The US Embassy building, under construc- tion in Moscow in 1988. The tortured project took 27 years to complete. The building finally opened in 2000.

The new US Embassy in Moscow was half done. Then officials realized the Soviets had built hundreds of listening devices right into the structure. Cleaning the Bug House By Peter Grier n December 1991, Robert S. Strauss, and a valise full of electronic devices. He After years of denial, the Soviet intel- US ambassador to the Soviet Union, handed them to Strauss. ligence arm was admitting its role in one visited KGB chief Vadim V. Bakatin “Mr. Ambassador, these are the plans of the most notorious espionage incidents in his Moscow office. Strauss—a that disclose how the bugging of your of the 1980s: It had packed the new US genial Texan—thought he was mak- embassy took place, and these are Embassy office building in Moscow with Iing a simple courtesy call on a Kremlin the instruments that were used,” said sophisticated listening devices. The edi- official with whom he had good relations. Bakatin. “I want them turned over to fice’s structure was so riddled with bugs Instead the American envoy got one of your government, no strings attached.” that some US counterespionage experts the biggest surprises of his life. Strauss was dumbstruck, according to described it as nothing but a giant mi- After the pleasantries were over Bakatin an account of the incident he gave later crophone. The unfinished building stood opened his safe and took out a thick file that year. half-completed for years, as Washington 98 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 AIR FORCE Magazine Magazine FORCE AIR foreign policy. foreign American of facets important most the of one remains century 21st the in that relationship diplomatic a for activity of government, across the street. It’s theRussian White House, seat center of the Russian center, with large windows that reflect the a in lovely the structure buff-colored city ambassador. US the back,” said [one]-fourth kept and you’d given me three-fourths of [the that bugs] believe would people building, that he knew mistrust remained on both sides. Strauss thought the sentiment genuine. But finish construction and move in. hope that now the US could debacle. ligence to deal with the intel how with struggled Today the US Embassy in Moscow is is Moscow in Embassy US Todaythe use to try to were I if Bakatin, “Mr. Bakatin expressed the - / September 2012 September /

AP photo by Boris Yurchenko RIA Novosti photo metal detection. metal other and and scanners electronic frustrate to pipes, junk, wrenches, as well as diodes, unconnected in thrown also had workers The it. of part just were Listening devices period. the of histories ment to congressional reports and State Depart according structure, embassy the in used a vast array of objects within the concrete covered that Soviet workers had secreted diplomats’ conversations to remain private. least, it was unusable if the US wanted its at unusable; was it that devices listening KGB by compromised so was building the determined had experts US 1985. in in materials—began 1979, but was halted and workers Soviet construction—using “bug house” in news Embassy headlines. years of the Cold War, the building was the US counterintelligence eventually US dis counterintelligence But it was not always thus. In the latter US Embassy. Embassy. US the at operations bugging Soviet about information of trove treasure a sador ambas US the to over turned Bakatin 1991, In 1990. in office his in meeting a takes head, KGB (right), Bakatin Vadim - - - officials urged that the building be torn torn be building the that intelligence urged officials and lawmakers US many at Washington. nose their thumbing were they if as was It USSR. for initials brick façade to spell building’s out the in CCCP, bricks darker the Cyrillic arranged Telemetry.”Holy of Church “The edifice the dubbed they Eventually from which to oversee the embassy’s bugs. odd times, and it seemed like a good spot was lights would suspicious—its go on at engineers decided a nearby US Soviet house of worship “batwing.” dubbed they power source shaped like a bow tie, which a found sophisticated wall US inspectors one within Buried transmitters. as serve together. welded Lengths of steel rebar had been altered to were I-beams metal Appalled at the breach in security, security, in breach the at Appalled had workers Soviet twist, final a In Some bugs were located at spots where 99 down. They felt reconstruction—from the ground up—was the only method that would thwart the KGB. However, in the end, the embassy wasn’t razed. RIA Novosti photo “The American premium on sophisti- cated wizardry and pride in our overall technological superiority often leads us to ignore the possibility that others could be doing to us the same things of which we ourselves are capable, so we do not take elementary precautions against known or possible techniques,” said Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), then ranking member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, in remarks about the embassy in 1990. US officials should have been on alert from the beginning of the embassy’s A miniature transmitter and microphone are displayed in Moscow during an exhibi- construction. After all, Soviet agents had tion of spy equipment. The US Embassy had been riddled with listening devices been eavesdropping on US diplomats, during construction. stealing secret US papers, blackmailing US guards, and generally harassing American in Spaso House, the US ambassador’s until 1952. By then Sergei had decades to diplomats in Moscow since the beginning residence, for years—at least part of that use the flat as a base from which to plant of full diplomatic relations between the time in the ambassador’s private study. additional bugs. two countries in 1933. Eventually, security personnel discovered In 1960, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., US am- When the US opened its USSR outpost a tiny microphone concealed within. bassador to the UN, publicly unveiled the in that pre-World War II era, at first officials Sergei, the Spaso House caretaker, kept Great Seal bug before the Security Council lacked such security basics as codes and his basement apartment in the building to counter Soviet complaints about U-2 safes. Communications with Washing- locked at all times. Apparently no US overflights. More than 100 similar bugs ton occurred over open telegraph lines. official bothered to obtain a key from him had been unearthed at US missions and The Soviet NKVD—forerunner residences in the USSR and Eastern of the KGB—quickly supplied Europe, Lodge charged. “girlfriends” for the Marine guard By the 1970s, Soviet surveillance contingent, according to a State was simply a fact of life for US dip- Department history of the Bureau lomats behind the Iron Curtain. In of Diplomatic Security. his memoir, Turmoil and Triumph, One of the embassy’s early former Secretary of State George code clerks, Tyler Kent, had a P. Shultz recalled that prior to his Soviet mistress. A chauffeur for first trip to Moscow, in 1973, the the US military attaché turned Secret Service and CIA warned out to be another NKVD agent. him repeatedly that bugs would be “US Embassy officers knew of everywhere. the Soviet espionage but did little “The only place to have a private to stop it,” read the diplomatic conversation was in a boxlike room security history. in the middle of our embassy with To some extent, US officials electronic measures surrounding it. thought the espionage served It was claustrophobic, but it was American purposes. Ambassador the one place in the whole city Joseph E. Davies felt it would en- of Moscow, I was told, that was able Soviet leaders to discover all ‘secure,’ ” Shultz wrote. the sooner that “we were friends, By this point, it had long been not enemies.” apparent that the US needed a But by today’s standards, the lax new Moscow embassy. American security is astonishing. diplomats had occupied their chan- cery, an old apartment building, in Sergei the Caretaker 1953. It was cramped, inefficient, In 1946, Soviet schoolchildren unsafe—and thoroughly vulnerable presented Ambassador W. Averell to Soviet espionage. Harriman with a carved wooden The USSR wanted to upgrade replica of the Great Seal of the its facilities in Washington as United States. It hung prominently well, so in 1969 the two nations

In these stills from a film shot during a presentation to the UN Security Council, Ambassador Henry Lodge opens a copy of the Great Seal of the United States given to Averell Harriman by Soviet school children in 1946 and reveals listening devices the Soviets had hidden inside. The bugged seal hung at the US ambassador’s house in Moscow for years.

100 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 reached a reciprocal agreement: The US would get a 10-acre site near its old building for a new embassy complex, and the Soviets would get a similar plot on RIA Novosti photo Mount Alto in Washington, D.C.,where Wisconsin Avenue peaks on its rise out of Georgetown in the northwest quadrant of the city. This pact set a 120-day deadline for further agreement on conditions of the new buildings’ construction. In a preview of what was to come, striking this particular part of the deal actually took more than three years, due to disagreements about edifice height and the degree of host coun- try control over contractor work. The US use of Soviet labor and materi- als was a “fatal error,” Hyde later charged on the House floor. But it was the era of Ambassador to Russia Robert Strauss (second from left) greets a USAF aircrew détente, and President Nixon and Secretary member in 1992. The year before, the Soviet KGB chief had turned over to Strauss of State Henry A. Kissinger felt larger details of how the USSR had bugged the US Embassy in Moscow. issues were at stake. In any case, Soviet Soviet officials used about 30 of their affairs, was reportedly unamused,” reads workers would be cheaper, argued the State own personnel to oversee about 100 US the NSA report. Department. Plus, the Soviets had built all workers in Washington, on average. The Some diplomats felt the Security Coun- other foreign embassies in Moscow. What US used 20 to 30 Navy Seabees to watch cil’s worries about embassy bugs were could go wrong? upward of 800 Soviet workers in Moscow. overblown. But in the end the evidence Further haggling over details pushed The Soviets used a badge identification was too compelling. back the laying of the cornerstone for system, maintained tight perimeter secu- On Aug. 17, 1985, the on-site US acting the new embassy building to September rity, and installed multiple surveillance project director told the Soviet contractor 1979. It was clear from the start that cameras. The US had perimeter sensors to suspend all work on the new embassy counterintelligence would be a challenge, and closed circuit TV monitoring, but office building. At the time it was 65 as the KGB maneuvered for ways to im- they were soon disabled due to various percent complete. plant listening devices. At the time, US “mishaps,” according to the Senate intel- The rest of the US complex at the site, intelligence services thought they could ligence committee. including residential and recreational neutralize any bugs they might find. This In sum, US counterintelligence was buildings, was finished the following year, was overly optimistic, according to a 1987 playing catch-up almost from the begin- but the embassy itself remained undone, an report from the Senate Select Committee ning of the Moscow embassy project. expensive and very public white elephant. on Intelligence. “By and large, US countermeasures Many in Washington doubted that the US “Unlike the Soviets ... the United States against Soviet technical penetration had would ever be able to use the building for did not employ a systematic, stringent to be directed against a huge prefabricated its intended purpose. security program to detect and prevent So- structure already in place,” the Senate In May 1990, legendary entertainer viet technical penetration efforts,” judged intelligence panel concluded. Bob Hope hosted a show for US Embassy the report. By the early 1980s, some officials on personnel on a grassy field in the middle For instance, Soviet officials overseeing President Reagan’s National Security of the new embassy complex. He got the Mount Alto construction site in Wash- Council had become concerned about some of his biggest laughs from 300 or ington routinely changed their blueprints the hostile foreign intelligence threat in so assembled American expatriates with without warning during the architectural general, and about the security of the new jokes about the plight of the unfinished bidding process, according to the Senate Moscow embassy in particular, accord- building at the site. study. Their design plans were vague, with ing to a National Security Agency report “What a shame that this new US Em- rooms identified as nothing more specific declassified in 2011. bassy has to be destroyed because of all than “office space.” So in 1982, the NSA sent a team of the listening devices in it,” said Hope. In contrast US blueprints identified specialized electronic intelligence person- “This place has so many bugs, it should office spaces by name, making the loca- nel to the USSR to check on the situation. be known as the roach motel.” tion of sensitive areas clear to the Soviet They found a chancery “honeycombed Then there was this one: “I’m not saying workers—and their overseers. with insecurities,” according to the report, this place is bugged,” said Hope, “but I The Soviets would use only concrete which is a partial history of NSA activity looked at myself in the bathroom mirror poured on site. The US accepted precast during the Cold War. and said, ‘Boy, what a handsome guy!’ concrete forms constructed off site with The NSA alerted the FBI, which con- And the mirror said, ‘That’s funnier than no American supervision. ducted its own investigation and confirmed any joke you’ll tell today.’ ” The Soviets inspected all materials the seriousness of the situation. US intel- The audience played along. At one point, carefully and were willing to halt construc- ligence and the FBI briefed Reagan on Brooke Shields stopped her act and told tion work if they had questions. The US the matter. a director that she was hearing a strange inspection system was less stringent, and “The State Department, already sus- sound. “Microwaves!” yelled some people the construction schedule ruled. picious of NSA ‘meddling’ in embassy in the crowd. AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 101 1991, the Soviet Union finally splintered, and the new Russian Federation rose in its place. In June 1992, Russia agreed to allow the US to finish the new embassy office building with a largely American workforce, using American materials, pursuant to an American design. Two years later Congress granted final approval for use of $240 million of taxpayer funds for a Secure Chancery Facilities effort. Nicknamed “Top Hat,” this involved demolishing the eight-story building to the sixth floor concrete slab and construction of four new floors, plus a penthouse.

Above: The completed US Embassy in Moscow. Below: Russia’s new embassy in Washington, D.C. The Soviets employed a strin- gent security oversight system during the construction of their embassy. The US did not. As Hope’s comments show, at the time many in the US assumed the embassy was doomed. It was too riddled with bugs, and US counterintelligence would never be confident it had cleansed the place of them all. That was certainly the opinion of many in Congress. The Senate committee on intelligence, for instance, had recommended as early as 1987 that the building be torn down. “The committee recognizes that de- molishing an office building in which $23 million and the considerable energies of specialists in the field have been invested is a difficult and potentially controversial Conditions for US diplomats working The bottom, unsecured floors would be recommendation. However, failure to in Moscow had long been problematic, used for public functions and other low- take action, even at this late date, would due to lack of space and continuing se- security activities. The higher, secured obligate further sizable expenditures in curity concerns. They only deteriorated floors would be for more sensitive work. the future to no foreseeable gain,” said over time. The bowling alley was turned Contractors hired for the job had to have a panel report at the time. into a communications center, for exam- top secret clearance. Lead firm Zachry, This conclusion, however, was not ple. Half the parking garage was turned Parsons, and Sundt did not have a public universal. Former Secretary of Defense into workspace. Pressed for space, and telephone number and required workers to James R. Schlesinger spent five months facing increased congressional pressure sign secrecy oaths. Construction materi- examining the situation at the request of for budget discipline, the State Depart- als, furniture, and other equipment for the Shultz, and he recommended demolish- ment decided that Schlesinger’s partial building were shipped from Finland into ing only the top three of the building’s demolition idea might work after all. Russia, escorted by armed US guards. eight stories. These would be replaced Bakatin’s attempt to provide the New construction began in September with new modular steel and perhaps a United States with a map of the listen- 1997. The embassy finally opened in new annex to house the most sensitive ing devices in its bugged shell of an May 2000, after more than two decades embassy activities. embassy did not quite work out as he of delays and at a cost to the US of more had planned. He had given Strauss the than $370 million. Its tortured 31-year Top Hat plans following discussions with Prime history remains a lesson in US diplomatic The 1972 construction agreement that Minister Mikhail Gorbachev and other and technical hubris and a reminder of a allowed the Soviets to pour concrete off leaders of the Soviet Union, but the spy-versus-spy world that may (or may site, among other things, was the real US was suspicious of his intentions, not) be long past. problem. and hardliners in his own government In celebrating the occasion, then-Am- “The prime party to blame is not the accused him of treason for the action. bassador James F. Collins called the new Soviets but ourselves. We have presented A few weeks after his meeting with building “one of the most challenging them with too much opportunity, too Strauss, the Soviet Union fell apart and construction projects ever undertaken by much temptation for them to resist,” said the KGB itself was dissolved, its functions the Department of State. It has been a task Schlesinger at a 1987 press conference. folded into other security agencies of the … beset by the unexpected.” In retaliation for the bugging, the US new Russian state. Then, at the end of That was putting it mildly. n prevented the USSR from fully occupy- ing its new Mount Alto complex. Both Peter Grier, a Washington, D.C., editor for the Christian Science Monitor, is a longtime sides blamed the other for the situation. contributor to Air Force Magazine. His most recent articles, “CyberPatriot World” and Stalemate became the status quo. “Aerospace, Robotics ... and Hip Hop,” appeared in June. 102 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012