MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director^ 8(5 Tear Class* The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas* SUBJECT: A Study of the German Fifth Army on 21 August, 1914, prior to the Battle of the Ardennes Forest* I, PAPERS ACCOMPANYING* 1* A bibliography for this study* 2* Two Maps, shoving the situation at evening 20 August and 21 August, respectively * II* THE PROBLQfi PRESENTED* What were the actions and orders of the German Fifth Army during 21 August 1914, and was the attack ordered for 22 August justifiable? III. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY* 1* On 20 August the German Fifth Amy reached the line (see map "Croquis No* 3/Situation Is 20 Aout 1914", hereinafter referred to as map 20 August): Etalle ~ Ohatillon — Redange — Jli^prlllers (also called Arswtller) (1)* The Army at this time consisted of the following units: (2) V Corps, 9th Division, 10th Division, HI! Corp*, 26th D iris ion, 27th Division, VI Reserve Corps, 11th Reserve Division, 12th Reserve Division* :CVI Corps, 33d Division, 34th Division, V Reserve Corps, 9th Reserve Division, 10th Reserve Division, 3d Cavalry Division, 6th Cavalry Division * Thio mission of the anny was to serve as the pivot (hinge) of the graat enyoloping movement of the German araiea, maintaining contact with the Sixth Amy on the left by pivoting about the area: Met* (southeast of Thionville) — Thionville. (if The Army was disposed in a flat open-bowl-shaped arc facing the fortress of Longsy to the south (4)* The V Corps was in the vicinity of 1) R, p i) w p 73; R, Karbo (Map) S* (3) M, p 12 (4) It, p 303 - 1 ­ Etalle, the XIII in the vicinity of Chatillon, the "Kampffer group11 consisting of detaohnents of all arm* inoluding the 62d Brigade and 23d Reserve Brigade, facing Longny, the VI Reserve Corps near Redange, the XVI nearAhgigrliHers, and the V Reserve Corps in army reserve southwest of Luxembourg* (5) The 3d Cavalry Division was northwest of Etalle on tho right flank, the 8th Cavalry Division on the left flank (not shown on map) • (6) Information had been received of strong French forces assembled behind the Othain River east of Montaedy, but there were no indications of a French attack on the Fifth Army; (7) the 0-2 Report from OHQ on the evening 20 August indicated no important changes in the enemy dispositions on this fronts (8) From Charloville to Verdun (40 kilometres south of Montmedy) were reported the French III, XI, IV,and the greator part of the VI Corps, with perhaps behind these four reserve divisions (9); aotually, as may be seen from map 20 August, the French Third and Fourth Armies were disposed on this front, consisting of the VI, V, IV, II, Colonial, XII, XVII, XI, and IX Corps. (10) The Fifth Army issued orders suspending the general advance and directing that corps dispose their troops during 21 August so that the V and XIII Corps northwest of Longwy, and the VI Reserve Corps southeast thereof, would be prepared to advance on order for attaokl the XVI Corps was to be prepared for a possible attack against the enemy's flank; the V Reserve Corps would remain in the rear center as reserve. (11) On 21 August those movanents were put into execution, the various columns closing on the line: Etalle -- Chatillon ~ Redango — ltfgqgrtLll<r o at the same time the siege of Longwy vras begun (12) • The Kampffer group, told off for the siege, attacked tho fort from the north, the 52d Brigade being supported by heavy artillery. (13) On both flanks of the army the cavalry gained contact frith the enemy; at 9:00 M the 3d Cavalry Division, north of Etalle, was attached to the V Corps and ordered to proceed west on Florenville; east of Iiel, it gained contact with hostile cavalry and drove it back, but found txel oocupied by the French 100th and 126th Infantry of the XII Corps, which promptly counterattacked; the 3d Cavalry Division then broke off the fight and retired to the vicinity of Habay, from which it had set out that morning. (14) On the left flank the 6th Cavalry Division by 6:00 AM had moved to the vioinity of Morcy-le-haut (west of Audun-le-toman) and was assem­ bled thore with a screen to tho south. At noon the approach of enemy infantry from the west caused its withdrawal to Audun-le-roman; its re­ connaissance had indicated hostile columns of all arms marching northeast through Longuyon, Ollieres, and Landres. (15) The aviation, handicapped by rain, reported the terrain east of a generally north-and-south line through Longuyon as free of the enemy between 8:00 and 9:00 AM, except for one column marching north at 8:40 (6) (E, map 20 Aug.; R, pp 303-304; M, p 12. (6) ( R, pp 230,303-304* (7) (R, p*303; E p 106. (8) (R, p 303. (9) (R, p 303. (10) (E, map 20 Aug. (11) (R, p 303. (12) (E, p 105 (13) (R, p 304. (14) (R, p 304; E, p 61. (16) (R, p 304. - 2 ­ AM from Etain (about 15 kilometres south of Spinoourt)* (15) The Sixth Army reported the success gained in Lorraine, thereby relieving the Fifth Army of anxiety as to its left flank (16)* flfci*i the first great victory of the war, had been gained under tho conuiand of Prince Ruppreoht of Bavaria* (17) The Fourth Amy reported about two hostile corps concentrated in the vicinity of Stenay and southeast of Montmedy* (17) The army commander is represented as deducing fran the foregoing that the Frenoh hud security on the right (**at) bank of the Meuse at Charleville, Sedan, Carignan, north of Won-bnedy, and along the Crusnes valley up to Mercy-le-bas (about 9 kilometres northwest of Landres), and that there were concentrations west of Mouzon and near Stenay* (18) There was no indication of an immediate enemy advance, and no necessity for a change of dispositions* (19) At 11:30 AM 21 Aflgftat the army chief of staff reported to 0-3, GHQ, at Coblens, by telephone: "The Fourth Army is not yet abreait. The Fifth Army will await the Fourth Armyfs advance tomorrow, on the line Tintlgny ~ St Legor — Longwy —- Diedenhoffen (Thionville) • For the time being it will not pass this line*" (20) In the afternoon, however, the Gennan aviation observed a general enemy advance on the line: Breux (north of Montmedy) ~ Landres 121)* The impression obtained that strong forces were being extended along the Othain position, and others marching north from Verdun* (22) The army commander then deduoed that this movement was intended to secure Longwy and Montmedy and to use them as bases for an attack on the German Fifth Army, to penetrate its center* (23) The Fifth Army's present disposition was not immediately adapted t^ defense, as it was based on the necessities imposed by the advance; ios frontage was 62 kilometres, for the development of five corps, four in the first line: a long front; it was therefore considered desirable to contract this front before offering battle* (24) The peculiar character of the terrain in the Ardennes Forest also exercised a strong influence; the right wing of the army was in the forest (see map), and the oharaoter of this region was such as to limit maneuver of any kind* (24) The forest is generally very dense, and movement difficult except in the clearings; of these the oorridor of Florenville lay in the right of the army tone, with an arm of the forest to the south extending northeast on Arlon* "It is in the main a region of veritable defiles" through which the streams "have cut their sinuous courses,, Their waters surge among the rooks which jut from this rocky corridor* The mass of woods is enveloped in complete silenoe and shsvis^ and it is only when one emerges on to the plateaus that the horizon ocur be seen* One sees stretched out vast mountainous areas with undulations ;and large depressions with an altitude varying from 400 to 600 meters* In this broken country the rivers wind through marches or meadows enclosed by hedges of stakes or wire fenoe forming a veritable network extending (15) (*, p 304. (16) (R, p 3©4; E, p 106. (17) (E, p 106 (18) (R, p 306 (19) (R, p 396; E, p 106 (20) (R, p 306} B, p 106 (21) (R, p 306; E, p 106 (22) (R, f 305 (23) (R, p 305; B, p 107 (24) (E, p 107. - 3 ­ in all directions aoross the routes of progression of troops* In this country there are small villages with little houses built of natural stone • Some of these owe their existenoe solely to their position at a orossing of railroads or simply because they were traditional trading places* In going over the terrain that eoostitutes the clearings one is aware that routes of communication are numerous, and run east and west as well as north and south* In the forest, on the contrary, routes are i*evr and run usually north and south* and off the roads the soil is often marshy or muddy and impracticable for artillery* In general +/he region is a close and difficult country*• *.." (25) The Gorman Fifth Army commander is represented as anxious to clear the Ardennes with his right, and gain spaoe forward (south) in order to cover the attack already begun on Longrry and to drive back the many frcrci the valleys of thA Chiers and Crusnes* (26) The desire to press forward and clear the Ardennes region prior to giving battle was also a main preoccupation on the part of General do Langlo, commanding the French Fourth Army* (27) The Fifth Amy decided to attack on 22 August to gaSii the line: Chiers Ri/er —• Crusnes River* (28) It was believed that if contact was thereby lost with the Fourth Army at Thionville, the fortress system: Met* — Thionville would protect the armyfs left flank* (29) 2* To what extent the command of the Fifth Army was influenced in what follows by the desire that the successes of Prince Ruppreoht