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FLASH UPDATE Situation update Military operations aiming at retaking areas under extremist groups’ control IRAQ in Salah al-Din and Kirkuk Governorates began on 21 September. The 25 September 2017 offensive, which reportedly started from Shirqat district (Salah al-Din Governorate), to the west of Hawiga, is gradually progressing eastward, reaching the first villages in Hawiga district on 23 September. Hawiga, located some 50 km southwest of the Key figures city of Kirkuk, was taken by extremists in 2014 and is one of the two remaining extremist strongholds in the country. 823,260 Internally displaced Referendum on the independence of Kurdistan Region of Iraq reportedly to Iraqis verified as being currently take place on 25 September. On 19 September, local media reported that Kurdish displaced from Mosul and leaders rejected the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s order to halt the referendum on surrounding areas since military the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) independence, stating that “the decisions of the operations to retake the city Iraqi parliament and Federal [Supreme] Court are not observed in Kurdistan.” 1 began on 17 October 2016 Security Council urges both central and Kurdish governments to pursue ongoing dialogue. In a press statement released on 21 September, the United 703,000 IDPs, returnees and Nations Security Council expressed its continuing respect for the sovereignty, members of the host community territorial integrity, and unity of Iraq, urging the federal Government and the from Mosul and surrounding Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to resolve all outstanding issues between areas assisted by UNHCR since 17 them in accordance with the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution, through structured October 2016. dialogue. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq will continue to facilitate the ongoing dialogue between Iraqi stakeholders. 373,609 Individuals (79,030 Population movements households) impacted by military Following the start of military operations in Salah al-Din and Kirkuk operations to retake Mosul since Governorates on 21 September, displacement from Hawiga district (Kirkuk) October 2016 are currently has significantly increased. Over 2,400 people were displaced from Hawiga enrolled in ASSIST, UNHCR’s between 21 and 23 September. Most IDPs were transferred to Haj Ali camp in south assistance tracking tool, Ninewa Governorate after completing security screening. The Iraqi Government estimates that about 85,000 people currently remain in Hawiga district. 3.2 million IDPs since Returns from camps in areas east of Mosul managed by the KRG suspended January 20142 ahead of the referendum. Since 19 September, returns from camps located east of Mosul, in KRG-controlled territory, have reportedly been suspended by Kurdish security forces until after the referendum. More than 700 families who registered for 262,758 Iraqi refugees return were not allowed to depart. Prior to 19 September, returns from camps east hosted in countries in the region, and northeast of Mosul had gradually increased from an average of 3,000 and 23,671 Iraqis received in individuals a week in August to 1,000 a day in the past three weeks. Another 1,700 camps in Hassakeh, Syria since IDPs returned from camps northeast of Mosul (Nargizlia) on 20 September. Most 17 October 2016 returnees express fear of not being able to cross easily into government-controlled territories after the referendum, or of being stigmatized as having supported the Funding referendum. Response update USD 578 million As military operations progress towards Hawiga district, humanitarian requested for IDPs and Iraqi partners are ready to immediately receive up to 73,000 people. Over 12,000 refugees in the region in 2017 plots are ready in camps built by the government and humanitarian partners in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din Governorates. In addition, UNHCR’s partner completed the construction of 1,000 plots for up to 6,000 IDPs in Al Salamiyah 3 camp (in south Funded Ninewa Governorate). Provided IDPs are allowed to cross into KR-I, another 3,400 34% family plots for up to 20,000 IDPs are available in camps built or managed by UNHCR in Erbil (900 plots in Debaga camps) and Sulaymaniyah (2,500 plots) Gap 66% Governorates. UNHCR has completed the expansion work in Kilo 18 Camp near Ramadi, in anticipation of military operations in west Anbar. An additional 512 family tents and six rub-halls have been installed at the site, along with latrines and showers. Kilo 18 camp is strategically located near the main screening site for IDPs from west 1IOM-DTM Emergency Tracking since 17 Anbar. Since January, over 50,000 individuals1 have been displaced from Anbar’s October 2016. 2IOM-DTM as of 30 August 2017. western towns of Ana, Al Qaim and Rawa. www.unhcr.org UNHCR Mosul Emergency Response Since October 2016 25 September 2017 UNHCR Co-coordinated Clusters: 1,097,466 displaced since 17 October 2016 Camp/Site Plots Tents Complete +of whom 823,260 are NFI Kits WƌŽƚĞĐƟŽŶ ƐƟůůĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůLJĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ & ;ŽͲĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďLJhE,ZΘZͿ Targets:44,000 60,000 87,500 ƐƐŝƐƚĞĚďLJhE,Z 10,586 KĐĐƵƉŝĞĚ DistribƵted SŚĞůƚĞƌΘE&/ 8,931 2,252 454,392 249,493 16,849 ( (Co-coordinated ďLJhE,ZΘEZͿ 19,576 16,557 16,398 ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ Developed Plots Available assisted assisted Camp ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƟŽŶΘ 34,671 74,662 ĂŵƉDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ in camps ŽƵƚŽĨĐĂŵƉƐ 7,924 34,220 /ŶĐůƵĚĞƐĐŽŶŇŝĐƚͲĂīĞĐƚĞĚ ĚĚŝƟŽŶĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĚĚŝƟŽŶĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ! ;ŽͲĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďLJhE,ZΘ/KDͿ ƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶǁŚŽǁĞƌĞ ŶĞǀĞƌĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ in 2017 in 2017 Derkar dhZ<z Batifa 20km UNHCR Protection Monitoring for Mosul Response Zakho Amadiya Amedi Mergasur Soran Ü 47,937 HHs Assessed Dahuk Sumel Dahuk ^zZ/EZ 226,503 IndividƵals ZWh>/ DAHUK Akre Choman Mosul Dam Lake Shikhan Soran Choman Amalla ISLADIC B Mosul Dam Nargizlia 1 Nargizlia 2 B ZEPUBLIC Tilkaif Zelikan (new)(n Telafar OF IZAN BQaymawaQ (Zelikan) Shaqlawa 62,522 64,442 53,110 46,429 NINEWA HHamdaHdHamHamdaniyaddaa iyaiyyay Al Hol HasanshamHaasasanshams U2 campp MosulMoMosuMososussululul HasanshamHasansham U3 Rania BartellaBartellBartelllalaB Pshdar BBBBHasanshamHhM2HHasanaanshnnsshamsh M2 Mosul KhazerKhazehaha M1 Plots in UNHCR Constructed Camps Sinjar BChamakorChamakor Al Salamiyah SSaalamiyahalamiyyah Erbil Hammamammama Al-AlilAlil 2 Al Salamiyah 2 & 3 DUKAN BB B RESERVOIR Occupied Plots Developed Plots Undeveloped Plots HammamHammH Al-Alil AAl Alil Erbil B Al ^alamiyaŚ 2 & 3 4͕1,104724 1͕028 4,248 Z/>ZZ/ZZ//>> Koisnjaq Ba'Aj Dokan B Hammam AlͲAlil 2 4͕622 50 Debaga 1 Debaga stadium BB Debaga 2 B Surdash B Debaga (Extension)) Amalla 3͕032 B Sharbazher Al Qaiyaraaraa A total of 28,729 plots planned Qayyarah Airstriprststripsstrsttrtripipp B CŚamakor 1͕250 1͕15045 BBBBHHaj Ali for 172,000 IDPs B QayyaQaQayyQQayyarah-Jad’ahayyaya y Dabes B HasansŚam U3 1͕648 288 Makhmur IZAQ Sulaymaniyah Ba'aj BBustan Al Sheuokh B Daquq 1͕600 Ͳ of which SULAzDANIzAH Al Qawsiat Chamchamal B 1͕131 429265 Shirqathirq Kirkuk HasansŚam U2 Rashedeya A total of 24,481 plots developed Al-Fawqania B 147 882 Besan Qaymaǁa (Zelikan) Jarf Military KIZKUK for 146,886 IDPs Almawsil Area Jawania Al-Araby Al-Kindy Alnahda 65 Al-Qayrawan Hawiga B Laylan 2 935 65 Al-Hadbah Daquq 1 Family per plot and Al-Qusur Al-SadeeqAl-Suker Al-Masarif Al-Tahrir B Laylan 2 Alrriasia BB 6 Individuals per family Al-Markaz Al-BareedAl-Moharebeen /ZY Laylan C B 1͕000 Al-Jamiy Al-Baladyat Olympic ^tadium Mshearfa/al-kaneasa Al-Rabee Al-Jamiaa Al-Rahmaa Al-Andalus Al-Zohoor Al-Thaqafah Ali bn abi taleeb Arbachya B Al-Shortah Al-Mothana AlͲAlam 500Ͳ Al-Ghabat Al-Athar 17 July Kolan Al-Dor Al-Afraah Haramat Almohandiseen SALAH Baiji Kalar Badr Aljeser Althalet Al-Hashemya Al-Akha'a AlA Alam Alam (2,3,4,5) ( ĂŵƉƐĂŶĚĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐLJƐŝƚĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞůŽĐĂƟŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌDŽƐƵůĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌ͘1,350,426 IDPs Al-Kobra Bab Aljeser AlkhamisAl-Zeraee Al Sh'hamahmahmamahB Al-Gazaer Al-Taameem AL-DIN B Baba Nur Singar Al AlamAll Al-Eqtesadyeen Al-Shifaa Al-Naser B ĨƌŽŵƌďŝů͕EŝŶĞǁĂ͕^ĂůĂŚĂůͲŝŶĂŶĚ<ŝƌŬƵŬ'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚĚƵĞƚŽŚŽƐƟůŝƟĞƐƐŝŶĐĞ Aljaser Alqadeem Al-Nabi Ninawa Kolan Mosul Al-Khatoneia Al-Faysalya YounisAl-Sharqia Al-Karama Cemetery Olympic Stadiumadiuma TikritTikrit Tooz Al-Senaa Tammam Al-Senaa B ƉƌŝůϮϬϭϲ͘ Shaikh Al-Qudus Al-Thawra Shaikh Al-Malya Fathi Aboalaula Alhuria Al-Safaa Al-Anabi Al-Dobat Kifri Bab Rizgary Al-Yarmook Aljeser Alrabe'a Al-Rafdin Al-Gadeeda Albeez BabAl-Dawassa B Completed IDP Camp ;ϭϬͿ;ϭϴ͕ϳϮϵƉůŽƚƐͿKalar Al-jadeed Tarek Ragem ben zyad Al-Wahda Nablus Hadead Al-Amel Al-Khizlani Al-Rahman 2 Al Janubeya Tal Al-Mansoor Wadie Mosul Almazarie B hŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶ/WĂŵƉ;ϭͿ;ϭϬ͕ϬϬϬƉůŽƚƐͿ Al-Jadeed Al-Romman Hagar UNHCR Funding Requirements International Al-Sabaawe Daur Kifri Airport Falastin ANBAAl-MaamoonZ Domez B Ghazlani Al-Hureia džŝƐƟŶŐ/WĐĂŵƉǁŝƚŚƐƉĂƌĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚLJKhanaqin Khosravi military @ training center Mosul B Khanaqin Sugar /WŵĞƌŐĞŶĐLJƐŝƚĞŽƌĐĂŵƉďLJƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐDIzALA Factory Ibn-Al-Atheer Daur B ZĞĨƵŐĞĞĂŵƉ USD 212 million Al-Salam Jalawla Jleawkhan Al-Harragiya Husain Samarra DĂŝŶZŽĂĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůŽƌĚĞƌƐSadiyah & Al-Ghabat Basha Samarra BUHAYRAT ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝŶϮϬϭϳĨŽƌDŽƐƵů Jleawkhan HAMRIN ZŽĂĚ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌĂƚĞŽƵŶĚĂƌLJ Al-Ghazaki Khalis Manssuriyt Al Jabal Ashor Bridge Al MansuriyahŝƐƚƌŝĐƚŽƵŶĚĂƌLJ Thethar ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐLJƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ 2km Balad ŝƚLJMuqdadiya EĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚŽƵŶĚĂƌLJBaladrooz The boundaries and names shown and the designaƟons used on this map do not imply oĸcial endorsement or acceptance by the United NaƟons. Sources: UNHCR, UNOCHA, CCCM Cluster, Shelter/NFI CLuster, IOM DTM. Geographic Coordinate System: GCS-WGS.
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  • Northern Iraq Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (Idps) in the Disputed Areas, Incl

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    Country report NOVEMBER 2018 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) Northern Iraq Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Report based on interviews in Erbil and Sulaimania © 2018 The Danish Immigration Service The Danish Immigration Service Ryesgade 53 2100 Copenhagen Denmark Phone: +45 35 36 66 00 newtodenmark.dk November 2018 All rights reserved to the Danish Immigration Service. The publication can be downloaded for free at newtodenmark.dk The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source reference. NORTHERN IRAQ – SECURITY SITUATION AND THE SITUATION FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN THE DISPUTED AREAS, INCL. POSSIBILITY TO ENTER AND ACCESS THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (KRI) Contents Disclaimer .................................................................................................................................................4 Introduction and methodology ................................................................................................................. 5 Abbreviations and definitions used in the report....................................................................................... 7 Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 10 Background ............................................................................................................................................
  • EASO Country of Origin Information Report Iraq Security Situation

    EASO Country of Origin Information Report Iraq Security Situation

    European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Iraq Security situation March 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Iraq Security situation March 2019 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN 978-92-9476-112-5 doi: 10.2847/204594 © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2019 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © European Union (Peter Biro), The ruins of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul’s Old Town on the western banks of the Tigris. From here ISIL leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi proclaimed the IS Caliphate in June 2014. Mosul’s Old Town was retaken in July 2017, Photo taken on 18 July 2018, url EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: SECURITY SITUATION — 3 Acknowledgements EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum and migration departments as co- drafters of this report, in conjunction with EASO: Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca (Centre for Documentation and Research) France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), Information, Documentation and Research Division Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Lifos Country of Origin Information research service EASO would also like to acknowledge the research and analysis contributions of Iraq Body Count (IBC) to the provision of data on security incidents/civilian deaths in 2017-2018. The UK Home Office also shared their compiled UNAMI statistics for use in this report.
  • Iraq – Kurdistan Regional Government Area – Security Situation – Internal Relocation – Sulaymaniyah – Muslim Fundamentalists – Insurgents – State Protection

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    Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: IRQ34994 Country: Iraq Date: 8 July 2009 Keywords: Iraq – Kurdistan Regional Government area – Security situation – Internal relocation – Sulaymaniyah – Muslim fundamentalists – Insurgents – State protection This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Please provide a brief overview of the current security situation in al-Sulaimanyah. What groups/parties are in control, and is there any conflict there etc? 2. What Muslim “fundamentalist” groups/parties are active in al-Sulaimaniyeh? How much power do they have? 3. How common is the incidence (if any) of individuals being killed in al-Sulaimanyeh because of breaches of social mores, excluding “honour killing? How do the authorities deal with perpetrators? 4. For a young single man from this area, what barriers are there to resettlement away from one’s home city, but within the Kurdish north? RESPONSE Location of Chwarbax/Chwar Bakh: Chwarbax is a quarter/neighborhood within Sulaymaniyah city centre.