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Russia Terrorist Attack 4 April 9, 2017 Debate Russia terrorist attack Home-grown terrorism in Saint Petersburg or Syrian spillover? he suicide and security policy. bombing in the The Russian Federation is a Saint Petersburg heterogeneous country, composed Metro was not of many religious groups, including unexpected. approximately 20 million Muslims. Russia has Many of them are heavily Russified witnessed some of and tend to be secular but over the Emmanuel the worst terrorist last two decades, and accelerating Karagiannis attacksT in Europe: The Budyon- in recent years, there has been a novsk hospital hostage crisis in process of radicalisation of Russia’s 1995, the attack at the Dubrovka Muslim communities. The hotbed Theatre in Moscow in 2002, the of political Islam remains the North Beslan school hostage crisis in Caucasus. 2004, the Moscow Metro bombings The Russian-Chechen conflict in 2010 and the suicide bombings started as a separatist conflict but in Volgograd in 2013. turned into a religious one. Russian authorities identified a Bombings and other attacks have Kyrgyz-born Russian citizen as the spread to neighbouring autono- perpetrator of the latest assault. mous republics of Karachay- The logic of the attack against a Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria soft, high-profile target was and Dagestan, indicating an Lingering questions. Women grieve near the Tekhnologichesky straightforward: To inflict massive ever-widening scope of operations Institut subway station in Saint Petersburg, on April 3rd. (AP) casualties on the population and for jihadist groups. undermine Russian President The Saint Petersburg suicide targeted Russia and more attacks networks in a kind of self-fulfilling Vladimir Putin’s image as a strong bomber could have been a member are likely to take place. Not prophecy. While investing more in leader. of such North Caucasian groups surprisingly, the Kremlin has intelligence-gathering is a neces- The timing of the attack is and acted on their behalf. portrayed the intervention in Syria sity, a successful strategy should significant, coming during a period On the other hand, the interna- as a preventive war against jihadist focus on promoting further integra- of increased political tensions tionalisation of the Syrian conflict terrorists. It is a narrative that tion of Muslim communities. As a between the Kremlin and the means that networks and links resonates well with many Russian visible minority, Russian Muslims liberal opposition. By targeting have been established between at citizens. have greatly suffered from exclu- civilians, the group behind the least some of Russia’s jihadist Yet the flow of Russian and sion and discrimination. assailant likely hoped to spark a groups and their counterparts in Central Asian jihadist volunteers to The siege of eastern Aleppo and racist backlash against the coun- the Middle East and Central Asia. Syria presents a unique challenge the indiscriminate killing of try’s Muslim communities and thus Thousands of Russian and Central to Moscow. If the history of Arab civilians by the Russian Air Force gain more recruits. The rise of Asian Muslims have joined the Afghans is a guide, the return of were bound to radicalise many Islamophobia has led to physical Islamic State (ISIS) and other Russian fighters to their home young Muslims. The Syrian city is and verbal attacks against Muslims jihadist groups to fight in Syria and country after the end of the war the Srebrenica of the 21st century. in Russian cities. Iraq. may contribute to the outbreak of While Bosnian Serbs attempted to Akbarzhon Jalilov, the alleged Within the transnational jihadist jihadist campaigns in Russia or hide the evidence of mass murder The flow perpetrator, probably did not act networks, there is a clear division other former Soviet republics. in the UN-protected enclave, the of Russian alone. Although there is no of labour among those who Having gained military skills and suffering of Aleppo’s civilians has effective way to prevent a deter- radicalise individuals, recruit operational experiences, jihadist been documented by social media and Central mined individual from committing fighters, raise funds, provide veterans may be tempted to target users and citizen journalists. The Asian jihadist an act of mass murder, Russian logistical support, participate in their own country. memories will not go away easily. security services must answer a the actual fighting and propagate Moscow must carefully choose volunteers to fundamental question: Was the messages to a larger audience. strategies and policies for dealing Emmanuel Karagiannis is a senior Syria presents a attack an act of home-grown or Was Jalilov a member of such a with this new security threat. For lecturer at King’s College London’s international terrorism? Their transnational jihadist network? If instance, a harsh security response Department of Defence Studies. He unique challenge response could have serious yes, that means the Islamic State could push more Russian Muslims can be followed on twitter: to Moscow. ramifications for Russian foreign (ISIS) or another jihadist group has to join transnational Islamist @E_Karagiannis. Why Russia is the jihadists’ prime target t took less than 12 hours ing Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1996, for authorities in the Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in 2004, former Soviet republic of Aslan Maskhadov in 2005, Abdul- Kyrgyzstan to identify the Halim Sadulayev in 2006 and Doku suspect of the Saint Umarov in 2013. Since 2007, Petersburg Metro attack as Chechnya has been ruled by a a man born in Osh, a Russian satrap, Ramzan Kadyrov, Francis Ghilès restive region in the whose father switched sides from southernI part of the country. the rebels to the Russians during Whether Russia has become the the second Chechen war, which No. 1 target for jihadists, as many lasted in some form from 1999- observers rushed to point out in 2009. the wake of the bombing, is a moot The rebels were long divided into point. two competing groups: the The No. 1 target theory shifts Caucasus Emirate and the Islamic according to need. One day it is State’s Caucasus Governorate. France, the next the United States, They could, however, be united by then Germany or Britain and now their mutual antipathy towards the Russia. Russians. The fact that there are What is undeniable is that millions of Muslims from the Russia’s escalating intervention in Caucasus and the former Soviet Syria and apparent intention to get republics of central Asia living in involved in Libya makes it a prime Russia means there is a powerful target for Sunni jihadist groups, be Reason for concern. Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a network of potential terrorists. they linked to al-Qaeda or the meeting in Saint Petersburg, on April 3rd. (AP) Racism against darker-skinned or Islamic State (ISIS). Planting a Muslim people is widespread in bomb in Saint Petersburg on the el-Sheikh to Saint Petersburg 18 In 1949, the Soviet authorities Russia. day Russian President Vladimir months ago. Last year, the Russian erected a statue of General Aleksey In the run-up to the 2014 Winter Putin was meeting there with the ambassador to Ankara was killed Ermolov, a key military com- Olympics in Sochi, Russian president of Belarus adds insult to by one of his Turkish guards. Areas mander of the 1840s, in Grozny. On authorities were happy to see many injury, especially given that Saint of Russia and the Caucasus have the base of the statue, the follow- Sunni militants join jihadists in Petersburg is the native city of the been hit by violent jihadist attacks ing words were engraved: “There Syria. However, now that ISIS is Russian president. It is where he over the past decades — from the are no people under the sun more crumbling there, they might be honed his political skills after the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in vile and deceitful than this one.” tempted to return. collapse of the Soviet Union. 2002 and a suicide attack in History records that the front lines However strict Russian border It is worth remembering that Domodedovo airport in 2011 to the of the German advance never controls are, the West has learnt fighters from Russia’s republics in Beslan school siege in 2004 and the reached Chechnya. The Chechens that sealing off the European the Caucasus have been involved Moscow Metro bombings in 2010. never saw a German. They were continent from the turmoil in the in the conflicts in Syria and Libya. Russia has been at war with the allowed back in 1957. Middle East is impossible. There An estimated 2,400 may be fleeing people of the Caucasus since the During the first Chechen war may be many disaffected youth of the collapsing ISIS’s caliphate in early 19th century, when the from 1994-96, the Russian Army’s North African, Pakistani or Middle Syria and Iraq, posing a consider- novelist Leo Tolstoy famously scorched-earth policy flattened Eastern origin in Europe but France able threat to Russia. Fighters from described the brutal conquest of the Chechen capital of Grozny. and Britain have never treated Fighters Chechnya, Dagestan, Ossetia and Chechnya in his novel Hadji Murat. Torture and rape were widespread; their own citizens like Russia has Ingushetia have been among the In February 1944, 400,000 forced disappearances and treated the people of the Caucasus. from Russia’s toughest opponents of Bashar Chechens were exiled from their collective punishment the norm. Retribution there will undoubtedly republics in the Assad. Their opposition to Assad, ancestral lands and deported to In 2006, Russian journalist Anna be from those “vile and deceitful” who is allied with Shia Iran, is even Siberia and the northern regions of Politkovskaya paid with her life for people. That will only increase Caucasus have more intense given that they are Kazakhstan, the entire nation the brave reporting she did of that Putin’s popularity among Russians.
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