RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2013.0001 Vol. 4 (2013), n. 1, pp. 1-12 Studi Searle’s New Mystery, or, How Not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness Saulo de Freitas Araujo Ricevuto il 31 dicembre 2012, accettato il 21 maggio 2013 █ Riassunto Il nuovo mistero di Searle, ovvero: come non risolvere il problema della coscienza – John Searle ha più volte affermato di aver risolto il problema mente-corpo, in particolar modo per quel che riguarda il mi- stero della coscienza. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è presentare e analizzare la sua teoria del naturalismo biolo- gico, dalla sua prima formulazione, alla metà degli anni ’80, sino alle sue ultime manifestazioni. La nostra analisi mostrerà che il naturalismo biologico di Searle presenta molti problemi teorici e incongruenze logi- che, che non depongono a suo favore come buona spiegazione sia per il problema della coscienza sia per il problema mente/cervello. In definitiva, lungi dall’offrire una soluzione al problema della coscienza, Searle finisce col fare della coscienza un nuovo mistero. PAROLE CHIAVE: John Searle; Coscienza; Naturalismo biologico; Problema mente-corpo; Filosofia della mente. █ Abstract John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the mind-brain problem, especially as regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of bio- logical naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, which disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. We conclude that, far from offering a solution to the problem of consciousness, Searle ended up creating a new mystery of con- sciousness. KEYWORDS: John Searle; Consciousness; Biological Naturalism; Mind-Body Problem; Philosophy of Mind. JOHN SEARLE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED as one resents a new way of doing philosophy».1 of the most original and influential philoso- The range of topics discussed by Searle is, phers of recent decades. His undeniable style, indeed, impressive, even bringing to mind the his sharp criticism of intellectual fashions and philosophers of the late nineteenth century and absurd theories as well as his philosophical their ambition of system-building. Following proposal of presenting a unified theory for all the Oxford analytical tradition of the mid- of human reality, have attracted many sympa- twentieth century, Searle began his career in thizers and supporters. A contemporary phi- the field of the philosophy of language, devel- losopher has even claimed that «his work rep- oping a theory of speech acts from the early S.F. Araujo - Department of Psychology - Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF) - Brazil () E-mail: [email protected] Attribution - Noncommercial - No Derivative Works 3.0 2 Araujo works of John Austin.2 However, some years of dualism.7 However, when we turn our atten- later, he began to realize that language itself, tion to its more specific meaning, we no longer though crucial to philosophy, needed a non- find a single characterization. On the contrary, linguistic basis, which led him to address issues there is little or no consensus regarding its in the so-called philosophy of mind and to the meaning, as acknowledged by one of its con- investigation of the biological and psychologi- temporary defenders.8 We should, therefore, cal aspects of human beings.3 From the second always pay attention to the meaning it acquires half of the 1990s, he turned his attention to so- in each specific context of use. ciety and its institutions, in search of a social In spite, however, of the lack of a consensu- ontology.4 al definition, it is possible to at least outline a Since then, he has revised and developed his more general classificatory framework, in order initial positions, seeking to integrate all of his to delimit, albeit incompletely, some conceptu- analyses into a general theory of reality.5 al limits to the use of the term. In general, we This brief overview of Searle’s work serves can distinguish between ontological and meth- as a warning and general indication that, within odological naturalism.9 In the former, emphasis the space limits established here, it is impossi- is placed on the structure and contents of reali- ble to analyze his thinking as a whole, unless, of ty. In other words, on clearly stating what type course, in a caricatural way. Therefore, what I of thing exists or does not exist (e.g., trees exist, propose to do here is something much more angels and disembodied spirits do not exist). In modest, significantly restricting the scope of the latter, only a commitment to how to inves- my analysis. tigate and obtain knowledge of reality is estab- I will present and discuss in its essential as- lished, maintaining a neutral stance with re- pects Searle’s biological naturalism, namely, his spect to ontological questions (e.g., regardless alleged solution to the mind-body problem, es- of what the ultimate reality of things is or pecially in regard to consciousness.6 In fact, he should be, we can only know something about firmly believes that he has transformed the mys- the real world through science). What is im- tery of consciousness into the problem of con- portant is to safeguard the authority of the sci- sciousness by treating it as a natural biological entific method and of the empirical sciences. phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis. Also useful for our purposes is the distinc- To conduct my analysis, I will follow this tion suggested by Craig and Moreland10 be- path: 1) initially, I will explain the meaning of tween “strong naturalism” and “weak natural- the term “biological naturalism” in the context ism”: the former corresponds to a strict physi- of the philosophy of mind; 2) then I will outline calism and is directed toward the description Searle’s theory of intentionality and its connec- and/or explanation of all phenomena in terms tion with biological naturalism; 3) third, I will of physics, chemistry or biology, whereas the analyze specifically how Searle addresses the latter concedes the existence of properties question of consciousness; 4) finally, I will dis- and/or irreducible emergent entities, such as, cuss what I consider to be the main obstacles to for example, the mind and consciousness. this approach. Based on these preliminary considerations, we can then begin our analysis of Searle’s pro- █ The definition of biological naturalism posal. In a recent paper, entitled “Biological Naturalism” intended to explain consciousness The term “naturalism”, although widely as a biological phenomenon, the philosopher used in scientific and philosophical discussions clarifies his position as follows: «“biological since the twentieth century, does not always naturalism” is the name I have given to an ap- designate a single theory or idea. In a very gen- proach to what is traditionally called the eral sense, we can say that it designates a kind “mind-body problem”»; more specifically – he of philosophical monism, by rejecting all forms adds – «biological naturalism is a theory of Searle’s New Mystery 3 mental states in general».11 man behavior.14 And it is precisely in the context From this simple statement, we can deduce of this broader project that the concept of inten- that Searle’s naturalism is first and foremost an tionality, considered as an irreducible feature of ontological naturalism, as its central concern is the human mind, is introduced. to present a solution to the problem of the real According to Searle himself, «Intentionali- relationship between the mind and the brain. ty15 is that property of many mental states and In other words, Searle wants to explain what events by which they are directed at or about or the mind, consciousness, beliefs, etc. are, which of objects and states of affairs in the world».16 presupposes, therefore, the acceptance of their Thus, every belief implies something that is be- existence. But the adjective “biological” means lieved (e.g., “I believe in the existence of cor- something more, namely, that Searle wants to rupt politicians”), as every desire implies some- explain them as part of biology, which suggests, thing that is desired (e.g., “I wish every politi- in principle, a strong naturalism. However, this cian involved in corruption would be arrested first impression soon reveals itself as inade- and removed from public life.”). It is worth not- quate. Later in that same text, we find him de- ing, however, that not all mental states have In- fending emergentism, first-person ontology, tentionality. A state of generalized anxiety, for the irreducibility and the causal efficacy of con- example, which is not directed at any particular sciousness, which leads us to classify his pro- situation, is a not an Intentional mental state. posal as a weak naturalism. Now, the question Likewise, still according to Searle, we must not immediately arises of whether and in what confuse Intentionality with consciousness, sense it would be possible to sustain a weak bio- since there are, on the one hand, unconscious logical naturalism without dualism. Intentional states (e.g., a dormant fear), and, on Before answering this question, which in my the other, non-Intentional conscious states view is crucial to Searle’s entire undertaking, it (e.g., a general feeling of well-being).17 In sum- is necessary to analyze in greater detail the mary, Intentional mental states represent foundations and the general articulation of the things and states of affairs in the world. central elements of his approach. This is what Later, Searle provides a more detailed ac- we shall do in the following two sections.