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Home , Akhmad Kadyrov, Alexander (Ishchein), Aslan Maskhadov, Avars (Caucasus), Caucasian War, Chechen refugees

CHECHNYA, AND THE INVASION OF

By Emil Souleimanov*

"We are like a herd of horses. When we sense danger, we unite immediately in order to confront it. As soon as the danger disappears, however, we start turning on one another." --Chechen proverb

Between 1996 and 1999, enjoyed a numbering in the tens of thousands de facto independence. This experiment, were struggling to survive in camps, however, failed due to many factors, primarily in . The made including the triumph of loyalty to the clan temporary or permanent refugees out of up to (which undermined any chance to establish a 50 percent of the Chechen population.4 The strong central authority), a lack of state post-war Chechnya unemployment rate was institutions capable of effectively as high as 80 percent; among young people safeguarding the needs of the state and this figure reached nearly 100 percent.5 Many society, a high post-war crime rate, mass others were injured during the war and will armament, and corruption involving clan- suffer long-term physical and psychological based nepotism. Since then, such conditions damage. have also been responsible for the country's The generation of who unfortunate situation. 1 experienced the horrors of war, los ing friends After 1996, Chechnya was in and in and relatives as well as their homes and a state of total chaos, with the exception of a property, were then forced to search for their few northern districts fortunate enough to place in life and society under dire make it through the war unscathed. The war conditions. At the same time, the war raised had destroyed the country's entire thousands of youths in such a way that an infrastructure. Factories and processing plants automatic rifle became their most trusted had been thoroughly bombed. Mines were friend and life's only wisdom. These people planted under roughly 5,000 hectares, 15 learned to rely primarily on their own percent of the republic's cultivatable soil, strength as well as on the tried and true causing injuries and deaths among civilians.2 traditions of the clan network and therefore The lowest estimate puts the number of never on the (national) concept of the state, civilian deaths at 35,000, the highest up to which was rather ephemeral in Chechen 100,000 individuals.3 society.6 According to some statistics, 60 to 70 At the same time, the invasion of federal percent of the republic's housing stock had forces, which were accompanied by countless either been destroyed or severely damaged. acts of violence, evoked intense humiliation

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Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan for thousands of struggling Chechens who Such high spirits led to the spread of longed for revenge. As a result of all this, messianic visions. Some Chechens regarded many young Chechens saw no other option their people as God's chosen ones, whose but to turn to illegal arms trafficking, car mission was to liberate their "Caucasian theft, and extortion both in Chechnya and brethren" from "'s colonial yoke." elsewhere, including in Russian cities. Others deemed Chechnya and the Chechens According to a number of sources, only 10 as the core of the Islamic world's, or even all percent of the population had wholly legal of humanity's, progress. 10 Furthermore, the employment in interwar Chechnya. 7The nationalists argued that considering its country also witnessed a substantial rise in geographic isolation, Chechnya could only kidnappings. Hundreds of people were achieve true independence if the republic abducted each year. Even the local were to gain access to the Caspian and Black population, especially the members of weaker seas. It was believed this could only be clans feared being abducted. In many cases, achieved by the unification and kidnappers tortured their victims. High- institutionalization of the North Caucasian profile kidnappers were particularly attracted peoples within a united (Islamic) state. This to foreigners from Western countries, such as would in fact be a grand version of Shamil's engineers and journalists who could be Imamate. This ambitious expectation served expected to bring high ransoms. The most as the ideological foundation for the notorious incident involved the brutal empowerment of nationalistic and religious execution of abducted Chechen Telecom interventionism, which engaged the employees in October 1998 by the nation's imaginations of several influential most infamous ruffian and kidnapper, Arbi personalities, including Zelimkhan Barayev.8 The victims included Britons Yandarbiyev, , and Movladi Rudolf Petschi, Darren Hickley, and Peter Udugov. Kennedy as well as New Zealander Stanley As there was a lack of studies on Chechen Shaw. history and culture while Chechnya was part The fact that virtually everyone owned a of the USSR, once it had gained firearm and was conscious of the nation's independence, the desire to compensate for victory over the Russian army--previously this and gave rise to wild ideas. There were regarded as invincible--instilled a great deal serious discussions on such matters as the of confidence in the Chechens. Together with racial superiority of the Vaynakhs as the the anarchy that continued to reign, this direct descendants of Noah and supposed evoked a sense of impunity and "anything "founders" of the Aryan and even Caucasian goes" sentiment in many young Chechens. (i.e., white European) race, the originally There was an explosive growth of Islamic character of Chechen nationalism that often included a sense of ethnopsychology, and the excellence of the superiority. 9 Chechens' ethno-social structure. After 1996, the studies pumped out in a swift, assembly-

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Emil Souleimanov line fashion and were affected by uncritical Mission's chief Tim Guldiman as "legitimate post-war euphoria and arrogant nationalism. and democratic."13 Maskhadov's main rival, Russia's military withdrawal was followed Basayev, received 23.5 percent of the vote by an extensive dispensing of titles and and Yandarbiyev received only 10.2 positions among war veterans, with percent.14 "Brigadier General" being especially popular Facing regional and clan leaders, President among field commanders. Between 1996–97, Maskhadov's attempts to stabilize, or rather the number of people holding this title rebuild, centralized political power were skyrocketed. The field commanders who felt condemned to failure right from the start. they were not getting their fair share of This was despite his remarkable merits in political power or economic benefits came to other fields; his well-balanced policies, for hate the government as well as their more instance, staved off the very real threat of a successful compatriots. They withdrew to catastrophic civil war. their auls (highland villages), where they As mentioned earlier, many individual built "family" bases, refusing to recognize the field commanders established themselves in sovereignty of the central government and respectable positions in their native villages thus involving their whole clan in conflict and towns and were unwilling to with the regime.11 A special tension occurred acknowledge 's authority.15 They in relations between the highland natives (and generally argued that they only recognized subsequently entire teyps) and the residents "Allah's supremacy."16 In a sequence of of towns and the plains. Owing to the controversial events, they did not even highlanders' enormous contribution to the hesitate to use traditional means of "force" in war effort--but thanks also to smoothly order to convince rivals of their sole functioning clan bonds--members of the sovereignty and right to limited economic highland clans (teyps) managed to occupy resources, especially oil wells, which several important positions in the republic at represented a source of steady income. In the expense of their fellow countrymen from several regions battles for wealth and the towns and lowland areas. positions of power flared between men who Even 's12 policies geared had once fought side by side. Now they were towards social compromise failed to defuse divided into armed formations according to perpetual rivalries between teyps. Therefore, clan or territorial principles which fought as early as 1998, the despairing president endless blood and extorted money from started to place members of his own Aleroy members of weaker clans. clan in the government. Of course this was Consequently, the degree of Grozny's met with resistance from the members of actual authority was determined to a far other teyps and undermined Maskhadov's greater extent by personal sympathy toward legitimacy as president; he had in the mean Aslan Maskhadov, or clan kinship with him, time won with 64.8 percent of the vote in the rather than by devotion to the notion of a presidential elections of January 1997, united Chechen state. This is shown by the described by local OSCE (Organization for president's appeal: Security and Cooperation in )

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Chechens, Citizens of Ichkeria, Chechen nation - a nation of toil, of Brothers and Sisters! We spent many war, and of triumph in its centuries- long years walking along the path of long struggle for independence and war with certainty and dignity: sovereignty! 17 However, now we have suddenly changed entirely. Yesterday's In all likelihood, an overwhelming comrades-in-arms look at one another majority of the republic's cocksure field with mistrust because the seed of commanders and religious radicals would discord has been sown amongst them have interpreted Maskhadov's potential firm and its name is ambition for power! (i.e. armed) efforts to unite the Chechen There is no other explanation but the regions and teyps as a flagrant attack on their pursuit of power for the behaviour of own liberty. In the end, this might have been the liberation movement leaders and the quickest route to a civil war among the military commanders of yesterday, citizens of the already devastated country. formerly united by one vision and one goal, who today cannot handle a taste POLITICIZATION OF of fame and have become hostages to Despite their intensive efforts, the Soviets tawdry injustices, speculations, did not manage to completely eradicate Islam slander and gossip ...Leaders of the in the northern . Although the ! Be worthy of the love and Chechens' originally Islamic self-awareness respect of the Chechen people, throw adopted distinctly atheist elements over the burden of conceit off of several decades of active Sovietization, yourselves and in the name of this adherence to external signs of Muslim great nation, whose flesh you are, dogma--as an integral part of an anxiously rally your ranks against our common guarded ethnic identity-persisted even during enemy! The fight against our people years of severe repression. This was the case is not over; it has only assumed new for the Chechens, as well as the Ingushes, low and treacherous forms and its Karachay, , Crimean , and other objective is to drain the blood of the Caucasian groups--including the Christian Chechen people at all costs, to --whose fear of extinction as a alienate you from your people, and to result of deportation and massacres led to a discredit the warriors of the jihad. revitalization of ethnic traditionalism. This Stop basking in the rays of past glory! revitalization also incorporated religious self- There is but a step from being awareness. As Alexei Savateyev wrote, even esteemed to being hated, so take a after the intensive repressions in effect from step towards each other, towards unity the 1960s to the 1980s: and harmony. Today we have a chance, a great chance to become the [Islam] obviously existed in everyday joint authors of the victory of the life. Its prevalent form in the

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Emil Souleimanov

[Caucasian] society at that time was The highland (southern, Ichkerian) so-called 'National Islam,' a syncretic Qadiriya virds were the traditional bastions of religious system with a strong Sufi anti-Sovietism. There were conflicts among influence, whose organisational some virds in earlier eras about theological groundwork lay in the illegal issues which were often later promoted by brotherhoods (virds). Conservative by Soviet security agents. For example, at the nature, National Islam resigns itself to dawn of Soviet rule, the se forces turned not the archaic beliefs of its followers, only the Qadiris and against one whose community was traditionally another, but even two highly esteemed Qadiri organized on the basis of the brotherhoods: the vird of Kunta-haji customary norms (adat), and actually Kishiyev, founder of the Chechen Qadiriya supports these in certain ways. (so-called Zikrism), and the followers of Paradoxically, traditional social Sheikh Bammat-Girey-haji Mitayev, structures thus ultimately enabled including his son Ali Mitayev. 21 Islam to survive under the conditions The Islamic renaissance in Chechnya , of the Soviet political system around the time of the USSR's fall, was economic reforms and to descend boosted by the constant fear of Russian from the mountains to the town. 18 aggression nurtured both from by Dudayev's regime and actual incidents. The Achkhoy-Martan district is a prime Consequentially, Chechnya experienced a example of Islam's survival. In 1968, the huge growth in nationalism, closely tied to district had over 30 registered Murid groups Islam as an ntegrali part of ethnic identity. and sects organizing secret meetings, during This was further reinforced by social trends. which, in addition to reciting their prayers, Georgi Derlugian explains how the Chechen members discussed political events from a nouveau riche, who began returning to their patently anti-Soviet position.19 With state "liberated" homeland in the early , control diminishing in the late 1980s, the "sought to establish prestigious social roles in Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet their native auls. They gave presents to Socialist Republic saw the emergence of up relatives, elders, and clergy, including paying to 280 Murid groups. These groups for the construction of Italian red brick reconstructed or built hundreds of mosques mosques. Their entourages and bodyguards and ziyarats, highly venerated monuments became like socio-political organisations."22 dedicated to Sufi saints. Islam in this territory This abundance of newly-formed parties, all (largely of the Shafi school of religious law) of which used the word "Islamic" as an was represented primarily by the adherents of indispensable adjective in their names and two Sufi tariqs-Naqshbandiya (followed were led by shady "" (spiritual mainly in the lowlands) and Qadiriya guides or masters) who often had criminal (followed mainly in the highlands)-further backgrounds and a minimal knowledge of divided into virds.20 These were named after Islam, proliferated. Sufi sheikhs and often led by teyp elders. The Russian invasion and the two-year war that followed gave rise to another

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Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan powerful stimulus to strengthen Islamic self- emphatically urged his fellow countrymen awareness in Chechen society. In the from television screens to pray three times a Chechen mindset, a war against an external day as proper , while in fact the rules (Russian) aggressor is almost automatically of (Sunni) Islam dictate that adherents pray associated with a war for territory, freedom, five times per day. In an interview he gave "national honor," identity, and religion. This shortly before his death, Dudayev explained was also compared to the heroic exploits of the essence of the country's development: their more pious ancestors in fighting the "Russia...has forced us to choose the path of during the nineteenth century. Islam, even though we were not duly These Caucasian , invoked in stories, prepared to adopt Islamic values."24 ancestral weapons, and religious chants, From this perspective, the situation after passed on their Islamic themes to their 1996 was the logical continuation of a modern-day counterparts. general orientation towards the politicization Therefore, combining Islam with of Islam. Its radicalization was quite natural nationalism as an effective instrument of in the context of Chechen society's dismal social mobilization became part of the socio-economic conditions. It was impossible official "style" and was probably the only and even undesirable to create a functioning tool legitimizing the building of Chechen state on the basis of the half-forgotten adats. statehood at the time. There was an obvious Secular laws did not exist and even their parallel to the "golden age" of Shamil's establishment would probably not have Imamate, the only time in history when guaranteed them enough legitimacy to make Chechnya existed as a legitimate them binding to the Chechen population. "uncolonized," or non-Russian, state. No less important was the fact that the Yet Jokhar Dudayev himself being a implementation of secular legislation Soviet-style general was far from an adherent certainly would not have solved the problem to strict Islamic laws and initially tried to of the rebellious field commanders and make Chechnya a secular state. Dudayev territories that did not acknowledge Grozny's made his thoughts on the matter clear: "I authority. Islam was thus an essential tool in would like the Chechen Republic to be an trying to build a stable regime and a strong institutional secular state. This is what we are political structure. According to a fitting fighting for; this is the ideal that we seek to comment by Dmitriy Furman, "as it is achieve.…If religion takes priority over an extremely difficult for a Chechen to execute institutional secular system, a more striking or put another Chechen in jail isn't it easier if form of the Spanish inquisition and Islamic all this happens according to Allah's will?"25 fundamentalism will emerge [in However, owing to an enduring absence Chechnya]."23 After a while, however, he had of qualified theologians and Islamic legal to turn to Islam publicly. The former Soviet specialists, the Shari'a norms were general and then-president of independent implemented either in a superficial manner, Ichkeria, who was fond of Armenian cognac, or, in some regions, even in their original,

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Emil Souleimanov early medieval form. Zelimkhan WAHHABISM Yandarbiyev, who became Chechnya's Wahhabism was a doctrine that originated second president following Dudayev's tragic in the mid-18th century in the death, was aware of this fact. As a confident peninsula which called for a return to the supporter of the "Islamic model", he declared purity of early Islam. Wahhabis disapproved Islamic law and the Arabic language of any kind of legal interpretation () of compulsory subjects in one of his first their faith's original sources-the Koran and decrees. He modeled the penal code for the the Sunna. They regarded only these sources Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on the 's as being sacred, and allowed nothing but Shari'a-based penal code.26 In comparison, literal interpretations.28 Wahhabism became Jokhar Dudayev's original scheme of the an attractive alternative to the complicated Chechen constitution had leaned on the mystic ideology of "normative" Sufi Islam Estonian one. During Yandarbiyev's rule, the for a certain segment of Chechen believers. It statues of the penal code were enforced especially appealed to the militarized and-- through a military-Shari'a tribunal, falling owing to the war--radicalized youth. Going under the Supreme Shari'a Court. Now the through the socialization stage of their lives, sale of alcohol and drugs was forbidden and these young people were in search of their the authorities started punishing those caught personal identities. In the eyes of the enraged using either substance by publicly thrashing youth, the ongoing disputes between them with a truncheon. In mid-1998, innumerable virds did nothing to help Maskhadov formed a special Shari'a regiment traditionalist Islam gain respect; it even responsible for ensuring individual citizens alienated the young and the faithful from it. adhered to the Shari'a norms. Shari'a courts Wahhabism offered an excellent ideological were set up throughout the country and public platform for adolescents who not only looked executions- usually by firing squad-soon to religion for answers to philosophical followed. 27 questions about the meaning of human Aslan Maskhadov, the third Chechen existence (which is the traditional domain of president, acted in a similar fashion. For the Sufi orders), but also possessed a burning instance, his very first decree required that all desire to "improve" society immediately and managers in state and commercial enterprises establish justice and order.29 set an extra room aside for prayer in their Wahhabism thus became a means of workplaces. However, Maskhadov's efforts protest against the traditionalist forms of were unable to establish conformity in a social organization, extricating the individual society characterized by traditional clan- from the clan alliance structure that binds related power structures. In addition, there Chechen society together. The nation's young was a developing network of Muslims who people were clamoring against the would not accept the status quo because their unchanging forms of social ties and "non- goal was a return to the "pure Islam" of Islamic" clan hierarchies. The Sufi 's era. brotherhoods, an organic part of traditionalist relations in Chechen society, were naturally unable to voice this dissatisfaction. The

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Wahhabi insistence that only Allah be fearing lives, and wanted relations in the worshipped as a solitary and all- country to change for the better, even if this encompassing God, and thus also as the sole meant dying for such a cause. Wahhabi fountainhead of holiness, vindicates the emissaries often provided Chechen families individual's effort to disengage himself from and individuals with financial assistance as the complicated and often psychologically well. Wahhabi groups enjoyed the goodwill demanding hierarchal systems (teyps, virds, of members of weaker clans in particular. etc.). According to the Chechen scholar Vakhit Also, and this is a matter of great Akaev: importance from a psychological perspective, Wahhabism provides a bewildered individual With only a few exceptions, we can with the feeling of having his own personal label Wahhabi groups that emerged in mission and being close to God. Admittedly, Dagestan and Chechnya as protesting such guaranteed individual freedom is, in religious organizations. Originally, reality, rather self-deluded because the their activities were of an enlightening tenacious discipline of the Wahhabi umma nature. They directed their critical constrains the individual's doings at least as zeal against local bribers and the severely as a teyp or a vird does. Yet in post- official clergymen who associated war Chechnya the egalitarian and militant with them, and this gained them new spirit of Wahhabism seemed to be a desirable believers who had become alternative to the rigid social structure. This disenchanted with the regime. was thanks to, among other aspects, the sense Wahhabism's critical shots were of physical certainty that the individual aimed against the traditionalist clergy acquired as a member of a powerful armed of the northern Caucasus, who were society (a "brotherhood") of confident and, in being accused of ignorance, of an ideological sense, extremely tight-knit co- distorting Islam, and of close ties with religionists subjected to strict discipline. a corrupt government.30 Incidentally, despite all the injustices and misunderstandings, the people of Chechnya Typical Wahhabi constituents were are still reluctant to despise the Wahhabis. reinforced by groups of Islamic volunteers They generally make distinctions between a who had fought in the first Russo-Chechen questionable ideology (in essence the north War. 31 After 1996, several of them married Caucasian variant of Wahhabism) and the women from Chechnya and Dagestan and common people that adhere to it. In stayed in the Caucasus. A classic example is conversations with the author, many of the the Emir Khattab, allegedly a Jordanian Arab locals admitted that among ordinary who supposedly had Chechen roots and was a Wahhabis there were open-hearted and veteran of the Afghan War. He married a honorable young people who neither Dagestani Darginian and settled in consumed alcohol nor took drugs, led God- Chechnya. 32 Aslan Maskhadov presented him

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Emil Souleimanov with the state's highest military decoration, sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the the K'oman Siy (Honor of the Nation) Medal Wahhabis, because the traditionalist Sufi for his outstanding military merits in the concept of Islam was as heretical to them as Russo-Chechen War. A substantial number of laicism. socially and politically active mujahids In his televised address of January 20, ("warriors of the faith") were originally either 1999, the Chechen president condemned ethnic or Arabicized descendents of what he perceived as Wahhabism: Chechen and other Northern Caucasian refugees and migrants, the so-called The worst thing about it is the fact muhajirun, who had fled or had been forced that it seeks to divide us according to by Russian colonial authorities to leave for our faith. And this happens in every the after the end of the place that wins over. They Great . In the 1980s , they divide us according to faith, which fought in , where they absorbed subsequently leads to civil war.... the Wahhabi way of thinking propagated by They say that only they are Allah's Saudi Arabia. Today, following the chosen ones that only they are annihilation of the Afghani Talibs, it is the walking along the true path. And only country where this doctrine has an everyone else is their enemy.... We official status. The bonds between a number have always been proud of the fact of highly regarded Islamic volunteers in that we are Chechens. And now they Islamic (Wahhabi) terrorist groups and are telling us: '...Do not say that you foreign patrons, who sympathized with are the Chechen nation.' They want to Wahhabis and often provided the Chechen deprive us of the faith of our fathers, mujahids with financial support, also played a our sheikhs and ustadhs. They want to role. rob us of our customs and traditions As mentioned earlier, the ideological and adats.... They are not even maneuvering of Aslan Maskhadov, originally content with the fact that we call a proponent of a secular model, in trying to Chechnya an Islamic state.... They say unite the Chechens on the basis of Islam that the president, the parliament, and eventually failed. Although Wahhabism the are meaningless. engaged the hearts and minds of merely five Everything is to be in the hands of the to ten percent of the Chechen population (the Emir. The Emir who, I must add, vast majority leaned towards traditionalist came here from God knows what Islam), these sectarians possessed a country and who furthermore is not solidarity, fanaticism, economic self-reliance, even Chechen....They take the Koran and military strength that made them a in...and find words in it that claim it is political power. The Wahhabis refused to permissible to abduct people...that accept the single centralized national body they can use them as a source of politic advocated by President Maskhadov. income…. Their calls for the Even Maskhadov's attempts to impose Islam immediate start of a war in Dagestan on the republic failed to secure him a

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aim to pit Chechnya and Dagestan to an increasing number of clashes with against one another.33 adherents of the Sufi orders. In 1995, the Wahhabis attempted to destroy the ziyarat Such categorical words were provoked by devoted to Khedi, mother of the venerated the bitter experience of the Chechen Kunta-haji. Despite the efforts of some highly president, who had been yearning for respected field commanders to mitigate the compromise and social accord. In the spring ensuing conflict, this led to armed skirmishes of 1995, Chechnya saw the rise of a division throughout the entire country.35 In battle, the of predominantly Islamic volunteers Wahhabis were not deterred from setting up (mujahids) operating under the name Jama'at military positions at memorials and nearby Islami (Islamic Assembly), which was ziyarats. They did not even hesitate to murder originally led by the Jordanian Chechen Ash- traditionalist clergymen who spoke openly Shashani who was openly in opposition to the against Wahhabi sectarians. Additionally, idea of "National Islam." After Ash- they often reprimanded Chechen women and Shashani's death in 1997, his compatriot girls for being "insufficiently clothed" or for Khattab succeeded him. The next year, an not wearing veils. Since the custom of education and training center called covering women's hands and faces had never "Caucasian Center of the Islamic Mission" been practiced among the Muslim Caucasian was established (with the help of Chechens in highlanders, such censure was beyond the Jordan) near the village of Serzhan-Yurt in comprehension of even conservative Chechen the Shali district. Hundreds of Chechens and men. Clashes between Wahhabis and members of other Muslim nations, largely "tariqists" soon became a more or less from the northern Caucasus, were "educated" common phenomenon. in this camp, where several months of Maskhadov tried a policy of military training followed two months of accommodation. For instance, in April 1998, instruction in the Wahhabi doctrine. Special he called for the establishment of an Islamic emphasis was placed on developing skills in state governed by Shari'a norms. But his executing diversionary and terrorist tactics.34 intensifying Islamic rhetoric did nothing to The center's activities received generous earn him the favor of the Wahhabis. Their financial sponsorship from a Saudi-based number and influence among leading organization called "International Islamic representatives of the Chechen military- Support" backed by members of the royal political elite dissatisfied with the existing family. distribution of power or with the president The Wahhabis vigorously expressed their himself, gained strength concurrently with lack of respect for the shrines of Chechen society's frustration over the adverse socio- "National Islam." Their unrelenting battle economic situation. Furthermore, the first against "Muslim paganism," a syncretic mix vice-chairman of the government, Shamil of Islam and the adat, and its concrete Basayev, began to lean toward the Wahhabis, manifestations in Chechen society gave rise and Khattab was often Basayev's esteemed

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Emil Souleimanov guest during the interwar years.36 On July 10, of crime and called for the establishment of a 1997, Basayev resigned from his post "owing "truly Islamic" or Wahhabi state in to health problems." Chechnya. However, within the bounds of the policy A turning point occurred on June 14, of social consensus, Maskhadov continued 1998, in , where defiant armed his endeavors to use this influential field Wahhabis challenged Maskhadov's units. The commander and highly respected personality ensuing clash claimed the lives of at least in public life. This task appeared to have been fifty people, mostly Wahhabis. The sectarians accomplished on January 15, 1998, when then fled to Urus-Martan which became the Basayev was named vice-president, and later center of Chechen (and Dagestani) prime minister, although Maskhadov had Wahhabism. The Wahhabis' armed protest originally wanted to keep that position for and their debates concerning plans to topple himself, as the constitution required. Shamil's the elected Chechen president actually left younger brother Shirwani occupied the Maskhadov with no choice. The "Chechen lucrative post of director of the Chechen Lion"37 dismissed ministers who were Republic of Ichkeria's State Committee for members of or who sympathized with the Energy Resources. Basayev's clan also Wahhabi order (Khamidov, Udugov, controlled a large number of oil wells. Vahidov, and Shamil Basayev) and urged In mid-1998, however, Basayev resigned Chechen believers to expel Wahhabis from once again, allegedly because Maskhadov their towns and villages. Together with was unable to execute "any of his plans." Of , Chechen grand mufti and course, the main reason was Basayev's a dauntless anti-Wahhabi who had been opposition to the president's anti-Wahhabi personally appointed by Dudayev, policies, which also closely affected Maskhadov began a systematic effort to Basayev's protégé, Khattab. The Jordanian discredit the Wahhabi doctrine. In the autumn enjoyed the protection courtesy of the of the same year, a congress of the Muslim powerful and populous Basayev clan living in clergy was held in Grozny on Kadyrov's the Ichkerian highland village of . initiative. During the assembly, the Wahhabis Consequently, Khattab was an enormous were accused of extremism, craving power, influence on the thoughts of Shamil Basayev, and their interpretation of Islam was not who was a hero to Chechens at that time. For deemed genuine.38 a variety of reasons, , A phony war in which both sides avoided , and, after some hesitation, direct armed conflict continued until August , and other highly regarded 1999. Meanwhile, on February 3, 1999, Chechens chose Wahhabism as their political Aslan Maskhadov announced the platforms. The radicals scorned Maskhadov's establishment of a "full-fledged Shari'a balanced and realistic approach to Russia, government" a day before the Wahhabi and labeled his attempts to preserve peaceful opposition was to make a similar relations with their mighty neighbor as weak proclamation to try to discredit Maskhadov's and defeatist. They also accused him of being "unholy regime." In the short term, he incapable of putting a stop to the proliferation

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Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan succeeded in undermining the Wahhabis, SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS several of whom returned to the government. IN DAGESTAN From a long-term strategic perspective, The deportation of the Chechens in 1944 however, the president found himself in an delivered a heavy blow to the age-old even more complicated situation. On the day friendly relations between the Chechens and Maskhadov issued the decree that rendered the Dagestanis. This was due to the fact that Shari'a effective in Chechnya, Basayev after the Chechens had been displaced, stated, "Our president has finally accepted several territories with traditionally Islam. He is no longer the president; predominant Chechen populations (the therefore, we should elect an imam." Through former Aukhov district) and some villages in his decree, Maskhadov actually divested the Vedeno district of Ichkeria in the himself of the safeguards provided by the mountainous southeastern Chechnya were constitution according to which he had been settled primarily by Dagestani , , elected president. The legitimacy of his and . In accordance with a special power was thus contested and, as it soon decree issued by Stalin, these lands were also turned out, the more or less functioning handed over to Dagestan. The subsequent Chechen state collapsed entirely. In Vakhit return of Chechens to these territories often Akaev's words: led to conflicts with the new Dagestani settlers. The Akki district, to which thousands It appears that Maskhadov, who was of deported Chechens returned in the second surrounded and pressured by the half of the 1950s, had been renamed opposition, failed to grasp the "Novolakskiy District" owing to the number particulars. In his attempt to snatch of Laks who had been allocated land there. the flag of Islam from the To this day, it has remained a part of opposition's hands, he initiated a Dagestan (according to some estimates, the game on a foreign pitch, where he in number of citizens of Chechen origin in this fact suffered a political thrashing. district, including who This enabled the Islamic opposition came in the 1990s, is as high as 100,000, to provoke Russia into waging which comprises approximately five percent another war with Chechnya.39 of Dagestan's total population). Even before the beginning of the war in The critical debilitation of Maskhadov's the northern Caucasus, Dagestani delegates power and legitimacy as president eventually represented in ethnic groups and syndicates, resulted in the Wahhabis' attack on Dagestan- as well as in the Confederation of the Peoples their first step in a far-reaching plan that of the Caucasus (CPC), cautioned envisioned the "liberation and unification" of against armed intervention in Chechnya. the northern Caucasus under the green flag of With this warning, as well as with their (Wahhabi) Islam. preventing Russian military convoys from entering Chechnya in September 1992, the

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Dagestanis showed the Chechens that the spiritual roots, faith obviously appeared to be negative feelings of the 1950s no longer the only credible idea needed to combat remained. An overwhelming majority of corruption, rising crime, drug abuse, and Dagestanis sided with the Chechen rebels and unemployment. The case of their Chechen some nationalists, or religious radicals, neighbors, who had succeeded in defeating actually called for a united fight for Russia's colossal military superiority with independence. Individual Dagestanis also only "Islam in their hearts" gave them hope volunteered to participate in the Chechen and self-confidence.40 War. In the early 1990s, similar to the independence era of 1918 to 1921, certain THE SPREAD OF WAHHABISM IN circles of the Dagestani clergy nurtured DAGESTAN hopes--as marginal as they may have been-- In the Northern Caucasus in the late for a sort of renewed era of Shamil's imamate 1980s, the Wahhabi doctrine originally (1834-1859) that would unite Chechnya and nested in Dagestan.41 It found fertile soil in Dagestan. the northeastern Caucasus, because it fit both As in Chechnya, where resistance temporally and thematically into the context materialized under a nationalist-religious of mass demonstrations of Dagestanis banner, the Russo-Chechen War also boosted demanding an end to the Soviets' persecution Islam's function in Dagestan to a certain of Islam. The population perceived the re- degree, especially in the underdeveloped Islamization of society as an integral part of highland territories of the western part of the emancipation from its Soviet-strangled ethnic country. Dagestani youth, over half of whom and socio-cultural identity. It was the were unemployed in the 1990s, were trapped Dagestanis who formed the core of the in a kind of ideological vacuum after the Party, the very first group demise of the Communist system. representing political Islam in a Soviet Furthermore, they were confronted with so- territory that had emerged in , called "wild" or "mafioso" capitalism, which , in the summer of 1990. The was (and still is) hardly compatible with party aimed to "defend Muslims' holy right to traditional highland Caucasian values that live their lives according to Allah's centered around the cult of a daredevil, a commandments". warrior man (). Therefore, many began to Dagestan's intensive contact with the engage in criminal activities within the world around it, and the uncritical to euphoric republic, as well as outside of it. Ethnic perception of political Islam held by some criminal networks that were emerging Dagestanis, sparked a dramatic influx of especially in major Russian cities consisted members of Near and Middle Eastern mostly of young people recruited from humanitarian and public education Dagestani villages. There was an increase in organizations. These people openly or the number of Dagestanis who occasionally covertly distributed propaganda to promote engaged in shady business practices. the idea of "pure Islam" in Dagestan. The However, to another segment of youths absence of integrated state policies from striving to rediscover their ethnic and and Moscow, as well as the

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Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan protesting spirit of the Dagestani believers In May 1997, a major armed clash and the country's thorny socio-economic between Wahhabis and traditionalists situation, made Wahhabism a major social occurred near the village of Chabanmakhi, force in the early 1990s. Members of claiming the lives of about a dozen people. Wahhabi jama 'ats (religious communities or The formal cause of this conflict was a groups) also differed from other Muslims in theological dispute between two relatives terms of appearance: the men sported long loyal to opposing camps. In reaction to this beards with shaven moustaches and wore event, the Dagestani government started shortened trousers while women wore making a resolute effort to discredit the chadors, which covered their entire bodies Wahhabi doctrine and, at the same time, to and faces. liquidate Wahhabi cells in western Dagestan. Together with the rising number of (often In 1997, the Dagestani parliament passed a armed) conflicts between Wahhabis and law entitled "On the fight against Islamic traditionalist Islamists, the local intelligentsia fundamentalism" which triggered mass hunts and the more or less secular populations of for the country's sectarians. Makhachkala and other Dagestani cities were A year later, in early 1998, members of a becoming increasingly concerned about the Wahhabi village in the Tsumadi highland activities of Wahhabi emissaries. The district of western Dagestan announced the situation escalated especially in the Kadarian birth of an independent Islamic republic in Zone in the highlands of western Dagestan-in their territory, despite pressure by state the predominantly Darginian villages of authorities not to do so. Although the (the birthplace of Khattab's Kremlin's swift intervention managed to spouse), Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. In these prevent the conflict from escalating, the villages, just like in neighboring Chechnya, villages remained outside of Makhachkala's there was a rash of retaliatory murders of effective jurisdiction from this point forward. traditionalist and Wahhabi imams, and even This boosted the Wahhabis' confidence, as of rank-and-file believers. Similar incidents did the "pr obe" attack that Khattab's divisions in this district began occurring as early as launched against the North Caucasian mid-1996, when the citizens of Karamakhi military district in Buinaksk in December accused local Wahhabis of killing the head of 1998. The federal forces were not able to the village. The murderers received a hold back the assault effectively. In 1998-99, hospitable welcome from fellow believers in surprisingly disregarded by the border troops Chechnya. Outraged citizens from several as well as by the Russian FSB (the Federal villages in the Buinaksk district organized Security Service), an abundance of weapons, emotionally charged rallies in the , munitions, and soldiers were sent from chanting slogans such as "Out with Chechnya to Dagestan for the impending war Wahhabism" and "Death to Wahhabi which was to be waged in the name of the murderers." "liberation of Dagestan".42 Many commentators later criticized the inactive

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Emil Souleimanov position Russian authorities adopted in this "take part in the jihad" and to do their share matter.43 in "liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus In late 1997, Bagauddin Magomedov, the from the Russian colonial yoke." According Avar leader of the radical wing of the to this prominent Dagestani Wahhabi's Dagestani Wahhabis, heeded the bidding of vision, proponents of the idea of a free Zelimkhan Yadarbiyev, Shamil Basayev, and Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the Khattab, and moved--or rather fled--with his "Islamic Army of the Caucasus" that he had entourage to Chechnya. There he had founded and report to the army's headquarters established close ties with Emir Khattab and (in the village of Karamakhi) for military leaders of Chechnya's Wahhabi community duty. Another notable Dagestani Wahhabi, during the war. In early 1998, Magomedov Magomed Tagayev, formed the "Dagestani initiated the relocation of several hundred Imam's Army of Freedom Fighters." Just at Dagestani Wahhabis and their families, who that time, the attacked an were the targets of repression in their native island on the River (in Chechen land, to Gudermes in eastern Chechnya. In territory) where a Wahhabi military base was March 1998, these Dagestanis, together with allegedly located.44 their Chechen co-religionists, started to drift In the spring of 1999, it was already quite toward Urus-Martan, where they then began certain that the attack on Dagestan was just a preparations to invade Dagestan. matter of time. The years 1998 and 1999 saw the institutional unification of Dagestani and THE INVASION OF DAGESTAN Chechen Wahhabis. The formation of the On August 2, 1999, a group of Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Magomedov's soldiers attacked a number of Dagestan, headed by Shamil Basayev, villages in the Tsumadi district. On August 6 publicized the expansive intentions of the and 7, 1999, roughly 1,500 armed Dagestanis Chechen and Dagestani Wahhabis and their (mainly Avars and Darginians), Chechens , partners. In November 1998, Basayev left no and Arabs--predominantly Wahhabis-- doubt as to the Congress' program: "The crossed the Dagestani border from Chechnya leaders of the Congress will not allow the and occupied several Wahhabi villages in the occupying Russian army to wreak any havoc border districts of Botlikh and Tsumadi in the land of our Muslim brethren. We do without firing a shot. Three days later, on not intend to leave our Muslim brothers August 10, they announced the birth of the helpless." In January 1999, Khattab began the "independent Islamic State of Dagestan" and formation of an "Islamic Legion" with declared war on "the traitorous Dagestani foreign Muslim volunteers. At the same time, government" and "Russia's occupation units." he commanded the "Peacemaking Unit of the The operation bearing the name of the first Majlis [Parliament] of Ichkeria and Dagestani imam, "Imam Kazi-Mahomed," Dagestan". Moreover, in April 1999, was led by Shamil Basayev, the head of the Bagauddin Magomedov, "the Emir of the "United Command of the Dagestani Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan," made an appeal Mujahids." He also swiftly and solemnly to the "Islamic patriots of the Caucasus" to proclaimed himself "Emir of the Islamic State

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Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan of Dagestan." During the same period, they were going to teach us Islam. I Khattab made clear his objective to create "an answered that we could teach him Islamic Caucasian state extending from the many things about it. I invited him to to the ."45 visit our village unarmed and see for However, to the "liberation army's" himself just how highly we honor the absolute astonishment, Dagestan's Muslim tradition. Shirwani, however, multinational population behaved in a way said that he did not have time for that went against what the Wahhabis had sightseeing trips. He warned me that obviously expected. Instead of a mass anti- if we did not let his squad through the Russian uprising, the border areas saw a more Muni Pass, they would walk there or less mass mobilization of volunteers over our corpses. I told Basayev that against this army. The villagers considered if they killed our men, then our them occupants and unwelcome religious women would tear at their throats as fanatics. Arzulum Islamov, a 70-year-old viciously as wildcats. Basayev wanted elder from the Andi village of Gagatli in the to outwit us. So he asked us to let Botlikh district, recalled crossing the them go through at least to help their Dagestani-Chechen border with three other dying brothers [Dagestani Wahhabis village elders to take part in negotiations on a from Magomedov's divisions] hot August day following the invasion: fighting against the Russian army in the villages of Ansalta and Rakhat. I They tried to put us under said that the Andis may not permit psychological pressure. The anyone with bad intentions to set foot [Chechen] soldiers pointed their on their soil. The soldiers spoke automatic weapons, machine guns and amongst themselves in Chechen. grenade launchers at us. Shirwani However, I know the language and I Basayev [Shamil's younger brother], understood them–they wanted to kill who commanded the soldiers posted us. As we were leaving they started in our district, refused to meet with shooting at us.46 us….Through a transmitter he told us that we had no business being in his The Dagestani homeland security forces headquarters. But if we permitted his thus fought side by side with regular units of squad to go through the Andi village the federal army and the Dagestani , to the pass and bridge near the village and together managed to drive the Wahhabis of Muni, he would leave us and their Chechen sympathizers out in less alone….After a few days I went to than two weeks of fighting in the meet with the soldiers again. This mountains.47 Soon after quashing the time I managed to get a hold of rebellion in the Botlikh district, the Russian Shirwani Basayev. He spoke with me troops and Interior Ministry divisions, backed in a conceited manner. He said that by Dagestani volunteers, concentrated on the

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Emil Souleimanov heart of the Wahhabi resistance in the As the fighters…occupied villages, villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi in they were genuinely startled to see the Tsumadi district. The operation began on that they were not welcomed as August 29, 1999. In retaliation, the Chechens liberators by the locals, which they struck in the Novolaksk district, far to the obviously expected…. Did they really north of the Botlikh and Tsumadi battlefields, think they could occupy Dagestan clearly in order to divert the federal forces with less than two thousand fighters? from launching a concentrated attack on More likely, their intelligence sources Tsumadi. Taking its code name from the had apparently led them to believe second Dagestani imam, "Imam Gamzat- Dagestan was ready for rebellion bek," this operation took place at the against Russia, and that their invasion beginning of September but only fuelled the would be the triggering factor in a Dagestanis' anger over the activities of the popular revolt that Russia would have Chechens as well as of "their own" no chance of suppressing. 49 Wahhabis, who reminded the Dagestani population of their western neighbors' "age- The attack on Dagestan led to a old designs" of territorial expansion. deterioration of Dagestani-Chechen relations. Together with Russian divisions, local units The nationalistic segment of the Dagestani also succeeded in repelling this Wahhabi public saw the invasion not as a consequence attack for nearly a month. of Wahhabi extremism, but rather as a Opinions vary on what made some of the manifestation of Chechen territorial erstwhile Chechen rebels decide to attack aspirations.50 Some Dagestanis rebuked the Dagestan. This concerned only a small, Chechens for "unprecedented ingratitude" though influential and disciplined, segment of since, following the 1994-1996 war the Chechen army. In contrast, like the thousands of Chechens had found refuge with majority of the military-political elite among Dagestani families. the Chechen anti-Wahhabis, President Aslan On the other hand, some Chechens Maskhadov publicly denounced the invasion accused the Dagestanis of betrayal, of Dagestan, albeit with some delay.48 His collaboration, and conformism since the hesitation was due to the ongoing collapse of latter--unlike their ancestors--were not his own regime, concern over the Wahhabi's willing to join the former in Chechnya's fight power and support among field commanders, for freedom against Russia. Yet the majority and sympathy from many Chechens for an of Dagestanis saw Chechnya as a bad "Islamic war." precedent, which had achieved independence The attackers themselves apparently at the price of anarchy, clan conflict, religious expected to win by setting off a mass uprising extremism, economic catastrophe, and throughout Dagestan as the first step towards rampant criminality. An additional problem a great northern Caucasian to stemming from such an upheaval in Dagestan overthrow the "despised Russian was communal conflict in what was then a colonialists". As Svante Cornell points out: stable multiethnic Dagestan, where it was

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Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan common to see several ethnic groups living severe violations on the part of the federal side-by-side in the same village. troops of Chechen civilians' rights, resulted in The events in western Dagestan put a the strengthening of the Chechens' desperate considerable damper on pro-Chechen and resistance. Unfortunately, the nationalist and "national liberation" enthusiasm garbed in the rather secular-minded Chechen-Soviet green of Islam in the Muslim autonomous officers who formed the core of the Chechen areas of the northwestern Caucasus. This army during the first war have now been contributed to Chechnya's regional isolation. replaced by ruthless, uneducated youth, If the Dagestanis would not join Chechens in infected by primitive religious extremism, a campaign to have an Islamic in and who are too young to have memories of the area there would be even less support in the peaceful Russian-Chechen coexistence the sparsely populated, more remote areas of within the former USSR. Moreover, a many the Northern Caucasus with their Chechen fighters are driven by a thirst for considerable Russian populations. In 1999, it revenge rather than by political motivations. seemed that the Chechen conflict would Increasing Wahhabi influence and a growing remain local. Nevertheless, in that era, areas power gap between Chechen separatists and including Kabardino-Balkariya and the very large occupation army (the number Karachayevo-Cherkessia experienced a of federal forces taking part in the operation growth in the activities of local Wahhabis, is estimated at around 80,000 men) led to a mostly trained in camps in Chechnya. Their rising number of Chechen militants to carry controversial methods, however, did not win out more terrorist actions; among these them the favor of traditionalist-religious or attacks, the most notorious included the secular fellow citizens. One of the reasons for attack on Moscow's Dubrovka Theater in this was the fact that, unlike Wahhabism, Sufi October 2002 and the siege on the Islam is an inseparable part of the ethnic school in September 2004 organized by identity of the northern Caucasian peoples. Shamil Basayev. Recent developments show Instead, the radicals' activities discredited--at that the Chechen conflict is spreading to least temporarily--religious radicalism itself neighboring areas, Dagestan and Ingushetia in these areas. The dreaded domino effect in particular. There militant Islamists have predicted by many did not occur , at least for become increasingly active, strengthening the time being. ties with their "brethren" from Chechnya and Triggered by Russian army's invasion of the northern Caucasus, as well as from the Chechnya in October 1999, the so-called Middle East. Second Russo-Chechen War has turned into a never-ending military conflict no less brutal * Dr. Emil Souleimanov is senior lecturer at than the first war. The liquidation of a the Department of International Relations, considerable number of Chechen military and Institute of Political Studies, Charles political leaders in Grozny in the winter of University in , . His 1999/200051, followed by an increase of research focuses on the field of security

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Emil Souleimanov studies (, transnational organized crime, ethno-political conflicts), political Survey, Vol. 19, Nos. 3–4 (September Islam, and nation and state-building in the 2000), p. 338. See also Gunnar Heinsohn, Post-Soviet space, with emphasis on Russia Lexikon der Völkermorde (Dictionary of and the Caucasus. He is author of some ), (Reinbek: Rowohlt, hundred scholarly and publicist articles 1998/1999), p. 330. See, for example, published in a variety of Czech and foreign Olga Trusevich and Alexandr Cherkasov, specialist periodicals, recently including Neizvestniy soldat kavkazskoy voyny, OSCE Yearbook 2004 and Jahrbuch für 1994-1996: Poteri rossiyskikh vojsk: internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2004. He has Pogibshiye, propavshiye bez vesti, also provided numerous analyses to Czech plenniye. (An Unknown Soldier of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Caucasian War, 1994-1996. Russian Defense, and NATO. Troops' Losses: The Killed, the Last, the A different version of this text is part of the Captures) (Moscow: , 1997). author's book, An Endless War: The Russian- Online version: Chechen Conflict in Perspective, with http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N- contributions from Anatol Lieven and Andrei /soldat/index.html. See also Jacek Babitsky (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishing Cichocki, Konflikt rosyjsko-czeczenski, Group, forthcoming in autumn of 2006). dzieje konfliktu, woyna rosyjsko- czeczenska 1994–1996 i obecna sytuacja NOTES w Republice Czeczenskiej-Iczkerii, (The Russian-Chechen Conflict, Its History, 1 Building a functioning state from the Russian-Chechen War of 1994-1996 scratch as early as during the first era of and the Overall Situation in the Chechen Chechen independence (1991–94) was Republic of Ichkeriya) (: OSW, just as difficult. During Dudayev's 1997), pp. 11–12. Interestingly, the presidency, the Chechen Republic was overall Chechen population before the situated under the Sword of Damocles of war (1994) was around 1 million. the Russian invasion, although Chechen society's notorious fragmentation should 4 Valeriy Serebryannikov, Sotsiologiya not be disregarded. voyny (The Sociology of War), (Moscow: Os-89, 1997), p. 167. 2 Charles W. Blandy, The Federal 5 Response to Chechen Independence: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October Occupy, Liberate, Obliterate, Conflict 28, 1997.

Studies Research Centre, UK Defence 6 Academy, July 14, 2003. For further details about life in interwar Chechnya, see Zura Altamirova, "Zhizn 3 John Dunlop, How Many Soldiers and v poslevoyennoy Chechne," ("The Life in Civilians Died During the Russo-Chechen the Post-War Chechnya") and also Zalpa War of 1994–1996? Central Asian Bersanova, "Sistema tsennostey

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sovremennych chechentsev (po 9 materialam oprosov)" ("The System of In fact, some members of neighboring Values of Contemporary Chechens ethnic groups consider this feeling of (According to Questioning Results)") being culturally exceptional and superior both in Dmitriy Furman (ed.) Rossiya i as a characteristic unique to the Chechen Chechnya: obshchestva i gosudarstva people.

(Russia and Chechnya: Societies and 10 States) (Moscow: Sakharov-Center, For analysis of messianic-fantastic models, 1998). Online version: see Valeriy Tishkov, Obshchestvo v http://www.sakharov- vooruzennom konflikte: Etnografiya center.ru/chs/chrus14_1.htm chechensko voyny. (A Society in the Armed Conflict: Chechen War's 7 Boris Moskalyov, "The Anatomy of the Ethnography), (Moscow: Nauka 2001), Chechen Conflict," Mediterranean pp. 462–76. See also Lyoma Vakhayev, Quarterly, Vol. 7, No.1 (Winter 1997). "Politicheskie fantazii v sovremennoy Chechenskoy respublike," ("Political 8 Barayev demanded a ransom of ten million Fantasies in the Contemporary Chechen dollars for the release of his captives. Valeri Republic") in Dmitriy Furman (ed.), Tishkov speculates that Barayev may have Rossiya i Chechnya: obshchestva i coordinated his operation with the assistance gosudarstva (Russia and Chechnya) of high-ranking officials in Moscow. This (Moscow: Sakharov-Center, 1999). seems probable owing to the fact that, until Online version: http://www.sakharov- his death in 2001, Barayev had no problems center.ru/chs/chrus15_1.htm. gaining access to security stations throughout 11 the country--he had an FSB pass, as See Chapter 1 of Emil Souleimanov, testimony from Sanobar Shermatova, Petra An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Prochazkova, Josef Pazderka, and others has Conflict in Perspective (Frankfurt: Peter indicated. Incidentally, in spring 1998, an Lang Publishing Group, forthcoming in armed conflict took place between autumn of 2006).

Maskhadov's "anti-terrorist" units and 12 Barayev's group, which was holding two In September 1951, Aslan Maschadov British citizens--John James and Camille was born into a family of deported Carr--hostage in Urus Martan. Kidnapping Chechens in the village of Shakay in people and holding them for ransom therefore . He was a member of the became an endless nightmare for Aleroy teyp. He graduated from the Maskhadov's government. Contributing Artillery College in 1972 and from significantly to the discreditation of the Moscow Artillery College in 1981. As Chechnya' image worldwide an officer in the , he served in

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Emil Souleimanov

the Far East, , and the Baltics. In 18 autumn 1990, he became the commander Alexey Savateyev, Musulmane of the rocket and artillery troop of the Chechni: mezhdu adatom, shariatom i garrison, and the deputy islamskim revolyutsionizmom. commander of the 7th Division. In 1992, (Chechnya's Muslims: Between Adat, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was released and Islamic Revolutionarism). from the army at his own request because Published by the Moscow Center of of a conflict with a superior. At the Regional and Civilization Studies. Online insistence of some of his friends, he left version: Leningrad's military district for http://civreg.ru/caucasus/pubonline.html.

Chechnya. President Dudayev personally 19 offered him the position of Commander Ibid. of the Chechen Militia. As of 1994, he 20 Sergei Arutyunov stipulates that a vird was the head of the Chechen Republic's is "in essence a monastery, the difference primary army staff. From August to being that the people forming Sufi virds, November 1996, he took part in the honoring oaths, fasting, norms of restraint peace talks. From October to and a whole range of religious principles, December 1996, he held the office of live in their own homes. They live with prime minister. On January 27, 1997, their wives and they have children, so Aslan Maskhadov was elected President they are not monks in the European sense of the Chechen Republic. of the word for that is something

13 See, for instance, dissimilar. Nevertheless, in terms of http://www.nupi.no/cgi- religious obedience and the adherence to win/Russland/krono.exe?445 their canons, and in terms of constant and unconditional observance of the teachings 14 Ibid. of the faith's book, fasting, ceremonies, given obligations, etc. they are actually 15 In 1996, the city of Grozny was monks living normal everyday lives." See renamed Jokhar-Kala (in proper Chechen Sergei Arutyunov, Etnopoliticheskiye Zokar-Kala). ozidaniya na Severnom Kavkaze, Moscow Center for Civilizational and Regional 16 In interwar Chechnya the term "Indian" Studies. Online version: came to describe an armed warrior who www.caucasusmedia.org/pdf/epencroundt did not submit to anyone, did not accept ables3.pdf. anyone, and waged war according to his changing interests. 21 Vakhit Akaev, Islam i politika (na primere Chechni). (Islam and Politics on 17 Cited according to Valeriy Tishkov, v Chechnya's Example). Online version: vooruzennom konflikte (A Society in the Armed Conflict), p. 447.

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http://www.iea.ras.ru/books/dostupno.htm between al-Wahhab's original teachings l. and the religious constructs of his later protagonists. This gap makes it more 22 Georgiy Derlugian, "Chechenskaya difficult to discuss the authentic character revolutsiya i chechenskaya istoriya" of the theological teachings of those who ("Chechen Revolution and Chechen have devoted themselves to Wahhabism. History"), in Dmitriy Furman (ed.), See, for instance, sources on typically Rossiya i Chechnya: obshchestva i "Neo-Wahhabit" Al-Qaida, such as, gosudarstva (Russia and Chechnya: Yonah and Michael Swetnam, Societies and States) (Moscow: Usama bin-Laden's Al-Qaida: Profile of a Sakharov-Center 1998). Online version: Terrorist Network (New York: www.sakharov- Transnational Publishers, 2001). See also center.ru/chs/chrus10_2.htm. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of

23 Radical Islam (: Penguin Books, Literaturnaya Gazeta, August 12, 2004). 1992. 28 24 The other schools are Shafi, which has Nezavisimaya Gazeta , November 11, a long tradition among the Chechens, then 1999. , which has spread in other parts of the Northern Caucasus, and Maliki. 25 See, for instance, Vakhit Akaev,

"Religious-Political Conflict in the 29 Akaev, Islam i politika (Islam and Chechen Republic of Ichkeria," Central Politics). Asia and Caucasus, http://www.ca- c.org/dataeng/05.akaev.shtml 30 Wahhabi emissaries of both North

26 Caucasian and Arab origin had also Moreover, with this demonstrative received higher education at colleges and measure, Grozny distanced itself from specialized Islamic schools in a number Moscow's authority, stressing its de facto of Middle Eastern countries. and de jure independence. By taking this step, Grozny emphasized the validity of 31 No general consensus regarding its own legislature (Shari'a) in its Khattab's (nicknamed "the Black Arab") territory, since having one's own ethnic origins has been reached, because legislature is considered an integral he did not like to communicate with attribute of a sovereign state. journalists, and as a proper Wahhabi, he

27 never spoke of his ethnic origins. It is a When speaking of Wahhabism, known fact that he had a Jordanian however, it is important to keep in mind passport. However, many said that he the fact that there is an enormous gap

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Emil Souleimanov

came from the southern part of the Saudi 38 Akaev, Islam i politika (Islam and Peninsula and that he was of Arabic Politics). origin. Others said that he was a 39 descendant of a Chechen Thomas Valasek, "Hintergründe des refugee. Khattab became renowned for Angriffes an Dagestan" ("The his attack on a column of Russian troops Background of the Invasion of in a pass near the Chechen village of Degestan"), Österreichische Militärische Jarysh-Mardy, during which around a Zeitschrift, No. 6. (1999). rd hundred soldiers from the 103 40 Motorized Regiment of the Moscow See, for example, Sanobar Shermatova, military district were killed. "Tak nazyvayemiye vakhkhabity," ("The So-Called Wahhabits") in Dmitriy 32 Cited according to Igor Dobayev, Furman (ed.) Rossija i Chechnya: Islamskiy radikalizm v mezhdunarodnoy obshchestva i gosudarstva (Russia and politike (Islamic Radicalism in World Chechnya: Societies and States) Politics), ( na Donu: Rostizdat, (Moscow: Sakharov-Center, 1998). 2000), p. 143. It is interesting to note that Online version: http://www.sakharov- afterwards Maskhadov was heard saying center.ru/chs/chrus20_1.htm

that the had brought Wahhabism to 41 the republic in order to ignite Moskovskaya Pravda, August 13, 1999. intra-Chechen dissension. 42 Alexey Litvinenko & Yefim

33 Sovershenno Sekretno, October 1999. Felshtynski, FSB vzryvayet Rossiyu (FSB explodes Russia). Online version: 34 Vakhit Akaev, Sufizm i vakhkhabizm na http://www.terror99.ru/book.htm. Kap. 5.

Severnim Kavkaze ( and 43 Wahhabism in the Northern Caucasus) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September (Moscow: RAN, 1999), p. 26. 5, 1999.

44 35 Maskhadov's cabinet put this anti- Emil Pain, "Chechnya i drugiye Wahhabi policy into effect following the konflikty v Rossii" ("Chechnya and events in Gudermes (see below). Russia's Other Conflicts"), Mezhdunarodnaya zizn, October 2, 1999. 36 "Aslan" means "lion" in Turkic 45 languages. , August 5, 2002.

46 37 Also acting on Kadyrov's initiative, the Uwe Halbach, "Wahhabismus im congress blamed Russia for "indirectly Kaukasus und Zentralasien." supporting the Wahhabis in Chechnya." ("Wahhabism in the Caucasus and "), Aktuelle Analyse des BIOst, No. 6 (1999).

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47 . August 9, 1999.

48 Svante Cornell, The Caucasus under Renewed Russian Pressure: Realities on the Ground and Geopolitical Imperatives, Caspian Brief, No. 10 (January 2001). Cornell Caspian Consulting. Online version: www.cornellcaspian.com/pub/10_0101ru ssianpressure.html.

49 Age-old competitiveness between Chechens and Dagestanis and the resulting tensions certainly played a role as well.

50 Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen separatists' formal leader and president who had been consistently calling for negotiations with the Russians, was killed in an operation by Special Forces in March 2005. This contributed to further strengthening of religious hard-liners' uncompromising attitude.

51 For further details and information on the recent developments in the conflict, see Emil Souleimanov, An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishing Group, forthcoming in autumn of 2006).

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