DOCSLIB.ORG

UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Felt Thought: Neuroscience, Modernism and the Intelligence of Poetry Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4948m8v9 Author Langione, Matthew Paul Publication Date 2016 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Felt Thought: Neuroscience, Modernism and the Intelligence of Poetry by Matthew Paul Langione A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English and the Designated Emphases in Critical Theory and in Science and Technology Studies in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Charles Altieri, Chair Professor Mitchell Breitwieser Professor Dorothy J. Hale Professor David A. Hollinger Professor John R. Searle Spring 2016 To Aynslie, M & D, Barry O’C, Jaime and the brothers G ~i~ TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..1 Poetic Intelligence in the Age of Intelligent Machines Chapter I…………………………………………………………………………………….55 A Geometry of One’s Own Chapter II……………………………………………………………………………………97 Probability, Pragmatism and the Problem of Personality Chapter III…………………………………………………………………………………136 The Science of Sensibility Chapter IV…………………………………………………………………………………186 Prufrock and the Poetics of Observation Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………242 Intelligent Examples Epilogue……………………………………………………………………………………248 Minding the Gap: The Value of Neuroscience to Literary Criticism Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………....289 ~ii~ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A dissertation is a life’s work even if it springs into being in the white heat of a few months’ labor. My first debts, therefore, are to my parents, Paul and Joanne Langione, who put me in a position to dream of such a thing, to James Kloppenberg who gave me faith that I could do it, and to Barry O’Connell who never allowed me to forget how much it mattered if I did. I am indebted to Kathleen Moran who made it possible for me to come to Berkeley, and to Jennifer Hudin who made it impossible for me to leave. The debts I owe to my committee far exceed my powers of description. They are to be credited for whatever is intelligent in the present work, and to be blamed for none of what is obtuse. It would be difficult to imagine anybody more intellectually generous than my adviser, Charles Altieri, a model of how much a critic must work to be worthy of his art. His influence looms large here even in places where he might prefer not to claim it. Likewise, the project was shaped by—indeed, it could not have proceeded without—the penetrating attention of Dorothy Hale, and the wisdom of Mitchell Breitwieser. If a Berkeley graduate student wishes to know the mind and character of a particular place and time in history, he has two options: either he can lock himself in the Gardner stacks for a year, or he can ask David Hollinger and have the thing in a half-hour. And if he wishes to know how any of it is possible in the first place, he would do well to drop in on John Searle, who is best known abroad for his straight-shooting, incisive brilliance, but who is most admired here for his undimmed and inexhaustible capacity for wonder. My wife, Aynslie Accomando, did everything in her power to enable me to get this project done, while my two boys, Gus and Gordon, did everything in theirs to prevent me. They should not be discouraged. The triumph of their mother’s will was a very narrow one indeed. If this dissertation shines at all, it shines as a testament and a tribute to a wife’s love, patience and belief. I hope she does not find it unworthy. ~iii~ Abstract Felt Thought: Neuroscience, Modernism and the Intelligence of Poetry by Matthew Paul Langione Doctor of Philosophy in English with Designated Emphases in Critical Theory and in Science and Technology Studies University of California, Berkeley Professor Charles Altieri, Chair The first decade of the twentieth century was a time of unprecedented epistemic polarization in the American academy. The “tender-minded” orientation of idealism, to borrow William James’s turn of phrase, was quickly ceding ground to the “tough-minded” orientation of scientific materialism on the assumption that, before long, all serious consideration of human experience, meaning and value was destined to come under the care of newly- minted human sciences such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology. This left traditional humanists resentful of what must have seemed to them a kind of epistemic mission creep: the empirical sciences, riding high on the strength of triumphs in fields such as radioactivity and electromagnetics, were suddenly staking claim to territories that had once been the province of literature, religion and philosophy. One dominant view has been that modernist literature comes into being on the hot fumes of this resentment. Frank Kermode, for example, saw modernism as “a rapprochement between poet and occultist” so that “magic came, in an age of science, to the defence of poetry.” Since modernism is an elastic term, there is an element of truth in this view. But many modernists were, especially in the early years, anything but eager to indulge in a revanchist ~1~ mysticism that abstracted away from the vitalizing energy of the modern sciences. In particular, T.S. Eliot, whose graduate work in philosophy brought him into close proximity to the scientific currents of the day, produced a body of criticism that reveals a sophisticated and remarkably coherent cognitive structure corresponding with his aim to find in poetry a literary form that could unite “feeling” and “thought.” Felt Thought begins by establishing Eliot’s motivation both to embrace and to resist the computational ideal of intelligence that was being codified during the period in which he was writing, an ideal that would reach its apotheosis in the 1940s and 1950s with the birth of artificial intelligence. In my introduction I use A.I. as a contrastive paradigm against which to specify the more subtle mode of poetic intelligence that emerges in Eliot’s criticism. It is an ideal that implicates what he calls “sensibility” as it mediates between “feeling” and “thought” in constructive, writerly activity. But since this cognitive structure finds expression implicitly in criticism written for various purposes, rather than explicitly in philosophy, it must be reconstructed with the aid of a robust bank of supplements. I begin with Eliot’s literary and philosophical influences in Chapter I, particularly Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Henry James and Ezra Pound. I turn to his graduate school influences at Harvard in Chapter II, among whom are Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce and Karl Pearson. In Chapter III, I synthesize these influences in the effort to flesh out a cognitive structure that unites Eliot’s major trilogy of critical formulations—“the dissociation of sensibility,” “the doctrine of impersonality,” and the “objective correlative”—and I substantiate those formulations with reference to contemporary neuroscience. Then in Chapter IV, I make use of this neuroaesthetic cognitive structure to interpret Eliot’s first book of poems, Prufrock and Other Observations, as a work culminating in a unique mode of expressive activity that I have termed intelligent exemplification. My Epilogue begins with a breviary on the ways in which the sciences of mind have been called into action in literary study thus far. Then I recommend a set of principles that I hope will sustain at once a more integrative method of interdisciplinarity, and at the same time an increased commitment to the many and intricate ways that the texts themselves ask to be interpreted. ~2~ INTRODUCTION // Poetic Intelligence in the Age of Intelligent Machines “To make two bald statements: There’s nothing sentimental about a machine, and: A poem is a small (or large) machine made of words.” - William Carlos Williams, “Author’s Introduction” ~ The Intelligence of Poetry ~ Let’s begin with an assertion about our subject that should be uncontroversial: poetry reflects and enables a special kind of intelligence. The degree to which a particular culture at a particular moment in its history values the “intelligence” of poetry may be remarkably various, but, at least in the pantheon of Western culture, the “special” status of poetry has been unmistakably secure. Were we to settle on the contents of a time capsule intended to represent Western civilization from antiquity to the present, one suspects that poetry, hardly a quotidian human experience and never the dominant compositional practice, would be overrepresented by far. What makes the opening assertion controversial is not the term “special” but the term “intelligence.” For though we quote poetry regularly in speeches, and though we insist that our children learn to read and to analyze poetry in school, we rarely look to poetry as a mode of intelligence, as a way to grasp the reality of a state of affairs. For poetry, we are given to understand, is subjective rather than objective, expressive rather than scientific. Thus while poetry, in our culture, is assigned decorative value (beauty) and pedagogical value (ethics), it is almost never recognized for its epistemic value. This is true even ~1~ in academia, where criticism tends to feature aesthetic, historical and political criteria.1 One suspects that if the canon of poets were roused from their slumbers to weigh in on this state of affairs, few would be terribly vexed. For most of Western history, poetry was received as historical record (Homer), as secular scripture (Dante), as divine inspiration (Donne), as organic communion (Wordsworth), as cultural decorum (Arnold).2 It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century, amid increasingly powerful institutional and cultural preferences for knowledge-producing, “objective” sciences that aesthetic criticism began to justify the study of poetry on the ground of its unique epistemic affordances.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mind and Social Reality
    Masaryk University Faculty of Economics and Administration Study program: Economics METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: MIND AND SOCIAL REALITY Metodologický Individualizmus: Myseľ a Spoločenská Realita Bachelor´s Thesis Advisor: Author: Mgr. Josef Menšík Ph.D. Ján KRCHŇAVÝ Brno 2020 Name and last name of the author: Ján Krchňavý Title of master thesis: Methodological Individualism: Mind and Social Reality Department: Department of Economics Supervisor of bachelor thesis: Mgr. Josef Menšík, Ph.D. Year of defence: 2020 Abstract The submitted bachelor thesis is concerned with the relation between mind and social reality and the role of the mind in the creation of social reality. This relation is examined from the perspective of the social ontology of John Searle, an American philosopher who is considered to be the proponent of methodological individualism. This thesis aims to reconsider the standard, mentalistic interpretation of Searle’s social ontology, one that is centred around the primary role of the mind in the construction of social reality, to examine criticisms of such approach which highlight the professed neglect of the role that social practices have for social reality, and to provide an alternative, practice-based reading of Searle’s social ontology. The thesis thus proceeds first by outlining the standard interpretation of Searle’s theory as put forward mainly in his two monographs on social reality. Subsequently, the objections against such an approach from an alternative, practice-based approach, which highlights the role of social practices for the constitution of society, are raised. Following these objections, the Searle’s social ontology is looked at again in an effort to find an alternative interpretation that would bring it closer to the ideas and principles of the practice-based approach, and thereby provide a response to some objections against the missing role of the social practices in his theory as well as open the way for the novel interpretation of his social ontology.
    [Show full text]
  • European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012 Darwinized Hegelianism Or Hegelianized Darwinism? 2
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy IV-2 | 2012 Wittgenstein and Pragmatism Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? Mathias Girel Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/736 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.736 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Mathias Girel, « Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], IV-2 | 2012, Online since 24 December 2012, connection on 21 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/736 ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.736 This text was automatically generated on 21 April 2019. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? 1 Darwinized Hegelianism or Hegelianized Darwinism? Mathias Girel 1 It has been said that Peirce was literally talking “with the rifle rather than with the shot gun or water hose” (Perry 1935, vol. 2: 109). Readers of his review of James’s Principles can easily understand why. In some respects, the same might be true of the series of four books Joseph Margolis has been devoting to pragmatism since 2000. One of the first targets of Margolis’s rereading was the very idea of a ‘revival’ of pragmatism (a ‘revival’ of something that never was, in some ways), and, with it, the idea that the long quarrel between Rorty and Putnam was really a quarrel over pragmatism (that is was a pragmatist revival, in some ways). The uncanny thing is that, the more one read the savory chapters of the four books, the more one feels that the hunting season is open, but that the game is not of the usual kind and looks more like zombies, so to speak.
    [Show full text]
  • Wallace Stevens
    Classic Poetry Series Wallace Stevens - poems - Publication Date: 2004 Publisher: PoemHunter.Com - The World's Poetry Archive A High-Toned Old Christian Woman Poetry is the supreme fiction, madame. Take the moral law and make a nave of it And from the nave build haunted heaven. Thus, The conscience is converted into palms, Like windy citherns hankering for hymns. We agree in principle. That's clear. But take The opposing law and make a peristyle, And from the peristyle project a masque Beyond the planets. Thus, our bawdiness, Unpurged by epitaph, indulged at last, Is equally converted into palms, Squiggling like saxophones. And palm for palm, Madame, we are where we began. Allow, Therefore, that in the planetary scene Your disaffected flagellants, well-stuffed, Smacking their muzzy bellies in parade, Proud of such novelties of the sublime, Such tink and tank and tunk-a-tunk-tunk, May, merely may, madame, whip from themselves A jovial hullabaloo among the spheres. This will make widows wince. But fictive things Wink as they will. Wink most when widows wince. Wallace Stevens www.PoemHunter.com - The World's Poetry Archive 2 Anecdote of the Jar I placed a jar in Tennessee, And round it was, upon a hill. It made the slovenly wilderness Surround that hill. The wilderness rose up to it, And sprawled around, no longer wild. The jar was round upon the ground And tall and of a port in air. It took dominion everywhere. The jar was gray and bare. It did not give of bird or bush, Like nothing else in Tennessee.
    [Show full text]
  • The Great Ideas: the University of Chicago and the Ideal of Liberal Education 05/2002 – 09/2002
    THE GREAT IDEAS: THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND THE IDEAL OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 05/2002 – 09/2002 CASE 1 1. John Erskine, “General Honors at Columbia,” New Republic (October 25, 1922): 13. Reproduction from Library Microfilm Collection 2. John Erskine. The Delight of Great Books. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. Signed presentation copy. Rare Book Collection 3. John Erskine, “Report of Progress to July 1, 1918,” in Educational Plans for the American Army Abroad by Anson Phelps Stokes. New York: Association Press, 1918. Library General Collection 4. Columbia College, Columbia University, “General Honors Examination,” January 1927. Mortimer J. Adler Papers 5. The Harvard Classics. 50 vols. Edited by Charles W. Eliot. New York: P.F. Collier and Sons, 1909. Library General Collection CASE 2 1. [Mortimer J. Adler], Columbia University Honors Reading Assignments—1927-28 [1927]. Robert M. Hutchins Papers 2. John Erskine, “Culture: An Interplay of Life and Ideas,” Century Magazine 116 (May 1928): 83-88. Library General Collection 3. Mortimer J. Adler’s Columbia University grade report for Winter Session 1923. Mortimer J. Adler Papers 4. Columbia University General Honors instructional staff to Dean Hawkes, Columbia College, unsigned typescript letter, May 25, 1925. Mortimer J. Adler Papers 5. Columbia University Philosophy Department invitation to Honors Students performance of The Chronomides, February 27, 1922. Mortimer J. Adler Papers CASE 3 1. Mortimer J. Adler, “Candidates for General Honors Reading,” [1927]. Robert M. Hutchins Papers 2. Mortimer J. Adler, “Honors Credo,” [1927]. Robert M. Hutchins Papers 3. Robert M. Hutchins to Mortimer J. Adler, manuscript letter, August 9, [1931]. Mortimer J.
    [Show full text]
  • University of Oklahoma Libraries Western History Collections Ralph
    University of Oklahoma Libraries Western History Collections Ralph H. Records Collection Records, Ralph Hayden. Papers, 1871–1968. 2 feet. Professor. Magazine and journal articles (1946–1968) regarding historiography, along with a typewritten manuscript (1871–1899) by L. S. Records, entitled “The Recollections of a Cowboy of the Seventies and Eighties,” regarding the lives of cowboys and ranchers in frontier-era Kansas and in the Cherokee Strip of Oklahoma Territory, including a detailed account of Records’s participation in the land run of 1893. ___________________ Box 1 Folder 1: Beyond The American Revolutionary War, articles and excerpts from the following: Wilbur C. Abbott, Charles Francis Adams, Randolph Greenfields Adams, Charles M. Andrews, T. Jefferson Coolidge, Jr., Thomas Anburey, Clarence Walroth Alvord, C.E. Ayres, Robert E. Brown, Fred C. Bruhns, Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, Benjamin Franklin, Carl Lotus Belcher, Henry Belcher, Adolph B. Benson, S.L. Blake, Charles Knowles Bolton, Catherine Drinker Bowen, Julian P. Boyd, Carl and Jessica Bridenbaugh, Sanborn C. Brown, William Hand Browne, Jane Bryce, Edmund C. Burnett, Alice M. Baldwin, Viola F. Barnes, Jacques Barzun, Carl Lotus Becker, Ruth Benedict, Charles Borgeaud, Crane Brinton, Roger Butterfield, Edwin L. Bynner, Carl Bridenbaugh Folder 2: Douglas Campbell, A.F. Pollard, G.G. Coulton, Clarence Edwin Carter, Harry J. Armen and Rexford G. Tugwell, Edward S. Corwin, R. Coupland, Earl of Cromer, Harr Alonzo Cushing, Marquis De Shastelluz, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Mellen Chamberlain, Dora Mae Clark, Felix S. Cohen, Verner W. Crane, Thomas Carlyle, Thomas Cromwell, Arthur yon Cross, Nellis M. Crouso, Russell Davenport Wallace Evan Daview, Katherine B.
    [Show full text]
  • Cognitive Psychology
    COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY PSYCH 126 Acknowledgements College of the Canyons would like to extend appreciation to the following people and organizations for allowing this textbook to be created: California Community Colleges Chancellor’s Office Chancellor Diane Van Hook Santa Clarita Community College District College of the Canyons Distance Learning Office In providing content for this textbook, the following professionals were invaluable: Mehgan Andrade, who was the major contributor and compiler of this work and Neil Walker, without whose help the book could not have been completed. Special Thank You to Trudi Radtke for editing, formatting, readability, and aesthetics. The contents of this textbook were developed under the Title V grant from the Department of Education (Award #P031S140092). However, those contents do not necessarily represent the policy of the Department of Education, and you should not assume endorsement by the Federal Government. Unless otherwise noted, the content in this textbook is licensed under CC BY 4.0 Table of Contents Psychology .................................................................................................................................................... 1 126 ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1 - History of Cognitive Psychology ............................................................................................. 7 Definition of Cognitive Psychology
    [Show full text]
  • Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2014 Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Bradley Taylor University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Taylor, Bradley, "Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy" (2014). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1468. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Abstract ABSTRACT HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN KANT'S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY Bradley M. Taylor Dr. Paul Guyer This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant's ethics. Human beings are in a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of transgressing the moral law and are often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions. Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the basic relationship between human beings and the moral law, in Kant's moral philosophy, is, most fundamentally, one of tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the human moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant's account of human moral agency. We have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the possibility of conflict between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations) and the requirements of the moral law.
    [Show full text]
  • How Three Triads Illumine the Authority of the Preached Word
    THE WORDS OF THE SPEAKER: HOW THREE TRIADS ILLUMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE PREACHED WORD By J. D. HERR B.S., Philadelphia Biblical University, 2008 A THESIS Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Theological Studies at Reformed Theological Seminary Charlotte, North Carolina February 2019 Accepted: _______________________________________________________ First Reader, Dr. James Anderson _______________________________________________________ Second Reader !ii ABSTRACT According to J. L. Austin’s important work, How to Do Things With Words, the philosophic and linguistic assumption for centuries has been that saying something “is always and simply to state something.”1 For many people today, speech is simply the description of a place or event. It is either true or false, because it either describes an item or event well, or it does not. It either re-states propositional truth or it does not. Austin’s program was to regain an understanding and awareness of the force of speech—what is done in saying something—and came to be known as speech act theory. Similarly, in the discipline of theology, and in the life of the Church, many people tend to think of preaching as the passing of some “truth” from the divine mind to the human mind, or from the preacher’s mind to the hearer’s mind. While it is that, in a very real and meaningful way, in this paper I seek to explore whether there is more. As incarnate creatures, God has made humans to consist of spiritual and physical aspects. If we focus wholly on the “mental truth transfer” aspect of speech, especially in the case of preaching, how does this leave the Church equipped to bridge the divide between the mental information and what they are to do in their bodies? By interacting with and interfacing the triadic framework of speech act theory with the triadic frameworks of Dorothy Sayers and John Frame, I seek to understand preaching in 1 J.
    [Show full text]
  • Mature Kantians Mika Lavaque-Manty [email protected]
    Mature Kantians Mika LaVaque-Manty [email protected] Department of Political Science University of Michigan Philip Otto Runge, Hülsenbeck Children, 1805–6. © ARTstor. Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2 – September 5, 2004. © American Political Science Association. Mature Kantians i INTRODUCTION: THE AUTONOMY PROBLEM One of the many problems facing Enlightenment thinkers was the question of how to reconcile their claim that all humans have equal dignity by virtue of their autonomous agency with the fact that many people neither enjoyed the respect their dignity warranted nor acted in ways that would have suggested they were meaningfully autonomous.1 If the 18th century was the age of the Enlightenment, many people didn’t act their age. Part of the problem was political in the institutional sense: absolutism, feudal vestiges and religious authoritarianism made it difficult, even impossible, for people to be autonomous. But these didn’t account for all the problems, and as Kant suggested, another part had to with ordinary people themselves: the people’s “immaturity” was also “self-incurred.” This was a real pickle, both theoretically and practically: If another person’s autonomous agency is your goal, you had better be careful about what and how much you do for her. There is a real tension, if not an outright conflict, between paternalism and respect for autonomy. There is also a risk of elitism in concerning yourself with others’ autonomy. In the absence of a shared summum bonum — and I take it that part of what modernity means is the absence of a shared summum bonum — the apparent end of a person’s action doesn’t always tell you whether she chose the action or the end.
    [Show full text]
  • Tribute to Glyn W. Humphreys, 1954-2016
    cortex 107 (2018) 1e3 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cortex Special issue: Editorial Tribute to Glyn W. Humphreys, 1954e2016 Martin Edwards a, Monika Harvey b and Julie Snowden c,d,* a Psychological Sciences Research Institute, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium b School of Psychology, University of Glasgow, UK c Cerebral Function Unit, Neuroscience Centre, Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust, UK d Division of Neuroscience and Experimental Psychology, University of Manchester, UK article info (obituary Cortex 2016; 75: A1eA2) is a profound loss to cognitive neuroscience. Article history: It is fitting that a Special Issue dedicated to Glyn'smemoryshould Received 3 July 2018 be published in Cortex, whose stated remit is “the study of cognition Accepted 4 July 2018 and the relationship between the nervous system and mental pro- Published online 26 July 2018 cesses”. The description encapsulates Glyn's work. Glyn started his career at the University of Bristol in the 1970s. His PhD involved letter and word perceptual recognition, using state-of-the-art technology of the time, combined with clever priming experimental design (Humphreys, 1978). His scientific aptitude and creativity were early indicators of what was to come. In 1979, Glyn moved to Birbeck College, where he met his wife and scientific partner, Jane Riddoch. Together, they formed a team, located at the University of Bir- mingham in 1989 and at the University of Oxford in 2011, that changed the face of cognitive neuropsychology. Their meticulous studies of patients with brain disorders are a model par excellence of how neuropsychological investigation can inform understanding of brain function.
    [Show full text]
  • Anthropological Theory
    Anthropological Theory http://ant.sagepub.com John Searle on a witch hunt: A commentary on John R. Searle's essay ‘Social ontology: Some basic principles’ Richard A. Shweder Anthropological Theory 2006; 6; 89 DOI: 10.1177/1463499606061739 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ant.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/1/89 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for Anthropological Theory can be found at: Email Alerts: http://ant.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://ant.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Downloaded from http://ant.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on November 5, 2007 © 2006 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Anthropological Theory Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) http://ant.sagepub.com Vol 6(1): 89–111 10.1177/1463499606061739 John Searle on a witch hunt A commentary on John R. Searle’s essay ‘Social ontology: Some basic principles’ Richard A. Shweder University of Chicago, USA Abstract In this commentary I respond to John Searle’s conceptual framework for the interpretation of ‘social facts’ as a provocation to spell out some of the philosophical foundations of the romantic pluralist tradition in cultural anthropology. Romantic pluralists in anthropology seek to affirm (to the extent such affirmation is reasonably possible) what the philosopher John Gray describes as ‘the reality, validity and human intelligibility of values and forms of life very different from our own’. With special attention to two examples of contemporary social facts (a witchcraft tribunal in Africa and death pollution practices in a Hindu temple town), the commentary raises questions about John Searle’s approach to the mind-body problem and his account of epistemic objectivity and ontological subjectivity with regard to social facts.
    [Show full text]
  • I. the Metler of NOTHINGNESS 2. Samuel French Morse, Quoted By
    Notes I. THE METlER OF NOTHINGNESS 1. My title alludes to a phrase in 'Seventy Years Later" (CP 525-6), the whole of which late poem is suggestively relevant to this chapler. Sources of quotations from Stevens's published writings will be given in the running lext, using the abbreviations already described. 2. Samuel French Morse, quoted by Peter Brazeau in his Parts of a World: Wallacr Stevens Rt'IIJembi'rrd (New York: J{andom House, 1983), p. 152. Subsequent references to this book wil! be incorporated in Ihe running h.'xl as (Brazeau, p. -), 3. WI' Dream of Honour: John Berryman '5 Letters to his Mother, ed. I{ichard J. Kelly (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1988), p. 207;'So Long? Stevens' can be found in the collection His Toy, His Dream, His Rest (London: Faber & Faber, 1969), p. 148. 4. Thomas C. Grey, The Wallace Stevws Case: Law alld the Practice af Paetry (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University I'ress, 1991), p. 12. 5. Pound's remarks about Stevens date from 1933, and are quoted by Alan Filreis in Modernism from RiXI1t to Left: Wal/ace Stevells, the Tllirties & Literary Radicalism (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 147. 6. John Timberman Newcomb, Wallace StePt'lls alld Literary Callons (Jackson & London: University Press of Mi5Sis$ippi, 1992), pp. 3--4. 7. Henry James, HllwtilOrne, ed. Tony Tanner (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 55, 56. 8. D.H. Lawrence, Stlldies ill Classic Amrricall Literatllff! (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 70. [n citing Sacvan Bcrcovitch, I am thinki ng principally o f The Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic COllstruction af America (New York & London: Routledge, 1993).
    [Show full text]