to the call for police officers to quit after the first, most violent days of protests:

It is like a symbolism that the police officers remain on the side of the authorities. Moreover, if they are on the side of the current government, then the government, accordingly, can be calm. I think it is a simultaneous expression of strength and position10.

Figure 9: Avtozak with a red-green flag (retrieved from Krasnaya Vesna)

Regardless of the reason, this example demonstrates that those who use the flag (police officers) can supplement it with their values and meanings (Guibernau, 1996). Moreover, the flag, in this case, acts as a propaganda tool (Elgenius, 2011). However, as it is also a tool for the exclusion of social groups within the nation (ibid), respondents note that now the red-green flag does not represent the entire Belarusian nation:

If everything were not the way it is now, then perhaps it would have retained its status as a state flag in the eyes of people, but now it only denotes those

10 Это как символизм, что силовики остаются на стороне власти. А если они на стороне действующей власти, то и власть, соответственно, может быть спокойной. Я думаю, это выражение силы и позиции.

42 who support the regime, but in general, it has nothing to do with Belarus.11 ~ Yan (19, male)

Yan, who adopted the red-green flag 'with mother's milk' and generally gravitated towards a pro-Soviet identity, now notes that this flag has lost what he believes to be 'holiness'. However, this happened not only due to the change in its connotations but also due to the fact that the red-green flag was hung in places where it had not been displayed before:

You know, it is impossible to say the word ‘God’ a million times, because this word loses its sacredness, and here when it [the flag] appeared on the avtozak and even at every supermarket, this is strange.12 ~ Yan (19, male)

All interviewees stress that nowadays, the authorities are trying to ‘fill’ the entire public space with a red-green flag, hanging it not only on government buildings but also on shops and residential buildings. However, the fact that respondents notice an increase in the number of flags destroys the metonymic image of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) aimed at unconscious influence through such ‘flaggings’. Yauhen (20, male) confirms that interviewees are aware of government intentions, saying that “the authorities seem to be trying to program the minds of people with banal everyday habits”13. Moreover, the government tries to repurpose what can be perceived as a symbol of protest into those ‘banal everyday habits’: “For example, recently I saw an ambulance car with an additional green bar on it. I think this is just a policy of absurdity”14 (Anya, 26, female).

11 Если бы все не было вот так, как сейчас, то возможно он бы сохранил свой статус государственного флага в глазах людей, но сейчас он обозначает только тех, кто поддерживает режим, но никакого отношения к Беларуси в общем он не имеет. 12 Это, знаешь, как нельзя миллион раз говорить слово «Бог», потому что это слово утрачивает свою сакральность, так и тут, вот он когда появился на автозаке и даже на каждом супермаркете, это странно. 13 власти будто бы пытаются запрограммировать сознание людей бытовыми привычками. 14 Например, недавно я видела скорую помощь, на которой дорисована зеленая полоска. Я считаю, это просто политика абсурда.

43

Figure 10: Typical ambulance car before and after the start of the protests (retrieved from TUT.by)

In some instances, however, the unwaved flag method propagates a particular message (Firth, 2011 [1973]): Yauhen (20, male) draws attention to the fact that in September 2020, the Lida Castle – heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – was ‘supplemented’ with a red- green flag that does not correlate with that historical period. Yauhen notes that, indeed, he has read the message, which, according to him, is to deprive Figure 11: Red-green flag on the wall of the Lida Castle protesters of the points of (retrieved from TUT.by) reference through attaching the Soviet symbol; however, this action, first of all, affected the ‘reputation’ of the flag and intensified the rejection of it. Other respondents support this statement by sharing similar feelings:

When you see a red-green little flag glued somewhere, you ask yourself, what it essentially did to you, furthermore, it was with you throughout your life; however, despite this, it seems to you that this flag needs to be ripped off.15 ~ Valery (25, male)

Viktar (21, male) draws attention to the fact that now this 'red-green mania' extends to heritage 'beloved' by the regime and cited the case of the town of Mosty. There, in commission by the government, the monument to those who died during the Great Patriotic War was repainted from gray to red-green in May

44 this year. According to Viktar, there is no contradiction/outrage in this action in terms of the correlation of historical periods (as in the case of Lida Castle).

However, he considers it a political manifestation that he would not like to see in relation to that topic. Other respondents also note the politicization of wartime heritage during the protests – the next section, with the help of interviewees' answers, explains the messages that the regime is spreading via this heritage.

Figure 12: Monument to Belarusians who died during the GPW before and after May 2020 (retrieved from Radio Svaboda/Radio Free Europe)

1.2.2 Shield and the only safe topic: utilization of the GPW narrative/heritage – decoding the message

This [the Great Patriotic War] must be remembered as a world war, but the way it is presented is absurd, it is a purely political instrument. It is used as propaganda as it was used in the Soviet Union.16 ~ Kasia (22, female)

In this quote, Kasia confirms two statements from the theoretical framework at once: firstly, tragedies can be used to spread political messages (Sharpley, 2009), and secondly, Belarus continues the Soviet historical tradition, where the GPW had a central legitimizing position (Marples, 2012; Zadora, 2014).

15 Когда ты видишь красно-зеленый маленький флажок, приклеенный где-то, ведь что он по сути тебе сделал, более того, он ведь был с тобой на протяжении твоей жизни, но тебе кажется, что вот это нужно сдирать. 16 Об этом обязательно нужно помнить как о мировой войне, но то, как это подается, это абсурдно, это чисто политический инструмент. Она используется как пропаганда, как использовалась в Советском Союзе.

45 Indeed, all respondents believe that the war and wartime heritage helps the regime justify and legitimize brutal actions against the protesters (Henderson, 2000): “It became like a shield that can be used in defense of their goals”17 (Yauhen, 20, male). Katsiaryna (18, female) calls war the only “safe" topic for the regime since it is difficult to oppose it. Figure 13: Participants of the GPW car rally in support of Lukashenko (retrieved from Komsomol'skaya Pravda) Consequently, as respondents note, rallies to the GPW monuments were deliberately launched by the authorities, first of all, as a response to the protests, and secondly, as a visual way to popularize their ideas: “Why do they carry out rallies, again, in order to show and talk about them on TV”18 (Anya, 26, female). Anya believes that in this way, the authorities are trying to present themselves as positive heroes, as 'saviors', and protesters as negative ones, which confirms the use of the 'protest paradigm' (McLeod and Hertog, 1999). To sum up, the regime's strategy is through state-controlled media to 'encode' (Hall, 1992, as cited in Gegner and Ziino, 2012) the GPW heritage with such interpretations so that when 'decoded', the protesters appear as militant traitors/Nazis who are trying to destroy everything, and the supporters of the authorities become defenders of peace and stability. The target audience of this narrative, according to the respondents, is the older generation, which was born during or shortly after that war.

They control people who are children of war. There are no longer people who have already seen the war at a conscious age, but a few veterans, when they hear the word ‘Nazi’, they have a hundred million triggers and, having

17 Это стало как будто щитом и просто инфоповодом, который можно использовать в защиту своих целей. 18 Для чего у нас проводятся автопробеги, опять-таки для того чтобы их показали и о них рассказали.

46 understood the situation or not, they hate people because they were called Nazis.19 ~ Valery (25, male)

However, vilifying the opposition along the lines of Nazis (rather than Americans/Europeans, for instance) is essential not only in influencing the older generation. Considering that the Nazis were defeated in the GPW, the current government strive to demonstrate that the protesters will fail as well. The latter disagree and resent being tagged as supporters of the war: in their opinion, such accusations and comparisons are unfounded.

For me, this is a painful topic, but these authorities tell me that I am a fascist and I did not appreciate what happened. I appreciate it, maybe more than any government official who, perhaps, knows absolutely nothing about this war.20 ~ Darya (24, female)

In general, when discussing the theme of the Great Patriotic War during the interviews, most respondents note that they disagree with the rhapsodic rhetoric that comes from the Belarusian authorities in relation to the tragic event. Some interviewees cite as an example Ukraine, which, firstly, abandoned the Soviet formulation of the Great Patriotic War, and secondly, made the memorable ‘focus’ the main one in this event. Respondents consider this to be the correct approach, given the number of wartime deaths.

The Great Patriotic War is a colossal feat that our people performed, but this is such a complex topic; how can you be proud of this if it is the murder of

19 Они управляют людьми, которые дети войны. Не существует уже людей, которые уже в осознанном возрасте застали войну, но ветераны немногочисленные, когда слышат слово «нацист», у них срабатывает сто миллионов триггеров и они, разобравшись или нет в ситуации, ненавидят людей, потому что их назвали нацистами. 20 Для меня это больная тема, а мне эти власти говорят, что я фашистка и я не оценила того, что произошло. Я ценю это, может, больше чем любой чиновник в правительстве, который, возможно, не знает ровным счетом ничего про эту войну.

47 people, the murder of one nation by another on the orders of those sitting in the offices.21 ~ Katsiaryna (18, female)

According to the respondents, the theme of the Great Patriotic War still causes painful sensations in them. Therefore, when they see this topic being exploited by the regime for political purposes, it only intensifies the authorities' rejection. The following section summarizes how this affected the national identity of young Belarusians.

1.3 “They” instead of “us”: anti-effect of pro-Soviet identity

“In a couple of months of everything that was happening in the country, they managed to cause such a negative attitude towards what they are doing, to break everything so badly”22 (Darya, 24, female). With these words, Darya sums up the actions of the Belarusian authorities during the protests: according to her, if with the help of wartime heritage they tried to influence emotions (Ashworth, 2008) and thereby restore an old attitude towards them, it turned out the other way around. All respondents agree with her on this ‘opposite effect’. Anya (26, female), for example, says the following: “I understand why this [authorities’ actions] causes negativity in people, up to aggression and anger. This is such an absurdity”23. Valery (22, male), who had a hybrid identity before the protests, emphasizes that after the protests, the nation and the state separated for him: what used to be part of his national identity is now alienated. Currently, he compares the state with an avtozak: “Green, with bars, small, from which everyone dreams of freeing themselves, from which everyone runs away. Not a nation, but a state"24. Moreover, given the actual

21 Великая Отечественная война это огромный подвиг, который совершил наш народ, но это такая сложная тема, как можно этим гордиться, если это убийство людей, убийство одним народом другого народа по приказу людей, сидящих в кабинетах. 22 Просто за пару месяцев всего то, что происходило в стране, они сумели вызвать такое негативное отношение к тому, что они делают, настолько сломать. 23 Я понимаю, почему у людей это, в первую очередь, вызывает негатив, вплоть до агрессии и злости. Это такой же абсурд. 24 Зеленое, с решетками, маленькое, из которого все мечтают освободиться, от которого все убегают. Не нация, но государство.

48 level of repression, respondents increasingly associate this time with the worst, most severe/repressive years of the Soviet Union:

It is terrible when citizens are persecuted like this; when any dissent is suppressed. Now, absolutely the same thing is happening – what attitude, apart from hatred, can this evoke towards the Soviet Union? It pisses me off that the authorities not only fail to learn from the past but, on the contrary, repeat their mistakes.25 ~ Viktar (21, male)

Therefore, parallels between the current and the Soviet authorities exacerbated during the protests make respondents feel negative about pro-Soviet identity. Moreover, the above quotes illustrate that the red-green flag is now often called ‘their flag’. In addition, when describing the actions of the government/its supporters, respondents also often say ‘they’, ‘in another camp’ or even ‘the enemy’: the delineation of the Other is an important element of national identity (Trošt, 2019), and the protests finally shaped the Other for the respondents. If the Belarusian national elites of the early 90s constructed identity with the rejection of the USSR, now the focus has shifted to its adherent/successor. However, for the identity to be formed, it is essential not only to define ‘them’ but also ‘us’ – the feeling of ‘we-ness’ (Melucci, 1995) was also forged thanks to protests and heritage manifested itself at this time. The following section describes this process in more detail.

25 Это ужасно, когда граждан так преследуют, когда любое инакомыслие пресекается. Сейчас происходит абсолютно тоже самое – какое отношение, помимо ненависти, это может вызывать к Советскому Союзу? Меня бесит, что власти не выносят уроки прошлого, а наоборот, повторяют ошибки.

49 2. Emerging from history, emerging during modernity, merging to protest: ‘un’offical heritage – ‘un’infying identity

2.1 History does not repeat itself? Flag, language, identity – nation in imagination

When a [history] teacher at school, outside the compulsory program, told us about the times of Yanka Kupala, protest newspapers, in general, about times when the Belarusian national movement was active, our idea was defended, they fought for it – it seemed, why did they need it, why did they fight for it.26 ~ Yan (19, male)

In the above quote, Yan describes his attitude to the Belarusian history of the late 19th and early 20th century, when the Belarusian People's Republic was proclaimed. Unlike Yan, who prior to the protests identified himself in the pro-Soviet 'zone' of the spectrum, other respondents note a greater interest in the history of the Belarusian national movement predating Belarus' inclusion in the USSR. Nevertheless, they saw this period as dreamlike and did not believe that it could be repeated in modern times; they did not imagine Belarusians defending their independence: “It seemed to me that the history where Belarus was formed has passed. And at the time before the protests, there was no feeling that we had won independence and have value as a people”27 (Darya, 24, female). This uncertainty can be reasoned by the inconclusive formation of the myth of renewal (Trošt, 2019) within the alternative outlook on Belarusian identity, namely the absence of a single revolutionary event that would serve as the main support/foundation in this regard. However, unlike Darya, who had repressed national identity before the protests, Hanna (23, female), thanks to her deep immersion in Belarusian history, felt a connection with the roots, found events to rely on, and, hence, changed her position on the spectrum. It is the protest (that of 2015) that became the inspiration

26 Когда в школе учитель дополнительно, вне обязательной программы рассказывал нам о временах Янки Купалы, протестных газет, когда активно было белорусское национальное движение, наша идея, ее отстаивали, за нее боролись – казалось, зачем это им было, зачем они боролись. 27 Мне казалось, что та история, где формировалась Беларусь, она прошла. А на момент до протестов чувства, что мы отвоевали независимость и имеем ценность как народ, такого ощущения не было

50 for additional self-education and, subsequently, the moment of ‘awakening’ of national identity:

I came across a series of documentaries called "Mysteries of Belarusian History", this program helped me fill in the gaps left by my school. The series told about the primordial Belarusian legends, the time of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Belarusian national movement – all this, together with the protests, inspired me to accept the white-red-white flag and the ideas that its supporters pursue as my own.28 ~ Hanna (23, female)

In addition to interest respondents had in those historical periods, their exploration 'awakened' senses associated with national identity in interviewees; however, they note that the effect was short-term. More prolonged immersion in those eras could have perpetuated that feeling, according to respondents. A similar position is expressed about the Belarusian language: interviewees recall that it was studied only once a week at school, even the foreign language was given more lessons. However, at the moments of closer contact with the Belarusian language, national identity was felt more clearly, like in the above case. The lack of 'collectivity' in that regard reduced the impact and prevented that sense from 'gaining a foothold':

When I worked more closely with the Belarusian language, it was pleasant for me, I felt some kind of deep connection inside. I love the Belarusian language, and I have always been very sad about not having this culture in our country; in my life, there were only two or three people who speak Belarusian on a permanent basis.29 ~ Viktar (21, male)

28 Я наткнулась на серию документальных фильмов под названием «Загадки белорусской истории», эта программа помогла мне заполнить пробелы, которые оставила моя родная школа. Там рассказывалось об исконно белорусских легендах, времени ВКЛ, Речи Посполитой, белорусского национального движения – все это вместе с протестами вдохновило меня принять бело-красно-белый флаг и идеи, которые преследуют его сторонники, как свои. 29 Когда я работал плотнее с белорусским языком, то мне было приятно, я чувствовал какую-то глубокую связь внутри. Я люблю белорусский язык, и мне всегда было очень грустно, что у нас

51 When the ‘collectivity’ was present, that language truly influenced national identity. Anya (26, female) says that the Belarusian language accompanied her since childhood when she was sent to a Belarusian-speaking kindergarten, then she paid much attention to it at school, and later Anya entered the university to study Belarusian philology:

I have always been proud that I can speak Belarusian. Despite the fact that I am from the northern pro-Russian region, I still absolutely confidently call myself Belarusian. In this regard, I am very grateful to my teachers, who instilled in me a love of both language and culture. Thanks to the Belarusian language, I plunged deeper into our culture.30

This quote from Anya confirms the status of the Belarusian language as a ‘heritage language’ (Lee, 2002; Leeman, 2015), the study of which contributes to the transfer of national and cultural identities. Yauhen (20, male), like Anya, already before the protests, considered himself to be on the pro-democratic side of the spectrum. However, as a decisive transitioning factor, he notes not directly the Belarusian language but the Belarusian-speaking culture. Despite that, Yauhen considered the white-red-white flag, first of all, a historical symbol: “I knew that there was such a symbol, I respected it because this is the history of our country”31. The white-red-white flag was perceived as part of the past by most respondents – especially representatives of the repressive ‘zone’ of the spectrum. Nevertheless, they did not give up hope that once that historical symbol would be transformed into a modern one:

I have often seen videos of them in America, when they travel with their flag or have some kind of picnics, sit on it, it surrounds them everywhere. And it

отсутствует эта культура, что в моей жизни было всего два или три человека, которые всегда говорили по-белорусски. 30 Я всегда гордилась тем, что я могу говорить на белорусском. Несмотря на то что я из северного про-российского региона, я все равно абсолютно уверенно называю себя белоруской. В этом плане я очень благодарю своих преподавателей, которые привили мне любовь и к языку, и к культуре. Благодаря белорусскоязычности я погрузилась глубже в культуру. 31 Я знал о том, что есть этот символ, я уважал его, потому что это история нашей страны.

52 seemed to me that someday I would take the white-red-white flag, hang it on my shoulders and walk down the street.32 ~ Katsiaryna (18, female)

As that finally has happened during protests, the white-red-white flag, according to respondents, opened up from a new perspective. At the moment, this symbol is perceived differently by interviewees. The next section describes the change in the ‘status’ of the white-red-white flag and analyzes the protest use of other alternative/unofficial heritage.

2.2 Unofficial heritage: utilizing, generating, integrating, strengthening

2.2.1 White-red-white flag: a symbol to fight and (from now on) a symbol to unite

What happened a long time ago is difficult to associate with. And now, in addition to the historical significance, there are personal events and personal experiences that happened to you, and now you are directly a part of this.33 ~ Darya (24, female)

Indeed, most of the interviewees noted that they treated the white-red-white flag as a historical (past) symbol due to the lack of modern personal ties with it. The events during the protests laid the foundation for a more confident identification with the white-red-white flag: “If earlier for me this symbol was more in the past and always somewhere behind my back, now it is already next to me, it has become modern and, accordingly, mine” (Yauhen, 20, male). Yauhen, who condemned the appearance of the red-green flag at the Lida Castle, supported the self-willed hoisting of the white-red-white flag at the Nesvizh Castle. According to him, it has the right to be on this building since they both belong to the same historical period.

32 Я часто представляла себе клипы, как в Америке, когда они часто едут со своим флагом или устраивают какие-то пикники, садятся на него, он везде их окружает. И мне представлялось, что и я когда-то возьму бело-красно-белый флаг, повешу его на плечи и пойду по улице. 33 То, что происходило когда-то давно – с этим сложно себя ассоциировать. А теперь, помимо исторического значения, появились личные события и личные переживания, которые произошли с тобой, и теперь ты непосредственно являешься частью этого.

53 Thanks to the personal identification of many, the white- red-white flag has gained strength as a collective, namely a national symbol: “Yes, the white-red-white flag is beautiful, but it could have remained just a historical flag, but now it has turned into a flag that Figure 14: White-red-white flag on the Nesvizh Castle most Belarusians regard as a (retrieved from Nasha Niva) national”34 (Yan, 19, male). When designating the flag as national, however, the respondents refer specifically to the protesters, whom they see as the majority of Belarusians, as a nation, respectively. In addition, interviewees note that the meanings of the white-red-white flag have been transformed precisely thanks to actions of the protesters:

The example of the current protests showed me what horror is going on under the red-green flag, and how much mutual assistance and understanding, help, sacrifice, manifestations of the best human qualities are visible under the white-red-white flag.35~ Marya (26, female)

According to respondents, apart from meanings of struggle and freedom, connotations of solidarity and hope have been added to the white-red-white flag after the start of the protests. This example, firstly, confirms the dynamic and dialogical essence of heritage (Harrison, 2013), and secondly, illustrates that heritage layers are attributed (Logan, 2012). In this case, layers have been forming for decades, which means that some have constructed a basis for others. Specifically, the interviewees emphasize that without the meanings attributed to the flag thanks

34 Да, бело-красно-белый флаг красивый, но он мог остаться просто историческим флагом, а сейчас он наборот, превратился во флаг, на который большинство белорусов смотрят как на cessнациональный. 35 Пример нынешних протестов показал мне, какой ужас творится под красно-зеленым флагом, и сколько я увидела взаимовыручки и взаимпонимания, помощи, жертвенности, проявлений лучших человеческих качеств под бело-красно-белым флагом.

54 to past generations, its modern ‘reset’ would not have been possible. Contemporary meanings successfully complement the historical ones:

White-red-white symbols, in my opinion, have become symbols of protest, because everyone suddenly felt a connection with the roots, the past, it turned out that this is what you can rely on when you are fighting for something important.36 ~ Hanna (23, female)

Figure 15: Protesters with a white-red-white flag in Minsk in August 2020 (retrieved from Reuters)

Hanna, like other respondents, sees the white-red-white flag as the main symbol of protest. Nevertheless, it has acquired this status not only because of protesters themselves but also due to the government’s efforts to ‘erase’ the white- red-white flag from the public space and repaint it red-green: “They themselves provoke all aggression and cultivate this color combination”37 (Valery, 25, male). Interviewees remind about sentences for a white-red-white box in the window, for a white-red dress or umbrella, or even for the flag of Japan since all of them have the same colors with the corresponding flag – on the one hand, such news make respondents angry, on the other hand, increase the desire to use/accept this symbol.

36 Бело-красно-белая символика, на мой взгляд, стала символом протеста, потому что внезапно все ощутили связь с корнями, прошлым, оказалось, что это то, на чем можно основываться, когда ты борешься за что-то важное. 37 Они сами провоцируют всю агрессию и сами культивируют это сочетание.

55 Therefore, above examples confirm that in order to survive, heritage can manifest itself in different forms, and its destruction only increases its power (Jaramillo, 2018): “I am sitting in the kitchen now and I see white-red-white flags in other windows, they awaken great emotions in me”38 (Valery, 25, male). However, flags are far from the only heritage that evokes emotions in respondents – the next section provides more examples in this regard.

Figure 16: Women's protest with white-red-white umbrellas in Minsk (retrieved from Radio Svaboda/Radio Free Europe)

2.2.2 Traditional customs: historical layers – modern appropriation – additional meanings

“It seemed to me that our people perceive it as a relic, like a rustic thing, some kind of obsolete”39 (Yan, 19, male). This is how Yan defined his attitude to traditional Belarusian heritage before the protests. Other respondents also perceived rituals or ceremonies as something outdated and irrelevant prior to demonstrations. However, the uprising radically changed the idea of the interviewees about the ritual , making it not only fashionable/modern but also politically acute. Yan cites the example of a pumpkin-rolling ritual performed by women in Minsk at the residence of Alexander Lukashenko on his birthday. “Firstly, I didn't even

38 Я сижу сейчас на кухне и вижу перед собой бело-красно-белые флаги в окнах, они пробуждают во мне огромные эмоции 39 Мне казалось, что люди наши воспринимают это как пережитки, типа там деревенское, какое-то такое отжившее себя.

56 know about this [ritual], and secondly, how beautiful it was! But the main thing is how accurately it conveyed our message!"40 (Yan, 19, male).

Figure 17: Women with pumpkins walk to Lukashenko’s residence in Minsk (retrieved from Onliner)

In ancient times, Belarusian women rolled out a pumpkin when they refused a man: by performing this rite in relation to Lukashenko, female protesters thus wanted to deny him as president. Therefore, this example clearly demonstrates how heritage has manifested itself as a political instrument during the protests and how the demonstrators convey their demands to the government through it. Marya (26, female) recalls a 'tougher' example of the utilization of ritual heritage, in this case, not purely Belarusian but generally Slavic: on the day of the expiration of Lukashenko's fifth presidential term, his effigies were burned all over the country. Usually, this ritual is carried out as a farewell to winter and symbolizes parting with it and its hardships. In the political context, accordingly, that was done for a symbolic farewell to Lukashenko as the .

40 Во-первых, я о таком даже не знал, во-вторых, как же это было красиво! Но главное – как круто это донесло наш посыл!

57 Figure 18: Examples of Lukashenko's effigies burned by protesters (retrieved from KYKY.org)

However, in addition to the direct message disseminated by this heritage during protests, its global meaning lies in the very fact of its use. The respondents say that the indifferent and negligent attitude of the authorities towards traditional culture prompts them to utilize it as an expression of protest and an act of transgression. This confirms the words of Way (2010) that the mobilizing tools of identity are transformed into weapons against the opponent in times of conflict.

Rituals, they are historical. The white-red-white flag, it is historical. Belarusian language, it is also historical. The fact that the authorities are trying their best to refuse this only provokes interest in this from the protesters. And naturally, this is a manifestation of protest.41 ~ Marya (26, female)

One such manifestation is that during the protests, people took to the streets in traditional costumes. This was already illustrated by the ‘protest’ rite; however, the national garments are also utilized during ‘ordinary’ demonstrations.

41 Обряды, они исторические. Бело-красно-белый флаг, он исторический. Белорусский язык, он также исторический. То что власть изо всех сил пытается от этого отказаться, только провоцирует интерес к этому со стороны протестующих. И естественно, это протестное проявление.

58 The effect of such protest dressing coincides with the conclusions of Goodrum (2005) that the sense of belonging is enhanced by putting on a traditional national costume. The interviewees note that they bought/have wanted to buy clothes in this style after the start of the Figure 19: Female protester in the national costume waves a white-red-white flag in Minsk (retrieved from Getty Images) protests.

You understand that you are involved in this, you go out in this [national dress], and you can feel it. I cannot say that this is the call of the crowd, this is not the call of the crowd, it is exactly something at the level of identity. It is something that energizes you, that gives you strength to believe, hope, and fight in your own way.42 ~ Anya (26, female)

The respondents most often talk about unity and inspiration when describing the feelings arising from the regeneration of heritage during the demonstrations: “I learned about many rituals during the protests. If they were not there, of course, it would not be so impressive, not so inspiring”43 (Viktar, 21, male). Consequently, not only participation in (Ross, 2007) but also observation of shared cultural activities reinforces feelings of group identity. Hanna (23, female), for instance, mentions the use of musical heritage, namely a song prayer for Belarus to become free:

Most of all, I was impressed by the performance of the song "Mahutny Boža” [Mighty God] by the philharmonic workers when they came out to protest. It

42 Ты понимаешь, что ты к этому причастен, ты выходишь в этом, и оно отдается. Я не могу сказать, что это зов толпы, это не зов толпы, это именно что-то на уровне идентичности, это что-то что тебя заряжает, что дает силы верить, надеяться и по-своему бороться 43 Я узнал о многих обрядах именно во время протестов. Если бы их не было, это, конечно, было бы не так впечатляюще, не так вдохновляюще.

59 was so impressive that it brought tears to my eyes! Constant chills and pride. And of course, it gave emotions and unity with these people.44

Moreover, respondents are pleased that the protests have awakened attention to cultural heritage because in the future, if the regime falls, it can be used in terms of tourism. In their opinion, Belarus can follow the example of Ukraine, which, after the Maidan, actively revived its cultural heritage and attracted many international tourists thanks to this.

The protests served as an impetus to turn to the historical roots, to the resurrection of traditions and culture in our minds. This is great, and it will be great for tourism if it continues to develop normally over time.45 ~ Marya (26, female)

Nevertheless, interviewees pay even more attention to conflict heritage (Sørensen and Viejo-Rose, 2015) that is born at this moment and has tourism potential in the future (Butler, 2010; McDowell, 2008): in their opinion, international tourists and, in particular, Europeans may be interested in a nearby country that overcomed the dictatorship. However, having evaluated this path critically, the national elites of the future, due to the promotion of a single interpretation of the conflict (McDowell, 2008), may follow their predecessors and move from marketing to propaganda. During protests, the latter is nonetheless extremely important, and graffiti analyzed in the next section play an important role in terms of both ‘painting public space’ and ‘drawing’ a new sense of national identity.

44 Сильнее всего меня впечатлило исполнение песни «Магутны Божа» работниками филармонии, когда они вышли на протест. Это было настолько впечатляюще, что вызывало слезы на глазах! Постоянные мурашки и гордость. И конечно, это придавало эмоций и единения с этими людьми. 45 Протесты послужили толчком к тому, чтобы обратиться к историческим корням, к воскрешению в наших умах традиций и культуры. Это классно, и это классно будет для туризма, если это продолжат развивать нормально со временем.

60

Figure 20: Protest graffiti in the Belarusian town of Kalinkovichi (retrieved from Onliner)

2.2.3 Draw the image and draw identity: protest graffiti – underlying meanings, ‘traumatic’ consequences

It seemed to me, who are these people? In the morning, for example, you wake up, look at pictures on Telegram channels, where you see that during the night they have painted such masterpieces, like who you are and how talented you are, you did not go to crush or break something, but in such a way, again, ultra-culturally expressed the position.46 ~ Yan (19, male)

With these enthusiastic words, Yan describes the graffiti that appeared during the protests. His position is shared by all respondents, who stress the fact that not just slogans but national-style works of art are drawn on the walls. For this reason, interviewees view the destruction of protest graffiti as vandalism. According to the respondents, if the authorities ignored graffiti, it would be a more effective tactic.

46 Мне казалось, вот кто эти люди? Утром, например, просыпаешься, смотришь фотки в телеграм-каналах, где видишь, что за ночь нарисовали такие шедевры, каак, кто вы, эти люди, и какие же вы талантливые, вы не пошли крошить что-то или ломать, а таким образом, опять же ультракультурно выразили свою позицию.

61 You look at how they [graffiti] appear simply out of nothing, and this symbolizes for you the strength of the people, that we will stand, no matter what, and this is embodied in such signs.47 ~ Katsiaryna (18, female)

Indeed, the respondents believe that if graffiti are restored after attacks/overpaintings, then the protesters will be able to win after massive repressions. “We have many monuments that symbolize something. Likewise, graffiti is a symbol of what is happening now”48 (Darya, 24, female). This perception is essential from the perspective of national identity: thanks to additional layers that appeared due to iconoclasms, now respondents consider graffiti not just art but as heritage that needs to be preserved and around which it is easier to unite. “Graffiti have become points of attraction, a unifying force that transmits the values of Belarusians”49 (Viktar, 21, male). This and the above standpoints once again emphasize that conflict ‘generates’ new heritage that embodies/symbolizes events important to its participants (Sørensen and Viejo-Rose, 2015). When discussing examples of graffiti that should be preserved in the future, all respondents mentioned the one on the so-called Square of Changes in Minsk – this graffiti is going through the longest cycle of attacks and restoration. It appeared in honor of the DJs who had played a protest song at a pro-government event a few days before the 2020 elections and were arrested for doing so. According to the respondents, it was the systematic overpainting that attracted much attention to this graffiti; moreover, the moment when the police were assigned to it made it cult: “Is it generally a normal action to put guards near the graffiti? Obviously not”50 (Darya, 24, female).

47 Ты смотришь на то, как они появляются просто из ничего, и это символизирует для тебя силу народу, то что мы выстоим, несмотря ни на что, и это воплощается в таких знаках. 48 У нас есть многие памятники, которые являются символом чего-то. Так же и граффити являются символом того, что происходит. 49 Граффити стали точками притяжения, объединяющей силой, которая транслирует ценности белорусов. 50 Ставить охрану возле граффити – это вообще нормальное действие, которым должен заниматься сотрудник правоохранительных органов? Очевидно, что нет.

62 Figure 21: Policemen guard the wall where the protest mural was first drawn and then painted over (retrieved from TUT.by)

The author of the initial version of the graffiti on the Square of Changes is considered to be Roman Bondarenko, whose story is described in a theoretical framework. The answers of the respondents confirm that the death of that Belarusian became a ‘cultural trauma’ (Alexander, 2004): the words of the interviewees illustrate that there was a reaction of shock and high emotionality due to the impact of the event on the moral human depths (Smelser, 2004).

I wanted not to believe that all this is happening and all this is real, I wanted to grieve, I wanted to cry. Overall, all these emotions were present. I am not ready to forgive the state for this. I think no one is ready to do so.51 ~ Valery (25, male)

When discussing the connection between cultural trauma and cultural heritage, the respondents, on the one hand, emphasize that without the initial relationship of the event with the white-red-white flag, it would not have led to such consequences. The flag, according to the interviewees, served as a trigger that

51 Хотелось не верить, что все это происходит и все это реально, хотелось скорбеть, хотелось плакать. В принципе, все эти эмоции присутствовали. Это государству я прощать не готов. Я думаю, что никто не готов.

63 launched a chain of actions. On the other hand, that chain of actions led to the acquisition of new meanings by heritage, confirming the theoretical statement that the conflict is also a reason for reinterpreting existing heritage (Sørensen and Viejo- Rose, 2015).

The next day we went to the Square of Changes, left flowers there, saw everything that was happening there – those drawings, the white-red-white flag, this influenced us even more, through the blood they gave the symbols an epochal meaning.52 ~ Katsiaryna (18, female)

In line with another statement by Smelser (2004), the death of Roman Bondarenko triggered a wave of solidarity, which, accordingly, affected the sense of togetherness important for national identity:

I went there a day later, on the wave when everyone came and brought flowers. This showed me how much Belarusians are ready to empathize, how much Belarusians are ready to help each other, how united we are.53 ~ Yan (19, male)

The above quotes also indicate how widescale the level of commemoration of the event was. Moreover, respondents see a spontaneous action that occurred on social media after the death of Roman Bondarenko as a virtual Figure 22: Example of a photo Belarusians shared on social memorial that complemented the media after the death of Roman Bondarenko (retrieved from TUT.by) real one:

52 На следующий день мы пошли на Площадь Перемен, оставили там цветы, увидели все, что там происходит – те рисунки, бело-красно-белый флаг, это еще сильнее повлияло, они с помощью крови придали этим символам эпохальное значение 53 Я сам ездил туда спустя день, в ту волну, когда все привозили цветы, приезжали. Насколько белорусы готовы сопереживать, насколько белорусы готовы помогать друг другу, насколько мы едины.

64

I think that Instagram at that moment became a place where people could put their pain, and not some kind of multimedia platform. I want to believe in this more. Many people did not have friends with whom they could talk about it; you need to empty it out somewhere and get feedback.54 ~ Valery (25, male)

The connection between the collective ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ through the lens of national identity is discussed in the next section. It illustrates how the collective basis created in reality migrates to virtuality, and online interaction not only strengthens offline connections but also becomes their substitute in times of crisis.

2.2.4 Collective ‘VirtuReal’: ‘ritual’ interaction in both dimensions

“When you go out to protests, you feel this atmosphere of unity, a warm feeling arises in you, and you want to be one with these wonderful people”55 (Darya, 24, female). Similar feelings from participation in protest marches are described by all respondents: thanks to the powerful positive emotions received from the demonstrations, they unite with other Belarusians, which, accordingly, affects their national identity. This statement confirms the crucial role of the emotional component in the process of identity formation (Billig, 1995; Melucci, 1995). “People got charged with emotions when they were in a huge crowd, you get charged and therefore want to share it – social media is one of the main ways”56 (Hanna, 23, female). Indeed, interviewees stress that the protests inspired them to write about that experience on social media. According to respondents, participating in the demonstrations was a “historic moment” (Marya, 26, female) they wanted to remember through social media.

54 Я думаю, что Инстаграм в тот момент стал местом, куда люди могли деть свою боль, а не какой-то мультимедийной площадкой. Все-таки я хочу в это верить больше. У многих не было людей, с которыми они могли об этом поговорить, тебе нужно куда-то это выплеснуть и получить обратную связь. 55 Когда ты выходишь на протесты, чувствуешь вот эту атмосферу единения, в тебе возникает теплое чувство, что ты хочешь быть одним целым с этими прекрасными людьми. 56 Люди получали заряд эмоций, когда находишься в огромной толпе, ты заряжаешься и поэтому хочешь делиться этим – социальные сети как один из главных способов.

65 Thus, given social media's ability to coordinate offline protest and activism (Piechota and Rajczyk, 2015), they, on the one hand, act as precursors of protest as a ritual action (Alexander, 2006). On the other hand, they are the Figure 23: Photo that Marya shared on Instagram after participating in the protest (retrieved from her Instagram account with her permission); the translated text can 'successors' of the latter be read in the Appendix C since, in order to carry through time the collective memory formed during the demonstrations (Berezin, 2001), the protesters again turn to social media. Subsequently, the virtual ritual of interaction that occurs when the collective memory is embodied also fills users with emotions (Milan, 2015):

I did that because I knew that in my posts I can express my emotions. If those emotions found a response – that happened most of the time – then I felt unity with people.57 ~ Katsiaryna (18, female)

Katsiaryna's quote proves that social media does have an essential role in terms of the (discursive) construction of national identity (Valenzuela, 2013). Moreover, other respondents emphasize the significance of social media when there are no mass protest marches in the country: virtual interaction allows interviewees to maintain/imagine a real 'mass' and not lose hope (Poell and van Dijck, 2017).

Until you march with a hundred thousand people, you see what is happening in the country, and this all [unity, togetherness] starts to blur. But when people

57 Я это делала потому, что я знала, что в своих постах я могу высказать свои эмоции. А если эти эмоции находили отклик – а так чаще всего и происходило – то я чувствовала общность с людьми.

66 show that here I am, I am nearby; certainly, this is super important.58 ~ Darya (24, female)

The respondents note that it is also important for them to see the abundance of Facebook avatars with a white-red-white flag in order, again, to construct the feeling of ‘we-ness’. Overall, social media have become an outlet for alternative heritage and history dissemination in contrast to traditional media. Anya (26, female), who supplemented her avatar with the white-red-white flag, notes that she has done this to demonstrate her national identity and express her position through it. Moreover, she believes that virtual actions can become the foundation for real ones:

Even if today they put a ‘sign’ on their avatar, tomorrow they will take the white-red-white flag and go out with it to protest, or simply put on red-white clothes and go out into the street.59

Nevertheless, coming back to ‘virtuality’, the interviewees note that, thanks to protest activity, for the first time, they felt the desire to express their national identity on social media. The respondents feel proud of belonging to the Belarusian nation; this fact has finally become significant for them:

I tried to describe what I could not describe before, I wanted to formulate it. I saw that others were formulating it as well, that gave me the feeling that everyone was experiencing something similar, that everyone seemed to be awakened.60 ~ Viktar (21, male)

58 Пока ты не идешь маршем в сто тысяч человек, ты видишь, что происходит в стране, и вот это все начинает размываться и теряться. Но когда люди показывают, что вот я рядом, и вот я такой, это, конечно, суперважно. 59 Пускай сегодня они поставили себе значок на аватарку, завтра он возьмет бело-красно- белый флаг и выйдет на улицу на протест, или просто наденет красно-белую одежду и выйдет на улицу. 60 Я попытался описать то, что раньше не мог описать, мне хотелось это сформулировать. Я видел, что это формулируют и другие, и это придавало ощущения, что все испытвают нечто подобное, что все будто бы пробудились.

67 The next section elaborates on the trend to share thoughts/comments on national identity and summarizes why the respondents came to a new sense of it. Moreover, this ‘awakening’ is analyzed in terms of movement/transition on the spectrum.

2.3 From emigration to integration: transition on the spectrum – changes in thoughts, plans, perceptions

I think these people are the best on the planet, no matter how it sounds. This feeling appeared in me only now, because before that I was thinking about how to emigrate from here. My biggest dream is that the business that I would like to do, the life that I would like to live, can be possible in Belarus.61 ~ Katsiaryna (18, female)

Laudatory statements regarding Belarusians are heard not only from Katsiaryna but also from all other respondents. Furthermore, many of them (mainly those who had repressed identity before the protests) note that earlier, they wanted to emigrate from Belarus. However, as in the case of Katsiaryna, at the moment, they are willing to stay in the country: “Now I want to do something for this country and for these people, and it would be hard for me to leave. I would really like to participate in the creation of a new country”62 (Darya, 24, female). The above quotes are direct evidence that the Belarusian protests have affected the layer of national identity of respondents and (re)constructed it. However, this process is also multi-layered, as it includes not just one but many repetitive procedures that bind actors together (Melucci, 1995). Real and virtual ‘ritual interaction’ during protests, cultural contestation over heritage, cultural enactments with its help, consequences of cultural trauma – all these elements have merged to form a sense of ‘us’ and (re)shape national identity. Thus, as noted above, the actions of the Belarusian authorities outlined the category of ‘them’ more clearly in the eyes

61 Я считаю этот народ лучшим на планете, как бы это ни звучало. Это чувство во мне появилось только сейчас, потому что до этого я думала о том, как бы быстрее уехать отсюда. Моя самая большая мечта, чтобы дело, которым мне хотелось бы заниматься, жизнь, которой мне хотелось бы жить, была возможна в Беларуси. 62 Сейчас мне хочется что-то сделать для этой страны и для этих людей, и мне было бы тяжело уехать. Мне бы искренне хотелось участвовать в создании новой страны.

68 of the respondents, and the processes within the protest movement formed the category of ‘we’. Built on this foundation, a renewed/awakened national identity encourages respondents to look at the future of the country differently: “At the moment, this state can no longer marry this red-green nation. The nation has changed and is not ready for this. But this nation is now ready to make the marriage with the white-red-white side” (Valery, 25, male). Currently, absolutely all respondents consider themselves to be in the pro- democratic zone of the spectrum of national identity – everyone who previously had a hybrid, repressed, or pro-Soviet identity has shifted their positions. This change confirms the fluid and dynamic nature of (Belarusian) national identity (Palmer, 1999), thereby proving the correctness of displaying it as a spectrum. Moreover, interviewees' responses illustrate that due to polarization taking place during the national conflict/protests, shifts within the spectrum are more drastic (Alder and Wang, 2014). The presence of many variations gives Belarusians the opportunity to choose their position and change it, taking into account the surrounding context. As for those who were in the pro-democratic zone before the protests, their position on the spectrum remained more or less stable. However, this does not mean that they did not feel the changes in terms of national identity: the interviewees note that they finally realized that they belong to most Belarusians.

Previously, many even preferred not to say that they were from Belarus, but now they are proud of it. And I felt it in other Belarusians. It gave me pride and confidence as well. For my country, for this nation. I am very glad that many Belarusians came to this in August, that Belarus is not a mark in their passports or birth certificates for them, that this is much more.63 ~ Anya (26, female)

Indeed, the respondents note that they now proudly tell foreigners about their nationality; in general, interviewees also positively assess changes brought

63 Раньше многие даже предпочитали не говорить, что они из Беларуси, а сейчас нет, они этим гордятся. И я это ощутила в других белорусах. Это придало гордости и уверенности мне самой также. За свою страну, за эту нацию. Я очень рада, что многие белорусы пришли к этому в августе, что Беларусь для них не отметка в паспорте или свидетельстве о рождении, что это гораздо больше.

69 about by protests from the perspective of the international image of Belarus. Yan (19, male), for example, is sure that foreigners now look at his country differently:

Earlier, how did foreigners imagine us? This is something near Russia, they eat potatoes there and a dictator rules there, but now they know much more about our flag than about the red-green one, they see our people as peaceful and striving for freedom. That is cool!64

Many respondents emphasize the peacefulness of Belarusian protesters, despite the violent repressions by the authorities. The interviewees note that they do not know uprisings where the participants would be so unwaveringly peaceful and cultural in every sense of the word. Therefore, they consider these traits of Belarusians to be unique, which accordingly reform and create new facets of the myth of superiority (Trošt, 2019). A new favorable perception of the international image of Belarus, a desire to openly and confidently declare their national identity, pride in belonging to the Belarusian nation – all these transformations are indicators that at the moment the national values coincide with respondents' personal ones, thereby demonstrating 'identity convergence' (Snow, 2001). Moreover, national identity now affects personal identity of the interviewees since they express a desire to work not only for their good but also for the good of the nation. The only condition to bring this to life is a victory over the Lukashenko regime.

64 Раньше как иностранцы представляли нас? Это что-то возле России, там едят картошку и там правит диктатор, а сейчас они знают о нашем флаге гораздо больше чем о красно-зеленом, о наших людях как о мирных и стремящихся к свободе. Это круто!

70 CONCLUSION

On June 14, 2021 (the day of the submission of this thesis), a new law signed by Alexander Lukashenko comes into force. It aims to prevent the rehabilitation of Nazism. One of the main changes introduced by the law is the extension of the definition of Nazi symbols to include the symbols of organizations collaborating with the Nazis ("Lukashenko podpisal", 2021). Consequently, after the 'protest paradigm' (Chan and Lee, 1984; McLeod and Hertog, 1992, 1999) in the media, the regime wants, along with the swastika and the flag of the Third Reich, to officially recognize the white-red-white flag used by collaborationists during the GPW, as the Nazi one. Such a decision would make waving it illegal and thereby easier to persecute and repress. As this thesis has demonstrated, the Belarusian authorities are building a discourse referring to the GPW events around that heritage to legitimize their current actions against the protesters. Therefore, by underlining the white-red-white flag as a symbol of Nazi collaborationists, the government is trying to use it for political purposes (namely, to neutralize protesters by exposing them as fascists): the interweaving of the political and symbolic dimensions in such a process as heritage has been explored in this thesis. In order to conform to the modern approach in this regard, those dimensions were investigated through those directly involved in the process, namely young Belarusians participating in protests. After conducting interviews and analyzing data, it can be argued that heritage acts, firstly, as a participant in the 'dialogue', the purpose of which is to establish contact with the values of a specific era and through objects, places, and practices transfer them to the present, following modern political needs. Specifically, the regime 'communicates' (Dicks, 2000) with Soviet/GPW heritage as a mediator of the principles and standards of the USSR. In contrast to this, the protesters deliberately prolong the 'dialogue' in historical terms to demonstrate a different – both political and cultural – 'essence' of Belarus with the help of the traditional/pre-Soviet heritage and annoy the government. Traditional/state-controlled media, on the one hand, and social media, on the other, are tools for 'encoding' (Hall, 1992, as cited in

71 Gegner and Ziino, 2012) heritage and dissemination of favorable interpretations to a broad audience. Second, as a "symbolic representation of identity" (Smith, 2006, p. 30), heritage (for instance, flags, their colors or cultural customs and traditions) is utilized to 'paint public space' and thus dominate the symbolic 'world' of conflict (Docherty, 2001). This cyclical struggle, when one representation is erased or replaced by another, is a ‘cat-and-mouse game’ during which, furthermore, new representations as additional 'weapons' give birth to new heritage (Sørensen and Viejo-Rose, 2015). In particular, due to the constant confrontation around graffiti, they have turned from the art of protest into its heritage. The dimensions of heritage are closely related to those of national identity (Harrison, 2013); therefore, the study of the former, accordingly, affected the latter. The interviews have shown that, indeed, the reinterpretation of existing heritage and the emergence of new objects, practices, places connected with the protests affected the sense of the national identity of young Belarusians. Their position on the spectrum of the Belarusian identity has changed in response to a new context: at the moment, all interviewees 'place' themselves in the pro-democratic 'zone'. Indeed, in order to add fluidity and dynamics (Palmer, 1999) to existing models of Belarusian national identity (Bekus, 2013; Brzozowska, 2003; Hansen, 2006; Kazakievič, 2011; Way, 2010), the concept of spectrum has been presented in the thesis. Respondents' answers, on the one hand, confirm that identity processes are especially active during protests (Klandermans, 2014): the spectrum format thus allows a researcher to more easily and accurately 'record' changes in this regard. On the other hand, interviewees often mention states of sleep and awakening when speaking of national identity: this observation prompts a rethinking of the components of the spectrum, specifically, changing the naming of 'repressive' identity to 'sleeping' in order to better match the feelings of Belarusians. As one of the reasons for 'sleep', the interviewees cite the lack of heritage and/or history that would unite and make them proud of their nation. The pro-Soviet 'option' that the government proposed/promoted did not resonate with most respondents because of the mainly negative associations that period aroused in them. However, the red-green flag – the primary signifier of pro-Soviet national

72 identity – was taken for granted before the protests and did not raise fundamental questions (Billig, 1995). Now this flag is 'marginalized' in the interviewees' eyes: the symbol transmits meanings of violence and cruelty and causes anger and aggression in young Belarusians. The actors who have attributed those connotations to the red-green flag are the police officers who committed brutality against people during the protests under this flag. Therefore, as shown in the thesis, heritage is a dynamic and dialogical process where an object, place, or practice is constantly reevaluated according to the discourse between them and those directly involved (Harrison, 2013). This discourse has been renewed in relation to the white-red-white flag as well: in addition to the meanings of freedom and independence attributed to heritage due to the connection with the Belarusian People's Republic, the symbol was supplemented with layers of solidarity, unity, and peace. According to respondents, additional associations arose because of the corresponding actions of the protesters acting under that flag. Nonetheless, demonstrations themselves are actors in this regard, adding emotional weight to the symbol (Ross, 2007). Moreover, as in the case of the red-green flag, the Belarusian authorities are also among those who influenced that process: due to different discourses around the white-red-white flag, namely 'heritage dissonance' (Kisić, 2017), cultural contestation (Ross, 2007) was broken out, where the regime actively participates. Whereas earlier the Belarusian government tried to blur unfavorable meanings via history textbooks (Goujon, 2010; Zadora, 2014), now it has moved on to more brutal actions, namely to iconoclasms (Zarandona et al., 2017), in order to deprive the protesters of the symbols rely on through the destruction of heritage. In addition to the flag itself, attacks also affect its 'modifications', including graffiti of the corresponding colors. However, as it should be according to the 'canons' of iconoclasm (Mitchell, 1987), heritage, consequently, has acquired a new and even more powerful image. The white-red-white flag began to be perceived as the national one rather than historical by the interviewees. Graffiti, as emphasized above, are now seen as 'separate' heritage reflecting the events of the conflict (Sørensen and Viejo-Rose, 2015). Therefore, as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bleibleh and Awadb, 2020), one side uses heritage of the other as a 'target' to

73 destroy their identity, while the adversary, through protection/restoration efforts, resists against attacks and simultaneously imbues both heritage and identity with additional power. Given the parallels between heritage and national mythology (Rampley, 2012), changes in one process, as the Belarusian case shows, correlate with transformations in another. In particular, 'peaceful' layers of the white-red-white flag embody/support the reformation of the myth of superiority for protesters (Trošt, 2019), which is now focused on the intractable peacefulness of Belarusians. Graffiti, in turn, are important in terms of the myth of renewal, as they symbolize ‘resurrection’ in spite of violent attacks. Due to the cultural trauma (Alexander, 2004) provoked by the death of Roman Bondarenko, the myth of martyrdom has also been updated: now the victims of protest (not Soviet) repressions are in the foreground. While in the case of top-down construction of national myths, history textbooks act as their main sites (Brockmeier, 2010; Trošt, 2019), with bottom-up modifications of this process, as the thesis illustrated, this role is played by social media. In addition to carrying collective (protest) memory (Berezin, 2001; McDowell, 2016), they are also crucial in terms of strengthening the sense of 'we-ness' (Melucci, 1995), as the virtual writing of the 'history textbook' is an interactive and synergetic process. Therefore, the fact that rebuilding of national myths and changes concerning heritage were initiated and consolidated by protesters/citizens confirms the theoretical statement that national elites in modern times are not omnipotent in constructing national identity. Through the ('revolutionary') modification of its key elements, citizens can also contribute in this regard, which means they should not be excluded from the discourse of national identity. Moreover, external transformations also affect internal ones: in addition to the fact that the protests have filled national myths with 'fresh' narratives, they forced the respondents to perceive the alternative Belarusian history differently, transferring it from the 'imaginary' to the real dimension. As a result, young Belarusians who took part in this study now have a unifying history/heritage they are proud of. The protests, thereby confirming the conclusions of Fournier (2007) about Ukrainian youth, influenced the reassessment of those components of national identity and, in general, the rise of national

74 consciousness. Considering that the respondents have a predominantly negative attitude towards the USSR, they are closer to Ukrainians in terms of the Soviet Union's perception as well (Nikolayenko, 2008). However, the above comparisons cannot be extrapolated to all Belarusian youth due to the small-scale sample. Overall, the results of this qualitative study are not subject to generalization – this is the main limitation of the thesis. Nevertheless, its purpose was to dive deeply into the topic to reveal insights invisible on the 'surface'. In turn, the findings from detailed exploration provide a basis for future research that can test their 'generalizing' potential through a larger sample. Moreover, in order to add dynamics in this regard, it is essential to assess national identity of young Belarusians after the protest period (the spectrum, again, will be a helpful tool). In addition, focusing on other age groups can also improve understanding of the impact of protests on Belarusian national identity. Further research on the role of heritage in Belarusian society will be no less relevant. However, such a study will depend on the development of the situation in Belarus: if the regime falls, the ‘formalization’ of conflict heritage/relations with Soviet heritage can be assessed. Otherwise, new examples of the utilization of wartime/Soviet heritage for political purposes may expand the study of its functionality/effectiveness.

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95 Appendix A. List of respondents

Females Males

6 4

Katsiaryna, 18, female, student Hanna, 23, female, PR manager Yan, 19, male, student Valery, 25, male, engineer Kasia, 22, female, economist Yauhen, 20, male, photographer Anya, 26, female, editor Darya, 24, female, operational manager Marya, 26, female, chemical technologist Viktar, 21, male, copywriter

96 Appendix B. Interview guide (respondents – young Belarusians under 26)

Position on the spectrum: before/after

• What were your feelings of national identity before and after the start of the protests? (neutrality, pride, dormancy, confidence, or other feelings) • What did/does it mean to you to be a Belarusian?

Flags: how their meanings has changed (if changed)

• What was your attitude towards the red-green and white-red-white flags before and after the start of the protests? (embedded values and meanings, evoked emotions) • What events has changed your attitude towards those flags? • What is more important for you in the white-red-white flag: its historical meanings, contemporary events, or all together?

Heritage: a symbolic-political role

• What was your attitude towards the abundance of Soviet heritage in Belarus before the start of the protests? What do you think about the USSR? Has the attitude towards it changed after the protests? • How do you feel about the pro-Lukashenko car rallies to the monuments of the Great Patriotic War? Why was this method and this heritage chosen? • Did the attacks on graffiti affect their perception by you? Would these objects have such a powerful meaning if the authorities had not been actively destroying them? • How do you feel about the use of traditional heritage during protest demonstrations (rituals, music, costumes)? What examples do you remember? Have they influenced your sense of national identity?

97 The death of Roman Bondarenko as a cultural trauma

• Why did the death of Roman Bondarenko become so resonant? • How did you feel after this tragedy? Has it affected your felling of national identity? Has it strengthened sense of togetherness with protesters?

Media: assessing the position of traditional ones and the impact of social ones

• How do you feel about the protesters being portrayed as Nazis in state media? Why was this strategy chosen? Do you find it effective? • Why did you supplement your Facebook avatar with a white-red-white flag? • What prompted you to write about your feelings of national identity on social media? Was it important for you to see similar posts from other Belarusians?

98 Appendix C. Russian-language and translated into English text of Marya's Instagram post dated August 16, 2020

СТЕНЫ РУХНУТ. У меня нет слов, достойных описать все то, что происходило сегодня в большинстве городов Беларуси. Этот день не может не войти в историю, и я просто рада быть его частью. Белорусы – потрясающий народ, который за последние недели не раз на деле показал, что способен сплотиться перед лицом общей угрозы и действовать во благо своих людей. Я впервые в жизни искренне горжусь своей принадлежностью к этой национальности. == WALLS WILL COLLAPSE. I have no words worthy to describe everything that happened today in most cities of Belarus. This day cannot but go down in history, and I am just glad to be a part of it. Belarusians are an amazing people who have shown in practice more than once in recent weeks that they are able to unite in the face of a common threat and act for the benefit of their people. For the first time in my life, I am sincerely proud of my belonging to this nationality.

99