RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2013.0001 Vol. 4 (2013), n. 1, pp. 1-12

Studi

Searle’s New Mystery, or, How Not to Solve the Problem of Saulo de Freitas Araujo

Ricevuto il 31 dicembre 2012, accettato il 21 maggio 2013

█ Riassunto Il nuovo mistero di Searle, ovvero: come non risolvere il problema della coscienza – ha più volte affermato di aver risolto il problema mente-corpo, in particolar modo per quel che riguarda il mi- stero della coscienza. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è presentare e analizzare la sua teoria del naturalismo biolo- gico, dalla sua prima formulazione, alla metà degli anni ’80, sino alle sue ultime manifestazioni. La nostra analisi mostrerà che il naturalismo biologico di Searle presenta molti problemi teorici e incongruenze logi- che, che non depongono a suo favore come buona spiegazione sia per il problema della coscienza sia per il problema mente/cervello. In definitiva, lungi dall’offrire una soluzione al problema della coscienza, Searle finisce col fare della coscienza un nuovo mistero. PAROLE CHIAVE: John Searle; Coscienza; Naturalismo biologico; Problema mente-corpo; Filosofia della mente.

█ Abstract John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the -brain problem, especially as regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of bio- logical naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, which disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. We conclude that, far from offering a solution to the problem of consciousness, Searle ended up creating a new mystery of con- sciousness. KEYWORDS: John Searle; Consciousness; Biological Naturalism; Mind-Body Problem; .

JOHN SEARLE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED as one resents a new way of doing philosophy».1 of the most original and influential philoso- The range of topics discussed by Searle is, phers of recent decades. His undeniable style, indeed, impressive, even bringing to mind the his sharp criticism of intellectual fashions and philosophers of the late nineteenth century and absurd theories as well as his philosophical their ambition of system-building. Following proposal of presenting a unified theory for all the Oxford analytical tradition of the mid- of human , have attracted many sympa- twentieth century, Searle began his career in thizers and supporters. A contemporary phi- the field of the philosophy of language, devel- losopher has even claimed that «his work rep- oping a theory of speech acts from the early

S.F. Araujo - Department of Psychology - Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF) - Brazil () E-mail: [email protected]

Attribution - Noncommercial - No Derivative Works 3.0

2 Araujo works of John Austin.2 However, some years of dualism.7 However, when we turn our atten- later, he began to realize that language itself, tion to its more specific meaning, we no longer though crucial to philosophy, needed a non- find a single characterization. On the contrary, linguistic basis, which led him to address issues there is little or no consensus regarding its in the so-called philosophy of mind and to the meaning, as acknowledged by one of its con- investigation of the biological and psychologi- temporary defenders.8 We should, therefore, cal aspects of human beings.3 From the second always pay attention to the meaning it acquires half of the 1990s, he turned his attention to so- in each specific context of use. ciety and its institutions, in search of a social In spite, however, of the lack of a consensu- .4 al definition, it is possible to at least outline a Since then, he has revised and developed his more general classificatory framework, in order initial positions, seeking to integrate all of his to delimit, albeit incompletely, some conceptu- analyses into a general theory of reality.5 al limits to the use of the term. In general, we This brief overview of Searle’s work serves can distinguish between ontological and meth- as a warning and general indication that, within odological naturalism.9 In the former, emphasis the space limits established here, it is impossi- is placed on the structure and contents of reali- ble to analyze his thinking as a whole, unless, of ty. In other words, on clearly stating what type course, in a caricatural way. Therefore, what I of thing exists or does not exist (e.g., trees exist, propose to do here is something much more angels and disembodied spirits do not exist). In modest, significantly restricting the scope of the latter, only a commitment to how to inves- my analysis. tigate and obtain knowledge of reality is estab- I will present and discuss in its essential as- lished, maintaining a neutral stance with re- pects Searle’s biological naturalism, namely, his spect to ontological questions (e.g., regardless alleged solution to the mind-body problem, es- of what the ultimate reality of things is or pecially in regard to consciousness.6 In fact, he should be, we can only know something about firmly that he has transformed the mys- world through science). What is im- tery of consciousness into the problem of con- portant is to safeguard the authority of the sci- sciousness by treating it as a natural biological entific method and of the empirical sciences. phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis. Also useful for our purposes is the distinc- To conduct my analysis, I will follow this tion suggested by Craig and Moreland10 be- path: 1) initially, I will explain the meaning of tween “strong naturalism” and “weak natural- the term “biological naturalism” in the context ism”: the former corresponds to a strict physi- of the philosophy of mind; 2) then I will outline calism and is directed toward the description Searle’s theory of and its connec- and/or explanation of all phenomena in terms tion with biological naturalism; 3) third, I will of physics, chemistry or biology, whereas the analyze specifically how Searle addresses the latter concedes the existence of properties question of consciousness; 4) finally, I will dis- and/or irreducible emergent entities, such as, cuss what I consider to be the main obstacles to for example, the mind and consciousness. this approach. Based on these preliminary considerations, we can then begin our analysis of Searle’s pro- █ The definition of biological naturalism posal. In a recent paper, entitled “Biological Naturalism” intended to explain consciousness The term “naturalism”, although widely as a biological phenomenon, the philosopher used in scientific and philosophical discussions clarifies his position as follows: «“biological since the twentieth century, does not always naturalism” is the name I have given to an ap- designate a single theory or . In a very gen- proach to what is traditionally called the eral sense, we can say that it designates a kind “mind-body problem”»; more specifically – he of philosophical , by rejecting all forms adds – «biological naturalism is a theory of

Searle’s New Mystery 3 mental states in general».11 man behavior.14 And it is precisely in the context From this simple statement, we can deduce of this broader project that the of inten- that Searle’s naturalism is first and foremost an tionality, considered as an irreducible feature of ontological naturalism, as its central concern is the human mind, is introduced. to present a solution to the problem of the real According to Searle himself, «Intentionali- relationship between the mind and the brain. ty15 is that property of many mental states and In other words, Searle wants to explain what events by which they are directed at or about or the mind, consciousness, beliefs, etc. are, which of objects and states of affairs in the world».16 presupposes, therefore, the acceptance of their Thus, every implies something that is be- existence. But the adjective “biological” means lieved (e.g., “I believe in the existence of cor- something more, namely, that Searle wants to rupt politicians”), as every desire implies some- explain them as part of biology, which suggests, thing that is desired (e.g., “I wish every politi- in principle, a strong naturalism. However, this cian involved in corruption would be arrested first impression soon reveals itself as inade- and removed from public life.”). It is worth not- quate. Later in that same text, we find him de- ing, however, that not all mental states have In- fending , first-person ontology, tentionality. A state of generalized anxiety, for the irreducibility and the causal efficacy of con- example, which is not directed at any particular sciousness, which leads us to classify his pro- situation, is a not an Intentional . posal as a weak naturalism. Now, the question Likewise, still according to Searle, we must not immediately arises of whether and in what confuse Intentionality with consciousness, sense it would be possible to sustain a weak bio- since there are, on the one hand, unconscious logical naturalism without dualism. Intentional states (e.g., a dormant fear), and, on Before answering this question, which in my the other, non-Intentional conscious states view is crucial to Searle’s entire undertaking, it (e.g., a general feeling of well-being).17 In sum- is necessary to analyze in greater detail the mary, Intentional mental states represent foundations and the general articulation of the things and states of affairs in the world. central elements of his approach. This is what Later, Searle provides a more detailed ac- we shall do in the following two sections. count of his theory. «Every Intentional state» - he says – «consists of an Intentional content in █ Intentionality and the mind-brain problem a psychological mode».18 This means that a sin- gle Intentional content (the existence of cor- As some interpreters of Searle’s work have rupt politicians) may be combined with differ- aptly noted, the notion of intentionality is the ent psychological modes (belief, satisfaction, central element in his thinking.12 Not only bio- indignation, etc.), and a single psychological logical naturalism, but his entire philosophical mode (belief) may be associated with several program is based on this notion. Our analysis, Intentional contents (the existence of corrupt therefore, takes the book Intentionality, origi- politicians, the corruption of the legal system in nally published in 1983, as its starting point. general, etc.) In addition, every psychological Right in the Introduction, Searle makes it state has a condition of satisfaction with regard clear that the fundamental aim of the book is to to that which is necessary for its being success- provide a foundation for his previous two books ful.19 For example, my belief in the existence of on language.13 In other words, what he intends corrupt politicians will only be satisfied if in- to do is to explain the essential characteristics of deed at least one corrupt politician has existed language starting from the fundamental charac- or still exists, my wish that those involved in teristics of the mind. However, in the next pages, corruption be arrested will only be satisfied if he reveals a much more ambitious project, they are indeed arrested, and so on. which involves both the solution to the mind- Another central point of Searle’s theory is body problem and a general explanation of hu- the distinction between intrinsic and derived

4 Araujo

Intentionality, which allows us to understand the ultimate reality of these phenomena. Never- the relationship between mind and language. theless, it is precisely to overcome this limitation Only mental states are intrinsically Intentional, that he changes direction in the tenth and final in the sense that Intentionality is a basic and chapter of his book, trying to show how mental irreducible characteristic of the mind. Speech states are actually present in the natural world. acts, which involve a physical realization (e.g., a In this context, the expression “biological natu- sound, a graphic sign, a gesture), have their In- ralism” appears for the first time: tentionality derived from that primitive Inten- tionality of the mind.20 Human actions (e.g., my On my account, mental states are as real as commute from home to the university to give a any other biological phenomena, as real as lecture) also derive their meanings from human lactation, photosynthesis, mitosis, or diges- intentions, which are a type of primitive Inten- tion. Like these other phenomena, mental tional state.21 But how is this possible? How does states are caused by biological phenomena this transmission of intentionality occur? and in turn cause other biological phenom- To explain this possibility, Searle uses the ena. If one wanted a label, one might call concept of Intentional causation, which is a such a view “biological naturalism”.23 kind of efficient related to the capaci- ty of the mind to impose Intentionality on non- To defend the viability of his proposal, Intentional entities and phenomena.22 In the Searle uses two different arguments. In the first, case of human action, for example, an Inten- he says there is no problem in assuming that tional state (my intention to give a lecture) mental states are at the same time caused by causes a movement of my body (my commute the brain and realized in the brain. To illustrate to the university), and it is in the experience of how this would be possible, he uses an analogy the action itself that we become aware of the with the property of water being liquid: existence of that causation. It is, therefore, through this kind of efficient causality that the The relation between the molecular behav- mind interacts with the non-mental world, ior and the surface physical characteristics generating linguistic events, communication of the water is clearly causal. If, for example, with other organisms, social institutions, etc. we alter the molecular behavior, we cause Our presentation of Searle’s theory thus far the surface features to change; we get either is still insufficient to address the central prob- ice or steam depending on whether the mo- lem of this article, since we have not touched lecular movement is sufficiently slower or on the question of the brain processes involved. faster [...] The liquidity of a bucket of water One could ask: but, after all, what is the rela- is not some extra juice secreted by the H2O tionship between the theory of intentionality molecules. When we describe the stuff as and biological naturalism? Or, more specifical- liquid we are just describing those very mol- ly, how can the Intentional states approach ecules at a higher level of description than solve the mind-brain problem? that of the individual molecule.24 In fact, throughout the first nine chapters, what Searle does is simply defend the actual ex- In the second argument, Searle addresses istence of a class of primitive, irreducible and the question of Intentional causation. How is it non-eliminable basic primitive mental phenom- possible to explain, for example, that the inten- ena: the Intentional states. However, by opting tion to lift my arm is the cause of the fact that at the beginning to do a primarily logical analysis my arm is being raised? Once again, he appeals of Intentionality (in terms of Intentional con- to an analogy with the physical world: tents, conditions of satisfaction, etc.), he must restrict himself to the description of its basic fea- Consider the explosion in the cylinder of a tures, without being able to say anything about four-cycle internal combustion engine. The

Searle’s New Mystery 5

explosion is caused by the firing of the spark fact of the specifically human existence».28 plug, even though both the firing and the This means that Intentionality ceases to be explosion are caused by and realized in Searle’s central target, giving way to the phenomena at a micro level, at which level broader problem of consciousness. However, of description terms like “firing” and “ex- not yet having a more precise definition and plosion” are entirely inappropriate. Analo- treatment of the problem, does not prevent gously, I want to say that the intention in Searle from saying that his solution is simple: action causes the bodily movement even we do not know how, but we are certain that though both the intention in action and the specific electrochemical activities between bodily movement are caused by and real- neurons cause consciousness.29 ized in a microstructure at which level terms It is only with The Rediscovery of the Mind, like “intention in action” and “bodily published in 1992, that Searle presents for the movement” are inappropriate.25 first time a systematic treatment of conscious- ness, thus justifying his earlier declaration that At the end of his presentation, Searle admits it is the mental phenomenon par excellence. In that his analogies are imperfect and that, in the Introduction, he reiterates that he considers fact, we have no idea of how the brain produces consciousness to be the principal mental phe- Intentional mental states. However, he clearly nomenon and sets as one of the objectives of believes in the future progress of the book offering «a serious examination of as the key to solving the problem: conscience on its own terms».30 Thus, he in- tends to overcome what he sees as the main For all we know the type of realizations that misconceptions of the philosophical tradition Intentional states have in the brain may be (dualism, , etc.) and to lay the describable at a much higher functional lev- foundation for an innovative approach to men- el than that of the specific biochemistry of tal life. Let us see how this happens. the neurons involved. My own speculation, After denying the possibility of a precise and at the present state of our knowledge of definition of consciousness, whether in terms neurophysiology it can only be speculation, of necessary and sufficient conditions, or by the is that if we come to understand the opera- method of genus et differentia, Searle announces tion of the brain in producing Intentionali- his goal of placing it as a natural phenomenon ty, it is likely to be on principles that are within the scientific worldview. And it is pre- quite different from those we now employ, cisely here that we receive the first big news of as different as the principles of quantum the book: he presents two scientific theories he mechanics are from the principles of New- considers to be already proven and unques- tonian mechanics.26 tionable, namely, the atomic theory of matter and the theory of evolution. The former states █ Consciousness as a biological phenomenon that subatomic particles and their causal and systemic relationships are the ultimate reality One year later, Searle published Mind, of the universe, so that many macro-pheno- Brain and Science, where he again defends the mena can always be explained by micro- biological naturalism outlined above, reinforc- phenomena (e.g., water boils because the re- ing and further expanding the scope of his leased kinetic energy increases the internal analogies with physics through the macro- pressure of the H2O molecules). The latter the- and micro-structural levels of description. ory analyzes biological phenomena in terms of This time, however, on presenting the basic the genetic mechanisms that, acting at the mo- features of mental phenomena, he says that lecular level, produce the molar characteristics «the most important of these features is con- of living beings (e.g., plants perform photosyn- sciousness»,27 and also that it «is the central thesis because their biochemical structure de-

6 Araujo termines the secretion of auxin, causing the proach, namely, the defense of emergentism. leaves to turn toward the sun). It is, therefore, Again, the strategy consists in offering analo- in relationship to both theories that Searle sees gies with other examples from the natural the only possibility of con- world. Let us suppose, for example, according sciousness.31 As a summary of his proposal, he to Searle, the existence of a particular chair. presents the following picture: This chair, considered as a system of molecules, has some characteristics, such as its overall Our world picture, though extremely com- shape and its total weight, which are not char- plicated in detail, provides a rather simple acteristics of any of its individual molecules, account of the mode of existence of con- only of the system as a whole, but that can be sciousness. According to the atomic theory, deduced from the combination and arrange- the world is made up of particles. These ment of those individual elements. There are, particles are organized into systems. Some however, other characteristics of the “chair” of these systems are living, and these types system, such as solidity, which cannot be un- of living systems have evolved over long pe- derstood only by the composition of the indi- riods of time. Among these, some have vidual molecules, requiring an explanation in evolved brains that are capable of causing terms of their causal interactions. In this case, and sustaining consciousness. Conscious- we would be facing a causally emergent charac- ness is, thus, a biological feature of certain teristic of the system.34 Based on these analo- organisms in exactly the same sense of “bio- gies, Searle sees no difficulty in explaining this logical” in which photosynthesis, mitosis, aspect of consciousness: digestion and reproduction are biological features of organisms.32 On these definitions, consciousness is a causally emergent property of systems. It is Soon after, however, Searle acknowledges an emergent feature of certain systems of that conscious states have a particularity not neurons in the same way that solidity and found in other natural phenomena: subjectivity. liquidity are emergent features of systems of And he understands this characteristic in onto- molecules. The existence of consciousness logical terms, that is, it concerns a way of being. can be explained by the causal interactions When, for example, I am sad, it is a phenome- between elements of the brain at the micro non that exists only for me, in the first person. If level, but consciousness cannot itself be de- I were eliminated from the experience, that sad- duced or calculated from the sheer physical ness would immediately cease to exist. Another structure of the neurons without some addi- person can believe me, understand and even tional account of the causal relations be- empathize with my sadness, but he or she cannot tween them.35 feel “my” sadness. It is inherent to consciousness, therefore, to exist always for someone, to be al- But would this not represent a form of re- ways tied to a subject. However, this mode of ductionism? According to Searle, we can say being entails an epistemological problem, in that that his position implies a causal reduction, to consciousness, being essentially a first-person differentiate it from other forms of reduction phenomenon, cannot be understood in the (logical, theoretical, ontological), but his main third-person perspective, like other natural phe- concern is to prove that his proposal does not nomena. This is the reason why we can never entail an ontological reduction. In other words, observe another person’s consciousness, but only although consciousness is a causally emergent his expressions and behavior.33 property of neuronal processes, and its exist- The next step is to explain this irreducible ence can be thus explained, it is not possible to ontology of the mental. It is at this point that reduce it ontologically, saying, for example, that Searle introduces another innovation in his ap- it is nothing more than that same set of cerebral

Searle’s New Mystery 7 processes X that causes it, because, in this case, elements presented here: consciousness as a bi- we would be losing sight of its very subjective ological phenomenon caused by the brain; characteristic.36 analogies with biological functions such as di- This leaves unanswered the question of why gestion.39 However, as in previous works, Searle only this phenomenon or property of the natu- acknowledges that we still do not know how ral world resists an ontological reduction, while the brain causes the mind, which leads us to in all other cases a causal reduction implies an postpone its definitive solution. ontological reduction. Why, after all, can we not redefine sadness in terms of the underlying █ Criticisms of Searle’s approach neurochemical processes, in the same way that we redefine heat in terms of the kinetic energy Despite Searle’s self-confidence, his biologi- of molecules? The answer, according to Searle, cal naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain is that in the former case we cannot neglect the problem, especially to the problem of con- subjectivity of the experience in question, as it sciousness, presents some problems and incon- is the very reality that we want to investigate.37 sistencies, and has received many criticisms, Finally, even acknowledging the irreducibil- which I would now like to analyze and discuss. ity of consciousness, Searle insists that through- As a whole, Searle’s position has been criti- out this discussion there is no mystery involved cized for not offering any scientific novelty, for at all. It is only a consequence of the mode of only restating an old commonsensical and pop- knowledge that we choose. Nothing prevents, ular view of mind. Dennett, for example, finds however, an epistemic revolution from happen- in Searle’s Rediscovery of Mind a kind of popu- ing in the future, thus enabling an ontological lar psychology: «Unsullied common sense is reduction. his chief ally, and his frequent invocations of common sense and its endorsement of his Consciousness fails to be reducible, not be- views give the book a characteristic populist cause of some mysterious feature, but simp- flavor».40 Along the same lines, Churchland ly because by definition it falls outside the contrasts Searle’s book with real science: pattern of reduction that we have chosen to use for pragmatic reasons. Pretheoretically, What Searle’s book resolutely rediscovers is consciousness, like solidity, is a surface fea- not the mind, but our commonsense, presci- ture of certain physical systems. [...] When I entific, folk-psychological conception of the speak of the irreducibility of consciousness, mind. The aim of science, by contrast, is to I am speaking of its irreducibility according discover a new and better conception. In this to standard patterns of reduction. No one endeavor, Searle’s book is not likely to help.41 can rule out a priori the possibility of a ma- jor intellectual revolution that would give us This line of criticism is not fruitful, unless a new – and at present unimaginable – con- one can accomplish two things: a) a systematic ception of reduction, according to which exposition of the fundamental tenets of so- consciousness would be reducible.38 called folk psychology or common-sense psy- chology, which would allow us to compare After the publication of The Rediscovery of and classify similar theories; b) an empirical the Mind, Searle has addressed the problem of proof of a scientific theory which is radically consciousness in other works, among which opposed to the former, something both au- The Mystery of Consciousness and, more recent- thors believe will happen in the future. Unfor- ly, Biological Naturalism stand out. However, as tunately, neither Dennett nor Churchland ac- there is no change in the structure of his argu- complish either, which leads me to the conclu- ments and no new elements in his approach, we sion that their criticism is vague and has only a can say that these works simply repeat the same rhetorical character.42

8 Araujo

The real difficulties with Searle’s approach avoid Cartesianism,46 his theory of conscious- lie elsewhere. First, Searle does not seem to be ness reproduces some Cartesian elements, in- too far from the philosophical tradition he crit- cluding the thesis that consciousness is the es- icizes and wants to overcome. Despite his re- sence of the mental. This has led some of his peated claims that his biological naturalism is critics to see his theory as a new form of Carte- novel with respect to its predecessors, what one sianism.47 Churchland, for example, states that can easily see, in fact, is a repetition of several «what unites him with Descartes is his firm in- elements from this same tradition. It is impos- sistence that mental phenomena form an onto- sible not to note, for example, the influence of logically distinct class of natural phenomena».48 Brentano and Husserl on his theory of inten- Finally, the categories with which Searle tionality, neither of whom Searle ever quotes or constructs his arguments come from the same mentions. tradition he wants to avoid (subjective x objec- Likewise, the analogies employed by Searle tive, first-person x third person, etc.). Here he between consciousness and biological functions comes to mention some philosophers within such as digestion have been extensively used by the contemporary philosophy of mind, who materialists of different sorts since at least the have before him defended the irreducibility of eighteenth century, as I have shown elsewhere.43 consciousness, like Thomas Nagel49 and Frank Let us consider, for example, the following cita- Jackson.50 However, according to him, they tions of two leading representatives of material- have mistakenly treated subjectivity as merely ism from different cultural traditions: epistemic, while for him it is ontological. This could constitute in fact the novelty of his con- To form an accurate idea of the operations tribution: to reconstruct the epistemic argu- from which thought results, it is necessary ment as an ontological one. Unfortunately, his to consider the brain as a special organ de- efforts notwithstanding, Searle does not suc- signed especially to produce it, as the stom- ceed in presenting an independent ontological ach and the intestines are designed to make construal, since everything he says is based up- the digestion, the liver to filter bile, the pa- on the epistemic properties of human experi- rotids and maxillary and sublingual glands ence, as Churchland has also noted.51 In the to prepare the salivary juices.44 end, he gives no pure ontological criteria for … discriminating mental states and processes as I think that every natural scientist, who being in principle irreducible to brain states thinks in a logical way and with consistency, and processes, thus failing to fulfill his promise. will come to the conclusion that all those To sum up, despite his declarations to the capacities that we apprehend under the contrary, Searle has not been able to escape the concept of mental activities are only func- philosophical and theoretical tradition that he tions of the brain substance; or, to express sees as fundamentally mistaken. Besides that, myself here in a more rudimentary way, his position on the subject brings no big novelty that thoughts relate to the brain in the same to the debates in the field. Let us now analyze way as the bile to the liver or urine to the the way he presents his . kidneys.45 Regarding the structure of his arguments, Searle’s approach is anchored in at least three From these passages, we can easily see that fundamental theses: 1) consciousness is a bio- Searle is repeating a very old discourse on how logical phenomenon, that is, physical; 2) it is to conceive of the brain causing or producing entirely caused by the behavior of cerebral mi- the mind. There is nothing new at all, despite cro-phenomena; 3) it has causal power. Searle’s conviction that he is presenting a novel Starting with the thesis of mental causation approach to the subject. (thesis 3), it is important to mention Kim’s cri- Moreover, contrary to Searle’s intention to tique.52 According to Kim, if a mental state X

Searle’s New Mystery 9 has causal power over another mental state Y, privilege at any level of activity of the particles, then Searle has to accept two sufficiently dis- which makes, in my view, his proposal arbitrary tinct causes for a : a mental phe- and lacking in scientific evidence. Moreover, nomenon and a biological phenomenon. How- Hannay55 noted that the bottom-up relationship ever, Kim argues, if every mental event can be defended by Searle to explain natural phenom- causally explained by a biological process, why ena is over simplified, in that it isolates mole- appeal to its mental cause? If an intention Y cules from their dynamic context, thus ignoring was caused by the desire X, why not replace it top-down systemic influences. In this case, con- with its causal biological processes? sciousness could not be entirely explained by Still concerning mental causation, we bottom-up causation, as Searle states. should ask how exactly consciousness, which It is true that he sometimes shows aware- is an emergent cerebral property, is able to ness of the hypothetical character of his model, cause, for example, the movement of my arm? when he says, for example: Searle admits only, as an obvious fact, that it happens, but never explains the manner in I have been mostly talking as if the neuron which this happens. is the basic functional unit, and perhaps that But the main problems of Searle’s proposal, is right. But at the present we do not know in my view, are related to theses 1 and 2. First, that it is right. [...] It might turn out that the Searle seems to have an obsolete and simplified functioning causal mechanisms require lots view of the working of the . As of neurons, as is suggested by Edelman’s ex- Freeman and Skarda53 have pointed out, he still planations at the level of neuronal maps, or understands the overall functioning of the perhaps the explanatory units are much brain in terms of the behavior of neurons, smaller than neurons, as is suggested by whereas many scientists have abandoned the Penrose’s discussion of microtubules.56 cellular level of explanation. In fact, it is worth adding that there are now several competing This does not stop him, however, from con- theoretical models of the brain. So, it would be tinuing to talk as if it had already been demon- necessary to first to decide which one is the strated that or how the brain causes or produc- candidate for explaining consciousness, in or- es the mind. der to subsequently judge its adequacy.54 This The great weakness of Searle’s proposal, means that Searle’s model is far from corre- however, lies in its incoherence and incon- sponding to a model of the human brain well sistency. First, biological naturalism is, contrary accepted in contemporary science, to which he to what he continues to assert,57 a form of dual- claims to be faithful. ism, in that it involves two very distinct types of I would like to discuss further his thesis of biological phenomena: one with subjective on- the causal relationship between the macro and tology and another with objective ontology. To micro levels. If reality, as Searle states, is actual- classify this new kind of dualism, Corcoran ly composed of particles in hierarchical rela- coined the term “biological dualism”.58 But how tionships, it seems then arbitrary to determine is it that a property of the brain can be accessi- that consciousness as a physical phenomenon ble only to itself (consciousness) and how could should be explained by the neuronal level of ac- the natural world have bifurcated this way, tivity, unless we have a good justification for producing subjective and objective biological this. Why not appeal to the level of molecules, properties? Unfortunately, Searle does not offer atoms or subatomic particles? Why not seek an explanation for this curious fact. explanation for cerebral phenomena in quan- Another point related to the inconsistency tum physics, as seems to be the new scientific of biological naturalism is that the analogies hope? The atomic theory of matter accepted by presented by Searle are irrelevant to the under- Searle does not predict a priori any ontological standing of consciousness. Comparing the so-

10 Araujo lidity of a rock or the liquidity of water to a inconsistent, which disqualifies it as a theory of conscious state is to lose sight of the very es- explaining consciousness and mental phenom- sence of the phenomenon under investigation. ena in general. Now, if it is not possible to re- Now, if all emergent physical properties can be duce the first-person ontology of consciousness observed in the third-person, with the sole ex- to the third person ontology of traditional bio- ception of consciousness, which can only be ac- logical phenomena, how can a philosopher or cessed in the first-person, what is exactly the scientist explain consciousness via the brain, sense of comparing it with phenomena from that is, in the third person? The overall pro- which it diverges? And if there is no other posal is, therefore, unachievable, if we accept emergent physical property comparable to con- Searle’s own premises. sciousness, then what is the reason for insisting But if biological naturalism cannot be a the- on the fact that it is still a physical phenome- ory per se, what status could be conferred upon non? Here as well, Searle offers us no answer. it? In truth, it seems to resemble more a proph- I would like to consider, finally, Searle’s con- ecy, anchored in a dogmatic and, in my view, tradictory statements relating to the biological ingenuous attitude toward modern science. nature of consciousness, which reinforce my Like almost all prophecies, Searle does not an- assumption of the inconsistency of his biologi- nounce the precise date of its fulfillment, be- cal naturalism. Since he first used this term in cause if announced, he would be running a se- his book Intentionality, he has repeated that the rious risk of being refuted. Instead, he only solution to the mind-brain problem is simple provides very general and vague ideas, so that and that there is no mystery regarding con- they can continue to be maintained indefinitely sciousness, as it is a biological phenomenon as as a promise to be fulfilled in an indefinite fu- natural as digestion. Simultaneously, however, ture. Maybe it is exactly this feature that has Searle himself has also repeated for nearly 30 allowed Searle to maintain it already for thirty years that we do not have the slightest idea of years, even without any empirical evidence, how this would be possible. In one of his most something which would hardly be conceded to recent works, he again recognizes the difficulty: a scientific theory. What Searle has to offer, «As yet, nobody knows the answer to these therefore, is not even remotely a solution to the questions – how consciousness is caused by problem of consciousness, but simply the repe- cerebral processes and how it is carried out in tition of an old rhetorical strategy, which can be the brain?»59 Nevertheless, if no one knows the renewed indefinitely. In his attempt to trans- answer, what sense is there in a statement like form the mystery of consciousness into the «we know in fact that brain processes cause problem of consciousness, all he has managed consciousness»?60 to do is create a new mystery, to which he does not know the solution. █ Final remarks █ Notes

Our brief presentation and discussion of Searle’s biological naturalism had the objective 1 B. SMITH, John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social of highlighting the essential characteristics of Reality, in: B. SMITH (ed.), John Searle, Cambridge his proposal. We are aware that some details University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 1-33, here could not be dealt with here due to space re- p. 29. 2 See J. SEARLE, Speech Acts, Cambridge University strictions. However, this does not prevent us Press, New York 1969; J. SEARLE, Expression and from concluding our analysis with a general as- Meaning, Cambridge University Press, New York sessment of the same. 1979. Based on what has been presented, we can 3 See J. SEARLE, Intentionality, Cambridge Univer- say that Searle’s biological naturalism presents sity Press, Cambridge 1983; J. SEARLE, , Brains and Science, Harvard University Press, serious difficulties. If our analysis is correct, it is

Searle’s New Mystery 11

Cambridge (MA) 1984; J. SEARLE, The Rediscovery 25 Ivi, pp. 268-269. of Mind, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1992. 26 Ivi, p. 272. 4 See J. SEARLE, The Construction of Social Reality, 27 J. SEARLE, Minds, Brains and Science, cit., p. 15. Free Press, New York 1995; J. SEARLE, Mind, Lan- 28 Ivi, p. 16. guage and Society, Basic Books, New York 1998. 29 Ivi, pp. 23-24. 5 See J. SEARLE, Rationality in Action, The MIT 30 J. SEARLE, The Rediscovery of the Mind, cit., p. xi. Press, Cambridge (MA) 2001; J. SEARLE, Mind: A 31 See ivi, pp. 84-93. Brief Introduction, Oxford University Press, Ox- 32 Ivi, pp. 92-93. ford 2004; J. SEARLE, Freedom and Neurobiology, 33 See ivi, pp. 93-100. Columbia University Press, New York 2006; J. 34 See ivi, p. 111. SEARLE, Making the Social World, Oxford Univer- 35 Ivi, p. 112. sity Press, Oxford 2010. 36 See ivi, pp. 113-116. 6 See J. SEARLE, The Rediscovery of Mind, cit; J. 37 See ivi, pp. 116-122. SEARLE, The Mystery of Consciousness, Basic 38 Ivi, pp. 122-124. Books, New York 1997; J. SEARLE, Biological Nat- 39 For example, in The Mystery of Consciousness, uralism, in: M. VELMANS (ed.), Blackwell Com- Searle claims: «in my view, we have to abandon panion to Consciousness, Blackwell, London 2007, dualism and start with the assumption that con- pp. 325-334. sciousness is an ordinary biological phenomenon 7 See A. DANTO, Naturalism, in: P. EDWARDS comparable with growth, digestion, or the secre- (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. V, tion of bile» (J. SEARLE, The Mistery of Conscious- Macmillan, New York 1967, pp. 448-450. ness, cit. p. 6). 8 See D. PAPINEAU, Philosophical Naturalism, 40 D. DENNETT, Review of “The Rediscovery of the Blackwell, Oxford 1997. Mind”, in: «The Journal of Philosophy», vol. XC, 9 See P. MOSER, D. YANDELL, Farewell to Natural- n. 4, 1993, pp. 193-205. ism, in: W.L. CRAIG, J.P. MORELAND (eds.), Natu- 41 P. CHURCHLAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of Con- ralism: A Critical Analysis, Routledge, London sciousness, in: P.M. CHURCHLAND, P.S. CHURCH- 2000, pp. 3-23: D. PAPINEAU, Naturalism, in: E. LAND (eds.), On the Contrary. Critical Essays, ZALTA (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1987-1997, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) Spring 2009 Edition. 1998, pp. 113-122, here p. 122. 10 See W.L. CRAIG, P. MORELAND, Naturalism: A 42 I have argued elsewhere that Churchland’s concep- Critical Analysis, Routledge, London 2000. tion of a unitary folk psychology is very loose and prob- 11 J. SEARLE, Biological Naturalism, cit., p. 325. lematic, and that at least some psychological theories 12 See J. RUST, John Searle, Continuum, Lon- which would thus fall under his general label of “folk don2009; B. SMITH, John Searle: From Speech Acts psychology” (for example, in social experimental psy- to Social Reality, cit.; S. TSOHATZIDIS (ed.), John chology) are indeed in accordance with his theses. See Searle’s Philosophy of Language, Cambridge Uni- S.F. ARAUJO, Psicologia e neurociência: uma avaliação da versity Press, Cambridge (MA) 2007. perspectiva materialista no estudo dos fenômenos mentais, 13 See J. SEARLE, Speech Acts, cit; J. SEARLE, Expres- 2nd edition, EDUFJF, Juiz de Fora 2011. sion and Meaning, cit. 43 See S.F. ARAUJO, Psicologia e neurociência: uma 14 J. SEARLE, Intentionality, cit., pp. vii-x. avaliação da perspectiva materialista no estudo dos 15 To be faithful to Searle’s approach, I will follow fenômenos mentais, cit. S.F. ARAUJO, Materialism’s from now on his capitalization of the words “in- eternal return: recurrent patterns of materialistic tentionality” and “intentional”. explanations of mental phenomena, in: A. MOREIRA- 16 J. SEARLE, Intentionality, cit., p. 1. ALMEIDA, F.S. SANTOS (eds.), Exploring Frontiers of 17 Ivi, p. 2. the Mind-Brain Problem, Springer, New York 2012, 18 Ivi, p. 12 – italics in the original. pp. 3-15. 19 Ivi, pp. 10-13. 44 P. CABANIS, Rapports du physique et du moral de 20 See ivi, pp. 26-27 l’homme, t. I, seconde édition, Crapelet, Paris 21 See ivi, chap. III. 1805, pp. 152-153. 22 See ivi, pp. 117-132. 45 K. VOGT, Physiologische Briefe für Gebildete al- 23 Ivi, p. 264. ler Stände (1847), in: D. WITTICH (Hrsg.), Schrif- 24 Ivi, pp. 265-266. ten zum kleinbürgerlichen Materialismus in

12 Araujo

Deutschland, Bd. I, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1971, MEROFF, Quantum Computation in Brain Microtu- pp. 1-24, here p. 17. bules. The Penrose-Hameroff “OrchOR” Model of 46 See J. SEARLE, Response: The Mind-Body Problem, Consciousness, in: «Philosophical Transactions of in: E. LEPORE, R. VAN GULICK (eds.), John Searle and the Royal Society of London», Series A, n. 356, His Critics, Blackwell, London 1993, pp. 141-146. pp. 1869-1896; J. STATINOVER, The Quantum 47 See D.M. ARMSTRONG, Searle’s Neo-Cartesian Brain, John Wiley & Sons, New York 2002; J. Theory of Consciousness, in: E. VILLANUEVA (ed.), TUSZYNSKYI (ed.), The Emerging Physics of Con- Consciousness: Philosophical Topics 1, Ridgeview, sciousness, Springer, New York 2006. However, a Atascadero (CA) 1991, pp. 67-71; P. CHURCH- closer look at this debate reveals huge conceptual LAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of Consciousness, cit. problems and strong disagreements on how to 48 P. CHURCHLAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of Con- conceive and interpret quantum mechanics, since sciousness, cit., p. 114. the latter has also been used to defend new ver- 49 See T. NAGEL, What is it like to be a bat?, in: sions of dualism. See e.g. M. BEAUREGARD, Brain «The Philosophical Review», vol. LXXXIII, n. 4, Wars, Harper One, New York 2012; C. CLARKE, 1974, pp. 435-450. No-collapse Physics and Consciousness, in: A. 50 See F. JACKSON, Epiphenomenal , in: MOREIRA-ALMEIDA, F.S. SANTOS (eds.), Exploring «The Philosophical Review», vol. XXXII, n. 127, Frontiers of the Mind-Brain Problem, cit., pp. 55- 1982, pp. 127-136. 78; H.P. STAPP, Quantum Interactive Dualism, in: 51 See P. CHURCHLAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of «Zygon», vol. XLI, n. 3, 2006, pp. 599-616. This Consciousness, cit. is obviously a logical absurdity, which must be 52 See J. KIM, Mental Causation in Searle’s “Biological eliminated before we can take quantum mechan- Naturalism”, in: «Philosophy and Phenomenological ics seriously as an explanation of consciousness or Research», vol. LV, n. 1, 1995, pp. 189-194. as a solution to the mind-brain problem. 53 See W. FREEMAN, C. SKARDA, Mind/Brain Sci- 55 See A. HANNAY, Consciousness and the Experi- ence: Neuroscience on Philosophy of Mind, in: E. ence of Freedom, in: E. LEPORE, R. VAN GULICK LEPORE, R. VAN GULICK (eds.), John Searle and (eds.), John Searle and His Critics, cit., pp. 129- His Critics, cit., pp. 115-127. 139. 54 There is now a strong appeal to quantum me- 56 J. SEARLE, The Mystery of Consciousness, cit., p. chanics as the ultimate frame of reference for un- 198. derstanding how the human brain gives rise to 57 See J. SEARLE, Making the Social World, cit., consciousness. See e.g. S. HAMEROFF, R. PENROSE, chap. VIII. Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in 58 See K. CORCORAN, The Trouble with Searle’s brain microtubules: A Model for consciousness?, in: Biological Naturalism, in: «Erkenntnis», vol. LV, S.R. HAMEROFF, A.W. KASZNIAK, A.C. SCOTT n. 3, 2001, pp. 307-324. (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness – The 59 J. SEARLE, Making the Social World, cit., p. 26. First Tucson Discussions and Debates, The MIT 60 J. SEARLE, The Mystery of Consciousness, cit., p. Press, Cambridge (MA) 1996, pp. 507-540; S. HA- 191 – italics in the original.