http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/aspj_f/Index.asp ASPJ–Afrique etFrancophonieAutomne2010

Automne 2010 Volume 1, No. 3 John Hursh John

Moving toward Democracy in Morocco? in Democracy toward Moving Afrique : le bout du tunnel est-il en vue ?

Dustin Dehéz Dustin Herman J. Cohen

m Work m Sector Refor Sector Intelligence Services in Sub-Saharan Africa: Making Security Security Making Africa: Sub-Saharan in Services Intelligence Fissures dans le Jihad

Thomas Rid, PhD

Rumu Sarkar, PhD Sarkar, Rumu

All the Players the All Le maintien de la paix par des organisations régionales

Fearful Symmetry: How to Achieve Coherence among Coherence Achieve to How Symmetry: Fearful Général de corps d’armée indienne (2s) Vijay Kumar Jetley, PVSM, UYSM

Col Jiyul Kim, USA, Retired USA, Kim, Jiyul Col Dimension culturelle de la stratégie et de la politique

Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy and Strategy of Dimensions Cultural Colonel (ER) Jiyul Kim, USA

Lt Gen Vijay Kumar Jetley, PVSM, UYSM, Retired UYSM, PVSM, Jetley, Kumar Vijay Gen Lt Une symétrie de la peur : Comment peut-on atteindre Peacekeeping by Regional Organisations Regional by Peacekeeping une même volonté pour tous les acteurs ?

Rumu Sarkat, PhD

Thomas Rid, PhD Rid, Thomas Cracks in the Jihad the in Cracks Réforme du secteur de la sécurité et services de renseignements

en Afrique subsaharienne : Saisir toute l’histoire

Herman J. Cohen J. Herman Dustin Dehéz Africa: A Light at the End of the Tunnel? the of End the at Light A Africa: En marche vers la démocratie au Maroc ?

John Hursh

Fall 2010 Fall Volume I, No. 3 No. I, Volume ASPJ–Africa and Francophonie Fall 2010 Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Norton A. Schwartz

Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Stephen R. Lorenz

Commander, Air University http://www.af.mil Lt Gen Allen G. Peck

Director, Air Force Research Institute Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired

Editor Rémy M. Mauduit

Marvin Bassett Contributing Editor http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil James Howard Web Site Editor

Professional Staff Col Robyn S. Read, USAF, Retired Chief, Outreach Division Col John Conway, USAF, Retired Military Defense Analyst Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Nedra O. Looney, Prepress Production Manager http://www.au.af.mil The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1931-728X), published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and ASPJ—Africa and Francophonie other matters of national defense. The views and opinions 155 N. Twining Street expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction U.S.A. of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Telephone: 1 (334) 953-6739 Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or e-mail: [email protected] departments of the US government. In this edition, articles not bearing a copyright notice may Visit Air and Space Power Journal online be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil Articles bearing a copyright notice may be reproduced for http://www.af.mil/subscribe any US government purpose without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air & Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. To obtain permission to reproduce material bearing a copyright notice for other than US government purposes, contact the author of the material rather than the Air & Space Power Journal. Fall 2010 Volume I, No. 3

Editorial

Is Africa at a Crossroads? ...... 3 Rémy M . Mauduit

Articles

Africa: A Light at the End of the Tunnel? ...... 6 Herman J . Cohen

Cracks in the Jihad ...... 16 Thomas Rid, PhD

Peacekeeping by Regional Organisations ...... 24 Lt Gen Vijay Kumar Jetley, PVSM, UYSM, Retired

Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy ...... 34 Col Jiyul Kim, USA, Retired

Fearful Symmetry: How to Achieve Coherence among All the Players ...... 46 Rumu Sarkar, PhD

Intelligence Services in Sub-Saharan Africa: Making Security Sector Reform Work . . . . . 57 Dustin Dehéz

Moving toward Democracy in Morocco? ...... 64 John Hursh

Book Reviews

Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges ...... 79 Omano Edigheji, editor Evaluating Climate Change and Development ...... 79 Rob D . van den Berg and Osvaldo Feinstein, editors

America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide ...... 84 Sarwar Kashmeri

Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict ...... 86 Marc Howard Ross

The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons and Delivery Systems since 1945 ...... 87 Norman Polmar and Robert Norris

Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul ...... 89 Michael Reid

Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Miltary Action after the Cold War ...... 90 Ryan C . Hendrickson

The Torture Debate in America ...... 91 Karen J . Greenberg, editor

U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology ...... 92 Titus Galama and James Hosek

Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam ...... 93 Zahid Hussain

Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century . . . . 94 John R . Deni

Wolfpack Warriors: The Story of World War II’s Most Successful Fighter Outfit ...... 95 Roger Freeman Is Africa at a Crossroads?

No one knows the history of the next dawn. —Yoruban saying

From the early 1960s through the 1990s, the rapid growth and industrialization of the first developing regions in Asia—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (the “Asian Tigers”)—fascinated the world. In the early twenty-first century, however, attention has shifted to new economic powers in the making—the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Like the Asian Tigers, the BRICs are not only well under way in their economic development but also share huge local markets. With regard to Africa, though, the widespread occurrence of HIV, civil wars, genocide, cor- ruption, coups d’état, inequality, and insecurity, as well as the persistently high levels of poverty that plague the continent, cast it in a negative light. Nevertheless, breathtaking changes taking place there give us good reason to be optimistic about the future of Africa. Indeed, we may be witnessing the birth of the “African Lions.” Many of the 53 countries in this diverse continent face considerable political, social, and eco- nomic challenges. Some still contend with severe poverty, disease, and civil war. In this context, what future can Africa expect in the globalized world? How can the continent become economi- cally viable and competitive? Can Africa produce its share of countries like the Asian Tigers and BRICs—the African Lions? Let’s look at some numbers from research recently published by the McKinsey Global Institute: $1.6 trillion: Africa’s collective GDP [gross domestic product] in 2008, roughly equal to Brazil’s or Russia’s. . . . The continent is among the world’s most rapidly growing economic regions. $860 billion: Africa’s combined consumer spending in 2008 316 million: the number of new mobile phone subscribers signed up in Africa since 2000 60%: Africa’s share of the world’s total amount of uncultivated, arable land. . . . With [this amount of] land and low crop yields, Africa is ripe for a “green revolution” like the ones that have transformed agriculture in Asia and Brazil. . . . [Such a revolution] would be enormous in terms of raising rural incomes, boosting GDP growth, and creating huge new business opportunities. 52: the number of African cities with more than 1 million people each 20: the number of African companies with revenues of at least $3 billion $2.6 trillion: Africa’s [projected] collective GDP in 2020 $1.4 trillion: Africa’s consumer spending [by] 2020. . . . The continent’s five largest consumer markets in 2020— Alexandria, Cairo, Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Lagos—will each have more than $25 billion a year in house- hold spending and be comparable in size to Mumbai and New Delhi. 1.1 billion: the number of Africans of working age [by] 2040. . . . Africa’s labor force is expanding more rapidly than anywhere in the world. The continent has more than 500 million people of working age (15 to 64 years old). By 2040, that number is projected to exceed 1.1 billion—more than in China or India.

128 million: the number of African households with discretionary income [by] 2020. . . . Africa already has more

3 middle-class households (defined as those with incomes of $20,000 or above) than India. The rise of the African urban consumer is serving as a new engine of domestic growth.

50 percent: the portion of Africans [who will live] in cities by 2030. . . . By 2030, the continent’s top 18 cities could have a combined spending power of $1.3 trillion. . . .

In 1980, just 28 percent of Africans lived in cities. Today, 40 percent do—a portion close to China’s and larger than India’s—and this share is projected to increase.1 Moreover, according to the institute, While poor government policies, wars, and other events could disrupt growth in individual countries, our analysis suggests that Africa’s long-term economic prospects are quite strong, . . . propelled by both external trends in the global economy and internal changes in the continent’s societies and economies. To begin, Africa will continue to profit from rising global demand for oil, natural gas, minerals, food, arable land, and other natural resources. The continent boasts an abundance of riches, including 10 percent of the world’s reserves of oil, 40 percent of its gold, and 80 to 90 percent of the chromium and the platinum group metals. . . . Foreign direct investment in Africa has increased from $9 billion in 2000 to $62 billion in 2008—almost as large as the flow into China, when measured relative to GDP.2 Encouragingly, Africa’s economic growth comes not only from commodities and natural resources, for which the continent is well known, but also from other areas: Natural resources directly accounted for just 24 percent of Africa’s GDP growth from 2000 through 2008. The rest came from other sectors, including wholesale and retail [(13 percent), agriculture (12 percent)], transportation [and] telecommunications [(10 percent)], and manufacturing [(9 percent)]. Economic growth accelerated across the continent, in 27 of its 30 largest economies. Indeed, we find that GDP grew at similar rates in countries with and without significant resource exports. . . . Africa’s recent growth was so solid that the continent was one of just two economic regions—along with Asia— where GDP rose during the global recession of 2009. Its economic growth rate is already rebounding, from 1.4 percent in 2009 to a projected 4.5 percent by 2011. . . . The key reasons behind Africa’s growth surge include government moves to end armed conflicts, improve macro- economic conditions, and adopt microeconomic reforms to create a better business climate. In every country where these shifts occurred, they correlated with faster GDP growth.3 To analyze growth in Africa, the McKensey Global Institute spurns the traditional partition of the continent into sub-Saharan and northern areas in favor of classifying the economies of its largest countries: Diversified economies: Africa’s growth engines. Africa’s four most advanced economies—Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia— already have significant manufacturing and service industries. . . . Oil exporters: Enhancing growth through diversification. Africa’s oil and gas exporters have the continent’s highest GDP per capita but the least diversified economies. . . . The three largest producers [are] Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria. . . . These countries have strong growth prospects if they can use petroleum wealth to finance the broader development of their economies. . . . Transition economies: Building on recent gains. Africa’s transition economies—including Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal—have lower GDP per capita than the countries in the two first groups, but their economies are growing rapidly. . . . Pre-transition economies: Strengthen the basics. The pre-transition economies [(including the Democratic Repub- lic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Mali)] are very poor, with annual GDP per capita of just $353, but some are growing very rapidly. . . . Although the individual pre-transition economies differ greatly, their common problem is a lack of the basics, such as strong, stable governments and other public institutions, good macroeconomic conditions, and sustainable agricultural development.4 Like democracy, however, the economy is a fragile commodity throughout Africa. Nelson Mandela stressed the interdependence of freedom and economy in Africa, declaring that “freedom is meaningless if people cannot put food in their stomachs.”5 In the African envi-

4 ronment, institutional transformation must accompany economic transformation. Can Africa take advantage of its recent spurt of growth and enjoy an economic stimulus as well? Obviously, many of its 53 individual economies face serious obstacles, but the continent has considerable assets: talented people and vast resources. If Africa maintains its hard-won political and macro- economic stability, develops sound growth strategies, creates a more attractive business envi- ronment, improves its infrastructure and regulatory systems, and entrenches good governance at an institutional level, African Lions might roar throughout the continent and the world.

Rémy M. Mauduit, Editor Air and Space Power Journal—Africa and Francophonie Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes 1. Charles Roxburgh et al., Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies (Washington, DC: McKinsey and Company, June 2010), see the unnumbered pages immediately preceding the “Contents,” as well as pp. 1, 3, 7, 19, 22, 24, http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/progress_and_potential_of_african_economies/pdfs/MGI_african _economies_full_report.pdf. 2. Ibid., 1, 3. 3. Ibid., 2, 11. 4. Ibid., 5–6. 5. Quoted in Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?,” British Journal of Political Science 31, no. 3 (July 2001): 447.

5 Africa A Light at the End of the Tunnel?

Herman J. Cohen*

veryone wants Africa to succeed. will to take the necessary steps leading to In the broad sense, African na- strong and sustainable economic growth. tions have no strategic adversar- On the contrary, these countries are hope- ies. Nor is most of Africa’s terri- lessly mired down as prisoners of the sta- Etory the objective of big-power hegemonic tus quo and the special interests that want ambitions—with the exception of the to keep them just where they are. These eastern Horn, which is geographically countries, which should normally be the close to the oil states of the Middle East. engines of growth for all of sub-Saharan Most of the rest of the world’s nations Africa, include Nigeria, Democratic Re- would welcome African states’ participa- public of the Congo, Sudan, and Angola. tion in the global economy as full part- To this unhappy list we must add two ners. The major industrial powers would smaller African states that showed great welcome the day when Africa ends its de- promise until the turn of this century— pendence on both economic develop- Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire—but which ment aid and humanitarian assistance. succumbed to civil strife that set both of None of these powers seek spheres of in- them back several decades, with no turn- fluence in Africa. around currently in sight.1 Looking forward to the year 2020, we The one glimmer of hope among the see that the outlook for the majority of larger African nations is the Republic of African countries remains mediocre, at South Africa. Having achieved black ma- best, in the absence of major policy re- jority rule only in 1994, South Africa has forms at all levels. At the present time managed to avoid most of the mistakes (2010), there is little indication that the made by those countries that achieved in- required reforms will likely see imple- dependence between 1957 and 1974. Al- mentation, with a few exceptions. The key though South Africa’s real democracy has to this bleak prognosis lies chiefly among some way to go before consolidation, it the large, resource-rich African nations appears irreversible.2 That nation has also that demonstrate absolutely no political preserved a market economy, the rule of

*Prior to his retirement, the author served as assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the administration of Pres. George H. W. Bush. From 1993 to 1998, he was a senior advisor to the Global Coalition for Africa, an intergovern- mental forum for dialogue between African and donor governments on economic reform. Currently Mr. Cohen lectures at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and, as president of the firm Cohen and Woods International, consults US business in Africa.

6 AFRICA: A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? 7 law, and a vigorous international trading ety, the singularly important counter- capability. Nevertheless, South Africa’s vailing power that constitutes the back- uncertain political future and the absence bone of democracy, was co-opted into of viable opposition to the power struc- the single-party structure. The state/ ture have caused potential investors to party, which prohibited political oppo- hesitate. In addition, its crime rate, one of sition, owned all media. The party the highest in the world, deters investor structure became a huge bureaucracy confidence. In the final analysis, South that constituted a parallel state within Africa’s natural market is the rest of Africa, a state. Without opposition, the single and the absence of significant purchasing political party became the most impor- power to the north continues to dampen tant route to fame and fortune. With- growth in South Africa itself. out multiparty elections, the single party could not be defeated. Hence, careers within the single party pro- The Roots of Stagnation vided security as well as power. Needless to say, the African one-party Why is Africa lagging behind the rest of state at the national, provincial, and mu- the emerging world? Some historical rea- nicipal levels could not replicate the tra- sons, which provide perspective, continue ditional consensus exercises led by the to inhibit progress 60 years later. It is so- village chiefs. With so many different eth- bering to contemplate that Nigeria, nic groups and their different languages, Ghana, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea and with so many competing interests had higher gross domestic products (GDP) based on geography and economic re- per capita in 1950 than South Korea, Ma- 3 sources, government by consensus made laysia, and Indonesia. What happened? no sense. Political opposition would inevi- Africa’s first generation of leaders, the tably rear its head to air profound differ- captains of the anticolonial movement, ences. Real conflicts required nonviolent made some important decisions about resolution. With opposition forbidden their political and economic policies that under the one-party consensus system, caused great damage to their nations and people who expressed discontent and un- that continue to haunt their countries to happiness with the party in power faced 4 this day. Virtually all African leaders re- incarceration. Thus, political prisoners jected the Western-style democracy that became a fact of life. In addition, political they inherited from the European colo- opposition had to be stifled in its infancy. nial powers, considering multiparty de- Consequently, the secret police became a mocracy incompatible with African cul- growth industry. People were afraid to tural norms. As practiced in Europe and talk to each other in public places for fear the United States, multiparty democracy of being overheard. To find out the truth is adversarial. In Africa, tradition requires about their own countries, citizens had to the resolution of political issues through listen to the BBC, the Voice of America, a slow process of consensus building from or Radio France on shortwave radio. which solutions emerge. Having no fear of the populace voting The political system of choice, the them out of office and enjoying total con- “African one-party state,” proved all- trol over government bureaucracies, the encompassing, including all citizens as single parties condemned themselves to party members from birth. Civil soci- fall into corruption and malfeasance. To 8 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE paraphrase Lord Acton, unchecked making. The government had to subsi- power is always abused. In addition, the dize the enterprises in order to keep them tendency to bend or severely diminish the in business. The money funneled into rule of law rendered those societies unin- subsidies for enterprises reduced the viting to private investors, both home- amount of funds available to pay for vital grown and foreign.5 traditional governmental services, includ- ing education, public health, and mainte- nance of infrastructure. Government bor- Socialism with an African Face rowing from central banks crowded out On the economic side, the initial deci- applicants for bank credit. All of these sions were no less damaging to the pros- developments made it virtually impossible for the indigenous private sector to ob- pects for future prosperity than on the tain financing. The net result was an eco- political side. Under the strong influence nomic vicious cycle, with subsidies to of their best friends in the United King- government enterprises reducing govern- dom and France, most of them ideological ment services, which in turn made it more socialists, the first generation of free Afri- difficult for existing private business to can leaders opted for “African socialism,” continue operating. As more investors the economic counterpart of the African disinvested, revenue from taxes and royal- one-party state. That translated into the ties decreased, and so on. state’s taking possession of the “com- In most African countries, the eco- manding heights of the economy.” Within nomic vicious cycles were masked be- the first five years after independence, tween 1957 and 1975, when the global most of the large plantations, banks, in- economy enjoyed a commodities boom. surance companies, telecommunications The many tropical and mineral products firms, agro-industries, mines, and -facto exported to world markets by African na- ries were nationalized with compensation tions brought in high prices. Thus, those to the (mostly foreign) owners. countries could avoid budget deficits, at Government ownership of enterprises least to permit the paying of salaries. is not necessarily condemned in advance Where cash was still short, some African to failure. A number of such enterprises governments could use their high earn- in Africa have proven profitable and ex- ings as collateral for commercial borrow- pansive, such as Ethiopian Airways and ing from London and New York banks. Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière Sadly, those governments spent a signifi- (SNIM), the iron ore mining company in cant percentage of the receipts from ex- Mauritania. Unfortunately, managers of ports and borrowing on white elephants the vast majority of African nationalized rather than on water, roads, and power enterprises did not consider profitability for the rural majorities. and growth a high priority. Instead, gov- Between 1975 and 1980, world com- ernment-owned enterprises have created modity prices declined steeply. Electro- employment for the ruling party’s sup- lytic copper diodes exported from the porters and their families, many of whom Democratic Republic of the Congo, for come from rural areas, where salaried example, dropped from $1.40 per pound employment is scarce. to $0.75—a catastrophic loss on copper As the bloating of enterprises ex- exports of 400,000 tons per year. It was panded, profitability turned into loss the same for natural rubber, palm oil, AFRICA: A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? 9 coffee, and ground nuts. This occurred To make Africa’s prospects look even because of a leveling of demand from in- better, multiparty democracy started to dustrialized countries after the initial break out all over the continent at the surge of World War II reconstruction, beginning of the 1990s. Two new gen- combined with increased exports from erations of educated Africans, who had new producers in Latin America and not known colonialism, demanded an Southeast Asia. Because African govern- end to political prisoners, media cen- ments neglected maintenance and new sorship, government media monopo- investments in infrastructure in favor of lies, and just plain old dictatorship. subsidized state enterprises, their exports They wanted multiparty democracies, became less competitive, and they subse- and they started to get them. quently lost substantial market share to Here we are today, two decades later, countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, and whither Africa? Well, the answer is and Malaysia. The Republic of Togo, to that not much progress toward poverty cite another example, used to supply 5 reduction has taken place. Africa’s percent of the European Union’s cattle share of world trade has decreased over feed with exports of cassava. Togo lost its that period (1990–2010) from 3 percent entire European market to Thailand in the to 1 percent. Average annual GDP 1970s due to the lack of competitiveness. growth continues to move between 2.5 percent and 5 percent. Considering the low bases of most African countries (the World Bank to the Rescue growth rate needed to reach sustainable development is 10 percent to 20 per- By 1980 the World Bank considered cent), Africa still has not produced a the majority of African economies “in single equivalent of the Asian “tiger.” free fall,” overburdened by debt, incapa- What are the problems, and are there ble of paying government salaries, and solutions? suffering from declining infrastructure The structural adjustment programs and essential services. Between 1980 and of the World Bank, International Mon- 1990, most African countries signed on etary Fund, and international donors to tough World Bank economic-reform established a macroeconomic floor for programs in return for substantial debt most African countries, reversing the rescheduling and development assis- free fall of the 1970s. But that marked tance. They had no choice. The World only the beginning of the process of Bank gave them significant breathing achieving sustainable development. room on the road to economic recovery. Moving upward from that point would By 1990 African countries that had ac- require even greater effort. Unfortu- cepted the World Bank recovery pro- nately, African nations have encoun- grams, called “structural adjustment,” tered too many pitfalls along the way, had hit bottom and were steadily work- including civil conflict; loss of market ing their way back to financial stability. share in international trade through Growth rates of 2.5 percent to 3.5 per- lack of competitiveness; continued ne- cent were mediocre compared to those glect of agriculture, which employs the of Southeast Asia but gave hope to some majority of the people at subsistence very sick economies.6 level; and vagaries of global markets. 10 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

Agriculture: The Key But the African governments and interna- tional donor community failed to follow Among the several reasons for the ago- up with agricultural modernization pro- nizingly slow progress in African develop- grams that could have tripled yields for ment, the neglect of agriculture is proba- grains, stabilized domestic markets, and bly the most important. As one African expanded exports. The donors had no head of state informed me recently, “By incentives to help African agriculture in neglecting agriculture, we killed the view of their agricultural protectionism goose that laid the golden egg.” at home. At the time of independence in the As for local food security, African farmers early 1960s, the African continent was a did a fairly good job of matching agricul- major exporter of tropical products, and tural production to population expan- most African nations were self-sufficient sion. But they ran out of steam around in food production. Unfortunately, with 1995 when food imports began to expand the notable exceptions of Côte d’Ivoire, significantly. From 2006 to 2008, world Malawi, and Zimbabwe, most African gov- food prices increased dramatically, caus- ernments assigned their highest priority ing great hardship in a number of African to satisfying the needs of the cities—the importing countries that found them- centers of political activity. This resulted selves competing with the gigantic and in taxation of producers of wealth in the wealthier populations of China and India. rural areas for the benefit of urban dwell- Currently, though, we see signs of African ers. A corollary of this policy involved countries paying new attention to agricul- maintaining artificially high exchange ture, with talk of improved seed varieties, rates so as to provide cheap imports for increased availability of fertilizer, and de- the urban populations. Among other re- velopment of local irrigation schemes. sults, this practice raised agricultural ex- Better late than never.9 port prices artificially, thereby causing loss of market share to cheaper producers in Latin America and Southeast Asia. The African Entrepreneur: Needless to say, these policies reduced incentives for the farmers to produce for Under the Radar markets and caused major reductions in After neglect of agriculture, the ab- export earnings. With the lowering of op- sence of an enabling environment for portunities for young people in farming, private investors represents the most im- migration to cities expanded, thereby in- portant impediment to African develop- creasing pressure on governments to rob ment. African entrepreneurs are reluc- Peter (the farms) to pay Paul (the cities).7 tant to invest. Unless a business person The World Bank stabilization programs enjoys a close connection to the ruling eliminated artificial exchange rates. The elites, no rule of law exists; banks extend devaluation of the common Commu- very little credit; many hurdles impede at- nauté Financière d’Afrique (Financial tempts to start a business; and pathologi- Community of Africa) (CFA) currency in cal corruption is extremely stifling. Safety- 13 francophone countries in 1994 pro- conscious investors keep their money vided major relief to farmers, especially in outside Africa. In the final analysis, the those few nations with active agricultural ruling class takes a dim view of African support programs, such as Côte d’Ivoire.8 entrepreneurs not closely connected to AFRICA: A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? 11 the power structure and unable to win The Resource Curse: special privileges. Countries in Southeast Alive and Well Asia consider entrepreneurs partners in development. Those in Africa, however, Countries along the west coast of Af- often see them as a threat to power.10 rica, known as the Gulf of Guinea, have To make matters worse, the lack of in- become both major and minor producers of hydrocarbons. Easy money coming vestment in infrastructure maintenance from production-sharing agreements be- and upgrades over the years has steeply tween governments and oil companies increased the cost of doing business for has resulted in declines in all other eco- both local and foreign investors. Electric nomic activities. Why make an effort in power is expensive and unreliable. Port infrastructure, agriculture, or manufac- operations are slow and inefficient. Workers turing when a big monthly check comes often do not have needed skills, including in from Houston, Paris, Rome, or London? basic literacy and a working knowledge of The resource curse has hit particularly math. Roads to and from ports and neigh- hard in Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, boring countries are badly in need of re- and the two Congo republics. In Africa, pairs, making transport very expensive perhaps only Botswana—the world’s big- and slow. All other things being equal, gest producer of high-quality diamonds— Africa remains noncompetitive for value- has utilized an abundant natural resource wisely.11 added investors. Civil conflict has taken a heavy toll on a high number of African countries. Inter- The Big Four of Misery nal wars in Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and The outlook for Africa as a whole re- Ethiopia continue to inhibit development mains discouraging for a special reason and continue to generate refugees and which relates to the dismal internal per- flows of illegal arms. Countries coming formance of the four countries that are out of conflict have a long, steep hill to most populous, biggest in land mass, and climb in order to repair destroyed infra- most fortunate in their abundance of structure, repatriate refugees, and restore natural resources: Nigeria, Democratic basic services. Because of minority gov- Republic of the Congo, Angola, and Su- ernment in a number of African states, dan. All of them are mired down in civil civil conflict lurks under the surface and conflict, debilitating corruption, and dys- can explode at any time. A monopoly of functional government. power residing in one minority ethnic With a population of 120 million people group produces an absence of social capi- or more, Nigeria suffers from blockages by powerful vested interests. Such inter- tal and a disaffection from government ests in the importation of refined petro- among the excluded ethnic groups—a leum products, for example, prevent the potentially explosive situation. A number repair of four government-owned oil re- of African countries continue to be ruled fineries. New, privately owned power by ethnic minorities that have firm con- plants cannot receive allocations of natural trol over coercive power, which they show gas because vested interests are profiting no intention of sharing. from imports of diesel generators for 12 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE homes and businesses. The stealing of Obama chose to visit only Ghana during crude oil from oil company pipelines is con- his first visit to the continent of Africa in nected to high-ranking politicians who real- July 2009. ize personal profits and finance their po- In the sector of international peace- litical machines from these criminal acts. keeping operations and diplomatic con- When democracy returned to Nigeria in flict resolution, some African countries 1999 after two decades of military rule, have begun to stand out. Nigeria, Angola, electricity production stood at 6,000 and Senegal have battle-hardened profes- megawatts. Eleven years later, it has sional militaries that provide leadership dropped to less than 3,000 megawatts. in stabilization activities in conflict zones. The overall negative outlook appears ir- Its own severe internal problems notwith- reversible in Nigeria. The same holds true standing, Nigeria—boasting Africa’s largest for Democratic Republic of the Congo, population and oil-production revenues— Angola, and Sudan—countries that should serves as a key diplomatic mediator in be the locomotives of development for all conflict countries such as Sudan, Chad, of Africa. Sadly, they remain negative eco- and the Central African Republic. nomic forces. In meetings of the G-20 economic powers, South Africa enjoys full member- ship, indicating its growing weight on African Points of Light and trade and investment issues. Within the Potential World Players World Trade Organization, the Africans have become increasingly sophisticated in Moving from the general to the spe- their negotiations, demanding an end to cific, we see individual African countries, farm subsidies that undercut African agri- or clusters of countries, that seem capable of achieving sustainable development. cultural production. Their governments are making an effort. In the United Nations, Africa retains In addition, a few African governments three Security Council seats on a rotating can pull some weight on the global scene. basis. A consensus of the entire African In southern Africa, South Africa knows caucus at the United Nations decides the how to produce wealth and is making an votes of the three Africans, who have re- effort to bring benefits to the people. peatedly demonstrated their ability to tilt Closely attached to South Africa are the the balance between the Western mem- economies of Botswana, Namibia, and bers and China and Russia. southern Mozambique, where good poli- Clearly, despite the weakness of indi- cies encourage activity in the private sector. vidual states, no one can take collective In East Africa, the increasingly inte- Africa for granted on the world stage. grated nations of Kenya, Tanzania, and That continent has begun to carve out its Uganda show signs of breakthrough in own identity. development. Governance is generally good, if not brilliant, and entrepreneur- ship is becoming politically acceptable. The Need for a New Paradigm In West Africa, the Republic of Ghana What is to be done? What can the inter- has become a role model for democratic national donor community do to make a transitions, the rule of law, and openness difference in Africa? Do we need a new to business.12 Unsurprisingly, Pres. Barack paradigm? AFRICA: A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? 13

To give it much credit, the interna- around the world. An additional key ele- tional donor community has been quite ment of the modernization of agriculture innovative in Africa. After a decade of in Africa involves land reform. Moreover, heated debate, toward 1995 the donors China and India will probably greatly in- agreed to forgive and reduce debt owed crease their consumption of protein and to international financial institutions cereals as their middle classes grow—a (World Bank, International Monetary situation that has already caused food Fund, and the regional developments prices to rise worldwide, making Africa’s banks) by the poorest heavily indebted self-sufficiency imperative. The other side countries, most of them African. The ad- of that coin, of course, is that Africa can ministration of Pres. George W. Bush was earn money as a food exporter, as it did particularly creative with respect to Africa, before the independence wave.14 persuading the other donors to move to- The private sector must take the lead in ward grants rather than loans from the stimulating economic growth—and the World Bank; establishing the Millennium most important subset of the private sec- Challenge Corporation, which selectively tor is the African private sector. Though finds African countries with the best po- always welcome, foreign investors do not tential for growth and gives them signifi- necessarily create jobs. The African entre- cant amounts of money to implement preneur, if allowed to invest with security, 15 homegrown development plans; obtain- will become the driving economic force. ing large appropriations from Congress Infrastructure and its multiplier effect to begin a huge program in Africa to com- represent the key link to a revival of agri- bat HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis; and culture and to the rise of the private sec- expanding duty-free entry for African tor. Rural areas need infrastructure to products, without a requirement for reci- provide irrigation water, roads to markets, procity, in a program authorized in the and real-time communications for the final year of the Clinton administration. modern farmer. The entrepreneur needs The donor partners must contemplate it to provide reliable power and water, ef- what they can do now to help Africans ficient port services, and good road and rail communications. Until agriculture, make the right decisions to achieve break- the private sector, and related infrastruc- throughs in economic growth. Is there a ture become priorities in Africa, the rise new paradigm?13 of African economic tigers will remain elusive. The Essentials What about the international donor community? Does it need a new paradigm Agriculture must come back. Only 15 for Africa? I think it does. The Bush ad- percent of African land is arable, but only ministration’s Millennium Challenge Ac- 15 percent of the arable land is actually count adopted a policy of selectivity, find- devoted to modern agriculture. However, ing countries that have demonstrated an 15 percent of African land equates to 45 ability to grow rapidly and giving them a percent of the United States in a conti- significant financial head start. These nent with fewer than one billion people. countries have made progress in imple- It is unacceptable, therefore, that Africa menting a variety of reforms and have cannot feed itself and must lose scarce fulfilled a set of criteria, as witnessed by foreign currency to import food from independent observers. The idea that all 14 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE developing countries should receive aid and agricultural exports, an enabling en- regardless of their level of policy reform vironment for the African private sector, has essentially been allowed to lapse. and targeted infrastructure designed to make African nations global competi- tors. The countdown to the end of for- The End of Dependency eign assistance will serve as an incentive The next logical step, in my view, would for a much greater effort on the part of involve announcing the phasing out of Africans themselves. For those African development aid over a relatively reason- countries that border on collapse, or able period of time, such as 15 years. At which suffer natural disasters, donor hu- present, most African nations receiving manitarian assistance would remain in foreign assistance include this aid in their place indefinitely. annual budgets. In essence, those aid re- Some would call this new paradigm cipients have developed a dependency “tough love.” That is exactly the right that tends to dull other needed efforts to term. In the United States, President promote rapid growth. Foreign assistance Obama, a son of Africa, has launched for the poorest African countries is like that policy. He is speaking out about the cursed oil resource for oil-producing corruption without fear of alienating countries in the Gulf of Guinea. the Africans who hear him. He is also During those 15 years, foreign assis- insisting on food security and infrastruc- tance should focus on food self-sufficiency ture development.16 

Notes

1. “Sub-Saharan Africa Lags, Rest of World on Track Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, 2 April to Meet Poverty Goals,” UN News Centre, 9 June 2005, 2008). http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=1455 7. Philippe Hugon, “Hunger Riots and the Food Crisis 0&Cr=millennium&Cr1=development. See also United in Africa,” Passages, March 2009, 74–78. Nations Development Programme, UNDP Poverty Report, 8. The CFA, a common currency pegged to the euro, 2000: Overcoming Human Poverty (New York: UNDP, 2000). is guaranteed convertible by the French Treasury. 2. All of the international observers judged the South 9. Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Top Economist Calls for Massive African presidential election of May 2009 a high-quality, Increase in Aid for Agriculture in Africa,” International free, and fair process. Herald Tribune, 8 May 2008. See also Michelle D. Gavin, 3. Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, “Explaining “Africa’s Looming Mega-Challenges,” in U.S. Africa Policy African Economic Performance,” Journal of Economic Lit- beyond the Bush Years: Critical Challenge for the Obama Admin- erature 37, no. 1 (March 1999): 64–111. istration, ed. Jennifer G. Cooke and J. Stephen Morrison 4. Daniel Etunga-Manguelle, “Does Africa Need a Cul- (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International tural Adjustment Program?” in Culture Matters: How Values Studies, 2009), 181–201. Shape Human Progress, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and 10. R. Glen Hubbard and William Duggan, “The Forgot- Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), ten Lessons of the Marshall Plan: To Combat Poverty in 65–77. Africa, Government Should Redirect Aid to Foster Local 5. Victor T. Le Vine, Politics in Francophone Africa Business,” Strategy+Business, no. 51 (Summer 2008), http:// (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). See www.strategy-business.com/article/08203?gko=7a7ab. chap. 7, “Experiments in Power, 1958–2003.” 11. Stephan Faris, “Fool’s Gold,” Foreign Policy, 31 July 6. Robert B. Zoellick, president, World Bank Group, 2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/07/30/ “A Challenge of Economic Statecraft” (speech to the fools_gold. AFRICA: A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? 15

12. “African Economies: Lion Cubs? An Up-Beat Assess- 15. “The Corporate Council on Africa Sends Private Sec- ment of Africa,” Economist.com, 19 April 2008, 131, http:// tor’s Policy Recommendations for Africa to the Obama www.docstoc.com/docs/2085362/TheEconomist20080419. Administration,” press release, Corporate Council on Africa, 13. Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working 5 March 2009, http://emailwire.com/release/20197-The- and How There Is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Corporate-Council-on-Africa-Sends-Private-Sectors-Policy- Straus and Giroux, 2009). See chap. 5, “Radical Rethink Recommendations-for-Africa-to-the-Obama-Administration of the Dependency Model.” .html. 14. “African Farmland: Investing for the Long-Term,” 16. Paul Collier, “A Measure of Hope,” New York Times, 21 Corporate Council on Africa (CCA) Business Report 2009 6, September 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/ no. 2 (30 January 2009). opinion/22collier.html. Cracks in the Jihad

Thomas Rid, PhD*

et ready for all Muslims to country’s interior. Seize the centers of join the holy war against you,” population, commerce, and industry, the jihadi leader Abd el-Kader “and soon the interests are forced to ca- warned his Western enemies. pitulate.” Not so at the foot of the Atlas, GThe year was 1839, and nine years into he conceded. Instead, he would focus the France’s occupation of Algeria the resis- army’s effort on the tribal population. tance had grown self-confident. Only Later that year, a well-known military weeks earlier, Arab fighters had wiped out thinker from Prussia traveled to Algeria to a convoy of 30 French soldiers en route observe Bugeaud’s new approach. Maj from Boufarik to Oued-el-Alèg. Insurgent Gen Carl von Decker, who had taught under attacks on the slow-moving French col- the famed Carl von Clausewitz at the War umns were steadily increasing, and the Academy in Berlin, was more forthright army’s fortified blockhouses in the Atlas than his French counterpart. The fight Mountains were under frequent assault. against fanatical tribal warriors, he fore- Paris pinned its hopes on an energetic saw, “will throw all European theory of general who had already served a successful war into the trash heap.” tour in Algeria, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud. One hundred and seventy years later, In January 1840, shortly before leaving to jihad is again a major threat—and Decker’s take command in Algiers, he addressed dire analysis more relevant than ever. War, the French Chamber of Deputies: “In Eu- in Clausewitz’s eminent theory, was a clash rope, gentlemen, we don’t just make war of collective wills, “a continuation of poli- against armies; we make war against inter- tics by other means.” When states went to ests.” The key to victory in European wars, war, the adversary was a political entity he explained, was to penetrate the enemy with the ability to act as one body, able to

*Dr. Rid, who holds a doctorate in political science from the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, works at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and at the Richard Koebner Minerva Center for German History at the Hebrew University. He also is a nonresident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. From 2006 to 2009, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC, as well as at the Institut français des relations internationales in Paris. From 2005 to 2006, he directed the foreign policy program of the American Academy in Berlin. He is the author of War and Media Opera- tions (Routledge) and War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age (Praeger), as well as coeditor of Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare (Routledge). His articles have appeared in such journals as Die Zeit, Neue Züricher Zeitung, Der Tagesspiegel, Merkur, Policy Review, Military Review, and the Wilson Quarterly. Dr. Rid’s main research interests are civil-mili- tary relations, particularly the emergence of the local civilian population as a concept in military thinking, and the im- pact of telecommunication technology on fragile states and armed conflict. He is also working on European and German foreign and security policy. Reprinted with permission from the Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2010, 40–47, published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Copyright © 2010 by Thomas Rid.

16 CRACKS IN THE JIHAD 17 end hostilities by declaring victory or ad- to the Muslim mainstream and a rhetoric mitting defeat. Even Abd el-Kader eventu- of high aspiration and promise. ally capitulated. But jihad in the twenty- The most visible divide separates the first century, especially during the past local and global jihadis. Historically, Is- few years, has fundamentally changed its lamist groups tended to bud locally and anatomy: al-Qaeda is no longer a collec- assumed a global outlook only later, if tive political actor. It is no longer an ad- they did so at all. All the groups that have versary that can articulate a will, capitu- been affiliated with al-Qaeda either- pre late, and be defeated. But the jihad’s new date the birth of the global jihad in the weakness is also its new strength: Because early 1990s or grew later out of local of its transformation, Islamist militancy is causes and concerns, only subsequently politically impaired yet fitter to survive its attaching the bin Laden logo. Al-Qaeda present crisis. in the Islamic Maghreb, for example, In the years since late 2001, when US started out in 1998 as the Salafist Group and coalition forces toppled the Taliban for Preaching and Combat, an offshoot of regime and all but destroyed al-Qaeda’s another militant group that had roots in core organization in Afghan­istan, the bin Algeria’s vicious civil war during the early Laden brand has been bleeding popularity 1990s. Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba, the across the Muslim world. The global jihad, force allegedly behind the 2008 attacks in as a result, has been torn by mounting Mumbai, India, that killed more than 170 internal tensions. Today, the holy war is people, was formed in the 1990s to fight for a united Kashmir under Pakistani set to slip into three distinct ideological rule. In Somalia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and and organizational niches. The US surge other countries, the al-Qaeda brand has in Afghanistan, whether successful or not, been attractive to groups born out of local is likely to affect this development only concerns. marginally. By joining al-Qaeda and stepping up The first niche is occupied by local Is- violence, local insurgents have long risked lamist insurgencies, fueled by grievances placing themselves on the target lists of against “apostate” regimes that are au- governments and law enforcement orga- thoritarian, corrupt, or backed by “infi- nizations. More recently, however, they del” outside powers (or any combination have run what may be an even more con- of the three). Filling the second niche is sequential risk, that of removing them- terrorism-cum-organized crime, most vis- selves from the social mainstream and ible in Afghanistan and Indonesia but losing popular support. This is what hap- also seen in Europe, fueled by narcotics, pened to al-Qaeda in Iraq during the extortion, and other ordinary illicit activi- Sunni Awakening, which began in 2005 ties. In the final niche are people who in violence-ridden al-Anbar Province and barely qualify as a group: young second- its principal city, Ramadi. Al-Qaeda had and third-generation Muslims in the dias- declared Ramadi the future capital of its pora who are engaged in a more amateur- Iraqi “caliphate,” and by late 2005 it had ish but persistent holy war, fueled by their the entire city under its control. But even own complex personal discontents. Al- conservative Sunni elders became alien- Qaeda’s challenge is to encompass the ji- ated by the group’s brutality and violence. hadis who drift to the criminal and eccen- One prominent local leader, Sheikh Sattar tric fringe while keeping alive its appeal Abdul Abu Risha, lost several brothers 18 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE and his father in assassinations. Others nom de guerre Dr. Fadl. “Every drop of were agitated by the loss of prestige and blood that was shed or is being shed in power to the insurgents in their tradi- Afghanistan and Iraq is the responsibility tional homelands. In early 2006, Sattar of bin Laden and Zawahiri and their fol- and his sheikhs decided to cooperate with lowers,” he wrote in the London-based American forces, and by the end of the newspaper Asharq Al Awsat. year they had helped recruit nearly 4,000 In Afghanistan, coalition soldiers see men to local police units. “They brought the global-local split replicated as a fis- us nothing but destruction and we finally sure between what they call “big T” Tal- said, enough is enough,” Sattar explained. iban and “small t” Taliban. The “big T” The awakening (sahwa in Arabic) was ideologues fight for more global spiritual not limited to al-Anbar. One after an- or political reasons; the “little t” oppor- other, former firebrand imams, in so- tunists fight for power, for money, or just called revisions, have started questioning to survive, to hedge their bets. A family the theological justifications of holy war. might have one son fighting for the Tal- The trend may have begun with Gamaa iban and another in the Afghan National al-Islamiya, Egypt’s most brutal terrorist Army; no matter which side prevails, they group, which was responsible for the as- will have one son in the right place. US sassination of Egyptian president Anwar Marines in Helmand Province say that 80 el-Sadat in 1981 and the slaughter of 58 to 85 percent of all those they fight are foreign tourists in Luxor in 1997. As the “small t” Taliban. The US counterinsur- Iraq war intensified during the summer gency campaign aims to co-opt and rein- of 2003, several of Gamaa al-Islamiya’s tegrate many of these rebels by creating leaders advised young men not to partici- secure population centers and new eco- pate in al-Qaeda operations and accused nomic opportunities, spreading cleared the organization of “splitting Muslim areas like “inkblots.” But the Taliban have ranks” by provoking hostile reactions long been keen to spread their own ink- against Islam “and wrongly interpreting blots, with a similar rationale: attracting the meaning of jihad in a violent way.” more and more “accidental” guerrillas, in Another notable revision came in Sep- the famous phrase of counterinsurgency tember 2007, when Salman al-Awda, an specialist David Kilcullen, not just hard- influential Saudi cleric who had -previ liners. ously declared that fighting Americans in Yet even Afghanistan’s “big T” Taliban, Iraq was a religious duty, spoke out against the ideologues, cannot simply be equated al-Qaeda. He accused bin Laden in an with al-Qaeda. Last fall, Abu Walid, once open letter of “making terror a synonym an al-Qaeda accomplice and now a Tal- for Islam.” Speaking on a popular Saudi iban propagandist, ridiculed bin Laden TV show on the sixth anniversary of 9/11, in the Taliban’s official monthly magazine al-Awda asked, “My brother Osama, how al-Sumud, for, among other things, his do- much blood has been spilt? How many in- it-yourself approach to Islamic jurispru- nocent people, children, elderly, and dence, as Vahid Brown at the Combating women have been killed . . . in the name Terrorism Center at West Point observed. of al-Qaeda?” A number of veterans had criticized bin Other ideologues have followed, in- Laden in the past, among them such tow- cluding Sajjid Imam al-Shareef, one of al- ering figures as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, one Qaeda’s founding leaders, who used the of the key architects of the global jihad. CRACKS IN THE JIHAD 19

But Abu Walid’s criticism was more bit- by the umma [Muslim community], be- ing. Bin Laden’s organization lacks strate- cause it is a model which makes jihad gic vision and relies on “shiny slogans,” he subject to the market of political compro- told Leah Farrall, an Australian counter- mises and distracts the umma from the terrorism specialist, in a much-noted dia- liberation of Islamic lands and the estab- logue she reported on her blog. Conse- lishment of the Caliphate.” quently the Taliban would no longer A few weeks later, Mullah Omar pointedly welcome the terrorists in Afghanistan, he reiterated his promise of good neighbor- said, because “the majority of the popula- liness and future cooperation with Af- tion is against al-Qaeda.” ghanistan’s neighbors, including China, At the root of the disagreement between Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—all of the two groups is the question of a local, or whom face their own jihadi insurgencies even national, popular base. Last Septem- and are on al-Qaeda’s target list. ber, Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s founding The Taliban’s new tactics are throwing figure and spiritual overlord, issued a mes- an “ideological bridge” not only to nearby sage in several languages. He called the countries but to parts of the current Ka- Taliban a “robust Islamic and nationalist bul elite, most notably politically mobi- movement” that had “assumed the shape lized university students, notes Thomas of a popular movement.” Probably realiz- Ruttig of the Afghanistan Analysts Net- ing that pragmatism and a certain amount work. Even the newly moderate Taliban, it of moderation offer the best chance of a should be clear, remains wedded to inhu- return to power, Omar vowed “to maintain mane and medieval moral principles. Yet good and positive relations with all neigh- Omar’s pragmatism immediately affects bors based on mutual respect.” the question of who and what is a desir- Al-Qaeda’s reaction was swift and able target of attacks. harsh. Turning the jihad into a “national Perhaps the greatest tension between cause,” in the purists’ view, was selling it the local and global levels of the jihad out. Prominent radicals, in a remarkable grows out of a divide over appropriate move, compared the Taliban’s turnabout targets and tactics. Classical Islamic legal to the efforts by Hezbollah in Lebanon doctrine sees armed jihad as a defensive and Hamas in Gaza to distance themselves struggle against persecution, oppression, from al-Qaeda. Hamas in particular, per- and incursions into Muslim lands. In an haps because it is, like al-Qaeda, a Sunni attempt to mobilize Muslims around the organization, has been the subject of “re- world to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, Ab- lentless” criticism in al-Qaeda circles, says dallah Azzam, an influential radical cleric Thomas Hegghammer of the Institute for who was assassinated in 1989, helped ex- Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. pand the doctrine of jihad into a transna- When a self-proclaimed al-Qaeda faction tional struggle by declaring the Afghan appeared in Gaza, Hamas executed one jihad an individual duty for all Muslims. of its leading imams and many of his Azzam also advocated takfir, a practice of armed followers. Jihadi ideologues were designating fellow Muslims as infidels aghast. The globalists shuddered at the (kaffir) by remote excommunication in thought that local interests could com- order to justify their slaughter. Al-Qaeda promise their pan-Islamic ambitions. “Na- ideologues upped the aggressive poten- tionalism,” declared Ayman al-Zawahiri, tial of such arguments and expanded the al-Qaeda’s number two, “must be rejected defensive jihad into a global struggle, ef- 20 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE fectively blurring the line between the dants of Muslim immigrants. For these “near” enemy—the Arab regimes deemed alienated youth, the idea of becoming illegitimate “apostates” by the purists— “citizens” of the virtual worldwide Islamic and the “far” enemy, these regimes’ West- community may be more attractive than it ern supporters. is for first-generation immigrants, who In the remote areas of Pakistan and tend to retain strong roots in their native Afghanistan that produce many of today’s countries. radicals, however, local and tribal affilia- The identity problems of these young tions are powerful. One US political ad- people seem to have affected the character viser who worked in Afghanistan’s Zabul of the jihad itself. Like the disoriented Province, a hotbed of the insurgency, de- Muslim youth of the diaspora, the global scribes prevailing local sentiment as “val- jihad has loose residential roots and leyism” rather than nationalism. It is a numb political fingertips. One sign of this force that drives the tribes to oppose any- disconnection from the local is that al- body who threatens their traditional Qaeda’s rank and file does not include power base, foreign or not—a problem many men who could otherwise join a ji- not just for the Taliban and al-Qaeda but had at home: There seem to be few Pales- for any Afghan government. Al-Zawahiri tinians, Chechens, Iraqis, or Afghans complained of this in a letter after the in- among the traveling jihadis, who tend to vasion of Afghanistan: “Even the students come from countries where jihad has (talib) themselves had stronger affilia- failed, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, tions to their tribes and villages . . . than and Syria. to the Islamic emirate.” The provincial Al-Qaeda’s identity crisis is also illus- valleyists, to the distress of al-Qaeda’s trated by how it treats radicalized converts, more cosmopolitan agitators, are selfishly often people without religious schooling eyeing their own interests, with little ap- and consolidated personalities. Olivier petite for international aggression and Roy, one of France’s leading specialists on globe-spanning terrorist operations. radical Islamism, has pointed out that con- The contrast with the character of ji- vert groups assume responsibilities “be- had in the Muslim diaspora could not be yond all comparison with any other Islamic starker. For radical Islamists in Europe, organization.” Roy has put the proportion the local jihad doesn’t exist. And they of converts in al-Qaeda at between 10 and understand that toppling governments 25 percent, an indicator that the move- in, say, London or Amsterdam is a fantasy. ment has become “deculturalized.” These radicals are less interest-driven These contrary trends, in turn, create than identity-driven. Many young Euro- chinks in al-Qaeda’s recruitment system. pean Muslims are out of touch with their The most extreme Salafists, deprived of ancestral countries, yet not fully at home identity and cultural orientation, have an in France or Sweden or Denmark. For appetite for utopia, for extreme views that some, the resulting identity crisis creates appeal to the margin of society, be it in a hunger for clear spiritual guidelines. Holland or Helmand. Recruitment in the The ideology of global jihad, according to diaspora, as a result, follows a distinctive a report by EUROPOL, the European pattern, not partisan and political but off- Union’s police agency, “gives meaning to beat and outré. The grievances and moti- the feeling of exclusion” prevalent among vations of European extremists and the the second- and third-generation descen- rare American militants tend to be idio- CRACKS IN THE JIHAD 21 syncratic, the product of unstable indi- erated by unaffiliated Islamists have been vidual personalities and a history of per- the most important distribution platform sonal discrimination. Many take the for jihadi materials. But after the arrest of initiative to join the movement them- a top-tier online activist in London two selves, and because they are not recruited years ago, the connection between the by a member of the existing organization, forums and al-Qaeda’s official media cen- their ties to it may remain loose. In 2008 ter, al-Sahab, began to loosen. Al-Qaeda alone, 190 individuals were sentenced for has lost more and more control of the Islamist terrorist activities in Europe, online jihad. And, just like others online, most of them in Britain, France, and jihadi Web administrators face increas- Spain. “A majority of the arrested indi- ingly tough competition for visibility. viduals belonged to small autonomous Within the forums, the tone has become cells rather than to known terrorist orga- harsher. Brynjar Lia, a specialist on Salaf- nizations,” EUROPOL reports. ism at the Norwegian Defense Research As a result of the change in its member- Establishment, says that “interjihadi quar- ship, the global al-Qaeda movement is rels seem to have become more common encountering strong centrifugal forces. and less ‘brotherly’ in tone in recent years.” The rank and file and the center are los- Some far-flung jihadi groups are enjoy- ing touch with each other. The vision of ing newfound independence of another Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who laid much of the kind, as a result of criminal ventures they ideological foundation for al-Qaeda’s have established to fund their efforts. global jihad, blends a Marxist-inspired This too is intensifying the centrifugal focus on popular mass support with forces within the global movement. Some twenty-first-century ideas of networked, groups are tipping into a more purely individual action. Al-Suri’s aim was to de- criminal mode. vise a method “for transforming excellent A cause is what distinguishes an insur- individual initiatives, performed over the gency from organized crime, as David past decades, from emotional pulse beats Galula, an influential French author on and scattered reactions into a phenome- counterinsurgency, noted decades ago. non which is guided and utilized, and Organized crime does not have to be in- whereby the project of jihad is advanced compatible with jihad. It may even be jus- so that it becomes the Islamic Nation’s battle, tified in religious terms: Baz Mohammed, and not a struggle of an elite.” The global ji- an Afghan heroin kingpin and the first had was to function like an “operative sys- criminal ever extradited from Afghani- tem,” without vulnerable, old-fashioned or- stan, bragged to his coconspirators that ganizational hierarchies. That method is selling heroin in the United States was ji- intuitively attractive for a Facebook genera- had because it killed Americans while tak- tion of well-connected young sympathizers, ing their money. but the theory contains an internal contra- A budding insurgency has only a limited diction. Self-recruited and “homegrown” window of opportunity to grow into a seri- terrorists present a wicked problem for al- ous political force. If the cause withers Qaeda. As a bizarre type of self-appointed and loses its popular gloss, what remains elite, they undermine the movement’s ambi- as a rump may be nothing but a criminal tion to represent the Muslim “masses.” organization, attracting a following with The problem is embodied in the on- criminal energy rather than religious line jihad. For al-Qaeda, Web forums op- zeal, thus further damaging jihad’s status 22 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE in the eyes of the broader public. For ing broad appeal, and the recent global some groups, this already appears to be crop of extremists may be disunited and happening. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic drifting apart. Yet in the fanatics’ own Maghreb funds itself through the drug view, the ideology remains a crucial cohe- trade, smuggling, extortion, and kidnap- sive force that binds together an extraor- pings in southern Algeria and northern dinarily diverse extremist elite. Salafism, Mali. Indonesia’s Abu Sayyaf Group and despite its crisis, continues to be attractive the Philippines’ Jamiyah Islamiyah en- to those at the social margins. One of the gage in a variety of criminal activities, in- ideology’s most vital functions appears to cluding credit card fraud. The terrorist be to resolve the contradictions of jihad cell behind the 2004 Madrid bombings in the twenty-first century: being a pious earned most of its money from criminal Muslim, yet attacking women and chil- activities; when Spanish police raided the dren; upholding the authority of the home of one of the plotters, they seized Qur’an, yet prospering from crime; de- close to $2 million in drugs and cash, in- pending on Western welfare states, yet cluding more than 125,000 Ecstasy tab- plotting against them; having no personal lets, according to U.S. News and World Re- ties to any Islamic group, yet believing port. The Madrid bombings had cost the oneself to be part of one. terrorists just $50,000. Al-Qaeda’s altered design has a number The goal of leading Islamists has always of immediate consequences. The global been to turn their battle into “the Islamic jihad is losing what Galula called a strong Nation’s battle,” as al-Suri wrote. Far from cause, and with it its political character. reaching this goal, the jihad is veering the This change is making it increasingly dif- other way. Eight years after 9/11, support ficult to distinguish jihad from organized for Islamic extremism in the Muslim world is at its lowest point. Support for al- crime on the one side and rudderless fa- Qaeda has slipped most dramatically in naticism on the other. This calls into ques- Indonesia, Pakistan, and Jordan. In 2003 tion the notion that war is still, as Clausewitz more than 50 percent of those surveyed said, “a continuation of politics by other in these countries agreed that bin Laden means,” and therefore whether it can be would “do the right thing regarding world discontinued politically. Second, coerced affairs,” the Pew Global Attitudes Project by adversaries and enabled by the Inter- found. By 2009 the overall level of sup- net, the global jihadi movement has dis- port had dropped by half, to about 25 mantled and disrupted its own ability to percent. In Pakistan, traditionally a strong- act as one coherent entity. No leader is in hold of extremism, only 9 percent of Mus- a position to articulate the movement’s lims have a favorable view of al-Qaeda, down will, let alone enforce it. It is doubtful, to from 25 percent in 2008. Even an Amer- quote Clausewitz again, whether war can ican failure to stabilize Afghanistan and still be “an act of force to compel the its terror-ridden neighborhood would enemy to do our will.” And because jihad be unlikely to ease al-Qaeda’s crisis of has no single center of gravity, it has no legitimacy. single critical vulnerability. No matter But it would be naive to conclude that what the outcome of US-led operations in the cracks in al-Qaeda’s ideological shell Afghanistan and other places, a general mean that the movement’s end is near. risk of terrorist attacks will persist for the Far from it. Islamist ideology may be los- foreseeable future. CRACKS IN THE JIHAD 23

In combating terrorism, therefore, events but by decisions not taken and at- quantity matters as much as quality. But tacks not launched. Because participation some numbers matter more than others. in the holy war in both its local and global How many additional American and Eu- forms is an individual decision, these ropean troops are sent to Afghanistan choices have to be the unit of analysis, matters less than the number of terrorist and influencing them must be the goal of plots that don’t happen. Success will be policy and strategy. As in crime preven- found subtly in statistics, in data curves tion, measuring success—how many po- that slope down or level off—not in one tential terrorists did not join an armed particular action, one capitulation, or group or commit a terrorist act—is nearly even one leader’s death. It will be marked impossible. Success against Islamic mili- not by military campaigns and other tancy may wear a veil.  Peacekeeping by Regional Organisations

Lt Gen Vijay Kumar Jetley, PVSM, UYSM, Retired*

ith the end of the Second forces, forms of cooperation between re- World War, there was a gen- gional forces and the UN, and advantages eral feeling that trouble and and disadvantages of using regional forces strife had ended, heralding a vis-à-vis the UN. Wgolden era of peace. That was perhaps After the Cold War, the concept of re- one of the reasons why in the Charter of gional peacekeeping under the authorisa- the newly created United Nations (UN) tion of the UN Security Council increas- Organisation there is no mention of the ingly gained currency. Interstate and word “peacekeeping.” The UN at that intrastate conflicts virtually left no region point of time did not envisage that it in the world untouched, compelling the would ever have to step in anywhere to UN to hammer out numerous peace ini- restore a situation. This euphoria, how- tiatives simultaneously. The existing op- ever, was short-lived, for, with decolonisa- erational framework and resource level of tion, the UN was besieged with requests the UN did not permit it to give its undi- for help in trouble spots all over the world. vided attention to all the conflict-ridden As resources of the UN were never regions of the world at the same time. enough to meet the demand, many re- One had to accept the reality that the gional initiatives were born. These initia- worldwide crises of the 1990s have high- tives either resolved prickly issues in their lighted. It was the sheer complexity and backyards by taking their own initiative or magnitude of these conflicts which often under the umbrella of the UN. Unfortu- compelled the Security Council to take a con- nately, their modus operandi for doing troversial stand of selectivity or indifference. what the UN missions do is still a grey area On the African Continent, many inter- for most of us. and intrastate conflicts have been brought To understand regional forces better, it about due to a lack of coincidence be- is essential to be acquainted with the role tween nation and state; suppression of of regional organisations in peacekeeping minority communities and ethnic ten- with particular reference to the nature sions; corrupt and dictatorial regimes, and scope of the involvement of regional quite often supported externally by inter-

*Commissioned into the Dogra Regiment on 25 December 1965, Lieutenant General Jetley commanded the Siachin Brigade and a corps in the northeast, served as force commander of the UN mission in Sierra Leone, and retired as master general of ordnance on 30 November 2004. He is a member of United Service Institution Council. Reprinted with permission from the Journal of the United Service Institution of India 139, no. 577 (July–September 2009): 378–91.

24 PEACEKEEPING BY REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 25 national arms traders and the vested inter- such forces is becoming the rule rather ests of nations constituting the so-called than the exception. civilized society; and chronic poverty lead- ing to underdevelopment and a grinding debt burden. Nature and Scope of Involvement To combat the problems plaguing it on of Regional Organisations the African Continent, the Organisation The founding members of the UN had of African Unity (OAU) took it upon itself foreseen the birth of regional peace or- to find a solution. The secretary-general ganisations and duly provided for them in of the OAU (now African Union [AU]), the UN Charter. Chapter 8 clearly defines Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, said at a meeting the role of regional organisations in the in 1998, “OAU Member States can no lon- maintenance of international peace and ger afford to stand aloof and expect the security. Article 52 of the UN Charter en- International Community to care more courages regional arrangements or for our problems than we do, or indeed groupings, and even agencies, to make to find solutions to those problems which every effort to achieve settlement of local in many instances, have been of our own disputes before referring them to the Se- making. The simple truth that we must curity Council. confront today, is that the world does not Article 53 states that, where appropri- owe us a living and we must remain in the ate, the Security Council should utilise forefront of efforts to act and act speed- such regional arrangements for enforce- ily, to prevent conflicts from getting out ment actions under its authority, but that of control.” no enforcement action will be under- The bottom line of all UN peacekeep- taken without the authorisation of the ing (UNPK) operations in the initial Security Council. Article 54 further states stages was to deal with international con- that the Security Council shall at all times flicts involving governments. Such opera- be kept fully informed of activities under- tions were authorised by the UN Security taken or in contemplation under regional Council, in exceptional cases by the UN arrangements. General Assembly (UNEF-1), and were The Brahimi Panel Report endorses always directed by the secretary-general. this view by stating that, “where enforce- The functioning of such UN missions was ment action is required, it has consistently governed by the fundamental principles been entrusted to coalitions of willing of consent, impartiality, and non-use of States, within the authorisation of the Se- force, except in self-defence. curity Council, acting under Chapter VIIl Over the last half a century plus, the of the Charter.” number of conflicts has increased. They The second-generation UNPK opera- have become more intense and brutal tions have taken the form of enforcement where violation of human rights has be- actions, wherein the consent of the par- come a norm. The UN has not been able ties to the conflict was either partially or to cope with the rush of such conflicts wholly ignored. More often than not, the and has therefore had to fall back upon force did not have the necessary combat regional peacekeeping forces to retrieve power to be considered a credible force the situation within the geographical lim- by the parties to the conflict. In such its of their regions. The frequent use of situations, regional organisations with 26 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE necessary combat potential and staying and Tajikistan, and the UN has been power could undertake the enforcement supporting the OSCE on the issue action in a quicker time frame. In cases of Nagorny Karabakh. where the regional organisations are c. Operational Support. This co-operation providing the military cover, the UN varies according to requirements on could go about the task of nation build- the ground. One example was the ing with the help of other non-military provision by the North Atlantic regional organisations. Treaty Organization (NATO) of air power to support the United Na- Forms of Cooperation tions Protection Force (UNPRO- FOR) in the former Yugoslavia. An- between the UN and other was the support provided by Regional Organisations the NATO-led multinational Imple- The supplement to An Agenda for mentation Force / Stabilisation Force Peace, issued on 3 January 1995, outlines (IFOR/SFOR) to the United Nations the forms of cooperation between the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern and regional organisations. These can Slovenia, Baranja, and Western Sir- basically be categorised as follows: mium (UNTAES) in establishing a safe and secure environment in the a. Consultation . The purpose of this region of Croatia and the opera- form of co-operation is to exchange tional support provided by Com- views on conflicts that both the UN monwealth of Independent States and the regional organisations may (CIS) forces to the UN observer mis- be trying to solve. In some cases, sion in Tajikistan. The European consultation is formal, with periodic Union (EU) has provided support reports made to the General Assembly; in Eastern Slovenia, Bosnia, and Li- in other cases, it is less formal, with the beria while the Western European secretary-general calling consultative Union (WEU) has provided support meetings with the heads of all regional to de-mining activities of the UNPK organisations and arrangements co- forces in Iraq and Kuwait. operating with the UN. d. Co-Deployment . UN field missions b. Diplomatic Support. Regional organi- have been deployed in conjunction sations have participated in peace- with UNPK forces of the Economic making activities of the UN that led Community of West African States to the establishment of peacekeep- (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra ing operations, and supported them Leone, and of the CIS in Georgia by diplomatic initiatives. The OAU, and Tajikistan. This model has again the Arab League, and the Organisa- been followed in Bosnia and Herze- tion of the Islamic Conference govina where the UN and regional (OIC) played this role in support- organisation were co-deployed with ing the UN efforts in Somalia. The different mandates. The United Na- Organisation for Security and Co- tions Mission in Bosnia and Herze- operation in Europe (OSCE) has govina (UNMIBH) includes the In- been playing this role, for instance, ternational Police Task Force (IPTF), on constitutional issues in Georgia which, among other things, monitors PEACEKEEPING BY REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 27

the local police. The NATO-led multi- now AU, and a number of subregional national peacekeeping force (IFOR/ organisations, some of which have con- SFOR) helps maintain a safe and tributed to peacekeeping in their own re- secure environment. OSCE assists gions. Africa can be divided into five main in the organisation of elections, subregions, each hosting a subregional while the EU provides develop- organisation: ment assistance and the Office of Arab Maghreb Union UMA (North) the High Representative is respon- sible for overall co-ordination. South African Development Community SADC (South) e. Joint Operations. In Haiti, the UN and the Organization of American East African Corporation EAC (East) States (OAS) jointly launched the Economic Community of International Civilian Mission in West African States ECOWAS (West) Haiti (MICIVIH), for which the staffing, direction, and financing Economic Community of Central were to be shared between the UN African States ECCAS (Centre) and the OAS. Strictly speaking, this The OAU has contributed positively in was initially purely a US operation, various peace processes in Africa, which which was later converted into a UN includes a number of successful diplo- operation. matic negotiations and arbitrations. How- When and if the regional organisations ever, in the face of the enormity of the don the mantle of regional peacekeepers, crisis like the one witnessed in Rwanda, the nature and scope of their involvement the OAU could not do much to contain will need to be crystallised. The past expe- violence against humanity. Amongst the riences of a number of regional organisa- subregional set-ups, ECOWAS and SADC tions in this regard need to be analysed to have done creditably well in their respec- identify strengths and weaknesses and to tive areas. Yet, the African regional or- recommend possible measures to stream- ganisations have not developed adequate line the process. A critical evaluation of capability to act without considerable UN the future prospects of regional arrange- support. This is mainly because of a pau- ments for peacekeeping will further assist city of funds and resources. Also, in many in deciding the type of relationship and cases, troops involved in such tasks were ill the extent of cooperation/integration be- led, lacked motivation, and in some cases tween the UN and the regional groupings. became part of the problem themselves. European Region Analysis of Certain Regional The other regional and subregional ar- Peacekeeping Organisations: rangements for conflict resolution in Eu- Strengths and Weaknesses rope are the EU, WEU, and OSCE. The significant point to note is that regional organisations and arrangements no lon- African Region ger act in isolation but together in a Africa has a fairly large number of effec- closely co-coordinated and mutually rein- tive regional organisations—the OAU, forcing fashion. 28 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

The experiment of NATO in Kosovo ing Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, a purely was mired in many controversies, in that bilateral arrangement at the invitation of it went forward with its air war without and with the consent of the host country, obtaining UN Security Council approval. failed to achieve the desired result. Paki- This is the greatest danger involved in stan did play her role in Afghanistan, but growing reliance on regional organisa- the whole effort has been dubious and tions. Had the Security Council given the has been tragically counter-productive. “green signal” prior to the launch of the The capabilities of regional organisa- operations, probably the NATO action tions like the South Asia Foundation may have been seen as more acceptable (SAF), South Asian Association for Re- to the international community, since it gional Co-operation (SAARC), Association would have been legitimised as having of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and been undertaken in the interest of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation- Fo greater good of protecting thousands of rum (APEC) in terms of tackling a conflict terrorised people. NATO continues to situation in their respective regions prove remain the most potent regional force in that they have been inadequate. This is Europe and is expanding. because the primary focus of such regional organisations was basically economic de- West Asian Region velopment although, increasingly, such In the Middle East, Jordan has been ac- organisations are trying to assume a role of tively involved in all working groups of preventive diplomacy. the multilateral component, which pro- In Central Asia, there are several rela- vides a broad framework for the future of tively young regional arrangements that the region and is intended as a comple- have a potential for peacekeeping roles, ment to the bilateral component. In De- such as the cember 1994, a decision was made by all Commonwealth of parties to establish a regional security Independent States CIS centre in Amman with related facilities in Central Asian Economic both Qatar and Tunisia. The concept of es- Community CAEC tablishing a conflict prevention / regional security centre was first introduced and “Shanghai Five” or the presented by Jordan. However, the arms “Shanghai Forum” SF control and regional security process has The SF is a successor to Soviet-Chinese been superseded because the co-sponsors border talks between China and the four of the peace process (the United States and newly independent states—Kazakhstan, Russia) could not get all parties to agree on Russia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgistan (follow- introducing structural arms control. ing the break-up of the USSR). However, from the point of view of the UN Charter, Asian Region the SF is not a regional arrangement or The experiments in South Asia and agency in the sense of Chapter 8. South-East Asia as regards regional The CAEC, having four former Soviet powers / regional organisations taking Central Asian Republics except Turkmen- the lead in peacekeeping efforts have not istan, has some formal attributes of a re- met with any significant success, so far. gional organisation. However, lack of ad- Interventions of the Indian Peace Keep- equate defence capabilities, compounded PEACEKEEPING BY REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 29 by insufficient mutual confidence and b. No Inhibitions to Undertake Peace En- trust, negates any attempt to jointly stand forcement Duties. Some of the re- for audacious peacekeeping efforts. The gional conflicts necessitate enforce- Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalions ment actions. These fall under the (CENTRASBAT), originally made up of definition of peace enforcement, troops of Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and and many troop contributors to the Uzbekistan, is paid for by NATO through UN hesitate to take part in such op- the Partnership for Peace Programme. erations. In such scenarios, regional The declared goal of this endeavour is to organisations with requisite politi- promote co-operation between the partici- cal and military capability can prove pating countries’ militaries and to provide to be valuable. a capability that would be made available c. Similarity of Training Standards. An- for UN peacekeeping when the need other aspect is the similarity of the arises. standards of training and physical and mental make-up of the person- nel taking part in the operations as Advantages and Disadvantages part of regional arrangements. of Regional Arrangements d. Legitimacy and Credibility. For an or- vis-à-vis UN Forces ganisation or force to succeed in There is no escaping the fact that the peacekeeping or humanitarian as- strife-torn world is going to remain in sistance operations, legitimacy and the same state, if not a worse one, in the credibility are the key. A UN force foreseeable future. The resources of the comprised of countries who have no relation or relevance in the context UN are going to prove to be more and of the conflict or crisis has little to more inadequate. Under such circum- justify by way of legitimacy, as against stances, the UN would have to depend a regional force which, by virtue of on regional arrangements. Let us there- its regional location and security fore examine the advantages and disad- concerns, can identify and relate to vantages that regional arrangements the crisis. The support and confi- have vis-à-vis UN forces. dence that such a force can gener- ate from the warring factions and Advantages population far surpass those of a a. Clearer Perspective of Local Conflicts. multinational force that is from out- Regional forces tend to have a bet- side the region. ter understanding of the history of e. Desire for Regional Stability. Countries the region and therefore have a in close proximity of the conflict clear perception of the root causes have a greater desire in ensuring of local conflicts. Besides, parties to regional stability, lest it spill over the conflict sometimes view forces and destabilise the whole region. from outside as strangers to the With ethnic and religious affinity far situation, whereas a regional force surpassing national identity, spill- might be viewed differently and over of conflicts to consume the hence have more chances of success. whole region is a potential danger. 30 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

This acts as a strong incentive to teroperability is a major factor. Com- contribute to peace initiatives in the munications, language, and methods region and is a motivating factor for of conducting operations are vital regional organisations. for the success of a mission. A re- gional force which has trained and f. Balanced Response. Countries in the operated earlier as a coherent force region have a better feel for the issue can perform better than a force com- and the root causes of the conflict. prised of troops from a grouping of Cultural and ethnic affinities and nations which have got together for proximity have a role to play in un- the first time in the conflict zone. derstanding the issues. Hence, their response is likely to be more bal- k. Preventive Diplomacy and Deployment. anced and apt vis-à-vis multinational While conflict resolution is an- im forces or organisations from out of portant function of the UN, the the region. more important facet would be con- flict prevention. A regional organi- g. Role of Regional Leaders. Coupled with sation with a high level of acceptabil- the understanding of the issues is ity to all parties concerned could the fact that the regional leaders contribute to preventive diplomatic would be personally acquainted with efforts and deployment. The accept- the leaders of the warring factions, ability of a UN force in the early making it easier to interact, negoti- stages of the conflict, where negotia- ate, and be involved in conflict pre- tions are still a possibility, is far less vention or conflict resolution. than that of a regional organisation. h. Early Warning of Potential Flash Points. l. Cultural Sensitivity. Language, customs Proximity to the source of conflict and traditions, ethnic similarity, and and regular interaction with the tar- religious affinity play a major part in get country help regional organisa- acceptability of a force into the coun- tions to obtain early warning to try. The need for interpreters, com- identify a potential flash point and munication, and understanding reli- inform and update the UN of the gious norms, customs, and traditions situation before it explodes into a is an inhibitor for the force. Use of a crisis. This could help in conflict regional force can mitigate this factor prevention rather than being reac- to a very large extent. tive in conflict resolution. m. Facilitation of Postconflict Reconstruc- i. Wider Information and Intelligence tion. While UN involvement in a crisis- Base. Intelligence is key before ridden country provides a focal point launching any such operations. The for international support and re- regional players’ information and sources, regional and subregional intelligence database would far sur- organisations/arrangements can be pass that of other organisations, and very useful in launching peace-building their participation and co-operation activities. Co-operation between the are hence critical. UN and such organisations can facili- j. Interoperability . For military or peace- tate postconflict reconstruction. keeping operations to succeed, in- Such co-operation also provides both PEACEKEEPING BY REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 31

entities with an exit strategy, allowing powerful regional organisations are either putting in place or managing highlighted by Brahimi in his re- successor arrangements that can con- cently published report, wherein he tinue the work begun by the peace- states, “Powerful regional organisa- keeping operation. tion shows a willingness of major powers to commit their own troops Disadvantages as well as massive funds to enforce- ment even without Security Council Involving regional organisations in peace- Authorisation in Europe, while re- keeping/enforcement operations may fusing to send troops to or pay as- also have some disadvantages. The major sessments for UN operations deal- ones are as given below: ing with more brutal and intense a. Lack of Political Will. Lack of politi- conflicts in Africa.” cal will on the part of the organisa- f. Problems of Command and Control. tions may jeopardise the peace- However effective and efficient it keeping operations. may be, there is always the possibility b. Conflicting Interests. Conflicting na- of the joint effort between the UN tional interests and lack of mutual and regional organisation(s) floun- trust amongst the member countries dering due to command and control of the regional organisations may problems and deadlocks in the deci- vitiate the fragile framework of the sion-making process in critical situa- peace process. tions. Sierra Leone is a glaring ex- ample of this. c. Lack of Military Capability and Re- sources. This may result in deadlocks g. Reduced Credibility of the UN. The UN when the regional organisations are continues to be the primary organi- sation for conflict prevention and switched into action without ade- resolution. However, major roles quate preparations. played by regional organisations d. Hidden Agenda/Influence of Regional could lead to the UN losing its rele- Big Power(s). Even in the regional ar- vance and countries losing faith in rangements, one cannot rule out the organisation. The role of NATO hidden agendas and the undue in- in the Balkans, though it has its ap- fluence of the regional big power(s) parent advantages, gives the impres- in the decision-making process. sion of the UN being defunct. e. Possibility of Marginalisation of the UN. h. Single-State Dominance / Rise of Re- Overreliance on powerful regional gional Hegemonic Powers. Regional organisations in UN peacekeeping organisations have the inherent operations may result in such or- danger of a single state dominating ganisations becoming overconfident the organisation. A regional organi- and at times attempting to margin- sation may have a predominant alise the UN itself. NATO and the member, which could jeopardise Economic Community of West Afri- the efforts to serve its own ends and can States Monitoring Group (ECO- emerge as a regional hegemon if its MOG) are cases in point. Dangers of national interests predominate re- 32 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

gional interests. The Nigerian ex- and displaced persons predominate ample in Sierra Leone goes to prove operations. These impacts have to this point. be examined before deploying re- gional forces. i. Lack of Acceptability. While accept- ability of regional organisations is a major factor, it can be an inhibiting one. In Rwanda, the Francophone Recommendations for Streamlining countries of Senegal, Mali, Chad, Procedures for Utilisation of and Guinea had a low level of ac- Regional Peacekeeping ceptability by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government, due to Organisations the perceived links to the Hutu gov- In order to overcome the drawbacks/ ernment. The RPF government in- disadvantages of regional arrangements sisted that these countries be the for UNPK operations, the following mea- first to leave in the phasing out of sures could be adopted: the United Nations Assistance Mis- sion for Rwanda (UNAMIR). There a. No Compromise in Selecting the Regional were reservations against the Zam- Organisation. The criteria for en- bian troops on ethnic grounds. trusting the UNPK operation to a regional organisation should be j. Untimely Withdrawal of Troops. This carefully worked out and adhered to fear always exists, thereby compro- by the UN. Any compromise in this mising the whole effort. The regional regard will not only undermine the organisations may pull out if they reputation of the organisation but find their interests not being served also jeopardise the whole mission. or their view not being accepted by the UN with regard to the final out- b. Foolproof Decision-Making Mechanism. come of the conflict, and this can The mechanism for decision mak- jeopardise the whole effort. The un- ing should be absolutely foolproof scheduled pull-out of ECOMOG in the case of joint operations by the from Sierra Leone is one such ex- UN and the regional organisations. ample, where the gains made were c. Encouragement of Regional Initiatives. neutralised by their withdrawal. The UN should endeavour to con- k. Lack of Expertise and Equipment. tinue to support the initiative of the Forces of regional organisations regional organisations for political who have not conducted operations and strategic direction and give the of a UNPK nature earlier would lack required technical assistance and lo- the expertise and equipment to gistics support. There is, however, a handle complex contingencies. need for targeting such efforts on the countries having the requisite politi- l. . The eth- Cultural and Social Impact cal will, military might, and regional nic, cultural, and regional affinities standing so that they are not found could have a cultural and social im- wanting when called upon to deliver. pact on the local population, espe- cially where human rights viola- d. Upholding Regional Awareness. Re- tions, mass movement of refugees, gional organisations should use PEACEKEEPING BY REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 33

their advantage of being more fa- sealed the fate of such commitments to miliar with local conditions and the Third World countries. socioeconomic, cultural, and politi- It is evident that, given the fact that the cal environment than the UN to UN is always strapped for resources and that break barriers and uphold their sta- donor states, especially from the First World, tus as pacesetters in this challenge. are reluctant to commit their troops, except in their own backyards, the future trend for e. Participation by Big Powers. Member peacekeeping is likely to see greater involve- countries should endeavour to dem- ment of regional organisations. onstrate practical commitment in New concepts of peace incline towards full readiness to support and con- regional organisations playing a more tribute forces for active participa- prominent role in association with the tion in conjunction with regional UN. OAU has performed peacekeeping forces. Unfortunately, First World operations in Liberia, Congo, and Sierra countries never do. Leone, as have the OAS in Haiti, CIS in f. Financial Support. There should be Georgia, and ASEAN in East Timor; regular financial contributions to NATO has taken on similar tasks in the sustain regional organisations’ fund- former Yugoslavia. ing for future operations. There are presently only a few regional organizations around the world involved g. Avoidance of Unwanted Interference. in UNPK operations (NATO, CIS, SADC, The bigger nations in the operations ECOWAS, etc.), yet there are many or- should not unduly influence issues ganisations that could be used to help in in the deliberations on the peace ef- times of crisis. Some regional organisa- fort. Nations on the sidelines who tions were formed for collective security do not commit troops are the ones reasons, others for economic reasons, and who normally make the most noise. still others for trade and development. For whatever purposes they may have Conclusion been formed, they have a common duty to perform and can help immensely in Apart from a host of other factors, one bringing about peace and stability in their of the main reasons for the transference respective regions. of peacekeeping to regional organisations The advantages of using regional or- is that the donor states are no longer will- ganisations must be assessed correctly in ing to commit their troops to dangerous consideration of the inherent drawbacks operations. This syndrome came to a in this arrangement. The UN has an im- head in Somalia with the killing of US portant role to play in strengthening the peacekeepers. The savage murder of 10 efforts of regional organisations in over- Belgian soldiers in Rwanda probably coming their weaknesses.  Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy

Col Jiyul Kim, USA, Retired*

iological and cultural factors deter- and outcome of policy and strategy. Iden- mine human thoughts, decisions, tity is the most significant because it ulti- behaviors, actions, and reactions. mately determines values and interests Biological factors are more prom- that form the foundation for policy and Binent in determining the thoughts and strategy to attain or preserve those inter- behaviors of individuals than of human col- ests. Though not necessarily a definitive lectivities. At the collective level—the one approach, ACFSP provides a specific way to with which strategy and policy are con- approach the complex issue of how culture cerned (e.g., a nation-state)—cultural fac- figures into strategic and political behav- tors are dominant. Thus the formulation, ior. The key points include the following: implementation, and outcome of strategy 1. Strategy and policy are driven by ends. and policy must consider cultural dimen- sions. 2. These ends are determined by in- Policy makers and strategists tend to terests. view situations through their own cultural 3. Interests are derived from the sense of and strategic “lenses,” without sufficiently purpose and core values that a partic- considering and calculating other per- ular collectivity considers foundational spectives and interests. However, the Ana- to its existence. lytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) offers a systematic 4. The sense of purpose and core val- and analytical approach to the vital task of ues arise from elements that consti- viewing the world through many lenses. tute the collectivity’s identity. The national security community is inter- 5. Identity is the foundation for collec- ested in cultural features or dimensions tive mobilization. that drive political and strategic action and behavior. The ACFSP identifies basic 6. Such a mobilized collectivity can be cultural dimensions—identity, political put into action for political purposes culture, and resilience—that seem funda- through its peculiar form of politi- mental to determining such behavior and cal culture that provides the ways thus are important to the formulation and the means.

*Colonel Kim is currently completing doctoral work in history and East Asian languages at Harvard University. An Army intelligence officer, he formerly served as the director of Asian studies and the coordinator for regional studies at the US Army War College. He also served as a Japan and Korea foreign area officer in a variety of field and policy assign- ments. He has published on Asian policy issues, history, and archaeology. Colonel Kim holds a BA in anthropology and biology from the University of Pennsylvania and an MA in East Asian regional studies from Harvard.

34 CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 35

7. The resilience of the group’s culture, operational levels. We might call this the grounded on the strength of a com- Department of Defense’s “cultural turn”— mon identity with a shared sense of hence, the emphasis placed on culture as purpose and values, can determine a consequential, if not a decisive, factor in the collectivity’s flexibility in resist- countering insurgencies.1 ing, succumbing to, or adapting to Moreover, the national security com- forces that challenge the shared pur- munity is recognizing the significance of pose and values. culture at the policy and strategic levels, although most of the current effort and resources for the cultural turn remain Why Culture? devoted to the tactical and operational fights. Consideration of how culture af- We face a world without the simple and fects our political/strategic actions and comforting dichotomy of the Cold War— behavior as well as the actions and behav- a world made increasingly more complex ior of others has become a vital strategic by the forces of nationalism and globaliza- task. tion released by the end of the Cold War. During the period following the early 1990s, the post–Cold War era, scholars Cultural Dimensions of Leadership, have become more aware of the growing Operations, and Strategy importance of culture in determining the course of today’s complex and intercon- It is too easy to think of the role of cul- nected world. ture in the world of national security Although scholars may have recognized strategy and military operations as a sin- this phenomenon, practitioners at first gle-dimensional phenomenon. That is to did not. We can criticize US national secu- say, too often we conflate our consider- rity and foreign policy of the 1990s for its ation of culture to one comprehensive failure to recognize and address the im- set, conceived and perceived as widely ap- mense, potentially destabilizing, and con- plicable across the length, breadth, and flict-generating cultural and political depth of the space we call national secu- changes unleashed by the end of the Cold rity and military operations. War. Much of this force had to do with the To attain a better resolution of the role release of pent-up demands for self-deter- of culture, we can consider three distinct mination by a variety of cultural groups dimensions of its intersection with na- distinguished by ethnicity, religion, and tional security and military operations: language. Finding space to emerge, sup- cultural considerations at the individual pressed groups quickly turned into politi- level, in tactical- and operational-level cal forces and movements in the pursuit military actions, and at the political and of formerly unattainable interests (sepa- strategic levels. This is not to imply that ration, independence, domination, etc.) these dimensions are separate and dis- defined by previously unviable identities tinct because there are significant areas of (ethnoreligious nationalism). overlap and mutually supporting as well The reemergence of counterinsur- as hierarchical relationships among them; gency as a major task has alerted the prac- nevertheless, the distinction is useful. titioners of policy and strategy to the im- Cultural considerations at the individ- portance of culture at the tactical and ual level encompass the dimensions of 36 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE leadership, management, and interper- What Is Culture? sonal communications and relations. Culture is a fundamental, although not Languages, cultural dos and don’ts, and the only, factor for defining and under- negotiation skills are examples of what standing the human condition.4 It affects this dimension would consider. The US how people think and act. Through their military’s current emphasis on cultural culture, humans and societies assign understanding, cultural awareness, and meaning to the world around them and languages addresses this dimension. define their place there. We see culture Cultural considerations in tactical- and manifested in languages; ideas and ideol- operational-level military actions exam- ogies; customs and traditions; beliefs and ine cultural factors that can influence the religions; rituals and ceremonies; settle- success or failure of tactical activities and ment patterns; art and music; architec- campaigns. At the tactical level, aspects of ture and furniture; dress and fashion; games; and images—in short, in anything the tactical battlefield such as tactics, that symbolizes or represents the values, training, small-unit leadership traits, and norms, perceptions, interests, and biases weapons design have cultural compo- of a culture.5 nents. To design campaigns with the The German political economist and greatest chance for success at the opera- sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) saw tional level, we must consider the inter- man as an animal suspended in webs of play and harmony of factors such as ser- significance that he himself has spun. vice/agency organizational cultures and The American anthropologist Clifford the cultures of allies in forming a capable Geertz (1926–2006) extended this notion joint, interagency, and multinational by equating culture with Weber’s “webs of 6 force operating in a foreign land. Addi- significance.” In Weber’s and Geertz’s conception, man was like a spider in the tionally, military leaders must consider middle of his web except that the strands cultural dimensions of the opponent, were not made of silk but of values, per- such as civil-military relations (political ceptions, and norms that were significant control), military-societal ties (popular and meaningful to him. Thus, the main support), and military force (senior lead- task in analyzing culture entails under- ership style, operational-level doctrine standing the specifics of what is signifi- and training philosophy, and military cul- cant and meaningful—the meanings rep- ture), among other factors.2 resented by the strands of the webs of Cultural considerations at the political significance. Conducting this task- re and strategic levels deal with the impact quires interpretation of symbolic forms of cultural factors on the formulation, and systems to tease out their denotations. We must recognize that human beings implementation, and outcome of policy are not born with a particular culture and strategy. Such factors can affect po- (the webs of significance) but that culture litical and strategic decisions, actions, and develops through a process of conscious behaviors. The ACFSP gives us one ap- and unconscious socialization and accul- proach for considering this dimension, turation (human interactions) within the the area with which we are most con- particular situation into which an indi- cerned, in a systematic manner.3 vidual is born. This “particular situation” CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 37 can encompass a wide range of factors, tions, and regions see themselves and the from the individualistic and biological, world? Let us examine the ACFSP’s basic such as gender and race, to an ever-widening cultural dimensions—identity (its defini- circle of social, political, economic, reli- tion and linkage to interests), political gious, organizational, and ethnic levels of culture (the structure of power and deci- human organization (family, community, sion making), and resilience (the capacity ethnic community, religious order, economic or ability to resist, succumb to, or adapt to class, village/town/city, state/province, na- external forces)—in an American context tion, region, and world). Therefore, in try- to understand how they affect American ing to come to grips with how culture oper- values and interests and, therefore, Amer- ates, we must recognize that it varies ican policy and strategy. First we should enormously through space and time. Vari- consider the revolutionary circumstances ability over space is reflected by the variety of America’s national origin and the found- of cultures in the world at a given moment ing documents (Declaration of Indepen- in time. Because history best captures vari- dence, Constitution, Bill of Rights, Federal- ability over time, it thus becomes, in part, a ist Papers, etc.). The United States’ unique record of cultural change. revolutionary origin redefined the orga- Culture operates at different levels, nization of society. Democracy and repub- ranging from the individual to various lev- licanism, freedom and liberty, equality, els of collectivities. At each level, it is Manifest Destiny, and other fundamental rarely the sum of the cultures of lower lev- conceptions of man and society combined els. At the individual level, culture affects with a pioneering spirit, individualism, interpersonal communications and rela- and entrepreneurialism to establish a tions; at the collective level, it affects in- unique and enduring American identity. tercollective (e.g., interclan, intertown, Furthermore, Protestantism combined interstate, etc.) communications and rela- with capitalism to fan a tremendous ap- petite for innovation, adaptation, and tions. Clearly, an overlap exists between 7 culture at the individual and collective progress. America became both a syn- levels, especially if we consider decision onym and symbol for a land of innovative makers. But a framework that distin- and adaptive people. Along with growing guishes between the two could facilitate a prosperity came the dominance of mid- study of the cultural dimension of policy dle-class livelihoods, values, and practices and strategy. that formed the backbone of American society. These ideas and values interacted with history, resulting in a richer—some The Analytical Cultural Framework would say a more “positive”—development for Strategy and Policy of American society and identity. What does all of this mean in terms of As noted above, policy makers and American identity, political culture, and strategists tend to use their own cultural resilience? First, American citizenship and strategic lenses for viewing situations, and identity are based on place and, more without much regard for other perspec- importantly, on the idea of being an tives and interests. That said, how should American rather than on bloodlines.8 we approach the task of appreciating and This foundational notion of the American understanding the different lenses through identity differentiates US citizens from which other people, groups, societies, na- those in the rest of the world who favor 38 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE bloodlines. Second, American political Common Themes across the culture, having evolved from a revolution- ary distrust of strong central authority ACFSP Dimensions (kings and tyrants), thus emphasizes the Two aspects of the modern world that protection of individual/local rights and play key roles in all the dimensions—mo- privileges and the principle of checks and dernity and nationalism—form the first balances even though it may compromise common theme. Modernity has both ma- the efficient functioning of the govern- terial (e.g., industrialization, scientific ment. This has resulted in a particularly and technological developments, and the complex political culture. Finally, Ameri- information revolution) and ideational ca’s relationship with globalization re- (e.g., different ideas about political and flects one test of US resilience. Perhaps economic organization such as democ- more than any other society, that of the racy, autocracy, and socialism) aspects. United States has been able to innovate Nationalism has taken many forms rooted and adapt to the forces of globalization. in the traditional past as well as in the new Indeed, America has been and remains political and geographical arrangements one of the engines of globalization. In of the modern era (ethnic, religious, and another test of resilience—the way Amer- nation-state political).9 ica integrates with transnational institu- Another common theme holds that, as tions (e.g., the United Nations or the a subjective and emotional entity and pro- World Trade Organization)—it does so cess, culture is inherently unpredictable. with the determination to protect indi- This contrasts with rationalism or ratio- vidual and national prerogatives while re- nal-choice theory, prized in social sci- maining open to institutions that support ences because it seems to provide a way to its ideas of liberal democracy, economic predict. However, we can see the predic- openness, and universal human rights. tive shortcomings of rational-choice the- These cultural considerations affect ory as the basis for human thought and American policy and strategy. Most Amer- action everywhere in daily life, from the icans have a distinct worldview and beliefs unpredictability of the stock market to about the United States’ place in that the uncertainties of international rela- world. That view is very much founded on tions.10 In the world of policy and strategy, the legacy of eighteenth century enlight- prediction is the prize of analysis. Human enment that also animated America’s beings, individually or collectively, do not founding revolution. A democratic world always think and behave in rational ways. with a capitalist economic system based The concept of rationality itself is relative on free trade is America’s idealized uto- and subject to differing conceptions and pia, and Americans see their country as definitions, based on culture. At best, destined to have a leading role in bring- people may gain some insight into what ing about such a world. might be most probable. Precisely be- Other societies may share aspects of cause we are creatures of emotions and what constitutes American identity, politi- passions, we can more fully comprehend cal culture, and resilience, but not identi- our thoughts and actions only through cally. In the same manner, every other so- cultural understanding that offers predic- ciety reflects a unique combination of tive insights into the seemingly irrational identity, political culture, and resilience. patterns of thought and behavior. CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 39

Culture is the principal contemporary ultimately determines values and interests expression of another common theme— that underlie the policy and strategy de- history, the record of people and society. signed to attain or preserve those inter- Without history, there is no culture. But ests. A fundamental trait essential to history is an interpretive field, more sub- people and societies, identity can very jective than objective. Thus, we must ap- well be equated with culture.11 It defines preciate each dimension of the framework existence, purpose, destiny, and, some- as the product of both the accumulation times, fate; moreover, identity provides a of actual historical experience and the re- sense of self-worth, dignity, and commu- visionism brought by memory and inter- nity. Because people exist both as individuals pretation of that history. In doing so, we and members of a group—a collective—an must also consider that memory and in- examination of identity must also recog- terpretation of history are often incom- nize the existence of differing individual plete, selective, or distorted. and collective identities. At the individual History, therefore, serves two impor- level, identity begins with a base of bio- tant functions: as an agent and a process logically inherited features that supports that determines specific tangible and in- a superstructure of cultural or acquired tangible cultural forms; and as an instru- elements. Clearly, race, gender, and fam- ment of culture, usually purposefully dis- ily are the most obvious and consequen- torted or adapted for contemporary and, tial biologically inherited identity traits. most often, political purposes. For many Superimposed on these are socially inher- modern nation-states, distortion often ited features such as ethnicity, religion, takes the form of inventing or exaggerat- clan, class, and tribe. The boundary be- ing a heroic past that serves to legitimize tween biological and social inheritances is the regime while inspiring and helping to often blurred. Ultimately, however, social mobilize the populace for national proj- inheritances are changeable while bio- ects. Examples abound throughout the logical inheritances are not. world and in history: Hitler’s Nazi Ger- Though important for the individual, many, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Saddam’s identity may not necessarily have equal or Iraq, and Kim Il Sung’s North Korea. similar significance at the collective level. More than likely, we could probably find Collective identity almost always consists evidence of manipulation of history for of fewer traits than the sum of the indi- political purposes anywhere in the world. vidual identities of its members because, When we dig a little deeper into the histo- by necessity, collective identity is based on features shared by all or most members of riography of a particular society, deliber- the group. However, in terms of political ate distortions, exaggerations, omissions, and social power, collective identity is al- and even inventions become readily ap- most always far more than the sum of the parent. individuals because it has the potential to Identity mobilize the group and thus exert politi- cal power. For example, at the nation-state One aspect of culture that seems to mat- level, leaders who can fuse individual with ter greatly at political and strategic levels national identity can inspire the people of involves those cultural factors that deter- the country to sacrifice for survival and mine identity, perhaps the most impor- glory. The ability to mobilize a nation is tant of the ACFSP dimensions because it essential in strategy and the conduct of 40 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE foreign and domestic policy—and abso- between capitalism and communism dur- lutely paramount for the enterprise of ing the Cold War, nationalism has under- war. Inasmuch as policy and strategy are gone a resurgence during the post–Cold oriented toward a particular collectivity War period. But the form of nationalism rather than an individual, be it a subna- that became prominent in that era has tional, national, regional, or transnational been more of the ethnic and religious va- entity, we are most concerned with collec- riety rather than nation-state political na- tive identity in considerations of policy tionalism. The era following the terrorist and strategy. attacks of 11 September 2001 has added As with individual identity, collective to the increasingly complex situation by identity consists of both biologically and highlighting the potency of religious and socially inherited traits, but often the bio- ethnic extremism. logical or “blood” traits are more fictional When considering more specifically and mythical than real. Ultimately, of the sources of collective identity, espe- most importance is the collective social cially those that result in political power agreement on what commonality binds (and, therefore, the power to mobilize the group. Even if all members shared the collective toward a common purpose), exactly the same features of individual we cannot escape history, whose principal identities, biological and social, they contemporary expression is culture. We could not form a collective identity unless can extend the thought that culture can- they agreed on the basis for coming to- not exist without history, that culture is a gether. historical product, to the notion that Collective identity also exists in widely identity cannot exist without history. His- ranging forms, creating intricate layers of tory is based on interpretation and is sub- overlap and hierarchy. Indeed, it would ject to constant revision and reinterpreta- be the rare society that exhibited only one tion. But what is the basis of the revisions collective identity; thus, we must consider and reinterpretations? Here we consider the existence of a multiplicity of such not academic history but the popular identities. The latter also reveal social and mass view of history, usually a simplified political fault lines that contain the poten- and reduced version. New evidence plays tial for future divisions. Although collec- a part, but even more so does the collec- tive identities exist simultaneously, we can tive “memory” of that history—memory usually define them hierarchically. Some that may be real but is more likely selec- are more important than others. Each in- tive, subjective, or manufactured. The fact dividual and group sorts and prioritizes, that history can never be definitive points often consciously but sometimes not. The to one of the most important aspects of identity that occupies the top of the hier- identity—that identity is dynamic and archy has the greatest potential for signifi- changeable. It need not be permanent. cant and powerful political force, often Politically, the most potent collective with implications for peace and conflict. identity in the modern era has been the For most of the modern age (i.e., since nation-state. The concept of a nation is the late eighteenth century), nation-state old, and, in the traditional sense, mem- political nationalism—the most impor- bership in a nation is determined by a tant and powerful collective—has had di- common identity based on one or more rect implications for war and peace. Al- of a number of physical and cultural fac- though suppressed by the confrontation tors such as origin, ancestry, location, reli- CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 41 gion, language, and shared history. In the consensus over climate change as a com- modern era, the concept of the nation- mon global problem, encourage religious state that combined national fervor with expressions of universal brotherhood, political organization introduced a power- and advance international efforts for the ful new foundation for nationhood. Mod- peaceful resolution of conflict. Subna- ern forms of national identity can thus tional collective identities such as a tribe serve as the basis for powerful collective or sect have also proven to possess increas- actions, especially in the political, social, ingly potent political force in those parts economic, cultural, and strategic arenas. of the world where the nation-state is weak The sources of national identity of mod- or where the state seems remote from in- ern nation-states are often based on a dividual or group concerns. shifting amalgamation of the old and tra- ditional (ancestry, location, and religion) Political Culture with the new (recent history). Thus, nation-state identity usually arises artifi- Aristotle famously said that “man is by na- cially or deliberately rather than deriving ture a political animal.” What does this from the natural and spontaneous conse- mean in terms of thoughts, decisions, and quences of a country’s history. Every na- actions? We are most interested in how tion glorifies what it is and what it repre- being political translates into real-world sents and thus tends to gloss over history outcomes. Identity provides collective that does not fit that story (narrative). unity and foundation for mobilization, This becomes all the more evident in na- but politics supplies the instrument and tions with arbitrarily created rather than the means to mobilize the group, leading historically evolved boundaries—for in- to actions and results. stance, countries established by colonial We can define political culture as the powers, especially in the Middle East, Af- set of values, beliefs, traditions, percep- rica, and Asia. Thus national leaders com- tions, expectations, attitudes, practices, monly evoke and use history deliberately and institutions that a particular society as an instrument of unity and mobiliza- harbors about how the political system tion. In such usage, history is often dis- and processes should operate and what torted or even falsified.12 sort of governmental and economic life it Nationalism is not the only basis for should pursue. Political culture is dy- collective identity with consequential po- namic and changeable because of its his- litical power. Transnational identities have torical derivation. Factors that contribute also proven effective in generating sub- to the formation of a particular political stantial political power. Some, such as ex- culture include historical experience, reli- tremism (religious, ethnic, and political) gious tradition, collective values, founding and criminal activity, can be destructive principles, geographical location and con- and threatening to order. Others are po- figuration, strategic environment (e.g., rela- tentially constructive, such as collective tive vulnerability or security), economic ca- identities that, for example, advocate pacity, and demographics. worldwide human rights, seek to preserve The philosophical attitude toward the and promote labor rights in the context meaning of progress and development of a globalizing society, promote an open represents a most important factor of po- and tolerant society for the free exchange litical culture. If we accept the notion that of ideas and information, build global modernity and modernization originated 42 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE in and became defined by the West, we gradations of systems such as democracies. must also consider the problems of West- Within each of these systems resides a spec- ern bias in the modernization scenario. trum of players and institutions that have The essential question in this debate con- political power and influence, usually hav- cerns whether there is only one correct ing differential access to tangible and intan- path to modernization (“civilization”) gible resources (e.g., material, financial, in- and its implied sense of progress, or fluential, and moral). Within all political whether there is a multiplicity of paths systems are rules of the game about obtain- (e.g., a “Confucian way” that could ex- ing, using, and transferring power. plain the successful developmental paths Strategic culture, a relatively new con- taken by East Asian nations). This is an cept, arose in the post–Cold War era in important issue because of its profound reaction to two developments, the first of effect on the kind of political culture which was the shock of the social scientific that develops. approach’s failure in predicting the end Faith and religion have become in- of the Cold War and the demise of the creasingly important factors in the con- Soviet Union and European communism. struction of political culture, especially in This precipitated a search for one or more the post–Cold War era and in societies missing factors that could have led to with significant nonsecular political tradi- more accurate predictive analysis.13 The tions. The role of religion in political cul- second development—the realization ture is not difficult to understand if we that each nation had a unique perspective recognize its role in identity formation. A which affected the way it perceived, inter- key issue in political culture entails the preted, analyzed, and reacted to events extent to which people having a primarily and developments—amounted to a real- religious or ethnically based identity will ization that no single universal “law” gov- also show allegiance to the nation-state erned how all nations behaved. These two and/or transnational institutions. developments led to considering culture Political culture also forms two key sup- as an important factor in collective behav- porting instruments of its expression that ior (including that of the nation-state) are of interest for policy and strategy: po- and, thus, policy and strategy; out of it litical system and strategic culture. Politi- emerged the idea of strategic culture, cal system refers to the organization of po- thus defined as the concept that considers litical power, with particular emphasis on how cultural factors affect strategic behav- identifying and understanding the basis ior.14 Strategic culture both enables and for power, its distribution, and hierarchy. constrains actions and reactions regard- Consideration of the political system in- ing strategic choices, priorities, security, cludes examination of the role of history, diplomacy, and the use of force. class, religion, race, ethnicity, gender, ge- ography (physical, social, and cultural), Resilience demography, and power fault lines that determine power centers, connections, As mentioned previously, resilience refers and operations. The world houses a spec- to the capacity or ability of a culture to trum of political systems, varying from resist, succumb to, or adapt to external failed states and diffuse power structures forces. It tests the culture’s stability and to centralized systems such as autocracies. coherence and measures the endurance In between these extremes occur various of its identity and political culture. Thus, CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 43 it can help us understand either the per- chial position, intent on preserving its manence or changeability of the values own interest at the cost of the larger in- and interests that determine a particular terest for which the institution was cre- culture’s strategy and policy. ated. Alternatively, it may be willing to Globalization probably represents the sacrifice parochial interest for the good greatest external force that affects cul- of the larger community. The motiva- tures around the world and tests cultural tions for and viability of taking these po- resilience. From a historical perspective, sitions offer insight into each culture’s although globalization often focuses spe- resilience. cifically on the economic and the infor- mational, we should consider it the cur- rent phase of modernity that encompasses both material and nonmaterial dimen- Conclusion sions. Despite the existence of other pe- The theoretical principles of consider- riods of globalization, the type that we ing cultural dimensions in the formula- face today may assume such enormity tion, implementation, and outcome of that we do not yet have the historical ba- strategy and policy seem simple enough, 15 sis to inform us of its potential impact. but to actually apply them to a specific Although it is a term most often associ- nation or a group, subnational or trans- ated with economics and information, national, requires intense study and we believe that globalization in its broad- analysis of the history of that collectivity. est sense includes economic, social, tech- We will discover no one right answer, but nological, political, informational, and if we hope to formulate more effective ideational factors. Key notions to con- strategies and policies, then we must sider include interdependence and a dy- strive to make them more answerable to namic that is more involuntary than vol- cultural factors. The very lack of a defini- untary. Thus we have a sense that we tive cultural analysis demands a multi- cannot control the globalization force, only accommodate or mitigate it. plicity of efforts. Different approaches An important component of globaliza- will emphasize different factors. A his- tion calls for understanding its linkage torically oriented analysis likely empha- with anti-Westernism and anti-American- sizes different factors than one taking a ism. Many people in the world consider political scientific approach—anthropo- globalization synonymous with Ameri- logical, sociological, economic, psycho- canization or Westernization and iden- logical, or military approaches focus on tify America as the primary source of yet other factors. Their sum, however, globalization, especially those aspects of can provide the sort of comprehensive it perceived to undermine traditional analysis that can move us closer to the society and values. truth even if we never reach it. This is the Another important test of resilience is difficult challenge that faces strategic how a culture approaches its integration leaders involved in strategy and policy. with transnational institutions such as Identity, political culture, and resilience the United Nations or the World Trade give us a starting point for that cultural Organization. A culture may take a paro- analytical journey.  44 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

Notes 1. “The cultural turn describes developments in the tive features that describe a particular culture humanities and the social sciences brought about by vari- include its myths and legends. ous developments across the disciplines. Most noted See US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army amongst these was the emergence of cultural studies and Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, draft. Culture is the rise of the sociology of culture within the discipline of expressed in the real world through symbols and symbolic sociology. . . . It describes a shift in emphasis towards systems that represent, reflect, or contain the meanings meaning and on culture rather than politics or economics. inherent in cultural features—therefore, values, beliefs This shift of emphasis occurred over a prolonged time, and norms. Learning to identify these symbols and sym- but particularly since the 1960s” (emphasis in original). bolic systems and “read” the meanings they reflect, repre- Wikepedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v., “cultural turn,” sent, or contain is thus a crucial skill for understanding a http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_turn. particular society and its culture. 2. The Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsur- 6. Geertz founded the field of interpretive anthro- gency, December 2006, and FM 3-0, Operations, February pology, the dominant variant of cultural anthropology 2008, represent examples of how cultural factors have now that approaches culture as a symbolic system. Clifford become prominent aspects of the tactical- and operational- Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New level fights. Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber offer York: Basic Books, 1973), 5. a five-dimensional approach (physical environment, econ- 7. Max Weber examined Protestantism and capital- omy, social structure, political structure, and belief system) ism’s complementarity in detail. See his famous treatise to the issue of culture and military operations. This cul- The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott tural framework for operations is an excellent complement Parsons (New York: Scribner, 1976). to the ACFSP’s three-dimensional framework for strategy 8. Ethnicity is a cultural construct usually based on and policy. See their book Operational Culture for the Warfighter: race, religion, language, and way-of-life traditions. It may Principles and Applications (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps be possible to conceive of a distinctive American ethnicity University Press, 2008), http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/mcu/ that transcends the usual determinants by embracing an mcupress/opculture.pdf. ethnic identity based on the American idea. 3. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, visiting professor of national 9. The beginning of the modern era is most commonly security studies at the Army War College’s Strategic Studies defined by the advent of the enlightenment and industrial- Institute, 2006–8, writes of the need for appreciating how ization in the eighteenth century. The enlightenment cre- the three different levels of political-military operations— ated a rational secular world in which man dominated the strategic, operational, and tactical—require different kinds ideational domain, while industrialization created a mate- of cultural knowledge. See her study On the Uses of Cultural rial world in which man dominated the physical domain. Knowledge (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army Divorced from the constraining and limiting premodern War College, November 2007), http://www.strategicstudies- fixation on the divine, the modern era increasingly prom- institute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB817.pdf. Jager’s levels (stra- ised a future of unlimited possibilities. tegic, operational, and tactical) are different from the 10. The most prominent example was the failure to three dimensions considered by the US Army War College— predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two important policy/strategy, operations, leadership/management. criticisms of rational-choice theory came from Cold War However, the more important point is that the two historian John Lewis Gaddis and political scientist Ian Sha- frameworks agree on the notion that we must differen- piro. Gaddis’s criticism of the social sciences and their tiate how cultural factors work in different areas—that focus on the quest for the independent variable appeared culture cannot and should not be conflated into a “one in his book The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the size fits all.” Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 3. 4. Two other features that define the human condi- Shapiro indicted the social sciences and humanities, tion include man’s biology and the physical environment. maintaining that they are driven more by concern over 5. The Army defines culture as methods—most importantly, rational-choice theory—than the set of distinctive features of a society or group, by real-world problems. See his book The Flight from Reality including but not limited to values, beliefs, and in the Human Sciences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University norms, that ties together members of that society Press, 2005). or group and that drives action and behavior. 11. Thus, the study of identity involves the explora- Additional aspects or characteristics of culture are: tion of the same parameters mentioned earlier for the (1) Culture is shared; there is no “culture of one”; study of culture: formation, agency, process, boundary, (2) Culture is patterned, meaning that people in a variability, stability, coherence, and effect on thinking and group or society live and think in ways forming decision making. definitive, repeating patterns; (3) Culture is change- 12. Two important and powerful studies have had an able, through social interactions between people enormous impact on how we view the formation of coherent and groups; (4) Culture is internalized in the and stable modern nation-states. Editors Eric Hobsbawm sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and and Terence Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, perceived as “natural” by people within the group England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), contains star- or society; (5) Culture is learned; (6) The distinc- tling studies of how nation-states deliberately invented tradi- CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 45 tions to provide legitimacy by tying themselves to their long, 14. Important works on strategic culture include traditional past and by consolidating their power through Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: invented symbols and rituals. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism University Press, 1996); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Think- (London, England: Verso, 1983), examines how printed ing about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, words played a key role in virtually linking all parts of the no. 4 (1995): 32–64; Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military modern nation-state. Widespread, cheap printing—“print Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Secu- capitalism,” to use Anderson’s term—is a modern phenom- rity 19, no. 4 (1995): 5–31; Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and enon. Its ubiquity was an essential mechanism and instru- Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International ment for rapidly binding citizens of a nation-state by helping Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 65–93; Robert D. Putnam, them imagine their membership in that national commu- Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy nity. For example, print capitalism helped spread the sort of (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); invented traditions that Hobsbawm and Ranger considered. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas For some nations, such as Indonesia, that had never existed and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change as a single coherent community prior to its formation in (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Richard J. modern times, the concept of a national community in Ellis and Michael Thompson, eds., Culture Matters: itself was an invention that print capitalism made possible Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky (Boulder, CO: West- to imagine. view Press, 1997); Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and 13. John Lewis Gaddis, perhaps the world’s foremost Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political historian of the Cold War, wrote that Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1997); and Yosef Lapid, “Culture’s Shop: the efforts theorists have made to create a “sci- Returns and Departures in International Relations ence” of politics that would forecast the future Theory,” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, course of world events have produced strikingly ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder, unimpressive results: none of the . . . approaches CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). to theory . . . that have evolved since 1945 came 15. For example, note the globalization based on anywhere close to anticipating how the Cold War expansion of European trade between the sixteenth and would end. . . . If their forecasts failed so com- eighteenth centuries or the opening of the Silk Road in pletely to anticipate so large an event as that con- the thirteenth century. flict’s termination, then one has to wonder about the theories upon which they were based. See his article “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–93): 3. Fearful Symmetry How to Achieve Coherence among All the Players

Rumu Sarkar, PhD*

he Cold War era locked the The contradictions contained within United States and the former socialist regimes eventually led to their USSR into a political and mili- collapse, but the peaceful lull that fol- tary standoff based on the grim lowed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 Tpossibility that nuclear warfare might lead was shattered by the terrorist attacks of 11 to their mutually assured destruction. The September 2001 (9/11). We now find two superpowers were polarized not only ourselves in the second stage of the “an- in terms of their underlying ideology and tithesis” or the “asymmetry” posed by means of governance (democracy versus global terrorism acting through nonstate communism) but also in terms of their actors such as al-Qaeda and related ter- means of economic production (capitalist- rorist groups. In fact, the US military, fully based free-market economy versus state- recognizing the so-called asymmetric threats posed by such groups, established the led socialism). Asymmetric Warfare Group within the US Further, they also insisted on polarizing Army in 2005.1 the rest of the world. Like the African Asymmetric warfare is not a new tactic proverb that says that when two elephants but an ancient one that uses unconven- fight, the grass gets trampled, the policies tional means to counter the overwhelm- of striving for containment, conducting ing conventional military and technologi- proxy wars, and creating spheres of influ- cal superiority of an adversary. In the ence took their toll on countries extrane- current context, such means may include ous to the conflict. Although the political terrorist attacks, weapons of mass destruc- and economic approaches of the two su- tion, guerrilla warfare, cyber attacks, and perpowers were strikingly dissimilar, the information warfare. The asymmetry of overarching “symmetry” of these two ac- these warfare tactics underscores the rela- tors, the two most powerful nation-states tive imbalance in size, tactical approaches, at the time, created the “thesis.” and objectives of the actors. Powerful na-

*Dr. Sarkar, who holds a PhD in public international law from Cambridge University, currently is the senior legal adviser to CALIBRE Systems. She formerly served as general counsel for both the Base Closure and Realignment Com- mission and the Overseas Basing Commission, as assistant general counsel for administrative affairs for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and as a member of the Office of the General Counsel at the US Agency for Interna- tional Development. Prior to her government service, she was an associate in the New York offices of Lord, Day, and Lord and of Gaston, Snow, Beekman, and Bogue. In private practice, she specialized in complex antitrust and securities litiga- tion. Dr. Sarkar was also a long-time adjunct law professor at Georgetown University Law Center, where she taught an LLM seminar on international development law. She has published International Development Law (Oxford University Press, 2009), Transnational Business Law (Kluwer Law International, 2004), and several law review articles.

46 FEARFUL SYMMETRY 47 tion-states (not just the United States and witness the new protocols with regard to former Soviet Union) are now threatened airline travel; heightened security in al- by nebulous terrorist groups that have no most every aspect of everyday life; and a organized center, armies, or formal struc- new, fearful consciousness of the pres- ture of governance. ence of implicit danger. Moreover, this The term “fearful symmetry,” the next stage has reached a “steady state” in which stage or “synthesis” we are moving towards, neither the targets nor the effects of derives from William Blake’s poem “The global terrorism are dissipating—a theme Tyger,” the first stanza of which follows: explored later in this article, along with a proposed resolution of the fearful sym- Tyger Tyger, burning bright, metry. In the forests of the night; What immortal hand or eye, Global, Fundamentalist, Islamic- Could frame thy fearful symmetry?2 Based Terrorism: One Size Does Not Fit All Not only are we terrorized by the acts of terrorists (an obvious outcome since At the outset, we must make a very ba- that is their aim), but also many of the lat- sic distinction between Islamic-based sep- ter are fearful of (if not actually terror- aratist (or secessionist) movements that ized by) the perceived threat posed by employ terrorist means and the so-called Western ideals and institutions. In other global, fundamentalist, Islamic-based ter- words, fundamentalist, Islamic-based ter- rorist movement. The reason for doing so rorist networks and operatives find deeply is that the nature of Islamic-based terror- problematic the ideas of universal suf- ism determines, in part, the international frage and representative government, response to it, as discussed below. participatory democracy, respect for the Palestine, of course, represents the pri- rights of women as well as of religious and mary example of an Islamic-based sepa- ethnic minorities, and free-market eco- ratist movement. It has engaged in a nomic practices and institutions. decades-long struggle for autonomy, A fundamental change is prompting self-determination, and establishment transformation from the antithesis of the of its own statehood, the causes and im- asymmetric threats posed by global ter- plications of which this article will not ad- rorism to the synthesis of a fearful sym- dress. In light of the fact that the US State metry. A palpable shift has occurred from Department designated Hamas a foreign the mere tactical level of posing asymmet- terrorist organization, Hamas surprised ric threats by global terrorists to an over- US and other policy makers by winning arching psychological dimension wherein the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) general both sides instill fear in each other. The legislative elections in January 2006.3 It asymmetric threat of global terrorism is defeated Fatah, the party of the PA’s pres- no longer confined to conflict zones with ident, Mahmoud Abbas, thereby setting specific military engagements under way; the stage for a prolonged power struggle. it now affects civilians in every walk of life. Although Hamas uses terrorist tactics In fact, ordinary life has been trans- of conducting suicide bombings along formed to accommodate the impact of with launching short-range rockets and global terrorism’s asymmetric threat— mortars in order to achieve its political 48 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE goals, it also provides basic human ser- failure of the state as an institution of gov- vices such as educational, sports, health, ernance that creates an ordered society. A and religious facilities to its constituents. second failure that can no longer be ig- The fact that Hamas has responded to the nored is the disinclination of people to basic needs of Palestinians and allegedly hold their state leaders accountable. has a reputation for honesty, in contrast Thus, we may view the failure of the state to the corruption of which Fatah officials as twofold—in terms of both governing often stand accused, may explain, in part, and being governed. its political victory. In essence, Hamas The failure of the state as an economic combines Palestinian nationalism with Is- actor is particularly relevant in this con- 4 lamic fundamentalism. text. In the decades following the inde- Rather than belabor the point by men- pendence of most developing nations, tioning other Islamic-based separatist the state was the only institutional actor movements, it may be useful to consider large enough and sufficiently creditwor- whether a historical relationship (how- thy to assume an entrepreneurial func- ever tenuous) exists between the exam- tion. In other words, the state was the ples cited above and postcolonial move- only actor capable of borrowing funds ments that established new nation-states. and providing for basic human needs, in- Revolutionary forces in former colonies cluding power generation, transporta- generally did not have access to organized tion, and telecommunications. armies or arms, often resorting to uncon- In response to the urgent needs of ventional means for attaining their revo- their populations in such sectors, many lutionary goals (most notably, Mahatma nations created state-owned enterprises Gandhi, who eschewed violence in order to gain India’s independence). (SOE), which borrowed capital to sup- Although Palestine is not emerging port the capital infrastructure and other from a colonial past per se, it has not yet nation-building needs of the state. The managed to win its own statehood. The SOEs, however, generally engaged in inef- fact that the global terrorism espoused by ficient borrowing practices that burdened al-Qaeda now energizes this separatist numerous developing states with high lev- movement and others reflects a profound els of debt, leading to the debt crisis and departure from the past practice of using the continuing debt overhang of many international law’s principles of self-de- countries. Over time, the collapse of termination to create internationally rec- SOEs, the failure to create adequate pri- ognized statehood. In fact, the Israeli- vate-sector growth and private capital Palestinian conflict no longer catalyzes markets, the continuing debt burden, global terrorism; rather, in the view of the and many other complex factors led to jihadists themselves, the global jihadist stagnant economic growth and, in some terrorist movements have overshadowed cases, political instability. and surpassed it in importance.5 The previous discussion drew a funda- mental distinction between two types of fundamentalist, Islamic-based terrorism: The Failure of the State separatist-based movements and the so- A significant underlying theme that called global terrorism of al-Qaeda and unites the examples of Islamic-based sep- related terrorist cells and networks. The aratist movements discussed above is the first type is based on a failure of the state, FEARFUL SYMMETRY 49 as described above, but the second arises suit of modernity has been perhaps even from a failure of ideology. more painful and has not led to the same The new ascendancy of the “rule of result. According to Fareed Zakaria, “For law” on a global scale is certainly worth the Arab world, modernity has been one considering. In the fracas of dying and failure after another. Each path followed— defunct ideas, a core ideal of Western socialism, secularism, nationalism—has thought has endured, namely, Adam turned into a dead end. . . . If there is one Smith’s elevation of the drive to acquire great cause of the rise of Islamic funda- material wealth to a classical economic mentalism, it is the total failure of political ideal. This, in combination with John institutions in the Arab world.” Moderniza- Locke’s demand that the state protect pri- tion is now viewed as Westernization, glo- vate property and individual liberties, sets balization, or—worse—Americanization, the stage for liberal political theory. In but, as Zakaria points out, “importing the other words, the pursuit of personal hap- inner stuffings of modern society—a free piness through the material acquisition market, political parties, accountability of personal wealth as well as the state’s and the rule of law—is difficult and dan- protection of individual liberties, has gerous.”6 Going back to an earlier theme, risen to a Western classical ideal. Indeed, neglecting to demand that state leaders the terrifying force of this ideal may be its take a more informed and critical ap- universality. proach to issues of governance and eco- While Western societies developed legal nomic growth—a demand that the gov- structures over the centuries to protect erned people legitimately could have private property (e.g., contract enforce- made—also constitutes part of the failure ment, mortgages, secured loans, liens, and of the state. bankruptcy proceedings) and to ensure The profound transformation of the the protection of individual liberties—for frustration, sense of humiliation, and de- example, by passing a Bill of Rights and spair in the Arab world into an ideology ensuring the due process of law—non- of hatred involves a very complex alchemy Western societies, for the most part, did that lies outside the scope of this analysis. not develop similar institutions. What be- On the one hand, it appears that Islamic- gan revolutionizing our world at the end based separatists have responded to the of the last millennium was not adoption crisis of the state in a secularized fashion, of a Western classical ideal by the using violence as a means to gain political non‑Western world, but adoption of the power. On the other hand, it appears that Western methodology of achieving this in response to the failure of modernity ideal through private property, demo- and its accompanying ideological founda- cratic governance, and the rule of law. For tion, al-Qaeda has developed a more pro- the most part, adoption of this Western- foundly religiously influenced “new ideol- based methodology has fueled the legal ogy of hate.”7 This ideology empowers its reform efforts in the developing world for adherents through hatred and the single- the past 25 years. minded pursuit of disruption, terrorism, If the failure of ideology on a worldwide and the destabilization of Western-styled scale in the past century has led to the su- economies. Its actions, largely of symbolic perficial ascendancy of Western-based in- value, feed off the despair, disempower- stitutions, the failure of ideology in the ment, and disenfranchisement of fren- Arab world in the post–World War II pur- zied young Muslims. Rather than holding 50 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

Arab leaders accountable for their ac- political dominance, and cultural hege- tions, this distrust has metastasized into mony—its luxury goods, in fact. However, an uncompromising hatred of Western the ultimate luxury good is the freedom ideals, values, institutions, symbols, and of choice. The freedom to choose and peoples. take risks to support those choices (as in- The new generation of terrorists has stitutionalized by the genius of capital- no interest in undertaking the hard work ism) is the ultimate freedom. of nation building. In fact, their brand of Deliberately choosing (and imposing terrorism is not based on the failure of on others) the “unfreedom” of having no the state, which has already imploded, as or few choices dictated by religious lead- has the failed state of Afghanistan, or is in ers or tribal war lords does not constitute the process of gradual decline and col- real empowerment. Indeed, far from dis- lapse, as in Iraq unless the civil strife there empowering other nation-states, global is reversed. Rather, this type of terrorism terrorism acts to disempower its own ad- arises not only from a failure of Western- herents by cultivating despair and a lack based ideology supporting “liberal democ- of hope in the future—or simply the be- racy” but also, and more disturbingly, from lief that tomorrow will be better than to- the ascendancy of a new ideology of hatred. day. Although this ideology claims to be faith based, it mocks universal, faith- based values. A New Ideological Conflict If, on the other hand, Islamic-based The creators and adherents of al-Qaeda’s global terrorists have not fundamentally new ideology of hatred are educated, misinterpreted man’s nature and are will- wealthy, privileged, and successful by ing to kill for it and, more importantly, to Western standards, as are their new re- die for this state of unfreedom, then we cruits, who are Western-educated engi- are all lost. They have, in effect, created a neers, physicians, and other affluent pro- new kind of human being impervious to fessionals. This ideology does not advance the values of human civilization, not the the economic or political stability of a least of which is the regard for the sanctity nation-state in order to create stable, via- of human life. In fact, the systematic in- ble, state-oriented structures of gover- doctrination of a creed of violence and nance and economic production—this is the uncompromising repression of hu- not at all the goal of global terrorists. In man creativity affecting all spheres of life fact, one may argue that such terrorists may give rise to a new, terrifying sensibil- emerging from the European context ity that implicitly encourages a wanton demonstrate that living in stable political disregard for human life. There truly is economies does not deter them from no real response to someone who is will- adopting the ideology of hatred. Nor ing to die when we clearly are not. does it deter them from engaging in acts In order to resolve the fearful symme- of terrorism—quite the contrary, in fact. try, we must create a “new soldier,” who On a deeper level, the ideology of ha- needs to demonstrate the highly subjec- tred fundamentally misunderstands man’s tive qualities of empathy, compassion, acquisitive nature. From an outsider’s wisdom, and heightened intuitive and point of view, much of their furious ha- perceptive abilities that enable him or tred seems based on envy and deep mis- her to navigate in unknown cultural, lin- trust of the West’s economic successes, guistic, and emotional terrains. Such a FEARFUL SYMMETRY 51 soldier needs to be both intuitive and paigns and approaches.8 He argues that wise—thus, we will have to cultivate differ- the post-9/11 shift in defense policy to- ent cultural values (within the military wards military interventions against asym- and, more broadly, in Western-based soci- metric threats, irregular warfare, stabiliza- eties) in order to create this new kind of tion operations, and nation-building soldier. exercises is misguided and, ultimately, In the final analysis, however, despite quite dangerous. In fact, it may actually any efforts to produce and deploy a new destabilize US national security rather soldier, the fearful symmetry will be re- than strengthen it. He correctly points solved only when and if the global terror- out that ists themselves learn to love—not us but although it is always dangerous to generalize, themselves. Only by giving up their de- much of the instability described by theories of structive and self-destructive nihilism and asymmetric and nontraditional warfare stems replacing it with a sense of self-respect, first and foremost from causes other than mili- and the respect for others, will the fearful tary aggression. Many rebellions, insurgencies, and civil wars are the symptoms of political, eco- symmetry truly end. This is the complex nomic, and psychosocial factors that undermine challenge posed by the fearful symmetry, social stability and popular commitment to pub- and it is my sincere hope that we may all lic order. Once order has collapsed, leaders and work together to revive hope and restore groups arise determined to seize power, and the faith in the future. The true leaders in the contest can become a clash of power-seekers. Yet, the essential problem in many so-called fearful symmetry are those who can in- failed states and other contexts that give rise to spire hope, faith, trust, and, finally, love. civil wars, insurgencies, and the radicalism at Only when we can live peaceably to- large in the Muslim world is a society or a large gether will the promise of the future be group of individuals beset with some combina- restored to us. At that point, we may tion of economic stagnation, cultural resent- ment, historical grievance, political or national move past the fearful symmetry and wel- repression, and other factors. These afflic- come a new era of history that will begin tions—injustices, in the eyes of the aggrieved— when this one ends. are not amenable to military solutions.9 However, creating and cultivating a In other words, these military engage- corps of new soldiers to address global ji- ments are not wars at all but small, inter- hadists are extraordinarily difficult -un necine, and often intrastate and inter- dertakings—to which most military estab- ethnic conflicts. lishments are unwilling to commit The list of downstream negative con- themselves. The following discussion ex- sequences from shifting to a counterin- amines the reasons militating against surgency-focused military approach in- such a course of action and the reasons clude, for example, underfunding the why and how we should pursue it. research, development, and procurement of systems for war; inappropriately or Liabilities of the inadequately training military forces for conventional warfare; underfund- Counterinsurgency ing nonmilitary agencies and programs Prof. Michael J. Mazarr succinctly puts better equipped to deal with the under- into perspective many of the objections to lying causes giving rise to irregular war- adopting a US-based defense policy aimed fare; and risking the loss of the US at developing counterinsurgency cam- strategic and compelling advantage in 52 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE conventional-warfare arenas (especially has two dimensions[:] . . . winning wars in dealing with Russia’s and China’s po- and winning the peace.”13 Military forces, tentially expansionist ambitions).10 designed to do the first, often do it well, Moreover, by adopting a strategy of but they are not designed to do the latter fighting “small wars,” the United States, in and often fare poorly—precisely one of particular, is positioning itself to lose. De- the key arguments against engaging in ir- mocracies have a limited capacity to ab- regular warfare in the first instance. sorb the costs of small wars because of an Finally, and most importantly, the use overall commitment to democratic prin- of the military in counterinsurgency op- ciples and because of the general repug- erations and related engagements substi- nance to brutal military behavior often tutes military operations for diplomatic found in such conflicts. efforts and development assistance. Argu- Jeffrey Record points out that dictator- ably, this reflects a strategic misinterpreta- ships which use violent tactics with their tion of Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that own people and which are not account- “war is the continuation of politics by able for their actions often have a higher other means.”14 War is not meant to sub- tolerance for small wars than democra- stitute for politics: cies.11 Thus, the often protracted irregu- lar wars are generally not winnable by It is thus dangerous to view the military as the lead agency to deal with very diffuse, broad-based major democracies such as the United asymmetric challenges such as radical Islamism, States. Arguably, this is the case histori- nation building, stability operations, and even cally even with England and France, as counterinsurgency. Talk of redirecting U.S. mili- witnessed by the asymmetric nature of tary emphasis to asymmetric threats amounts to a many of the struggles for independence form of avoidance, allowing U.S. national secu- that took place in their colonial eras. rity planners to ignore the truly dramatic change underway in the character of conflict. As smart, Further, the single-minded focus on adaptable, and courageous as U.S. military offi- winning the kinetic-warfare stage tends to cers and men and women clearly are and will be, make military strategists, policy makers, asymmetric challenges demand asymmetric re- and perhaps the public as well feel that sponses—political, economic, cultural, informa- the war has been won and that the world tional, and psychological tools, tactics, and tech- niques allowed to work organically over time, not is now a better place. It overlooks the fact retrained military forces whose true purpose is to that “military victory is a beginning, not fight and win wars, which are different enter- an end. . . . Pursuit of military victory for prises. The strategic trap is obvious: Furnished its own sake also discourages thinking with a vast, expensive, skillful military tool, policy- about and planning for the second and by makers will use it again and again, as they have far the most difficult half of wars for re- been doing, without confronting the tougher challenge of shifting resources into nonmilitary gime change: establishing a viable re- tools of statecraft.15 placement for the destroyed regime. War’s object is, after all, a better peace.”12 By dramatically expanding budgets for Indeed, since many small wars are intra- foreign aid, public diplomacy, exchange state rather than interstate conflicts, regime programs, and related nonmilitary forms change often becomes a significant factor at of power, the United States can do much the conclusion of the kinetic-warfare stage. more to address sources of instability, However, bringing about political trans- stagnation, and grievance that underlie formation frequently lies beyond the abil- state failures, radicals, insurgents, and ter- ity of a military force. “Military conflict rorist groups at large in a globalizing FEARFUL SYMMETRY 53 world. Military power is not the way to de- this limited analysis). Nonmilitary sources feat such threats.16 on both a unilateral (state-to-state) and Incidentally, Robert Gates, US secre- multilateral level have not fully succeeded tary of defense, agrees with this view: in ensuring concrete development de- We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be spite their best efforts to do so. the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for This leaves the international commu- some time. These conflicts will be fundamen- nity with the baleful choice of either ig- tally political in nature, and require the applica- noring these power vacuums that lead to tion of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and potential insurgencies, further instability, more a function of shaping behavior—of and endemic corruption—or taking some friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the course of action in response to such con- people in between. . . . ditions. Although the preferred course of But these new threats also require our govern- action with respect to containing forces ment to operate as a whole differently—to act leading to the potential collapse of the with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to state should involve nonmilitary actors, America’s non-military instruments of power. . . . clearly this has not occurred successfully [There] is no replacement for the real thing— in many instances. Yet, the unavoidable civilian involvement and expertise.17 conclusion is that neither political trans- formation nor economic development Although there seems to be a fairly can take place without security.19 broad basis of consensus for devoting As we all know, nature abhors a vacuum. more resources to nonmilitary ap- Despite (or perhaps in response to) the proaches, agencies, and policies in the failure to devote additional US nonmili- context of responding to asymmetric tary resources to the effort of quelling threats, we seem to lack the requisite will and preventing asymmetric threats, the to implement this need. However, as Gen US military paradigm has shifted. Depart- David Petraeus points out, “power vacu- ums breed insurgencies.”18 In his view, ment of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Sta- these insurgencies typically emerge from bility Operations, 16 September 2009, firmly civil wars or from the collapse of states. validates the defense policy of supporting Generally speaking, insurgencies and stability operations in order to global terrorism stem, in large part, from establish civil security and civil control, the failure of the state. Indeed, the failure restore essential services, repair and protect of the development process derives from critical infrastructure, and deliver humani- tarian assistance until such time as it is feasi- two related aspects of governance. First, ble to transition lead responsibility to other within the host country one finds a failure U.S. Government agencies, foreign govern- in governing and in being governed. Sec- ments and security forces, or international ond, from the perspective of the wider governmental organizations. In such circum- international community—especially ad- stances, the Department will operate within vanced nations actively involved in the U.S. Government and, as appropriate, inter- national structures for managing civil-mili- overall development process—one finds a tary operations, and will seek to enable the failure in statecraft. In other words, failed deployment and utilization of the appropri- states have experienced a systemic inabil- ate civilian capabilities. . . . ity to successfully bring about sustainable Integrated civilian and military efforts are development (albeit for a complex menu essential to the conduct of successful stability of reasons that lie outside the scope of operations. The Department shall: . . . . 54 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

(3) Continue to support the development, Ultimately, the new soldier corps implementation, and operations of civil-military should reside in multilateral armed forces teams and related efforts aimed at unity of and peacekeeping units such as the effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fos- United Nations (UN), North Atlantic tering security, economic stability, and devel- Treaty Organization (NATO), European opment; and building indigenous capacity Union, African Union, and G-8’s Global for such tasks.20 Peace Operations Initiative, a multilateral program that will create a self-sustaining Of course, the United States has cer- peacekeeping force of 75,000—largely tainly intervened nonmilitarily in conflict- African—soldiers by 2010. The concept of ridden areas over the past 60 years. One the new soldier may also be relevant to commentator notes that “Africa has been the Africa Counterinsurgency Operations the recipient of several Marshall Plans Training Assistance program and many worth of foreign aid since World War II’s other military and paramilitary programs. end, yet it remains arguably as impover- In my view, multilateral and regional ished today as it was in 1946.”21 This stems peacekeeping forces are better suited to in part from the reluctance of bilateral fighting the wars of the new soldier since and multilateral aid institutions such as such forces are predicated on multilater- the World Bank to factor security needs alism, based on multilingual and multi- into the development equation.22 cultural approaches. Indeed, a RAND study points out that multilateral peace- keeping forces have added credibility, The New Soldier lower operating costs, and more access to It is not certain whether broader non- seasoned professionals who have experi- military interventions in the security, sta- ence in handling crises created by col- 23 bilization, and reconstruction process are lapsed states. Thus, rather than create forthcoming, but military forces (whether conflicts with standing national armies, unilateral or multilateral) clearly are the perhaps it is time to take a new approach first actors in conflict and postconflict by reinvesting in and developing new situations. Therefore, I would argue for forms of militarized interventions for the creation of the new soldier, whether act- new soldier. If we adopt this approach, we may need ing for a unilateral force or multilateral to negotiate and secure the agreement of forces, as a necessary agent of stability members and participants to the underly- and, paradoxically, of change. While the ing commitments, missions, and rules of current US military stability, security, tran- engagement for reformulated and new sition, and reconstruction paradigm is in military interventions with much broader effect, creation and training of the new goals in mind. The far-reaching political soldier seem inevitable. However, this ar- implications need to be part of the para- ticle has a much broader vision in mind, digm shift not only for the US military which encompasses not only US military and its long-term sustenance, but also for forces but also any and all military forces other militaries strained by the demands faced with asymmetric threats; these in- of insurgencies and global terrorism. clude those of France, Great Britain, Spain, Initially the new soldier should focus the Netherlands, India, Morocco, Indone- on such interventions as providing hu- sia, the Philippines, and many more. manitarian relief; security and stabiliza- FEARFUL SYMMETRY 55

tion; and conflict resolution and preven- structures—after all, established militaries tion. Ultimately, the new soldier should are built on a different set of skills and ex- create the backdrop for initiating a diplo- pectations. Therefore, perhaps we should matic dialogue to end hostilities and be- formulate and promulgate a new military gin the process of peace and reconcilia- career track to attract officers and other tion. Thus, the underlying articles of personnel who wish to develop the new association of multilateral military forces skill sets necessary for the new soldier. such as NATO, the UN, and related orga- Since the new soldier has a different mis- nizations and units may need to be sion, based on a different perspective and changed or overhauled to reflect the need training, perhaps the core curriculum of and support for the new soldier. This may military schools needs significant change call for broader authority, for example, to as well. Retired military officers may wish intervene internationally by regional mili- to lead the effort in order to share their tary forces, where necessary. For exam- ple, the African Union may be tasked “lessons learned” perspective with others with setting up peacekeeping forces in and help shift the military paradigm to in- the Philippines. clude a different kind of soldiering by cre- Further, as we create the new soldier, we ating a different kind of soldier. As Defense also may need to drastically alter recruit- Secretary Gates put it, “New institutions ment strategies. There is significant con- are needed for the 21st century, new orga- cern that changing the emphasis on kinetic nizations with a 21st century mind-set.”24 aspects of warfare to “softer” skills involved This may be the new challenge: to create in conflict prevention and reconciliation, the new soldier, not in conflict with the sol- as well as nation-building exercises, will dier of today but as a new and invaluable clash with and demoralize existing military partner for the military of tomorrow. 

Notes 1. See US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, http:// 7. Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam: www.awg.army.mil/ (accessed 6 June 2010). On Reading the Qur’an—and Misreading It,” Boston Review, 2. William Blake, Songs of Innocence and of Experience: December 2001 / January 2002, http://bostonreview.net/ Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul, 1789– BR26.6/elfadl.html (accessed 6 June 2010). The author, a 1794 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 148. distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at UCLA, alleges that 3. See US Department of State, fact sheet, 11 October the theological premises of global terrorism derive from “the intolerant puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (accessed creeds.” Founded in the early twentieth century, Salafism 25 July 2007). argued, according to the author, that one should respond to 4. See Council on Foreign Relations, “Hamas” (updated the demands of modernity by returning to the “original 27 August 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ sources of the Qur’an and Sunnah (tradition of the (accessed 6 June 2010). Prophet).” Although “Wahhabism narrowly defined ortho- 5. Reuven Paz, “Between Ideology and Strategy,” in doxy, and was extremely intolerant of any creed that contra- “What Does al-Qaeda Want?” edition 31, vol. 3 (18 August dicted its own,” the author argues that it “does not bear pri- 2005), Middle East Roundtable, bitterlemons-international. mary responsibility for the existence of terrorist groups in org, http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous Islam today.” He argues that .php?opt=1&id=98#397 (accessed 6 June 2010). Wahhabism is distinctively inward-looking—although 6. Fareed Zakaria, “The Politics of Rage: Why Do focused on power, it primarily asserts power over They Hate Us?” Newsweek, 15 October 2001, http://www other Muslims. . . . Militant puritan groups, however, .newsweek.com/2001/10/14/the-politics-of-rage-why-do are both introverted and extroverted—they attempt -they-hate-us.html (accessed 6 June 2010). to assert power against both Muslims and non-Muslims. 56 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

As populist movements, they are a reaction to the dis- based on secular revolutionary ideals. These new forms empowerment most Muslims have suffered in the of old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the modern age at the hands of harshly despotic govern- most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars. ments, and at the hands of interventionist foreign These conflicts resemble the wars of religion in Europe powers. These groups compensate for extreme feel- before and after the Reformation of the 16th century. ings of disempowerment by extreme and vulgar claims People have replaced nonfunctioning national identi- to power. Fueled by supremacist and puritan theologi- cal creeds, their symbolic acts of power become ties with traditional sources of unity and identity. When uncompromisingly fanatic and violent. countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the Ibid. United States normally focused on increasing a threat- 8. Michael J. Mazarr, “The Folly of ‘Asymmetric War,’ ” ened but friendly government’s ability to defend itself Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 33–53, and on encouraging political and economic reforms to http://www.twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer_mazarr undercut support for the insurgency. Today, when .pdf (accessed 6 June 2010). Professor Mazarr is a professor countering an insurgency growing from state collapse of national security strategy at the US National War College. or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunt- 9. Ibid., 35–36. ing task: helping friendly forces reestablish political 10. Ibid., 39–41. 11. Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Parameters order and legitimacy where these conditions may no 35 (Winter 2005–6): 16, 20–22, http://www.carlisle.army longer exist. .mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/05winter/record.pdf Ibid. (accessed 6 June 2010). 19. James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: 12. Ibid., 25. From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 69, 13. Ibid., 26. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ 14. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. MR1753/ (accessed 7 June 2010). Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Prince- 20. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Sta- ton University Press, 1976), 87, 89. bility Operations, 16 September 2009, 2, 3, http://www.dtic 15. Mazarr, “Folly of ‘Asymmetric War,’ ” 38. .mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf (accessed 16. Ibid., 50. Professor Mazarr further argues that “the United States should powerfully enhance its efforts 7 June 2010). See also FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, Counter- to reduce instability, conflict, and radicalism in key areas insurgency, a manual devoted to conducting a counter- of the world and to shore up institutionalization and gov- insurgency campaign, coauthored by Gen David Petraeus, ernance in critical states. It should do so, however, by rely- which states clearly that “[counterinsurgency] involves ing on an expanded and deepened set of nonmilitary the application of national power in the political, military, tools and do so largely in an anticipatory and collabora- economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields tive manner rather than an ex post facto and interven- and disciplines. Political and military leaders and plan- tionist one.” Ibid., 35. ners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; 17. Robert Gates, “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power” (Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, cannot succeed in [counterinsurgency operations] alone” KS, 26 November 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/ (p. 1-1). speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed 6 June 21. Sean McFate, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Strate- 2010). gic Paradigm?” Military Review 88, no. 1 (January–February 18. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfight- 2008): 15, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdf ing Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Decem- viewer?vid=6&hid=109&sid=4878c47a-0d64-4da0-bc4f ber 2006, 1-4, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3- -e55ade516190%40sessionmgr13 (accessed 7 June 2010). 24.pdf (accessed 6 June 2010). General Petraeus further 22. Ibid. points out that 23. Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, recently, ideologies based on extremist forms of reli- xxv, xxxvi, xxxvii–xxxviii. gious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies 24. Gates, “Beyond Guns and Steel.” Intelligence Services in Sub-Saharan Africa Making Security Sector Reform Work

Dustin Dehéz*

n recent years, the security sector has security policy and development assist- emerged as a crucial component in ance but also, in that sense, led to a turn guaranteeing lasting peace and secu- toward security in the way the West under- Irity, particularly in countries that stands and comprehends development arose from bloody civil wars and internal and stability. Moreover, SSR provided a conflicts. Reform of the security sector, coherent concept, the means, to bridge therefore, offers a means of ensuring that the gap between both fields. Despite this such countries do not reenter conflicts early success, however, SSR has remained and wars. In this respect, it is also a part of largely conceptual; coordination and se- conflict prevention. Ideally, security- sec quencing of measures taken under the tor reform (SSR) addresses the twin chal- SSR framework remain highly contested lenges posed by security services and secu- issues; governments emerging from con- rity sector governance by transforming flict situations find it difficult to compre- military forces to defend their countries hend the complexity and sophistication against foreign foes and enemies, while at of the process; and donors still need to the same time trying to institutionalise develop a coherent, systemwide approach. civilian oversight and parliamentary con- Although SSR highlights the importance trol. In order to do so, it aims to strengthen of well-managed civil-military relations, oversight and executive control of all there seems to be little effort to manage security services, including the army, border assistance in this realm. Moreover, sur- control, and intelligence services, while prisingly few advances have occurred in simultaneously attempting to enhance their understanding these relations in general.1 operational capabilities. The impact of conflicts on civil-military The concept of SSR owes its attractive- relations has largely been neglected, and ness to its twofold function: SSR not only the legacy of socialism, particularly in Af- helped identify the missing link between rican contexts, has not received much

*The author is a historian and visiting professor at the Centre for International Studies at the University of Economics, Prague. He is also a member of the Young Foreign Policy Experts of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and a lecturer in international relations. His articles have appeared in the Weekly Standard and the Journal of American Foreign Policy Interests, among others.

57 58 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE scholarly attention; the same holds true cally, it outlines the role of intelligence of specific challenges posed by the incor- services in the national security architec- poration of intelligence services, customs, ture and their relations with other security and border control. Obviously, during services; describes the major problems the implementation of SSR by develop- that SSR needs to address when aiming at ment practitioners, little research sup- cohesive reform of the security sector, in- ports their efforts. Currently the gap be- cluding intelligence services; and, finally, tween practice and academic knowledge is draws some conclusions. In doing so, the widening. It is noteworthy that the books article concentrates on SSR efforts in sub- published by Samuel Huntington and Saharan Africa and the particular chal- Morris Janowitz remain the most influen- lenge left by legacies from colonialism tial works in civil-military relations and and socialism in the African context and their role in different forms of statehood.2 the specific impact of the role of the mili- Further scholarly attention will need to tary in African states. focus on civil-military relations, not only to guide efforts in SSR but also to incorpo- rate the history of those relations during Defining the Relationship and the past two to three decades into our Identifying Problems understanding of the military in Africa, the Middle East, and those states gov- Undoubtedly, security services and gov- erned by socialist regimes until the end ernance of the security sector are impor- of the Cold War. tant features of modern statehood. Repre- As Andrea Wright put it, when every- senting the heart of any state, security gives body is doing SSR, clearly not everybody nations their legitimacy and their mandate knows exactly what to do.3 Though SSR to govern. Ideally, security services provide certainly is en vogue in development cir- protection for the population, and the cles, indispensable knowledge of the mili- state and its institutions command and tary and security services is thinly spread, control them to that end. In democracies especially given the long-standing aver- this control would ensure that the mili- sion to the military that has long charac- tary would not undermine the state since terised the development community as a the controlling institutions are products whole. It is therefore feasible to ask of the will of the people. Potentially, how- whether all donors really have a plan or ever, undemocratic regimes and autocrats cohesive framework to guide their efforts. could face threats from either outside or Do they know how to include all national inside the country, either from the upper security services? Particularly in the latter echelons of their own ruling elite or from case, intelligence services need to be society itself.4 Because of this concern for taken into account, but for a variety of their own survival, many autocrats use se- reasons, these services have not received curity services to further their interests, the attention they deserve. Against this not those of the state. Especially during background, this article focuses on the lat- the Cold War, national security services in ter and its role in SSR, aiming to close a sub-Saharan Africa occupied themselves gap left both by the lack of academic ef- with regime security, often receiving aid forts to describe the role of the intelligence from their Cold War allies for this pur- service and by SSR efforts that have largely pose. This practice has included intelli- neglected the intelligence sector. Specifi- gence services as well. Ideally, in autocracies INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 59 the security of the regime translates directly pant corruption and poor management into regime stability.5 This, however, by no of the national security forces. Corrup- means equates to the stability and security tion, poor ministerial planning, and the of the state, let alone its population. Quite lack of oversight have left many of sub- the contrary, the means employed to secure Saharan Africa’s armies and intelligence regime stability have often undermined the services ill prepared for current chal- soundness of state structures. Efforts to en- lenges, from an increase in the trade of hance regime stability, therefore, often- narcotics in Western Africa to the threat times only foster the negative sovereignty of of radical Islamism in the Horn of Africa. these states, increasing their status as quasi- This legacy has weakened armies and states—nations referred to as states only intelligence services alike, not least be- because of the international recognition cause these two institutions share impor- they received earlier.6 tant features. Both exist to protect the A majority of African states has at some state, but both command the power to point tried to develop socialist systems, become its greatest threat. SSR in both whether they called it scientific socialism areas identifies the need to strengthen or African socialism. Between the begin- civil oversight bodies but at the same time ning of the decolonisation period and the to face the challenge of increasing opera- 1980s, no fewer than 35 of 53 states called tional effectiveness. Both have to cope themselves socialist at various times.7 with the legacies of the Cold War. For These experiences have left a problematic example, like many military forces in sub- legacy since socialist regimes tend to Saharan Africa, intelligence services in highlight regime security even more than autocracies have been and frequently are other autocracies, often by putting the still dominated by the ethnic group that party and not the state in charge of na- seized power in the nation, however small tional security affairs and the army. Com- that group. Although intelligence serv- munist countries simply would not toler- ices in sub-Saharan Africa originally mir- ate anything like a military outside the rored their colonial counterparts, they political realm, since in previous decades often underwent transformation after they considered it the armed wing of these countries gained independence. In capitalism and the defender of the bour- Anglophone African states, for instance, geoisie. In the eyes of communist leaders, most intelligence services originated from therefore, it was totally legitimate to turn within the police, most commonly in the the military into an instrument of the form of the special branch. However, Communist Party, a tool to modernise so- since many countries in sub-Saharan Af- ciety and advance socialism. As the case of rica have faced recurrent coups d’état by Ethiopia dramatically illustrates, this dy- military forces or presidential guards, the namic led to a militarisation of society shape and function of these services have and a politicisation of the military, intelli- often changed rather dramatically.9 In gence, and other security services.8 Over the wake of such coups, newly established decades, such a focus on regime security regimes quickly moved to redirect the manifested itself in many countries in work of intelligence services to their own sub-Saharan Africa in decision-making safety and often subsumed intelligence processes, largely undisturbed by any ci- command structures under military lead- vilian oversight and control at all. This ership, creating a highly politicised and situation inevitably culminated in ram- militarised intelligence community that 60 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE worked solely toward regime security.10 intelligence from Western nations or the Often enough, new regimes and juntas Soviet Union and its allies by no means created new or rival intelligence services compensated for this weakness. In the with the sole purpose of maintaining re- Congo crisis of the 1960s, for example, gime security. These security services the United States relied heavily on Bel- arose only after a certain force had seized gian intelligence because it had long ne- the state and subsequently developed an glected to develop its own capabilities in interest in the consolidation of power. sub-Saharan Africa, believing until the The Gambia is one such case in point. 1960s that the former colonial powers In 1994, when the army under the would take the lead in cooperating with leadership of a young officer named the newly independent African states and Yahya Jammeh staged a coup d’état, it keeping the Soviet Union out of sub-Saharan initially had only a tenuous hold on Africa. When it finally did establish an in- power. The new regime quickly moved to telligence apparatus, it still had problems install the Armed Forces Provisional Rul- capturing the entire picture.13 The end of ing Council, which would lead the Gambia the Cold War again saw intelligence capa- for the next two years, before Jammeh bilities with regard to sub-Saharan Africa would run on a civilian platform for reelec- significantly downgraded, and the West is tion.11 Regime security, however, remained only slowly rebuilding that capacity. One, an important issue during these years, and therefore, has reason to believe that in in 1995 the new regime created the Na- the absence of both reliable intelligence tional Intelligence Agency (NIA), which on Africa and strong partnerships with reinforced the ruling council’s control African partner services, the West currently over society and radically changed the po- might not be in a position to strengthen the litical atmosphere in the country.12 De- operational capabilities of African intelli- spite the establishment of the civilian gence services. platform in 1996—the Alliance for Patri- But intelligence services differ in one otic Reorientation and Construction— important respect from armies. By their the country remains a dictatorship, and very nature, they are active services— the NIA has as its top priority the mainte- more so than their army counterparts nance of regime security. In fact, like during peacetime. Apart from that, the other parts of the national security appa- work of intelligence officials requires a ratus, the agency identifies dissidents and certain distance from politicians and po- journalists critical of the regime. Moreover, litical decision makers for various rea- it may have played a role in fabricating al- sons. On the one hand, they must work leged coups from 1996, 1997, and 2006, partly under covert circumstances, which all of which served as a pretext for the re- requires a certain isolation. On the other gime to consolidate its hold on power by hand, because political decision makers jailing its dissidents. SSR in the area of in- are not subject to the same scrutiny as telligence services, therefore, should not intelligence officials, close relationships only change the ways of conducting intel- run the risk of compromising the covert ligence but also alter its ends significantly. nature of intelligence work. A challenge Unsurprisingly, these services have his- to civil oversight, this distance renders torically been comparatively weak, partic- SSR efforts particularly difficult. Ideally, ularly in terms of countering threats from intelligence services operate under the abroad. During the Cold War, the stronger leadership of some sort of executive au- INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 61 thority that, in turn, must report to inde- of agencies as well as the need to cooper- pendent legislative bodies of the state ate and at times move beyond the bound- (in democracies, most often a parlia- ary of operational culture therefore con- mentary oversight committee). In these stitutes a particularly daunting challenge settings, intelligence services must regu- to the services. But even if they manage larly account for their activities, and the these relations rather efficiently, demo- oversight committee must have the cratic oversight bodies face the task of power to demand any information it sees controlling activities that are becoming fit to implement its oversight function, ever more complex and sophisticated. including the right to issue subpoenas. The number of agencies and interagency However, even in fully established de- relationships requires efficient oversight mocracies, this arrangement is by no bodies. However, these bodies cannot means always certain, and security estab- expand in the same way intelligence lishments can still exert influence on agencies can, nor can they monitor all politics. As Nicole Ball asked in the interagency communications and link- 1980s, just how much influence is “nor- ages, whether within the country or be- 14 mal”? Oftentimes one can detect prob- tween foreign agencies. Usually based as lems with oversight and the implementa- parliamentary committees, oversight tion of civilian superiority only bodies cannot increase in number and indirectly—in sub-Saharan Africa, per- cannot have more parliamentarians or haps the most apparent being the extent staffers allocated to them. Moreover, an of control over and public accountability expanding system of intelligence and se- for the financing of intelligence services. curity sectors may require experienced Since intelligence services by necessity parliamentarians in the oversight com- operate in secretive ways, civilian over- sight is harder to implement than in mittees, but in democracies one always other areas of the security sector, indicat- sees some fresh faces in committees. In ing the twin challenges that intelligence sub-Saharan Africa, where many democ- presents to SSR. That is, on the one racies have been established only re- hand, the necessity for efficient intelli- cently, following either the end of the gence has particular relevance in coun- Cold War or civil wars, experienced par- tries that can apply only limited financial liamentarians willing to apply and resources (as many times is the case in capable of applying the full spectrum of countries undertaking SSR) and there- oversight are in short supply. On top of fore require the use of secret measures. all that, one must consider the institu- On the other hand, this scenario makes tional history: some agencies may have effective civilian oversight all the more come under close scrutiny, perhaps fol- important. lowing a need felt in parliament to do so Lastly, in implementing counterter- or in the wake of some sort of scandal. rorism measures, intelligence services Such strict monitoring might not apply need to act simultaneously in a deterrito- to different and recently established rialised, desegregated, and cohesive agencies, even though they engage in manner. At the same time, the number the same activities, simply because of of institutional security services has their newness and because politicians grown on nearly all levels, whether national, have not yet felt the need to establish the federal, or regional. The growing number same sort of scrutiny. 62 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

Conclusions state in northern Nigeria, Kenya, Tanza- nia, and Somalia, partner agencies have Intelligence services are perhaps the needed capabilities in preemptive intelli- least studied instrument of the state’s gence and counterintelligence. States security apparatus in sub-Saharan Af- should avoid situations such as the one in rica. SSR in the area of intelligence serv- Pakistan, where Inter-Services Intelli- ices ultimately aims to detach those serv- gence is reluctant to cut ties it has nur- ices from political abuse and at the same tured with the Taliban and fight them al- time strengthen executive and legislative though they have clearly begun to pose a control over them. The challenge, there- threat to the state. Strong capabilities of fore, really lies in overcoming historically partner services in Nigeria and Eastern grown civil-intelligence relations that fo- Africa are therefore in the best interests cused on regime security and replacing of the West.16 As the Gambian case illus- them with relations characterised by trates, some services exist for the sole pur- stronger ties between oversight commit- pose of enhancing regime security; conse- tees and intelligence leadership, at the quently, reforming their structures and same time ensuring that the services fo- capabilities will pose a particularly diffi- cus on state rather than regime security. cult challenge. In such cases, SSR needs Typically, any intelligence service recom- to change the way of anticipating threats. mends bolstering operational capabilities Further research also needs to examine and putting more analysts in the field.15 more closely the differences in structure, However, for the foreseeable future, many style, and methods between Western and sub-Saharan African countries cannot sub-Saharan African intelligence services. commit more resources to intelligence, Nearly all developing countries are reform- particularly when the recipient states ing their security sectors and intelligence themselves will hold ownership in the aid services anyway; in recent years, the donor process. Therefore, clear and specific leg- agenda simply overruled these efforts. In islation detailing mandates and fields of this context, sequencing becomes first and operations is as important as the adher- foremost a question of where to pick up lo- ence to general principles of civilian con- cal reform efforts. Additionally, the fact that trol. Moreover, despite scarce resources, most donors still develop their own ap- security services should be financed by proaches to SSR catalyses the neglect of the state only and should have no access SSR efforts in recipient countries and often to any other monetary sources. Parlia- leads to contradicting donor agendas— ments will need to extend control from creating a specific burden. Moreover, since oversight of the forces to allocation, weap- SSR programmes are relatively new and, in ons procurement, and definition of the most cases, still in the initial stage of the rules of intelligence engagement—a chal- implementation process, the withdrawal of lenging task. For outside powers, it is hard donors adds a relatively recent challenge to offer help in establishing oversight that also lends more importance to the over intelligence agencies. question of sustainability. Overall, reform Improving capabilities, an important efforts have neglected intelligence and issue in the sub-Saharan Africa context, failed to place sufficient emphasis on the also represents a question of national se- training of parliamentarians; moreover, curity to the Western world. Ever since knowledge of intelligence services in sub- radical Islamists began challenging the Saharan Africa is too thinly spread. As SSR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 63 in sub-Saharan Africa turns into a policy into oversight enforcement in Africa and priority of the West and its development as- the characteristics of African intelligence sistance, a need exists for more research services. 

Notes 1. A white paper on international development, pub- rism in Africa, ed. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily lished in November 1997 by the Labour government in (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1998), 258–63. the United Kingdom, introduced SSR as a concept for 9. For research on coups d’état in Africa, see Aaron postconflict stabilisation. Deane-Peter Baker, “Agency Belkin and Evan Schofer, “Toward a Structural Under- Theory: A New Model of Civil-Military Relations for standing of Coup Risk,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, Africa?” African Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 1 no. 5 (2003): 594–620, http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/ (2007): 115, http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ajcr/ reprint/47/5/594.pdf; Patrick J. McGowan, “Coups and ajcr_2007_1.pdf?phpMyAdmin=ceeda2df659e6d3e35a6 Conflict in West Africa, 1955–2004: Part I: Theoretical 3d69e93228f1. Perspectives,” Armed Forces and Society 32, no. 1 (2005): 2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The 5–23, http://spafs.highwire.org/cgi/reprint/32/1/5 Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, .pdf; and Patrick J. McGowan, “African Military Coups MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); d’état, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution,” and Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 339–70. the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 10. Lauren Hutton, “Intelligence and Accountability 3. Andrea Wright, “Security Intelligence—Everybody’s in Africa,” ISS Policy Brief 2, no. 6 (June 2009): 1, http:// Doing It: New Challenges for Democratic Control” www.iss.co.za/uploads/JUL09INTELLIGENCEAC (paper presented at the European Consortium for Politi- COUNT.PDF. cal Research Conference, Pisa, Italy, September 2007), 11. Abdoulaye Saine, “The Gambia’s ‘Elected Auto- http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalcon crat Poverty, Peripherality, and Political Instability,’ 1994– ference/pisa/papers/PP379.pdf. 2006,” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3 (April 2008): 450– 4. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritar- 73, http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/3/450.pdf. ian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative 12. Alice Bellagamba, “On the Virtue of Margins: A Political Studies 40, no. 11 (1 November 2007): 1279–1301, Story of Conflict between Government and Muslim Leader- http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/40/11/1279.pdf. ship in Post-1994 Gambia,” in Beside the State: Emergent Powers 5. Ulrich Schneckener, “States at Risk: Zur Analyse in Contemporary Africa, ed. Alice Bellagamba and Georg fragiler Staatlichkeit,” in Fragile Staatlichkeit: “States at Klute (Köln, Germany: Köppe, 2008), 105–20. Risk” zwischen Stabilität und Scheitern, ed. Ulrich Schneckener 13. Charles C. Cogan and Ernest R. May, “The (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2009), 21. For the Congo, 1960–1963: Weighing Worst Choices,” in Dealing ideological character of security forces during the Cold with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and Intelligence War, see John Markakis and Michael Waller, “The Ham- Analysis, 1945–1990, ed. Ernest R. May and Philip D. mer, the Sickle and the Gun,” in Military Marxist Regimes in Zelikow (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 56–60. Africa, ed. John Markakis and Michael Waller (London: 14. Nicole Ball, “Third World Militaries and Politics: An Frank Cass, 1986), 1–13. Introductory Essay,” Cooperation and Conflict 17, no. 1 (1982): 6. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, Interna- 41–60. tional Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1990), 21–29; and Michael Wes- 15. Eric Rosenbach, “The Incisive Fight: Recommen- ley, “The State of the Art on the Art of State Building,” dations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence,” Global Governance 14, no. 3 (July 2008): 370, http://media Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci- .web.britannica.com/ebsco/pdf/33/33968783.pdf. ence 618, no. 7 (2008): 133–47, http://ann.sagepub.com/ 7. M. Anne Pitcher and Kelly M. Askew, “African Social- cgi/reprint/618/1/133.pdf. isms and Postsocialisms,” Africa 76, no. 1 (2006): 1–14, 16. David Omand, “The Limits of Avowal: Secret Intel- http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/africa_the_journal_of_the ligence in an Age of Public Scrutiny,” in National Intelli- _international_african_institute/v076/76.1pitcher01.pdf. gence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects, ed. 8. Bahru Zwede, “The Military and Militarism in Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (Cambridge: Africa: The Case of Ethiopia,” in The Military and Milita- Cambridge University Press, 2009), 235–64. Moving toward Democracy in Morocco?

John Hursh*

The Arabs, according to international surveys, have the greatest thirst for freedom and are the most appreciative of democracy out of all people in the world. —Dr. Rima Khalaf United Nations Assistant Secretary-General Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab States

[Arab] regimes have been too resistant to political change and [Arab] democracy movements too feeble to force it. —Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic

orocco’s advantageous geo- bors across the Strait of Gibraltar. Nevertheless, graphical location in large this kingdom at the crossroads of many civiliza- part defines its historical tions will continue to orient itself in many direc- 1 tions at the same time. Its future identity will importance in world affairs. depend on how politicians and citizens respond MBordering the North Atlantic Ocean and to global pressures for democratization, economic the Mediterranean Sea, it has long been reform, and human resource development.2 an important site for trade and com- As Dillman suggests, Morocco remains merce. Historically, commentators have at the crossroads of European, Arab, and regarded Morocco as the link between African policies, traditions, and thought. Africa and Europe, Islam and Christianity. Given its almost entirely Muslim popula- Although such a simplistic dichotomy is tion, the country has a strongly Islamic no longer accurate—and, indeed, proba- identity.3 Still, European colonialism and bly never was—Morocco remains a coun- a distinct North African culture exert a try of great cultural, social, and religious strong and diverse cultural and social in- complexity, a fact that raises important fluence on that identity. The influence of questions regarding its future identity. the Berbers remains particularly strong, Prof. Bradford Dillman asks, insofar as they account for about 35 per- As Morocco redefines its place in the world in cent of the Moroccan population.4 In ad- the new millennium, will it lean more toward dition, the linguistic and cultural influ- Europe, weakening its roots in the Arab world and disassociating itself from the troubles of ence of the Berbers on Moroccan sub-Saharan Africa? Globalization will pull the society—especially through music and country toward its liberal, industrialized neigh- dance—is well known.5

*The author is a JD candidate at the Indiana University–Bloomington School of Law and an MPA candidate at the Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs.

64 MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO? 65

Morocco serves not only as an impor- tance of internally rather than externally tant cultural link but also as a significant imposed reform. political and economic link between Af- rica and Europe. In addition to its role as an African-European crossroad, Morocco Moving toward Democracy? enjoys a reputation as a moderate Islamic Yet it is already clear that governments in the state. Perhaps as a result, it also has a close Middle East will have to cultivate compromise— relationship with the United States, both now, or very soon—to survive in any form. Initiat- as a political ally and as a trading partner. ing action on three controversial issues—political Politically, Morocco was the first Arab and prisoners, women’s rights, and political Islam— can start the process. Cooperation will signal Islamic state to condemn the terrorist at- intent to change. It will require ceding some tacks of 11 September 2001 on the United political power. And it will redefine the social States.6 As trading partners, Morocco and contract between ruler and ruled. . . . the United States exchanged approxi- Morocco is the only country that has attempted mately $860 million worth of goods and action on all three.9 services in 2003, before the countries signed a free trade agreement on 15 June 2004.7 In a press release pertaining to this Liberalizing Morocco’s Government agreement, US congressional representa- Currently, Morocco is a constitutional tive Bill Thomas stated that ‘‘Morocco is monarchy, but it could realistically change an important U.S. ally, and this agree- to a democratic government and society. ment will enhance the economic compo- The timeframe for such a transition re- nent of that relationship and support mains less clear.10 King Mohammed VI, Moroccan economic reforms.”8 who assumed the Moroccan throne in This article assesses the likelihood of 1999, wasted little time launching a “rela- Morocco’s transition from a monarchy to tively ambitious program of political and a democratic state. Toward that end, it social reforms,” including the establish- discusses recent liberal reforms and the ment of the IER.11 threat of terrorism within Morocco as Since assuming the throne, King Mo- well as political and social changes that hammed VI has made several important resulted from actions of the Equity and reforms designed to liberalize Morocco, Reconciliation Commission (IER) and the two most important institutional ac- from reforms to the Moudawana (Code tions being creation of the IER and of Personal Status). Moreover, the article changes to the Moudawana. Mohammed examines the historical context of the Al- VI created the IER to investigate and re- gerian scenario, inquiring whether Mo- search violations of human rights in Mo- rocco might experience its own version of rocco from 1956, when the country this scenario and whether the results of gained independence from France and the 2007 Moroccan parliamentary elec- Spain, until 1999, when King Hassan II tions demonstrate a deepening rift be- died and Mohammed VI assumed power.12 tween the monarchy and the Moroccan The IER primarily addressed violations people. Finally, it addresses the mixed re- that occurred within the Zaman al-Rusas sults that King Mohammed VI’s liberal (Years of Lead), a period of civil unrest, reforms have had on Morocco’s political political violence, and severe government and social discourse, as well as the impor- repression beginning in the 1960s and 66 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE ending in the 1980s.13 Any attempt to im- the IER and Moudawana reforms for fail- prove women’s rights in Morocco would ing to push far or hard enough for necessarily require a change to the Mou- change. Perhaps more importantly, some dawana, the set of laws that deal with per- commentators argue that these are re- sonal status, family, and inheritance.14 forms in name only, alleging that political These two institutional reforms are essen- and social conditions within Morocco tial to Morocco’s potential transition to a have not changed appreciably and that democratic state because they address the rhetoric of reform takes precedence past abuses of human rights and matters over the substance of reform. of state repression, thus allowing for rec- onciliation and the establishment of trust The Threat of Terrorism in state authorities. Moreover, they lend legitimacy to women’s participation in the Many observers have stressed the chal- lenge that terrorism presents to democ- country’s social, civil, and political life. 16 In Morocco, recent interaction be- racy, particularly within the Middle East. tween the state and society has led to im- Arguably, Nafia Noureddine, founder of proved human rights and fewer restric- Jamaa Islamiya Moukatila Maghrebia (the tions on women. No assessment of these Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, or GICM), represents one unlikely example improvements should underestimate the 17 actions of Mohammed VI, who, after gain- of Morocco’s successful reform. GICM ing the throne, made bold moves to im- has a strong affiliation with al-Qaeda, hav- ing received both military training and fi- prove human rights, such as asking long- 18 time political dissident Driss Benzekri to nancial support from Osama bin Laden. lead the IER.15 Although creation of the The United Nations (UN), United States, IER largely moved from the state to soci- and United Kingdom consider GICM a ety, changes to the Moudawana moved dangerous terrorist organization. On 10 largely from society to the state. Grass- October 2002, the UN issued a worldwide roots women’s rights organizations and ban on the group pursuant to UN Secu- 19 social activists successfully brought wom- rity Council Resolution 1267. That same en’s rights to mainstream social and po- year, the US Department of State desig- litical thought by deftly maneuvering nated GICM a foreign terrorist organiza- around religious obstacles, arguing that tion.20 Similarly, under the United King- increased women’s rights accord with Is- dom’s Terrorism Act of 2000, GICM lamic principles. membership may result in a 10-year Currently, Morocco’s potential transi- prison sentence.21 tion to democracy depends almost en- Authorities blamed GICM for bomb- tirely on King Mohammed VI since no ings in Casablanca in 2003 that targeted a political opposition can significantly chal- Jewish community center, a Spanish res- lenge the monarchy’s authority or taurant and social club, a hotel, and the threaten its power. Democratic transition Belgian consulate, killing at least 41 will take place on the king’s terms. If the people and injuring about 100 more, and monarchy continues, a ruler less inclined for railway bombings in Madrid on 11 to Mohammed VI’s liberal reforms could March 2004 that killed 191 people and obviously undo these changes although wounded another 1,841.22 The events he would likely encounter strong opposi- that occurred after these tragic reminders tion. In addition, commentators criticize of the destructive power of terrorism illus- MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO? 67 trate several encouraging aspects of Mo- Afghanistan in 2001 and appeal to bin roccan society. First, the fact that Noured- Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri for military dine stood trial, was convicted, and is and material support.26 Although Noured- serving a 20-year prison sentence in Mo- dine succeeded in bringing substantial rocco for his involvement in the Casa- violence to Morocco and Spain, the fact blanca bombings shows that Morocco is a that he could not plan and finance these secure state with a working judiciary.23 attacks within Morocco is significant. The Working with Moroccan officials, the Al- execution of terrorist attacks, prepared gerian authorities did not simply capture for and financed far from their target, is and kill Noureddine. Likewise, Tamara and will continue to be a threat to democ- Wittes characterizes Morocco’s domestic racy and state security in the twenty-first security services as “efficient,” perhaps century. Well-coordinated and mobilized because they are “flush with U.S. funding terrorist networks and activities are highly and training.”24 Importantly, Morocco’s problematic to democracy and state secu- security does not come at such a high rity. This is true, however, for all govern- price that it threatens civil society. Despite ments and all states, not just Morocco. the devastation of the Casablanca bomb- More importantly, Noureddine’s inability ings, Moroccan citizens resumed normal to find support within Morocco suggests life relatively soon. both a rejection of GICM’s philosophy and Second, immediately following the of terrorism as means of undermining civil Casablanca bombings, US Deputy Secre- society and political participation. tary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that Morocco “stands out in the Arab world as a country that is making significant strides Equity and Reconciliation towards democracy and I think the terror- Commission ists are opposed to progress.”25 Even though his statement is somewhat self- In contrast to combating the violence serving, given the Bush administration’s that GICM, a nonstate actor, unleashed reliance on Morocco in its “war on ter- on Casablanca and Madrid, the IER ror,” it demonstrates a different expecta- sought to reconcile the Moroccan people tion for Morocco than for other Arab with the violence that their government states. As Wolfowitz suggests, Morocco brought upon them between indepen- “stands out” as an exception to the norm dence in 1956 and the end of King Hassan in the Middle East. The United States, or II’s rule in 1999: “What is needed to turn at least the Bush administration, expected states of a despotic whim into genuine na- a democratic transition to occur in Mo- tions of law? In Morocco, many reformers rocco. Terrorists, Wolfowitz asserts, also believe, an essential first step is an open perceive this possibility and understand reckoning with the abuses that this system the threat that it poses to their organiza- spawned in the past. That effort shows the tions, both in Morocco and, perhaps, profound limits that real change faces regionally. If other Arab states follow even among Arab nations that have taken Morocco’s lead, the terrorists may re- tangible steps toward political open- act accordingly. ness.”27 When the IER attempted to an- Third, when Noureddine could not swer this profound political question, its develop his terrorist organization in Mo- members directly (and Moroccan citizens rocco, he had to travel to Taliban-controlled indirectly) experienced successes, set- 68 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE backs, and limitations as the commission royal mandate allows it to act effectively: moved from an ambitious beginning to a “Royal support means that public institu- qualified, if not disappointing, conclusion. tions and security forces are obliged to Perhaps the most important step in es- comply with all requests for information tablishing the rule of law and a democratic and assistance.”33 Accordingly, the com- government within a formerly nondemo- mission received many, though presum- cratic state is the recognition of past injus- ably not all, of the answers to its questions: tices. Without such recognition, finding “To date, there has not been a single occa- reconciliation and establishing social trust sion when the IER has asked for informa- between the state and its citizens become tion, that it has not received. The mili- highly unlikely. The acknowledgment of tary and the police have been totally past injustices—in this case, those perpe- cooperative.”34 trated by his father and grandfather— Total cooperation seems unlikely, given motivated King Mohammed VI to create the numerous criticisms of the commis- the IER. During a speech to commemo- sion, including its limited dissemination rate the commission’s opening in January of state knowledge—probably the most 2004, he declared, “Our objective is to en- damaging criticism. Without a complete sure that Moroccans reconcile themselves commitment to establishing and telling with their history.”28 the historical truth, it is very unlikely that Mohammed VI modeled the IER after reconciliation will occur. Indeed, as the the South African Truth and Reconciliation commission’s work progressed, Moroc- Commission, which addressed atrocities cans appeared to resign themselves to fo- that occurred during apartheid.29 Headed cusing on future prevention rather than by former political prisoner Benzekri and past reconciliation: “Moroccans recognize 16 other such former prisoners or human that the past will not get a full airing. . . . rights activists, the IER investigated over ‘Instead, we need guarantees that it won’t 20,000 cases of human rights abuses.30 happen in the future.’ ”35 Attorney Moham- Benzekri, whose appointment gave the med Sebbar, who now heads the Forum for commission credibility, clearly supported Justice and Truth, is less optimistic: “What King Mohammed VI’s objective of recon- we got is the truth decided and provided by ciliation: “To create a democratic society, the state.”36 people have to know the truth and their Even though a full disclosure of past history. . . . The report marked a funda- wrongs almost certainly did not occur, the mental rupture with Morocco’s past.”31 commission had its beneficial aspects, so- The benefits of the IER remain contested, cial catharsis perhaps the most significant but nearly all commentators agree on its of them. Indeed some commentators ar- importance as the first truth commission gue that the state broadcast of the initial in North Africa or the Middle East: “No IER hearings on national television cre- Arab government had ever confessed to ated a historical moment in which Moroc- widespread abuses, much less tried to inves- cans attempted to move forward, letting tigate the past or reconcile with its victims.”32 go of the past.37 Still, “despite its difficult Interestingly, King Mohammed VI’s nature, few doubt the cathartic benefits support was perhaps both the greatest ad- of airing grievances in such a public man- vantage and disadvantage to the IER. The ner. However, some human rights organi- commission would not exist without the zations accuse the IER of stopping short king’s approval and support since his of justice for its victims.”38 Certainly, hu- MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO? 69 man rights organizations should criticize Consultative Council on Human Rights the IER, but one could argue that, despite to resolve human rights abuses.42 After his the failure to bring justice to each victim, predecessor’s death, King Mohammed VI the larger social cathartic function of created an arbitration board through the these public hearings somewhat mitigates consultative council that distributed more the shortcomings of individual justice. It than $100 million for nearly 4,000 cases is also important to note that in any post- of such abuses.43 Even though this sub- conflict state or democratic transition that stantial financial compensation seemed a involved large-scale human rights abuses, sincere commitment to improving hu- some victims never receive the justice they man rights, “the Independent Arbitration seek. Although unfortunate, this reality sug- Panel in particular set an extremely short gests that some justice is better than none. deadline for applications, cutting off In any case, the IER suffers from addi- thousands of people, and paid monetary tional shortcomings. For example, not damages to victims or their families with- only were former detainees unable to out any concern for reconciliation.”44 In state the names of those responsible for comparison, about 13,000 victims were to their torture but also the commission receive financial reparations through the lacked the power to prosecute the perpe- IER, which also used a relatively short dead- trators.39 However, it did not grant am- line but did emphasize reconciliation.45 nesty to them, unlike the South African Perhaps more than anything, the com- Truth and Reconciliation Commission. mission reflects a missed or half-grasped Thus, in theory at least, victims or their opportunity for Morocco. Certainly, it im- families could prosecute the perpetrators proved human rights as well as political and in court.40 social discourse within Morocco: “Activists The much more damaging criticism describe the gradual evaporation of the cli- occurred after the IER made its final re- mate of fear as perhaps the biggest shift in port to King Mohammed VI. Following Morocco.”46 Despite these changes for the the bombings in Casablanca, human better, reforms could have pushed further rights activists alleged that unlawful de- and involved less compromise had the Mo- tention and torture continued: “The IER roccan government been more forthcom- is looking at violations up until 1999 but ing with state knowledge and more resistant violations are still continuing; the security to returning to repressive measures follow- forces have been taking Islamists to the ing the Casablanca bombings. detention center in Temara and torturing In 2005 Charles Kenney and Dean them. It is all continuing.”41 There is per- Spears found a significant statistical rela- haps no better way to invalidate a recon- tionship between truth commissions and ciliation commission than to resume the lasting democracy: “This study finds that illegal practices and human rights abuses there is evidence for lasting positive ef- that prompted its creation in the first fects of truth commissions on [all] levels place. Unfortunately, according to vari- of democracy.”47 Despite the fact that the ous human rights organizations and so- study applies only to South America and cial activists, this is exactly what happened. that the statistical significance, though Reparations also presented mixed re- valid, is small, its findings are encourag- sults. Unlike the IER, financial repara- ing for Morocco. In fact, the authors con- tions mark a carryover from King Hassan clude with a note of careful optimism: “If II’s rule. In 1990 Hassan II created the the statistical effects of truth commissions 70 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE are positive but fragile it is perhaps be- Before the Moudawana underwent re- cause the real effects of truth commissions form, women remained minors through- on democracy are positive but fragile— out their entire lifetimes. This code of significant but operating among many laws effectively classified women as sec- other factors mediated by variable con- ond-class citizens—always subject to the texts. This would encourage optimistic control of men. Even a woman’s son was but realistic hopes for the impact of truth her legal guardian.53 Wright argues that commissions on democracy.”48 the Moudawana “relegated females to Given Morocco’s compromised truth haremlike status” and that it has been the and reconciliation commission and the “biggest legal impediment to empowering resumption of human rights abuses as women.”54 soon as the state faced a security crisis, the Significant changes to the Moudawana first Arab truth and reconciliation com- include increased women’s rights in mar- mission did not completely meet the ini- riage, divorce, and citizenship, as well as tially optimistic expectations. Still, simply in child custody and inheritance.55 Politi- having a legitimate, if not ideal, reconcili- cal parties also agreed to reserve spots on ation commission represents a significant a special national parliamentary ballot for step toward liberal reform and possible women.56 The reforms allow women both democratic transition within Morocco greater personal and political rights. Prob- and perhaps the region. lems remain, but the improvement is quite significant: “Despite continuing problems Reforming the Moudawana of implementation—such as untrained judges and a lack of information among The IER received substantial interna- women about their rights—the scope of tional attention, but “of the changes car- the reform is considerable and puts Mo- ried out by Mohammed, perhaps the most rocco well ahead of other countries in the significant is the family law code [Mou- region on the issue of women’s rights.”57 dawana].”49 King Mohammed VI did not Perhaps the most interesting aspect of make these changes by himself. As Robin the Moudawana reform involved political Wright points out, numerous women and some men of diverse backgrounds cam- Islamic groups’ promotion of democratic paigned, protested, and lobbied for gen- change and the near-universal approval erations to change the Moudawana.50 they received for doing so—particularly Women had a greater stake in this issue, as from the United States and Europe. US and illustrated by the social and political move- European leaders and policy makers would ments: “Women’s organizations in particu- do well to remember the ability of these lar played a key role not only in generating groups to promote liberal reform and dem- support for the reformed Mudawwana, ocratic change. Unfortunately, as the next but also in lobbying for changes in the na- part of this article demonstrates, these tionality law (so that women could trans- leaders and policy makers seldom do. mit citizenship to their children) and a 51 gender quota for women in parliament.” The Algerian Scenario Wittes recognizes the significance of re- forming the Moudawana, stating that the The “Algerian scenario” refers to Alge- recent changes have “vastly improved the ria’s failed attempt to democratize its gov- legal status of women.”52 ernment in the early 1990s. Fearing a MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO? 71 democratically elected Islamist govern- states and oil-conscious Western states ment, Algerian authorities halted the learned that unleashing democracy within country’s democratic transition, resulting the Middle East and North Africa would in a brutal civil conflict that claimed more not produce desirable political results: than 150,000 lives. Autocratic regimes in “The Algerian failure at democratization the Middle East and North Africa consis- and its descent into civil war provided a tently return to this scenario and remind number of lessons for political actors out- oil-hungry industrialized countries of this side the country and later came to be possible outcome, lest these states push known as the ‘Algerian scenario’—a sce- too hard for meaningful democratic re- nario which was to be avoided at all costs.”65 form. Although a true Algerian scenario Ruling autocratic regimes now argue has never occurred, and the logic of this that allowing truly open political systems scenario remains dubious, the scenario will backfire and that unfettered democ- has nonetheless prevailed as an effective racy will allow fundamentalists with no tool for autocratic regimes to retain power. real interest in democracy to seize power, doing so, ironically, by winning an elec- Historical Context tion. As a result, typically repressive states In 1989 Algeria suffered from an unprece- that oppose Islamist groups—those en- dented economic crisis, which, combined dorsing political Islam—simply eliminate with basic shortcomings in governance, or marginalize them within political dis- threatened the ruling regime’s existence.58 course. Thus, the proclaimed fear of an- Seeking to regain political legitimacy, the other Algerian scenario allows autocratic Algerian government opened the political states to repress Islamist groups. Numer- system to virtually unhampered demo- ous contemporary scholars, such as Fran- 59 cratic reform. The result confounded cesco Cavatorta, have strongly criticized the expectations of Algeria’s ruling elite. this scenario: The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) utilized the democratic process to win broad sup- Twenty years ago, Algeria attempted to democ- port from the largely dissatisfied Algerian ratise and it failed to consolidate its progress 60 because an Islamist party was going to be the population. In 1991, after a successful main beneficiary of regime change. Secular sec- first round of legislative elections, the FIS tors of the domestic polity and the international stood ready to claim a landslide victory of community sanctioned a “democracy-saving” the state’s electorate.61 The second elec- military coup. The outcome of the Army’s inter- tion never took place due to the Algerian vention has been a brutal civil war and a legacy Army’s intervention.62 of authoritarian rule where the socio-economic and cultural situation that gave rise to the FIS is Following that intervention, the be- still very much alive.66 sieged Algerian government reinstalled authoritarian rule, banning FIS and im- Strikingly, the Algerian scenario re- prisoning many of its members.63 Rather mains a powerful political lesson to many than accept this defeat, the remaining Arabs and Westerners even though the members of FIS took arms against the Al- scenario has never occurred. Further, de- gerian government. The war that followed spite the numerous theoretical flaws and claimed more than 150,000 casualties and questionable assumptions inherent in this “was characterized by unspeakable brutal- political conceptualization, autocratic Arab ity.”64 From this conflict, autocratic Arab governments continue to justify their rule 72 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE and nondemocratic policies by appealing to the king wishes, thus making participa- the Algerian scenario. tion a meaningless gesture. In this sense, The uncritical acceptance of this sce- liberal reform within a constitutional nario hinders true democratic reform. monarchy may have reached its limit. First, accepting it allows for simple dis- Whether this impasse means that Mo- missal of all Islamist groups, including rocco will endure its own Algerian sce- those with liberal and democratic beliefs, nario remains to be seen. thus collapsing the ideologies of violent After assuming the throne, Mohammed militants with the peaceful ideologies of VI significantly increased the avenues of democratically minded reformists. Sec- political participation, including loosen- ond, Islamist groups will not simply disap- ing the state’s control of the press and pear; eventually, they must be included in opening registration for political par- political discourse and policy discussions. It is ties.69 Recent restrictions on the press and a mistake to marginalize these groups now. the intimidation of journalists suggest Wittes argues forcefully that the Bush that these actions might not be perma- administration made this very mistake: nent. Moreover, such restrictions and in- “The Bush administration’s failure to timidation undermine the already limited overcome the legacy of Algeria and to de- ability of Moroccan citizens to voice mean- velop a more sophisticated relationship ingful political and social criticism, inviting with the region’s varied Islamist move- comparisons to the Algerian scenario. ments severely hampered the effective- Wittes argues that within Arab states, ness and indeed the basic credibility of its political debate often dissolves into polar- democracy push.”67 This article returns to ized rhetoric between autocratic govern- this point during its discussion of the ne- ments and political Islamist groups be- cause of the built-in advantage that the cessity of internal liberal reform versus 70 externally imposed reform in “The Im- latter enjoy. The fact that Islamist groups portance of Internal Reform,” below. It is can voice political dissent within the reasonable, however, to assume that the mosque affords them both a guaranteed Bush administration applied a version of audience and a relatively secure venue to the Algerian scenario when it decided to speak. Secular groups, who do not enjoy invade Iraq in 2003. Many commentators these advantages, can be more closely argue that, despite initially displaying monitored and more easily restricted. For signs of avoiding this scenario, the Obama example, autocratic states may success- administration is currently repeating this fully restrict secular political dissent by closing the organization’s press or simply mistake. Tariq Ali is particularly critical, by banning the organization or its activi- characterizing Obama’s foreign policy as ties. In contrast, autocratic governments “imperialism with a human face.”68 have only limited ability to control dis- Will Morocco Experience an Algerian Scenario? sent within the mosque, thereby allowing Islamist groups to occupy a “privileged Despite King Mohammed VI’s liberal re- position” within political and social dis- forms, recent developments suggest that course.71 Furthermore, the monopoliza- the Moroccan people are ready for de- tion of political dissent allows Islamism to mocracy. Political participation in Mo- stand as a “catchall category for political rocco is declining, largely due to the per- dissent.”72 Islamist groups do not need to ception that politics are ultimately what create a meaningful political message. MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO? 73

Instead, Islamism becomes an undiffer- 1980s, labor movements experienced nu- entiated resistance to often unpopular merous political successes in Morocco autocratic governments. despite severe state repression.76 For in- Although it is not possible to disregard stance, Moroccan labor unions success- King Mohammed VI’s recent restrictions fully delayed implementation of the Inter- on the press, some social factors suggest national Monetary Fund’s recommended that Morocco might avoid the Algerian structural adjustment programs by creating problem. Al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and widespread popular resistance to them.77 Benevolence), the leading Islamist social Finally, due to its complex social, cultural, movement in Morocco, refuses to partici- and political past, Morocco defies expec- pate in elections but maintains a large tations of conflict: “Morocco also has a popular following.73 In contrast to the history of peaceful pluralism so firm that leaders of Islamist organizations in other the population still includes several thou- Arab states, those of Al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsan sand Jews, who enjoy genuine freedom of advocate a very moderate version of Islam, worship and close ties to Israel.”78 as well as inclusive democratic participa- tion: “Leaders of the current Moroccan The 2007 Moroccan Parliamentary Elections religious movement, al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsan . . . discard an exclusive understanding of Is- In large part, the restrictions on the press lam, rely on interpretation and historiciz- and intimidation of journalists discussed ing, and acknowledge flexibility and am- above occurred leading up to and during the 2007 Moroccan parliamentary elec- biguity; they reject imposing Shari’a laws 79 or the wearing of the hijab and endorse tions. The political protest and dissent human rights, pluralism, democracy, and surrounding those elections suggest not separation of powers” (italics in original).74 only a growing rift between the govern- The liberal views of the most popular Is- ment and the Moroccan people but also a lamist group within Morocco suggest that strong link between restricting free the usual polarization between autocratic speech and a general decline in political state and political Islamist organization will participation. not occur in that country. Granted, the This link might be symptomatic of a motivations and goals of both states and larger underlying problem within Moroc- social organizations change—sometimes can society. One of the most troubling as- rapidly—and the unlikelihood of a con- pects of Morocco’s current political situa- frontation between the monarchy and Is- tion is that the monarchy overshadows lamist organizations does not mean that Parliament to the point that political par- one will not occur. ticipation becomes a substantially margin- Further complicating the predication of alized activity. Regardless of Parliament’s a Moroccan version of the Algerian scenario actions or the people’s will expressed is Morocco’s contradictory and volatile past. through parliamentary voting, the king During King Hassan II’s rule from 1961 to still makes the final decision.80 1999, the country experienced severe re- The fact that only 37 percent of regis- pression and political violence, including tered voters took part in the 2007 parlia- political killings, forced disappearances, mentary elections suggests that Moroccans arbitrary arrests, torture, the operation of are growing tired of this political situa- secret prisons, the shutdown of newspapers, tion.81 Further, of those voters, nearly one- and the banning of books.75 During the fifth intentionally invalidated their ballots 74 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE in political protest, including writing anti- Taking the Good with the Bad 82 monarchy statements on the ballots. Despite the encouraging actions that Mo- Wittes is especially critical of King Mo- hammed VI has taken in moving Morocco hammed VI’s government regarding the toward becoming a liberal state, it remains parliamentary elections, suggesting that a constitutional monarchy and in all likeli- the political protest indicates the monarchy’s hood will remain one in the future—an limited ability both to retain social and unsurprising conclusion, given Morocco’s political control and to liberalize Moroc- long history as a monarchy.85 Moreover, can society: “This act of political protest the king shows no signs of relinquishing suggests that limited liberalization, even power: “King Mohammed, who is 42 [now in the best of circumstances, has a limited 47], is seen as far more concerned with 83 life span with frustrated citizens.” More- humanitarian issues [than King Hassan over, she links the failure of free speech II], yet not once since assuming the to the failure of meaningful political de- throne in 1999 has he ever suggested di- bate: “If the king is ever to be expected to luting his role.”86 Even though Morocco’s acknowledge the need for reforms mean- transition to a democratic state remains ingful enough to engage citizen participa- unlikely in the short term, the reforms tion in politics, the quality of public discus- made by King Mohammed VI should not sion must improve—and press freedom be overlooked. Morocco remains a rela- will be essential to that process.”84 Wittes’s tively free and secure society, if not a analysis suggests that the Moroccan people democratic one. may be closer to demanding democracy The importance of Mohammed VI’s than many commentators think. Whether civil and political reforms perhaps be- such a demand for democracy would cause comes more evident when one examines King Mohammed VI to invoke the Alge- the civil and political societies of Moroc- rian scenario remains unknown. co’s Arab neighbors—Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.87 In 2007 the US De- Mixed Results partment of State concluded that Morocco implemented significant measures dur- Assessing King Mohammed’s liberal re- ing the year which resulted in the advancement forms provides both cause for concern and of human rights, including the government’s re- cause for optimism. Of course, Morocco vision of the Nationality Code to permit Muslim women to transmit citizenship to children and its remains a monarchy and likely will remain publishing of domestic violence statistics. In Sep- as such for some time. Although he does tember an overall civic commitment to develop- not provide his citizens with democracy, ing a culture of human rights was reflected in King Mohammed has a commitment to parliamentary elections which were monitored 88 civil and social reform that remains note- by domestic and international groups. worthy and important. Moreover, the rela- Interestingly, the Department of State’s tive success of these liberal reforms affirms characterization of the 2007 parliamen- the necessity of internal reform, as opposed tary elections differs strikingly from to externally imposed reform. Indeed, Mo- Wittes’s stinging critique. Perhaps the key roccans enjoy expanded civil and social point is that Morocco likely will remain a rights due to top-down and bottom-up re- monarchy for at least the near future, but form from within Morocco, not externally King Mohammed VI’s commitment to hu- imposed reform from beyond its borders. man rights is laudable, if not ideal. Criti- MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO? 75 cism is certainly appropriate, but it is too serves that this phenomenon is not lim- early to label King Mohammed VI’s Mo- ited to the Middle East—that imposed rocco either a success or a failure. democracies also have failed in the Philip- pines and Korea.92 The Importance of Internal Reform Among the numerous ways to demon- Although the limitations to implement- strate the failure of the Bush administra- ing democracy in Morocco’s constitu- tion’s plan to democratize Iraq following tional monarchy are readily apparent, the removal of Saddam Hussein, the most one must remember that the successful obvious is the number of civilian casual- civil and political reforms of King Mo- ties resulting from that effort—currently hammed VI and his government came (as of June 2010) between 96,813 and from within Morocco. Top-down institu- 105,563.93 Moreover, many people doubt tional changes implemented by the that a secure, democratic Iraq will arise or king—combined with bottom-up calls for endure in the future. Instead, Wright ar- reform by various Moroccan social and gues that since the beginning of the war political activists, intellectuals, and com- there in 2003, terrorism has become a mentators, as well as a diverse network of nongovernmental organizations—created greater threat, the proliferation of weapons meaningful liberal reform. of mass destruction has increased, Iraq Morocco provides an important, if has become less stable, the war appears sometimes ignored, lesson for implement- unwinnable, and regional sectarian vio- ing such reform in the Middle East and lence threatens to undermine the stability North Africa. Meaningful reform must of other Middle Eastern states.94 In addi- come from within the state. Externally tion, she maintains that US influence is at imposed reforms, democratic or other- its lowest point in the region since immedi- wise, that lack legitimacy fail to garner the ately following World War II.95 Finally, she support of the people that the reforms declares that the Bush administration’s intend to help. Even the best-intentioned failed attempt to implement democracy in externally imposed reforms cannot offset Iraq has greatly reduced legitimate grass- this lack of legitimacy and public credibility. roots democracy’s chance to take root: “The Contemporary Iraq represents perhaps complete failure in Iraq . . . will only keep the starkest reminder of the failure to im- other regimes in power longer.”96 Obvi- plement external democratic reform on ously, some of Wright’s criticisms seem an Arab state. Tom Hayden terms this tempered by recent developments in Iraq, failed policy “democracy at gunpoint.”89 especially after President Bush’s largely Similarly, Asef Bayat refers to the external imposition of democracy on Iraq as “de- successful troop surge in 2007 and the mocracy by conquest.”90 Bayat notes that still inconclusive national elections of foreign intervention in the name of dem- 2010. Moreover, the Obama administra- ocratic change not only has failed as an tion’s decision to shift the focus of US effective policy but also has often proved foreign policy to Afghanistan also compli- counterproductive: “If anything, foreign cates this assessment. The situation in intervention in the Middle East has his- Iraq is not nearly as stark as it was in 2007, torically worked against, and not for, but no one can say whether democracy democratic governance.”91 He also ob- will take root and flourish. 76 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

Conclusion A strong and immediate push toward full-fledged democracy may not be likely, True to its history, Morocco continues but maintaining the status quo also seems to present complex social and political unlikely. Of course, this situation might questions that evade simple resolution. Morocco is and likely will remain a consti- change rapidly. King Mohammed VI is a tutional monarchy. Still, significant areas respected leader working to reform Mo- of social and political freedom exist within rocco’s civil and political societies and the monarchy. Islamism, a social and po- expand human rights, but he will not al- litical force often criticized for supposedly ways be king. Obviously, this is the funda- working against liberal reform and the mental problem of any monarchical system implementation of democratic govern- of governance—no matter the popularity, ment, is moderate and encouraging of success, or political acumen of the cur- recent liberal reforms in Morocco. In- rent ruler, a less popular, less successful, deed, according to Wittes, “If Islamism or less gifted leader may always follow. and democracy can ever be proved com- Thus, King Mohammed VI would be well 97 patible, it might well be in Morocco.” advised to institutionalize the positive re- Morocco does seem to rest at a crossroads, forms that he has made. poised to transition into a democratic Other commentators take a more criti- state or to backslide into a repressive auto- cal position: “Ultimately, despite its prog- cratic state. Perhaps because of its im- ress, Moroccan democracy remains a proved record in human rights and rela- tively successful civil and political reforms, shadow game: democratic institutions Morocco stands out from other Arab have little substantive authority, and citi- states in another respect. Specifically, Mo- zens’ preferences, as expressed at the bal- roccans generally approve of their govern- lot box, rarely have much effect on gov- ment, albeit with some severe reservations— ernment policy.”98 In this sense, Morocco as the political dissent over the 2007 remains a government of the king’s sover- parliamentary elections demonstrated. eign voice rather than a government of Accordingly, they face a difficult decision. “We the People.” 

Notes 1. “Morocco’s strategic location has shaped its his- Middle Eastern Minorities and Diasporas, ed. Moshe Ma’oz tory.” See “Background Note: Morocco,” US Department and Gabriel Sheffer (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 26 January 2010, Press, 2002), 153; and “The Berbers,” An Open Door to the http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm. Arab World, 12 January 2010, http://www.al-bab.com/ 2. Bradford Dillman, “Morocco’s Future: Arab, African, arab/background/berber.htm. or European?” Friends of Morocco Newsletter, July 2001, http:// 6. “Background Note: Morocco.” friendsofmorocco.org/2001News/July01/Morocco 7. House, Implementation of the United States–Morocco Future.htm. 3. “Background Note: Morocco.” Free Trade Agreement, Hearing before the Committee on Ways 4. James Stuart Olson, The Peoples of Africa: An Ethno- and Means, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 7 July 2004, http:// historical Dictionary (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS64776. 1996), 90–91. 8. “[Cong. Bill] Thomas Announces Hearing on 5. See Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities: Implementation of the United States–Morocco Free Berbers, ‘Berberism,’ and the State in North Africa,” in Trade Agreement,” press release, US House Committee MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO? 77 on Ways and Means, 25 June 2004, http://ftp.resource links to terrorist and fundamentalist groups, particularly the .org/gpo.gov/hearings/108h/99669.txt. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.” “Spain Names 9. Robin Wright, Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the ‘Bomb Suspect’ Group.” See also “Madrid Train Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 341. Attacks,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/ 10. Statement of Driss Benzekri, former Moroccan spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/default.stm. political prisoner and president of the Equity and Recon- 23. “French Court Convicts 8 of Helping 2003 Casa- ciliation Commission: “ ‘There is a decision in Morocco to blanca Suicide Bombers,” International Herald Tribune, 11 go ahead with democratization and reform, including July 2007. separation of powers, but we are still debating a time 24. Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March, 73. frame and how to go about it.’ ” Ibid., 350. 25. “Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca.” 11. Tamara Cofman Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March: 26. Bergen, Osama bin Laden I Know, 279. America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy (Washington, DC: 27. Neil MacFarquhar, “In Morocco, a Rights Move- Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 72–73; and Wright, ment, at the King’s Pace,” New York Times, 1 October 2005, Dreams and Shadows, 343. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/01/international/ 12. Wright, Dreams and Shadows, 343. africa/01morocco.html?pagewanted=print. 13. Ibid., 342. 28. Maryam Montague, “Morocco’s Truth Revealed, 14. Ibid., 366–67. and the Possibility of Reconciliation,” Fletcher Forum of 15. Ibid., 344. World Affairs 29, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 59, 60. 16. See Gérard Soulier, “Terrorism*,” in The European 29. Wright, Dreams and Shadows, 343. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: International 30. Ibid., 344. Protection versus National Restrictions, ed. Mireille Delmas- 31. Ibid., 346. Marty, trans. and ed. Christine Chodkiewicz (Dordrecht, 32. Ibid., 344. See also MacFarquhar, “In Morocco”: Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 15. “The commission’s public hearings . . . are without prece- 17. Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An dent in the Middle East”; and Montague, “Morocco’s Truth Oral History of al-Qaeda’s Leader (New York: Free Press, Revealed,” 59. 2006), 279. 33. Montague, “Morocco’s Truth Revealed,” 61. 18. Ibid. 34. Ibid. See statement of IER commissioner Abdelhay 19. Security Council Resolution 1267, UN Doc. S/ Moudden. RES/1267 (15 October 1999); and Security Council Com- 35. MacFarquhar, “In Morocco.” See statement of mittee Established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Prof. Muhammad Sassi, University of Rabat. Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Indi- 36. Wright, Dreams and Shadows, 348. viduals and Entities, The Consolidated List Established and 37. Montague, “Morocco’s Truth Revealed,” 62. Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, 38. Ibid. Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, 39. MacFarquhar, “In Morocco.” Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them, 4 June 2010, 40. Montague, “Morocco’s Truth Revealed,” 63. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml. 41. Ibid. 20. US Department of State, “Determination Pursuant 42. Ibid. to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 Relating to the 43. Ibid., 61. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM),” Federal Regis- 44. Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, Morocco: From ter 67, no. 242 (12 December 2002): 77, 311, http://www.fas Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition? Carnegie Papers, .org/irp/news/2002/12/fr121702.html; and US Depart- Middle East Series, no. 71 (Washington, DC: Carnegie ment of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterror- Endowment for International Peace, September 2006), 7–8, ism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” http://www.state http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp71_ottaway .gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/ (accessed 14 June 2010). _final.pdf. 21. “The traditional primary objective of the GICM has 45. MacFarquhar, “In Morocco.” been the installation of a governing system of the caliphate to 46. Ibid. replace the governing Moroccan monarchy. The group also 47. Charles D. Kenney and Dean E. Spears, Truth and has an Al Qai’da–inspired global extremist agenda.” See “Pro- Consequences: Do Truth Commissions Promote Democratization? scribed Terrorist Groups,” Home Office, http://www.home (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American office.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed- Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1–4 Sep- terror-groups/proscribed-groups?view=Binary. See also Ter- tember 2005), 1, http://www.allacademic.com/one/apsa/ rorism Act, 2000, chap. 3, sec. 11 (United Kingdom), http:// apsa05/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=un www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000011 published_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no _en_2#pt2-pb2-l1g11. _click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSES 22. “Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca,” BBC News, 17 SID=da9387ac0151ea4082be5a9cd6cf7981. May 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3035803. 48. Ibid., 25. stm; and “Spain Names ‘Bomb Suspect’ Group,” BBC 49. MacFarquhar, “In Morocco.” News, 30 March 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 50. Wright, Dreams and Shadows, 352–67. europe/3583113.stm. According to Angel Acebes, Spanish 51. Ottaway and Riley, Morocco, 20. interior minster, “Our investigation is focusing on two 52. Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March, 11. strands: determining the leaders of the organisation and 53. Ibid. 78 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE

54. Wright, Dreams and Shadows, 360, 361. 76. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 197. 55. Ibid., 73; and Laura A. Weingartner, “Comment: 77. Ibid. Family Law and Reform in Morocco—The Mudawana: 78. Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March, 73. Modernist Islam and Women’s Rights in the Code of Per- 79. Ibid., 107. sonal Status,” University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 82, no. 80. “Yet the entire system of law rests not on a frame- 4 (2004–5): 687, 702–4, http://www.law.udmercy.edu/ work of checks and balances, but on the whim of the king. lawreview/recentissues/v82/issue4/82%20U.%20 Morocco’s Constitution declares the king both sacred and Det.%20Mercy%20L.%20Rev.%20687.pdf. the ‘prince of the faithful.’ ” MacFarquhar, “In Morocco.” 56. Weingartner, “Comment: Family Law and Reform 81. Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March, 73. in Morocco.” 82. Ibid. 57. Ottaway and Riley, Morocco, 8. 83. Ibid., 73–74. 58. Francesco Cavatorta, “Alternative Lessons from 84. Ibid., 107. the ‘Algerian Scenario,’ ”Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 1 85. “Monarchy dates back 1200 years in Morocco. The (January 2008): 7, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/ current Alouite dynasty dates back to the seventeenth articles/issues/PTv2i1.pdf. century.” Wright, Dreams and Shadows, 348. 59. Ibid. 86. MacFarquhar, “In Morocco.” 60. Ibid. 87. “Morocco has moved further along the reform 61. Ibid. road than any of its Arab neighbors. Its press is vibrant 62. Ibid. and outspoken. A family law no longer treats women as 63. Ibid. chattel. Civic organizations can be formed with relative 64. Ibid. ease, and scores of them work on everything from improv- 65. Ibid. ing prison conditions to lowering the country’s abysmal 66. Ibid., 11. illiteracy rate.” Ibid. 67. Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March, 24. 68. Derrick O’Keefe, “Tariq Ali on Obama: Imperial- 88. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, ism with a Human Face,” rabble.ca, 16 February 2009, Human Rights, and Labor, “Morocco,” 11 March 2008, http://rabble.ca/news/interview-tariq. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100602.htm. 69. Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March, 72–73. 89. Tom Hayden, Ending the War in Iraq (New York: 70. Ibid., 105. Akashic Books, 2007), 214. 71. Ibid. 90. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 199. 72. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 73. Nathan J. Brown et al., “Islamist Political Parties in 92. “ ‘Imposed democracies,’ such as the Philippines Kuwait and Morocco,” Carnegie Endowment for Inter- and Korea, had plunged into dictatorship by the 1970s.” national Peace, 27 February 2007, http://www.carnegieen Ibid., 198. dowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=967. 93. “Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence,” Iraq 74. Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Move- Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. ments and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, CA: Stanford 94. Wright, Dreams and Shadows, 416. University Press, 2007), 189. 95. Ibid. 75. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, eds., 96­. Ibid., 417. See statement of Syrian political analyst Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World (Wash- Sami Moubeyed. ington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 97. Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March, 73. Peace, 2008), 164. 98. Ibid. Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in The relationship among developing coun- South Africa: Potentials and Challenges edited tries, democratic states, and climate change poses by Omano Edigheji. Human Science Re- issues that underscore intense debate, most of search Council Press, 2010, 326 pp., $43.31. it taking place among the parties to the UN Frame­work Convention on Climate Change and Evaluating Climate Change and Development, World the UN General Assembly or at the Common- Bank Series on Development, vol. 8, edited by wealth or Francophone Conferences. It has be- Rob D. van den Berg and Osvaldo Feinstein. come increasingly clear that developing coun- Transaction Publishers, 2009, 438 pp., $49.95. tries will have to carry a large cost burden in The recent volcanic eruption in Iceland repairing the damage caused by international grounded many civilian flights across Europe, environmental problems—problems having demonstrating the importance of climate their roots in developed nations. Furthermore, change to our safety and our daily lives. Cur- the issue of the weak state construct has its ori- rently, many African states are celebrating gins in the governance system that departed co- their 50th anniversary of independence. lonial masters bequeathed to their colonies. These two subjects—climate change and the Consensus is growing that use of the Western developmental state—have emerged as ur- model of the nation-state, foundational to gent and politically hot topics. the current international system, poses many From the efforts of the Kyoto Protocol, Nobel problems. Although it originates from the Prize winners Al Gore and the Intergovernmen- specific sociohistorical context of Europe, the tal Panel on Climate Change, and the Copen- model is widely applied in former colonies hagen Conference of 2009, among others, the or postcolonial countries in Africa with the world is gradually coming to its senses regarding assistance or under the influence of the inter- the effect of a depleted atmosphere on human national community. beings. On the other hand, as many African Mainstream models of state building as- states celebrate their 50th anniversary of inde- sume that one can establish state legitimacy pendence—especially 17 Francophone countries and avoid state collapse through international that gained independence in 1960—the issue of intervention combined with military pres- good governance takes centre stage since most ence, huge amounts of aid, and democratic of these states have failed to respond positively to elections. Reality, however, leads us to ques- the needs and aspirations of their citizens. tion the effectiveness of these measures, at The concept of development serves to link least in the way they have been implemented. Rob D. van den Berg and Osvaldo Feinstein’s Thus, the need for rethinking the foundations book Evaluating Climate Change and Develop- of the state is imperative. Edigheji’s collection ment and Omano Edigheji’s Constructing a of essays addresses such issues as the reform Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: of state building, the model of the state, and Potentials and Challenges. The debate on deve- its transformation in delivering quality ser- lopment, though relatively lukewarm, cannot vices to the people. Far from basing itself on just be brushed aside. Several traditional yet Max Weber’s concept of the state, Constructing pertinent issues such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa security, food, trade reforms, and malnutrition tries to tilt the argument towards the expecta- appeared on the list of the Copenhagen tions and needs of the population as a foun- Conference. Thus, on these issues, one can dation for state transformation. at least talk of a real consensus on evaluating African countries have argued and will climate change and crafting a democratic de- continue to argue that higher environmental velopmental state. standards, especially those regarding green-

79 80 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE house gas emissions, make it impossible for Democratic Developmental State them to progress to the same level as the developed world. Therefore, to advance their The contributors to Constructing a Democratic development and achieve global environmen- Developmental State in South Africa point to a cen- tral fact that a developmental state in South tal benefits, they would require compensation Africa, unlike the twentieth-century develop- for the additional costs. The second line of mental state in East Asia, must be anchored by reasoning follows the consequence of climate the principles of democratic governance pat- change and calls for countries to adapt to terned after the Scandinavian developmental what is happening. states. Moreover, the national development With regard to the emergence of a demo- agenda and its policy must strongly emphasize cratic state, some commentators maintain that social transformation under the aegis of social the developed world, especially the colonial policy. That is, a developmental state in Africa powers, handed a form of quasi-independence needs to be democratic and promote social co- to their colonies while holding on to real hesion and inclusion. In the 1990s, the golden power. Globalisation without Africa’s scien- age of democratisation in Africa, the process tific and technological base constrains the attained what has been dubbed the “third wave,” continent’s participation in global trade, mak- which penetrated the continent’s political land­ ing the state construct a facade. The terms of scape. Strong international pressure gave rise trade are decided not in Africa but elsewhere. to popular protests against a “sit-tight” central- The cost of raw materials and finished prod- ized, dictatorial regime structure, triggering ucts is decided by the industrial powers. the ground-breaking shift from a monolithic to a multiparty system throughout the continent. Clearly, the existing state construct has fol- By 1997 at least 48 sub-Saharan African coun- lowed the wrong path. tries had embraced multiparty elections.2 Cognizant of these facts, some people ar- Constructing a Democratic Developmental State gue for constructing a democratic develop- in South Africa includes 14 papers divided into mental state in Africa and for urging African five parts. Omano Edigheji’s introductory countries to take appropriate measures to re- paper, “Constructing a Democratic Develop- duce the impact of climate change by adopt- mental State in South Africa: Potentials and ing a people-oriented strategic approach to Challenges,” sets the tone and conceptual development. The politics of inclusion, not framework. He argues that the developmen- exclusion, should take precedence.1 tal state should have the capacity to provide Mindful of the failure of the state to deliver leadership as it defines a common national development or quality services to the popula- agenda and mobilises all sectors of society to tion, community associations that cooperate participate in implementing that agenda. with citizens to fill the development gap left Edigheji questions whether a developmental by the government have flourished in the past state can take root in South Africa because of decades. Such associations believe that par- its constitutional democracy, assuming that de- mocracy and development are incompatible. ticipation has a greater chance than represen- Does this explain why the “Asian tigers” made tative governance of ensuring effectiveness progress under what one might call dictato- and efficiency in development; of promoting rial regimes, as in Singapore, Malaysia, South transparency and sustainability of develop- Korea, and Taiwan? But why have centralised, ment; of empowering people and breaking authoritarian regimes in African not forged chains of dependency; of promoting account- ahead with development like East Asian coun- ability and responsiveness to local needs; and tries, some of which were at parity during the of reducing the vast inequalities between the 1960s with many African countries in terms few rich elite and the numerous poor who suf- of gross domestic product. Where are these fer in silence. countries today, compared with African states? BOOK REVIEWS 81

Clearly something is inhibiting African states the banks, unlike the situation with classical from attaining industrial status. developmental states of the twentieth century. Part 1, “Conceptual Issues and Historical He recommends the establishment of a “devel- Experiences,” includes five essays—the bulk opment bank” and of other special-purpose of the contributions. In “Constructing the banks to overcome the state’s lack of control. 21st Century Developmental State: Potentiali- Eun Mee Kim’s essay, “Limits of the Authori- ties and Pitfalls,” Peter B. Evans offers three tarian Developmental State of South Korea,” theoretical groundings for the emergence substantiates the authoritarian governance of a democratic developmental state, namely of Gen Park Chung Hee that launched South new growth theory, institutional approaches, Korea’s developmental state, just as East Asian and capability theory or capability expansion. developmental states gained worldwide atten- Noting the convergence of these three strands tion under authoritarian leadership. of development theory, Evans proposes that In “Foiling the Resource Curse: Wealth, “enhancing human capabilities is the cen- Equality, Oil and the Norwegian State,” Jonathan tral goal of the 21st century developmental W. Moses focuses on the institutional and po- states.” Developing human capital not only litical context and policy instruments used by enhances citizens’ welfare but also establishes the Norwegian state to manage its oil resources a foundation for social inclusion and sustained and revenues for the benefit of its citizens. economic growth. He concludes that the en- The case of Norway is interesting when com- hancement of human capital is both a means pared to oil-producing countries like Gabon, and an end, in contrast to a tenet of neoliberal- Nigeria, Cameroon, and Angola. Even though ism, which conceives of investment in human Gabon and Nigeria started exporting oil capital only in narrow, economic terms. long before oil was discovered in Norway, Thandika Mkandawire’s paper, “From their people’s livelihood remains unchanged; Maladjusted States to Democratic Develop- Norway, however, now has a strong economic mental States in Africa,” proposes useful base in Europe. Why? Moses raises two funda- ways of crafting developmental states on the mental issues—visionary leadership and role continent, based on the central thesis that of civil society in taking development into its African states have been maladjusted since hands. Other stakeholders are involved in the 1960s in terms of the downsizing of the policy articulation as well. state and the collapse of public investment He shows that, with the right institutional in physical and human capital. He raises and organisational arrangements, develop- important issues about developmental states mental states in mineral-rich countries can within the context of democracy, in contrast avoid both the “resource curse” and “Dutch to Evans and Edigheji, who maintain that de- disease” and that one can draw useful lessons mocracy is incompatible with development. from developmental states like those in East But Mkandawire holds that constructing Asia. Centralised hegemonic parties with fo- democratic developmental states in Africa cused leadership can make significant differ- calls for originality and intelligence, pointing ences in Africa. Change requires visionary out, for example, that because of the lack of leadership and a vibrant civil society. fixed prerequisites for borrowing during the Part 2, “Policy-Making and Economic Gover- establishment of a developmental state, this nance in South Africa,” contains three papers. process could proceed by trial and error. “The Effect of a Mainstream Approach to Eco- In “How to ‘Do’ a Developmental State: nomic and Corporate Governance on Devel- Political, Organisational, and Human Resource opment in South Africa” by Seeraj Mohamed Requirements for the Developmental State,” examines South Africa’s economic governance Ha-Joon Chang argues that South Africa has the regime and its impact on the country’s ability potential to build a developmental state, given to construct a developmental state. The author the existence of strong mineral/energy con- argues that economic policy has largely been glomerates and the state’s lack of control over driven by the need to maximize shareholder 82 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE value and that rating agencies rather than ci- mental State,” pointing to poor organisation tizens often determine the credibility of policy, and processes as important explanations for inhibiting efforts to construct a democratic the poor state of public health care in South developmental state. Africa. His analysis shows that the problem In “Can South Africa Be a Developmental extends to other service-delivery sectors and State?” Ben Fine sees financialisation as both thus impedes the emergence of a developmen- an expression of post-1994 policy orientation tal state. Holdt proposes the restoration of and as one of the main challenges facing any Weberian logic in public service as a solution. attempt by the country to become a develop- “Intermediate Skills Development in South mental state. Anthony Butler’s contribution, Africa: Understanding the Context, Res- “Consolidation First: Institutional Reform ponding to the Challenge,” Salim Akoojee’s Priorities in the Creation of a Developmental contribution, urges aggressiveness in the de- State in South Africa,” offers a different velopment of human capital. The system of perspective—a skeptical view about South governance contributed to a widespread shor- Africa’s ability to craft a developmental state. tage of skills, exacerbating the dysfunctiona- He raises issues often missed in establishment lity of the South African educational system of such a state, namely, the sequencing of ins- in the postapartheid era. Therefore, the de- titutional and policy reforms—especially the velopment of human capital is central to both question of which should come first. Butler capability enhancement and industrialisa- cautions policy makers not to use the excuse tion—and, ultimately, to national prosperity. of citing the difficulty of constructing a deve- Sam Moyo’s “The Agrarian Question and lopmental state, along with its institutional the Developmental State in Southern Africa,” arrangement and policy orientations, to avoid the sole entry in part 5, “Agrarian Reform,” making the necessary policy decisions. notes that agriculture, on which most transi- Part 3, “South Africa’s Macroeconomic tional polities rely, needs structural reforma- and Industrial Policy Landscapes,” includes tion. One sees the significance of this area, Kenneth Creamer’s “Towards an Appropriate which should not be underestimated in the Macroeconomic Policy for a Democratic De- formation of a developmental state, in terms velopmental State in South Africa” and Simon of assuring food security, improving the levels Roberts’s “Competition Policy, Competitive of employment, reducing poverty, addres- Rivalry and a Developmental State in South sing inequality, and transforming productive Africa.” Creamer argues that the democratic forces within southern Africa. Moyo points developmental state in South Africa has the out that agriculture plays a key role in trans- primary responsibility of transforming the forming economic, social, and political issues structure of opportunities by widening access as well as in reducing vulnerability to the vaga- to basic services and physical infrastructure. ries of global markets. Roberts addresses competition policy and the role of industrialization and global competiti- veness in the context of developmental states. Threat to the Environment Emphasizing diversity in competition policy, even among the states of East Asia, he argues and Human Security that competition in industrial development The contributors to Evaluating Climate Change and policy plays an important role in ensuring and Development, who presented their papers at the formation of a developmental state. the International Conference on Evaluating In part 4, “Social Policy and Its Institutio- Climate Change and Development hosted by nal Underpinnings in South Africa: What the government of Egypt and the Bibliotheca Hope for a Developmental State?” Karl von Alexandrina in May 2008, drive home the fact Holdt writes about “The South African Post- that ethics remains the missing dimension in Apartheid Bureaucracy: Inner Workings, climate debate. The inequalities and injustices Contradictory Rationales and the Develop- likely to occur globally as a result of climate BOOK REVIEWS 83 change demand that world leaders carefully and national capacity to better plan for, moni- examine the moral and ethical dimensions of tor, and evaluate the effects of climate change. this phenomenon. Specifically, the effects of Finally in part 6, “The Road Ahead,” Rob D. global warming pose a serious threat to both van den Berg and Margaret A. Spearman pre- global security and human livelihood. sent a synthesis of all of the book’s papers in Part 1, “Climate Change, Development, and their essay, “The Future of Evaluating Climate Evaluation,” features essays by Ismail Seragel- Change and Development,” addressing the din, Robert Picciotto, and Joyeeta Gupta on challenges faced by developing countries in re- “Food, Feed, Fuel, and Climate Change: Chal- ducing emissions. The authors point out that, lenges, Threats, and Possible Actions,” “Eva- ironically, developing countries—especially luating Climate Change and Development,” those in Africa—that emit the lowest amounts and “Climate Change, Development, and Eva- of greenhouse gases will actually bear the grea- luation: Can Flexibility Mechanisms Promote test cost of dealing with the effects of climate Sustainable Development?” respectively. change. Moreover, the fact that climate change “Evaluation Techniques for Disaster” by will have unequal, severe effects in many parts Claudine Voyadzis and Bastian de Laat, one of of the world demands serious soul searching the five papers in part 2, “Challenges and Les- and articulate policy decisions. According to sons Learned from Evaluations,” addresses the Rajendra K. Pachaun, chairman of the Inter- role of the World Bank in providing national governmental Panel on Climate Change, “We and local authorities funds for the reconstruc- have to think at a much higher level. And I tion of affected areas and developing means think this is where ethics comes in so critically for the prevention and mitigation of natural or as the missing dimension in this debate.”3 An ecological disasters. appeal to world leaders drafted by the Bahá’í Part 3 examines the “Mitigation of Climate International Community declares that “the Change” in six essays, including “Contribu- quest for climate justice is not a competition ting to Global Benefits or Supporting Local for limited resources but part of an unfolding Sustainable Development: Evidence from a process towards greater degrees of unity among Global Evaluation of UNDP’s Program” by nations as they endeavor to build a sustainable, Howard M. Stewart, Juha I. Uitto, and Michael just and peaceful civilization.”4 Something P. Wells, and “The Impact of BACIP Energy- more is needed—good governance. Efficient Products on Domestic Fuel Savings in Northern Pakistan” by Nahida Khudadad and Qayum Ali Shah. Conclusion The five papers in part 4, “Adaptation to Climate Change,” assess the state of the art and Constructing a developmental state in identify gaps in evaluation of adaptation to South Africa or any part of the developing climate change interventions. Note especially world and evaluating climate change and de- the contribution by Merylyn McKenzie and velopment call into play the ethical and moral others on “Evaluation of Adaptation to Climate questions that lie at the root of the problems Change from a Development Perspective.” involved—questions of justice and equity that Essays such as “Making Adaptation Work will determine the survival of cultures and eco- for the Vulnerable: An Approach for Assessing systems for present and future generations. Community-Based Interventions” by Balgis Both books reviewed here raise issues of Osman-Elasha and others, one of the six in part tolerance, inclusion, the system of gover- 5, “Vulnerability, Risks, and Climate Change,” nance, the influence of capitalism, and the explore a range of tools and approaches for effects of globalisation. The message they mapping and assessing interrelationships in drive home is that leaders and societies must complex human systems and ecosystems that commit themselves to pursuing democratic are particularly prone to the effects of climate governance and evaluating the effects of change. The contributors also examine local climate change, guided by ethical and mo- 84 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE ral considerations. Doing so will inspire the ding for those who wish to understand the trust and confidence of individuals, commu- solutions to national, regional, and global nities, institutions, nations, and the world to problems. bring about appropriate and humane poli- cies that ensure democratic governance and John W. Forje an environment needed to build sustainable Yaoundé, Cameroon civilizations. The issue of power politics— military or civilian—should be readjusted Notes to concentrate on coexisting harmoniously 1. See John W. Forje, Here The People Rule: Political with nature. Both books’ contributors call Transition and Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in for a new dimension and use of power that Africa (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009). 2. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and Political Institu- demonstrate trust, justice, solidarity, and a tionalisation,” American Behavioral Scientist 40, no. 5 vision of prosperity for the most vulnerable (1997): 562–74; Michael Bratton, “Second Elections in populations. Directly or indirectly, they Africa,” in Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat, ed. issue a strong appeal for new political lea- Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: John ders who will exhibit courage and morality Hopkins University Press, 1999), 18–33; Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over? An Empiri- as they articulate the vision and secure the cal Assessment,” Working Paper no. 236, March 1997, foundation for a comprehensive and legally http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/ binding agreement to ensure the peaceful WPS/236.pdf; and Patrick Chabal, “A Few Considerations coexistence among people, development, on Democracy in Africa,” International Affairs 74, no. 2 (1998): 289–303. and a sustainable environment. As mentio- 3. “Ethics Are ‘Missing Dimension’ in Climate ned at the beginning of this review, the re- Debate, Says IPCC Head,” Bahá’í World News Service, 23 cent volcanic eruption in Iceland gave us an September 2009, http://news.bahai.org/story/729. indication of our vulnerability and a reason 4. Ibid. for cooperating for our mutual benefit. Both Evaluating Climate Change and Deve- lopment and Constructing a Democratic Deve- America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The lopmental State in South Africa will appeal to Great Divide, revised and updated edition, a broad cross section of the reading public, by Sarwar Kashmeri. Potomac Books, 2008, including students; policy makers; and mem- 176 pp., $13.56. bers of nongovernmental organisations, donor communities, international organisa- Each national election season nourishes tions, and governments in both established the growth of a new crop of policy recom- democracies and transitional polities. But we mendations aimed at future administra- must not only read these books, but also— tions—just as outgoing administrations tend and more importantly—put into construc- to produce rich harvests of tell-all books tive action their various recommendations. and memoirs. Whatever influence these pu- Implementation is the key word. The demise blications exert is in large part a product of of the apartheid system and the emergence placement and timing. Published in 2008 (up- of a government of national unity should be dating a 2007 edition), Sarwar Kashmeri’s valuable lessons for African countries. America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq should Whether or not a construct for a develop- be judged mainly by the circumstances of the mental state arises from Africa, governance, time in which it he wrote it. Although subse- climate change, and development provide quent developments have overtaken some of areas for constructive social change under what he writes, the core of his argument about the canopy of justice and respect for all the crisis in the transatlantic relationship still human life. These books project messages contains an essential kernel of truth: namely, of using “soft power” to address our under- that the poor state of political relations which lying dilemmas and thereby reach the goals quickly developed between the United States of equity and justice. Both are essential rea- and Europe over the US invasion of Iraq did BOOK REVIEWS 85 not simply arise from actions taken by the Bush Europe—which arose in part from a tendency administration. Instead it grew out of deeper to see Europe through a distinctively British systemic problems that a simple change of (“special relationship”) lens. He encourages personnel is unlikely to solve. Efforts aimed at US policy makers to seek greater accommo- creating a better and more effective transat- dation and closer cooperation with Europe as lantic relationship, the author writes, require a whole in order to deal properly with global substantive changes in (primarily American) challenges America cannot face alone. policies and practices. Kashmeri points to neoconservative state- With a background in engineering and in- ments that a flourishing European Union is formation technologies and through his work not in the broader US interest and claims that as a strategic communications adviser to inter- neoconservatives “prefer an American policy national corporations, Kashmeri approaches that actively promotes discord within the Eu- the topic largely from a business perspective. ropean Union’s member states to weaken the His experience as a corporate consultant as Union” (p. 98). However, he fails to produce well as his participation in numerous forums explicit evidence that any substantive policy that bring together American and European flowed from this point of view. Although Eu- business leaders, public officials, and media ropeans clearly believe this to be the case— representatives has shaped his views on Eu- and this in itself constitutes a problem for US ropean-American relations. In particular his policy makers—the author does not convin- role in advising American businesses about cingly demonstrate that it is much more than changes created by the introduction of the a figment of the European imagination. More euro appears to have proven a seminal mo- importantly, the insistence that the United ment in his appreciation of the growing di- States treat Europe as one entity rather than vide between the Atlantic allies. It put into deal with member states individually overlooks bold relief America’s failure to comprehend the fact that Europe is not yet such an entity “the political and economic dimensions of an but to a degree remains burdened by internal integrated Europe” and the “independent po- disagreements and structural deficiencies. litical and economic interests” that resulted Kashmeri tends to ignore shortcomings on (p. xii). In short, the United States has not ta- the European side (especially in the area of ken Europe as seriously as its increased power security), focusing instead almost exclusively and influence would warrant. on what the United States must do to make Kashmeri directs his argument primarily things better. against the neoconservative/transformationa- Although his diagnosis of the state of tran- list “vision that dominates United States po- satlantic relations is accurate, his prescriptions licy today” (p. 37), which gives little credence for improving those relations are rather gene- to traditional alliances or international insti- ral and palliative. He hits on a key issue when tutions (like the United Nations), preferring he points out that an underlying source of the instead a go-it-alone approach aimed at pro- problems in the Euro-American relationship moting the global spread of democracy. This lies in the different perceptions of the “war on he contrasts with the approach of traditio- terror” on either side of the Atlantic and that, nalist conservatives (many of whom were his even more fundamentally, these perceptions interlocutors for the book: James Baker, Brent in turn flow from differing attitudes toward Scowcroft, and Caspar Weinberger, as well as war in general (p. 43). Kashmeri is right in George H. W. Bush himself) who, Kashmeri suggesting that a new consensus must be says, “work with . . . friends and allies within formulated with respect to the use of force. international organizations” (p. 37). Kash- But his proposal for forging that consensus— meri suggests that the policies pursued under the “demilitarization” of the North Atlantic George W. Bush crystallized America’s lon- Treaty Organization (NATO) and its trans- ger-term inattention to, indifference about, formation into a “transatlantic forum” for and even resistance against developments in developing “rules of engagement”—suggests 86 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE a decoupling of US-European military rela- leads many media consumers to believe that tions in hopes that “perhaps in the future a certain people “just can’t get along,” perhaps new military role for NATO might emerge” ascribing such conflict to inherent differences (pp. 110–11). One wonders how any abstract in the respective groups, based upon a mythi- consensus will work if it does not drive new cal past, such as the Jacob and Ishmael stories structures or shape concrete actions. Simi- that underlie much of the common discourse larly, his proposal that the “Iraq problem” on Arab-Jewish conflict. Unfortunately, few be “internationalized” (pp. 107–8), though voices in the media seem interested in ei- laudable in the abstract, has proven a tough ther addressing the real issues driving ethnic sell in reality. conflict or offering real-world solutions. On the one hand, since the bulk of Kash- Enter Marc Howard Ross, a renowned meri’s argument reflects circumstances as expert in the field of conflict management. they existed at middecade and is in turn sha- His latest book, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic ped by them, one wonders how more recent Conflict, examines how culture frames the events, especially the neoconservatives’ de- interests of competing ethnic groups and parture from the political stage and the rise how peace might be achieved through broa- of a Congress and White House controlled dening psychocultural narratives to include by Democrats, might modify his proposals. other points of view. He opens by discussing On the other hand, neoconservatism, as an the dynamics of group identity, noting that expression of an American impulse to “se- cultural expressions as reflectors of a group’s cure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and worldview can play a causal role in conflict our posterity,” remains a fundamental strain as well as exacerbate or inhibit conflict, -de of American political culture and, as such, pending upon the exclusivity or inclusivity likely will continue to inform US policy in of the narratives. Narratives matter precisely one fashion or another. Ultimately, the Uni- because they are the stories through which ted States will need to determine the degree a sense of communal identity is constructed, to which a Europe that no longer looks to it and thus they reveal how people understand for leadership but actively questions that lea- the conflicts in which they are involved—what dership (p. 21) shares the values that under- Ross calls psychocultural dramas, “polarizing pin America’s sense of itself in the world. events about non-negotiable cultural claims, threats, and/or rights that become important Michael Prince, PhD because of their connections to group narra- München, Germany tives and core metaphors central to a group’s identity” (p. 25). Citing the power of cultural expression in such ritualized performances as Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict by Marc festivals and pilgrimages, Ross notes that, just Howard Ross. Cambridge University Press, as ritual can help perpetuate exclusivist nar- 2007, 388 pp., $34.99. ratives, so can it help conflicting groups “re- frame or redefine the symbolic and emotional Ethnic conflict makes headlines like no- aspects of the conflict so that the parties can thing else. Civil war in Sri Lanka, the breakup move beyond signed agreements and develop of the former Yugoslavia, Tibetan and the institutions and practices needed to avoid Uyghur independence movements in China, future confrontations” (p. 86). the Shiite-Sunni divisions in US-occupied After the first three chapters, which outline Iraq, Muslim riots in France, tribe-centered Ross’s theories as to the role of narrative in election battles in Kenya, and the ongoing conflict and conflict management, the author struggle between Palestine and Israel—these follows with seven chapters offering concise are just a few of the stories that have driven case studies that detail how these dynamics the news cycle in recent years. The ubiquity work across the world in instances where of ethnic conflict, as well as its longevity, often conflict has been actively abated and where BOOK REVIEWS 87 it remains. The first case he tackles centers conflicts,” Ross writes in conclusion (p. 312). on Loyalist parades in Northern Ireland. Indeed, most analysts tend to present long- Here, Ross contrasts Protestant parades in standing cultural narratives either as mere Portadown and Derry, demonstrating how the fronts—schemas of political posturing desig- one in Derry has grown into a more inclusive ned to secure political advantage for a select community celebration involving both Pro- few—or as markers of irrationality for cultures testants and Catholics due to an opening of too backward to devote time and effort in the central narrative of the parade, while the concerning themselves with the “real” issues one in Portadown remains a focus of political of economics and power. Such simplifications resistance. Next he analyzes Catalonia’s status serve only to undermine the attempt to paint as an independent and linguistically unique a larger, strategic portrait of ethnic conflicts state within Spain, enumerating the various in the world at large and therefore diminish policies of the central Spanish government the chance of transforming zones of disac- that have lowered the potential for ethnic cord into truly peaceful regions. This is where conflict, even though language serves as the scholars such as Marc Howard Ross serve a focal point for violent resistance elsewhere in noble purpose. The key arguments of Cultural the world, as in Sri Lanka. Contestation in Ethnic Conflict are backed by The issue of archaeological exploration Ross’s many decades of work in conflict ma- on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem serves for nagement and the research he has conducted Ross as a microcosm of the conflict between the world over. In this book, he offers more Israel and Palestine, illustrating how each than just a set of academic musings—these “selectively utilizes historical references to are real guidelines for achieving peace and bolster its position in building a non-linear ar- strategic stability, and those whose business gument. Time collapse is far more prominent is such would ignore his offerings, not just at than continuity” (p. 187). In chapters that their own peril, but at all of ours. could easily be paired side by side, Ross ana- lyzes the French ban on head scarves, which Guy Lancaster, PhD targets Muslim students, in light of various Arkansas State University Republican narratives that underlie French national identity. Later he looks at contro- versies surrounding public display of the The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons Confederate battle flag, with all its separatist and Delivery Systems since 1945 by Norman and racist implications, in the context of race Polmar and Robert Norris. Naval Institute relations and the far-different conception of Press, 2009, 240 pp., $49.95. national identity at work in the United States. Finally, two chapters are devoted to cultural The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal provides a useful contestation issues in South Africa, the first analysis of nuclear weapons deployed by the focusing upon the reinterpretation of older United States on land, at sea, and in the air heritage sites that served the narratives of the from the end of the Second World War until ruling whites, and the second detailing the 2009. Norman Polmar and Robert Norris creation of new sites offering a presentation are both recognized experts on the subject, of the black experience in the nation. The the former an author who has written on nu- book is illustrated throughout with pictures, clear weapons development for the US Navy, maps, and two very helpful, multipage charts Department of Energy, Defense Advanced that delineate the events most entrenched in Research Projects Agency, and Defense Nu- the narratives of the Northern Ireland and clear Agency, and the latter a senior research Israel-Palestine conflicts. associate at the National Resources Defense “Political analyses tend to ignore, dismiss, Council. or under-theorize the role that identity The first chapter offers a comprehensive and emotional framing play in long-term historical overview, while the next seven 88 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE chapters focus on nuclear warheads, strategic factors argued against manned bombers,” aircraft, tactical aircraft, strategic missiles, including the vulnerability of Strategic Air tactical missiles and rockets, artillery, and Command bases to Soviet SLBM attack, the antisubmarine weapons. The text is well “fallacy of a principal Air Force argument illustrated with numerous black-and-white from manned bombers: that they could be photographs. There is also a useful glossary recalled,” and the effectiveness of Soviet sur- of abbreviations and acronyms; appendices face-to-air missiles in Vietnam and the Middle on the US nuclear stockpile and the effects East, which “led many government officials of nuclear weapons; and a chart divided into and bomber opponents to argue that the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), large and modern Soviet air defense network submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), made strategic bombers obsolete” (p. 30). and bomber columns listing the numbers of Polmar and Norris clearly question the value launchers and warheads by year from 1945 to of the Air Force’s ICBM fleet: 2008. The volume refers to primary sources A factor in U.S. Minuteman-Titan ICBM throughout; it also includes a useful “Recom- effectiveness was the question of reliability. mended Reading” section. Of the three components of the Triad, the Although well illustrated, The U.S. Nuclear land-based ICBMs were the only force that Arsenal is not a picture book. The initial was not extensively tested. Bombers regularly chapter is a good analysis of the evolution of took off, flew missions, and dropped bombs; US nuclear weapon systems and doctrine, ex- prior to test-ban agreements, bombers dropped plaining their development and deployment nuclear weapons (and dummy bombs) in full- by the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and system tests. Similarly, submarines regularly fired unarmed ballistic missiles—sans- war Navy. The chapter assumes a strategic pers- heads—on test ranges; and on 6 May 1962, pective, but it considers tactical applications the USS Ethan Allen (SSBN 608) fired a of nuclear power as well—as in the case of Polaris A-1 missile almost 1,200 nautical the Davy Crockett, designed to give battalion miles in the Pacific with a nuclear detona- commanders a nuclear battlefield punch. As tion. This was the only full-system test of a the authors explain, there were actually two U.S. nuclear-armed ICBM/IRBM/SLBM Davy Crocketts (both recoilless rifles): the 120 missile from an “operational silo” (p. 16). mm M28 and the 155 mm M29, each firing The authors continue: the M388 projectile with a W54 warhead. The chapters on aircraft make it clear that No nuclear-armed ICBM has been launched most Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps air- from an operational silo. Periodically, the silo crews fired various ICBMs from test craft were nuclear capable and that even the facilities at the Vandenberg Air Force Base in venerable Second World War–era Essex-class California and from Cape Kennedy in Flor- carriers had a nuclear capability in both their ida under highly controlled conditions. But attack and antisubmarine warfare roles. Pol- even periodic efforts to launch an ICBM with mar and Norris explain that all of the services reduced fuel and no warhead from an opera- incorporated nuclear weapons into their war- tional silo have failed, and Congress has fighting doctrine at the strategic, operational, refused approval of full-range test firings and tactical levels throughout the Cold War. from an operational silo that would take Air Force readers might take exception even an unarmed missile over urban areas (p. 16). to some views expressed by the authors, who refer to the nuclear triad as a “term coined by These passages left this reviewer with the U.S. Air Force to rationalize the ‘need’ nagging questions. As this book notes, “The for three U.S. strategic offensive forces,” first first Minuteman IA was placed on alert at publicly used by Gen John D. Ryan, Air Force Malmstrom AFB, Montana, on 27 October chief of staff, in 1970 as a way to “help explain 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis” the continuing need for a manned strategic (p. 171). Although the current Minuteman III bomber” (p. 20). They later state that “three is continuously upgraded, it sits in remote silos BOOK REVIEWS 89 in regions subject to highly adverse weather powerless and redistribute wealth quickly. An- conditions, and those launch facilities were tidemocratic, it concentrates political power built close to a half century ago. They might in the executive branch, and its historical be constantly monitored by disciplined crews, record suggests that it will once again fail. serviced by dedicated maintenance person- Despite this record, democracy survives and, nel, and guarded by diligent security forces, amazingly, has sunk deeper roots in Latin but how many of these weapon systems are America. Reid underlines this fact constantly actually capable of fulfilling their mission in in this fast-paced book. intricate Single Integrated Operational Plans, Venezuela serves as an example of the al- as expected? lure of populism. Underwritten by vast petro- Given the current effort to restore focus on leum income, chavismo (a form of populism the nuclear mission, degraded since the end named after Pres. Hugo Chávez) has reached of the Cold War, and the Obama administra- a high level of support among Venezuelans tion’s stated commitment to disarmament, because of the failure of predecessor go- publication of The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal is ti- vernments to channel wealth to improve the mely indeed. Some readers might find parts conditions of the vast underclass. Though of the book discomfiting, but Norman Polmar chavismo may have already reached its apogee, and Robert Norris provide an informed pers- the continuing, depressing socioeconomic pective worth serious consideration. conditions of poverty and social exclusion threaten the legitimacy of democracy in a Dr. Frank Kalesnik, PhD number of countries. Here, Reid is at his best, Malmstrom AFB drawing on his impressive observations as a journalist to draw comparisons and derive conclusions across various countries, large Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s and small. He possesses unlimited energy and Soul by Michael Reid. Yale University Press, an uncanny reportorial eye to find profound 2007, 400 pp., $30.00. significance in vignettes that define the com- pelling human condition in cities, towns, and Michael Reid, editor of the Americas sec- villages. His reporting also takes him to the tion of the Economist, has written an excep- higher reaches of academic organizations, tionally timely analysis of Latin America’s the news media, government institutions, and social and economic performance in the last diplomacy. decade. The fact that Yale University Press pu- Reid demonstrates a passion for Latin blished it is a strong recommendation—and America and obviously admires the region the book does not disappoint the reader. The and its people. At the same time, he ap- title reflects the essential thesis: in spite of its preciates the enormous impact of history, enormous potential in terms of resources and seeking constantly to connect the present human talent, Latin America, once the most with the past. He is also an effective analyst advanced region of the developing world, has of social and economic indicators, such as been forgotten and has fallen behind other investment and growth patterns, writing in developing regions because it failed to achieve a style that the nonspecialist audience can sufficient progress in improving the condi- understand. He deploys his talented and tions of its people. As the result of frustration lively pen to coldly analyze the sources of and the fact that some 40 percent of the po- the problem, the nature of reform efforts, pulation lives in poverty, the political force of and what he calls “The Stubborn Resilience populism is attracting attention among the of Flawed Democracies” (the title of chap. underclass in a number of countries, notably 11). He attributes Latin America’s failure to Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. weak and ineffective state systems—that is, Populism, which takes many forms, both li- to the inability of government ministries to beral and conservative, seeks to empower the reach the people they are supposed to serve 90 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE by providing security, justice, and education, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and by promoting vibrant economies that and Military Action after the Cold War by Ryan C. productively employ the maximum number Hendrickson. University of Missouri Press, 2006, 184 pp., $16.95. of people. But state weakness is only one part of the Research on the North Atlantic Treaty Or- story, according to Reid. National leaders ganization’s (NATO) post–Cold War transfor- of the last generation embarked on a se- mation devotes little analysis to the secretary- ries of neoliberal reforms espoused by the general position and implicitly downplays “Washington Consensus” (p. 6) (pushed by the significance of NATO’s post–Cold War research centers and multinational lending military operations. Recognizing the notable institutions) to remove tariff barriers to absence of scholarly literature on NATO’s trade and investment and get the state out secretaries-general during this period, Ryan of running enterprises. But progress could Hendrickson investigates their evolving im- not be sustained because the governments pact on the alliance, particularly regarding did not conduct additional reforms and the use of force. Only those secretaries-general protections of the most vulnerable, which who led after the Cold War oversaw NATO’s would unlock their creativity and wealth. use of military force. Accordingly, an anti-neoliberalism backlash Employing an analytical framework that he is now generating tensions between the pro- credits to Michael G. Schechter, the author ponents of free-market economies and those examines the first four of five post–Cold War who advocate that the central government secretaries-general and the roles they played provide greater direction to the economy, as in moving the alliance toward military action. well as redistribution of wealth schemes. Add Hendrickson theorizes that the NATO mili- to this the awesome insecurity in the streets. tary instrument remains relevant and that the Indeed, criminal violence subtracts nearly 25 secretaries-general who have served since the end of the Cold War have significantly affected percent of gross domestic product annually. NATO policy, transnational unity, and the use This reviewer is sympathetic to this kind of military force. of writing. Reid writes well, with an engaging Upon completion of a concise yet subs- style that captures the reader. To be sure, tantive historical overview of the creation of some simplifications challenge credibility. the office of secretary-general, the author Note, for example, the statement that “the dedicates the remaining chapters to com- Catholic Church—which had blessed in- parative case-study analysis of the first four justice in Latin America since the moment people who held this position after the Cold a Dominican friar had taken a full part in War. Although not alike (and thus making for the capture and murder of Atahualpa, the imperfect comparisons), the cases examined Inca—had an attack of conscience” in the are suitably relevant to meet the author’s twentieth century (pp. 97–98). But Reid has objective. Each chapter focuses on the role captured the essence of the Latin American that each secretary-general played in contem- social, economic, and political dilemma. The plating the use-of-force option (e.g., Manfred only disappointment with the book is that he Worner—Bosnia; Willy Claes—Operation doesn’t offer some policy alternatives. No- Deliberate Force against Bosnian Serbs; Javier netheless, Forgotten Continent is a worthy ad- Solana—Operation Allied Force bombings of dition to a growing collection of writings on Serbia; and Lord George Robertson—post- what went wrong and what should be done in 9/11 defense measures for the protection of Latin America. Turkey). Personal interviews of key diplomats and NATO policy makers, coupled with the Dr. Gabriel Marcella use of professional literature, provide a sound Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania basis for the comparative analysis. BOOK REVIEWS 91

Each of the chapters dedicated to the se- of secretary-general in promoting consensus cretaries-general begins with the process—the if the US preference for “coalitions of the wil- behind-the-scenes geopolitical posturing and ling,” rather than NATO-supported military consensus building that led to their elections. operations, remains the norm. Moreover, the author goes on to describe how This rich yet concise book is very reader- their professional and national backgrounds friendly. Diplomacy and War at NATO is most shaped their approaches in leading NATO. suitable for those individuals interested in This backdrop alone makes the book an inte- American foreign policy and NATO’s post– resting read. Cold War history and politics; those destined One of the many intriguing insights pro- to work directly or indirectly with NATO; and vided in the book occurs in the chapter ad- scholars and students of political science / dressing Secretary-General Javier Solana. In international affairs. light of his vocal opposition to Spain’s joining NATO in 1982 and to the stationing of Ame- Dr. David A. Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, rican military bases in Spain, this Spaniard USMC, Retired later led NATO expansion into the former US Army Command and General Staff College Eastern Bloc states. Finding sufficient legal ba- sis without United Nations approval, he advo- cated and oversaw NATO’s military response The Torture Debate in America edited by Karen to Yugoslavian (Serbian) president Slobodan J. Greenberg. Cambridge University Press, Miloševic’s acts of aggression against Kosovo 2005, 436 pp., $27.99. Albanians. Furthermore, Solana aggressively secured member states’ support for the opera- The editor of The Torture Debate in America, tional/targeting plan of Gen Wesley Clark, su- Karen J. Greenberg is executive director of the preme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), Center on Law and Security at New York Uni- which ultimately led to the capitulation of versity School of Law, editor of both Al Qaeda Serbian forces in Kosovo. Now and the NYU Review of Law and Security, In all cases, Hendrickson’s comparative ana- and coeditor of The Torture Papers: The Road lysis supports his theory. Although the position to Abu Ghraib (2005). In her introduction to of secretary-general has limited formal autho- the compilation under consideration, Green- rity in the alliance, each leader utilized an berg notes her objective of raising public assortment of diplomatic tactics and alliance consciousness on torture and facilitating open tools to make an impact on major political and military decisions at NATO. The author’s discussion on US policy regarding that subject. findings clearly demonstrate that different per- Rather than judging the current policy, the sonalities and diplomatic styles employed by contributors to this volume report the facts the secretaries-general seemed to work equally and provide policy options consistent with do- well in promoting consensus, depending upon mestic and international laws and ethics. the circumstances. Furthermore, his findings Given the presence of combatant prisoners highlight the importance of the SACEUR’s at the US Navy base in Guantanamo, Cuba, and the secretary-general’s viewing the alliance and the wars smoldering in Afghanistan and from similar ideological perspectives. Iraq, Greenberg and the other contributors, Hendrickson concludes this fine work with from different disciplines, skillfully tackle summarized findings, offers a comparative as- the question of whether the United States sessment of effective diplomatic leadership in should allow its military to torture prisoners NATO, and provides policy recommendations for information. Following her short intro- for the improvement of transnational tensions duction is a transcript of a panel discussion by surrounding the office of secretary-general. these contributors at the New York University Of particular note, he emphasizes the tremen- School of Law, including participation by a dous political challenges faced by the office Judge Advocate General Corps officer who 92 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE had recent experience defending detainees With the clinical thoroughness charac- at Guantanamo. teristic of other works from the RAND Cor- The participants contrast recent instances poration, U.S. Competitiveness in Science and of permitting torture with US democratic Technology takes a deep look into questions ideals. Recognizing the need for timely in- concerning the future of America’s science telligence, they demonstrate how common and engineering capacity. Fundamentally, the positions favoring torture also argue against report explores factors affecting US compe- US policy. Most advocates of torture consider titiveness in science and technology (S&T), it the lesser of two evils if the information both globally and domestically. obtained saves lives. Considering some pri- From a global perspective, the report com- soners’ extensive time in captivity, several pares historical data on the development of contributors assert that the latter no longer US scientific and engineering to similar data have access to the type of intelligence that from other technological nations (Russia, In- could justify torture and point out that the dia, China, Japan, South Korea, and members practice violates US ideals of human dignity. of the European Union). Galama and Hosek Some even suggest that policy allowing tor- review such factors as where international ture could harm long-term US interests in the students go to earn scientific and engineering event that enemies reciprocate. degrees, what countries they choose to use After considering the place of torture in those degrees in upon graduation, and what a democracy, the contributors review inter- countries are most conducive to research and national law and conventions that govern this publication. They then draw favorable conclu- practice, all the while avoiding judgmental sta- sions concerning the ability of the United tements and offering options. After a thorough States to compete globally in technology de- discussion of applicable international law, they velopment. In addition, the authors explore address arguments against torture, the last sec- whether the United States will continue to tion glimpsing into the future to predict any compete favorably in attracting and retaining ramifications for the United States, given the a distinguished international S&T workforce. recent conflicts. Although international laws Turning their analysis inward, they also in- forbid torture, it remains an option for most vestigate whether the United States is doing nonstate actors that have not signed the perti- enough domestically to maintain its role as a nent international conventions. fertile ground for developing scientists and Throughout The Torture Debate in America, engineers. In reaching their conclusions, they the contributors allude to the ease of abusing break down the US investment in private and current US policy on this matter and the un- public research and development, the viabi- fortunate circumstances in which the United lity of the US education system in producing States feels it must resort to torture. Readers graduates enthusiastic about careers in S&T, who lack a background in international law and, finally, the job environment and career will appreciate the book’s presentation of potential for scientists and engineers in the national and international legal precedents United States. Here, too, there are optimistic governing the treatment of detainees. They prospects for maintaining favorable trends in will also find useful the biographical details S&T in the United States. for each contributor and the listing of essen- This monograph is exhaustively resear- tial source material. ched, and assertions concerning the health of US scientific and engineering are well suppor- Lt Col Steven M. Beasley, USAF ted. The authors break down each broad re- Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota search question into more focused questions that they analyze, using available data. The U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology by Titus comparisons typically span the last 50 years Galama and James Hosek. RAND Corporation, for which data is available. The reader who 2008, 188 pp., $32.00. stays with the report from beginning to end— BOOK REVIEWS 93 no small task, given the extensive amount near anarchy will persuade just about any- of information presented throughout—is body of the dilemmas facing decision makers rewarded with a good-news story. Galama and everywhere. Hosek quantitatively support their conclu- It appears that Zahid Hussain is well qua- sions that the United States has not declined lified in attempting to give us a picture of in S&T with respect to historical standing or the situation. A journalist who provides ma- in comparison to other contemporary tech- terial to the Times of London, Newsweek, and nical-oriented nations. They support these the Wall Street Journal, he possesses a good assertions by studying the infrastructure, edu- writing style. Clearly, Hussain is an expert on cation, and workforce of the United States, the region and has had access to some diffi- which they identify as the building blocks of cult-to-find sources. He organizes his work in S&T leadership. In each case, their objective topical chapters and in a more or less chrono- assessment is that reports of the demise of US logical order. The political landscape is clut- S&T leadership are greatly exaggerated. tered with military, religious, power-seeking, Galama and Hosek do follow up with nuclear-smuggling, and drug interests that a level-headed, cautionary note, however, yielded an almost impossible problem for quickly pointing out that their research iden- former president Pervez Musharraf, who tifies growth trends in many other technolo- was trying to survive between many mutually gical nations. Without sustained levels of US hostile domestic groups and the pressures of public and private growth and support across S&T leadership factors, the favorable condi- international politics. tions we currently enjoy could evaporate. I fear that the reader seeking a coherent I recommend this report as a ready refe- picture of what Pakistan and Afghanistan rence on the topic of US scientific competiti- are about is doomed to frustration. Both veness to anyone who wants or needs in-depth countries have long seemed ungovernable, data that is exceedingly abundant in answe- partly due to the fact that the central go- ring each research question. For anyone else vernments have had very limited powers over who routinely relies on or influences the de- the regional and local interests. I suppose velopment of a robust US S&T workforce, the that the main idea of the book is that there final chapter, “Discussion and Recommenda- is likely trouble ahead for the United States tions,” is a worthwhile read in its own right. since Pakistan has been a principal ally during the global war on terror, but that is largely a Maj Nick Martin, USAF result of President Musharraf’s having sided University of Colorado, Colorado Springs with the United States, very much against the tide in his own homeland. That cannot go on forever, according to Hussain, and I suppose that he thinks the only possible solution is to Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant permit real democracy in Pakistan. However, Islam by Zahid Hussain. Columbia Univer- given the strength of the local warlords and sity Press, 2007, 232 pp., $24.95. the growing power of radical Islam, that would be a miracle. In addition to that, Musharraf If any reader of this journal needs convin- was faced with a tough problem of nuclear cing that US foreign policy in the Islamic proliferation. Pakistan followed India into the world is complex and dangerous, he or she elite group of nuclear states, but its control can get a good view of it in Frontline Pakistan. of nuclear secrets has been defective, and its It will be hard enough for readers accusto- people have been involved in serious under- med to English to make any sense out of it ground nuclear proliferation. If that were not because of unfamiliarity with the names of Pa- enough, he was also utterly dependent upon kistani places and persons, but the labyrinth the loyalty of his military, and that is a little of politics and religion in a region that hovers shaky since the latter has an affinity for some 94 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE of the radical Islamic groups, who are against liances at war and peace, the strength of this secular government. monograph is its detailed, well-developed Hussain does not get into the character insider description of the process of transfor- of the “liberal” Pakistani groups advocating ming NATO concepts into force structures secular rule, but it appears that they are ut- and doctrine. terly opposed to radical Islam and to military The monograph consists of eight chapters, rule. If that were not enough, there has been with the introduction and following two chap- a perennial issue with India over Kashmir, and ters setting the theoretical framework of the Musharraf was able to contain that up to a cer- study. Deni notes that much of the literature tain degree, but this situation is fully capable on alliances focuses on their formation and of boiling over into a disaster for Pakistan’s dissolution, with much less attention to the leaders—and for the United States. Since our dynamics of alliance maintenance. By concen- campaign in Afghanistan against the rem- trating on the intra-alliance negotiations and nants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda is highly deal making that sustains existing alliances, dependent upon our relationship with the Alliance Management and Maintenance provides Pakistani government, that means trouble. a different theoretical perspective. The heart Few Americans know much about Pakistan of the monograph consists of three chapters and its surrounding region, and this book will that examine the development of the NRDCs, certainly not make one an instant expert on the alliance’s response to changing threats, the subject. However, it is readable and will and the impact of political bargaining. serve as a useful introduction to the problems Here Deni is at his best, providing specific of the area. I therefore recommend it for a mo- examples of how national interests resulted in derately high place on anyone’s reading list. the designation of six corps as “high readiness forces” (HRF) despite force structure reviews Dr. David R. Mets that called for only three. The penultimate Niceville, Florida chapter turns to the alliance’s response to ter- rorism, providing a brief 15-page overview of NATO initiatives that seems oddly disconnec- Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructu- ted from the study’s previous chapters on ring NATO for the 21st Century by John R. Deni. force structure and political bargaining. The Ashgate Publishing, 2007, 128 pp., $99.95. monograph’s conclusion summarizes and emphasizes the study’s value at the broader John Deni, political advisor to US military theoretical level, noting that straightforward, forces in Europe and lecturer at Heidelberg threat-based explanations of alliance beha- University, examines how the realities of vior fail to account for NATO’s organizational establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- change in the twenty-first century. nization’s (NATO) rapid deployment corps Thoughtful and well researched, this mo- (NRDC) furnish insights into the broader nograph keeps a tight focus on NATO, ma- theories of alliance management and doc- king no mention of parallel endeavors such trine development in this compact if pricey as the European Union’s (EU) rapid reac- monograph. Deni provides a fine overview of tion force. Yet for most members of NATO, political science and international relations the bargaining and negotiation process that literature on the topic; a detailed narrative sustains alliances occurs at two levels: both wi- of how, when, and why NATO established thin NATO and within the framework of the its NRDCs; and an insightful analysis of how EU’s European Security and Defence Policy. intra-alliance bargaining resulted in compro- By focusing solely on the former, this mono- mises that generated suboptimum outcomes. graph presents an incomplete picture of the Although this conclusion will hardly surprise multidimensional complexity of European those who have served within the bowels of security. Nevertheless, Alliance Management NATO or historians who have analyzed al- and Maintenance offers insight and analysis BOOK REVIEWS 95 that will appeal to both academics and prac- crew chiefs, maintenance officers, service titioners of security and statecraft. Academics personnel, and commanders—to give the will find Deni’s analysis of various theoretical reader a much better perspective of life within propositions of alliance behavior useful, the group. More than any other feature of although his acronym-laden discussion of the book, these first-person accounts bring to NRDCs, HRF(L)s, and the MTIWG (Military life the fears, concerns, victories, and defeats Transitional Issues Working Group) may experienced by these men. Freeman gives the prove daunting to the uninitiated. For those reader a feeling of being in the cockpit with who have worked at NATO or may do so in one of the pilots or in the barracks relaxing the future, Deni’s account of how bargains during some downtime. Comments from are struck and how compromises smooth the German pilots who engaged the 56th would way for implementation will be most useful. have made this aspect of the book even more Combining both a clear theoretical fra- appealing. mework and a well-researched examination Fortunately for us, Wolfpack Warriors is of the realities of alliance management within much more than just a shoot-’em-up history NATO, this monograph exemplifies political of this one fighter group. More importantly, science at its best. the author takes time to discuss the unit from its peacetime conception and formulation, Douglas Peifer through its deployment overseas and years Air War College of combat, to its disbanding after the war. He also examines in great detail many of the teething problems the unit faced with its P-47 Wolfpack Warriors: The Story of World War II’s Most Thunderbolts, the use of drop tanks in an Successful Fighter Outfit by Roger Freeman. attempt to increase the aircraft’s range, and Casemate Publishers, 2004, 256 pp., $18.95. the harrowing experiences of ground-attack missions. When readers finish the book, they In the war-torn skies over Europe, America’s actually identify with the men of the unit. 56th Fighter Group entered an almost daily Although reading about World War II is struggle against Hermann Göring’s Luftwaffe enjoyable, I have never relished accounts of in a race to achieve air superiority before the force-on-force combat. Simply knowing that planned Allied invasion of the continent. Battalion X engaged Battalion Y has always “Zemke’s Wolfpack,” as it came to be known, held little interest. The personalities behind played an integral role in dominating the the events hold more fascination for me. The fighter pilots of Nazi Germany. Flying the less men who made decisions, fought the battles, glamorous P-47 Thunderbolt, these Ameri- or engaged other pilots have always been intri- can pilots fought the Luftwaffe from the be- guing. In this respect, Wolfpack Warriors does ginning of the air offensive against Germany not let the reader down. Some of the biggest until the last days of the war. Their story, told names in American aviation emerged from in yet another wonderful book by author this unit: Hub Zemke, Dave Schilling, Francis Roger Freeman, is certain to make a signifi- “Gabby” Gabreski, Walker “Bud” Mahurin, cant contribution to the study of the Allied air and Robert Johnson, just to name a few, who campaign over Europe in World War II. The will always exemplify excellence in air com- author of more than 50 books on that war, bat. Gabreski and Johnson, for example, led Freeman has certainly produced one of his the way for American aces in Europe with 28 most interesting works in Wolfpack Warriors. aerial victories apiece. The author consulted over 150 veterans The book also points out several activities during the research for this book and spent that many readers will likely find interesting. 14 years compiling the history of the 56th For example, in the race to destroy enemy Fighter Group. In bringing the book alive, aircraft, pilots got credit for ground as well he freely quotes men from the unit—pilots, as aerial victories, a practice that, later in the 96 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE war, led to problems in determining actual aircraft, and estimates indicate that JG 52, on credit for individual pilots. The Germans the Russian Front, tallied nearly 10,000. The in North Africa did poorly in aircraft reco- top six pilots in JG 52 accounted for 1,580 air- gnition, and the Americans did little better. craft. Some British, Russian, or even Japanese On one mission in particular, a 56th pilot in units may also have enjoyed more success a hurry to score the group’s first kill came than the 56th. Although Zemke’s Wolfpack home only to find that he had accidentally was arguably the best American fighter unit, shot down a British Spitfire, as revealed by his if the measure of such a unit’s success is aerial gun camera film. victories, as alluded to by the author, then the This fascinating book boasts 32 pages of ex- 56th was certainly not the best during the en- cellent photographs. After all, when reading a tire conflict. unit history that spends so much time discus- Notwithstanding these facts, I highly re- sing the men that made it great, one should commend this book. Roger Freeman has be able to see them. Unfortunately, the final done a superb job of bringing us the history product doesn’t include maps, charts, or ap- of one of America’s most recognized and pendices detailing the most important aspects decorated fighter units. Well written, it easily of the 56th Fighter Group or its relationship holds the reader’s attention. Although Donald with other fighter units of the Eighth Air Caldwell’s incredible book JG 26: Top Guns of Force. Perhaps a reprint will add these. the Luftwaffe remains the standard for aviation My only complaint concerns the title. Perhaps combat units, Freeman’s work will not disap- a more accurate one would be Wolfpack Warriors: point. Readers interested in the European air The Story of World War II’s Most Successful Ameri- war and contributions made by a truly elite unit can Fighter Outfit. During the course of the war, should add Wolfpack Warriors to their libraries. the group destroyed 664 German aircraft. In North Africa alone, German Fighter Group JG Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFR, Retired 27 destroyed 776 Allied aircraft between April Montgomery, Alabama 1941 and December 1942. Likewise, JG 26, on the Western Front, destroyed some 2,700

Visit our web site http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/aspj_f/Index.asp