Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan

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Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan CHECHNYA, WAHHABISM AND THE INVASION OF DAGESTAN By Emil Souleimanov* "We are like a herd of horses. When we sense danger, we unite immediately in order to confront it. As soon as the danger disappears, however, we start turning on one another." --Chechen proverb Between 1996 and 1999, Chechnya enjoyed a Refugees numbering in the tens of thousands de facto independence. This experiment, were struggling to survive in refugee camps, however, failed due to many factors, primarily in Ingushetia. The war made including the triumph of loyalty to the clan temporary or permanent refugees out of up to (which undermined any chance to establish a 50 percent of the Chechen population.4 The strong central authority), a lack of state post-war Chechnya unemployment rate was institutions capable of effectively as high as 80 percent; among young people safeguarding the needs of the state and this figure reached nearly 100 percent.5 Many society, a high post-war crime rate, mass others were injured during the war and will armament, and corruption involving clan- suffer long-term physical and psychological based nepotism. Since then, such conditions damage. have also been responsible for the country's The generation of Chechens who unfortunate situation. 1 experienced the horrors of war, los ing friends After 1996, Chechnya was in ruins and in and relatives as well as their homes and a state of total chaos, with the exception of a property, were then forced to search for their few northern districts fortunate enough to place in life and society under dire make it through the war unscathed. The war conditions. At the same time, the war raised had destroyed the country's entire thousands of youths in such a way that an infrastructure. Factories and processing plants automatic rifle became their most trusted had been thoroughly bombed. Mines were friend and life's only wisdom. These people planted under roughly 5,000 hectares, 15 learned to rely primarily on their own percent of the republic's cultivatable soil, strength as well as on the tried and true causing injuries and deaths among civilians.2 traditions of the clan network and therefore The lowest estimate puts the number of never on the (national) concept of the state, civilian deaths at 35,000, the highest up to which was rather ephemeral in Chechen 100,000 individuals.3 society.6 According to some statistics, 60 to 70 At the same time, the invasion of federal percent of the republic's housing stock had forces, which were accompanied by countless either been destroyed or severely damaged. acts of violence, evoked intense humiliation 48 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan for thousands of struggling Chechens who Such high spirits led to the spread of longed for revenge. As a result of all this, messianic visions. Some Chechens regarded many young Chechens saw no other option their people as God's chosen ones, whose but to turn to illegal arms trafficking, car mission was to liberate their "Caucasian theft, and extortion both in Chechnya and brethren" from "Russia's colonial yoke." elsewhere, including in Russian cities. Others deemed Chechnya and the Chechens According to a number of sources, only 10 as the core of the Islamic world's, or even all percent of the population had wholly legal of humanity's, progress. 10 Furthermore, the employment in interwar Chechnya. 7The nationalists argued that considering its country also witnessed a substantial rise in geographic isolation, Chechnya could only kidnappings. Hundreds of people were achieve true independence if the republic abducted each year. Even the local were to gain access to the Caspian and Black population, especially the members of weaker seas. It was believed this could only be clans feared being abducted. In many cases, achieved by the unification and kidnappers tortured their victims. High- institutionalization of the North Caucasian profile kidnappers were particularly attracted peoples within a united (Islamic) state. This to foreigners from Western countries, such as would in fact be a grand version of Shamil's engineers and journalists who could be Imamate. This ambitious expectation served expected to bring high ransoms. The most as the ideological foundation for the notorious incident involved the brutal empowerment of nationalistic and religious execution of abducted Chechen Telecom interventionism, which engaged the employees in October 1998 by the nation's imaginations of several influential most infamous ruffian and kidnapper, Arbi personalities, including Zelimkhan Barayev.8 The victims included Britons Yandarbiyev, Shamil Basayev, and Movladi Rudolf Petschi, Darren Hickley, and Peter Udugov. Kennedy as well as New Zealander Stanley As there was a lack of studies on Chechen Shaw. history and culture while Chechnya was part The fact that virtually everyone owned a of the USSR, once it had gained firearm and was conscious of the nation's independence, the desire to compensate for victory over the Russian army--previously this and gave rise to wild ideas. There were regarded as invincible--instilled a great deal serious discussions on such matters as the of confidence in the Chechens. Together with racial superiority of the Vaynakhs as the the anarchy that continued to reign, this direct descendants of Noah and supposed evoked a sense of impunity and "anything "founders" of the Aryan and even Caucasian goes" sentiment in many young Chechens. (i.e., white European) race, the originally There was an explosive growth of Islamic character of Chechen nationalism that often included a sense of ethnopsychology, and the excellence of the superiority. 9 Chechens' ethno-social structure. After 1996, the studies pumped out in a swift, assembly- Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 49 Emil Souleimanov line fashion and were affected by uncritical Mission's chief Tim Guldiman as "legitimate post-war euphoria and arrogant nationalism. and democratic."13 Maskhadov's main rival, Russia's military withdrawal was followed Basayev, received 23.5 percent of the vote by an extensive dispensing of titles and and Yandarbiyev received only 10.2 positions among war veterans, with percent.14 "Brigadier General" being especially popular Facing regional and clan leaders, President among field commanders. Between 1996–97, Maskhadov's attempts to stabilize, or rather the number of people holding this title rebuild, centralized political power were skyrocketed. The field commanders who felt condemned to failure right from the start. they were not getting their fair share of This was despite his remarkable merits in political power or economic benefits came to other fields; his well-balanced policies, for hate the government as well as their more instance, staved off the very real threat of a successful compatriots. They withdrew to catastrophic civil war. their auls (highland villages), where they As mentioned earlier, many individual built "family" bases, refusing to recognize the field commanders established themselves in sovereignty of the central government and respectable positions in their native villages thus involving their whole clan in conflict and towns and were unwilling to with the regime.11 A special tension occurred acknowledge Grozny's authority.15 They in relations between the highland natives (and generally argued that they only recognized subsequently entire teyps) and the residents "Allah's supremacy."16 In a sequence of of towns and the plains. Owing to the controversial events, they did not even highlanders' enormous contribution to the hesitate to use traditional means of "force" in war effort--but thanks also to smoothly order to convince rivals of their sole functioning clan bonds--members of the sovereignty and right to limited economic highland clans (teyps) managed to occupy resources, especially oil wells, which several important positions in the republic at represented a source of steady income. In the expense of their fellow countrymen from several regions battles for wealth and the towns and lowland areas. positions of power flared between men who Even Aslan Maskhadov's12 policies geared had once fought side by side. Now they were towards social compromise failed to defuse divided into armed formations according to perpetual rivalries between teyps. Therefore, clan or territorial principles which fought as early as 1998, the despairing president endless blood feuds and extorted money from started to place members of his own Aleroy members of weaker clans. clan in the government. Of course this was Consequently, the degree of Grozny's met with resistance from the members of actual authority was determined to a far other teyps and undermined Maskhadov's greater extent by personal sympathy toward legitimacy as president; he had in the mean Aslan Maskhadov, or clan kinship with him, time won with 64.8 percent of the vote in the rather than by devotion to the notion of a presidential elections of January 1997, united Chechen state. This is shown by the described by local OSCE (Organization for president's appeal: Security and Cooperation in Europe) 50 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan Chechens, Citizens of Ichkeria, Chechen nation - a nation of toil, of Brothers and Sisters! We spent many war, and of triumph in its centuries- long years walking along the path of long struggle for independence and war with certainty and dignity: sovereignty! 17 However, now we have suddenly changed entirely. Yesterday's In all likelihood, an overwhelming comrades-in-arms look at one another majority of the republic's cocksure field with mistrust because the seed of commanders and religious radicals would discord has been sown amongst them have interpreted Maskhadov's potential firm and its name is ambition for power! (i.e. armed) efforts to unite the Chechen There is no other explanation but the regions and teyps as a flagrant attack on their pursuit of power for the behaviour of own liberty.
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