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The Crowd Outside the White House Didn't Have to Wait for Long

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The Crowd Outside the White House Didn't Have to Wait for Long The Second Russian Revolution 1914-Present Ch 34 n 1991, a delegation of hard-line leaders Gorbachev resigned his post as General Secretary of unexpectedly interrupted Gorbachev' s the Communist Party, the Baltic states gained full Ivacation on Sunday, August 18th. independence, and Boris Yeltsin became the most Speaking for a State Committee, the group powerful leader in the Soviet Union. But the changes demanded that Gorbachev accept emergency rule or unleashed by the failed coup had only just begun. resign. When he refused, the plotters returned to This section concludes by describing the events that Moscow, leaving Gorbachev's compound surrounded led to Gorbachev's resignation, the final collapse of by well-armed troops and cut off from the rest of the the Soviet Union, and the formation of a new country. Commonwealth of Independent States. Although the people of the Soviet Union remained unaware that a coup had begun, they would Turning Points in History: The August Coup soon find out. At 6 A.M. Monday morning, the Soviet news agency suddenly announced that Mikhail Monday, August 19. The news bulletin announcing Gorbachev could no longer perform his duties as the coup sent shock waves of concern around the President because of "health reasons." Vice world. President Yaneyev and several other senior officials Worried leaders in Eastern Europe had therefore formed a State Committee for the State wondered if the new Soviet leaders would honor of Emergency to govern the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's commitment to withdraw troops from The Committee promptly issued a statement eastern Germany and Poland. announcing a state of emergency. The statement also Meanwhile, President Bush and his top declared that Gorbachev's reforms had placed the advisors held emergency meetings to evaluate the Soviet Union in "mortal danger" by leading it "into a crisis. "The whole world just went topsy-turvy," said blind alley." Shortly afterwards, the Committee issued one alarmed aide. "Everything is out the window." As a second decree suspending political parties, banning the world watched and waited, the people of Moscow strikes, and closing all independent newspapers. By awoke to the sound of tanks and armored personnel midmorning hundreds of tanks and armored carriers rumbling through their streets. personnel carriers began rolling into Moscow and the The State Committee assumed that this Baltic states. show of force would stifle public criticism and ensure The August coup obedience. But they were marked a turning point in wrong. Gorbachev's world history. It began as reforms had created a an attempt to restore the new generation willing to old order. speak its mind and Convinced that defend its freedoms. ordinary citizens would "Those fools are out of choose security over touch," said one freedom; the plotters contemptuous 32-year- believed that a show of old electronics force would enable them to technician. easily gain control over the "They do not country. But they had realize that things have underestimated the people. changed and we are not Instead of turning the clock back, they changed the going to stay home just because they have sent Soviet Union forever. soldiers into the streets." As word of the coup spread This reading will begin by describing the across Moscow, the first signs of public resistance coup and explaining why it failed. As you will see, the began to appear. Angry citizens confronted Soviet fateful confrontation between the hard-liners and the soldiers demanding to know who sent them. "Why reformers shattered the Soviet Union. Within days, The Second Russian Revolution 1914-Present Ch 34 tanks?" screamed one furious woman, "Tanks against While resistance increased in the republics, whom? What are you doing? What do you want”? world attention remained focused on the dramatic By noon, many protestors began to gather at standoff between the State Committee and Boris the Russian Parliament building just two miles from Yeltsin. At noon, Yeltsin told a huge crowd of the Kremlin. Nicknamed the White House because of supporters, "We will hold out here as long as we have its marble facade, the 19-story building served as to remove this junta from power. We will win!" Still Boris Yeltsin's headquarters. "We are waiting for fearing that an armed attack could come at any time, Yeltsin's response. We are ready to defend him," volunteers strengthened the barricades surrounding shouted one demonstrator. the White House. As the evening hours began, The crowd outside the White House didn't thousands of men and women ignored a cold rain and have to wait for long. Like everyone else, Yeltsin had formed a human shield 30 rows deep in front of the been caught off guard by the coup. He narrowly building. A Russian Orthodox priest blessed avoided arrest by quickly leaving his home outside volunteers who vowed to die defending their elected Moscow and dashing to his office in the White House. leaders. At about 12:30 P.M., he walked outside the White While the tense vigil continued at the White House and boldly climbed atop one of the nearby House, the coup leaders frantically ordered tank units tanks. As his supporters cheered, Yeltsin defiantly to attack. predicted that "the reactionaries will not triumph." He But once again key units ignored their then called for a general strike and urged his orders. Although the coup was rapidly unraveling, the followers to disobey the State Committee's decrees. volunteers protecting the White House were unaware Yeltsin's courageous action helped inspire of the insubordination sweeping through the Soviet others to step forward. Fearing that an armed attack military. At midnight, a confused scuffle between could come at any time, volunteers worked feverishly troops and protestors broke out on a nearby street. to build barricades around the White House. By Three civilians died in the brief clash. Monday evening thousands of demonstrators Wednesday, August 21. The Army's refusal gathered outside the White House to protect Yeltsin. to attack the White House doomed the coup. In an Their fears were not misplaced. Yaneyev early morning meeting at the Defense Ministry, top Air and his fellow plotters had originally hoped to avoid a Force and Navy commanders demanded that bloody confrontation like the one in Tiananmen Defense Minister Yazov withdraw all troops from Square. But they now recognized that the coup would Moscow. After Yazov angrily stormed out of his office, fail unless they stormed the White House. the generals issued an order to begin troop Determined to seize and, if necessary, kill withdrawals at about 3:00 P.M. Yeltsin and his aides, the plotters ordered an elite Abandoned by the military and confronted by force of KGB commandos to assault the White massive public opposition, the coup quickly fell apart. House. But the Alpha commanders and their men While crowds cheered the departing soldiers, refused to obey the order. Despite threats that they panicked coup leaders flew to Gorbachev's villa to would be court-martialed or even executed, the Alpha beg for his forgiveness. Gorbachev refused to see members steadfastly refused to launch an attack that them and instead ordered their arrest. Later that could kill innocent civilians and ignite a civil war. night, Gorbachev and his family flew back to Moscow Yeltsin later admitted that if they had attacked, the where they would soon discover that the nation was Alpha force "would have killed us all." changing far more rapidly than anyone could imagine. Tuesday, August 20. The Committee's failure to seize Yeltsin marked a key turning point in Why did the coup fail? the coup. As the second day began, resistance The August coup marked a watershed in Soviet and rapidly spread. Huge crowds in Leningrad and world history. Had the coup succeeded, the West may Moldavia denounced the coup. have faced a new Cold War while the Soviet people Despite the presence of heavily armed faced the prospect of a return to totalitarian controls. soldiers, the Baltic States continued to defy Soviet Although many forces played a role, three key factors authorities. doomed the coup. The Second Russian Revolution 1914-Present Ch 34 communism sweeping the county. "We are all sick of 1. The coup leaders proved to be disorganized and the Communists," said one retired worker. "They have incompetent. For example, they thought to order been strangling us for 70 years." As public anger 250,000 pairs of handcuffs but neglected to cut the shifted from the eight leaders of the coup to the communications of resistance leaders. As a result, Communist Party, the crowds became more militant. Yeltsin was able to monitor events in the Soviet Union After listening to Yeltsin, thousands of demonstrators and solicit support from President Bush and other marched to the KGB headquarters where they tore world leaders. down a 14 ton statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet secret police. 2. The coup leaders failed to immediately arrest Boris In the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, a jubilant Yeltsin. Once established within the White House, crowd pulled down statues of Lenin. "I spent 12 years Yeltsin became a highly visible rallying point for in Siberia," said one elderly man. "But this is a popular resistance. happier day for me than the day I was released from the camps." Public resentment against the 3. The coup leaders Communist Party had been failed to understand how building for a long time. The much Gorbachev's Communists first seized reforms had changed the power in 1917. Under the Soviet people. Faced leadership of Lenin and with the choice of Stalin, the Communist Party submitting to more completely dominated Soviet communism or risking political, economic, and social their lives for more life.
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