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George Bush and the End of the Cold War. Christopher Alan Maynard Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School 2001 From the Shadow of Reagan: George Bush and the End of the Cold War. Christopher Alan Maynard Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses Recommended Citation Maynard, Christopher Alan, "From the Shadow of Reagan: George Bush and the End of the Cold War." (2001). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 297. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/297 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI fiims the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. -
Russia: CHRONOLOGY DECEMBER 1993 to FEBRUARY 1995
Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets file:///C:/Documents and Settings/brendelt/Desktop/temp rir/CHRONO... Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Home Issue Paper RUSSIA CHRONOLOGY DECEMBER 1993 TO FEBRUARY 1995 July 1995 Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All sources are cited. This document is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed or conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. For further information on current developments, please contact the Research Directorate. Table of Contents GLOSSARY Political Organizations and Government Structures Political Leaders 1. INTRODUCTION 2. CHRONOLOGY 1993 1994 1995 3. APPENDICES TABLE 1: SEAT DISTRIBUTION IN THE STATE DUMA TABLE 2: REPUBLICS AND REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MAP 1: RUSSIA 1 of 58 9/17/2013 9:13 AM Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets file:///C:/Documents and Settings/brendelt/Desktop/temp rir/CHRONO... MAP 2: THE NORTH CAUCASUS NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES REFERENCES GLOSSARY Political Organizations and Government Structures [This glossary is included for easy reference to organizations which either appear more than once in the text of the chronology or which are known to have been formed in the period covered by the chronology. The list is not exhaustive.] All-Russia Democratic Alternative Party. Established in February 1995 by Grigorii Yavlinsky.( OMRI 15 Feb. -
Collection: Vertical File, Ronald Reagan Library Folder Title: Reagan, Ronald W
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: Vertical File, Ronald Reagan Library Folder Title: Reagan, Ronald W. – Promises Made, Promises Kept To see more digitized collections visit: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research- support/citation-guide National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ . : ·~ C.. -~ ) j/ > ji· -·~- ·•. .. TI I i ' ' The Reagan Administration: PROMISES MADE PROMISES KEPI . ' i), 1981 1989 December, 1988 The \\, hile Hollst'. Offuof . Affairs \l.bshm on. oc '11)500 TABIE OF CDNTENTS Introduction 2 Economy 6 tax cuts 7 tax reform 8 controlling Government spending 8 deficit reduction 10 ◄ deregulation 11 competitiveness 11 record exports 11 trade policy 12 ~ record expansion 12 ~ declining poverty 13 1 reduced interest rates 13 I I I slashed inflation 13 ' job creation 14 1 minority/wmen's economic progress 14 quality jobs 14 family/personal income 14 home ownership 15 Misery Index 15 The Domestic Agenda 16 the needy 17 education reform 18 health care 19 crime and the judiciary 20 ,,c/. / ;,, drugs ·12_ .v family and traditional values 23 civil rights 24 equity for women 25 environment 26 energy supply 28 transportation 29 immigration reform 30 -
Statement of Senator Bob Dole President Reagan Departs for The
This press release is from the collections at the Robert J. Dole Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas. ews from SenatorPlease contact us with any questions or comments: http://dolearchive.ku.edu/ask OBDOLE (R- Kansas) SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510-1601 POR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: WALT RIKER, DALE TATE MAY 25, 19 8 8 (202) 224-3135 STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB DOLE THE PRESIDENT DEPARTS FOR .THE SUMMIT THIS MO R NING, PRESIDENT REAGAN DEPARTS WASHINGTON, EN ROUTE TO HIS FOURTH SUMMIT MEETING WITH SOV IET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, SCHEDULED TO BEGIN MAY 29 IN MOSCOW. AS DO ALL SUMMITS, THIS ONE OFFERS THE PROMISE OF PROGRESS ON IMPORTANT BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES; AND THE PERIL OF NF LATED EXPECTATIONS. AS WITH ALL SUMMITS, THE BEST ATT ITUDE FOR APPROACHING THIS ONE IS TO KEEP OUR EYES AS WIDE OPEN AS OUR MINDS; AND TO KEEP O UR FEET FIRMLY ON THE GROUND. ' WE CAN ACHIEVE MUCH IN MOSCOW; WE CANNOT ACHIEVE VERYTHING. AND WE CAN ONLY BE DISAPPOINTED IF OUR GOALS EXCEED OUR REACH. WE CAN ACHIEVE IMPORTANT RESULTS ON ARMS CONTROL. IF WE IN THE SENATE DO OUR PART, WE CAN PUT INTO EFFECT A GROUND-BREAK ING UCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT, THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY; THE FIRST EVER TO REDUCE EXISTING NUCLEAR STOCKP ILES, AND ELIMINATE WHOLE CLASSES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE CAN MOVE CLOSER TO AN UNDERSTANDING ON VERIF ICAT ION REGIMES WHICH COULD YIELD THE REALISTIC PROSP ECT OF SENATE ACTION ON AT LEAST ONE OF THE TWO NUCLEAR TEST ING TREATIES BEFORE US. -
Reagan's Victory
Reagan’s ictory How HeV Built His Winning Coalition By Robert G. Morrison Foreword by William J. Bennett Reagan’s Victory: How He Built His Winning Coalition By Robert G. Morrison 1 FOREWORD By William J. Bennett Ronald Reagan always called me on my birthday. Even after he had left the White House, he continued to call me on my birthday. He called all his Cabinet members and close asso- ciates on their birthdays. I’ve never known another man in public life who did that. I could tell that Alzheimer’s had laid its firm grip on his mind when those calls stopped coming. The President would have agreed with the sign borne by hundreds of pro-life marchers each January 22nd: “Doesn’t Everyone Deserve a Birth Day?” Reagan’s pro-life convic- tions were an integral part of who he was. All of us who served him knew that. Many of my colleagues in the Reagan administration were pro-choice. Reagan never treat- ed any of his team with less than full respect and full loyalty for that. But as for the Reagan administration, it was a pro-life administration. I was the second choice of Reagan’s to head the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). It was my first appointment in a Republican administration. I was a Democrat. Reagan had chosen me after a well-known Southern historian and literary critic hurt his candidacy by criticizing Abraham Lincoln. My appointment became controversial within the Reagan ranks because the Gipper was highly popular in the South, where residual animosities toward Lincoln could still be found. -
Design Matters: the Past, Present and Future of the INF Treaty
Trust Trust Winter 2018 Winter • Design Matters: The 162 Number Issue Past, Present and Future of the INF • Treaty ISSN 0966–9221 Introduction & In a discussion with journalists on 20 October 2018, US President Trump announced that the United States would seek to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, blaming Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for the decision. Verify Both countries allege the other has violated the treaty. However, US withdrawal from the treaty, combined with the lack of progress in extending New START (Strategic Arms Reduc- tion Treaty), which is designed to limit the number of strategic weapons in US and Russian arsenals, arguably represents the most severe crisis in nuclear arms control for several decades. Numerous experts have explored the geopolitical and strategic ramifications of US with- drawal from the Treaty. Pavel Podvig, for example, has argued that Russia’s violation fails to ‘reach the level that would justify destruction of a key disarmament agreement, most likely bringing irreparable damage to the larger arms control architecture’. Others have suggested that withdrawing from the Treaty represents an ‘own goal’ for the United States and that it risks undermining the broader international arms control architecture. US officials, on the other hand, have argued that triggering the 60-day notification period for withdrawal (which US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on 4 December 2018) is warranted by Rus- sia’s alleged noncompliance. Pompeo’s ultimatum states that Russia must return to ‘full and verifiable compliance’ with the INF Treaty or the United States would provide its official United Kingdom United London E2 9DA Rd. -
Checklist for the Moscow Summit,Briefing
65 1 May 20,1988 CHECKLIST FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT,BRIEFING From May 29 to June 2,1988, Ronald Reagan will be in Moscow for his fourth meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The first meeting, in Geneva in 1985, restored United States-Soviet summit dialogue after a six-year hiatus caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the terminal illness of three Soviet leaders. Reagan and Gorbachev met again in Reykjavik in 1986. That meeting broke down over Soviet insistence that the U.S. abandon its Strategic Defense Initiative. The third summit; .atwhichathe Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed, was held in Washington last December. With this fourth Reagan-Gorbachev summit, Reagan will have met the Soviet leader more times than any American President has met any other Soviet leader. In an important sense, therefore, this summit is almost routine. Dramatic agreements should not be expected, nor are they desirable. In keeping with this the Moscow summit should be deliberately low-key. Reagan should downplay arms control issues, except to insist on full Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty and to insist that any strategic arms agreement must include provisions for strategic defense deployment. Items of U.S. Concern. Reagan should emphasize agenda items reflecting U.S. concern over Soviet expansionism abroad and human rights abuses at home. He forcefully should express U.S. opposition to Soviet support for wars that anti-democratic and anti-Western regimes wage against their own peoples. He should tell Gorbachev that the U.S. expects Moscow to end all involvement in Afghanistan; stop its military aid to Nicaragua and pull Soviet-bloc advisors out of that country; support internationally supervised elections in Mozambique and Angola, along with a withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban troops from the latter country; refrain from encouraging the Philippine communist rebels; and end genocide being committed in Ethiopia by the Soviet client regime of the dictator Mengistu Haile Maria. -
Chapter One: the US and the Cold War: Historical Background
Dedication 1 I dedicate this Standard Essay to my beloved parents and my sister whom without their help, support, advices, cooperation, motivation, and prayers, I would not have taken up this study nor completed it. I also dedicate this work to all my friends who have supported me throughout the process. Also, to my teacher of secondary school “Mr. Moubarek” I’m thankful for all that he have done. Thank you all. Kenadessa Marwa I Dedication 2 I dedicate this work to the dearest, greatest and closest person to my heart, to my dear mother who passed away seven years ago. May Allah send his mercy upon her soul This was her dream; dear mother I did this work just for you. Goreini Amina II Acknowledgments First and foremost, all our gratitude, gratefulness, and thankfulness are directed to “ALLAH” for enabling us to complete this work. We would like to express our deepest gratitude to our supervisor “Dr. Zeghoudi Yahia”, who has gone with us through the ups and downs of this work and been invaluable source of knowledge and thoughtful advice. Thank you for giving us a wealth of ideas and generosity of time. Our utmost gratitude goes to Mr. Rahmoun Omar for his support and help. Personally, me Goreini amina, I would to thank you for your encouragement and due to your motivating words that I reach this stage of success. Special thanks go to our wonderful and greatest teacher Dr. Mouro Wassila for her assistance and guidance who without her help and support this work would not be done Great thanks to our teachers ‘Dr.Bensafa Abdelkader’, ‘Mr Kamech Mohamed’, ‘Benmeki Amine’ for their helpful advices We were fortunate to have been taught by such outstanding teachers during all the five years Finally, we would like to thank our beloved friends and families for their sustainment and their prayer for us without forgetting any name, thank you all. -
Moscow Summit Transcripts
first o.e on one M€etinq se.retary Gorbachev €l- sovier Nsc staff ^ffairs, .*,.r c----+-., A.ting DcFartient section chief, Mfl May 29, 1933, l:26 p.n. - 4:r7 p.m. st. catherine H.LI, The xrenrin, dosco' right away tnat he vas wery deremrined to contiNe t\e qro'inq dialoque whi.h gatrin!.; momentM in soviet-Aneri.an relarlors, ., -y u., o b, 'as that he th.usht that jn recent !.ars, since the statenent they had sisned in Genera, theie not onl? in bilaterai relations, but, ..lo .os po . chanqe was io nake rhe jhternational and 'hole clinate betrer dore it alone, t[e sovi.t leadership could not ha'c donc it a1.r€. The tqo si<res had ro do it roqertrer, .nd hdd. There was o' FE o" . - Luti.n had counLed For a ]ot. Gorbachew €nphasized rh.L he qrs not iust saying ricc {ords- lqr 1rie Preald.nt said th.t botn sides had con. a long lay since lrc -l;at;;tmo eorbachew in 1es5. History {ontil re.oi.r rhe plraod positiv.ry, tfue not just for our r.lati.... rNr A..ord, thay trad nade lhe rorrd a litr1c bit safer with sone ol rhe thinqs they had donc- clrba.hev said he \- P' . ..,| E!!!!- , ilts *,*-"***.*',,,-@ !e was parti.ula!l!. pleas.d litn corb.chew Fis .loinq ir afshani.tan, vithdrawinq'hat his troops. Afghanisian vas a lrob1€m c..bachew had inherit.d, he had nor bcer irwolw€d in rhe ilhore rortd aplroy€d the cotrrase he sas oJngi L -. -
About the Results of the Moscow Summit and Their Impact on U.S
About the Results of the Moscow Summit and Their Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy and Soviet-American Relations. As experience shows, final results of such events as the Soviet-American summits become apparent over more or less extended period of time. So far, we can only talk about preliminary results. Among them, the following are the most significant. First of all, the summit brought substantial political and diplomatic results. It is important that we did not allow any breaks in the process of dialog, even though it was possible and even probably due to the U.S. political calendar (the electoral campaign, the situation in which the outgoing administration now finds itself—according to the American political terminology—the state of “lame duck”). Thanks to the summit, the year 1988 did not fall out of the process of normalization of Soviet-American relations; to the contrary, it already became an important marker in their development, which help ensure the continuity: both most likely presidential candidates are simply forced by the logic of events itself to speak positively about Soviet-American relations, about disarmament and other important issues, which were on the agenda. Thus it is as if they are “taking the baton” from Reagan. Furthermore, the preparation for the summit, the summit itself, and the subsequent realization of those agreements, which were achieved or outlined there, do not just cement the constructive changes in Soviet-American relations, but also give them a new impulse for further development in all the spheres— disarmament, resolution of regional problems, and improvement of bilateral relations. -
Reagan/Gorbachev Summit: Planning/Background Material (2) Box: 1
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: Griscom, Thomas: Files Folder Title: [Washington Summit, 1986]: Reagan/Gorbachev Summit: Planning/Background Material (2) Box: 1 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name GRISCOM, THOMAS: FILES Withdrawer RBW 5/13/2008 ·:.}L!. \i . ' . File Folder [WASHINGTON SUMMIT, 1986]: REAGAN/GORBACHEV FOIA SUMMIT: PLANNING BACKGROUND MATERIAL. S08-118 (BINDER) (2 OF 2) Box Number CFOA 708 21 ID Doc Type Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 54332 MEMO THOMAS GRISCOM TO HOWARD BAKER RE TALKING PTS FOIL ------ CONVERSATIONJWFH REAGANS---- ON S'QMMI-~- ~ - -----;-OCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233 ' IR!f),f\I ·~ ': .. ·'.< !Al. p.: I~ Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] · B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] . B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purppses [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] : ··: .'• C. -
The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections
Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper REP 2011/01 The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Andrew Monaghan Nato Defence College June 2011 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication. REP Programme Paper. The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Introduction From among many important potential questions about developments in Russian politics and in Russia more broadly, one has emerged to dominate public policy and media discussion: who will be Russian president in 2012? This is the central point from which a series of other questions and debates cascade – the extent of differences between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and how long their ‘Tandem’ can last, whether the presidential election campaign has already begun and whether they will run against each other being only the most prominent. Such questions are typically debated against a wider conceptual canvas – the prospects for change in Russia. Some believe that 2012 offers a potential turning point for Russia and its relations with the international community: leading to either the return of a more ‘reactionary’ Putin to the Kremlin, and the maintenance of ‘stability’, or another term for the more ‘modernizing’ and ‘liberal’ Medvedev.