Chechnya's Secret Wartime Diplomacy

Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy This page intentionally left blank Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a Peaceful Resolution Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas Daniloff Translated by Anatoly Semenov With a Preface by Mark Kramer CHECHNYA’S SECRET WARTIME DIPLOMACY Copyright © Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas Daniloff, 2013. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-33878-5 All rights reserved. First published in 2013 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-46418-0 ISBN 978-1-137-33879-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137338792 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Akhmadov, Ilyas, 1960– Chechnya's secret wartime diplomacy : Aslan Maskhadov and the quest for a peaceful resolution / by Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas Daniloff; translated by Anatoly Semenov ; with a preface by Mark Kramer. pages cm For the first time in English, this volume makes available transcripts and commentary from the secret correspondence between former Chechen foreign minister Ilyas Akhmatov and Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, who would be killed by the Russians during the second Chechen-Russian War in April 2005. 1. Chechnia (Russia)—History—Civil War, 1994—Diplomatic history—Sources. 2. Chechnia (Russia)—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation)—Sources. 3. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations— Russia (Federation)—Chechnia—Sources. 4. Maskhadov, Aslan Alievich, 1951–2005—Correspondence. 5. Akhmadov, Ilyas, 1960—Correspondence. I. Maskhadov, Aslan Alievich, 1951–2005. II. Daniloff, Nicholas, 1934– editor. III. Title. DK511.C37A374 2013 947.5Ј2—dc23 2013026829 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2013 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents A Note on Translation vii Preface ix Mark Kramer Acknowledgments xvii Introduction 1 Ilyas Akhmadov 1 Maskhadov’s First Briefing 9 2 Immediate Tasks Ahead 19 3 Contact with Dr. Brzezinski 31 4 Taliban Recognition 43 5 Russian Army Disintegrating? 55 6 Election of George W. Bush 65 7 Russia Goes Authoritarian 75 8 The Mystery of Dr. Gluck 87 9 Russia Seeks to Bribe Maskhadov Out of Chechnya 97 10 Talks with Putin Suddenly Cancelled 105 11 Minister Akhmadov and the State Department 117 12 Maskhadov Hopes for CIA Support 123 13 Seeking Negotiations 129 14 The Challenge of Radical Commanders 141 vi Contents 15 General Gelayev in Georgia 149 16 Reaction to 9/11 159 17 Maskhadov Names a Successor 167 18 The January 27 Presidential Issue 175 19 Russia Takes Advantage of 9/11 187 20 The Problem with Lord Judd 195 21 The Russian Policy of Rape 205 22 Solving the Chechen Problem 215 23 Peace Plans Fail 227 24 Maskhadov’s Last Message 241 25 The Voice from Beyond 251 Notes 257 Index 267 A Note on Translation The Russian-Chechen wars have been studied mostly through official statements of the Russian government, recollections of Russian offi- cers, and reports from Russian and Western journalists. To date, little has come out that reflects the thinking and goals within the Chechen political leadership. This is why the correspondence (1999–2003) between President Aslan Maskhadov and his Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov constitutes the first substantial and unique resource into the thinking of the rebellious Chechen leaders. These communications were carried on by audio letters transmit- ted by couriers and postal services. About 60 percent of the surviving tapes were in the Chechen language and the remaining 40 percent in Russian. Akhmadov translated the Chechen parts, creating a complete collection in Russian. Dr. Anatoly Semenov of the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA, translated the whole into English. Nicholas Daniloff reviewed and edited the English translations to fit within the length of 100,000 words set by the publishers. In shortening the translations, we were guided by the following considerations: 1. Maskhadov, constantly moving around to avoid capture, spoke in a discursive and often disorganized manner, repeating sen- tences and thoughts. He sometimes repeated information in sub- sequent cassettes because he was not sure the first ones had been received. His speech was heavily larded with interjections, like the Russian particle “mol,” which can be translated as “he says” or “they say.” He frequently would close a sentence with “that’s the way it is” or the Arabic expression “Vallakhi.” We have elim- inated a good number of these interjections but preserved a few to give a sense of the tone of these reports. 2. Some of the material was very sensitive because it concerned individual Chechens who subsequently fled to the West and are viii A Note on Translation wanted by the Russians for treason. We cut some of this material for their safety. 3. A good deal of Maskhadov’s conversations deals with the details of internal problems. To remain within the word limit, we deleted some of this material that we judged would probably not interest a Western reader. We nevertheless made every effort to retain details pertaining to the war, the possibility of negotiations, and Maskhadov’s political and military opponents. 4. Finally, we agreed that a copy of the complete collection of audio letters in Russian and Chechen would be archived for perusal by specialists after a period of at least 15 years. Preface Mark Kramer* After the Soviet Union broke apart, the Russian government fought two large-scale wars in Chechnya: the first from December 1994 until the signing of the Khasavyurt accords in August 1996 and the second from 1999 through mid-2007. The three-year interregnum between the wars was a period of de facto independence for Chechnya, but instead of evolving into a robust state, Chechnya during that time became plagued by violence, rampant lawlessness, warlordism, crimi- nality, and kidnapping rings. Even though the second war did not officially end until 2009, the insurgency was largely crushed by the latter half of 2007, and it has not revived within Chechnya since then.1 Under the iron rule of the brutal president Ramzan Kadyrov, who was appointed by Moscow in March 2007, Chechnya has expe- rienced the first prolonged period of relative tranquility and peace in its post-Soviet history. In neighboring regions of the North Caucasus, however, violent instability has remained acute.2 In Dagestan, in particular, the situ- ation over the past several years has been increasingly reminiscent of Chechnya in the late 1990s. Dagestani insurgents have joined with Chechen fighters based in Dagestan to foment violent turmoil and destabilize the Dagestani government. The individual fighters and groups in Dagestan are not a unified force—they often disagree about tactics and goals—but they share the basic aim of establishing an “Islamic caliphate” in some or all of the North Caucasus. Because the attacks launched by these groups are likely to be a continuing source of instability in the North Caucasus for many years to come (includ- ing during the Olympics in Sochi in 2014), it is all the more important for scholars and policymakers alike to understand the dynamics of the two major wars that occurred in Chechnya from 1994 to 2007. * Mark Kramer is director of Cold War Studies and a senior fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. x Preface Until now, sources on the two Russian-Chechen wars have been predominantly from the Russian side. Despite severe Russian government restrictions, a handful of talented Russian journalists covered the conflicts extensively, and many of the key military and political figures on the Russian side have spoken at length in interviews, have written memoirs, or have appeared in documentaries.3 Former servicemen from the Russian side (the low-level “grunts” who did the actual fighting) have been interviewed one or more times, includ- ing by me. Taken together, these sources have given scholars a good sense of political and military decision-making on the Russian side. But until now there has been nothing comparable on the Chechen side. Even those researchers who have gone to the North Caucasus to learn more about the wars and the way they were fought have been hindered by the lack of solid sources reflecting the views of senior Chechen fighters. Although a few former Chechen guerrillas did write memoirs, these are mostly formulaic and polemical, rather than true firsthand accounts.4 Ilyas Akhmadov, the Chechen foreign minister during the second war, published a very useful memoir/history in English in 2010, but he wrote the book from the perspective of some- one who had fought only in the first war in Chechnya and was physi- cally outside the republic during almost all of the second war.5 The publication of the transcripts of these formerly confiden- tial audio tapes, recorded by Aslan Maskhadov during the initial years of the second war, helps to redress the imbalance of sources. Maskhadov had been elected president of Chechnya in early 1997 and remained in that post until he was killed by Russian special-operations forces in March 2005. He recorded the tapes as a means of transmitting instructions, advice, and informational updates to Akhmadov, whom he had appointed foreign minister in late July 1999, not long before the second war in Chechnya began.

Load more