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Northern Iraq Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (Idps) in the Disputed Areas, Incl

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Northern Iraq Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (Idps) in the Disputed Areas, Incl Country report NOVEMBER 2018 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) Northern Iraq Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Report based on interviews in Erbil and Sulaimania © 2018 The Danish Immigration Service The Danish Immigration Service Ryesgade 53 2100 Copenhagen Denmark Phone: +45 35 36 66 00 newtodenmark.dk November 2018 All rights reserved to the Danish Immigration Service. The publication can be downloaded for free at newtodenmark.dk The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source reference. NORTHERN IRAQ – SECURITY SITUATION AND THE SITUATION FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN THE DISPUTED AREAS, INCL. POSSIBILITY TO ENTER AND ACCESS THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (KRI) Contents Disclaimer .................................................................................................................................................4 Introduction and methodology ................................................................................................................. 5 Abbreviations and definitions used in the report....................................................................................... 7 Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 10 Background ............................................................................................................................................. 12 Disputed territories in northern Iraq ........................................................................................................... 12 Internal political split in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ................................................................................. 12 Map of the disputed territories ............................................................................................................... 13 1. Security situation ................................................................................................................................ 14 1.1. Security situation in areas previously controlled by ISIS, particularly in Mosul and Kirkuk Governorates ............................................................................................................................................... 14 1.1.2. Security situation in Kirkuk Governorate ....................................................................................... 14 1.1.3. Security situation in Ninewa Governorate ..................................................................................... 16 1.1.4. Security situation in Salah al-Din ................................................................................................... 18 1.1.5 Dynamics between PMUs and ISF................................................................................................... 19 1.2. Profiles of persons targeted by security actors .................................................................................... 20 1.2.1 Targeting by ISIS .............................................................................................................................. 20 1.2.2 Targeting by the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) ....................................................................... 22 1.2.3Targeting by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ..................................................................................... 23 1.2.4 Targeting by the Kurdish Peshmerga .............................................................................................. 24 2. Situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) .................................................................................. 25 2.1 IDPs in the KRI and the disputed areas .................................................................................................. 25 2.2. Restrictions on voluntary return to disputed areas ............................................................................. 26 2.2.1 Clearance procedures and freedom of movement for returning IDPs ........................................... 26 2.2.2 Security related obstacles for IDPs wishing to return..................................................................... 28 2.2.3 Lack of civil administration ............................................................................................................. 29 2.2.4. Lack of basic services ..................................................................................................................... 30 2.2.5. Lack of ID-documents .................................................................................................................... 30 2.2.6 Geographical restrictions of returns ............................................................................................... 31 2.2.7 Geographical engineering ............................................................................................................... 32 1 NORTHERN IRAQ – SECURITY SITUATION AND THE SITUATION FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN THE DISPUTED AREAS, INCL. POSSIBILITY TO ENTER AND ACCESS THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (KRI) 2.2.8 Secondary displacement ................................................................................................................. 33 2.3. Prevalence of forced return of IDPs to disputed areas ........................................................................ 34 2.3.1 Forced returns from the KRI ........................................................................................................... 34 2.3.2. Pressure by the KRG for IDPs to return ......................................................................................... 34 2.3.3 Pressure from Iraqi Government on IDPs in KRI ............................................................................. 34 2.3.4 Are IDPs forced to go to camps? ..................................................................................................... 35 3. Access and residence ........................................................................................................................... 35 3.1. Access to Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) ............................................................................................... 35 3.1.1. Procedure for access to KRI ........................................................................................................... 36 3.1.2. Access for mixed couples ............................................................................................................... 37 3.2. Residency in KRI .................................................................................................................................... 37 3.3. Significance of network for returnees .................................................................................................. 39 Appendix 1: Notes from the meetings ..................................................................................................... 40 An international NGO working in Iraq ......................................................................................................... 40 An Iraq Analyst ............................................................................................................................................. 44 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) ............................................. 50 An international humanitarian NGO............................................................................................................ 54 Norwegian Refugee Council ........................................................................................................................ 60 A specialist working for a human rights organisation in Iraq ...................................................................... 66 Kirkuk Now ................................................................................................................................................... 68 US Consulate, Erbil – Matthew Totilo, Refugee & IDP Affairs Coordinator; Karey Haywood, USAID; Chelsea Boorman, Information Officer ..................................................................................................................... 74 Hoshang Mohamed, Director General, Ministry of the Interior, Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC), Kurdistan Regional Government, Iraq ......................................................................................................... 79 An international non-governmental organization operating in the Kurdistan Region ............................... 83 International Organization for Migration (IOM) .......................................................................................... 86 An official working in a UN office that has a presence in Iraq. .................................................................... 91 Belkis Wille, Human Rights Watch ............................................................................................................... 92 Major Akam M. Mustafa, Station Residences & Passport, Erbil International Airport ............................... 94 Director General, Ministry of Interior, KRG, Sami Jalal Hussein .................................................................. 94 A Human Rights Activist ..............................................................................................................................
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