1 Why I Am Not a Property Dualist by John R. Searle I Have Argued in a Number of Writings1 That the Philosophical Part (Though
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Dualism Vs. Materialism: a Response to Paul Churchland
Dualism vs. Materialism: A Response to Paul Churchland by M. D. Robertson Paul M. Churchland, in his book, Matter and Consciousness, provides a survey of the issues and positions associated with the mind-body problem. This problem has many facets, and Churchland addresses several of them, including the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and methodological aspects of the debate. Churchland, of course, has very strong views on the subject, and does not hide his biases on the matter. In this paper I shall reexamine the metaphysical aspect of the mind-body problem. The metaphysical question concerns the existential status of the mind and the body, and the nature of the relationship between them. Like Churchland, I shall not hide my biases on the matter. What follows may be thought of as a rewriting of the second chapter of Churchland's book ("The Ontological Issue") from a non-naturalistic perspective. Substance Dualism René Descartes argued that the defining characteristic of minds was cogitation in a broad 2 sense, while that of bodies was spatial extension. Descartes also claimed that minds were not spatially extended, nor did bodies as such think. Thus minds and bodies were separate substances. This view has come to be called substance dualism. Descartes's argument for substance dualism can be summarized as follows: (1) Minds exist. (2) Bodies exist. (3) The defining feature of minds is cogitation. (4) The defining feature of bodies is extension. (5) That which cogitates is not extended. (6) That which is extended does not cogitate. Therefore, (7) Minds are not bodies, and bodies are not minds. -
Is Human Information Processing Conscious?
CommentaryfVelmans: Consciousness The resistance against a natural-science approach to conscious consciousness is required for it. He considers semantic analysis experience reminds one also of the great debate a century ago of novel word combinations, on-line analysis of speech, learn- between Darwinians and creationists. Darwin's opponents ing, memory, identification, planning and control of complex clearly believed they were attacking not a mere scientific hy- novel action, and others, arguing in each case that these things pothesis, but a conception of human nature that would tear away can be done without consciousnessp. (This survey is the bulk of the last remaining shreds of human dignity. The contemporary his paper.) He concludes that there is no type of information resistance by Velmans and others to a straightforward natural- processing for which consciousnessp is required, and therefore science approach to conscious experience may be driven by a that consciousness plays no causal role in and does not "enter similar anxiety. But Darwin did not deprive us of human into" information processing, and is in that sense dignity; treating conscious experience as a normal topic of epiphenomenal.1 psychology and neuroscience will not do so either. The fallacy of this argument is equally simple. Even if Indeed, one can make the opposite argument: that denial of Velmans is right that consciousnessp is not required for any first-person conscious experience in other people may lead to a particular sort of information processing, it does not follow that profound kind of dehumanization. It comes down to saying that consciousness does not causally enter into information process- other people are not capable of joy or suffering, that as far as the ing. -
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012 Darwinized Hegelianism Or Hegelianized Darwinism? 2
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy IV-2 | 2012 Wittgenstein and Pragmatism Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? Mathias Girel Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/736 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.736 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Mathias Girel, « Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], IV-2 | 2012, Online since 24 December 2012, connection on 21 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/736 ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.736 This text was automatically generated on 21 April 2019. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? 1 Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? Mathias Girel 1 It has been said that Peirce was literally talking “with the rifle rather than with the shot gun or water hose” (Perry 1935, vol. 2: 109). Readers of his review of James’s Principles can easily understand why. In some respects, the same might be true of the series of four books Joseph Margolis has been devoting to pragmatism since 2000. One of the first targets of Margolis’s rereading was the very idea of a ‘revival’ of pragmatism (a ‘revival’ of something that never was, in some ways), and, with it, the idea that the long quarrel between Rorty and Putnam was really a quarrel over pragmatism (that is was a pragmatist revival, in some ways). The uncanny thing is that, the more one read the savory chapters of the four books, the more one feels that the hunting season is open, but that the game is not of the usual kind and looks more like zombies, so to speak. -
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020 Santayana’S Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered 2
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy XII-2 | 2020 Democracy as a Form of Life Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered Robin Weiss Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2138 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.2138 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Robin Weiss, « Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XII-2 | 2020, Online since 14 December 2020, connection on 15 December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2138 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ ejpap.2138 This text was automatically generated on 15 December 2020. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered 1 Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered Robin Weiss 1 Recently, it has become increasingly common to question the extent to which Santayana’s philosophy of mind can and should be identified as a kind of epiphenomenalism, as has traditionally been the case. Most scholars take Santayana’s epiphenomenalism for granted, and either assert or deny that he gives an argument to support it.1 However, others have questioned whether the evident similarities between Santayana’s own views and those of modern-day epiphenomenalists obscure more significant differences. I will argue that, indeed, Santayana’s views are potentially inaccurately captured by the term “epiphenomenalism.” However, I shall argue that this is true for reasons other than other scholars have given for this view. 2 The issue turns on what Santayana means by a “cause” when he denies that ideas are causes of action. -
The Mystery of David Chalmers
Daniel C. Dennett The Mystery of David Chalmers 1. Sounding the Alarm ‘The Singularity’ is a remarkable text, in ways that many readers may not appreciate. It is written in an admirably forthright and clear style, and is beautifully organized, gradually introducing its readers to the issues, sorting them carefully, dealing with them all fairly and with impressive scholarship, and presenting the whole as an exercise of sweet reasonableness, which in fact it is. But it is also a mystery story of sorts, a cunningly devised intellectual trap, a baffling puzzle that yields its solution — if that is what it is (and that is part of the mystery) — only at the very end. It is like a ‘well made play’ in which every word by every character counts, retrospectively, for something. Agatha Christie never concocted a tighter funnel of implications and suggestions. Bravo, Dave. Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2013 So what is going on in this essay? It purports to be about the pros- pects of the Singularity, and since I can count on readers of my essay For personal use only -- not for reproduction to have read Chalmers, I needn’t waste so much as a sentence on what that is or might be. See Chalmers (2010). I confess that I was initially repelled by the prospect of writing a commentary on this essay since I have heretofore viewed the Singularity as a dismal topic, involving reflections on a technological fantasy so far removed from actuality as to be an indulgence best resisted. Life is short, and there are many serious problems to think about. -
Richard Swinburne's Arguments for Substance Dualism
Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. MA by Research in Theology and Religion David Horner September 2018 Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. Submitted by David Horner to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of MA by Research in Theology and Religion in September 2018 This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the dissertation may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 1 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Jonathan Hill and Dr Joel Krueger for their support and encouragement in the writing of this dissertation and for their patience in trying to keep me on the straight and narrow. I want to acknowledge the many conversations, on this and other topics, I have had with my friend and philosopher, Dr Chris Boyne, who sadly died in June of this year. I thank all my other chums at The Bull, Ditchling, for listening to my metaphysical ramblings. And finally, I thank my wife, Linda, for once more putting up with this kind of thing. 2 Abstract This dissertation is a contribution to debates in the philosophy of mind and of personal identity. It presents a critical account of arguments for substance dualism to be found in Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013). -
Reflexive Monism
Reflexive Monism Max Velmans, Goldsmiths, University of London; email [email protected]; http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/psychology/staff/velmans.php Journal of Consciousness Studies (2008), 15(2), 5-50. Abstract. Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out- thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense. Key words: Consciousness, reflexive, monism, dualism, reductionism, physicalism, functionalism, transparency, biological naturalism, phenomenal world, physical world, world itself, universe itself, brain, perceptual projection, phenomenal space, measured space, physical space, space perception, information, virtual reality, hologram, phenomenological internalism, phenomenological externalism, first person, third person, complementary What is Reflexive Monism? Monism is the view that the universe, at the deepest level of analysis, is one thing, or composed of one fundamental kind of stuff. -
William James's Objection to Epiphenomenalism
William James’s Objection to Epiphenomenalism Alexander Klein*y James developed an evolutionary objection to epiphenomenalism that is still discussed today. Epiphenomenalists have offered responses that do not grasp its full depth. I thus offer a new reading and assessment of James’s objection. Our life-essential, phenomenal pleasures and pains have three features that suggest that they were shaped by selection, according to James: they are natively patterned, those patterns are systematically linked with antecedent brain states, and the patterns are “universal” among humans. If epiphe- nomenalism were true, phenomenal patterns could not have been selected (because epi- phenomenalism precludes phenomenal consciousness affecting reproductive success). So epiphenomenalism is likely false. 1. Introduction. William James developed an evolutionary objection to epi- phenomenalism that is still regularly discussed today.1 Perhaps because the classic passage where he lays out the objection is so pithy, epiphenomenalists have offered responses that do not, I will argue, grasp its full depth. I begin with a brief history of James’s own encounters with epiphenomenalism. Then I make use of more recent theoretical tools from evolutionary biology to un- pack his worry. *To contact the author, please write to: University Hall 310A, McMaster University, 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, ON L8S 4K1, Canada; e-mail: [email protected]. yI would like to thank Trevor Pearce and Elisabeth Lloyd for helpful feedback, as well as the US-UK Fulbright Commission, which financially supported this work. 1. More recent advocates of epiphenomenalism have included Jackson (1982) and Rob- inson (2004). An oft-cited successor to James’s argument against epiphenomenalism from evolutionary considerations can be found in Popper and Eccles (1977). -
Santayana's Anticipations of Deleuze: Total Natural Events and Quasi- Pragmatism
Abstract *O B NPOPHSBQI QVCMJTIFE MBTU ZFBS MJU- FSBSZ UIFPSJTU .BSL /PCMF OPUFT UIBU JO UIF XBZ %FMFV[F VOEFSTUBOET UIF SFMB- UJPOTIJQ CFUXFFO NBUFSJBMJTN BOE TVC- KFDUJWJUZ %FMFV[F iBMTP TPVOET DVSJPVTMZ Santayana’s MJLF4BOUBZBOBw'PSFYBNQMF UIFXPSLPG CPUI QIJMPTPQIFST iMPDBUFT IVNBO WBMVF JOBTPVSDFBUPODFJNNBOFOUBOEBMJFOw Anticipations /PCMFBMTPXPOEFSTiXIFUIFSUIFMFTTPOPG 4BOUBZBOBTPXOOFHPUJBUJPOXJUIIJTUFO- of Deleuze: EFODZUPIVNBOJ[FUIFOPOIVNBOHSPVOE PG FYQFSJFODF BMTP BOUJDJQBUFT UIF UISJMM Total Natural %FMFV[FDIBTFTXIFOQPTJUJOHUIFVOJWPD- JUZPGCFJOHw*OUIFQSFTFOUBSUJDMF *XJMM Events and BUUFNQUUPFMBCPSBUFPOUIJTiBOUJDJQBUJPO w UIFJNQMJDBUJPOTPGXIJDIJODMVEFBHSFBUFS Quasi- BQQSFDJBUJPO PG 4BOUBZBOB PO UIF QBSU PG %FMFV[F FOUIVTJBTUT BO VOEFSTUBOEJOH Pragmatism PG CPUI QIJMPTPQIFST BT 64JOìVFODFE Joshua M. Hall &VSPQFBORVBTJQSBHNBUJTUT BOEBEFDJTJPO JOGBWPSPG.JDIBFM#SPESJDLTSFDFOUJOUFS- QSFUBUJPO PG 4BOUBZBOB BT B iUPUBM OBUVSBM FWFOUwQIJMPTPQIFSPGNJOE Keywords: George Santayana, Gilles Deleuze, Essence, Event, Phantasm, Ghost, Epiphenomenalism, Philosophy of Mind, Pragmatism *O UIF QSFTFOU BSUJDMF * IPQF UP BSUJDV- MBUFUISFFJNQPSUBOUJNQMJDBUJPOTPG.BSL /PCMFTSFDFOUPCTFSWBUJPOUIBU%FMFV[FBU UJNFT iTPVOET DVSJPVTMZ MJLF 4BOUBZBOBw1 'JSTU 4BOUBZBOBQSFEBUFTNBOZPG%FMFV[FT NPTU GBNPVT JOTJHIUT ɨVT JO SFHBSE UP UIFJOìVFODFPO%FMFV[FPG64"NFSJDBO UIJOLFST CPUI%FMFV[FBOEIJTJOUFSQSFUFST IBWFCFFOSFNJTTJOGPDVTJOHBMNPTUFYDMV- TJWFMZ PO UIF 1SBHNBUJTUT BOE FTQFDJBMMZ PO$41FJSDF 4FDPOE POFDBOIFMQGVMMZ TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY 270 -
Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Consciousness
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 15 Issue 1 Article 5 1-1-1998 Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Consciousness J.P. Moreland Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Moreland, J.P. (1998) "Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Consciousness," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19981513 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol15/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. SEARLE'S BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS J. P. Moreland In recent years, Robert Adams and Richard Swinburne have developed an argument for God's existence from the reality of mental phenomena. Call this the argument from consciousness (AC). My purpose is to develop and defend AC and to use it as a rival paradigm to critique John Searle's biological natural ism. The article is developed in three steps. First, two issues relevant to the epistemic task of adjudicating between rival scientific paradigms (basicality and naturalness) are clarified and illustrated. Second, I present a general ver sion of AC and identify the premises most likely to come under attack by philosophical naturalists. Third, I use the insights gained in steps one and two to criticize Searle's claim that he has developed an adequate naturalistic theory of the emergence of mental entities. -
General MT09 4 Scepticism M
GeneralGeneral PhilosophyPhilosophy DrDr PeterPeter MillicanMillican,, HertfordHertford CollegeCollege LectureLecture 4:4: TwoTwo CartesianCartesian TopicsTopics Scepticism,Scepticism, andand thethe MindMind LastLast TimeTime …… … we looked at scepticism about INDUCTION. ThisThis LectureLecture …… … will move on to SCEPTICISM concerning the external world, most famously exemplified in Descartes’ first Meditation, and his related claims about the nature of MIND AND BODY. TheThe NextNext LectureLecture …… … will say more about modern responses to SCEPTICISM, and focus on KNOWLEDGE. 2 TwoTwo KindsKinds ofof ScepticismScepticism VerticalVertical ScepticismScepticism – Inferring from one kind of thing to a different kind (e.g. inferring from one’s sensations or appearances, to the existence of real physical objects that cause them). HorizontalHorizontal ScepticismScepticism – Inferring things of the same kind as one has experienced (e.g. inferring from one’s sensations or appearances, to expect similar sensations or appearances in the future). 3 ExternalExternal WorldWorld ScepticismScepticism ItIt cancan seemseem thatthat ((““verticalvertical””)) externalexternal worldworld scepticismscepticism isis farfar moremore worryingworrying thanthan ((““horizontalhorizontal””)) inductiveinductive scepticism:scepticism: – Maybe I am just dreaming, and there is no external world at all. – Maybe an evil demon is causing me to have illusions of an external world. – Maybe a wicked scientist has my brain in a vat, and is creating these illusions. 4 DescartesDescartes’’ -
A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory Of
entropy Article A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Jon Mallatt The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844, USA; [email protected] Abstract: This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as φMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT’s strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative “experience- first” approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body (“hard”) problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested.