Practical Halachos of Techum Shabbos

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Adapted from a shiur by Rav Yosef Jacobowitz on Parshas Beshalach

אל יצא איש ממקומו ביום השביעי (שמות טז:כט)

Techum Shabbos dictates that one may not walk more than 2000 amos on Shabbos past his location (or his contiguous inhabited area) when Shabbos began.

Traveling less than 12 Mil is derabanan. More than 12 Mil outside the techum is subject to machlokes: Some hold it constitutes an issur deoraisa based on the pasuk Others hold, that too, is only derabanan. One who traveled past the Techum may walk four amos around him (or anywhere within his reshus hayachid, e.g., house or Eruv).

One’s animals and property also receive the techum of the owner. But poskim dispute the severity:

Maharlbach – It is derabanan, even if the halacha of Techum is deoraisa past 12 Mil Maharam Alshaker – If Techum is deoraisa, then this too is deoraisa.

Practical examples:

If a Lakewood resident travels to New York for Shabbos, a guest needing a raincoat may not borrow his raincoat and wear it outside of the Eruv, since the Techum follows the owner in New York. However, Rav Dovid Feinstein ruled that if the guest is staying in the house with permission to use it, it is permitted. If someone from Lakewood went to the hospital (out of the Techum) on Shabbos, Rav Dovid Feinstein ruled that the kids at home may wear or carry items outside of the Eruv (on Yom Tov) that are associated with them. However, they may not take items used only by the parents outside the Eruv. This because ownership here follows the general use of the object, not the rules of Choshen Mishpat. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach allows someone traveling to the hospital on Shabbos to bring as many items as he wants, as his property follows his changed status concerning Techum, and he receives a new Techum.

Taking Work Personal: Borrowing Office Supplies Can an employee take office supplies or borrow the company projector for personal use?

By: Dayan Dovid Grossman, Shlita, Rosh Bais HaVaad

Using Office Supplies

In a busy office, supplies and paper items have a way of coming and going. Paper clips, pens and staplers are lost and found within the full routine of office life. While some items may go missing as a matter of course, there are certain office supplies which are sometimes taken with intent. An employee may want to use a notepad to write a grocery shopping list, or pocket a handful of paperclips for a home project.

Is it permitted for an employee to use office supplies for his personal use?

The situation depends on the following question: Does the employee know that the boss allows him to use the office supplies? Is he sure that the boss does not mind if he makes a few extra photocopies?

Giving Up Hope The Gemara in Bavah Metziah (21b) covers the concept of yi’ush sheloh mida’as. This famous sugya is used by the poskim to develop the halacha with regards to these very relevant questions. The halacha of yi’ush sheloh mida’as pertains to a person who finds a lost item where it can be assumed that the owner gave up hope of finding it. This applies to an object which does not have a siman i.e. it has no identifying feature which would enable you to return it. It also applies to a situation where an object is found in a place which is mostly inhabited by einom yehudim, who are not sensitive to the Mitzvah of hashovas avedah.

In this case, one can assume that the owner of the lost object has given up all hope of ever recovering it. Once you can assume that the owner has lost hope, you may keep the object.

There could be a problem if you pick up the object before the owner has lost hope. Even if later on the owner would have lost hope of finding it, you would not be allowed to keep it, and would have to return it, if you can. If not, there would be a halacha of yehei munach ad sheyovoi Eliyahu and thus ownership of the object could not be ascertained until the coming of Eliyahu..

This famous Gemara of yi’ush sheloh mida’as is one of the first gemaras which is usually learned by children in elementary school. In a regular case where a person is miya’esh and loses hope of ever finding the object again, anyone who finds it after that point is allowed to keep it.

The question is what happens if the owner has not yet been miya’esh because he does not yet know that the object is lost? If the owner would know the object is lost, he would definitely lose hope. At that point, can you pick it up and keep it, or do you have to return it?

There is a machlokes, a disagreement between Rava and Abaya, and the halacha is like Abaya that yi’ush sheloh mida’as loi haveh yi’ush. This means that until the owner actually loses hope, even though he definitely would have lost hope had he known all the facts, that is not sufficient.

Does He Care If You Take It?

The Poskim use this Gemara as an example for the case of taking objects without permission. Even if you know that the owner does not care, and would allow you to take the object, you cannot take it until you have permission. You may not take the object until the owner allows you to take it – even if you are sure that he would be okay with you just helping yourself.

If an employee is going to use office supplies such as paper or pens, and he will not be returning them, he must make sure that his employer allows this.

However, the halacha is more lenient in the case of borrowing something without permission. If the borrower clearly knows that the owner allows you to borrow it, and you will be retuning the item, then it is permissible to use it. As long as you know that the owner would permit it, you can borrow the item and then return it.

Asking permission from the owner at least once can help to alleviate this problem. If a person asked the owner previously, “May I have some paper clips?” and the owner gave permission, then the poskim rule that as long as he is certain that the boss is not makpid he does not need to ask each time. If the owner is a relative and this situation had come up in the past, you can rely on the previous instance and help yourself to the item without permission as long as you are sure they still allow. The California Wildfires II: More on who is responsible to pay for wildfires and for what? Part 2

Electrical Fire:

In Part 1 of this series, we stated that if someone lights a fire in a way that it should technically have been stopped before reaching his friend’s property – for example, a wall separated the two fields – all opinions would agree that the fire has the status of mamon hamazik, and, therefore, the exemption of tamun would apply. However, if there was nothing obstructing the path of the fire, Rav Yochanon, whose view we follow, holds that the fire has the status of odom hamazik, and the lighter is liable for all damages.

Regarding electrical fires, there are several variables to take into account.

If the electrical system was set up negligently, which caused a spark to shoot out of the faulty mechanism that led to a fire, this would seemingly fall under the category of a fire that should technically have been stopped. This is because the spark cannot cause damage on its own and only creates a fire if it lands on something flammable. Therefore, there is much room to say that everyone would agree that such a case would fall under the category of mamon hamazik, and would be subject to the exemption of tamun.

However, if someone installed wiring that was so faulty that the entire mechanism went up in flames, which led to a large inferno, this could theoretically fall under the category of odom hamazik and be considered a direct result of his actions. However, this is somewhat of a stretch, being that if the fire caused damage far away from the original place where it started there is almost certainly some obstructions in between, and it is unlikely that all the damage caused by the fire was done through a direct path.

Another factor that we need to keep in mind is that one is only liable for the damage caused by his fire if the fire was spread through a “ruach metzuyah”, common wind. If the fire only spread because it came into contact with a “ruach she’aino metzuyah”, uncommonly strong wind, the lighter would not be liable because there is no reason to think that such a wind will suddenly appear and he is therefore not considered negligent.

In California, wind gusts that are strong enough to cause large forest fires may not be everyday occurrences; however, they do occur sporadically and are certainly not unheard of. Does this satisfy the criteria of ruach metzuyah?

The Chazon Ish[1] understands this to be the subject of a disagreement between Tosfos[2] and Rabenu Peretz[3], who disagree whether a wind that is not the norm but is not completely out of the realm of normalcy is considered a ruach metzuyah or not. Since the halacha is in doubt, a contemporary bais din cannot obligate someone to pay compensation for a fire that only spread because of such an uncommon – but not unheard of – gust of wind.

Is The Firestarter A Murderer?

It is clear that according to all opinions – even according to Reish Lakish that aish is usually m’shum mimono – if someone would actually kill someone else by throwing a firebomb at him, he would be labeled a murderer and would be Biblically liable for the death penalty. We may ask, however, what the halacha would be according to Rav Yochanon if someone would light a fire that spread through a direct path and ultimately killed somebody. Would this be categorized an act of murder?

This would seem to be a disagreement between Tosfos and the Ran[4], who argue whether one can be liable to capital punishment for death caused through such an act of odom hamazik. We find a similar discussion regarding the halachos of Shabbos. The Nimukei Yosef famously asks how it is permitted to put food up to cook on a fire before the onset of Shabbos. If aish is m’shum chitzo, the fire burning is akin to a direct action done by the lighter. If so, when the fire cooks food on Shabbos, it should be considered as if the lighter is cooking directly on Shabbos. How is this permitted?

He answers that, indeed, it is considered as if he cooked on Shabbos; however, it is only forbidden to do an act of melacha on Shabbos itself, whereas this individual did no action on Shabbos.

We see from the Nimukei Yosef that on a conceptual level, the burning of the fire that one lit is considered a direct action done by him, which seemingly would make him liable if the fire kills someone. This is the view of Tosfos. The Ran, though, disagrees.

Bais din today does not mete out capital punishment. What is applicable is the rule of “kom lei bid’rabbah minei”, which means that in a case where someone causes a loss of life – be it intentional or accidental – the Torah tells us that he is not liable for monetary damages that occurred as a result of the same action. For instance, if someone causes a car accident that kills another driver and also damages his car, bais din cannot hold the driver accountable for the monetary damage. Thus, if someone firebombs someone else’s house, thereby causing a loss of life, bais din cannot pursue the financial damages done to the house.

However, if the victim has some recourse; for example, he is a business partner with the fire starter and is able to be “tofes”, hold onto, funds that belong to the perpetrator, he would be allowed to keep that money[5].

[1] Bava Kama, Siman Hei, Se’if Bais

[2] Bava Kama 59 [3] Cited in Shitah Mekubetzes ibid

[4] Sanderin 77

[5] Choshen Mishpat Siman Daled

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Daf Yomi in Halacha Topics Parshas Bo Meseches Chulin

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Daf 46 http://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CHL_046_Wheezing_Lungs.mp3

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Daf 48 http://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CHL_048_Cesarean_Cows.mp3

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Daf 50 http://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CHL_050_Under_the_Knife_Is_a_Co w_that_had_Surgery_Kosher.mp3

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Halachos of Daily Living: Weekly Questions I was up all night. Do I recite birchas ha’Torah in the morning?

This is a common question on Shavuos. The Mishnah Berurah (47:28) writes that there is a difference of opinion among poskim as to whether one who was awake all night recites birchas ha’Torah in the morning. The Biur Ha’Gra (47:12) and Pri Chadash (47:12) write that one does not recite a bracha; however, the Magen Avrohom (47:12) and Elya Rabba (47:9) write that a bracha is recited every day even if one did not sleep. To avoid this uncertainty, one should listen to the bracha of one who slept and answer Amen. If this is not possible, he should have in mind to fulfill the mitzvah of birchas ha’Torah when reciting the bracha of ‘Ahavah Rabba’, and study Torah immediately after Shmoneh Esrei. If one had taken a nap during the previous day, Rabbi Akiva Eiger (OC 47:12) writes that one may recite birchas ha’Torah in the morning even though they were up all night. But what if one had not napped the previous day and will not be davening now, but wants to continue studying Torah? The Aruch Hashulchan (47:23) as well as other poskim write that the common custom is like the Magen Avrohom, that a bracha should be recited, though the Mishnah Berurah maintains that a bracha should not be recited because of the conflicting opinions.

Should birchas ha’Torah be said standing?

The Beis Yosef (O.C. siman 8) quotes a Yerushalmi which states that all brachos should be recited standing. This Yerushalmi is understood by the poskim to be referring to birchos ha’mitzvos and would seemingly include birchas ha’Torah as well. However, The Pnei Yehoshua (Megillah 21a) writes that this rule of the Yerushalmi refers only to mitzvos that are performed standing, such as shofar, tzitzis or hallel. However, regarding mitzvos that can be performed while sitting, such as reading the Megillah, the bracha can be recited sitting as well. The Gemara (Megillah 21a) relates that until the generation of Rabban Gamliel, Torah was studied standing, but after Rabban Gamliel passed away, weakness descended upon the world and from then on Torah was studied sitting. Therefore, Rav Ovadya Yosef, zt”l (Yechaveh Daas 5:4) writes that one may recite birchas ha’Torah sitting. He writes that this is also the opinion of the Rama MiFano (102:7) and others.

Is it forbidden to teach Torah to one who has not said birchas ha’Torah?

In regards to birchos ha’nehenin (brachos recited on food), there is a concept that one is not permitted to give someone food if the recipient will not recite a bracha. Offering food to one who will not recite a bracha is a violation of “lifnei iver lo sitain michshol” (enabling one to stumble) (See Shulchan Aruch OC 169:2). However, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt”l (Minchas Shlomo 1:91) writes that this does not apply to teaching Torah to one who did not recite birchas ha’Torah. Birchas ha’Torah is a birchas ha’mitzvah. Though birchos ha’mitzvos are obligatory, we do not find that Chazal forbade the performance of a mitzvah if a bracha is not recited. He notes that not studying Torah (bitul Torah) is a more serious offense than omitting the bracha. If possible, one should instruct those who have come to learn Torah how to recite the bracha, but if this is not practical, one should teach them Torah in any event.

Is birchas ha’Torah considered two brachos or three brachos?

There is a difference of opinion among Rishonim as to whether the brachos recited for birchas ha’Torah are counted as two brachos or three. The Rambam (Hilchos Tefila 7:11) writes that birchas ha’Torah consists of three brachos. According to the Rambam, “v’haarev na” begins a second, separate bracha. However, Tosfos (Brachos 46a s.v. Kol) writes that “v’haarev na” is a continuation of the first bracha. The practical difference between these two opinions is whether a listener should answer Amen prior to “v’haarev na.” Because this is a matter of dispute, Shulchan Aruch (OC 47:6) recommends being strict. Therefore, if someone is reciting birchas ha’Torah on your behalf, you should not answer Amen after “La’asok b’divrei Torah.” According to Tosfos, this is the middle of the bracha, and answering Amen at this point would constitute a hefsek (interruption). One must wait to answer Amen, until the very end of the bracha, “ha’melamed Torah l’amo Yisroel.” It is interesting to note that regarding the daily requirement to recite one hundred brachos, poskim are lenient to count birchas ha’Torah as three brachos. Avissar Family Ribbis Initiative RIBBIS: MATTERS OF INTEREST JEWISH MORTGAGE COMPANIES

When a person obtains a mortgage from a Jewish lender, a heter iska is necessary. However, many Jewish mortgage companies are merely brokers for non-Jewish banks and not the actual lenders. One may obtain a loan through the services of a brokerage company without an iska agreement, provided that the bank that is providing the funds for the loan is not owned by Jews. However, in cases where the mortgage company is also the actual banker, a heter iska must be drafted.

It is important to note that even with a heter iska one may not give any extra payment at the time the money is advanced. Since all payments are only the profits the monies generated, one can not give money prior to having the ability to invest the funds. Many mortgage agreements call for such payments (points, commitment fees, etc.), which are prohibited even under an iska agreement. The iska is therefore set up where these payments are deducted from the principle stated on the loan documents and the presumed profit amount is slightly higher.

In an iska agreement with a bank, one should review the iska agreement at the time of closing. This way he is aware of the actual amount invested, as well as the exact amount of the presumed profit.

When borrowing from a Jewish owned bank with a heter iska, a consumer should be aware that the standard practice is that many banks sell their loans to other banks after closing. If the loan would be sold to a non-Jewish bank, they would not honor the iska agreement. Therefore the Jewish bank’s heter iska is written in a way that the bank does not have to remain in a long–term iska partnership. Should they so choose, the bank will find another lending institution to loan the investor the money needed to return the iska money to the original bank. At that time the original bank will broker a loan between the managing partner (the borrower) and the new bank. The money from this loan is used to repay the iska funds to the original bank. In the event that there is extra money from the loan (due to the amount that was deducted off the iska at closing, as mentioned earlier), it will be given to the original bank as a brokers fee for brokering the loan. From that point and on, this deal is considered a regular loan with interest payments to a non- Jewish bank.

Why Is This Night Different From all Other Nights? http://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/SHE79_003_Bo_The_Exodus_Reme mbering_and_Retelling_Yetziyas_Mitzrayim.mp3

The Mitzva of Sippur and Zechira

Adapted from a shiur by Rav Ari Stauber on Parshas Bo

והגדת לבנך ביום ההוא לאמור בעבור זה עשה לי בצאתי) ממצרים (שמות יג:ח

According to Ben Zoma (Berachos 12b), the mitzvah of Zechiras Yetzias Mitzrayim applies daily, both by day and by night.

Why do we need a special mitzvah of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim the night of Pesach?

The Minchas Chinuch suggests three answers, accepting the third:

Zechira can be fulfilled through thinking, while Sippur must be verbal. But he rejects this because some poskim (e.g., Shaagas Aryeh) say that even for Zechira, one must speak. Zechira is mentioning briefly, while Sippur requires elaboration. But he cites the Pri Chadash that even reciting Kiddush fulfills the mitzvah of Sippur. Sippur requires telling it to another. But if no one else is present, the mitzvah is equivalent to Zechira.

The Minchas Chinuch apparently holds that the mitzvah of Zechira and Sippur have the same basis, but differ technically on some details.

Rav Chaim Soloveitchik holds that Sippur is distinct, with three nafka minos:

It must be: Derech Sheeilah Uteshuva (question and answer), even if no one else is there, which makes it a story; Hishtalshelus Devarim (relating a chain of events), including Lavan, Yaakov, and the miracles in Egypt; explaining the reasons for the mitzvos at the Seder.

What is the reason for these differences? Zechira –to internalize the lessons and apply them to our lives: Hashem controls nature, He can perform miracles, and we are dependent upon him (see Ramban, end of Bo). This is accomplished by fulfilling twice daily. Sippur – We transmit this lesson to future generations (as in the context of vehigadeta) and inspire them by relating the story and explanation.

Brinks Cash Flow: Windfall or Highway Robbery? By: Rabbi Yehoshua Wolfe

An armored Brink’s truck accidentally scattered money across a northern New Jersey highway on a recent Thursday morning, and as drivers got out of their cars to grab cash there were crashes. A windfall or highway robbery?

I’m driving on the freeway and the armored truck in front of me dropped its cash. Can I pocket the money?

A question few stop to ask.

Especially while the green-backs are still plastered to their windshield.

This article attempts to examine several aspects of this puzzling episode. In such a situation, are the drivers, in fact, permitted to keep the money?

Hashavas aveidah is one of the first mitzvos we are taught as children. Finders are not keepers – and lost property must be returned to its rightful owner. The following paragraphs, however, focus on when you may keep lost property. The times that finders are keepers.

Ye’ush

Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 262:5) states that after a person has expressed that he has given up all hope of recovering lost property, the finder is entitled to keep it. This principle, called ye’ush, applies even when the finder knows the identity of the person who has lost the object. Ye’ush, however, cannot be applied when the object has entered the possession of the finder before the owner is meya’aish.

The Chazon Ish (Bava Kama 18:1) expands the scope of ye’ush to include situations where a thought of ye’ush occurs in the mind of the owner. He writes that no verbal declaration of ye’ush is necessary. Implicit Ye’ush

We’ve all been there. You’re hustling down the street, and a $20 on the ground stops you dead in your busy tracks. We now know that you must ask yourself, “Was the owner already meya’aish”?

When somebody discovers he has lost property with no identifying characteristics, like money, he is presumed to be meya’aish. He gives up hope because he has no way of claiming his property. But the finder can only keep the money if the owner was already meya’aish. How do we determine whether he has even discovered his loss?

Sometimes, depending on the nature of the property, we can presume the owner has discovered his loss and was meya’aish. Some examples are heavy objects, or valuable items like money.

So next time you come across cash randomly lying in the street, you know you can keep it. The owner certainly has discovered his loss, and was meya’aish.

From this halacha, the poskim derive that when it is not known for certain that the owner was miah’aish, but there is strong reason to believe so, the finder may assume ye’ush and keep the object. The question in the case of the armored truck, then, is whether the security guard standing idly by, can be construed as indicating ye’ush on his part.

Rabbi Mordechai Gross (Mishpat H’aveidah 159:17) quotes Rabbi Moshe Feinstein zt”l and Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l as saying that a person’s failure to pursue his lost property is not considered ye’ush. However, one can argue that perhaps our case is different.

It is clear from a gemara in Bava Metzia (22 a) that when the lack of effort from the owner to pursue his property results in permanent loss, such an instance would certainly be considered ye’ush.

Getting back to our case of the armored truck, imagine the scene of all of the drivers frantically chasing after the fleeting bills. Indeed, it’s safe to assume that they had no intention of returning the money to the owner. So, at first glance it would seem that the guard’s lack of effort to recover the money should be considered ye’ush.

Ye’ush by an Agent

Upon careful examination, however, it’s not that simple. There‘s a discussion among the poskim whether ye’ush of a shomer (or, guard) is sufficient, or only the ye’ush of the object’s owner allows the finder to keep it.[1] In conclusion, the case of the armored truck is complex. Additional principles may apply to this scenario. So, next time you receive a windfall from an armored truck, be sure to ask a Shayla.

עיין אגרות משה (חושן משפט חלק א סימן פב בסוף דבריו) ועיין בשו”ת מהרי”ל דיסקין). [1] (בפסקים קפט) והביא נמי שהגרע”א הי’ מסתפק בזה. ועיין באולם המשפט (סימן רסב

Paying With Fire Who Is Responsible for the California Wildfires?

By: Rabbi Yosef Greenwald

The recent severe fires in northern California, with the ensuing tragic loss of life and of property, gives us all pause to reflect on the great chasadim of Hashem and to realize how much we depend on Him to protect us every moment of our lives.

That being said, we also can take some time to reflect on the halachic ramifications such a situation creates.

Is a firestarter liable?

The halachic questions raised by the California wildfires are many. To name a few: If someone lit a fire that caused a large conflagration, is he responsible to pay for everything the fire damages?

If the fire causes a loss of life, is the one who started it liable for the death penalty?

It appears that at least some of the California fires were caused by electrical malfunctions, and numerous lawsuits have been brought against the electric company to this effect. Does an electric fire have the same halachic status as a manmade fire?

The Mazik of Fire: Aish, fire, is one of the four nizkei mamon, damages done by one’s property, which are listed in the Mishnah in beginning of Bava Kama. This is referring to a fire that one lights on his property that spreads and causes damage to someone else’s property.

The Gemara discusses whether damages caused by fire always fall under the category of “Mamon Hamazik”, damage done by one’s property, or sometimes fall under the category of “Odom Hamazik”. There are a number of important halachic differences between the two classifications, which will be very pertinent to the California wildfires.

The halachos of aish are discussed in Choshen Mishpat[1], however there is an opinion that not all of them are enforceable by a contemporary bais din.

In our times, we have lost the institution of semicha, and our batei din do not have the full authority that they had in past generations. One ramification is that our batei din do not rule on occurrences which are uncommon. The majority opinion is that aish is common enough that batei din today can rule on it.[2]

It is important to bear in mind that the mazik of aish does not refer solely to fire. Anything which damages through a “koach acheir”, an outside force; for instance, debris falling from a wind and causing damage or water flowing through the force of a gust of wind also fall under this category.

Chitzo or Memono:

As an example of the damage that a fire can cause, for which the lighter would be liable, the posuk says a case where someone lights a blaze that goes into his friend’s field and burns his pile of wheat. The Gemara tells us that this example is used because a pile of wheat is an entity that is out in the open and can be clearly seen. We learn from there that if a fire burns something which is covered (referred to by the Gemara as “tamun b’aish”), the lighter is not liable to pay. In a later Gemara[3], it is stated that there is a fundamental dispute between Reish Lakish and Rav Yochanon regarding aish. Reish Lakish says that “isho m’shum memono”, one’s fire is one’s property and he is liable to pay for any damages it causes, just as he is responsible for damage caused by anything he owns. However, he always has the exemption of tamun b’aish. Rav Yochanon disagrees and says that sometimes “isho m’shum chitzo”, fire is akin to an arrow that someone shoots – meaning he is directly responsible for the damage, just as he would responsible if he shot an arrow at someone’s property.

The Gemara concludes that Rav Yochanon would agree that isho m’shum memono if the fire was lit in a way that it should have stopped before reaching someone else’s field. For example, if there is a wall in between the two fields that should have stopped the fire, but the wall fell down and the fire spread past the wall. In such a case, Rav Yochanon would agree that the lighter is exempt from payment on things that were tamun. However, if nothing stood in the way of the fire and it naturally spread to someone else’s field, Rav Yochanon says the fire is m’shum chitzo, a direct result of the lighter’s action, and he is liable to pay even on tamun.

The Poskim rule that the practical halacha is like Rav Yochanon.

The Shach[4] adds that if someone actually enters his friend’s field and lights a fire there, according to the view of Rav Yochanon he is directly responsible for the damage caused by the fire, even if a wall stood between the fire and the objects that were burned, and he would be liable to pay even for things which were covered.

Water Damage:

As mentioned earlier, the mazik of aish can include damage caused by water. Thus, if someone forgets to turn off his faucet and the sink overflows and damages his downstairs neighbor’s ceiling, he would be liable for the damages. According to Rav Yochanon, he would even be liable for damages done to covered items, as the damage was caused directly by the water he let out of the sink. However, if one’s pipes flood in a way that is not a direct result of his actions, the damaging water definitely falls under the category of m’shum mimono, and one would not be liable to pay for anything that is covered.

In Part 2 of this series, we will continue our discussion by moving on to the status of electrical fires and the liability one would have if a fire he started actually kills somebody.

[1] 418

[2] Pischei Teshuva ibid:1

[3] Bava Kama 25B

[4] 418:3