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RUSSIA and QATAR Mark N RUSSIA AND QATAR Mark N. Katz* This article discusses the improvement in relations between Russia and Qatar between the years 2004 to 2007 and the significance of this rapprochement. From 2004 to 2007, relations between Yandarbiyev was vice president of Russia and Qatar went from extremely poor to Chechnya under Dzhokhar Dudayev. When remarkably cooperative. How did this happen? the latter was killed by Russian forces in April Considering that Russia and Qatar are both 1996, Yandarbiyev became acting president. among the world’s three largest producers of Yandarbiyev, however, lost the Chechen natural gas (the third being Iran), what does presidential elections of January 1997. He then this Russian-Qatari rapprochement portend? went to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan where he Even early on in the Putin era, there was opened a Chechen embassy in Kabul and a recognition in Moscow that Russia could consulate in Kandahar. By 1999, though, he benefit from cooperating with Qatar in the oil had moved to Qatar where he reportedly raised and gas spheres.1 Moscow also hoped to sell money for the Chechen cause.6 From 1999 arms to Qatar as well as to boost trade and through most of 2002, Moscow “periodically investment ties with the country. The visit of raised the issue of Yandarbiyev’s presence in the emir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Qatar,” but only “half-heartedly,” according to al-Thani to Moscow and his meeting with Vremya novostei.7 The Kremlin, however, Putin in December 2001 raised expectations stepped up its demands after the October 2002 for increased Russian-Qatari cooperation.2 seizure of a Moscow theater by Chechen There was even talk of Russia and Qatar rebels and the ensuing hostage crisis. One of working together to create a “gas OPEC the leaders of this group spoke to Yandarbiyev [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting by cell phone during the crisis, which was Countries].”3 proof enough for Moscow that Yandarbiyev None of these prospects for Russian-Qatari was an accomplice.8 In addition to getting cooperation, however, were fulfilled—at least Yandarbiyev placed on Interpol’s most- not then. There were also important wanted list, the UN Security Council’s differences between Moscow and Doha related counterterrorist committee added him to its to Chechnya. Even when he was still prime “sanctions list” in June 2003. Russia formally minister, Putin declared Qatar to be one of a requested Yandarbiyev’s extradition from dozen countries which he believed was Qatar in May 2003. Yet while “Officials in “exporting terrorism to Russia.”4 At the time Qatar promised to consider the request,” they of the visit made by the Russian president’s did not take any action against him.9 special representative Vasily Sredin to all the On February 13, 2004, Yandarbiyev died in Gulf Cooperation Council states in late 2000, Doha when the vehicle he was traveling in Nezavisimaya gazeta described these countries blew up. Shortly thereafter, Qatari authorities as “a very difficult region for Russia, in large detained three Russian officials whom they part due to the Chechen problem.”5 In accused of killing Yandarbiyev. As it would addition, a sharp dispute arose between on other occasions when Putin opponents died Moscow and Doha over former Chechen rebel suddenly and mysteriously, Moscow hotly president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. denied any involvement in Yandarbiyev’s Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) 1 Russia and Qatar death.10 Yet circumstantial evidence strongly declined, though, to name the prison where suggested that it was. they were being held.18 Even if they are no Since one of the three detained Russians longer actually in prison, the two have not had a diplomatic passport, he was released to surfaced in public, and so there is no evidence the Russian Embassy in Doha. The other two, that Russia has violated the prisoner exchange however, were held and charged with agreement with Qatar. complicity in murder.11 Moscow’s initial During 2005 and 2006, Russian-Qatari reaction was extremely hostile and belligerent; relations quietly improved. In April 2006, a Qatari wrestler and his trainer were arrested Qatar joined Russia and Iran in announcing at Sheremetovo airport, in an apparent the provision of funds to the Palestinian retaliation for Qatar’s arrest of the two Authority despite the American-European- Russians. The trainer, though, turned out to be Israeli embargo against it. Vremya novostei a citizen of Belarus and not Qatar, while the seemed to delight in pointing out that this wrestler was a citizen of both Qatar and caused tension in U.S.-Qatari relations.19 In Belarus. Further, Russian Defense Minister May 2006, Sergei Lavrov went to Doha to Sergei Ivanov stated that the “Russian participate in the Dialogue on Cooperation in leadership will use all available leverage on Asia. He delivered a message from Putin to Qatar to secure its citizens’ release,” thus the emir, but little of substance regarding raising the possibility that Moscow respond Russian-Qatari relations appears to have with the use of force.12 Doha initially refused occurred.20 In October 2006, the Qatari to allow into Qatar attorneys from abroad for Foreign Minister visited Moscow and met the detained Russians.13 with Putin, who made a point of thanking Yet the crisis began to de-escalate Qatar for supporting Russia in becoming an following a March 2004 telephone observer member of the Organization of the conversation between Putin and the Qatari Islamic Conference in 2005.21 Emir. Russian authorities soon thereafter Russian-Qatari relations appeared to released the Qatari wrestler and his trainer, improve dramatically when Putin himself paid who immediately flew to Doha. Qatar then a visit to Qatar (as well as Saudi Arabia and declared persona non grata the Russian with Jordan) in February 2007. His visit to Qatar, the diplomatic passport whom Doha believed however, appeared to be particularly was also involved in Yandarbiyev’s death; he significant since it occurred shortly after two immediately left for Moscow.14 Speculation events: first, the January 2007 proposal by soon arose that Moscow and Doha had Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene’i that reached a face-saving agreement to resolve the Russia and Iran work to form a natural gas crisis. In the months that followed, the two cartel;22 and second, Putin’s February 10, Russians were tried and convicted of murder, 2007 speech in Munich that was highly critical but were sentenced to life in prison—not to of American foreign policy and which seemed death.15 A Qatari appellate court soon upheld aimed at rallying other governments, as well both their guilty verdicts and their life as world public opinion, against it.23 sentences.16 Not long afterward, Russia and Despite his Munich speech, Putin did not Qatar signed a prisoner exchange agreement. emphasize this anti-American theme in Qatar. At the end of 2004, the Qatari Emir allowed He was also somewhat coy about the gas the two Russians to return to Russia to serve cartel proposal, stating that he had not rejected out their sentences.17 it but found the idea “interesting.” He Once this happened, the crisis in Russian- emphasized, though, that the idea needed to be Qatari relations appeared to come to an end. “examined,” especially in light of the Speculation arose that Moscow would release “mistakes” that “other cartel organizations” the two Russians, but in December 2005, a (apparently referring to OPEC) had made. He Russian official denied this and stated that also noted that there was nothing to prevent they were still serving their sentences. He gas producing countries from consulting and 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) Mark N. Katz coordinating their approaches.24 Putin even out, it would be extremely difficult (perhaps indicated that “Russia and Qatar will impossible) to create a cartel that could coordinate their actions in the gas sphere influence natural gas prices as effectively as irrespective of whether a gas equivalent of OPEC influences oil prices. Most of the OPEC is set up.”25 world’s natural gas (80 percent according to Indeed, there was no Russian-Qatari Valery Yazev, president of the Russian Gas agreement about working to create a gas Society) is sold under long-term contracts.32 cartel. Instead, a far more modest agreement This and the fact that most of the world’s was reached on protecting investments in each natural gas is conveyed by pipelines that are other’s countries.26 In addition, Russian expensive and cannot be rerouted when a presidential aide Sergei Prikhodko noted that pricing dispute occurs means that there is not a Russian companies, including Gazprom, global market for natural gas, but many Lukoil, and RUSAL, sought investment separate markets. In addition, the strong opportunities in Qatar.27 Lukoil and Qatar linkage that has so far existed between natural Petroleum signed an MOU on “possible joint gas prices and oil prices also limits the ability activities” in Qatar.28 Qatari-Russian military- of gas producers to set prices. technical cooperation was also discussed, As Kommersant noted in April 2007, though no specific agreements were though, liquefied natural gas (LNG) amounted announced.29 Shortly after Putin’s visit, to only 6.9 percent of global gas consumption Russian sources expressed the hope that Qatar in 2005, but is set to rise rapidly.33 Qatar, would purchase Russian weapons. A Gazprom which mainly ships its natural gas as LNG, delegation visited Qatar in March 2007 to could increase its exports tremendously. Qatar discuss cooperation in the oil and gas spheres (or any other LNG producer) can sell its with Qatar Petroleum, Qatargas, and the Qatar natural gas to any country with LNG re- State Investment Agency.30 gasification facilities, or countries that can In April 2007, the annual meeting of the build them—including those to which Russia Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) took either now exports or hopes to export gas via place in Qatar.
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