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Socialist Parties and the Question of War And Revue des études slaves XC 1-2 | 2019 Les révolutions russes de 1917 Enjeux politiques et artistiques Revolutionary Defencism as a cul-de-sac? Socialist Parties and the Question of War and Peace in the Russian Revolution of 1917/18 Le défensisme révolutionnaire comme cul-de-sac ? Les partis socialistes et la question de la guerre et de la paix dans la révolution russe de 1917-18 Lutz Häfner Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/res/2762 DOI: 10.4000/res.2762 ISSN: 2117-718X Publisher Institut d'études slaves Printed version Date of publication: 20 July 2019 Number of pages: 47-62 ISBN: 978-2-7204-0560-0 ISSN: 0080-2557 Electronic reference Lutz Häfner, « Revolutionary Defencism as a cul-de-sac? Socialist Parties and the Question of War and Peace in the Russian Revolution of 1917/18 », Revue des études slaves [Online], XC 1-2 | 2019, Online since 20 July 2020, connection on 09 December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/res/2762 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/res.2762 Revue des études slaves REVOLUTIONARY DEFENCISM AS A CUL-DE-SAC? Socialist Parties and the Question of War and Peace in the Russian Revolution of 1917/18 Lutz Häfner University of Göttingen With the benefit of hindsight, the Menshevik leader fedor Dan conceded in his West european exile, that “the immediate termination of war, even at the price of serious sacrifices” would have been imperative after the february revo- lution of 1917.1 This statement of one of the most important social-democratic revolutionaries serves as my starting point. Like rex A. Wade in his seminal study2 or fedor A. Seleznev quite recently,3 I will argue that the question of war and peace was the pivot of all politics in 1917: The major issues of political dis- sent–such as the agrarian question, the social question, the provisioning of russia or the elections to and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly–were related to this topic. Moreover, it was the main bone of contention when the radical fac- tions of the Social-Democratic Internationalists and the Left Socialist revolu- tionaries (Internationalists) split off their old parties in autumn of 1917. The issue of war and peace got a new political quality after October 1917 when the Soviet Government accepted to conclude not only a separate but even an undemocratic peace dictate. Was the “shameful” peace treaty, which amounted to the decomposition of the former empire, politically necessary because it presented the single option if the Bolshevik government was to sur- vive?4 Did the peace treaty become a caesura in russian domestic politics which 1. Th. Dan, « Die Sozialdemokratie rußlands nach dem Jahre 1908 », Julius Martow, Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie. Mit einem Nachtrag von Th. Dan, Berlin, Dietz, 1926, rpt. erlangen, Politladen erlangen, 1973, p. 225-320, here p. 303. 2. rex A. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February-October 1917, Stanford CA, Stanford Uni- versity Press, 1969, p. VI ; Idem, « The Great War, revolution and the Struggle Over Peace : russia, 1917 », Revolutionary Russia 30, 2017, 2, p. 182-195, here p. 183. 3. fedor A. Seleznev, Революция 1917 года и борьба элит вокруг вопроса о сепаратном мире с Германией. 1914-1918 гг., Sankt-Peterburg, Aletejja, 2017, p. 11. 4. Wade, « The russian revolution and Civil War », The Cambridge History of Communism, vol. 1 : World Revolution and Socialism in One Country 1917-1941, Silvio Pons, Stephen A. Smith (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 74-95, here p. 84. Revue des études slaves, Paris, XC/1-2, 2019, p. 47-62. 48 LUTZ Häfner further deepened the rift between the different Socialist parties? for the parties represented in the All-russian Central executive Committee of the Soviets the peace question became the last chance to stop the fratricidal war and to reunite the warring socialist camps.5 This was, however, at the cost of offering military resistance against the Quadruple Alliance. Did the peace further contribute to diminish the popularity of the Bolshevik party especially among its proletarian followers as richard Sakwa, Tony Brenton and other historians suggest or did Lenin sacrifice the russian revolution in order to save Bolshevik arbitrary power as the Anarchist Vsevolod Volin argued?6 Did Soviet russia get the “breathing spell” that Lenin and his comrades regarded as conditio sine qua non to save the revolution and to enhance the construction of socialist state and society? To answer these questions, I will start with some brief remarks about the differentiations within the socialist camp right from the beginning of WWI until the february revolution. Continuing with the program of immediate ge- neral peace without annexations and indemnities of the Petrograd Soviet the paper analyses the positions of the main socialist parties concerning war and peace. The four options were: 1) defencism, 2) revolutionary war, 3) not war but upris ing, and 4) separate peace and breathing spell. The penultimate section discusses the attitudes of the Soviets of workers, soldiers and peasants and their reactions to the peace issue in february and March of 1918. finally, results are summarised and evaluated. “THe WAr AS fATHer Of ALL THInGS” The outbreak of WWI signified not only the failure of the Second Socialist International. It clarified also to which extent nationalism as an ideology of inte- gration alienated the constituency of socialism and its parties. The “political religion” of nationalism was more encompassing and flexible than socialism that was never attractive to certain layers of the society. After the outbreak of the war every party belonging to the Second Socialist International had to raise the crucial question “What is your take on war” (and–of course–on revolution)?7 5. The demand to build a united socialist Government was popular among Menshevik-Internationalists. even the Left Srs thought of an agreement on defence with the moderate socialists after the resumption of hostilities on february 18. Lenin, however, opposed any cooperation with of other socialist factions, see Alexander rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power : The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd, Bloomington, In, Bloomington University Press, 2007, p. 162 ; Aleksandr V. Šubin, Старт Страны Советов. Революция. Октябрь 1917-март 1918, Sankt-Peterburg, Piter, 2017, p. 425. 6. Tony Brenton, « Introduction », Was revolution inevitable? Turning Points of the Russian Revolution, Tony Brenton (ed.), London, Profile Books, 2016, p. 1-10, here p. 7 ; richard Sakwa, « 1917-22. The rise of Leninism: The death of political pluralism in the post-revolutionary Bolshevik party », Ibid., p. 262-283, here p. 271; Vsevolod M. Volin, « К вопросу о причинах “поражения анархизма” в русской революции », Анархический вестник, 1923, 5-6, p. 8-12, here p. 11. 7. Lutz Häfner, « Zwischen ‚Vaterlandsverteidigung‘ und ‚Defätismus’: die Partei der Sozialrevolutio- näre und die ‚dritte Kraft‘ als Weg aus dem Krieg », Krieg und Frieden im Spiegel des Sozialismus 1914- 1918, frank Jacob, riccardo Altieri (eds.), Berlin, Metropol, 2018, p. 367-387, here p. 367. reVOLUTIOnAry DefenCISM AS A CUL-De-SAC? 49 Bitter internal conflicts arose about this question in every party. Two opposing socialist camps became apparent. The right wing of the entente socialists took a nationalist stand. They referred to the behaviour of the German Social-democratic party which gave their parliamentary consent to the war loans and thus concluded the so called “fortress truce” [Burgfrieden]. In russia leading defencists such as the “father or russian Marxism”, the social democrat Georgii V. Plekhanov, or the Socialist revolutionary [Sr] Il′ia I. Bunakov-fondaminskii were convinced that it was time to renounce previous and now atavistic psychological patterns of behaviour and to have confidence in the Tsarist Government.8 They referred to Prussian militarism as the most dreadful threat to democracy and freedom which made a close alliance with the autocracy imperative.9 The left wing of the socialists took an internationalist stand. Some of them regarded the war as evil. They agreed, that russia’s victory in the war would consolidate Tsarism. Therefore, they wanted to exploit the war as a revolution- ary base to overthrow the old regime. They intended to make a virtue from necessity and to transform the international military crisis into a domestic rev- olutionary crisis.10 The Sr-Internationalist Mark A. natanson, who participated in both international Socialist conferences in Zimmerwald and Kiental, regarded the war as a prelude to revolution.11 Basically, the russian defencists performed a radical paradigm shift: neither socialism, nor the internal worker’s movement, nor the interests of the toiling masses stood at the centre of their actions but the defence of their country and its well-being.12 Therefore, they could not even know mutual class interests of the world proletariat. Their foes were the Germans including workers and Socialists, whereas the russian and entente bourgeoisie were their partners.13 The position of the russian defencists reminds us of the jingoist slogan of the former US-secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz: „My country, right or wrong“. THe feBrUAry reVOLUTIOn AnD THe PeACe ISSUe In the first weeks after the february revolution, it became evident that the Soviet leadership had no unambiguous attitude towards the war. The opinions ranged from defencism to the total withdrawal from the war. The dominant centre 8. Hoover Institution Archives, Boris I. nicolaevsky Collection, no. 232, Box 377, f. 1, l. 2. 9. Vadim V. rudnev, « Двадцать лет тому назад », Современные записки 56, 1935, p. 375-392, here p. 377-378. 10. Viktor M. Černov, « Два течения », Война и “третья сила”. Сборник статей, Petrograd, tip. P. P. Soikina, 1917, p. 11-16, here p. 15 ; Жизнь, no. 18 (80), 17.10.1915, p.
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