RUSSIA AND Mark N. Katz*

This article discusses the improvement in relations between and Qatar between the years 2004 to 2007 and the significance of this rapprochement.

From 2004 to 2007, relations between Yandarbiyev was vice and Qatar went from extremely poor to under . When remarkably cooperative. How did this happen? the latter was killed by Russian forces in April Considering that Russia and Qatar are both 1996, Yandarbiyev became acting president. among the world’s three largest producers of Yandarbiyev, however, lost the Chechen natural gas (the third being Iran), what does presidential elections of January 1997. He then this Russian-Qatari rapprochement portend? went to Taliban-ruled where he Even early on in the Putin era, there was opened a Chechen embassy in Kabul and a recognition in Moscow that Russia could consulate in Kandahar. By 1999, though, he benefit from cooperating with Qatar in the oil had moved to Qatar where he reportedly raised and gas spheres.1 Moscow also hoped to sell money for the Chechen cause.6 From 1999 arms to Qatar as well as to boost trade and through most of 2002, Moscow “periodically investment ties with the country. The visit of raised the issue of Yandarbiyev’s presence in the emir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Qatar,” but only “half-heartedly,” according to al-Thani to Moscow and his meeting with Vremya novostei.7 The Kremlin, however, Putin in December 2001 raised expectations stepped up its demands after the October 2002 for increased Russian-Qatari cooperation.2 seizure of a Moscow theater by Chechen There was even talk of Russia and Qatar rebels and the ensuing hostage crisis. One of working together to create a “gas OPEC the leaders of this group spoke to Yandarbiyev [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting by cell phone during the crisis, which was Countries].”3 proof enough for Moscow that Yandarbiyev None of these prospects for Russian-Qatari was an accomplice.8 In addition to getting cooperation, however, were fulfilled—at least Yandarbiyev placed on ’s most- not then. There were also important wanted list, the UN Security Council’s differences between Moscow and related counterterrorist committee added him to its to Chechnya. Even when he was still prime “sanctions list” in June 2003. Russia formally minister, Putin declared Qatar to be one of a requested Yandarbiyev’s extradition from dozen countries which he believed was Qatar in May 2003. Yet while “Officials in “exporting terrorism to Russia.”4 At the time Qatar promised to consider the request,” they of the visit made by the Russian president’s did not take any action against him.9 special representative Vasily Sredin to all the On February 13, 2004, Yandarbiyev died in Gulf Cooperation Council states in late 2000, Doha when the vehicle he was traveling in Nezavisimaya gazeta described these countries blew up. Shortly thereafter, Qatari authorities as “a very difficult region for Russia, in large detained three Russian officials whom they part due to the Chechen problem.”5 In accused of killing Yandarbiyev. As it would addition, a sharp dispute arose between on other occasions when Putin opponents died Moscow and Doha over former Chechen rebel suddenly and mysteriously, Moscow hotly president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. denied any involvement in Yandarbiyev’s

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) 1 Russia and Qatar

death.10 Yet circumstantial evidence strongly declined, though, to name the prison where suggested that it was. they were being held.18 Even if they are no Since one of the three detained Russians longer actually in prison, the two have not had a diplomatic passport, he was released to surfaced in public, and so there is no evidence the Russian Embassy in Doha. The other two, that Russia has violated the prisoner exchange however, were held and charged with agreement with Qatar. complicity in murder.11 Moscow’s initial During 2005 and 2006, Russian-Qatari reaction was extremely hostile and belligerent; relations quietly improved. In April 2006, a Qatari wrestler and his trainer were arrested Qatar joined Russia and Iran in announcing at Sheremetovo airport, in an apparent the provision of funds to the Palestinian retaliation for Qatar’s arrest of the two Authority despite the American-European- Russians. The trainer, though, turned out to be Israeli embargo against it. Vremya novostei a citizen of Belarus and not Qatar, while the seemed to delight in pointing out that this wrestler was a citizen of both Qatar and caused tension in U.S.-Qatari relations.19 In Belarus. Further, Russian Defense Minister May 2006, Sergei Lavrov went to Doha to stated that the “Russian participate in the Dialogue on Cooperation in leadership will use all available leverage on Asia. He delivered a message from Putin to Qatar to secure its citizens’ release,” thus the emir, but little of substance regarding raising the possibility that Moscow respond Russian-Qatari relations appears to have with the use of force.12 Doha initially refused occurred.20 In October 2006, the Qatari to allow into Qatar attorneys from abroad for Foreign Minister visited Moscow and met the detained Russians.13 with Putin, who made a point of thanking Yet the crisis began to de-escalate Qatar for supporting Russia in becoming an following a March 2004 telephone observer member of the Organization of the conversation between Putin and the Qatari Islamic Conference in 2005.21 Emir. Russian authorities soon thereafter Russian-Qatari relations appeared to released the Qatari wrestler and his trainer, improve dramatically when Putin himself paid who immediately flew to Doha. Qatar then a visit to Qatar (as well as Saudi Arabia and declared persona non grata the Russian with Jordan) in February 2007. His visit to Qatar, the diplomatic passport whom Doha believed however, appeared to be particularly was also involved in Yandarbiyev’s death; he significant since it occurred shortly after two immediately left for Moscow.14 Speculation events: first, the January 2007 proposal by soon arose that Moscow and Doha had Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene’i that reached a face-saving agreement to resolve the Russia and Iran work to form a natural gas crisis. In the months that followed, the two cartel;22 and second, Putin’s February 10, Russians were tried and convicted of murder, 2007 speech in Munich that was highly critical but were sentenced to life in prison—not to of American foreign policy and which seemed death.15 A Qatari appellate court soon upheld aimed at rallying other governments, as well both their guilty verdicts and their life as world public opinion, against it.23 sentences.16 Not long afterward, Russia and Despite his Munich speech, Putin did not Qatar signed a prisoner exchange agreement. emphasize this anti-American theme in Qatar. At the end of 2004, the Qatari Emir allowed He was also somewhat coy about the gas the two Russians to return to Russia to serve cartel proposal, stating that he had not rejected out their sentences.17 it but found the idea “interesting.” He Once this happened, the crisis in Russian- emphasized, though, that the idea needed to be Qatari relations appeared to come to an end. “examined,” especially in light of the Speculation arose that Moscow would release “mistakes” that “other cartel organizations” the two Russians, but in December 2005, a (apparently referring to OPEC) had made. He Russian official denied this and stated that also noted that there was nothing to prevent they were still serving their sentences. He gas producing countries from consulting and

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coordinating their approaches.24 Putin even out, it would be extremely difficult (perhaps indicated that “Russia and Qatar will impossible) to create a cartel that could coordinate their actions in the gas sphere influence natural gas prices as effectively as irrespective of whether a gas equivalent of OPEC influences oil prices. Most of the OPEC is set up.”25 world’s natural gas (80 percent according to Indeed, there was no Russian-Qatari Valery Yazev, president of the Russian Gas agreement about working to create a gas Society) is sold under long-term contracts.32 cartel. Instead, a far more modest agreement This and the fact that most of the world’s was reached on protecting investments in each natural gas is conveyed by pipelines that are other’s countries.26 In addition, Russian expensive and cannot be rerouted when a presidential aide Sergei Prikhodko noted that pricing dispute occurs means that there is not a Russian companies, including Gazprom, global market for natural gas, but many Lukoil, and RUSAL, sought investment separate markets. In addition, the strong opportunities in Qatar.27 Lukoil and Qatar linkage that has so far existed between natural Petroleum signed an MOU on “possible joint gas prices and oil prices also limits the ability activities” in Qatar.28 Qatari-Russian military- of gas producers to set prices. technical cooperation was also discussed, As Kommersant noted in April 2007, though no specific agreements were though, liquefied natural gas (LNG) amounted announced.29 Shortly after Putin’s visit, to only 6.9 percent of global gas consumption Russian sources expressed the hope that Qatar in 2005, but is set to rise rapidly.33 Qatar, would purchase Russian weapons. A Gazprom which mainly ships its natural gas as LNG, delegation visited Qatar in March 2007 to could increase its exports tremendously. Qatar discuss cooperation in the oil and gas spheres (or any other LNG producer) can sell its with Qatar Petroleum, Qatargas, and the Qatar natural gas to any country with LNG re- State Investment Agency.30 gasification facilities, or countries that can In April 2007, the annual meeting of the build them—including those to which Russia Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) took either now exports or hopes to export gas via place in Qatar. The Russian delegation was led pipeline. What this means is that tiny Qatar, by Industry and Energy Minister Viktor with its enormous LNG exporting capacity, Khristenko. While some Russians seemed may be in the best position to serve as an eager to promote a gas cartel, Khristenko was alternative to Russia as a gas supplier to any more circumspect. He noted that this would country with a coastline (and perhaps even to not be agreed upon at the Doha meeting, and some that do not). As former Yukos director “dismissed European” fears about this.31 Alexander Temerko wrote, “only LNG There did not appear to be any differences technology has the potential to undermine a between Russia and Qatar on this issue. In gas cartel.”34 other words, Moscow portrayed itself as Moscow, then, has a strong incentive to interested in exploring coordination in the gas court Qatar just for the defensive aim of sphere with Qatar, but not as trying to push persuading it not to undercut Russian gas Doha on this issue. exports. While Kommersant saw price Beginning with the March 2004 Putin-Emir coordination in the gas market as Hamad telephone conversation about the “impossible,” it declared that “coordinating Yandarbiyev affair and accelerating in 2007 actions for new pipeline and LNG projects with the Putin visit to Doha, Moscow has undertaken by GECF countries is entirely clearly been cultivating good relations with viable. This would enable Russia, Qatar, and Qatar. Whether a natural gas cartel is actually other GECF countries to hold out for higher formed or not, the desire to coordinate with gas prices from investors and consumers.”35 In Qatar in the natural gas sphere appears to be other words, while Russia, Qatar, and other motivating Russia to do so. However, as many leading gas producers may not be able to observers—including Russians—have pointed directly set prices, their acting together to limit

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) 3 Russia and Qatar supply can serve to keep them higher than assassination. Whether Doha will do so in the what they would be if the major producers all future is uncertain, but appears unlikely. On acted to maximize their exports. the other hand, Qatar-based al-Jazeera has not Gazprom’s eagerness to invest in the Qatari halted its critical coverage of Russia over the gas sector, then, may stem not only from the Chechen issue. Shortly before Putin visited desire to profit from it, but perhaps also from Doha, for example, al-Jazeera ridiculed the hope of being in a better position to Russian claims that its offer of amnesty to influence Qatar’s gas export policy in a Chechen rebels had been a success.38 Doha direction that benefits Russia. Of course, even would undoubtedly respond to any Russian if Gazprom cannot influence Doha’s gas complaints about this by arguing that al- export policy, the profit motive alone is a Jazeera is an independent media outlet which strong enough incentive for Moscow to court Qatar does not control. Yet while Qatar may Qatar into allowing Gazprom a role in its gas be too intimidated to aid the Chechen cause sector—as well as Lukoil and other Russian after the Yandarbiyev episode, it certainly firms in its oil sector—and gain Qatar as a does not want to be seen by Arab and Muslim customer for the Russian arms industry. public opinion as supporting Russian policy Yet another reason for Moscow to court there either. Permitting al-Jazeera to continue Qatar may have to do with the fact that the al- criticizing Russian policy in Chechnya allows Jazeera news organization is located in Doha. Qatar to be seen as supporting the Chechen As Kommersant put it, “Al-Jazeera TV-station cause in the Muslim world, but to deny commands a lot of respect in the Arab world. plausibly that it is actually doing so to Russia. It makes broadcasts from Qatar, it is even The possibility of cooperating with Qatar in financed by the Emir himself.”36 Moscow may the gas realm (as well as in trade and hope that good Russian-Qatari relations will investment more broadly), of course, appears result in more positive (or at least, less to be uppermost in Moscow’s concern about negative) coverage of Russia by al-Jazeera Doha. Like Russia, Qatar has not ruled out than if ties between Moscow and Doha are either creating a gas cartel or some looser poor. form of coordination. This would certainly be Qatar, of course, also has reason to seek of interest to Qatar if it served to increase its good relations with Russia. To begin with, it profits. On the other hand, Qatar is highly wants to avoid another Yandarbiyev episode; unlikely to oblige Russia by becoming the nor is it averse to earning more from its gas principal gas cartel member that reduces or exports rather than less. Moreover, receiving a limits its own production as Saudi Arabia does visit from Putin does indeed “boost the in OPEC. Nor is Qatar likely to forego prestige of the small Arab country,” as increasing its gas production or expanding the Kommersant bluntly put it.37 Further, number of customers it sells to for Russia’s improving relations with Russia fits into benefit. Qatar’s overall foreign policy of attempting to However, Qatar will likely avoid open maximize its number of friends and minimize confrontation with Russia on gas issues. its number of enemies. Qatar, for example, is Instead, it will make a show of consulting allied to the United States, but also seeks to Russia and other gas producers. Perhaps it will curry favor with public opinion in the Arab allow Gazprom a stake in the Qatari gas and and Muslim world through playing host to al- oil sector. Bringing the company into a Jazeera. Improving relations with Russia partnership on gas could create an important easily fits into this pattern. constituency in Russia that would benefit from What, though, can Moscow hope to gain increased Qatari gas exports even at the from its relationship with Qatar? One expense of Russian gas sales. Another way to important gain is that Qatar has not publicly build such a constituency would be to played host to any other high-level Chechen buy Russian weapons, thus bringing the opposition figures since Yandarbiyev’s politically powerful Russian oil and arms

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industries into advocating good relations between Russia and Qatar despite any 4 The others Putin named were Azerbaijan, differences they may have over gas issues. Yet Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Afghanistan, another possibility is that Qatar may simply , Turkey, the UAE, Iran, Syria, and engage in prolonged talks with Russia over Cyprus. Natalya Kalashnikova, “Putin Closes these and other forms of cooperation. Even if Caucasus,” Segodnya, November 10, 1999, p. reaching agreements proves elusive, just the 1 (English translation in Current Digest of the hope for them could provide sufficient Post-Soviet Press—hereinafter referred to as incentive for Moscow to behave politely CDPSP—December 8, 1999, p. 7). toward Doha. In the meantime, the Qatari 5 Marianna Belenkaya, “Moscow Becoming security services have undoubtedly been Mecca for Israelis,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, keeping a much closer watch on the activities October 26, 2000, p. 1 (CDPSP, November of Russian officials than they were the day 22, 2000, pp. 20-21). that Yandarbiyev was assassinated. 6 Aleksandr Raskin and Yelena Suponina, The bottom line for Russian-Qatari “Counterattack,” Vremya novostei, November relations is that despite Qatar’s small and 1, 2002, p. 1 (CDPSP, November 27, 2002, Russia’s vast size, Doha with its growing pp. 6-7); “Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev,” The Daily LNG export capacity is more of a threat to Telegraph, February 13, 2004, Moscow with its diminishing gas export http://www.telegraph.co.uk; and Felix Corley, capacity than vice versa. “Obituary: Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev,” The Independent, February 14, 2004, p. 48 (Lexis- *Mark N. Katz, a professor of government and Nexis). politics at George Mason University 7 Raskin and Suponina, “Counterattack,” (Fairfax, Virginia, USA), has written Vremya novostei, November 1, 2002. extensively on Russian foreign policy toward 8 Ibid. the Middle East. His recent articles on this 9 Musa Muradov, “Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev subject include “Putin’s Foreign Policy Lands on UN’s Blacklist,” Kommersant, June toward Syria,” Middle East Review of 27, 2003, p. 4 (CDPSP, July 23, 2003, p. 24). International Affairs (March 2006); “Putin, 10 Yelena Suponina, “Qatar in Diplomatic Ahmadinejad and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis,” Focus,” Vremya novostei, February 27, 2004, Middle East Policy (Winter 2006); and pp. 1-2 (CDPSP, March 24, 2004, p. 18). “Russia and Algeria: Partners or 11 Ibid. Competitors?” Middle East Policy, (Winter 12 Vladimir Bogdanov, “Planned Furor,” 2007). Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 5, 2004, pp. 1, 7 (CDPSP, March 31, 2004, pp. 18-19). 13 Vlad Trifonov, Sergei Topol, Yevgeny NOTES Khvostik, and Alyona Miklashevskaya, “Qatari Athletes Have Ironclad Alibi,” Kommersant, March 12, 2004, p. 6 (CDPSP, 1 Maria Pshenichnikova, “Russia, Qatar to April 7, 2004, p. 23). Discuss Main Directions of Cooperation,” 14 Mekhman Gafarly, “To the Stirlitzes’ Aid,” ITAR-TASS, December 25, 2001 (Lexis- Noviye Izvestia, March 24, 2004, p. 4 Nexis). (CDPSP, April 21, 2004), p. 18. 2 Maria Pshenichnikova, “Emir of Qatar to 15 Vladimir Demchenko, “Explosion that Arrive in Russia Monday for First Visit,” Killed Yandarbiyev Was Rehearsed Outside ITAR-TASS, December 24, 2001 (Lexis- Moscow,” Izvestia, July 1, 2004, pp. 1-2 Nexis). (CDPSP, July 28, 2004, pp. 19-20). 3 Diana Rudakova, “Russia, Qatar Ready for 16 Vladimir Demchenko, “Russian Intelligence Comprehensive Cooperation—Speaker,” Agents Will Soon Return Home from Qatar,” ITAR-TASS, January 28, 2002 (Lexis-Nexis).

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Izvestia, July 30, 2004, pp. 1-2 (CDPSP, 33 Dmitri Butrin and Natalia Grib, “Qatar and August 25, 2004, pp 18-19). the Gas Routes,” Kommersant, April 9, 2007, 17 Yelena Suponina, “‘Qatarsis,’” Vremya pp. 1, 14 (translation by Elena novostei, December 24, 2004, p. 1 (CDPSP, Leonova/Agency WPS) (Lexis-Nexis). January 19, 2005, p. 17). 34 Alexander Temerko, “How Russia and Its 18 “Russians Convicted in Qatar Serving Allies Will Be Able to Turn Up the Gas Prison Sentences in Russia,” AVN, December Pressure,” The Observer, April 8, 2007, p. 6 14, 2005 (FBIS). (Lexis-Nexis). 19 Dmitry Dubov and Maria Grishina, “Israel 35 Butrin and Grib, “Qatar and the Gas Is in No Hurry,” Vremya novostei, April 19, Routes,” Kommersant, April 9, 2007. 2006, p. 5 (CDPSP, May 17, 2006, p. 14). 36 “Russia and Qatar May Boost Cooperation,” 20 “Russian Foreign Minister Satisfied with Kommersant, October 17, 2006 (translation by Outcome of Qatar Meeting,” ITAR-TASS, the Russian Business Monitor) (Lexis-Nexis). May 24, 2006 (FBIS). 37 Ibid. 21 “Russian President Putin Thanks Qatar for 38 “Chechen Amnesty Ends,” Aljazeera.net, Support at OIC,” ITAR-TASS, October 17, January 15, 2007, http://www.aljazeera.net. 2006 (FBIS). 22 Pyotr Iskenderov and Aleksandr Grivach, “Cartel-Based Spirituality,” Vremya novostei, January 30, 2007, pp. 1-2 (CDPSP, February 28, 2007, pp. 7-8). 23 Mark N. Katz, “Putin’s Munich Speech,” United Press International, February 16, 2007. 24 Artur Blinov, “Munich’s Mideast Echo,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 15, 2007, p. 3 (CDPSP, March 14, 2007, p. 23). 25 “Putin, on Visit to Qatar, Denies Ruling Out Idea of Gas Cartel,” ITAR-TASS, February 12, 2007 (FBIS). 26 “Russia, Qatar Agree to Protect, Encourage Mutual Investment,” Interfax, February 12, 2007 (FBIS). 27 “Putin’s Visit to Qatar to Confirm Bilateral Cooperation Boosting,” ITAR-TASS, February 12, 2007 (FBIS). 28 “Lukoil, Qatar Petroleum to Work Together in Studying Qatari Projects,” Interfax, February 12, 2007 (FBIS). 29 “President Putin Says Russia Wants More Coordination between Energy Producers,” Interfax, February 13, 2007 (FBIS). 30 “Gazprom Chiefs Visit Qatar,” Interfax, March 14, 2007 (FBIS). 31 “Forum of Gas Exporters Opens in Qatar, No Gas Cartel Deal Expected,” ITAR-TASS, April 9, 2007 (FBIS). 32 “Gas Society Chief Says Doha Forum Was Step towards Gas Cartel,” ITAR-TASS, April 11, 2007 (FBIS).

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