MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director^ 8(5 Tear Class* The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*
SUBJECT: A Study of the German Fifth Army on 21 August, 1914, prior to the Battle of the Ardennes Forest*
I, PAPERS ACCOMPANYING* 1* A bibliography for this study* 2* Two Maps, shoving the situation at evening 20 August and 21 August, respectively * II* THE PROBLQfi PRESENTED* What were the actions and orders of the German Fifth Army during 21 August 1914, and was the attack ordered for 22 August justifiable? III. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY* 1* On 20 August the German Fifth Amy reached the line (see map "Croquis No* 3/Situation Is 20 Aout 1914", hereinafter referred to as map 20 August): Etalle ~ Ohatillon — Redange — Jli^prlllers (also called Arswtller) (1)* The Army at this time consisted of the following units: (2) V Corps, 9th Division, 10th Division, HI! Corp*, 26th D iris ion, 27th Division, VI Reserve Corps, 11th Reserve Division, 12th Reserve Division* :CVI Corps, 33d Division, 34th Division, V Reserve Corps, 9th Reserve Division, 10th Reserve Division, 3d Cavalry Division, 6th Cavalry Division * Thio mission of the anny was to serve as the pivot (hinge) of the graat enyoloping movement of the German araiea, maintaining contact with the Sixth Amy on the left by pivoting about the area: Met* (southeast of Thionville) — Thionville. (if The Army was disposed in a flat open-bowl-shaped arc facing the fortress of Longsy to the south (4)* The V Corps was in the vicinity of 1) R, p i) w p 73; R, Karbo (Map) S* (3) M, p 12 (4) It, p 303 - 1 Etalle, the XIII in the vicinity of Chatillon, the "Kampffer group11 consisting of detaohnents of all arm* inoluding the 62d Brigade and 23d Reserve Brigade, facing Longny, the VI Reserve Corps near Redange, the XVI nearAhgigrliHers, and the V Reserve Corps in army reserve southwest of Luxembourg* (5) The 3d Cavalry Division was northwest of Etalle on tho right flank, the 8th Cavalry Division on the left flank (not shown on map) • (6) Information had been received of strong French forces assembled behind the Othain River east of Montaedy, but there were no indications of a French attack on the Fifth Army; (7) the 0-2 Report from OHQ on the evening 20 August indicated no important changes in the enemy dispositions on this fronts (8) From Charloville to Verdun (40 kilometres south of Montmedy) were reported the French III, XI, IV,and the greator part of the VI Corps, with perhaps behind these four reserve divisions (9); aotually, as may be seen from map 20 August, the French Third and Fourth Armies were disposed on this front, consisting of the VI, V, IV, II, Colonial, XII, XVII, XI, and IX Corps. (10) The Fifth Army issued orders suspending the general advance and directing that corps dispose their troops during 21 August so that the V and XIII Corps northwest of Longwy, and the VI Reserve Corps southeast thereof, would be prepared to advance on order for attaokl the XVI Corps was to be prepared for a possible attack against the enemy's flank; the V Reserve Corps would remain in the rear center as reserve. (11) On 21 August those movanents were put into execution, the various columns closing on the line: Etalle -- Chatillon ~ Redango — ltfgqgrtLll
- 2 AM from Etain (about 15 kilometres south of Spinoourt)* (15) The Sixth Army reported the success gained in Lorraine, thereby relieving the Fifth Army of anxiety as to its left flank (16)* flfci*i the first great victory of the war, had been gained under tho conuiand of Prince Ruppreoht of Bavaria* (17) The Fourth Amy reported about two hostile corps concentrated in the vicinity of Stenay and southeast of Montmedy* (17) The army commander is represented as deducing fran the foregoing that the Frenoh hud security on the right (**at) bank of the Meuse at Charleville, Sedan, Carignan, north of Won-bnedy, and along the Crusnes valley up to Mercy-le-bas (about 9 kilometres northwest of Landres), and that there were concentrations west of Mouzon and near Stenay* (18) There was no indication of an immediate enemy advance, and no necessity for a change of dispositions* (19) At 11:30 AM 21 Aflgftat the army chief of staff reported to 0-3, GHQ, at Coblens, by telephone: "The Fourth Army is not yet abreait. The Fifth Army will await the Fourth Armyfs advance tomorrow, on the line Tintlgny ~ St Legor — Longwy —- Diedenhoffen (Thionville) • For the time being it will not pass this line*" (20) In the afternoon, however, the Gennan aviation observed a general enemy advance on the line: Breux (north of Montmedy) ~ Landres 121)* The impression obtained that strong forces were being extended along the Othain position, and others marching north from Verdun* (22) The army commander then deduoed that this movement was intended to secure Longwy and Montmedy and to use them as bases for an attack on the German Fifth Army, to penetrate its center* (23) The Fifth Army's present disposition was not immediately adapted t^ defense, as it was based on the necessities imposed by the advance; ios frontage was 62 kilometres, for the development of five corps, four in the first line: a long front; it was therefore considered desirable to contract this front before offering battle* (24) The peculiar character of the terrain in the Ardennes Forest also exercised a strong influence; the right wing of the army was in the forest (see map), and the oharaoter of this region was such as to limit maneuver of any kind* (24) The forest is generally very dense, and movement difficult except in the clearings; of these the oorridor of Florenville lay in the right of the army tone, with an arm of the forest to the south extending northeast on Arlon* "It is in the main a region of veritable defiles" through which the streams "have cut their sinuous courses,, Their waters surge among the rooks which jut from this rocky corridor* The mass of woods is enveloped in complete silenoe and shsvis^ and it is only when one emerges on to the plateaus that the horizon ocur be seen* One sees stretched out vast mountainous areas with undulations ;and large depressions with an altitude varying from 400 to 600 meters* In this broken country the rivers wind through marches or meadows enclosed by hedges of stakes or wire fenoe forming a veritable network extending (15) (*, p 304. (16) (R, p 3©4; E, p 106. (17) (E, p 106 (18) (R, p 306 (19) (R, p 396; E, p 106 (20) (R, p 306} B, p 106 (21) (R, p 306; E, p 106 (22) (R, f 305 (23) (R, p 305; B, p 107 (24) (E, p 107.
- 3 in all directions aoross the routes of progression of troops* In this country there are small villages with little houses built of natural stone • Some of these owe their existenoe solely to their position at a orossing of railroads or simply because they were traditional trading places* In going over the terrain that eoostitutes the clearings one is aware that routes of communication are numerous, and run east and west as well as north and south* In the forest, on the contrary, routes are i*evr and run usually north and south* and off the roads the soil is often marshy or muddy and impracticable for artillery* In general +/he region is a close and difficult country*• *.." (25) The Gorman Fifth Army commander is represented as anxious to clear the Ardennes with his right, and gain spaoe forward (south) in order to cover the attack already begun on Longrry and to drive back the many frcrci the valleys of thA Chiers and Crusnes* (26) The desire to press forward and clear the Ardennes region prior to giving battle was also a main preoccupation on the part of General do Langlo, commanding the French Fourth Army* (27) The Fifth Amy decided to attack on 22 August to gaSii the line: Chiers Ri/er —• Crusnes River* (28) It was believed that if contact was thereby lost with the Fourth Army at Thionville, the fortress system: Met* — Thionville would protect the armyfs left flank* (29) 2* To what extent the command of the Fifth Army was influenced in what follows by the desire that the successes of Prince Ruppreoht of Bav varia GgixtKi Army) should not outstrip those of the German Crown Prinoe (titular oomn&nder of the Fifth Army) is to be dealt with as a matter of opinion, but should be borne in mind while noting the events leading up to the actions of the Cram Prince's army during the remainder of 21 August* That actual coanand was not vested in the Crown Prince is indicated Vy a report concerning him personally, and by the known facts a* to the general-staff system of the German army: — The Prince is represented by a staff officer as never really commanding; he signed the orders presented by his chief of staff; his own greatsst activity lay in visits to the troops, reviews, awards of decorations, speech-making, and activities generally looking to maintaining morale* (30) It was usually the general staff in the German units that inade the decisions, communicating them as their own to subordinates, and, in a word, directed operations, while the commander kept up an appearance of activity and rarely oooupied him self with anything but the morale of the men, their well-being, ato* The difference on thia point is radical and fundamental as compared to the French conception •" (31)
The Crown Prince, in defending himself against the charge of use lessly continuing the bloody attacks at Verdun, states that ?n his efforts to break off that offensive he ^atood somewhat opposed to hi^ then Chief of Staff, General Schmidt von Knobelsdorff, and his representations were at first put aside11; with reference to 1914 he states that as com mander of the Fifth Army he "led the advanoe of his army in August 1914; (26) (E, pp 13-16• (26) (E, p 107; R, p 306* (27) (E, pp 19-20; p 107. (28) (E, p 107; R, p 306. (29) (R, p 305 (30) (E, p 110, quoting *Das Alte Heer, von einer, Stabsoffisier" (The Old Army, by a Staff Officer)* (31) (E, p 110, quotin gHThe Battle of Flanders11, by Colonel Tournes and Captain Berthmet*
- 4 he saw the decisions *n& notices that were isaued, and was present at the Koanty discussions with the General Higher Command (Oenerel Staff, OHQ) and with the adjacent armies •" (32) fc Crown Prinoe had first met General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf during the previous winter (1913-14)# the latter being his instructor at a course in strategy and taotloa attended by the Prinoe at the Great General Staff; in August 1914, von Knobelsdorf was the Prinoefs chief of Staff in the,ffcfftKh Army (33) • This offioer is represented as having the "reputation of being a 'hard-boiled doughboy1 (fun rude fantassin1); this was his repute when, before Falkenhayn, he commanded the 4th Foot Guards; but he incarnated the perfect type of f general-staffer', and his self-sufficiency was such that he was ordinarily inaccessible to even perfectly obvious arguments (see 'The Old Army, by a Staff Offioer*)* According to the reports of general-staff officers in whom one oould have perfect confidence, when confirmed information gained by the avia tion did not suit him, he used to declare it false with oategorioal fin* ality, and maintain his opinion strenuously efen if later such informa tion was revealed to be exact*91 He is charged with responsibility for refusal to break off the Verdun attacks out of sheer obstinacy, and de picted as generally of a stubborn and wilful character• (34) At 3:30 B!, 21 August (4r30 W German time) Knobelsdorf informed G«3, GHQ, by telephone, of the army decision; the latter (Lieutenant- Colonel von Tappen) replied at once that contact with the German Sixth!: Army must be maintained at Thinnville, and no rupture must occur on the front of the Fourth and Fifth Armies* Whether von Knobelsdorf requested support by the Fourth Army is unknown. (36) At 6:45JM (7:45 EM German time), General von Moltk<* telephoned from GHQ as follows: "It cannot yet be foreseen whon the Second and Third Armies will attack on the front Namur — Givet (to the northwest) • If the enemy in front of the Fifth Army advances on 22 August, the Fifth Army, to conform to our operations as a whole, should take up the defense — not pass to the attack* This is the only means for it to cooperate effectively with the left flank of the Fourth Army, while waiting for the enewy to run into our envelopment* Above all the right flank of the Fifth Army or that of the oorps of the Fourth converging toward the south must not be left in the air." (36) In the meantime the corps chiefs of st^ff had arrived at the com mand post Fifth Army by 5:00 HI, and were waiting for orders, and all arrangements for attack had been made*' The army did not wish to oall off its attack, (37) Knobelsdorf again oalled GHQ and reported that the army was in a lose contact with the enemy, who had advanced today from Montuedy on Breux and to the valley of the Basse-Vire (a stream) between Virton and Mousson* In conclusion, he stated that the right flank (V Corps) would defend the line: Tintigny ~ Virton, while the left would throw the enemy back to the line: Virton — Longuyon —- Audun-le-roman* (38) General von Moltke apparently gained tho impression that the Fifth Army wished to improve tie local situation by gaining the valley of the Crusnes in order to got more favorable ground for its left and to insure its contact with the Sixth Amy at Thionville. He therefore approved the (32) (Craim Prinoe, pp 214,199. (33) (Crown Prince, p 136• (34) (E, p 112. (35) (E, p 108; R, p 306* (36) (E, p 108; R, p 306* (37) (E, p 108; R, p 306* (38) (E, p 108; R, p 306•
• 5 plan* (39) Von Moltke was aiming at a grand envelopment of the French armies by the German right; up to this time the right wing (First, Second, and Third Annies) had not gained the neoessary' ground to insure the envelopment, and yet on the other hand were so situated that they oould not turn to the aid of the center without endangering the plan* (40) 3. The Fifth Amy orders were issued at once; these provided that the army attaok on 22 August and drive baok all hostile forces en countered to the lines Virton — Longuyon —* Audun-le-roman, including the valleys of the Chiers ~ Crusnes* (41) The advance would not be pushed beyond the triangle formed by the Chiers and Crusnes, because essential parts of the heavy artillery must remain in front of Longiry* (42) The V Corps, on the right flank, instead of disposing itself to defend the line: Tintigny -- Virton, as indioated to 6HQ (that is, astride the arm of the forest and faoing west), was to move to the vicinity of Virton and protect the right flank of the army from enemy enterprises from the vicinity of Florenville (43); its left was to be at Belmont, which would cause it to move south of the wooded area, and to face south (44) * The other corps were given objectives on the lines Longuyou ~ Audun-le-roman (45); the XIII to move west of and beyond Longwy so that the right w&uld be at Clarency (on the Chiers south of Virton) and the left tt Longuyon; the VX Reserve Corps with right on Longuyon and left at Pierrepont (10 kilometres southeast of Longuyon, on the Chiers); the XVI with right on Joppeoourt* (46) The 3d Cavalry Division was attached to the V Corps to cover the right flank, the 6th Cavalry Division to the XVI to cover the left* (46) The V Reserve Corps was to advance to cover the gap between the VI Reserve and the X7I Corps* (47) See "Croquis Ho, 4, Situation le 21 Aout 1914 mu soir* (hereinafter refermd to as "Map 21 August1*); the sones of action have been indicated tboreon,- and the map shows the actual location of the troops of both armies as of evening 21 August* This plan shows that between the left of the Fourth Array at Mellier and the right flank of the Fifth Anay at Virton there would neces sarily be a gap of about 20 kiloaet#rs, which the 3d Cavalry Division alone could not cover; the plan, therefore* risked exposing the right flank, in direct disobedience of the orders of the GHQ. (48) At the conference for the issue of the army order, the Chief of Staffs V Corps (Lieutenant-Colonel von Kessel) perceived this danger, aril requested von Knobelsdorf to arrange to have the left corps (VI) of the Fourth Army advance in the valley of the Semoy in order to eovar the right* This request was refused; instead, it was suggested that the V Corps effect a direct understanding with the left oorpo of tho Fourth Army, and von Knobelsdorf expressed no concern as to the right flank* (49) In the meantime the XIII Corps had gained contact with tho enemy; a report of the advance of hostile ooluans from the vicinity of Virton and Tellanoourt (west of Longwy) had ajmsed tho XIII Corps to alert its divisions; the 27th Division was ordered to move on St Leger, and the 26th Division (less 62d Brigade) on Raoheoourt (See map 21 August)* A battalion of the 26th Division advanced on Virton on reconnaissance, but was with* (39) (E, p 109; R, p 307* (40) (E, p 109 (48) (E, p 111; R, p 307 (41) (E, p 111; R, p 307, (49) (E, p 112; R, p 308* (42) (R, p 307* (43) (E, p 111; R, p 307 (44) (E, p 111; R, p 307. (45) (E, p 111. (46) (R, p 307. (47) (R, p 307 - 6 drawn at evening to the vicinity of St Leger on discovering strong Frenoh forces. On the Xe£t flank of the 26th Division a battalion froic the Kampffes* group was attached to cover the artillery in the vicinity of Longwy, where it resisted the attack of French forces which, after several hours fire fight, were driven baok# (60) On receipt of this information the army directed the V Corps to protect the rifJtA flank of the XIII, and the V Corps was alerted, the 9th Division being sent to Btalle and the 10th to the vicinity of Vance. (61) (See map 21 August*) 4* Late in the evening the Chief of Staff, V Corps, returned to his command post (Etalle), and informed the corps commander of the orders and the danger M the right flank* Captain Waohenfeld* ^ etaff, was accordingly sent to Anliers (Hap 21 August), command post of the 25th Reserve Division, XVIII Reserve Corps, to request that ui.it to incline to the south on 22 August* The liaison officer arrived at Kin destination about midnight, but the division, commander, on referring to corps headquarters, was directed to refuse the request on account of ex isting orders from Headquarters Fourth Army, which required a march on Neufchateau* Captain Wachenfeld then on his own initiative continued on to I/Eglise, command post of the VI Corps, arriving about 2:00 AM* The commander VI Corps referred the matter to Headquarters Fourth Army by telephone, wliich brought the Fifth Armyfs intentions for 22 August to the attention of Duke Albert of Tfurtemburg, commanding, the Fourth Army* (62) Duke Albert was surprised at receiving so important a request so late and through such an irregular channel instead of direct from Head quarters Flftji Army* (63) He did not himself intend to attack on 22 August, but to decrease his front in readiness for battle and to carry out the directions of GHQ, which he oorreotly understood* If ho complied with the request of the Fifth Army, hewxmld necessarily increase hi* front from about 60 to nearly 80 kilometers, with the probable reafoit that gaps would apjar at a time when a possible meeting engagement was im minent. On the other hand, a failure to respond to the request rpuld certainly cauae a gap of 20 kilometers between Kellier and Virton: that is, between the two armies; and thib gap would open at the corridor of Etallo — Florenville where he knew that units of the French Xtl Corps (see above) had that day driven back the German 3d Cavalry Division from Isol* Time w*s pressing, for it vr&a notr after 5:00 AM, and the V Corps (Fifth Army) was to march at 4:00 AH on Virton, while hiw own left (VI) Corpi? was to march on Neuf chateau* He, therefore, decided to accede to the request, and ordered the VI Corps to move on Tintigny to oover the right of the V Corps in event that the latter moved on Virton instead -of Tintigny as previously understood• He then informed the Fifth Army and OHQ of bis action* (54)
5« In the meanwhile the French Fourth Amy (General de Langle) had received and passed on to its GHQ repeated reports of the aviation during 19 and 20 August of German columns filing past its front at a dis« tauoe of two or three days marchfltothe•timing and moving to the vest and northwest* (56) Its provisional cavalry oorps of two divisions, during 20 August, gained contact with and identified near Neufohateau elements of (60) (R, p 306 (51) (R, p 308 (62) (E, p 112-113] R, p 309 (53) (E, p 114; R, p 309. (54) (E, pp 114, 116s R> P 309 (56) (E, p 31
- 7 • the German XVIII Corps with the XVIII Reserve Corps in rear thereof; the cavalry corps was operating from the vicinity of Florenville by 6:00 R£ 20 August. The army commander, as already noted, was eager to move north so that he might pass the wooded area before giving battle^ and at least to reach the Etalle — Florenville clearing* (66) French GHQ, however, intended to allow the mass of the German foroes to move west, and then utiliieothe Fourth Army in a penetration to out them off and force thorn baok# (67) At 9:30 Rfl, 20 August, GHQ authorised the Fourth Army to push covering detachments of all arms nofcth of the Semoy %ver and in the clearing of Florenville to cover the development of the army* These de tachments were in place by the worning of 21 August. (68) At 0:30 Hi, 20 August, GHQ directed the French Third Army to move on Arlon and protect the right flank of the Fourth Army; it warned the latter to be prepared to march on Neufchateau. (69) The Fourth Army, during :,he night 20-21 August, olosed up tho main bodies of tha XI, XVII,,and XH Corps and Colonial Corps to tho southern edgo of the woods south of the Florenville clearing. (60) Early on 20 August, GHQ directed the Fourth Army to move that day on the line: Tintigny — Paliseul, and on 22 August to continue the advance with the right moving via Rulles and LfEglise (see map 21 August) and attack the enemy wherever met* (61) By the evening of 21 August, accordingly,the French Third and Fourth Armies were disposed as indicated on map 21 Augui. (62) 6. This brief orientation as to the forces opposing the German Fifth Amy permits a general indication MI to the results of the Fifth Amy1 * decisions of 21 August. On the morning of 22 August, five corps of the French Fourth Amy moved north in numerous columns of brigades tsid divisions generally on Neufohateau, covered to right and. rear by three oorps of the French Third Anny moving on Arlon* and covered tc left and rear by the IX Corps (for general ^ fox-ma tion see map 21 August) • The French BHQ intended to cut off and force back of th& Meuse the mass of the German forces moving west; tho French assutaed that this mass was well on its way to the Meuse, but had no definite info nation to that effect* Orders oalled for attack ing the enemy wherever met, but tbe French Third and Fourth Annies did not expect to encounter opposition in force that day. (68) Tho Geraan GHCJ wished to defend w5th its center until the right wing had accomplished the planned envelopment; it was not particularly concerned as to the center, however, as it had underestimated the Frenoh strength there. (64) The Crown Prince1 s Fifth Array intondad to attack, and was moving south in a compact fofm&tion for that purpose. (64) The Duke of Wurtanburg was attempting to cover bis neighbor's right and to carry out the orders of GHQ. His army was not concentrated for battle, but separated in three groups, and in the midst of a change of direction to the south. Only two of the five corps oould be engaged at once. (65) The Gomans had not doduood the French intentions correctly; OH the other hand, they had obtained information of the general location, direction of march, and to some extent of the strength of their opponents. (66) (E, pp 32,39,40 (67) (B, pp 9, 118 (58) (E, p 33 (69) (E, pp 43,44 (60) (E, p 47 (61) (E, p 46 (62) (E, Croquis No. 4) (63) (E, pp 117-118 (64) (E, p 118 (65) (E, pp 118-119
m 8 The German Fourth Anay was advanoing in a deeply-eoheloned formation, and the Duke of Wurtemburg was very muoh alive to the possi bilities that .might develop on the front of the Fourth and Fifth Arm-lee* (ee) IV* OPINIONS BEARING ON THE STUDY. 1* fecole Superieure de Guerre (Fronoh), in "The BattLd of the Ardennes" (La Battaille des Ardennes) • The responsibility for the tangled state of affair* of 22 August 1914 lay first witLMoltke, because the Fifth Amy/ even by remaining on the defensive as he prescribed, could not have avoided battle. (67) The Fifth Amy1 s decision to attack contrary to orders of BHQ was due to psychological reasons; the Crown Prince wished to equal at least, or surpass, the accomplishments of Ruppreoht of Bavaria's army in Lorraine* (68) It was inanaterial to him if this endangered the plans of GKQ* (69) Von Knobeladorf declined to request the cooperation of the Fourth Army for his wwn V Corps (right flank) because he feared that this would bring his intended disobedience to the attention of GHQ* (70) Had GHQ exercised a strong control and proper supervision, it would have discovered the Fifth Army's intentions in time* In a similar oase in 1866 in the Austro-Pruosian war the elder Moltke discovered during the night that his Second Army (as it happened, through a delinquency of its ohiof of staff) was not going to support the First Army next day, 3r" July, in its attack on the Austrians behind the Bistrits; he at once des patched special orders which insured the necessary cooperation* (71) The persistence of Cpptiin Wachenfeld in carrying out on his own initiative vrliat he felt would be the wishes of his chief is an example of the best type of liaison mission* (72) Duke Albert's initiative, foresight, and willingness to take res ponsibility were indicative of his unusual qualities of command, even thought dictated perhaps by the fear, of himself being outlfanked* (73) 2# Opinions of the Author* (1)* Discussion. Moltke1 s plan to dofend in the center while awaiting the result of his envelopment on the right was sound; to carry out this con ception, it was not neoessarjr}.^hat the Fifth Army avoid combat entirely, and it therefore cannot be said with justice that MoXtke's basic plan was responsible for the difficulties that resulted on this front* Whether tho Crown Prince himself was responsible for dis obedience to the orders of GHQ is not clear; that the tactical reasons put forward did not justify the decision is evident* However, the decis ion may have boon taken by Knobelsdorf and adhered to by him; such an ex platotion would be in agreement with what is known of his illogical Im pulses and stubborn charaoter* It may be, but cannot be said positively, that the Crown Prince or hie chief of staff, or both, felt that the suc cess of the Bavarian Prince in Lorraine demanded on behalf of the imper ial dynasty, an equal success for the Fifth Army* In any event the chief of staff was the actual, and the Crown Prinoe only the nominal, commander of the army. — — — «•• (E, p 119 (71) (E, pp 116,117 [E, p 109 (72) (E, pp 118-:: IE, p 106 (73) (E, pp 116,119 ... (E, p 107 (70) (E, p 112 • 9 » Von Knobelsdorf evidently fully realized the fact of his disobedience, and declined to request the assistance of the Fourth Army for fear of referenoe to Even under existing oiroumstanoes quick action by QHQ could have forestalled difficulty, for the Fourth Aray reported the situa tion early on 22 August* Captain Wachenfeld carried out a difficult mission with loyalty, persistence and initiative. The Duke of Wurteaburg* s prompt action indicated a decisive character, and his quick and accurate estimate of the situation bore the hall-mark of an able (2)# Careful consideration of the foregoing justifies the conclusion that* The Gemah Fifth Army, in deciding to attack on 22 August, 1914, to seise the line: Clarenoy ~ Chirrs iver --Crusnes River Audun-le-raman, endangered the scheme of maneuver of the German high com* mand$*this attack was not justifiable« German GRQ was at fault in failing to discover imd prevent the attack as planned, even at the last moment* The Fifth Army deliberately violated the Principle of Coop eration, deceived GHQ as to its intention*, and rendered inevitable;what GHQ particmjtiLrly and"..properly forbade*a large jg^tp on the front of the pourtfc and Fifth AriftlitfV ^ . '- ^ Tie oommandor, Fourth Army, took prompt••mptiqri]io^'^oteot;';; the right of the S'ifth Army and so far as practicable'v%o oariy into #?feot the orders of GHQ on hid own fronts Responsibility for the aotion of the Fifth Army lies first with its chief of su^f, who was actually its oomoander; secondarily, joint responsibility may lie with the' German Crown Prince, nominal army command*r, who m&y have xu'ged the attack (though this is net established) for personal and dynastic reasons, in order to gain a success comparable to that of Rupprecht of Bavaria, in Lorraine #
EDWAPD 8. Major, Infantry, 2d Year Class.
- 10 x« CONDUCT or ms BUSS or TKB BUKB 1f WURIHMBERO# (1) General Situation of the Fourth German Army on the Morning of 22 August, On the morning of 22 iuguftt, at & result of the it.troh on VIrtoa by the V Corps * the right corps of the Fifth German Arnpr -, and a* a oonssq.uenc# of the deciilon taken by Duke Albert during the nigit, the front of the Fourth Army, oriented still towards the West, tended to straighten Itself out towards the South; and, as a result, it became overextended and broken up on a front of 80 kilometers. (1) It consisted of fire groupments, from north to south* 01 these, four groupments still faced watt. In the 3d large clear space the VlII Corps, mnay goflttqr and covered the left flank of the Third Xrxqy, which prepared to attack the Meuse* On the northern part of the 2d clear spaoo? the two Infantry divisions of the XVIII Corps - the 25th and 21st Divisions - hold themselves ready for aot'lon, the former in the Ai^loy region; the latter towards Libremont* On the southern part of esoond clesr apace, the XVIII Reserve Corpe ad vanced to the west of Neuf chateau, taking its place in the front line# Beiiind these three corps, the VIII Reserve Corp*, alone in rear line, was marchii\g towards St. Hubert, behind the gap between the VIII Corp* and the XVIII Corps* p 1£2 Only one groupment faced south) the VI Corps, whim was pivoting on Tlntigoy in two oolunns, gained the opening of Stalla« In brief i at the moment when the Fourth German Arny became liable to engage in battle and fight in an unknown di*eotion, the bulk of Its force was still oriented facing to the we6t and broken up into four groupments completely separated from one another by thickly wooded mas si yes ax*i therefore without ary hope of liaison between them; in short, only one corps executed the wheeling towards the south end faced towards the Samo?*
(1) Betraohtungen uber die grenzsohlaton • Colonel Ton Montey - Revne Wissen und Wehr - 7th and 6th menueorlpts, 1926* At the left of the fourth Amy, the Stfth inny advenoed to battle sn£
readied the froat Vlrton~-Chiere--Grusaes# It must bt acknowledged that the disposition of the Fourth irsqr was not at all favorable to flight a battle against an adversary* whose proximity aid intentions were not known, and whose strength was underaetiraated# (2) The Beginning of the Battle* — About 8:00 AM (1), Duke Albert, feeling uneasy for his left, went by motor with Letturitz to Bullea, in the clear space of Stalls (2), where he learned that the VI Corps was vigorously engaged in a hard figxt towards Bosalgnol and Tintigny* An opaqus fog, such
as the inhabitants of the country had never seen9 had covered, during the first hours of the dqr, th* wooded zones to the north of the Ohiers end the Mouse; this casual occurrence contributed to increase once more the Duke's 123 uncertainty as to the enemy's* intentions/ Hie aviation oould net function until after 7:00 iM, when a dear August sun came to 4ry out the oombetanta soaked through by tha storm of the day before* But, for the tin* being, Duke Albert was left to hypotheses* The combat of the 71 Corps was a serious one; if the enemy, with strong forces, had marched to the north, and If uqder cover of the fog, he had launched a surprise attack against the centre of the IV Arsy, partly broken up, the situation mi git become extremely serious* Biua, the Duk«9s first thought was to reunite his Jtriqr as closely as possible and to oonve?go towards the south new farose to support the VI Corps* Th* order at 9:30 MA* As a result, at 9:30 Al% while still without Information from his aviation, he ordered the X7IIX Reserve Corps, the head* of which should be
towards Noufchateau, to advance due aouth, by Bullet aur izel9 to Intervene, in the oombat of tho VI Corps and to «»ven push some foroes towards Qhiny* to out off the adversary9s retreat* Similarly! the XYIII Corps waa ordered to proceed from IIBIN and LIBRJttCSft' towards the south in the direction B3RTRTJC—• OH050. The VIII Pesorve Corps was to close up by ST. 1I0BSRT sur VILUDfOl,
(1) Wtk
west of LIBIN* This corps was the only one that could exeoute th*> order which was reooived about 12530 IN; the other two corpe hod been already engaged by the Trench when they received the order to converge towards the south* Duke Albert proceeded ino*diately by motor to the heights southwest of Marbehaa, commead post of the Vj Corps* General Pritzelwifc* had been there since 6:00 AM, He had seen marching before his eye*, the left column of his corps - the 11th Division - with which he was marohing; hearing towards the west the noise of a heavy combat, he thought that it came from his ri£it column - the 12th Divieion - which had not yet de 154 bouched from the Roaaigaol forest* About 7:30 AM, in fact, the advance guard of the 12th Division had run up against the enemy in the almost impenetrable forest north of the village of Ttoaaignol, The infantry fougit painfully| bearing the entire weight of the fight, the artillery net being able to support it,, Fritzelwltz then pushed the 11th Division by St. Yinoant sur Yalausart to assist the 12th Division and. asked the 3d Colonial Division to hold itself 1$ readiness for combat towards Tintigny* But before these orders could be executed, the 11th Divieion at the time of
its fight at Tintigny, had deployed facing Beliefontainet its artillery opened fire against a Trenoh column moving from Meanil towards RoasigaoJU It soon beoomes a serious ocmbat* Pritzelwitz had no more reserves! and therefore had no means of Intervening to coordinate the notion of his two divisions* No aews had been received from the other oorp* of the ?oiar*h Amy, nor of the Fifth Army which sesmod heavily engaged to th* south of the first wooded zone4
The information at Hi00 AM«
Suddenly, &T>out Hi00 Aii* a r^crt fi*om tive sriaticn finally ocjne| it showed clearly the dangerous sltuatioa into w hi oh the fourth Army has been mislead by a spirit of comradeship for the Fifth Amp*
Tive freAch divisions, departed from the line BuUbs~8t^ Oeolle sur la Ssoioy, their heads having retched, about IO1I6 AM, the northerm the second wooded some m the frostt Qribcmont—.a\»y „ Brief but of great eonse^uenees, revealing the seriousness of the crisis tfeat I
threatened the fourth Any* The enemy, large in numbers, had selected, therefore the northern direction* Within a short time, perhaps it has already happened, the center of the army la going to feel the-bio*/ of the
ie far at Wurtsmberg ie concerned, the vail ia torn* Ilia miaaiou. ie clear* above all, it la to protect the left flank of the Third Arty, »o that thla array may, In absolute safety, attack to the north of tUe Gloat* In order to repel the eneny advance without having to change the direction of the Third Aruy, only the two centre corpa are affiliable: the X7III reserve corpa and the XVIII Corpe; the Vlll Rdeorre Oorpa waa too far to the rear; an to the VIII Corpa, It was necessary to hold it in order to immediately cover the lif t flank of the Ihird Amy*
11 van a education therefore of first of all aaaembllng the me*ai*i neceeeaxy to face the enany and than of conducting the battle onergetlcoLl
Tae Duke ordered the 71 Oorpa, vrhich wma left to Ite own rorcot, to drive back the enowy towai'de tbe woat, if poeaible/ them to atrike ih* five coluiana advancing towardia tho uorth' in flank and rear*
About 13*00 noon, be liaetened to Llbramozxt ??hore hi6 conmaad post vrae to be established*
Wliilo goAjig through Keufcbateau9 he aaw the oonmandor of the XVIII
Tteeerre Corp«f Goueral vat Sfceuboxii thic corpa haid eiigaged in coin)>at about 11:00 Mi against an enemy marching fco?/ardo the north*
In fGot, as early at 10 s"5 AM, Yon Stoubon had received Wurwemoerg'i order dated 9J30 /iM, to advance i;o7?ard« the aouth on Isel« At that the XVIII Reserve Corpa had not yet finished taking ap Ite dlopoeitione around Neufchateeu* About 10*45 AM» the leading divleion - the Slat Division - came out of Noufchateau and signalled that maaaaa of enemy fantry wero holding the heights to tbe noKhrrost of St. Medard, that la to aay, due ^eet. That probably waa the «th Infantry Bi'lgada, the flank guard of the 17th Corp*, and the flrat elements of the l£th Corpa»•
This naw4i aeeued rexy auvpriaing; Yon Steuben ordered the bulk of the Slat Hea^rve diviaion to march totiari* the south in order to quickly aaeiat the 71 Corps^ while the advance guard would hold the heights at petit-Volr,
to the weat of Neufchateau. But very ooon thia wheeling waa shown to fee lqpoesible, in the presence of a very strong adversary, who p. 186 was already deployed{ In faot the entire French 12th Corps wat there* Ton Steuben than contented himself with having hi a leading division, • the Slit Be ear re Division - hold the heighte waat of Neuf chateau, while his rear division - the SCth Peearre Division. - again on march towards the southwest of the locality, was to deploy towarda the south, to the laft of fttnpadb.er'a reserve division. Having approved these dispositions, Duke Albert, headed towards the north, at the moment whan the fight of the Slat Reserve Division commenced with a repulee of its leading brigade
n * . • • • • ' . ' * . . ' ' " - • ' . ' . ' • . . - • ' • the 42d - which was driven back from Kevraiont by the French 84th Division that waa advanoing from the south* The rear brigade - the 41st > surprised in march column at the western exit of Keufchateau, waa similarly tttaoked on its left flank by the 5th Colonial Brigade. 'ft?e combat soon beoaae extremely violent, particularly at Neufchateau, where the 36 pieces of the Slat Reserve Division were crutked by the f ire of the Trenoh artillery (gro-jp of the 5th Colonial Brigade and the Divisional artillery of the £3d i Divisiou}*
Tory nertou49 the German Command loat lta control, it did not recover aomo presence of mind until between 4:00 and 5:00 ¥M, when the leading elements of the 25th Rosevve Divialon (Torgany) intervening at EMaipre on the ritfx^ flank of the Ctoullet Colonial Brigade, struck that Brigade aquaxely in front and gradually forced it to retreat to the a out h of the seoond wooded zone. But the criais reached its climax, the 41st Brigade waa forced to engage lta laet man to hold the heights of the dU>spot wood, to the eouthweet of Neu'ohatcau* She German batteriee in position west of the localities were on the verge of being carried away by the furious assaults of the Colonial troopd, The Germane, besides, after the retreat of the 5th Colonial Brigade on Suiy, stopped exhausted, on the right flank of the French SM Division; they did not dare engage the rear brigade of the 25th Reserve Division - the p* X9f 49th Reserve Brigade - which they Jealously held in reserve4 At dusk, the Goullot Brigade evacuated the battlefield, but farther to the t?9st, the 1&& Trench corps slept on its conquered positions* Ik fact, at niditfall, the laft column of this any corps - the 24th Division
(General du Garreau da la Mechanic) t with a bayonet charge captured ftosaart, hemlet situated north of the rout* Beuf chateau—Bertrix which waa rigorously defended by the 48d German Re a erre Brigade f the right column - the 234 DiTitian (General Ltblcmd) did not go beyond the route Neufchatoau~Bertrix# lhe 12th French Oorpa then stopped in front of th* weak screen of akirmlthera of the NiijSrker diTieioa; It did not exploit ita suooess towards
Reoogpa and Libramont which were ita objeotlrea# v In faot, •* noon, th* commander of the l£th Corpe wa# preoccupied. In ooaing to the aaaiatanee of the 5th Qploaial Brigade, which waa bottled up eouth of Keufohateau «ad which WM yelling far help* » About 4:00 M, Osnarel Leblood, commanding the 23d DiTiaftoa, learning (1) by a motorcycle me*meager that the 5th Colonial Brigade had suffered eerloua loaeee upon attacking Ntufchateau, aent in that direction a detach ment of three battalions (2 from the 78th Heecrrc Dirieion and one from the 158th Reaerre Dirision), uodex- command of Colonel Arlaboaae. (teneral Leblond, whose diyisional artillery (2) waa already firing on Haufchateau, asked Osneral Roynes at 4:10 IV to put the artillery of hie corpe into action to "stop the auccoaa of th* Garmans(3}«" Th© lateral moremant of these three Tarioua elements waa Tery alow p# 128 due to the difficultiea of the terrain; deep ravinea, lack of roada obstructed the movement of the artillery* Thus thesa reinforcement* ooul& not intcrrane in time to prarent the withdrawal of the- Ooullet Brigade* The Corps Artillery of the 12th Corps did not firo a single ahot; in
regard to Arlabosse, he halted about 6:00 PM (18th) in front of Grafontaim# souvhweat of Neufchateau* Thus the moat forward elemsnta of the French 12th Corps did hardly Co north of the road Neufchateau--Bcrtrix; on the right they did not reach tkat far. On 22 Auguet 1914, the 12th French Corpe might hsnre had in its hands the fftte of the Fourth Any* An action carried on more rapidly migit hare made etill more difficult the criala with whicli tha Qermfla ocmmaal waa struggling*
(1) Lea Arms Trafeoaiaec daua la Orande groeae * ?&** 1-1 or Tol Annexe 1:015 (8)••.»"• * « , » . » .•/•.•• •• " l «p it « • » * m N • 9S5 Udc
The 12th French Co~** found itself placed In front of an exceptionally favorable situation, it <*# had in front of it ox* weak brigade of reserve
infantry* Its left COIUL . (84th Dirieion) hardly suffered from the artil lory fire of the German position west of Heuf chateau. Shis was, besides, the impression brought back the seme evening by a general staff officer of the Fourth Ancy sent as liaison officer wit& General Boquos. "The la- pro at ion is that the infantry division em the left is engaged against an advanee guard without artillory", the infantry division on the right ie north of Warmlfoatalne, and has nothing in front of it {!)• Without
doubt9 the most efficient mains offered to the lath Corps to assist the 5th Colonial Brigade, which had to deal with sore than li e own match, consisted in pushing energetically towards its own objectives: fteeogoe and Ubramont. If it )*ad readied them, It would here opened a deep breach p* 1M between the airman XTIII Corps, and the X7III Bsserve Corps*
At aqr rate9 the delay of the lath French Carps taring the day and its hiOLt at idghtfell k«l fatal let* As we a hall see, the lack of a*aete of the 13th Franeh Corps, lmt% the SXtt German Wvieion in abeolute freedom to leave BecogAe amd aoccnQpllsh the disaster of the VUleneJeanc division in the Forest of Luoky* And thie is a striking example which shows that the ladder echelOM&ent adopted i>y the 4th freneb Arnr could not have functioned in a acre diffieult terrain*
ad« nnally, and thio is the most Important conoideratlbn9 the list Deserve Division (General Ran^acher) having been saved from annihilation after the French lath Corps had halted, the center of the IV German imy ftacaped froa t\ great danger, that of being pierced between Neufchateau and the Lucky Toreat. One weighs the significance of this danger which so heavily hung on all day over the arnr of the Duke of Wui-tembargo • • » • •
When a large unit wants to assist a neighboring unit that has fallen into u difficult predioanentt is it not surer in general to attain the purpose looked for, by accomplishing!first and above al},lt* own mission?
(1) Archivei Service Historiquo - OH de L'offioer de liaison • £B Aug, 1914** Cortor 406 - Gen* Staff 17 tray, ad Section* (4) Duto AlbTt With th» XTPI OoJP«.~tt« ordT at >t80 » (14th 30).
About 1*00 W, (Uth) t Dukt Hbtrt mai« oontaot a* ttbrantfnt with General ron Sohenk, oomending the XVIII Oorpa; here aleo the any order ISO of 9s30 AM, proecribing the march to war da the eouth oould not be exeouted* Qxx the one hand, in fact, the rigit diVieion of the XVIII Oorpe - the 85th DiYieion - had rim up againct the enemy elnoe 11100 AM,, towarde llelacln, On the other hand, ron Sofaenk learned frcw the aviation that numerou* enemy column* were coming up frcm the Sexmogr towarde the north, by Offagne
; and Bertriz; the a e were the ****& •>Jlth and 17th Corpa« due, instead of executing the arny order to daah towarda the eouth on Bertrix—Ofrgeo, he faced the enemy aid puahed towarda the eouthweat* The 25th Diyia ion from Recogne on Bertrix* ftiMtb Diriaion frqt Aulcy on Jehourille. It waa then that the dioaatiafaction of Duke Albert burat, wham he learned of the violation of the army order by hie aubordinate aj* e*w, with hie own ayea, the gap which continued getting larger, between the XVIfl Corpa and the X1HI Reacrvo Oorpa. A new p re a a ing appeal from, thie latter corpa decided Wu*temberg himaelf to order ron Schenk, in writing, to orient towarda the couth, towarda Orgeo—Bertrix, at leaat a one elamanta of the XVIII Corpa; t hi a order, for another reaaon, remained unfulfilled* Here it ie dearly ah own the influence exeroieed by the Anqr Commander • Since the morning, he haa been trying to preaent to the eneny, who debouohee by the aouth by aurpriae, a coherent front; by hie pereonal intorrention, he triea to aaaure the liaiaon of tha rarioua oorpa among themaelTea,; he cannot, howoyar, m&ke hie dociaiono, aare by an actual contact 3loae to
hia combat troope; in ahort, he di recta the battles About a:00 XV (14th), at Libraaont, Duke Albert puta dowi- 1A a unique arnor order the various oral ordere which he had already iaaued to the Corpa commmUra, and in riew of the turn taken by the combat, he accent^atea the morement^ of the two corpa on the right, the only once not yet engaged
and OTCT which he maintained abeolute control* The VIII Beaerre Corpa wee 181 to come up on Villance, in rear of the rigit of XVIII Oorpa, oloalng up ae much aa poaalble* In regard to the VIII Corpa, if It wae not attacked, then it would cg&Terge on* of it* divisions towards the south, towards
Oral da9 pushing it this evening as far forward as possible; the othar infantry division was to continue oovering the left flank of the Ihlrd Ircr. Duke llbtot oalls , therefbra, to battle gradually all his available forces* At tha sana tins, ha informs tha Supreme Oocnand of tha Tary violent
oombat which ia taking plaoa on tha front of tha yourth Arnsyr when an order arrive* from Coblens, prescribing him "to hold himsslf ready" on ths EM to push his right wing in liaifon with the Third ,ftwi to out off, if such should be the case, the retraat of tha Tranoh in tha region of Dinant and in the region south of Dinaut (1). But ^urteabarg considers that the most affleient protection that he cm assure the Oilrd Armf consists in putting out of the way the ensmy th*t ha has met and who by his direction of march, diractly threatens the Hausan irtay; ha doss not changa, therefore, the disposition taken* All hie efforts sore bent to rapulss "tha powerful attack that^ an enemy apparently superior in nuabere
direots against the Fourth irmy#f! (5) The oriels of Malsstn and Anslai. Tbwards the middla of the afternoon, tho situation of the fourth Army again eeeaed serious* Tha Till Corps, too far away, will not be able to pfrtiaipete in the battle until the following day; its direction of attack may, besides, p# 13tt than become decisive* Ihs columns of the Till Reserve Oorpa left Boetogme axd Siorat on the morning at forced march and pushed on Ylllanoe; a distance of 45 kilometers to be corered by reeerylsts, under a heavy sun and in a rery broken country, will thqy arriTS early enough? And during this time, the two centre corps of the any.- thp XVIII Corps and tha XTIII reterre corps, left to their own forces only, engaged in their zonce of actiom against Trench troops, rastly superior in numbers, oould not assist each other•
WeltklngZ I p 3«7t In fact the** two Herman Corps wort faoing the 11th, 17th, 12th Corps and ttie 5th CoJoaial Brigade* On the right» the wheeling of the X71II Oorpi towards the south with a view to make a junction with the XVIII Reserre Corps, was altogether impossibles Duke Albert, in turn, recognized it . ft* Sehenk Amr corps was in itself separated into three fregmsnta which fought all dey without liaison among themselres. Hheee three fragnant* were the 25th DirisLon, the ron dor Ssoh groupment and the Slat Dirts ion* 1st. On the north, the SCth Di Tie ion marching on Jehonrille, was •truck on both aides of Mali in by such yiolent resistance that it had to
\- • • . • • • * • content itself, first with the heights south of the Tillage, later on to hang on desperately to the hilltops north and east of the locality, under the repeated blows that the French 11th Corps and 34th Dirislon wars dealing it. Late in the afternoon, a oriels arose, perhaps eren more serious a* keen than that whioh we have described concerning the XVIII Beserre Corps. On left wing of the German 25th Division, the 49th Ifcfantiy Brigade, powerfully supported by its field artillery sucoeeded in making progress to the west and to the south of JUiloy. It drore back, in a bloody ccnbat in the woods | the right of the French Std Di Tie ion, as far as the road Mai J sin— p* 235 Paliseul, and also co&tained towards the.south the 34th Trench Dirision which debouched from Jehonrille. ' On the ottier hand, its ritfit wing, the 50th Brigade exhausted Itself in a confused oombat* 8hortly beft>re nipitfall, the 50th Brigade, completely surrounded on its right by the Trennh list Division whieh attacked from Our la a west-east
direction, was compelled to etaeuate MalsslBt in flsws, and withdraw 1* disorder to tho other side of the Lesse* At •tOOWj, Qeneral TOE flpesshardt^ oonmsadlng the Brigade, tried to recapture 71llano©. But the retreat soon « assuzaed the aspeet of a rout* in spite of the energetio efforts of the dlTlaloA ecomsdtler, the artillery batteries which supported the brigade abandoned their ptaitloAs west of the Tillage of Til lance, and were sow won over by the retrograde noTement* 3he staff officers of the dlTlaio*, rerolTiir 1m hand, succeeded! howerer, in rallying acme Infantry elements which dug in between Ylllmoe and Mkissin; under their protection, the **:
artillery batteries finally reoccupied their emplacements. But the bulk cC the Infantry continued its retrograde movement #thru VUlaaee in an easterly direction (!)• This brigade had suffered considerable losses, the 118th
Infantry Regimentt alone aufferod a loae oft6 offioere and over 1000 men. It thle erltloal moment, whan the stream of fugitives from the 50th German Brigade was crowding the road, the leading elements of the VIII Reserve Corps came up on the battlefield, under a burning sun, to the assist* ance of the XVIII Corps* In faot, as soon as General d'Xgloffstela, oomKiander of the VIII Reserve Corps, learned that the entry into line of his corps was,urgently desired, he had towards 1:00 HI, ordered his two divisions p» 134* to march beyond St. Hubert and Veequeville, which were the objectives that had been previously assigned to hiau The artillery of the 15th Reeerra Division started ahead; at 5:45 PM, a field group and l/£ battalion of heavy field howitzers were in position to the east of VULAN08, closely followed by the rest of the batteries* the ontire artillery then went itito action* While this assistance oo\jJL not change the outcome of the battle, it permitted, nevertheless, the infeatij of General von KUrowski (15th Reserve Division) to advance in the direotion of MAI3SIN, while the 50th Brigade assembled it s soattered elements to the. east of VILLAHOS. In the meaatinis, the advenes guard of the 16th Reserve Division, had been dispatched to Augloy to relnforoe the left of the 25th Division, rtiioh was In danger of being orerrun by the attack of the 54th Trench Division* But after having occupied the heights south of 1NL0Y; the advance guard of General Moots initiated the withdrawal of the 49th Brigade; by the evening, it had evaouated the village and returned to the right of the Lesse where it dug in. (B) The fi^it in this region was settled with a sure defeat of the 85th German Division, he next day, the 23d, this division oould not leave before 3:00 PU. Rie name of JNLOY, nust sound terribly in Haste* from where the 85t)i Division ci
(1) ffeltkrieg • l # • 116th Infantry Regiment* -11 The Weltkrieg praises Insistently the work carried out by %h* Reserve
Corps* In spite of the great heat and diffioultiee of the terrainf General •on Bglofftein brought, after a march o{ 49 kilometer*, the heads of him columns in time to avert on 22 August the nast serious crisis that the Germane had known* It seen*, in fact, that the intervention of the VIII leeerve Corps saved the 25th Division from an envelopment; completely p# 136 isolated, this division was about to be caught between two fires, between an attack *outh*north launched by the 34th and 2£d French Division and by an attack west-east by the £ist Division though the blcts of these three divisions were divided* 2d« While the 25th Division was facing this crisis, the 21st Division, on its part, gave up the march to the south* After having been assembled during the Morning in the Reoogne region, in position to continue its movement, either to the northwest or to the west, it was ordered towards the southwest by General von Schenk, to meet some Trench columns reported by the aviatiom as advancing towards the north, The old advanoe guard of the 21st Division,groupment von dsr Bsoh,
while trying to debouch from Ochsqps to Bertrixr was attacked at 1:00 HI by the infantry of the 66th Trench Brigade, coming out of the woods of LTCHT, and compelled to hang on to the ground* During the entire afternoon, the groupm«it von der Ssch fought isolated; it was not until th* end of the day that after having repulsed the sussaults of the 80th Trench Reserve Division/it penetrated the Forest of Luchy and reestablished liaison with the bulk of its division. 3d* The main forces of the 21st Division had received about 11:30 4lf» orders fro£ General von Schenk to march from Reoogne on Bertrix* fiie bulk of the division advanced, therefore, in column of squads over the main road from Ubramont to Bertrlx, when at about 2i90 Plf, its advanoe guard (88th Infantry Regiment) fell by surprise, in plain Vorest of Luchy, on the right flank and head of the 33d French Division, the head at whioh was attacking Oohamps, Yery quickly, the whole division beoan» Involved in a confused and very deadly combat in the woods, at point blank ranges•
•18 ttk
During the evening, the 33d Irwioh DiTi^ion, hariag •uffw»d con«id»r*bl« P# 196 lot set In men and materiel, disappeared toward! the west and south and ti* yen Oven diviaion debouched from the Forest, in vicinity of Bertrix. fixe deciaion taken by the Corps Commander, to engage himself towards the southwest, to face the approaching enemy and to persist in his attitude, in spite of Wurtemberg'a order, had borne its fruits• General ron Schenok had thus assisted, indirectly, his neighbor on the left, the XVIII Reserre Corps and even prevented the breaking up of his corps, which was already dispersed over a rery wide front, fecept on the right where the situation still remained serious at Maiaain, the X7III Corps hsd averted the crisis; » the surprise effects, oauaed by the unexpected arrival of the enemy, had been repaired; a coneiderable tactical success had been at$ai*#4 in the Forest of Luchy, where the Geftnana captured 27 guns of the 18th Regiment, Frenoh Artillery* (6) The two flank oorpa» — The Combat of the 71 Corps* During thia ti*», the left wing of the army, iaplated, continued the battle without receiving support either from the right or from the Lift, against the bulk of the French Colonial Amor Corps end the 4th Division (General Rabiar), The 11th German Division (von Weboon) deployed after its exit from Tintigny, its leading brigade - the 21st - engaged in a j*ort4l duel with the Cordonnicr Brigade at Beliefontaine, whose smouldering ruins remained by ni&tfall in hands of the Trench* The artillery of the Uth Division and its rear brigade (the S2d), intervening on the right flank of the Colonial Corps, permitted the debouchment of the lBth Divieion entangled in the Fore at of Neuf chateau. While the 11th Grenadiers and the 51st infantry Regiment, after a bloody fight with the 7th and 3d Colonial p# 137 regiments aueoeeded in taking poaaession of the Farm of Chanoia and that of St. Vincent, the artillery in position near Harineart, cut off the bridge of Brevauwie over the Ssmoy and thus contributed to the invest ment of the front of the 3d Colonial Division in the baain of Rossignol* 'S h'T ?.-".«
13th Division, In turn, had been stopped in front since 8:00 JMf in plain forest of Neufehateau by the edvanoe guard of the 3d Colonial Division. General Ohplee de Baaulieu pushed immediately towards hill 363 and Tfcrmes, th* 63d Infantry Btgiment and an artillery group (II/57 Bagt of colonial artillery) to open up to his division the exit of the clear space of Roaaigaol, About 11:00 1M, this force came out of the Forest; in apite of the destination of a German battery o* hill 363 under tha fire of the 24 art ill* ry regiment of tha Colonial Corps; in spite alao of the entry into lime, about 4:00 W, of tha leading elements of tha 2d Colonial Division near Termee, thia force consisting of the 63d Infantry Regiment and U/57 Colonial Artillery Regiment, assured the exit tram the Torcat of tha bulk of tha infantry division, and joiming handa with the Sid Brigade which arrived fire* the east, completed the defeat of tta 3d Colonial Division In the evening, the entire YI Corps had ease out of the wooded mone and was facing wast, on tha freat Rossigaol—Gt • Ylncentr-Wntigny, the 11th Division lost 110 officers and about 3000 men# The 12th Division lost 74 officers and over 1000 map* but It anni hilated tha let Colonial Brigade and captured the artillery of the 3d Colonial Division. The Germans had oaptured Rossignol, 8600 men and 39 guns; they rendered homage in tha Waltkrieg to tha heroism of their brave adversary, the French Colonial Corps» The VIII Corpa* let ua now follow Duke Albert in hie tour towards tha extreme right of his army* About 4:15 XV, he rejoined the Commander of the VIII Corps, General p« 136 Tulff von Tcheppe at Weindebaok, at Hormsy, at tha moment whan the latter, convinced that hie presenoe was of no value to the Third Aray, executed the any order issued at 2:30 PM and pushed towards tte eouth to tha west of Bievre, not only tha 15th Division, but also the bulk of the 16th Division, leaving only a flank guerd near Baaurlng to protect tha right flank of tha Third Anay, (1)
(1) At firat tha 30th Brigade, reinforced; later on only one battalion, one battery and two squadrons • -44 m
IHjke Albert gare hit ooaplete approval to this decision; the The aotlon of the VIII Corpst rather late on the ZZ August had been in rain, but it was full of promises for the following dqr# (7) Qerimn Situation on ZZ AugUvtU -* Poke Albert return* to Bastogne• - • - • ' * ; • • / • • • ' . • " ' • . • • ' . • ; • . • • • * . . • • ; • - ''•''•',. \ • • ' • • i - ' - . - ' • • - •• . * '." ; ' i ••••' • • '• • • i l s • • i • = • • ' . . ; • ; : . • : ;•• . ' • • • • • : ' • • • ; • < . . ' • • • ' . \ • • • : . , - - " - 4 v • . • < . - • • ' . • • ' . • . ' . ' ••'• * » ' . ' ' - ' ' • ' • After his conference with tbsi oommander of the Till Corps, Duke Albert returned to hie oommand poet *X tibraaonti vrhere nore farorable reports of the battle awaited hia# The serere crisis 77hich had threatened not only the Fourth •tagy, but the whole front of the wheeling wing might bt> considered as fortunately surmounted* Sntorlng Bofttogne late in the erening, Wurtemburg found thei^irt . • ' , * • ' • ' • • ia^ortant reports conoerning the neighboring armiea* During the battle, the General Staff of the Fourth Army had boen * . - * informed of the adranoe of the Fifth Anqr by an actirs exchange of between the Chiefs of Staff of the two aruies, Besidea, Oeneral Frltselwits had repeatedly/Informed that the T Corps, the right, oorpe of the Araqr of the Crown Prinoe, was adranolng* Re last telephone mesaage of the Fi£th Arwjr announeed that strong ?renoh foroea had been thrown baok after a hard struggle. The Fifth Area? had reached the line nrton*r~TOlle-an Mo*toia-~AAderay> which it Expected to hold on SS Auguat* (1) This laet phrase showed that the Fifth Aiw had not yet obtained a oqnplete Tictory. (*), Bro battalion* of the 13?th Regiment of Infantry, 1 battery of the 51et Field ArtUlery# • " (1) Weltkrieg I - p. 393« -16 A little later9 the Third Army informed that It intended to attack on 23 August beyond the Mouse, and requested the Fourth Army to coyer it* left flank against axy French foroes that might oome up from Givet. During the night , General yon Hauaen further stated that In the opinion of GHQ, the region from Fumay to Sedan and to the northeast was clear of enemy forces; apparently there was a gap in the French frost between Civet and Chiny. This report was sererel hours old, and it was wrong. Puke Albert knew what to expeot from sow on, he had just gon* thru > • •. a a«Yere crisis; he was under *;he impression the*, he had bssn etruck p t 141 by at laaet four French Corps and he did not hare a burning desire to fly to the assistance of his comrades. -Ha advised the fiiird imp that; ha was too busy en his front and that lie needed all his corps for the battle, including the bulk of the VIII Corps; which was to advance towards the south* The fact is that the General Staff of the fourth Jxmy was iioi, that evening, under the impression that i t had obtained a victory; i t has juet escaped from a great danger, and more so because during the dey it was thought that the battle of Neufchateau had been lost* It gave a sigh of relief* and again assuned courage, but it sensed that there wat still much left to be done* The battle was undecisivet the question was to resume it the naxt day with all available meansf The value of 3 corps , that had been engaged, out of the 5 corps com posing the Fourth Amy was as follows: the VI and the XVIII had been t'horou^Uy tried out under fire, the XVIII Reserve Corps had a brigade still intact,-the 50th Brigade, • the Till Reserve Corps had participated with ite artillery and leading infantry elements, tardily; the VIII Corps h&. not fired a shot* Ibis fresh corps was the one that must push energetically towards the enemyfs left flank« Orders for 88 August. —• i. At 8i4O HI* Wurteciberg ordered that the combat be reoumed on the entire front the next day, 33 August at 4)00 All* The VIII Corps to march from Oroide with its left on Pallseul* *vff^> The XOtti Reserve Wvie ion and the £5th Division under tho oomuwid of General Sgloffstoin to attaok from 7111 anoa • only oa the front 16th Reserve Pi vision and the 21st Division undar the oommaud of » General von Sohenk, from Ooheugpc<-~Libramont on Brsrtrix—Petit-Vcir, Ihe X7IH Heaerve Corps «n& the Yz Corps to atteok the emoor on their fronts« Ihese orders do not sound like a song of riotory* ,iVhile the front: of the army was better united, more coherent than on the morning of the 22dp while it did not extend over $5 kilomoters and while the 5 oorps in line pivoted towards the south, the centre had not recovered fiom the two • • " • < ' ' • • terrible crisis of Mfcdasin and ITeufchateau which they had suffered on 141 that day; the proof of this may be found in the oiiztiure of units of the VIZI Aaserve Corps and the XYTII Corps and tho new organizatioii of the t > . . ^ • . , . . . . eommand which oaae about as a eons equenoe; one re cognizes traces of it in the evident timidity which governed the selection of objectives4 BIBLIOGRAPHY. KEY* E, p 105 s Fo» 1 Text below, p 10fl« R# p 303 « No. 2 Text be Ion, p 3031 M* p 73 r No. 3 Taxt below, p 73, Crown Prince, p 214 • No* 4 Text below, p 214 1. La Bat4ille des Ardennca, Eoole Superleure de Guerre, Freince, 1928* 2* Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1918/ Reibharchir* (The^ Wdrld Ttar# from German B official arohiyes*) E. S. liittler £ Soni orlin# 102 « Dio Schlfcchtbeil^ngwy (They Battle of Long?ry)> l>y Capt,ain Erhard yon V Stalling, Oldenburg, Oenaany, 1919 ••' 4« Memoirs of the Crown Prii>6e of Germany; Charles Seribner's Sons* New York, 1922. NOTE: Search of the files and sheltes of the Library, Cocmmnc^ and Geneaal Staff School, haa indicated no available original sources antedating those given aboye* Croguis n*3 La Batailla de6 Ardennes /tlU/nand* ; rv.ee 1/aoo Goguis n*4t Ardennea *e* Etude d6t*il!*<: do k Comm */9 don t en $ Situation /e 21 A out r e II« % I/Zooooo