DOCSLIB.ORG

Mind and Body “Consciousness Is What Makes the Mind- Body Problem Really Intractable

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Mind and Body “Consciousness Is What Makes the Mind- Body Problem Really Intractable The Real Mind-Body Problem Nagel, “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?” (1979) Mind and Body “Consciousness is what makes the mind- body problem really intractable. Without consciousness, the mind-body Fall 2014 problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness, it seems hopeless.” 1 2 Descartes‘s Doctrines The Cartesian Impasse Meditations (1641) • Strict Separation between Humans, Animals • How Can a Material Substance Affect an – Animals as Unconscious Reflex Machines Immaterial Substance? – Consciousness Frees Humans from Reflex • The Pineal Gland • Substance Dualism – Location – Body Characterized by Extension – Singular – Mind Characterized by Thought – Uniquely Human • Interactive Dualism – Knowledge Through Sensory Organs – Thoughts Affect Bodily Actions 3 The Persistence of Dualism Escaping Descartes's Impasse: Varieties of Dualism • Religious Doctrine • Occasionalism – Soul Separates Man from Animals – Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) – Soul = Mind = Consciousness – All Causality Resides with God • As “Folk Psychology” • Dual-Aspect Theory (Property Dualism) – We have Bodies and Minds – Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) – They are Somehow Different – God Ordains Isomorphism between Mind and – Mind and Body Interact Somehow Body • As Scientific Psychology • Psychophysical Parallelism – Doctrine of Mentalism – Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) – Psychology as the Science of Mental Life 5 – Correlation Established by God 6 1 Escaping Descartes' Impasse: Escaping Descartes' Impasse: Varieties of Immaterialist Monism Varieties of Materialist Monism • Mentalistic Monism (Idealism) • The Automaton Theory – George Berkeley (1685-1753) – Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751) – No Reality Other than the Mind • Pierre Jean George Cabanis (1757-1808) – Humans are Conscious Automata • Mind-Stuff Theory – Morton Prince (1854-1929) • Epiphenomenalism – All Matter Contains “Mind-Stuff” – T.H. Huxley (1874) • Shadworth Holloway Hodgson (1870) 7 – Consciousness Has No Causal Efficacy 8 The Steamwhistle Analogy T.H. Huxley (1868) William James at Descartes‘s Impasse Principles (1890) “The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be completely without any power of • Rejected Mind-Stuff theory modifying that working as the steamwhistle which • Materialism is Right, but… accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery.” T.H. Huxley (1868) – Rejected Automaton Theory – Rejected Epiphenomenalism • Mind has Causal Efficacy • Psychophysical Parallelism – Secular Version “The Sespe”, built 1891 (Fillmore & Western Railway, California) 9 10 The Behaviorist Revolution The Concept of Mind Watson (1913, 1919) Ryle (1949) • Humans are Behaving Organisms – Behavior, Conditions Under Which it Occurs, Can Be Objectively Described • Mind as “The Ghost in the Machine” • Mental States are Not Causally Efficacious • Category Mistake – Behaving Organisms React to Environmental – Identify Mind with Brain Stimuli – Treat Mind as Separate Component of Body • Psychology a Natural Science • In Addition to Physical Parts – Predict Behavior to Advance Scientific Theory • Mind as Behavior or Disposition – Control Behavior to Promote Human welfare • Circumstances for Using Mental Terms 11 12 2 “Mind” in Philosophical Behaviorism Denying Consciousness • Consciousness Does Not Really Exist • “Thinking” – Illusory – Talking to Oneself • Positivistic Stance (“Vienna Circle”) • “Believing” – Nothing Exists Which Cannot Be Publicly Verified – Behaving As If Something Were True • Consciousness is Irrelevant to Function • Mental Terms – Plays No Causal Role in Behavior – Behavior • Mind as “Virtual Machine” – Circumstances Under Which It Takes Place • Processes Stimulus Inputs • Generates Response Outputs 13 14 Descartes’ Impasse and Back at Descartes' Impasse the Explanatory Gap Levine (1983) • James' Conundrum – Science Forces Us to Materialism • Physicalist Theories of Mind Cannot Explain – Experience Inclines Us to Dualism How Physical Properties Give Rise to • Responses Experience – Give Up Folk Psychology • Consider the Plausibility of the Following: – Non-Reductionist Materialism – The Motion of Molecules Creates Heat – Blend Materialism, Dualism – Electromagnetic Radiation at 700nm Creates Red – Embrace Dualism – Give Up Entirely 15 16 Mysterianism Searle’s Biological Naturalism McGinn (1989, 2000) The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) We have been trying for a long time to solve the mind-body problem. It has stubbornly • Consciousness is a Causal Property of the resisted our best efforts. The mystery Brain… persists. I think the time has come to admit – At Certain Levels of Anatomical Organization candidly that we cannot resolve the mystery. • Human, Primate Brain [W]e know that brains are the de facto causal • Invertebrate Brains? basis for consciousness, [but] we are cut off – In Certain Types of Physiological States by our very cognitive constitution from • General Anesthesia? • Concussion, Coma? achieving a conception of… the psychophysical link. 17 18 3 Intertheoretic Reduction Folk Psychology and Neuroscience Churchland & Churchland (1998) Churchland & Churchland (1998) “When the propositions and principles of a • Folk Psychology Talks About Mental States new theory mirror the propositions and principles of an old theory; and • Real Science Talks About Physical States The new theory gives better explanations and • Therefore “Psychology must be grounded in predictions than the old one; then the real-world findings of neuroscience” The new theory contains the correct • The World of the Mind is the World of Ether description of reality and is to be preferred on and Phlogiston and Fairies that ground.” 19 20 Should Have What Pat Said to Paul… ^ Quoted in The New Yorker, February 12, 2007 What Pat Said to Paul… “Paul, don’t speak to me, my serotonin levels have hit bottom, “Paul, don’t speak to me, my Your Broca’s area should be releasing my brain is awash in serotonin levels have hit inhibitory neurotransmitters for a bottom, my brain is awash while, so that my mirror neurons glucosteroids, my blood vessels in glucosteroids, my blood don’t automatically emulate your are full of adrenaline, and if it vessels are full of articulatory gestures as you push air weren’t for my endogenous adrenaline, and if it weren’t into your larynx, across your vocal for my endogenous opiates cords, and into your mouth and nose. opiates I’d have driven the car I’d have driven the car into into a tree on the way home. My a tree on the way home. Mix me a 12.7% solution of alcohol in dopamine levels need lifting. My dopamine levels need water, along with some glycerol and lifting. Pour me a a little reducing sugar, plus some Pour me a Chardonnay, and I’ll Chardonnay, and I’ll be tartaric, acetic, malic, and lactic be down in a minute.” New Yorker (02/12/07) down in a minute.” acids, with a pH level of about 3.25. 21 22 Touching a Nerve A Reductio ad Absurdum? Patricia Churchland, Touching a Nerve (2014) McGinn (2014) Churchland’s reasoning is as unsound as the following bit of invented “I began to learn neuroscience in the mid- autobiography: “I began by studying biology, but then I realized that 1970s after having begun a career in organisms are made of molecules, so I switched to chemistry—this being the only rational course of action.” That declaration can only seem remotely philosophy. This transition was motivated plausible if we assume a very strong form of reductionism, namely that by the realization that if mental processes psychology (or biology) can be translated into neurology (or chemistry). Indeed, anyone studying virtually any subject, following Churchland’s logic, are actually processes of the brain, then should switch immediately to physics, since everything is ultimately made of you cannot understand the mind without elementary particles and depends on their activity. Historians should become physicists, as should students of literature, because people and books are understanding how the brain works.” made of elementary particles! Churchland herself should abandon neuroscience and take up basic physics, because she must realize that brains are made of matter and physics is the science of matter. 23 24 4 But Why Not Ground Neuroscience “in Four Problems of Body and Mind the Real-World Findings of” Psychology? Kihlstrom (2010) • From Body to Mind • Examples – Neural Correlates of Consciousness – Color Vision – Structure of Memory • From Mind to Body – The Great Mental Imagery Debate – Placebo and Other “Psychosomatic” Effects • Mind Without Body “Without neuroscience, psychology – Spiritualism, Parapsychology is still the science of mental life; • Body Without Mind without psychology, neuroscience is – Zombies and Other “Reflex Machines” just the science of neurons.” 25 26 The “Unbridgeable Gulf” “The Hard Problem” of Consciousness Between the Body and the Mind Chalmers (1996) Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical Investigations, Part I, Section 412, p. 124e “The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process…. When • How Do Brain-Processes Produce does this feeling occur in the present case? Consciousness? It is when I (for example) turn my attention – What is the Mechanism? in a particular way on to my own • Why Do Brain-Processes Produce consciousness and, astonished, say to Consciousness? myself: THIS is supposed to be produced by a process in the brain! -- as it were – Why Doesn’t It All Just Go On In the Dark?
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ryle's Behaviorist View of the Mind
    Ryle’s behaviorist view of the mind Jeff Speaks August 31, 2006 1 The dogma of the ghost in the machine . 1 1.1 The problem of mental causation . 1 1.2 The problem of other minds . 2 2 The Cartesian view as a category mistake . 2 3 Ryle’s positive view . 3 1 The dogma of the ghost in the machine Ryle calls the kind of dualist view that we found in Descartes ‘the official doctrine’, and summarizes it like this: “The official doctrine, which hails chiefly from Descartes, is something like this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind. His body and mind are ordinarily harnessed together, but after the death of his body his mind may continue to exist and function. Human bodies are in space and are subject to the mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space . But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. A person therefore lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The events in the first history are events in the physical world, those in the second are events in the mental world.” Now, it is clear that Ryle thinks that this view is not the right one; he says that he will refer to it, ‘with deliberate abusiveness’, as the dogma of the ghost in the machine. What we have to get clear on is why he thinks the Cartesian view is so clearly false.
    [Show full text]
  • 24.09 Minds and Machines an Inconsistent Tetrad Argument For
    24.09 Minds and Machines an inconsistent tetrad spring 2006 1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true • more handouts 2) a priori physicalism is false shortly on website • Stoljar, contd. 3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is • evaluations, final true exam questions 4) epiphenomenalism is false 1 2 24.09 spring 06 24.09 spring 06 argument for (1) argument for (2) • out of type-A and type-B materialism, the • both the conceivability argument and the former is much more plausible than the knowledge argument show that latter “knowledge of every physical property a . see Chalmers against type-B materialism person has cannot by itself suffice to know • hence: if physicalism (materialism) is true, a which qualia, if any, his or her experiences priori physicalism (type-A materialism) is instantiate” true • hence a priori physicalism (type-A materialism) is false 3 4 24.09 spring 06 24.09 spring 06 argument for (3) argument for (4) • type-E dualism is much more plausible than • obviously qualia are causally efficacious with type-D dualism respect to physical events, otherwise we • hence if physicalism is false (and so dualism wouldn’t have any reason to think that is true), type-E dualism (and so there are any qualia epiphenomenalism) is true • hence epiphenomenalism is false 5 6 24.09 spring 06 24.09 spring 06 1 (1)-(4) are individually plausible, t-physicalism and o-physicalism but at least one must be false • P is a t-physical property iff P is (i) the sort of 1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism property that
    [Show full text]
  • Is Human Information Processing Conscious?
    CommentaryfVelmans: Consciousness The resistance against a natural-science approach to conscious consciousness is required for it. He considers semantic analysis experience reminds one also of the great debate a century ago of novel word combinations, on-line analysis of speech, learn- between Darwinians and creationists. Darwin's opponents ing, memory, identification, planning and control of complex clearly believed they were attacking not a mere scientific hy- novel action, and others, arguing in each case that these things pothesis, but a conception of human nature that would tear away can be done without consciousnessp. (This survey is the bulk of the last remaining shreds of human dignity. The contemporary his paper.) He concludes that there is no type of information resistance by Velmans and others to a straightforward natural- processing for which consciousnessp is required, and therefore science approach to conscious experience may be driven by a that consciousness plays no causal role in and does not "enter similar anxiety. But Darwin did not deprive us of human into" information processing, and is in that sense dignity; treating conscious experience as a normal topic of epiphenomenal.1 psychology and neuroscience will not do so either. The fallacy of this argument is equally simple. Even if Indeed, one can make the opposite argument: that denial of Velmans is right that consciousnessp is not required for any first-person conscious experience in other people may lead to a particular sort of information processing, it does not follow that profound kind of dehumanization. It comes down to saying that consciousness does not causally enter into information process- other people are not capable of joy or suffering, that as far as the ing.
    [Show full text]
  • European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020 Santayana’S Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered 2
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy XII-2 | 2020 Democracy as a Form of Life Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered Robin Weiss Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2138 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.2138 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Robin Weiss, « Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XII-2 | 2020, Online since 14 December 2020, connection on 15 December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2138 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ ejpap.2138 This text was automatically generated on 15 December 2020. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered 1 Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered Robin Weiss 1 Recently, it has become increasingly common to question the extent to which Santayana’s philosophy of mind can and should be identified as a kind of epiphenomenalism, as has traditionally been the case. Most scholars take Santayana’s epiphenomenalism for granted, and either assert or deny that he gives an argument to support it.1 However, others have questioned whether the evident similarities between Santayana’s own views and those of modern-day epiphenomenalists obscure more significant differences. I will argue that, indeed, Santayana’s views are potentially inaccurately captured by the term “epiphenomenalism.” However, I shall argue that this is true for reasons other than other scholars have given for this view. 2 The issue turns on what Santayana means by a “cause” when he denies that ideas are causes of action.
    [Show full text]
  • Richard Swinburne's Arguments for Substance Dualism
    Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. MA by Research in Theology and Religion David Horner September 2018 Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. Submitted by David Horner to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of MA by Research in Theology and Religion in September 2018 This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the dissertation may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 1 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Jonathan Hill and Dr Joel Krueger for their support and encouragement in the writing of this dissertation and for their patience in trying to keep me on the straight and narrow. I want to acknowledge the many conversations, on this and other topics, I have had with my friend and philosopher, Dr Chris Boyne, who sadly died in June of this year. I thank all my other chums at The Bull, Ditchling, for listening to my metaphysical ramblings. And finally, I thank my wife, Linda, for once more putting up with this kind of thing. 2 Abstract This dissertation is a contribution to debates in the philosophy of mind and of personal identity. It presents a critical account of arguments for substance dualism to be found in Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013).
    [Show full text]
  • Revisiting the Philosophy of Ghost in the Shell
    Mirt KOMEL* THE GHOST OUTSIDE ITS SHELL: REVISITING THE PHILOSOPHY OF GHOST IN THE SHELL Abstract. The article engages with the popular Japanese media franchise Ghost in the Shell, discerning its cultur- al aspects and influence through a philosophical reflec- tion of its main materialistic idea, namelly, the dual relationship between mind and body. The interpreta- tion is legitimazied by the fact that the author of the original manga series, Masamune Shirow, was influ- enced by Arthur Koestler’s book Ghost in the Machine, esentially a structuralist anti-Cartesian meditation. The author of the present article argues that the main under- lying materialistic idea of the ghost in the shell can be originally reinterpreted and developed further through Hegelian dialectics. Keywords: Ghost in the Shell, Japanese Manga, Cultural 920 Studies, Philosophy, Cartesian Materialism, Hegelian Dialectis Introduction Ghost in the Shell, a popular Japanese media franchise inspired by Arthur Koestler’s book The Ghost in the Machine,1 was originally written and illustrated by Masamune Shirow in 1989 as a seinen manga2 with the title 攻殻機動隊 (transliterated as Kōkaku Kidōtai, literally “Mobile Armored Riot Police”). Due to its enormous popularity the original manga and its sequels inspired several anime adaptations, starting in 1995 with the film Ghost in the Shell, then in 2002 the television series Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex, in 2004 followed by another film, Ghost in the Shell: Innocence, and in 2013 by an OVA reboot (original video animation), Ghost in the Shell: Arise, and again a movie in 2015 based on the Arise series, Ghost in * Mirt Komel, Phd, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
    [Show full text]
  • William James's Objection to Epiphenomenalism
    William James’s Objection to Epiphenomenalism Alexander Klein*y James developed an evolutionary objection to epiphenomenalism that is still discussed today. Epiphenomenalists have offered responses that do not grasp its full depth. I thus offer a new reading and assessment of James’s objection. Our life-essential, phenomenal pleasures and pains have three features that suggest that they were shaped by selection, according to James: they are natively patterned, those patterns are systematically linked with antecedent brain states, and the patterns are “universal” among humans. If epiphe- nomenalism were true, phenomenal patterns could not have been selected (because epi- phenomenalism precludes phenomenal consciousness affecting reproductive success). So epiphenomenalism is likely false. 1. Introduction. William James developed an evolutionary objection to epi- phenomenalism that is still regularly discussed today.1 Perhaps because the classic passage where he lays out the objection is so pithy, epiphenomenalists have offered responses that do not, I will argue, grasp its full depth. I begin with a brief history of James’s own encounters with epiphenomenalism. Then I make use of more recent theoretical tools from evolutionary biology to un- pack his worry. *To contact the author, please write to: University Hall 310A, McMaster University, 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, ON L8S 4K1, Canada; e-mail: [email protected]. yI would like to thank Trevor Pearce and Elisabeth Lloyd for helpful feedback, as well as the US-UK Fulbright Commission, which financially supported this work. 1. More recent advocates of epiphenomenalism have included Jackson (1982) and Rob- inson (2004). An oft-cited successor to James’s argument against epiphenomenalism from evolutionary considerations can be found in Popper and Eccles (1977).
    [Show full text]
  • Santayana's Anticipations of Deleuze: Total Natural Events and Quasi- Pragmatism
    Abstract *O B NPOPHSBQI QVCMJTIFE MBTU ZFBS MJU- FSBSZ UIFPSJTU .BSL /PCMF OPUFT UIBU JO UIF XBZ %FMFV[F VOEFSTUBOET UIF SFMB- UJPOTIJQ CFUXFFO NBUFSJBMJTN BOE TVC- KFDUJWJUZ %FMFV[F iBMTP TPVOET DVSJPVTMZ Santayana’s MJLF4BOUBZBOBw'PSFYBNQMF UIFXPSLPG CPUI QIJMPTPQIFST iMPDBUFT IVNBO WBMVF JOBTPVSDFBUPODFJNNBOFOUBOEBMJFOw Anticipations /PCMFBMTPXPOEFSTiXIFUIFSUIFMFTTPOPG 4BOUBZBOBTPXOOFHPUJBUJPOXJUIIJTUFO- of Deleuze: EFODZUPIVNBOJ[FUIFOPOIVNBOHSPVOE PG FYQFSJFODF BMTP BOUJDJQBUFT UIF UISJMM Total Natural %FMFV[FDIBTFTXIFOQPTJUJOHUIFVOJWPD- JUZPGCFJOHw*OUIFQSFTFOUBSUJDMF *XJMM Events and BUUFNQUUPFMBCPSBUFPOUIJTiBOUJDJQBUJPO w UIFJNQMJDBUJPOTPGXIJDIJODMVEFBHSFBUFS Quasi- BQQSFDJBUJPO PG 4BOUBZBOB PO UIF QBSU PG %FMFV[F FOUIVTJBTUT BO VOEFSTUBOEJOH Pragmatism PG CPUI QIJMPTPQIFST BT 64JOìVFODFE Joshua M. Hall &VSPQFBORVBTJQSBHNBUJTUT BOEBEFDJTJPO JOGBWPSPG.JDIBFM#SPESJDLTSFDFOUJOUFS- QSFUBUJPO PG 4BOUBZBOB BT B iUPUBM OBUVSBM FWFOUwQIJMPTPQIFSPGNJOE Keywords: George Santayana, Gilles Deleuze, Essence, Event, Phantasm, Ghost, Epiphenomenalism, Philosophy of Mind, Pragmatism *O UIF QSFTFOU BSUJDMF * IPQF UP BSUJDV- MBUFUISFFJNQPSUBOUJNQMJDBUJPOTPG.BSL /PCMFTSFDFOUPCTFSWBUJPOUIBU%FMFV[FBU UJNFT iTPVOET DVSJPVTMZ MJLF 4BOUBZBOBw1 'JSTU 4BOUBZBOBQSFEBUFTNBOZPG%FMFV[FT NPTU GBNPVT JOTJHIUT ɨVT JO SFHBSE UP UIFJOìVFODFPO%FMFV[FPG64"NFSJDBO UIJOLFST CPUI%FMFV[FBOEIJTJOUFSQSFUFST IBWFCFFOSFNJTTJOGPDVTJOHBMNPTUFYDMV- TJWFMZ PO UIF 1SBHNBUJTUT BOE FTQFDJBMMZ PO$41FJSDF 4FDPOE POFDBOIFMQGVMMZ TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY 270
    [Show full text]
  • Giving up on Consciousness As the Ghost in the Machine
    HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY published: 30 April 2021 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.571460 Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine Peter W. Halligan 1* and David A. Oakley 2 1 School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom, 2 Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, United Kingdom Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness- centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive Edited by: architecture for a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive Marjan Persuh, functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out Borough of Manhattan Community competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient College, United States non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience Reviewed by: David Rosenthal, of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive The City University of New York, explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a United States Andrew Patrick Allen, cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling Maynooth University, Ireland 1st-person experience (inside view) that convinces us that subjective awareness is the *Correspondence: mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for Peter W.
    [Show full text]
  • Ryle As a Critique of Descartes' Mind-Body Dualism
    International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 3, Issue 7, July 2013 1 ISSN 2250-3153 Ryle as a critique of Descartes’ Mind-Body Dualism Shanjendu Nath Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Rabindrasadan Girls‟ College, Karimganj, Assam, India Abstract- The problem of mind-body relation is a central observed by other persons. So like the lives of animals, reptiles, problem in the history of philosophy. From the very ancient trees, crystals and planets man‟s bodily life is publicly period there have been discussions on this issue but it could not observable and is subject to public affairs. But minds are not get prominent position. In modern period it is Descartes who publicly observable as it does not occupy space and not subject brought the old problem in a new way. He holds the view that to mechanical laws. One cannot know what is going on in other‟s mind and body are two dependent substances and thereby he is mind. One‟s mental states and processes are wholly and directly called a dualist philosopher. He is the most influential dualistic perceivable by one who possesses them. philosopher in modern philosophy. His analysis of mind body Whether a person is aware of the happenings of his own relation is accepted by most of the philosophers, psychologists, mind, either fully or in parts, is a matter of dispute. Official religious teachers and even by the common people. But in spite theory maintains that one‟s own mental occurrences can be of this, his theory has to face a lot of criticisms from different cognized by him alone, though not whole of it but at least some stand points.
    [Show full text]
  • Park, Sam-Yel (1999) a Study of the Mind-Body Theory in Spinoza. Phd Thesis. Copyright and Moral R
    Park, Sam-Yel (1999) A study of the mind-body theory in Spinoza. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2040/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] A Study of the Mind-Body Theory in Spinoza Departmentof Philosophy University of Glasgow A Study of Theory in Spinoza the pffindýBody by Sam-Yel Park A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Arts in Fulfilment of the Requirementsfor the degreeof Doctor of Philosophy June 1999 C Sam-Yel Park 1999 Abstract A Study of the Mind-Body Theory in Spinoza by Sam-Yel Park This thesis investigates Spinoza's mind-body theory starting with the discussion of the diverse interpretations of his mind-body theory such as hylomorphism.,idealism, epiphenomenalism,and materialism. From the critical comments on inadequaciesof these interpretations, it turns out that Spinoza's argumentof the relationshipbetween the mind and the body should be understood as holding that there is a non-causalrelationship between the mind and the body and that they have equal weight.
    [Show full text]
  • A Type-F Monist Account of Phenomenal Consciousness
    INTRINSIC NATURALISM: A TYPE-F MONIST ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS By LUKE ALEXANDER GORDON PALMER A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of Master of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham September 2010 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT The aim of this thesis is to provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness which accords with both the science-friendly spirit of physicalism and the acknowledgement of panpsychism that phenomenal properties may be inextricably linked to entities, but with none of the problems associated with either type of model. Initially, physicalism and panpsychism are evaluated by the lights of their most serious problems, and solutions are offered to these problems from the point of view of a third kind of model: intrinsic naturalism, presented in the final chapter. This model holds consciousness to be among the battery of a functional system’s intrinsic (i.e. non-dispositional) properties. A definition is given, and defence made for the existence of these properties, and their compatibility with an otherwise physicalist ontology.
    [Show full text]