England's “Descent” on France and the Origins Of

ENGLAND’S “DESCENT” ON FRANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF BLUE-WATER STRATEGY Robert McJimsey War may be too important to be left for generals alone to manage, but politicians who venture into areas of strategic planning oft en make even less enviable records. By the end of the seventeenth century English political society had divided over the issue of the nation’s proper strategic relationship to the Continental powers. On one side stood a band of Whig politicians who espoused the preference of their Dutch-born sovereign, King William III, for policies that linked their nation’s security to the military fate of his anti-French coalitions. Opposing these advocates of close alliances and continental warfare was a gathering of Tory and country party politicians who championed a “blue-water strategy.” Th e proponents of this strategy sought a lim- ited commitment to land warfare, stressed the importance of the navy as the guardian of the nation’s security and prosperity and emphasized the independence of England in any alliance system her sovereign might negotiate. Th e existence of this dispute is not in doubt.1 Th e story of how it came into being remains to be told. A crucial part of this story is the eff ort of William III’s government to launch, in 1692 during the Nine Years’ War (1689–97), a seaborne invasion or “descent” upon France. Th e origins of the blue-water strategy and its contest with the Williamite position did not rest solely upon the descent. From its beginning in 1689 until 1694 most observers would have agreed that for England the war against France had not gone well at all. By 1691 only the war in Ireland showed any sign of coming to a satisfactory conclusion. In Flanders Anglo-Dutch forces suff ered a series of minor reverses, but showed no sign of recouping. In 1691 the English fl eet had narrowly avoided a major defeat at French hands, leaving the threat of an invasion to restore the deposed James II hanging over the scene for the next two years. All the while expenses were mounting and criti- cism of the allies’ performance (William’s Grand Alliance included the 1 Geoff rey Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne (New York, 1967), 64–81. 244 robert mcjimsey Dutch, the Emperor, Spain, Savoy and certain German states) became commonplace. Th ese signs of adversity were so clear that by 1692 William himself had turned to thoughts of peacemaking. Nourishing these perceptions were certain concepts of English foreign policy, concepts which supplied much of the motivation for the government’s critics. Since the latter part of Charles II’s reign, the ideal of an independent English nation “holding” a balance among the Continental powers had become reasonably well defi ned.2 Proponents of this ideal stressed England’s insularity and the nation’s ability to intervene in Continental aff airs when it suited her to do so. Clearly this ideal stood at variance with William III’s insistence that his new king- dom assume the obligations of an ally in a mutually interdependent set of strategic relationships. Moreover it is known that two proponents of this conventional ideal, the Marquis of Halifax and Sir Th omas Clarges, carried over into William’s Parliaments, and that Clarges was a central fi gure in assembling the government’s critics into a “new country party.”3 Th e foregoing events and attitudes might seem suffi cient to account for the emergence of a blue-water strategy. When we consider the position of the government’s critics, however, diffi culties with this explana- tion arise. Th ese diffi culties were partly constitutional and partly political. Constitutionally the control of foreign policy and the com- mand of the military fell to the monarchy alone. Parliament had no right of petition on such matters and could not form committees to discuss war policy. Th e politicians consistently faced the bald choice of either funding or rejecting their King’s conduct of the war. Such a choice created an even more serious political liability. One set of critics, the Jacobite faction, opposed the entire constitutional settlement of 1689 and wished to restore James II, presumably with the aid of French fi repower. Any critics of William’s war policy, therefore, ran the risk of being tarred with the brush of Jacobitism, a fate which might well lead to a traitor’s end. Advocates of an alternative war strategy would have to follow a pathway leading somewhere between the cliff s of the royal prerogative and the slough of Jacobitism. Th e story of how this band of malcontented pilgrims made their way through these perilous 2 Th e Marquis of Halifax gave this position a clear summary in his “Th e Character of a Trimmer.” J. P. Kenyon (ed.), Halifax: Th e Complete Works, (Baltimore, 1969), 86–98. 3 Keith Feiling, A History of the Tory Party, 1640–1714, (Oxford, 1924), 292–3..

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