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Santayana's Anticipations of Deleuze: Total Natural Events and Quasi- Pragmatism

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Santayana's Anticipations of Deleuze: Total Natural Events and Quasi- Pragmatism Abstract *O B NPOPHSBQI QVCMJTIFE MBTU ZFBS MJU- FSBSZ UIFPSJTU .BSL /PCMF OPUFT UIBU JO UIF XBZ %FMFV[F VOEFSTUBOET UIF SFMB- UJPOTIJQ CFUXFFO NBUFSJBMJTN BOE TVC- KFDUJWJUZ %FMFV[F iBMTP TPVOET DVSJPVTMZ Santayana’s MJLF4BOUBZBOBw'PSFYBNQMF UIFXPSLPG CPUI QIJMPTPQIFST iMPDBUFT IVNBO WBMVF JOBTPVSDFBUPODFJNNBOFOUBOEBMJFOw Anticipations /PCMFBMTPXPOEFSTiXIFUIFSUIFMFTTPOPG 4BOUBZBOBTPXOOFHPUJBUJPOXJUIIJTUFO- of Deleuze: EFODZUPIVNBOJ[FUIFOPOIVNBOHSPVOE PG FYQFSJFODF BMTP BOUJDJQBUFT UIF UISJMM Total Natural %FMFV[FDIBTFTXIFOQPTJUJOHUIFVOJWPD- JUZPGCFJOHw*OUIFQSFTFOUBSUJDMF *XJMM Events and BUUFNQUUPFMBCPSBUFPOUIJTiBOUJDJQBUJPO w UIFJNQMJDBUJPOTPGXIJDIJODMVEFBHSFBUFS Quasi- BQQSFDJBUJPO PG 4BOUBZBOB PO UIF QBSU PG %FMFV[F FOUIVTJBTUT BO VOEFSTUBOEJOH Pragmatism PG CPUI QIJMPTPQIFST BT 64JOìVFODFE Joshua M. Hall &VSPQFBORVBTJQSBHNBUJTUT BOEBEFDJTJPO JOGBWPSPG.JDIBFM#SPESJDLTSFDFOUJOUFS- QSFUBUJPO PG 4BOUBZBOB BT B iUPUBM OBUVSBM FWFOUwQIJMPTPQIFSPGNJOE Keywords: George Santayana, Gilles Deleuze, Essence, Event, Phantasm, Ghost, Epiphenomenalism, Philosophy of Mind, Pragmatism *O UIF QSFTFOU BSUJDMF * IPQF UP BSUJDV- MBUFUISFFJNQPSUBOUJNQMJDBUJPOTPG.BSL /PCMFTSFDFOUPCTFSWBUJPOUIBU%FMFV[FBU UJNFT iTPVOET DVSJPVTMZ MJLF 4BOUBZBOBw1 'JSTU 4BOUBZBOBQSFEBUFTNBOZPG%FMFV[FT NPTU GBNPVT JOTJHIUT ɨVT JO SFHBSE UP UIFJOìVFODFPO%FMFV[FPG64"NFSJDBO UIJOLFST CPUI%FMFV[FBOEIJTJOUFSQSFUFST IBWFCFFOSFNJTTJOGPDVTJOHBMNPTUFYDMV- TJWFMZ PO UIF 1SBHNBUJTUT BOE FTQFDJBMMZ PO$41FJSDF 4FDPOE POFDBOIFMQGVMMZ TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY 270 7PM /P t EPJUSBODIBSQFJSTPD $PQZSJHIUª$IBSMFT41FJSDF4PDJFUZ VOEFSTUBOECPUI%FMFV[FBOE4BOUBZBOBBT64"NFSJDBOJOìVFODFE Deleuze of Anticipations Santayana’s &VSPQFBORVBTJQSBHNBUJTUT"OEëOBMMZ UIFNPTUQSPNJTJOHEFWFMPQ- NFOUJOSFDFOU4BOUBZBOBTDIPMBSTIJQJT.JDIBFM#SPESJDLTSFBEJOHPG 4BOUBZBOBBTXIBU#SPESJDLUFSNTBiUPUBMOBUVSBMFWFOUwQIJMPTPQIFS PGNJOE2 *O UIF QSFTFOU BSUJDMF JO SFHBSE UP 4BOUBZBOB * XJMM GPDVT PO 4BOUBZBOBTSkepticism and Animal Faith IFSFBGUFS SAF EVFUPCPUI JUTIFMQGVMTVNNBSJ[JOHOBUVSF BOEBMTPUIFGBDUUIBUIJTNPSFEFUBJMFE XPSLTBSFNPTUMZPVUPGQSJOU3"TGPS%FMFV[F *XJMMGPDVTIFSFQSJNBS- JMZPOIJTFBSMZNPOPHSBQI The Logic of Sense IFSFBGUFS LS CFDBVTFJU JTJOUIBUWPMVNFUIBUIFEFWFMPQTBDPODFQUJPOPGiFWFOUTwDPNQBSBCMF UP4BOUBZBOBTiFTTFODFTw4#VUCFGPSF*UVSOUPNZPXOSFBEJOHTPGCPUI QIJMPTPQIFST *XJMMCFHJOXJUIBCSJFGDPOTJEFSBUJPOPGUIFSFMFWBOUTFD- POEBSZMJUFSBUVSFJOQIJMPTPQIZ t M. Hall Joshua I. 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