Cyber Security in Estonia 2020 Contents

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Cyber Security in Estonia 2020 Contents Cyber Security In Estonia 2020 Contents The Year of Shaping International Law . 3 Cyber Security Governance in Estonia . 5 Threats and Challenges in Civilian Networks . 8 Cybercriminals Keep Us on Our Toes . 11 Threats and Challenges to Estonia’s National Security . 14 Threats and Challenges Around the World: Russian Cyber Threat . 18 Attribution and Deterrence in Cyberspace . 23 The Challenge of 5G Networks: A View From Estonia . 26 NATO CCDCOE Training the Alliance . 28 Defending the Nation Needs Steady Planning . 32 The EDF Cyber Command: What Is It and What Does It Do? . 34 The EDL Cyber Defence Unit: Preparing For The Storm . 36 Engaging the Cyber Security Community At Home and Abroad . 38 Making I-voting Even More Secure And User-friendly . 43 Protecting Personal Data Becomes An Issue Of Trust . 46 EISA: A Collaborative Effort To Boost Estonian Cyber Potential . 48 DISCLAIMER: All chapters express the views of the respective institutions that are identified at the top of each chapter . For general inquiries and media requests regarding the publication please contact the Estonian Information System Authority at www .ria ee. For specific questions regarding topics discussed in each chapter please contact the institutions directly . 2 CYBER SECURITY IN ESTONIA 2020 The Year of Shaping International Law KERSTI KALJULAID President of the Republic of Estonia If we want cyberspace to become a safe, secure, and stable domain, then malicious cyber activities should have similar consequences as attacks carried out in the ‘analogue’ world. Part of this deterrent is also clearly stating how international law applies in cyberspace – and this is something where Estonia was able to chip in last year. Cyberattacks have, for quite a long time, been the weapon of choice for vari- ous state, state-backed, and non-state actors in promoting their subversive goals – whether it is stealing money, influencing democratic processes, or just wreaking confusion . One of the rea- sons is that there is no clear and consen- sual agreement on how international law and the consequences of breaking these laws apply to cyberattacks and -activi- ties . Indeed, the last couple of years have seen a notable improvement on this issue mainly through states using attri- bution more actively . To put it bluntly: you still have a pretty good chance of conducting a coordinated, malicious, and devastating cyberattack – and CYBER SECURITY IN ESTONIA 2020 3 getting away with it even if the consequences of your activities in the case of conventional attacks or activities would mean a serious breach of international law . Not to mention everything that would come after this in our ‘analogue’ world – condemnations and resolutions by international organisations, sanctions, travel bans, and other restrictions . Therefore, creating a clear and agreed understanding on the appli- cation of international law vis-à-vis cyberspace is not a theoretical and philosophical issue, but at the end of the day, a question of deterring cyberattacks and keeping our digital societies safe and secure . To bring an obvious parallel from the analogue world – international law and con- ventions have not managed to eliminate wars and use of force as an instrument of interna- SUMMARY OF ESTONIAN POSITIONS tional affairs, but they most certainly have ON HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW limited the number and intensity of conflicts, APPLIES IN CYBERSPACE: as everybody is still deterred by the possible 1 . International law applies to state behav- consequences of going against the rules- iour in cyberspace . based international order . 2 . States are responsible for their activities The challenge here lies in the fact that in cyberspace . international law does stem, among other 3 . States have to make reasonable efforts to things, from conventions, agreements, and ensure that their territory is not used to customs – but first and foremost, it is still adversely affect the rights of other states . only the states themselves who can define 4 . States have the right to attribute cyber and interpret international law in a way that operations both individually or collec- makes academic theories become acclaimed tively according to international law . tenets of law and order . 5 . States have the right to react to mali- Taking all that into account, I was actually cious cyber operations, including using a bit surprised to realise a couple of years ago diplomatic measures, countermeasures, that Estonia – the world’s first digital state, and, if necessary, their inherent right of target of the first politically motivated and self-defence . coordinated cyberattacks back in 2007, and home of the Tallinn Manual on the relations of See more: vm .ee/en/cyber-security cyber and international law – was still miss- ing its official positions on this issue . That is why I convened a group of Estonia’s best law and cyber experts to my office back in the autumn of 2018 . By the end of that meeting, everybody more and less agreed that – all things consid- ered – Estonia’s official positions should indeed be drafted, confirmed by the Government, and publicly introduced . The Estonian positions themselves (see textbox), introduced at CyCon 2019, are relatively simple, and one could even say – quite habitual . However, they do carry a clear – and now official – understanding of how Estonia perceives this very important issue . As such, these positions are already helping us to further develop and interpret international law in international organisations and forums . As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Estonia, among other issues, intends to raise awareness of the threats that emerging cyber risks entail for our societies and security . For example, in March 2020, we raised the issue of cyber security for the first time in the UN Security Council when Estonia, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, condemned the 4 CYBER SECURITY IN ESTONIA 2020 President Kersti Kaljulaid speaking at CyCon conference in 2019 where she presented the Estonian positions on how international law applies in cyberspace . extensive cyberattacks against Georgia in 2019 and attributed them to Russian military intelligence . There are also two parallel working groups in the UN currently tackling cyber topics and Estonia’s official positions are being used to promote discussions in those two groups . There are a couple of countries – the UK, for example – that have already introduced their official positions in the past couple of years . Since mid-2019, many other nations have also followed suit and introduced or supplemented their positions on the relations of international law and cyberspace – Australia, the Netherlands, and France, to name a few . It is also true that many actors in the international arena will not share our understanding, or will purposefully remain ambiguous on this issue – that is also one way of creating deterrence . As a small and highly digitised state, Estonia, for one, does not have this kind of luxury . As the first post- war President of Estonia, Lennart Meri, once said: ‘International law is the nuclear weapon of a small state’ . CYBER SECURITY IN ESTONIA 2020 5 Cyber Security Governance in Estonia Government of Estonia Government Security Committee Cyber Security Council • Estonian Information System Authority (RIA) • State Infocommunication Foundation (RIKS) • Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (TTJA) • StartUp Estonia • Estonian Police and • Data Protection Border Guard Board: Inspectorate (AKI) Cybercrime division (C3) • Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO) • Estonian Defense Forces: Cyber Command (KÜVJ) • Estonian Defense League: Cyber Defense Unit (KKÜ) • Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) 6 CYBER SECURITY IN ESTONIA 2020 Cyber security is essentially the management and mitigation of the digital and electronic risks of the information society. This is why cyber security is inextri- cably linked to the development and management of state information systems and data. The goal is to prevent incidents from happening, which means that cyber security has to be integrated into the life cycles of all communications and information systems. If a cyber security incident or crisis were to occur, the state has to have the capabilities to manage the incidents, investigate the cyber crime, and handle all internal crisis situations. Government Security Committee Lead by: The Prime Minister Members: Ministers of Defence, Economic Affairs and Infrastructure, Foreign Trade and Information Leading ministry in the area of cyber security . In addition to Technology, Finance, Foreign Affairs, digital development and cyber security, also in charge of the Interior, and Justice . policies of trade, energy, construction, transport, media ser- Responsibility: Analyses and vices, and other areas . assesses the national security situ- ation and coordinates the activities of the authorities of executive power with regard to planning, develop- The Minister of Foreign Trade and ment, and organisation of national Information Technology defence . The political leader in charge of cyber security in Estonia . Cyber Security Council Lead by: Permanent Secretary of Secretary-General of the Ministry the Ministry of Economic Affairs and In charge of departments at the ministry and Communications . agencies under its authority . Members: Permanent Secretaries of all relevant ministries and top leader- ship of relevant agencies . Responsibility: Coordinates cyber security policy,
Recommended publications
  • Introduction 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A
    Notes Introduction 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical State- ment,” in Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, ed. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), 380. Among those in agreement with Huntington are S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Pro- fessionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Claude E. Welch Jr., Civilian Control of the Military (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1977), and in The Political Influence of the Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Chapter 1 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1957), 3. 2. Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical State- ment,” in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, eds., Political Be- havior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), 380. 3. Among those in agreement with Huntington are S. E. Finer, The Man on Horse- back: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); Bengt Abrahams- son, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Claude E. Welch Jr., Civilian Control of the Military (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and in The Political Influence of the Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
    [Show full text]
  • The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League
    The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League Legal, Policy and Organisational Analysis Kadri Kaska, Anna-Maria Osula, LTC Jan Stinissen Tallinn 2013 Disclaimer This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre) and it represents the views and interpretations of the Centre. This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO and is designed to provide an independent position. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate and the Centre is not responsible for the content of the external sources referenced in this publication. The Centre assumes no responsibility for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication. Copies of this publication may be distributed for non-profit and non-commercial purpose only. Contact NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Filtri tee 12, Tallinn 10132, Estonia [email protected] www.ccdcoe.org 2 Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5 1. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 7 NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY COLLABORATION IN ESTONIA ............................................................................................... 7 ESTONIAN DEFENCE LEAGUE ....................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Democratizing Communist Militaries
    Democratizing Communist Militaries Democratizing Communist Militaries The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces Marybeth Peterson Ulrich Ann Arbor To Mark, Erin, and Benjamin Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1999 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America V∞ Printed on acid-free paper 2002 2001 2000 1999 4 3 2 1 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson. Democratizing Communist militaries : the cases of the Czech and Russian armed forces / Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-472-10969-3 (acid-free paper) 1. Civil-military relations—Russia (Federation) 2. Civil-military relations—Former Soviet republics. 3. Civil-military relations—Czech Republic. 4. Russia (Federation)—Armed Forces—Political activity. 5. Former Soviet republics—Armed Forces—Political activity. 6. Czech Republic—Armed Forces—Political activity. 7. Military assistance, American—Russia (Federation) 8. Military assistance, American—Former Soviet republics. 9. Military assistance, American—Czech Republic. I. Title. JN6520.C58 U45 1999 3229.5909437109049—dc21 99-6461 CIP Contents List of Tables vii Acknowledgments ix List of Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 Chapter 1. A Theory of Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist States 5 Chapter 2. A Survey of Overall U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States
    Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States Edited by Tony Lawrence Tomas Jermalavičius 1 Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States Edited by Tony Lawrence Tomas Jermalavičius International Centre for Defence Studies Toom-Rüütli 12-6 Tallinn 10130 Estonia Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States Edited by Tony Lawrence Tomas Jermalavičius © International Centre for Defence Studies Tallinn, 2013 ISBN: 978-9949-9174-7-1 ISBN: 978-9949-9174-9-5 (PDF) ISBN: 978-9949-9174-8-8 (e-pub) ISBN 978-9949-9448-0-4 (Kindle) Design: Kristjan Mändmaa Layout and cover design: Moonika Maidre Printed: Print House OÜ Cover photograph: Flag dedication ceremony of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, Ādaži, Latvia, January 1995. Courtesy of Kalev Koidumäe. Contents 5 Foreword 7 About the Contributors 9 Introduction Tomas Jermalavičius and Tony Lawrence 13 The Evolution of Baltic Security and Defence Strategies Erik Männik 45 The Baltic Quest to the West: From Total Defence to ‘Smart Defence’ (and Back?) Kęstutis Paulauskas 85 The Development of Military Cultures Holger Mölder 122 Supreme Command and Control of the Armed Forces: the Roles of Presidents, Parliaments, Governments, Ministries of Defence and Chiefs of Defence Sintija Oškalne 168 Financing Defence Kristīne Rudzīte-Stejskala 202 Participation in International Military Operations Piret Paljak 240 Baltic Military Cooperative Projects: a Record of Success Pete Ito 276 Conclusions Tony Lawrence and Tomas Jermalavičius 4 General Sir Garry Johnson Foreword The swift and total collapse of the Soviet Union may still be viewed by some in Russia as a disaster, but to those released from foreign dominance it brought freedom, hope, and a new awakening.
    [Show full text]
  • The Constitution and Interpretation of the Authority Dilemma for the Leadership of the National Defence After Estonia Regained Its Independence
    175 The Constitution and Interpretation of the Authority Dilemma for the Leadership of the National Defence After Estonia Regained its Independence Hellar Lill ABSTRACT After the restoration of independence in August 1991, Estonia had no national defence, defence capability or capacity for international defence cooperation. The armed forced had to be ‘invented’. However, this can be regarded as an advantage, since retraining and reorganising an existing system is usually more difficult. The main principles of national defence were established in Chapter 10 of the Constitution, which was approved in a referendum held in June 1992. This chap- ter, which was influenced by the presidential constitution of 1937/1938, did not answer the question of whether the Commander of the Defence Forces would be placed under the authority of the President, the parliament or the govern- ment. Two voluntary national defence organisations, the Defence League and the Home Guard, which competed with each other, already existed in Estonia when the Defence Forces were established. The Ministry of Defence was established even later. There were fears that subordinating the Commander of the Defence Forces to the government may lead to the politicisation of the army and uneven development due to frequent changes of government. These problems were eased by subordinating the commander to the President – however, this caused ten- sion between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces Headquarters. The parliament had the right to appoint and remove the Commander of the Defence Forces, but the proposal had to come from the President. This conflict culminated in summer 2000 when the Commander of the Defence Forces was removed as a result of a vote in the Riigikogu, which the President called an issue of civilian control; the removal, as well as the Defence Minister and government keeping their positions, was decided by one vote, allegedly given by accident… 176 Hellar Lill The Constitution was amended in 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • Projektskizze Buchprojekt
    1 Estonia on the Road to a European Army Viljar Veebel, Baltic Defence College Chapter in “Strategic Autonomy and the Defence of Europe: On the Road to a European Army” (Eds. Hans-Peter Bartels, Anna Maria Kellner, Uwe Optenhögel), ISBN 978-3-8012-0498-3, pp. 152-164 Country background and statistics Estonia has a population of 1.315 million, as of 1 January 2016, about 0.26 per cent of the total population of the EU (Statistics Estonia 2016a). In the past decade, on average, the annual natural birth rate has been negative, at –1,330 people, on average (Statistics Estonia 2016b). Migration involves extensive back-and-forth mobility of Estonian citizens: 52 per cent of immigrants and 69 per cent of emigrants in 2015 were citizens of Estonia. In 2015– 2016, emigration stabilised and the number of immigrants increased (Statistics Estonia 2016b). After the parliamentary elections in March 2015, six political parties exceeded the 5 per cent election threshold. The Estonian Reform Party (RE) won the elections, receiving 30 of the 101 seats in the parliament, followed by the Estonian Centre Party (KE) with 27 seats. The Social Democratic Party (SDE) got 15 seats and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) got 14 seats. The newcomer, the Estonian Free Party (VE), received eight seats, and the most radical party, the Conservative Peoples Party of Estonia (EKRE), got seven seats. After the elections, the Reform Party, the Social Democrats and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union formed a coalition. A second coalition and government was formed in 23.
    [Show full text]
  • 101 Biographies 2021 January
    101 BIOGRAPHIES The 14th Riigikogu February 15, 2021 Tallinn 2021 Compiled on the basis of questionnaires completed by members of the Riigikogu / Reviewed semi-annually Compiled by Marge Allandi, Rita Hillermaa and Piret Pärgma / Translated by the Chancellery of the Riigi- kogu / Estonian edition edited by Gerli Randjärv, English edition by Piret Pärgma / Cover by Tuuli Aule / Layout by Margit Plink / Photos by Erik Peinar ISSN 2674-3205 Copyright: Chancellery of the Riigikogu, National Library of Estonia CONTENTS Members of the 14th Riigikogu 3 Members of the Riigikogu by Constituency 114 Members of the Riigikogu by Faction 117 Members of the Riigikogu by Committee 120 Members of the Riigikogu Whose Mandate Has Been Suspended or Has Terminated 124 List of Riigikogus 146 Abbreviations and Select Glossary 147 CONTENTS CONTENTS 2 Members MEMBERS OF Merry Aart Johannes Kert Kristen Michal Erki Savisaar THE 14TH RIIGIKOGU Annely Akkermann Kert Kingo Marko Mihkelson Helir-Valdor Seeder Yoko Alender Signe Kivi Madis Milling Andrus Seeme Riho Breivel Toomas Kivimägi Aadu Must Sven Sester Dmitri Dmitrijev Aivar Kokk Eduard Odinets Priit Sibul Ivi Eenmaa Rene Kokk Jevgeni Ossinovski Riina Sikkut Enn Eesmaa Mihhail Korb Ivari Padar Imre Sooäär Peeter Ernits Andrei Korobeinik Hanno Pevkur Mihhail Stalnuhhin Hele Everaus Siret Kotka Heljo Pikhof Timo Suslov Kalle Grünthal Heiki Kranich Õnne Pillak Margit Sutrop Helle-Moonika Helme Igor Kravtšenko Siim Pohlak Aivar Sõerd Mart Helme Eerik-Niiles Kross Anti Poolamets Kristina Šmigun-Vähi Martin Helme
    [Show full text]
  • 101 BIOGRAPHIES the 13Th Riigikogu
    101 BIOGRAPHIES The 13th Riigikogu January 1, 2019 Tallinn 2019 Compiled on the basis of questionnaires completed by members of the Riigikogu Reviewed semi-annually Compiled by Gerli Randjärv, Rita Hillermaa and Lii Suurpalu Translated by the Chancellery of the Riigikogu Cover by Tuuli Aule Layout by Margit Plink Photos by Erik Peinar Copyright: Chancellery of the Riigikogu, National Library of Estonia CONTENTS 3 Members of the 13th Riigikogu 113 Members of the Riigikogu by Constituency 116 Members of the Riigikogu by Faction 119 Members of the Riigikogu by Committee 123 List of Riigikogus 124 Members of the Riigikogu Whose Mandate Has Been Suspended or Has Terminated 167 Abbreviations and Select Glossary 2 MEMBERS OF THE 13TH RIIGIKOGU MEMBERS OF Arto Aas Helmen Kütt Heidy Purga Jüri Adams Ants Laaneots Raivo Põldaru th THE 13 RIIGIKOGU Raivo Aeg Kalle Laanet Henn Põlluaas Yoko Alender Viktoria Ladõnskaja-Kubits Mati Raidma January 1, 2019 Krista Aru Maris Lauri Laine Randjärv Peep Aru Heimar Lenk Valdo Randpere Maire Aunaste Jürgen Ligi Taavi Rõivas Dmitri Dmitrijev Oudekki Loone Kersti Sarapuu Enn Eesmaa Inara Luigas Erki Savisaar Peeter Ernits Lauri Luik Helir-Valdor Seeder Helmut Hallemaa Ain Lutsepp Sven Sester Hannes Hanso Jaak Madison Priit Sibul Monika Haukanõmm Jaanus Marrandi Arno Sild Mart Helme Enn Meri Mihhail Stalnuhhin Martin Helme Andres Metsoja Anne Sulling Andres Herkel Kristen Michal Märt Sults Olga Ivanova Marko Mihkelson Aivar Surva Jüri Jaanson Marianne Mikko Aivar Sõerd Toomas Jürgenstein Madis Milling Tanel Talve
    [Show full text]
  • 101 Biographies
    101 BIOGRAPHIES The 13th Riigikogu June 16, 2016 Tallinn 2016 Compiled on the basis of questionnaires completed by members of the Riigikogu Reviewed semi-annually Compiled by Gerli Eero, Rita Hillermaa and Lii Suurpalu Translated by the Chancellery of the Riigikogu Cover by Tuuli Aule Layout by Margit Plink Photos by Erik Peinar Copyright: Chancellery of the Riigikogu, National Library of Estonia CONTENTS 3 Members of the 13th Riigikogu 111 Members of the Riigikogu by Constituency 114 Members of the Riigikogu by Faction 117 Members of the Riigikogu by Committee 121 List of Riigikogus 122 Members of the Riigikogu Whose Mandate Has Been Suspended or Has Terminated 134 Abbreviations and Select Glossary 2 MEMBERS OF THE 13TH RIIGIKOGU MEMBERS OF Jüri Adams Külliki Kübarsepp Valdo Randpere Raivo Aeg Helmen Kütt Jüri Ratas th THE 13 RIIGIKOGU Yoko Alender Ants Laaneots Rein Ratas Andres Ammas Kalle Laanet Martin Repinski June 16, 2016 Andres Anvelt Viktoria Ladõnskaja Mailis Reps Krista Aru Maris Lauri Kersti Sarapuu Maire Aunaste Heimar Lenk Erki Savisaar Deniss Boroditš Kerstin-Oudekki Loone Vilja Savisaar-Toomast Dmitri Dmitrijev Lauri Luik see Vilja Toomast Enn Eesmaa Ain Lutsepp Helir-Valdor Seeder Peeter Ernits Jaak Madison Andre Sepp Igor Gräzin Jaanus Marrandi Priit Sibul Monika Haukanõmm Andres Metsoja Arno Sild Mart Helme Marko Mihkelson Kadri Simson Martin Helme Marianne Mikko Mark Soosaar Andres Herkel Sven Mikser Imre Sooäär Remo Holsmer Madis Milling Mihhail Stalnuhhin Olga Ivanova Aadu Must Anne Sulling Jüri Jaanson Kalle Muuli
    [Show full text]
  • Baltic Defence Review No. 11 Volume 1/2004
    Baltic Defence Review No. 11 Volume 1/2004 ISSN 1736-1257 Published by the Baltic Security Society, Riia 12, EE 51013 Tartu, Estonia. Articles of the Baltic Defence Review are also available to the subscribers of the EBSCO Host database at http:// search.global.epnet.com. Editor in Chief: Elizabeth Tromer. Editors: Tomas Jermalavicius, Kirsten Christensen, Heikko Pääbo Lay-out: Matis Karu Photo on a front cover: An official ceremony of raising a NATO flag in front of the Baltic Defence College, 2 April 2004 2 Contents 5 Editors note by Elizabeth Tromer Section III: Challenges to New 8 At the 5th Staff Course Graduation of NATO and New Regional Security the Baltic Defence College: The College Agenda Now and in the Future by Michael H. Clemmesen 93 The Central Issues for NATO Section I: Military Education by Janusz Onyszkiewicz 13 The Background and Development of 97 NATOs Security Agenda after the Baltic Defence College Higher Enlargement By Knut Kirste Command Studies Course Leadership 104 Security Dimension of the Northern of Transformation by Michael H. Clemmesen Europe after the Double Enlargement by Kestutis Paulauskas Section II: Transatlantic Relations Section IV: Perceptions and 21 U.S. Hegemony and the Transatlantic Policies of Non-Member States Alliance by Stanley R. Sloan 39 An Empire Unveiled by Jorgen Dragsdahl After Enlargement of NATO 65 The Transatlantic Security Rift and Its 117 Russia, NATO Enlargement and Implications for Baltic Security the Baltic States by Jennifer Ann Moll by Konstantin Khudoley and Dmitri Lanko 84 EU-NATO Relations: A European vision 129 Finlands Defence Policy: Sui Generis? by Jean-Francois Morel by Pauli Järvenpää 3 135 Reforms of the Croatian Armed Forces toward NATO by Neven Kranjcec Section V: EU Enlargement and New Members 147 EU25 > 15+10 by Kristiina Ojuland 154 Estonian Security Perceptions in the Context of EU Enlargement: A Critical Discussion by Steffen B.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League
    The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League Legal, Policy and Organisational Analysis Kadri Kaska, Anna-Maria Osula, LTC Jan Stinissen Tallinn 2013 Disclaimer This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre) and it represents the views and interpretations of the Centre. This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO and is designed to provide an independent position. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate and the Centre is not responsible for the content of the external sources referenced in this publication. The Centre assumes no responsibility for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication. Copies of this publication may be distributed for non-profit and non-commercial purpose only. Contact NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Filtri tee 12, Tallinn 10132, Estonia [email protected] www.ccdcoe.org 2 Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5 1. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 7 NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY COLLABORATION IN ESTONIA ............................................................................................... 7 ESTONIAN DEFENCE LEAGUE ....................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • EESTI EEST! Pilguheit Kaitseliidu Lähiminevikku 1988–2008
    EESTI EEST! Pilguheit Kaitseliidu lähiminevikku 1988–2008 EESTI EEST! Pilguheit Kaitseliidu lähiminevikku 1988–2008 Tallinn 2008 Peatoimetaja: Merike Jürjo Toimetuskolleegium: kapten Neeme Brus, kapten Ivar Jõesaar, major Meelis Kivi, PhD Ago Pajur, major Mart Puusepp, Tanel Lään Fotod: KL digitaalne fotoarhiiv Kaitseliit ISBN 9985-9564-?-? Kujundus Rainer Alas KUMA KIRJASTUS, 2008 [email protected] Trükk: Kuma trükikoda, Paide Kõvaköide: Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda Tagasipilk minevikku kinnitab meie usku tulevikku Hea lugeja, damine, riigikaitse seostatus kodanikeühiskonnaga, see raamat püüab anda Sulle ühe võimaliku pildi välis- ja sisekaitselise tegevuse integratsioon, on Kaitseliidu lähiajaloost. Nagu ei saa kunagi rääkida märksõnad, mida klassikaliste armeemudelite tormi- ajaloo sajaprotsendiliselt täpsest kirjeldamisest, ei saa lise ümberhindamise ja muutmise perioodi üle elavas me ka väita, et järgnevates peatükkides on kirjas kõik Lääne-Euroopas peetakse täna tihti uuteks ja mood- ja kogu tõde. Nii palju, kui on erinevaid inimesi, on sateks. Võime julgelt sellise organisatsioonimudeliga ka erinevaid arvamusi, hinnanguid, meenutusi ja ka tulevikule vastu minna, ilma et peaksime taotlema tõekspidamisi. Ometigi võime seda raamatut luge- pidevaid revolutsioonilisi reforme. Asume tugeval des leida palju kinnitusi neile ühistele väärtustele, filosoofilisel ja ideoloogilisel alusel, mis lubab meile millele tuginedes saame selge pilguga vaadata Kait- rahulikku ja tasakaalustatud arengut. seliidu tulevikku. Üheks meie peamiseks jõuks on ühised
    [Show full text]