Biannual of Iranian Review of Foreign

Affairs

Institute for Strategic 26 Research Vol. 8. No.2. Summer &Fall 2017

Advisory Board Mohsen Rezaee Mirghaed, , , Ahmad Vahidi, Saeed Jalili, Publisher Ali Shamkhanim, Hosein Amirabdolahian Institute for Strategic Research Editorial Board Expediency Council Seyyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour

Professor, University of Managing Director Gulshan Dietl Mohsen Rezaee Mirghaed Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University Associate Professor, Mohammad Marandi Imam Hossein University Professor, Jamshid Momtaz Professor, University of Tehran Editor-in-Chief Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour Professor of the University of Professor, School of International Relations Tehran Mohiaddin Mesbahi Professor, Florida International University Hosein Salimi

Professor, Allameh Tabatabii University Chairman of advisory board Seyed Jalal Dehghani Mohammad Nazari Professor, Allameh Tabatabii University Naser Hadian Director of Executive Affairs Assistant professor, Universuty of Tehran Hadi Gholamnia Vitaly Naumkin Copyediting Professor, Moscow State University Zeinab Ghasemi Tari Hassan Hoseini Assistant Professor, University of Tehran Layout and Graphics Mohammad Ali Shirkhani Najmeh Ghaderi Professor, University of Tehran Foad Izadi Professor, University of Tehran Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs (IRFA) achieved the highest ISSN: 2008-8221 scientific grade from the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology of since 22 February 2012.Articles Published in this Journal are Indexed at the Islamic World Science Citation Center (ISC). Publication Address: No. 376,Taleghani Ave, Before Hafez Bridge, Tehran, Iran Institute for Postcode: 1591816911 Tel: +98 21 86046957 Strategic Research Website: irfajournal.csr.ir Email: [email protected] & [email protected] Price: 200000 Rials

Contents

The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) 5 Ehsan Egazi, Reza Simbar, Arsalan Ghorbani, Ahmad jansiz Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership 25 Seyed Hasan Mirfakhraei Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure 51 Mehdi Kamkar, Rahman Najafi Sayar Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period 79 Faezeh Janati Moheb, Seyed Abbas Araghchi An Iranian Narrative of Tehran-Riyadh Tention Escalation 111 Ali Omidi, Zahra Aghmohamadi The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations: The Case of Foreign Investment 139 Majid Rnjbardar, Davood Aghaee

Refferees of this Issue

Seyyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour Gulshan Dietl Mohammad Marandi Jamshid Momtaz Mohammad Javad Zarif Mohiaddin Mesbahi Hosein Salimi Seyed Jalal Dehghani Naser Hadian Vitaly Naumkin Mohammad Ali Shirkhani Foad Izadi The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) Ehsan Egazi Reza Simbar Arsalan Ghorbani Ahmad jansiz Abstract The US Congress, as a legislative pillar of democracy, has a significant impact on American foreign policy. Nevertheless, the role of the US Congress is not limited to domestic politics rather they would usually shape the country’s foreign policy. Since the Islamic Revolution, the US Congress has adopted an aggressive approach towards Iran. The US legislative institution, as a domestic source of US foreign policy, has shaped US foreign policy toward Iran by imposing economic sanctions. The purpose of the research is to increase the Iranian officials’ understanding of US domestic politics. Therefore, the main question of the research is concerned with the impact of the US congress on American foreign policy towards Iran (2005-2017). In order to answer the main question, the authors would use neo-classical theory. In addition to systemic factors, neoclassic realism considers domestic factors to explain foreign policy. The findings of research suggest that the US congress has encouraged the US administrations to pursue an aggressive policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran by imposing economic sanctions and persuading the US administrations to implement them. Keywords: Congress, US Foreign Policy, Islamic Republic of Iran, Neoclassic Realism, Foreign Policy

 Phd in International Relations, [email protected]  Professor of International Relations, [email protected]  Associate professor of International Relations, [email protected]  Associate professor of international relations, jansiz@[email protected] Received: 29/8/2019 Accepted: 28/10/2019 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2017, pp. 5-24

Introduction Ever since the founding fathers established the United States as a nation-state, they decided to apply the principle of Montesquieu’s ideas on the separation of powers in the US political structure. Among the governmental powers, the Congress plays an exclusive role in the US political system to the extent that according to the US constitutions, this body is prioritized over the executive power and Supreme Court. For many years The Congress enjoys legal tools to restrict the authority of other branches of power, particularly that of the White House domestic and foreign policy sphere. Generally, when the Americans feel foreign threats and/or they suspect that internationalism may create a threat, they pay less attention to foreign policy recommendations coming from the White House. In such cases, they highly valorize the Congress activism in the area of foreign policy. It is hardly expected that in such conditions, disengagement from the international system imposes an enormous cost and above all, they believe that the US remains on the safe side. However, when the public believes that the country is facing a foreign threat, they feel the need for a powerful president. While any disagreement in the Congress is often welcomed at the time of peace, the disagreement would have best interpreted as inappropriate interference in vain or the worst interpreted as an “unpatriotic” action at the time of threat. In such conditions, the members of the Congress could feel the changes in the public opinion on the presidency and try to avoid being on the wrong side of the history because it may result in failure in the upcoming election. On occasions when the US is safe from the immediate foreign threat, we witness the period of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 7 “Congressional government”, “Congressional supremacy” and “government by Congress”; however, the power of making decision in foreign policy will be shifted to the White House at time of the crises such as 9/11 (Lindsay, 2012: 227-230) Taking into consideration the aggressive foreign policy of the US adopted against Iran after the Islamic revolution, it is of high importance to notify the impact of the US political domestic institutions on the foreign policy of this country against Iran. Therefore, this research attempts to assist the Iranian policymakers to pay more attention to the impact level of the US domestic policy on its foreign policy against Iran. One of the objectives of this research is finding an answer to the question that in case of any changes in the US domestic policy, should the Iranian policymakers expect any changes in the US foreign policy, or they should assume that the US foreign policy against Iran remains unchanged and consistent regardless of its domestic policy. Moreover, this research is going to minimize or possibly eliminate the Iranian policymakers' misunderstanding as for the US foreign policy against Iran. Due to different reasons such as the Iran nuclear program, the US has tried to apply various means like economic sanctions to prevent Iran’s empowerment in military and economic sectors within the last decade. The US has also been afraid of increasing Iran's influence in the region. Accordingly, the US has tried to have a tougher approach to make it impossible for Iran to achieve its goals. Taking into account the role played by the Congress as one of the internal foundations of the US foreign policy against Iran, this research analyzes the impact of the Congress on this process during the last decade. Accordingly, this research is going to find an answer to the question that how much the US Congress has affected the US foreign policy adopted against Iran (2005-2017). The authors will argue that the US Congress has formed the aggressive policy against Iran through the financial instruments including Iran sanction, military budget allocation to confront 8 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017)

Iran, democracy promotion, and providing consultation for the White House. This article attempts to review the role played by the US Congress as one of the domestic resources of the US foreign policy, as notified by James N. Rosenau, on the foreign policy of the US against Iran. Taking into account the Congress extensiveness, this research has particularly and technically focused on the role played by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the most important members of the Congress in formation of foreign policy. The Congress is a "bicameral legislature" which was founded in Connecticut upon a compromise. Accordingly, the legislation right of the states with more population is protected through the establishment of the House of Representative and the request made by the small states for equality in legislation is met by the establishment of Senate. This structure reflects the orientation of the social class of the US founding fathers. They were looking for a balance between the interests gained by the regular citizens and those of the landowners, bankers, and businessmen. To this end, the members of the House of Representatives should have been directly elected by people, while the members of the Senate were elected by a group of elites. It shall also be noted that upon approval of Amendment XVII, the members of the Senate are directly elected by people as of 1913 (Bardes and others, 2012: 335: 340). A bill is enacted to the law by passing different steps in the Congress as illustrated below (Davidson and Oleszek, 2004: 230): Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 9

The Congress enjoy various methods to affect the US foreign policy. The following four different methods are applied by the Congress to affect the foreign policy: 1. Legislative method, 2. Non-legislative method, 3. Direct method, 4. Indirect method. Now, these methods incorporated, four methods are concluded based on which the Congress affect the process of foreign policy as shown in the following table (Wittkopf and Others, 2008: 416- 419): Indirect Direct Non-binding rules Treaties (in Senate) Acknowledge individuals for Declare war Legislative method public office occupation Foreign commerce Procedural rules Unofficial recommendation Forming public opinion Consultation Non-legislative Foreign contacts Monitoring/ holding hearings method Court sessions

1. The Congress Role in the US Foreign Policy Adopted against Iran (2005-2017): In spite of the ideological gap between the Congress representatives and their different viewpoints toward foreign and 10 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) local issues, the members of the House of Representatives and the Senators have approved sanction bills against Iran showing that their approach towards Iran is similar. During their debates, the Congress representatives often try to support the ideological positions of their affiliated parties; while issues related to Iran are among the cases which end in bipartisan agreements. When the sanction bills are put forth in the House of Representatives and/or the Senate, the members of the Congress, regardless of their own ideological tendencies, try to draft and eventually approve the bills so that they can impose the maximum pressures on Iran. Even when the US president takes a new strategy against Iran to change Iran’s approach, the members of the Congress approve the bills and/or issue the resolutions to support it regardless of president's affiliated party, either the Republican or Democratic Party. The following part of the research reviews the periods in which the US Congress takes particulars measures against Iran, e.g. adopting sanction laws; thus 107th, 108th, and 110th Congresses are excluded.

І. 109th US Congress and Iran (2005-2007) House of Representatives Committee on International Relations (2005-2007) In this period, Henry Hyde was appointed as the chairman of the House Committee on International Relations. As a Republican and a member of the Committee, Dana Rohrabacher, believed that the House could take measures which go beyond sanctions. In order to support the Iranian opposition party, he believed that the US could arrange covert measures. The other republican representative, John Boozman reiterated that he will support bombing Iran by Israel. On the contrary, Orde Kittrie argued that it is better for the United States to take direct military action against Iran because the US has the required capacity for the said action (Dabashi, 2011: 130-131). Some other members of the committee had even more aggressive viewpoints against the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, Ted Poe Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 11 described the MEK (Mojahedin-e Khalgh or Monafeghin) as the freedom fighters (Alexis, 2013: 173). The democratic member of the committee, Russ Carnahan, accused Iran and stated that he had no doubt that Iran intends to manufacture nuclear weapons and Iran would benefit from this capacity to eliminate Israel and others across the world (Steele, 2013: 17). Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2005-2007): Having survived in his position as the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Richard Lugar, described Iran as a serious threat for the world and region security due to its active support of terrorism and its effort to manufacture and develop weapons of mass destruction which is clearly a violation to the NPT (Wilkins, 2013: 48). It was in this period that the next president of the US, Barak Obama entered the Senate as the senator of Illinois and was elected as one of the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Iran Freedom Support Act (2006): The measures taken by the US Congress against Iran is not limited to adopting economic sanctions. This legislative organization in the US has also tried to pass laws to exert a positive impact on what it called democracy promotion in Iran. Accordingly, the US Congress passed the Iran Freedom Support Act on September 30, 2006. This act aims to make the government of Iran responsive for its so called threatening behavior and supports Iran transition to democracy. Based on this act, the Congress announces that the US policy against Iran shall contain two principles: 1. supporting Iranian people to exercise self-determination for electing their government; and 2. supporting independent human rights and “peace-loving” democratic forces in Iran. To this end, the act authorizes the US president to take specific measures; including but not limited to providing political support and financial tools for certain individuals, organizations and institutions to promote democracy in Iran. Such tools may include granting assistance to the so-called independent Radio and TV broadcasting media for Iran. The individuals eligible to enjoy the US financial facilities 12 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) shall have the following qualifications: 1. The ones believing in democratic values and supporting democratic government in Iran 2. The ones supporting Iran compliance with the regime of non-proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons 3. The ones supporting human rights in particular equality of men and women 4. The ones supporting equal opportunity; and 5. the ones supporting freedom of media, freedom of speech, freedom of society and freedom of religion (Govtrack, October 22, 2016). Accordingly, the then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice attended the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and requested for a budget amounting to 75 million dollars for promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights in Iran for the financial year of 2006 (Snow, 2007: 194).

II. 111th US Congress and Iran (2009-2011) The House Foreign Affairs Committee (2009-2011): The democratic representative and a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Keith Ellison, intended to make US political elites more familiar with Iran through the arrangement of a forum on Iran. Three Iranian researchers attended this forum to provide answer to the questions of the attendants. All of them admitted that the approach of Bush against Iran was non- constructive (Farrell, 2009: 182). However, the Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee had an aggressive approach toward the Islamic Republic of Iran in a way that he compared the president of Venezuela with the then and had said that we should have the same approach to Chavez as we had with the president of Iran (Hellinger, 2012: 85). Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2009-2011): In the 111th Congress, John Kerry was appointed as the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. However, the most Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 13 important measure taken in the 111th Congress against Iran was the sanction plan proposed by the Democratic senator, Christopher Dodd and the representative of the Congress, Howard Berman. This act which was entitled as Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) was signed by Barak Obama and enacted into law. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) (2010): This act is actually considered as an amendment to the Iran Sanctions Act of (1996) which is enacted with the aim of increasing economic sanctions against Iran. The US government was permitted to impose sanction against the individuals who invested 20 million dollars or more on the petrochemical industry of Iran. The US government will also impose a sanction against the individuals who provide Iran with certain goods, services, technology or information to the value of one million dollars or more in the market to help Iran perform activities for maintenance or development of refined petrochemical products (such as gasoline). Moreover, the sanctions will be imposed to anyone who exports gasoline to Iran to the value of one million dollars or more and/or provides Iran with the certain goods and services to increase the capacity of the said country to import diesel (CISADA, US Congress, 2010). It is should be noted that the CISADA was passed by 99 YEAs in Senate and 408 YEAs and 8 NAYs in the US House of Representatives (Cheema, 2014). The result of the vote shows that the Congress representatives have almost the same opinions against Iran in spite of political and ideological differences on domestic issues and they almost always vote unanimously in favor of sanction laws against Iran.

th III. 112 US Congress and Iran (2011-2013) The most important measures taken by the Congress against Iran in this period was ratification of three laws as follows: 1. Sect. 311 Money Laundering Designation, USA PATRIOT Act; and 2. Section 1245, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY 14 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017)

2012; and 3. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights. This act is not just limited to Iran also the US can consider sanctions for Iran by accusing Iran to money laundering. The main objective of implementation of this act is defining and considering punishment for the terrorist actions in the US and across the world as follows: 1. Strengthening the US in preventing, recognizing and dealing with the international money laundering and financing terrorism. 2. Monitoring the financial integrity of the foreign financial institutes, foreign regions and classification of accounts or financial institutes which provide the possibility of misuse for performing financial crimes; and 3. Requiring all the sections related to the financial service providers to provide reports on the cases susceptible to money laundering (GPO, 2011). Section 1245 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012: The budget and costs allocated to the military actions of the US Ministry of Defense are defined based on the National Defense Authorization Act. This section consists of four clauses as follows: a. Defines the reason for imposing sanctions against Iran financial system and accuses the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and the Iranian banking system to bypass sanctions, financing terrorism, financing of proliferation and other issues; b. Implicitly accuses the financial system of Iran to money laundering; c. Orders confiscation of the assets of Iranian financial institutes in the territory of the US or available to the American individuals or under the control of the US; and d. Expresses the mechanism of sanction implementation against CBI and other financial institutes of Islamic Republic of Iran (GPO, December 31, 2011). Actually, this act aimed to restrict the banking interactions between the US financial institutes and CBI so that it could make Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 15 the Iranian banking structure and system completely unstable (Perles and MacAllister, 2013: 44). Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights: This act was put forth by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. According to the provisions of the act, there are two objectives for implementation of this act. 1. Enforcing Iran to stop its efforts to develop nuclear weapon capacity and other threatening activities. This objective is achievable through a policy including economic sanctions and military planning and diplomacy; 2. This aim complies with what was said by Obama in his annual lecture in the Congress in 2012. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights increases the sanctions related to the section of energy, nuclear proliferation, the revolutionary guards and human rights (H.R.1905, US Congress, 2012). Section 504 of the act, as one of the most influential clauses, prevents Iran from receiving its petrocurrencies in a way that the Islamic Republic of Iran had to spend its petrocurrencies in purchasing goods from its oil customers and/or deposit the petrocurrencies in the banks of the same countries (Kittrie, 2016: 131). This act also addressed transmission and insurance of Iran oil. Moreover, the said act authorized the government to impose sanctions on the individuals who are accused of violating human rights. This act had also considered sanctions against Iran nuclear activities in a way that imposed sanctions on the commercial activities which could help development of manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. (Kaussler and Hastedt, 2017: 153).

IV. 113th US Congress and Iran (2013-2015) House Foreign Affairs Committee (2013-2015): The California Republican representative, Edward Royce was appointed as the chairman of the Committee in this period. He is one of the representatives who has always adopted tough positions against Iran. When Chuck Hagel was introduced as the candidate for the Ministry of Defense, Royce accused him as the person who has 16 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) always been flexible toward Iran and the terrorist organizations under the financial support of Iran. (Jett, 2017: 384). He also has tough opinions toward the JCPOA and believes that the international investigations shall be carried out by the international investigators and nothing else (Spencer, 2016). Senate Committee on Foreign Relation (2013-2015): John Kerry was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by February 1st, 2013 and then the position was occupied by Robert Menendez up to the end of 113th Congress. Tom Udall was one of the few senators of the US who welcomed the nuclear agreement with Iran known as the JCPOA and issued a declaration stating that, Today's declaration is a historic step towards international cooperation and our common objective is reducing the threat of Iran which is equipped with the nuclear weapons. I have always believed that constructive diplomacy is the best way for having a more secure Middle East. I congratulate the negotiation team for this achievement (Tomudall.Senate.gov, 2015). On the other hand, the Idaho Republican senator, James Risch strongly criticized the nuclear deal with Iran (Washington Post, February 4, 2014). One of the measures taken by the Congress in this period was the ratification of Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 which was followed by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY 2013. According to this act, any type of activity in Iran energy section, shipping, ship building, and granting insurance to the ship companies will be imposed by sanction. The said act also imposed sanction on supplying precious metals for Iran (Samore, 2015: 11).

V. 114th US Congress and Iran (2015-2017) One of the most important measures taken by the Congress against Iran took place in the 114th Congress and after concluding the nuclear deal in a way that Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA) was enacted upon the suggestion made by Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 17 Senator Benjamin Kardin and Bob Corker as two influential members of Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations. This act which is known as Corker-Kardin Bill authorizes the Congress to monitor the nuclear deal. This act stipulates that the president shall send the deal’s script together with the whole annexures, side agreements, documents, etc. to the Congress for review prior to the date of nuclear deal implementation (Lewitt, 2016: 38). This bill passed by 98 YEAs and 1 NAY in the Senate and 400 YEAs and 25 NAYs in the House of Representatives (Reuters, May 15, 2015). However, the initial versions of this bill which was confronted by Barak Obama Administration forced Bod Corker and Benjamin Kardin to make amendments in the bill to avoid its veto by the president (Yambert, 2016: 91). According to this bill, the US president is required to approve the full implementation of the deal by Islamic Republic of Iran (INARA, US Congress, 2015). Yet, none of the 301 members of Senate and House of Representatives Republican lawmakers (the largest majority of Republicans in the Congress as of 1929-1931) publicly support the nuclear deal (Singh, 2016: 49). Nevertheless, if the Republicans failed to support the JCPOA in spite of their power and majority in the House of Representatives and Senate, the nuclear deal would have been too fragile or would have never been realized. Yet, the Congress has not considered the nuclear deal as a treaty because in that case, the JCPOA should have gained two third YEAs from the senators for implementation which seemed to be impossible due to the majority of the Republicans (Mahapatra, 2016: 41). As a result of conclusion of the JCPOA, the 114th Congress did not pass any new sanction law against Iran but it renewed Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1996 (known as D'Amato Act) for the third time. The bill on renewing ISA for ten years was passed by 99 YEAs and with no NAY in the Senate. This act would have been expired by December 31, 2016, if it had not renewed by the Congress. The members of the Congress together with Obama do 18 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) not consider enactment of this act as violation of the JCPOA (Reuters, December 1, 2016) but at the same time, implementation of some clauses of economic sanctions of ISA was suspended by the executive order 13716 issued by Barak Obama in January 16, 2016 (Executive Order 13716, January 16, 2016). However, the main question is how long does it take for the US president, Donald Trump who was elected in 2016, to postpone full implementation of ISA. Therefore, the full implementation of ISA which was renewed by December 31, 2026, depends on the foreign policy adopted by the Trump Administration against Iran.

VI. 115th US Congress and Iran (2017-2019) House Foreign Affairs Committee (2017-2019): Ed Royce continues to chair this committee in the 115th Congress. The Republican member of the committee, Joe Wilson has described the nuclear deal with Iran a dangerous deal and evaluated as quite correct the decision made by Donald Trump to reject the deal (joewilso. n.house.gov, October 13, 2017). Michael McCaul, another member of this committee and the National Security Committee, criticized Obama approach towards Iran in exchanging prisoners (Strang, 2017: 210). He also accused the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia of performing cyber-attacks against the US (CQ Researcher, 2014). The Pennsylvanian representative, Scott Perry as another critic of the nuclear deal, in an interview, remarked that "the US will respect the nuclear deal but I think the new president and lots of Americans consider this deal a terrible deal for the United States and it shall be renegotiated. This is the first step." (NPR, October 13, 2017). Taking into consideration that the majority of 115th Congress are the republicans, the opinion of the republicans can clarify the perspective of potential bills which will be passed by in the Congress in the future against Iran. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2017-2019): The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 115th Congress continues its activity as chaired by Bob Corker. The majority of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 19 the Committee on Foreign Relation, together with their colleagues in the House of Representatives have a tough negative viewpoint on Iran foreign policy approach in general and the nuclear program in particular. For example, the Republican senator, Marco Rubio supported the viewpoint of the Israel regime against Iran nuclear program and said, in case Israel has no inclination towards this deal and wants to sabotage nuclear program and facilities, it can easily do it through the cyberspace (Relia, 2016). Accusing Iran of manufacturing nuclear weapons, he said that Iran can threaten the US by placing a nuclear warhead on the rocket (Rhoades, 2014: 254). Yet, some senators are against military action against Iran. For example, Republican senator of the State of Kentucky, Rand Paus explicitly opposed the preventive attack against Iran (Marsden, 2014: 129). The 115th Congress passed the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act that it could be a violation to JCPOA in case the section related to Iran was fully implemented. The House Foreign Affairs Committee was one of the bill proponents. The section related to Iran in Countering America's Adversaries; Through Sanctions Act is Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 which requires the US president apply the economic sanctions in three cases: 1. Ballistic missiles and Iran's weapon of mass destruction program 2. Selling or transferring military equipment to Iran or providing financial and technical assistance to Iran 3. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates The president is also authorized to impose sanctions against the individuals who are accused of violating human rights at the international level. Yet, the president can impose or suspend the sanctions temporarily under specific situations (CAATSA, US Congress, 2017).

Conclusion Reviewing the the US senators ‘opinion and representatives of the 20 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017)

House shows that the majority of them has continued to have a negative view toward Iran; however, a number of them are looking for changes in the US approach towards Iran. Such views toward Iran has resulted in almost always a relative consensus among them in spite of the political and ideological differences on the domestic challenging issues. This becomes apparent when we consider the sanction laws passed against Iran in the Congress. Most of such laws, with little opposition in the ratification process, have passed by a relative strong support of the two Democratic and Republican parties. However, the Congress anti- Iranian laws can be divided into three categories of laws on economic sanction, human rights sanction and promoting democracy. The economic sanction laws were suspended by the JCPOA nuclear deal; however, two other sanction laws were passed by the Congress against Iran after the nuclear deal. At the initial process, ISA was renewed to 2026 for ten years but the implementation of some parts of the law which were in contradiction with the provisions of the nuclear deal was suspended upon the executive order of the president. In the next step, the Congress, based on the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act requires the president to impose sanctions against Iran missile program and the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Nevertheless, Donald Trump has not fully implemented this act because if he decides to impose tough sanction laws against Iran missile program and/or Revolutionary Guards Corp, it can be regarded as violation the nuclear. Taking into consideration Donald Trump’s disapproval of the nuclear deal and referring the JCPOA to the Congress, it can be expected that implementation of these two sanctions depends on the Congress reconsideration of “Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act". In spite of the sanction laws passed by the Congress during the last 17 years, in particular Obama presidency, the executive orders of the US president aimed at imposing sanctions on industrial, financial and oil export sections continues to impose fundamental impacts on Iran economic condition and subsequently, made changes in Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 21 Iran foreign policy with regard to nuclear issue. It can be argued that in some cases, the executive orders of the president inflicted more immediate and deeper destructive impacts on Iran economy. Such an approach adopted by the US shows that Iran should take into consideration the internal foundations of the foreign policy in the US in its negotiations with the United States because the negotiations alone with an administration in the US cannot guarantee Iran with the long-term benefits. Actually, any changes made in the government of the US may return the foreign policy of this country to its previous approach. Iran has experienced such process as for the JCPOA and transition of the government from Barak Obama to Donald Trump. As a result, it is suggested that Iran make any deal with the US conditional on its approval in the Congress as a treaty to ensure its implementation.

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Abstract The Syrian crisis could be perceived as the most important international crisis in the recent decade. Despite its extensively varied regional and international ramifications and repercussions, this crisis has changed Iran-Russia cooperation patterns in significant way. Prior to the outbreak of crisis in Syria, Iran and Russia had limited, traditional cooperation at different junctures in Afghanistan, the Tajikistan civil war and some regional issues in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, the new era of Iranian-Russian relations in Syria exhibits a new level of bilateral relations. Thus, the current Iran-Russia bilateral ties could be assessed within the framework of strategic partnership. Iran- Russia strategic partnership pattern has emerged in line with three essential criteria of environmental uncertainty (popular uprisings in the Middle East), strategic fit (compatibility and complementarity of Iranian and Russian interests and resources) and the system principle (opposition to the US new hegemonic order and exercising efforts to institute a desired order in the Middle East). Compared to traditional patterns such as strategic alliance, thematicity and low commitment costs of the new pattern have encouraged Tehran and Moscow to pick it up. This paper attempts to answer this question: what mechanism underlies the development of Iran-Russia relations since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis? Keywords: Iran, Russia, Strategic Partnership, Strategic Fit, System Principle, Environmental Uncertainty

 Associate professor of International Relations, [email protected] Received: 17/9/2019 Accepted: 4/11/2019 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer- Fall 2017, pp. 25-49

Introduction Since the years of post-USSR collapse, the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation have gone through numerous peaks and troughs, each analyzed within certain framework of international relations patterns. Iran-Russia relations were pushed into a new phase of cooperation in the wake of outbreak of the Syrian crisis as the confluence of the processes induced by popular uprisings which have affected the regional Middle East order. Prior to this crisis, the two countries had forged constructive cooperation in regional crises in Afghanistan and Tajikistan which profoundly contributed to the regional security and stability. However, the new Iran-Russia cooperation is different in nature than their previous cooperation rounds considering the depth of the Syrian crisis and its wide range of effects. These relations have been analyzed by international relations experts according to a variety of patterns, covering strategic alliance to a coalition of convenience as indicated by most theories. Over time and following other unfolding regional and international developments such as Ukraine Crisis, Crimean Accession to Russia and the nuclear deal (the JCPOA) concluded between Iran and P5+1 countries in 2015, further complexities were introduced into these relations which seriously questioned previous analyses. As a result, the recent Iran-Russia relations is different from previous ties in terms of quality, quantity, level, means, components and the range of influence. The analysis of such relations thus demands novel analytical patterns considering such complexities and developments. Strategic partnership is one of such patterns. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 27 As an emerging pattern in inter-state relations, strategic partnership gradually found its way in the literature of the 21st international relations in both theory and practice and came to be applid by several international actors such as EU, China, Russia, Brazil and India. This paper attempts to answer this question: what mechanism underlies the development of Iran-Russia relations since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis? Given the circumstances affecting the new Iran-Russia relations by the Syrian crisis matching the three essential principles of environmental uncertainty, strategic fit and system principle, strategic partnership has been the primary mechanism in development of Iran-Russia relations. By employing the theoretical framework of strategic partnership model presented by Thomas Wilkins, this paper intends to explain and analyze Iran- Russia relations. The paper mainly intends to provide a theoretical explanation for the inception of strategic partnership –given the unique characteristics of Iran-Russia relations- to enable the prediction of the future developments and terms of these relations in terms of components, characteristics, outcomes and the requirements of the model. Inter-state relations follow varied models based on their qualitative and quantitative components. Here, models such as coalition, alliance, cooperation, partnership and conflict are used to describe the status of inter-state relations. Now and then, terms such as strategic –indicating enhanced interests and extended duration of the relations- are employed to add to the content and functional richness of the model. Today, however, expanded dimensions and more complex nature of relations between states have sidelined older models in favor of new ones. Strategic partnership has been considered and reconsidered in the literature of international relations from the outset of the new century. Content analysis of British National Corpus and Corpus of Contemporary American English reveal that this term was rarely used prior to the 90s in international relations (Blanco, 2011:3). This model has been increasingly used in foreign policy doctrines, 28 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership bilateral legal documents, words of politicians and scientific texts of international relations experts. Today, the EU has signed more than 10 strategic partnership documents. This number exceeds to more than 20 for India more and 50 for China (Zhongping & Jing, 2014:4). Russia has signed more than 14 strategic partnership documents. Functional diversity and extensiveness of these relations is the first thing that captures attention in such strategic partnership documents. In some cases, even the countries closest in political and international stances are yet to sign any formal strategic partnership and their relations are not construed in strategic partnership terms. In contrast, there are actors that have signed strategic partnership memoranda of understanding in spite of remarkable political, economic and security differences. In other words, it should be noted that although some international actors are strategic partners, their relations may not be fed by this concept (Kundani, 2012). Another interesting point is that there is not a single, specific definition for strategic partnership, even by those countries adopting this model in their engagements. For example, there is no specific definition for strategic partnership in any of EU documents or statements (Grevi, 2012:2). Some researchers believe this to be natural and strategic partnership “should not” be in fact bound to any specific definition. As a matter of fact, every case of strategic partnership should be defined as a context-specific phenomenon which makes it unique and case-particular (Blanco, 2011:9). Therefore, it could be argued that Iran-Russia strategic partnership could receive a unique definition in proportion to the conditions, components, propositions, structural determinations and historical characteristics of the model of their bilateral relations. Despite plural definitions and functions, strategic partnership has a number of distinguishing minimal and maximum principles and components. For Mansingh, strategic partnership takes place when two governments agree to raise the level of their regular interactions to embrace levels from the lowest to highest, to deal Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 29 with the great variety of issues that concern each of them in a cordial and holistic manner seeking cooperation or understanding, and to make long-term commitments for mutual cooperation and furthering their respective goals, but stop short of entering an alliance (Mansingh, 2005:2221). In another conceptual and functional exploration, Czechowska sets out seven constitutive features for inception of strategic partnership between states: 1. Partnership nature of the relation, 2. Convergence of strategic goals of different parties, 3. Mutual conviction that through combination of the efforts could increase the probability of implementing cohesive strategic goals, 4. Authentic and long- term cooperation for fulfilling the common goals, 5. Preference and intensity of contacts that surpasses the ordinary level (for those states) of closeness with other partners, 6. Highly developed infrastructure of relations, 7. Positive atmosphere of bilateral relations (Czechowska, 2013:51). It is noteworthy that the concept of “strategic”, does not relate to military aspects. It rather falls within the scope of business and refers to a long-term initiative developed to realize specific goals or shaping a desirable future. This is no surprising as the concept of strategic partnership originates in organizational and commercial studies (Wilkins, 2008:363). When it comes to functional use, it is the constructions and impressions derived from the “strategic” concept that defines the features of strategic partnership to some extent. Consequently, strategic partnerships could take 5 specific modes. First interpreting the strategic aspect as a “strategic goal” such as NATO & EU membership in Lithuania-Polish partnership, second as “strategic national interests” such as US hegemony in the U.S.–Poland or the U.S.– Japan partnerships, third as cooperation in the strategically important areas for stimulation of projects beneficial to trade and economics such as EU – Chinese strategic partnership, fourth as strategic actors in form of potentially powerful and influential states such as US-EU and Russo-Indian strategic partnership and fifth as strategic action in form of changes in international 30 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership structure in Russo-Chinese strategic partnership (Gajauskaitė, 2013:192). On a more functional note, Wilkins mentions three essential criteria to formation of strategic partnership. The first criterion is environmental uncertainty which usually occurs when states respond to the uncertainty present in the international environment. Here, actors join together to increase their capabilities and flexibility to counter this uncertainty (Wilkins, 2008:364). The partners may have common threat perceptions, but these are not the decisive factor for collaboration as they are for conventional alliances. Given environmental uncertainty, the parties involved would then constitute a strategic partnership based on mutual interests and possibly also shared values (or ideology). Partners should furthermore bring "some worthwhile capability or benefit, especially complementary resources", to their alignment (Geldenhuys, 2015:125). The second is ‘strategic fit’, that is, the degree of mutual interests, perhaps shared values/ideology, and the resources and other benefits that might contribute to partnership (Wilkins, 2010:125). What Wilkins (2008: 364) refers to as values or ideologies can be treated as elements constituting the normative content of the agreements (Geldenhuys, 2015:126). An effective strategic partnership must be sustained by shared values and ideas, which will allow the parties to successfully cooperate in the search for common goals. Since the focus of a strategic partnership is supposedly the development of cooperation in shared strategic areas of interest, thus, any conflict concerning values and ideas naturally leads to an ineffective search for goals and the constitution of a failing or “false” strategic partnership (Blanco, 2011:17). However, it should be noted that although some levels of common values must exist in any strategic partnership, what constitutes strategic partnership is its pragmatic character based on type of strategic goals being pursued (Blanco, 2011:17). As a matter of fact, the smart balance between pragmatism and valuism could be perceived as the common thread of any strategic partnership. Depending on the balance, strategic partnership could be variably Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 31 defined in different situations which have allowed for flexibility, appeal and the wide range of applications of this pattern. System principle is the third criterion proposed by Wilkins. This principle refers to a general joint purpose around which strategic partnership is organized. This purpose is then converted to a comprehensive framework of agreement and common understanding and provides the raison d’être for partnership. In practice, System principle should be divided into a series of special joint purposes (Wilkins, 2008:364). However, it should be noted that individual partners are perfectly capable of deviating from these official goals, through their pursuit of covert (or ‘unofficial’) national objectives. The political leadership, often supported by business and military interests, typically plays a key role in initiating and presiding over the formation process of strategic partnership (Wilkins, 2010:125). An attraction of a strategic partnership during the formation phase is its informal nature and low commitment costs as opposed to an alliance. In their Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Russia and South Africa indeed declare that theirs "does not seek to create a military- political alliance" and is not directed against any other State or group of States (Geldenhuys, 2015:128). Therefore, in an emerging world of complexities of politics and international relations, countries are more inclined to the informal nature and preservation of positive commitments of cooperation rather than forming strong alliances with their high political, economic and security costs in the current evolving world. This type of partnership could prove more applicable in highly volatile, evolving regions such as the Middle East and for countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran to which other regional and international actors are particularly sensitive in political-security terms. Therefore, given the positive results of Iran-Russian partnership in Syria and their strategic convergence in this crisis along with their efforts to expand the potential areas of cooperation, numerous fields may be earmarked for inception of a 32 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership pattern of strategic partnership for future Iran-Russian bilateral relations in the Middle East. This could be extended to other fields considering the previous successful cooperation of these two countries in dealing with crises in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

І. Strategic Partnership Environmental Uncertainty in the Syrian Crisis Popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa started in the early 2010 in Tunisia. These uprising sparked a wave that swept through other Arab countries of the region, promising formation of a new order to replace the existing one (Husseini, 2013:62). This new order had roots in two important, essential outcomes of these popular uprisings. First the uncertainty of future: developments that followed the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa fuelled substantial transformations in the region. It seems that at least it takes a decade (an even longer) for the Middle East to find its final shape. However, (in spite of elapse of 7 years), it is anyone’s guess who will seize the power in the future and what directions will be taken by countries undergoing such transformation processes. The second is changes in the relations of the actors: popular uprisings in the Middle East changed both the shape and nature of intra-regional relations of those countries involved in the conflicts as well as their relations with other actors, major powers in particular (Bahman, 2012:32-33). Although the West led by the US was at first startled at the pace and magnitude of the developments, it quickly attempted to infiltrate and influence the MENA post-cold war order to its own advantage. For this, the US adopted a series of policies to control and manage the regional popular uprisings that fell within the political pragmatism framework of the Obama administration. The US tried to secure its interests through adoption of a non-ideological, non-security approach, indirect management, looking at the results of policies rather than the predefined, rigid principles, avoidance of unnecessary wars, multilateralism and lowering the costs of direct Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 33 interventions. To this end, the US practiced, at macro levels measures, direct foreign interventions to apparent changes in the ruling elites. In the long run, the US will attempt to manage the challenges arising out of these reconciliations via contributing to domestic reforms, continued military involvement in the region and the target countries, avoiding relying on a single ally, promotion of a secular edition of Islam, approaching the civil, Islamic communities of the region, advancing the human rights discourse and furthering the reconciliation processes (Govhari MOghaddam, 2014:138). The previous trends in these countries indicate the comparative success of the US policies and formation of a new order. However, the outbreak of the Syrian crisis posed challenges to US desired order. This crisis has completely overshadowed the security order of the Middle East, turning Syria into the interface of conflicting discourses on one hand and the interests of diverse actors on the other hand. This is why most analysts believe that the resolution for Syrian crisis would presumably set the tone for inception of the new regional order (Shoori, 2018:81). The ensuing environment of uncertainty drives development of fronts in this crisis. The experience of getting caught off the guard in Tunisia, discretion in Egypt, dualism in Libya, silence in Bahrain and inertia in Yemen (Bahman, 2012:33-38), made Russia to decide resolutely to offset mistakes of the West in Iraq and Libya through direct intervention in Syria (Geranmayeh & Liik, 2016:3). When it comes to its surrounding environment, Iran has invariably followed a consistent, clear policy on the US imposed order. Therefore, Iran and Russia decided to stand together once they perceived their interests in jeopardy in the wake of the prevailing environment of uncertainty of the new Middle East order and its corollaries. Strategic Fit and Complementarity of the Values/Interests: The second criterion in formation of strategic partnership is strategic compatibility which stresses the affinity and complementarity of the interests and resources of the interested 34 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership parties (Galang, 2017:2). Wilkins maintains that in environments of uncertainly, countries engage in strategic partnership based on shared values and interests. Here, the parties should introduce valuable and compatible capabilities and interests into their partnerships, particularly complementary resources (Wilkins, 2008:364). Japan-Australia strategic fit includes among others, components of a democratic liberal system, free market economy and commitment to upholding human rights, shared interests in criticizing the protective structure of marine communication lines, combating terrorism and safeguarding regional stability in the South Asia and South-Pacific, production of raw materials by Australia and Japan’s need of raw materials for production of electronic devices and more importantly, having a shared, powerful ally in the US (Tow & Kersten, 2012:119). The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation enjoy strategic fit at different levels and areas which could be categorized as regional and international. The way Iran and Russia view the world order is their primary ground for international strategic fit. This could be addressed in the framework of power polarization, power entities and trends influencing the international system. The way both countries view the power polarization, opposing a unipolar order and US uniaxial behavior is the common denominator of both countries. In terms of power entities, both countries oppose tendencies which are aimed at generation of new entities with exclusionary attitudes. Both Tehran and Moscow are not interested in globalization of West-oriented security and its associated entities. Finally, when it comes to trends influencing the international system, Iran and Russia have jointly opposed the employment of trends which are not part of the international law for deciding on major issues such as armed conflicts and peace in the international system (Sajjadpour, 2017:18). International sanctions are another point of international arena. Crimean accession to the Russian Federation in 2014 which prompted international sanctions on Russia by the US and the Europe conjured the feelings of a common destiny Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 35 with Iran in Russia. In particular, the adoption of Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (H.R.3364) by their common antagonist i.e. the US, has driven the two countries closer than ever. Iran proved that a country can live under sanctions and show growth in gross domestic product, even when actual development is in deep stagnation. Moscow has long tried to capture something useful from Iran’s experience of living under sanctions despite differences in their economic structures (Sveshnikova, 2017). Obviously, Iran welcomes the creation of a new axis of resistance against international sanctions. Countering NATO’s expansion to the East and the borders of two countries in Eurasia and the Middle East and extending efforts to restrict such trends is another internationally common view of both countries. Syrian crisis is the first and most important factor in regional strategic fit of both countries. Iran has the upper hand in ground military operations while Russia is in control of the sky and provides air support thanks to its mighty air force. For this, Iran’s influence on the grounds matters to Russia and Russian air support is crucial for Iran. Iran’s role appears to be more influential since Russia does not have many boots on the grounds and the ground operations is of critical importance in Syrian front (Ford, 2017). Furthermore, the Middle East intellectual and normative structures demands special requirements for long-term durability and influence which Russia lacks. Therefore, Iran’s soft power in the Middle East is crucial to increasing Russian presence in this region. On the other hand, Russian international status as a permanent UNSC member provides relatively precious advantages for Iran in both military and political dimensions. Combating terrorism is another common regional interest of both countries. Both Iran and Russia have shared vulnerabilities to terrorism in their contemporary times; Russia has adjacent borders with Chechnya, North Caucasus and some parts of Central Asia and South Caucasus and so does Iran. Considering the strong presence of terrorist outfits in the Syrian war, the return of foreign fighters from Syria to North Caucasus and particularly Chechnya 36 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership seems potentially possible which could pose a severe security threat to Russia (Bøgeskov Eriksen, 2017:22). Both countries have already demonstrated in their security approaches that they tend to deal with threats in their places of origin before they are activated in their area of interests and thus they have arrived at a common interface in the Syrian crisis. The last important factor in the strategic fit of the two countries is their reciprocal balancing roles at both regional and international levels. For 15 years, Iran had been searching for an ally in regional and international powers to defuse the anti-Iranian US plots. Russia has traditionally been the major, prominent candidate for playing this balancing role (Kozhanov, 2016:910). Iran-Russia has always been part of a bigger jigsaw covering a litany of various issues. One has been the state of Moscow’s engagement with the West. Until 2012 in particular, Moscow’s relations with Tehran tended to move in the opposite direction of Russian-US relations, with Russia leveraging its links with Iran to shape its relations with America (Geranmayeh, 2016:6). Also, at the regional level, Iran is seen as leverage for balancing Russia’s relations with Arab states of the Middle East. System Principles: The System principle is a series of common goals around which strategic partnership is built. As a matter of fact, this principle provides the raison d’être for the partnership. These (security) goals go beyond a certain action such as deterring or combating a hostile state, as with a conventional military alliance. Second, strategic partnerships, unlike alliances, are primarily ‘goal driven’ (positive) rather than ‘threat-driven’ (negative) alignments. Following from this, no enemy state is identified by the partnership as a ‘threat’, though the partnership may be concerned with joint security ‘issue areas’, such as proliferation or terrorism, for example. Third, strategic partnerships tend to be informal in nature and entail low commitment costs, rather than being enshrined in a formal alliance treaty that binds the participants to rigid courses of action, such as a mutual defense pact (Wilkins, 2010:123). For example, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 37 in the Strategic Partnership Instrument between Russia and South Africa, the system principles is expressed in form of, a more just system of international relations based on sovereign equality of all states and peoples and supremacy of the law under the central role of the Organization, the successful functioning of the universal system of collective security based on the UN Charter, opposing US unilateralism and enhanced friendship of the two countries (Gelgenhuys, 2015:127). Although the US plays an undeniable role in the system principles of any strategic partnership, one should not reduce this principle to countering US interests and goals in the Syrian crisis. Rather, this principle expands into a profound, comprehensive concept. It should be noted that the US is currently the single pole of the international system and the sole global hegemonic power. Thus, countering the US measures does not constitute confronting a government or a state. As a matter of fact, it is confronting a part of the international system. For Kenneth N. Waltz, the primary post- inception function of structures is influencing the interacting units, something that takes place through social acceptance and institutionalization of norms and competitions (Vaezi and Moshir Zadeh, 2015: 137-38). Therefore, countering the US in the Syrian crisis is not just engaging a state. Rather, it is engaging an international order and a series of actors. Furthermore, the US measures consistently take the shape of a coherent, structured order which drives structural determinants for actors. Popular uprising in the Middle East led to the collapse of Post-Cold war order instituted by the US in the region and propelled the ongoing formation of a new order. Accordingly, the key, crucial aspect of Iran-Russia strategic partnership should primarily be countering the new order that is being conceived in this strategic region for re-consolidation of the US hegemonic structure. In the second place, the incorporation of the desired components of both countries in this new order constitutes the system principles and raison d’être of Iran-Russia strategic partnership in the region. Both countries 38 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership naturally seem to completely concur with the first aspect with negligible differences. However, they have disagreements when it comes to the second aspect i.e. formation of a new order. While Iran seeks to complete and buttress the axis of resistance in the new Middle East order, Russia intends to revive its influence in the region to both upgrade its international status and achieve geopolitical, security and economic interests in the Middle East. Therefore, it is just the informal nature of their strategic partnership and lack of commitments on both sides to the other’s goals and actions that could lay the groundwork for sustained synergies of the both countries and the wider Eurasia via creation a common denominator in their goals, values and interests.

II. Unique Characteristics As noted earlier, strategic partnership is a phenomenon that is fed by a certain theme and could exhibit certain functions and characteristics under different circumstances. In view of the historical-structural specifications of the Islamic Republic of Iran - the Russian Federation relations, the unique characteristics of this strategic partnership could be described as follows: 1. Although a theme-based concept, strategic partnership requires some general prerequisites and infrastructures. Since the required infrastructures are not there, Iran-Russia strategic partnership is in the feasibility and formation stages and thus it is too early to discuss the mechanisms of implementation and results of this model (evaluation and implementation) in Iran-Russia relations. 2. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a regional power while the Russian Federation is an international force. Therefore, Iran- Russia communications are different at regional & international bilateral levels. Only their relations at the regional level could be properly dubbed a strategic partnership (Karami, 2017: 29) as the region acts as the interface of two countries’ communications, interests and actions. However, it should be noted that although Iran and Russia’s strategic partnership has a regional span, its Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 39 outcomes and consequences are global on scale. 3. The concept of “strategic” in Iran-Russia strategic partnership currently falls in the domain of “strategic action” and will extend to “cooperation in strategic fields” (Eurasia, transit, economy) in future. 4. The “informal nature” and “low commitment costs” play a bold role in Iran-Russia strategic partnership which may gain further weight on certain occasions. Israel is the most important issue in this regard. Although Israel cannot play the role of a strategic partner for Russia due to its records and historical background (Razoux, 2008:2), its carries strategic benefits for Russia as more than one million Russian Jews are living in Israel as well as the fact that Israel forms an integral part the triad of Russia-the US- Israel (Bar, 2003:4). For this, Russia has entered into cooperation with Iran to secure Israel’s security. On the other hand, Iran’s principal reason for involvement in the Syrian crisis has been protection of the Axis of Resistance to contain Israel and guarantee its own security. This marks Israel as the value interface of both countries. As the pragmatic side of the strategic partnership gains momentum, this discrepancy could be diluted, something that calls for a smart balance. This also applies to Saudi Arabia subject to putting some other characteristics into consideration. This cooperation forms not a pragmatic partnership, but a strategic one according to the criteria proposed by Wilkins and Czechowska.

III. Cooperation Fields Iran and Russia entered into a strategic partnership in response to their shared concerns in the Middle East in general and Syria in particular. These concerns were addressed in the formative, essential principles of strategic partnership i.e. environmental uncertainty, strategic fit and systems principles. It was mentioned that the concept of “strategic” in Iran-Russia strategic partnership currently falls in the domain of “strategic action” (in the Syrian crisis). The leaders of both states have clearly demonstrated that 40 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership they wish to pass through the formation stage to the “implementation” phase. There have been frequent exchanges of economic and political delegations between the countries during which new structures, entities and approaches have been engendered as the facilitators of implementation mechanisms of action in strategic fields. For the first time, Russia has mentioned Iran in its Foreign Policy Document (Para 94) with all-round cooperation development with Iran as part of it (the Concept of Foreign Policy in Russian Federation, 2016:27). The countries have also signed numerous strategic documents in political, legal, security, economic and cultural fields, hoping that these fields construct the foundations for a new regional order for the future. Although opposing the imposed order of the US was the raison d’être of Iran- Russia strategic partnership in a sense, both countries had a glance at inception of their own desired order. For this aim, re-defining the regional security of the Middle East is the first indispensable step in this way. Both Iran and Russia believe that the US interventionist measures have contributed to regional instability and insecurity, emergence of terrorist groups and terrorism in wider sense, drug trafficking, overthrow of states, installing new ruling elites and outbreaks of conflicts and clashes among countries, etc,. These new sources of insecurity jeopardize the security and interests of both Iran and Russia. Thus both countries seek a new security structure based on international law and honoring the sovereignty of states without instigating domestic and proxy wars. Combating the origin of security crises such as takfiri terrorism, failed states, energy security, drug trafficking and organized crimes are at the core of Iran-Russia security cooperation in the new order. With regards to economy, creation of an economic pattern resistant to the US sanctions and the West has been the most important field of Iran-Russia cooperation. To this end, both countries have considered ditching US dollar from their transactions, starting new companies and economic structures and establishment of direct financial channels etc. Russia wishes to Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 41 utilize Iran’s experience as a country with decent economic growth under prolonged sanctions extending several decades. Iran, in return, wants to enjoy the comparative economic advantages of Russia such as its financial and technological resources. Regarding transit, the two countries have adopted important, strategic measures for revival of the North-South corridor. Thanks to the unique geopolitical position and access to appropriate ground transportation infrastructures, Iran plays a key role to this corridor. In addition to offering numerous economic benefits to both countries (Iran in particular), this corridor provides a response to the components of the US order in creation of East- West transit routes, in particular in energy fields.

IV. Economic Ties Economic ties are one the most important factors in consolidation and deepening of strategic partnership. Although economic issues have not been covered in the most important or the key articles of various strategic partnership documents (in contrast to systemic components of the international system or security concerns), they could be deemed as the most frequently discussed issues in inter- state discussions. For instance, the Russia- SA Strategic Partnership Document mentions economic issues in 7 out of the total 13 fields, resulting in conclusion of scores of MoUs1 and contracts between these two countries (Geldenhuys, 2015:133- 134). This has been bolder in strategic partnership documents drafted between the EU and China. Even value-centered and security components have been placed within strategic partnership ties including cooperation in fields of transit, energy, financial & banking transactions or economic concepts such as free market and economic and trade liberalism. From such perspective, in spite of the fact that Iran-Russia strategic partnership has advanced to the “formation phase” on account of geopolitical and security requirements and necessities

1. Memorandom of understanding 42 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership of the both countries, the key to its consolidation and stabilities lies in no field other than economic ties. In contrast to security and political interests of states which quickly change in response to covert or overt arrangements and unpredictable field developments, economic ties are remarkably durable, more stable in nature. Speculation on possible scenarios for the future of Iran- Russia relations after the resolution of Syrian crisis has been a central theme in discussions of the current Iran and Russia cooperation in Syria. Assuming that Assad’s government relatively defuses all the threats, even the most optimistic analysts may not foresee the prevailing of Iran-Russia commonalities over their disagreements on Syria. These disagreements may become particularly challenging with the post-war economic involvement of China in Syria as the third side of Russian strategic triangle (UCF, 2016). In view of their less desirable economic ties in post- USSR collapse period, Russia and China have gone in a mad scramble to lay the grounds for such cooperation. The total of Iran-Russia trade volume was around 16 billion USD from 2010 to the end of 2016; this indicates less than 3 billion USD per year regardless of ups and downs in economic transactions. Compared to Iran’s annual trade of 32 billion USD with China, 9 billion USD with India, 6 billion USD with the Republic of Korea and 5 billion USD with Turkey, this reveals poor economic ties between Iran and Russia. Furthermore, the skewed trade balance of the two countries could also seriously compromise such ties. This balance was remarkably lopsided in favor of Russia from 2010 to 2016 with Iran mainly playing the role of an importer. Table 1 displays the volume of economic transactions from 2010 to 2016 between Iran and Russia. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the large portion of Iran- Russia transactions took place in form of military and arms contracts which are not mentioned in economic indicators due to their classified nature. However, media reports significant figures and statistics regarding Iran’s purchase of arms from Russia which points to the importance of defense industries in Iran-Russia Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 43 bilateral ties. In just one case, Victor Ozerov, the Chairman of the Russian Upper House of Parliament's Defense Committee, mentions 10 billion USD as one of the arms trade arrangements between Iran and Russia (Ozerov, 2016). Table 1: Iran-Russia Economic Transactions (2010- 2016) Iran’s Exports Russia’s Total Volume of Iran’s Trade Year to Russia Export to Iran Economic Exchanges Balance Ratio 2016 1880 302 2182 0.16 2015 1020 250 1270 0.24 2014 1330 341 1671 0.25 2013 1170 417 1587 0.35 2012 1900 410 2310 0.21 2011 3260 337 3597 0.10 2010 2790 304 3094 0.10 Source of data: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/irn Given such circumstances, the policy-makers and elites of both countries have designated bilateral economic ties as their second priority (after defense-security cooperation). Drafting economic visions in various fields (such as the roadmap for 5-year joint trade-industrial cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, an MoU between Customs Administrations of Iran and Russia on Green Customs Corridor, an MoU for development of infrastructural cooperation etc) and conclusion of contracts and MoUs at macro national levels between states, corporations as well as among states and provinces is a clear testimony of this. Of the most important contracts signed between the two countries, one can mention a 30 billion USD contract in the field of energy, a finance arrangement between 4 Iranian banks and Eximbank of Russia, a contract worth of 3 billion USD for joint production of train cars (wagons), contracts for building two new nuclear plants in Iran, a contract for purchase of 12 SSJ100s, a contract between Gazprom and Iran NIGC for LPF production, Inter-bank loan arrangements, Iran’s contract with Russia Helicopters and contracts for manufacturing of electrified railroads which could transform their bilateral economic ties. Organizing numerous joint economic commissions of the two countries to enhance the ties and removing the barriers in their economic exchanges coupled with activation of the trade 44 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership counseling sections of the diplomatic missions on both sides demonstrate the firm resolves of the both parties to bridge the most important gap in Iran-Russia strategic partnership.

Conclusion From 2010 onwards, the Islamic Republic of Iran - the Russian Federation’s relations have undergone changes in the wake of the developments of the Syrian Crisis and other regional and international developments such as expansion of Takfiri terrorism, the Ukrainian Crisis and the conclusion of the JCPOA. Accordingly, these new relations have changed in terms of level, depth, components, propositions, motives and drivers, values, interests and means, taking on a new structure in the transformation process. This has made it impossible to fathom and analyze the new relations within the frameworks of traditional, narrowed patterns of their bilateral relations. Strategic partnership as new pattern in inter-state relations lends itself to explanation in a much more straightforward manner thanks to its unique characteristics. Strategic partnership as a theme-based pattern of inter-state relations indicates high levels of relations between the two states. The informal nature of this partnership which lowers the commitment costs, its legal-political flexibility and the specific environment of its birth have distinguished it from alliance, coalition, partnership and cooperation patterns. In a pattern presented to explain the theoretical foundations of strategic partnerships in three steps of formation, implementation and assessment, Thomas Wilkins points to environmental uncertainty, strategic fit and system principles as three essential, important criteria in formation of strategic partnership. Iran-Russia convergence in the environment of uncertainty introduced by popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa from 2010 which led to the collapse of the old order and is in transition to a new order is noted for the first criterion. Regarding the second criterion or strategic fit, Iran and Russia concur on shared views on the global order and opposing the US Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 45 unilateralism, the imposition of international sanctions, NATO expansion processes, the reciprocal balancing functions of two countries, the complementary role of comparative political- security advantages in Syrian Crisis and finally a common view on regional stability and fighting terrorism. As far as system principles is concerned, opposing the US imposed order and shaping the components of their desired order could be noted in Iran-Russia strategic partnership. It is again noted that Iran-Russia strategic partnership is in the “formation phase” and solely viable at regional levels. In spite of their disagreements and interfering factors such as Israel, the informal nature of Iran-Russia strategic partnership gains further importance. To securer maximum benefits and enhance the influence indicators of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the followings items are suggested:  In international relations literature, strategic partnership is a new pattern in inter-state relations. It is a theme-based pattern which demands special coordinates for each country and under variable circumstances. Therefore, Iranian researchers and professionals on international relations should conduct extensive research on the dimensions of this new pattern along with its outcomes and functions.  Iran-Russia strategic partnership is in incipient stages of its formation. Its continuation and completion thus entails development of stabilizing mechanisms in Iran-Russia relations. This requires the vigilance of policy-making bodies to be able to maintain, replace if necessary upgrade the available tools and propositions in prospective conditions of regional and international developments.  Once formed, strategic partnership moves to the implementation stage which requires appropriate political-legal infrastructures to enable reaping the benefits of partnership. Economic fields in particular demand more concerted, tactful measures. On the other hand, the informal nature of strategic partnership results in emergence of grey areas in boundaries of the bilateral actions of both countries. This calls for employment of 46 / Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership controlling tools in different fields to secure interests.  Strategic partnership is a dynamic, non-static process which could upgraded to comprehensive or special strategic partnership (Mir Fakhraei, Rahimi, Sefidi Kassin, 2018:175). This requires transition from strategic action to cooperation in strategic fields. Therefore, functional enhancement of fields of cooperation to acceptable economic and cultural levels using novel tools of public diplomacy as well as geographical expansion of the strategic partnership to cover Eurasia could be a viable option for the policy-makers of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure Mehdi Kamkar Rahman Najafi Sayar

Abstract Saudi Arabia's foreign policy against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) as the dependent variable is affected by the factors and elements of domestic level and also by the factors and elements of macro structural level as independent variables. Meanwhile, the present study aims at clarifying the dialectics of structural factors (regional-international developments) and those at agent level (Saudi Arabia's domestic developments) in shaping the Saudi Arabia's foreign policy against Iran. The present study, by means of structure-agent approach, seeks to explore the roots of shaping Saudi Arabia's aggressive foreign policy against the IRI in the interval of 2011-2013 and the concerned signals and proofs of the Saudi behavior as a question. The outcome of the present study suggests that the developments at the macro-structural level such as the international anarchy, the change of US strategy as a superpower, change in the order and balance between and among the regional powers after the Arabian uprisings of 2011 along with change at Saudi agent level, i.e. the rise of Mohammad bin Salman's team as the offensive elites, led to the shaping of Saudi Arabia's aggressive foreign policy against Iran in 2011-2018. Admittedly, these developments at the macro-structural level

 PhD in in Strategic Studies, Associate Professor of National Security, [email protected]  PhD in International Relation, [email protected] Received: 18/8/2019 Accepted: 10/11/2019 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer- Fall 2017, pp. 51-77 52 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure

along with the domestic ones in Saudi Arabia resulted in shaping Saudi’s aggressive behavior against Iran in a bilateral dialectical equation. In the same vein, the proofs of this behavior against Iran at the two levels of structure and agent include the creation of military-security coalition, establishment of amicable relations with Israel, exertion of institutional pressures, economic war, media-propaganda war and endeavor to exacerbate Iran's home unrests. Keywords: Iran, Saudi Arabia, dialectics of agent-structure, aggressive foreign policy

Introduction The Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are two significant actors in the Middle East, which due to geopolitic, geostrategic and geocultural reasons, play key parts in the regional- international equations. The IRI, covering an area of 1.648.195 square meters and having a population of 80 million people, is a major country in the region. Besides access to oil and gas resources and then playing a key role in the Middle East due to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran wields the 2nd substantiated gas reserves and also the 4th oil reserves in the world. Geographically speaking, Iran lies on a plot of land surrounded by the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. In terms of political stance, the IRI is considered the leader of “resistance and uncompromising” in the region. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia with an area of 2.150.000 square meters and a population of 28 million people, is also a major country in the Middle East. After Venezuela, this country enjoys the 2nd substantiated oil reserves in the world, which encompasses 18 percent of the world’s oil. As the population of Saudi Arabia is 1/3 of that of Iran, its domestic oil consumption stands at a lower level and is deemed the 1st exporter of oil in the world (OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2015: 8-28). In political stance, Saudi Arabia is considered the leader of “compromising and resistance” pivot against Iran. These two major actors, featuring the said descriptions, continuously rival with each other to invigorate their part and expand their influence in the Middle East. The rivalry between the two countries in the region is simultaneously affected by their domestic developments as well as the macro regional-international 54 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure factors and developments in such a way that any transition in the Saudi-Iranian relations must be deemed to be rooted in the developments at the two levels. Accordingly, without considering the domestic factors of the two countries, the regional security order and the macro trends and developments of the international system, it fails to understand the nature of Iran-Saudi relations. The security order of the Middle East, specially after the Arabian uprisings in 2011 and susceptibility to macro changes in the US strategy, has been exposed to transition. The transition in the regional order of the Middle East has shifted the regional balance in the interest of Iran and in the disadvantage of Saudi Arabia. This circumstance along with the domestic developments in Saudi Arabia and also the rise of new agents, has led the Saudis to the approach Iran, if not hindered, will take the lead of regional order in the future (Kinninmont, 2015). The analysis of Saudi leaders of Iran's threat in the security comlex of the region is based on the following two views: the first view is concerned to Iran’s aggressive foreign policy. From this point of view, Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies hold that Iran's aid to Hezbollah and Palestinian groups along with support of Syria and its relation to Shiite groups in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain are in line with Iran's longterm purpose to disturb the regional balance powers particularly that in the Arab world. The second point of view concerns the rise of Iran's defense and nuclear power from which Saudi Arabia estimates as sign of Iran’s aggressive intentions. In this field, it is maintained that Iran seeks to access nuclear weapons and invigorate its missile power in such a way that it is likely to equip the hostile rivals and groups against Saudi Arabia, including the Hezbollah of Lebanon, Ansarollah in Yemen and other Shiite groups. Hence, with such a perspective at the level of agents and ruling elites in Saudi Arabia towards Iran and inception of some security changes in the countries allying with Saudi Arabia during the Arab the 2011 uprising which was synchronized with the change of the US strategic approach to the Middle East, the Saudi Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 55 regime reached the conclusion to put step into the balance, control and moderation of its major regional rival, the IRI, with adopting an aggressive active approach in the region. In the same vein, the present study, through applying the dialectics of agent-structure theory, seeks to clarify the dialectical role and interconnected structural elements (regional-international developments) and agent factors (home developments in Saudi Arabia) in shaping Saudi's aggressive behavior against the IRI. Besides, the signals and proofs of the Saudi aggressive approach against Iran will be analysed at the two levels of structure and agent.

І. Structure Structural elements in shaping the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia could be categorized into international and regional systems. The international system means the existing of anarchy, division of power and the act of superpowers. The regional system means the dynamism of regional powers and developments in the balance of regional powers. Both of the two factors as the variable of macro level, have been playing a leading role in shaping Saudi Arabia's aggressive behavior against Iran since the onset of the third millennium. International system developments: The international system includes structure, major actors and anarchy or the lack of central power at the international level. The anarchy status in the international system, as the overriding feature, encourages countries to forge alliance and coalition with superpowers in order to establish security. Saudi Arabia as a regional affiliated power, due to susceptibility to the international anarchy as well as the considerations surrounding her royal system, sustainably seeks security through forging strategic coalition with superpowers. In such a frame, Saudi Arabia, since the rise of Malik Abd-al-Aziz (the founder of Saudi regime), first, with accepting the British hegemony on the Persian Gulf and cooperation with this country, deemed alliance with Britain the main pivot in its foreign policy and later it put the strategic corporation with America on the 56 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure agenda in the format of “exchange of oil with security”. Presently, the US-Saudi strategic corporation is a consequential factor in creating the domestic legitimacy of the House of Saud (Al-e- Saud) and in formulating its foreign policy (Gause, 2014). In such a condition, any alteration in the US strategy severely affects the Saudi foreign policy strategy in various fields, including those concerned with the IRI. The doctrine of Obama was a milestone in the US strategy and in shaping the Saudi aggressive behavior in the early third millennium. This doctrine which was defined as “pivot to the East Asia” was a realistic turn in the US foreign policy for sequencing the US concerns and countering major challenges. The purpose of this doctrine was to reduce the US military array in Europe, stir allies to accept more liability, reduce the US presence in the West Asia and increase the focus on the East Asia to counter the growing power and influence of China in the region and in the world as the main rival of US in the coming decades (Kay, 2013: 1-3). The requirements to lessen the US role in the West Asia as a key principle in the doctrine, to decrease the number of military forces in the region, to avoid serious engagement in the regional crises, to reinforce the military power in reliance with domestic strength or intra-regional alliance and peaceful resolution of problems with Iran, particularly that of nuclear problem, all perniciously affected the Washington-Riyadh relations during the office of Obama because the consequence of the doctrine was to abandon Saudi Arabia in the midst of regional crises and in the rivalry with Iran. Riyadh expected the United States to directly enter crises like that of Syria, but it refused to do so (Assadi, 2016: 14). The much more substantial issue to be reviewed in the doctrine is Obama’s view towards Iran and her nuclear problem. To minimize the US engagement in the West Asia, Barack Obama flexibly formulated the US Middle East foreign policy upon the resolution of conflicts or the least dispute with Iran. The outcome of such a policy was the resolution of Iran’s nuclear problem and recognition of Iran as a regional power. As Gary Sick states, “Obama endeavored to turn the policy Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 57 of Iran’s containment into limited partnership with the country”. From Sick’s point of view, nearly all regional states, specially Saudi Arabia and Israel, were opposed to the policy (Sick, 2015). From the Saudi’s approach, the nuclear deal, politically, economically and militarily, donated further elbow room to Iran on the Middle East chess board. From their view, regional conflicts such as Syrian crisis, Iraq, Yemen, support of Hezbollah and opposite Bahraini groups should be considered in the deal (Kalout, 2015: 26). The Saudi officials also considered the agreement with Iran as a sign of the US government’s less determination to guarantee the regional security. Accordingly, they determined to counter Iran and its allies with taking a more autonomous part by their own or counterbalance with some Arab governments. However, with the rise of Donald Trump as the US president in January 2016, the Saudi regime found an opportunity, by means of dollar diplomacy and Trump’s business-oriented approach, to enjoy US government’s capacities to counter Iran. With the rise of Trump, the US adopted a new strategy in foreign policy towards the Middle East problems which emphasizes the outsourcing of authorities to allies and the US strategic partnership renewal with them. This strategy was retrieved from the Trump’s neo-isolationism (the first America's motto) and the new US government’s realism approach (make America great again) which emphasizes the reduction of US costs while maintenance of its dominant position in the international system. According to the new strategy in foreign policy, Trump’s administration, while trying to preserve the dominant position of the US in the international system, is not ready to implement the tasks of a hegemonic state, and it is unwilling to pay the costs of international security in the Middle East (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2018). Such an approach leads to the further partnership of Saudi Arabia in providing the regional-international security, creating the vacuum of power and expansion of rivalry in the region, new blockings, disorder and security-military conflicts in the West Asia where the IRI is at odds with Saudi Arabia as a 58 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure regional rival. The renewal of the US strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia by Trump adminstration, particularly in economic and military sphere, led to the exacerbation of Saudi confrontation with Iran. Only in terms of arms trade, in the first round of Trump’s visit to Riyadh which was customarily in contrast to those of the former US presidents, a 110 billion dollar deal was signed with Saudi Arabia in the field of military weaponry purchase; in accordance with the deal, equipment like the THAAD missile system, multipurpose warships, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, M109 tanks, laser guided bombs, modern frigates, patrol boats, Black Hawk helicopters, Abrams tanks and mine resistant vehicles were delivered to Saudi Arabia (David, 2017). While, foremerly the Saudis had purchased weaponry from the US, this volume is unprecedented in the Saudi military-political history (Holland, 2017: 2). Saudi Arabia pursues the following purposes with taking the armament: 1. Boosting the development of military power to counter the IRI and its allies like Hezbollah, Ansarollah, Hamas, Iraqi al- Hashd ash-Sha’abi, etc, 2. Offering required economic guarantee to Trump considering his economic-business characteristics in line with realizing the policies of Republicans and consequently drawing the support of the US against the IRI and its influence in the Middle East, 3. Guaranteeing the stability and security of Israel in case of the break of war and required cooperation with the regime in regard with IRI’s incremental influence in the region, 4. Establishing inflexible hegemony in the Arab peninsula and contact with any anti-hegemony actor through drawing hardware-software encouragements; a recent example of this was Saudi’s brutal conflict with Yemen and Qatar. However, from Saudi’s perspective, the major anti-hegemony actor in the region is Iran, 5. The final and most tangible goal is to forge joint military coalition and establish Arab army to counter IRI’s military power (Malsin, 2017: 2-1). Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 59 The second substantial sphere in the American strategic partnership renewal with Saudi Arabia in the Trump adminstration, which played a key part in exacerbating the aggressive behavior of the regime against Iran, is cooperation in the field of energy, particularly the export of oil. In this field, Trump, after exit from the JCPOA (8 May 2018) and oil resanctions against Iran, immediately called Saudi Arabia to compensate for Iran’s share of oil export. This regime, as America's strategic collaborator, pledged to increase its oil production up to two million barrels per day in order to redress the oil vacuum of Iran and hinder the oil price fluctuations in the global market. Hence, the idea to decrease the oil price in order to hurt Iran’s economy1 was conducted in tandem with Saudi and American officials (Tauleigne, 2018) in a way that this was one of the utmost consequential counteractive strategies against Iran. By the same token, it is observed that the structural considerations at the international level include anarchy escalation and change in the US strategic approach which have led to Saudi Arabia's aggressive behavior against Iran; as stated by Kenneth Waltz, the theorist of Constructivist Realism, the systemic pressures (at the international level) could reshape the behavior of agent (Saudi Arabia’s government) in foreign policy. International developments: the reasons of Saudi’s aggressive foreign policy at macro structural level, along with the international system developments which were formerly noted, the regional system transitions are also of a high significance. The regional system is somehow a subsystem of the main international system structure. While affected by the policy of superpowers and

1. The idea to decrease the oil price for hurting Iran's economy was first put forward in 2006 by “Navaf Abed” the security advisor to the Saudi regime. This plan was aimed to deactivate Iran’s support of Hezbollah and resistance forces in Iraq which was formerly applied in Obama’s administration in 2012 and recently in Trump’s in 2018 to counter the regional influence of Iran (Cunningham, 5 June 2018). 60 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure international system dynamics, the regional system features its own characteristics. Meanwhile, the Middle East regional system, with respect to elements such as the presence and influence of pivotal regional powers as well as serious intimidation in cases such as ethnic, religious, home legitimacy crises and conflicts and the breakout of revolutionary developments, is considered a challenged and sensitive environment for Saudi Arabia which affects her foreign policy. In the same vein, the Middle East developments, particularly those in post Arab revolutions in 2011 are reckoned substantial transitions which have led to change in Saudi foreign policy (Seifi & Pourhassan, 2016: 87). Saudi Arabia traditionally pursues a cautious foreign policy to avoid outright confrontation with Iran and calls for coexistence. However, the crisis and instability coming out of the Arab uprisings of 2011, moved the regime out of security corner and led to escalation of aggressive actions in foreign policy, the transition which mostly emanates from Saudi Arabia’s concerns and her sense of vulnerability (Echagüe, 2014). Security developments in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and Iraq since 2011 up to now are still current and these are the most substantial variables and dynamics in the region which lead to extroversion and securitization of Saudi foreign policy in the Middle East particularly against Iran. Each one of the countries exposed to such transitions enjoys specific geopolitic, ideological and geostrategic codes for Saudi Arabia which are mostly at odds with IRI’s interests. For instance, Saudi Arabia, due to vicinity to Yemen (geopolitical interests), Shiite residence in north Yemen and being contiguous to the south provinces of Saudi Arabia (ideological interests), and the critical location of Yemen in regard with Bab el Mandeb Strait and the port of al-Hudaydah (geostrategic interests), pursues the security developments of Yemen after the fall of Ali Abdollah Saleh; in the same vein, this country exercised some of her aggressive actions against the major actor of Yemen, i.e. Ansarollah and Iran, as the main sponsor of Yemen. According to Peter Salisbury, a researcher at Chatham Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 61 House, the ideological rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the utmost paramount element in shaping the model for aggressive counteraction behavior of Saudi Arabia against Yemen, as Saudis believe the Shiite Iran to be the main factor which stirs the Zaidi Houthi religionists. Saudi Arabia thinks that the Houthis as the proxy of Iran seek to dominate the political structure of Yemen unilaterally; hence, since March 2015, it announced military intervention in Yemen as a reason to counter the power of Ansarollah and hinder the influence of Iran (Salisbury, 2015: 12). Besides Yemen, some other regional developments particularly those in Syria and Bahrain affected Saudi’s aggressive behavior against Iran. The developments and protests in Yemen since February 2011, which finally led to Saudi military intervention in Manama, from Saudi officials’ view, is the outcome of IRI’s influence on the Shiites against Al-e-Khalifa’s rule. Saudi Arabia has been continuously defining Bahrain as its backyard and sphere of influence and accordingly, it persists on maintaining the rule of Al-e-Khalifa in the country and it rejects any political reform (Henderson, 2009: 77-79). Another point in Saudi sensitivity towards the security developments in Bahrain is the dempgraphy of the country, out of which 70% are Shiite and the historical influence of Iran could be dangerous to the Persian Gulf littoral states. This point is substantial in that there exists the Shiite crowd, correlated to the Shiite of Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia and they may be affected by the Bahraini developments. By the same token, Saudi Arabia has, during the crisis of Bahrain, continuously sought to brag the calls of Bahraini opposites as sectarianism and accuse Iran of meddling in the affairs of Bahrain and in other Persian Gulf states (Mekhennet and Warrick, 2018: 32-34). The Iran-Saudi confrontation in Syria after the security developments in 2011 lies at two levels of geopolitics and ideology. Ideologically speaking, Saudis have always threatened Syria for supporting of resistance groups for endengenering the status quo, expanding resistance (revisionism) in the region, and a 62 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure threat to the interests and future of conservative monarchies. Geopolitically speaking, the effect of the Syria crisis can analysed from two perspectives: regional balance of power with Iran, and intervention in Syria in the spheres of Saudi Arabia in Lebanon and Palestine (Kaviani Rad et al., 2013: 13); geopolitically, one of the reasons behind Saudi intervention in Syria and invigoration of the front against Assad, is the model of substitution of order in the region based on Salafism, an affair which signifies the ideological confrontation and the rule of Alawite minority against Sunni majority. In effect, Saudi Arabia, through its proxies, seeks, harassing internal opposition to prevent solidarity amongst them, to manifest the Sunni-Shiite confrontation and support the Sunni majority; this issue allows Saudi Arabia to show religious validity to its domestic opposites, i.e. the Wahhabis who call for Jihad in the media and satellite TVs (Madawi, 2012: 20). By and large, in case of Assad’s fall, and the rise of a Sunni system, Saudi Arabia will find a more desirable situation and the region will be submerged into the front of Arab conservative policies more than ever, however, in case of Syrian system's survival, the policies of Iran and Saudi Arabia will be confronted with each other more than ever, and Saudi Arabia will look for more international pressures on Iran (Nuruzzaman, 2016). These issues signify that the structural developments in the region in conjunction with those at the level of international system are considered the most substantial variables which play a key part in shaping the Saudi aggressive foreign policy against Iran (the dependent variable). Indeed, the impact of these structural variables (at regional and international level), fail to be determinant alone; rather, these variables, in a dialectical relation with agency element (governments and states), will shape the foreign policy behavior of countries (Saudi Arabia). The following will deal with the Saudi agency in shaping its aggressive foreign policy against the IRI.

Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 63 II. Agent In the frame of agent-structure dialectics and their bilateral interaction, it is implausible to overlook Saudi Arabia as an agent and its perception of trends and developments in the regional- international system. The Saudi agency includes the institutional monarchy, some figures and other actors like princes and Wahhabi Ulema who play a significant part in the foreign policy. Nevertheless, the overriding element of agency in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy1, with respect to the power structure and polity, is the institutional monarchy and the royal family. Although some point to the struggle of the royal family to build solidarity in foreign policy, it is varied in different terms and it is contingent upon the power of kings and their intellectual galaxy (Nonneman, 2005: 355-356). Hence, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy decisions in each term, the condition and royal considerations will place in priority. Meanwhile, in some conditions, the king may consider solidarity in the Saudi family and even in the experts and in the institutions concerned with foreign policy, but some kings tend to autocracy and monopolization in foreign policy decision making (Chuckman, 2017). In such a framework, the changes concerned to the utmost internal stratum of power in the Saudi royal family, since 2015, has led to a tendency toward the traditional conservative in the foreign policy. These changes could have roots in the developments after Malik Abdullah and the rise of Malik Salman and his perfidy in crown princess of his son Muhammad bin Salman. This change in the leadership of the Saudi polity has resulted in widespread alterations in the configuration of political

1. The polity of Saudi Arabia, as classified by Max Weber, is called neopatrimonial which features autocracy, lack of democratic political institutions, inefficient individualist bureaucracy, political monopoly, reliance on the intelligence service and armed forces, instrumental use of religion and tribal relations rather than formal and legal arrangements(refer to Weber, 1996: 394-396). 64 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure elites and different approaches in the foreign policy. While the political elites and decision takers in foreign policy in the realm of Malik Abdullah were mostly of the second generation of Abdulaziz’s offsprings who regarded caution, conservatism and forbearance in the foreign policy, the emerging third generation particularly Muhammad bin Salman believes in the risky and aggressive policies. Admittedly, the emerging Saudi elites hold that the former approaches are implausible to meet the interests and security of Al-e-Saud in the existing conditions and the country wields no way except to pursue the aggressive approaches contingent upon the employment of all power elements in the region (Assadi, 2016: 11). Accordingly, the shaping of aggressive approach in Saudi foreign policy is embedded in Salman’s doctrine. The bedrock of this doctrine is to hinder the increase of Iran’s regional power. In effect, the Salman’s Doctrine deems Iran the main cause of many politico-security problems in the West Asia. The principles of this doctrine (in accordance with the theory of structure-agent) is the outcome of Saudi’s strategic need in conjunction with the emerging regional and international situations. The goals of this doctrine also include the omission of Bashar Assad from Syria, Iran’s nuclear issue resolution, Iran’s growing regional power preclusion, the Shiite militia weakness in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and introducing them as terrorist groups, constituting the independent Palestinian country and finally seeking to invigorate the US-Riyadh relations (Nooralivand, 2017: 25). Salman’s Doctrine, in effect, adopts an aggressive security approach towards the regional conflicts and it pursues an active intrusive function in this field; the Saudi’s enterance to the war in Yemen is the primary executive instance of the doctrine, and the conflict with Qatar and continuation of proxy war with Iran’s allies is included in this doctrine as well. The goals and intentions of Salman’s doctrine are frequently seen in Muhammad bin Salman and other Saudi officials’ interviews. In an interview with the Atlantic journal in the early Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 65 2018, the Saudi crown prince called the IRI a part of “evil triangle1” in the region which pursues rule over the whole region. In another interview with the Saudi MBC network in the mid 2017, bin Salman claimed, “The main purpose of Iran is to reach the Qibla of Muslims. We do not wait for Saudi’s enter into the war, and we seek to draw the war into Iran.” He also claimed, “Iran’s extremism hinders talk to Tehran and therefore, we lack any commonalty to negotiate with Iran” (Haaretz, 2017). Adel al Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister as an agent in Saudi foreign policy, accuses Iran of disturbing the regional stability and claims, “Iran-Saudi relations are strained and this is nothing but the outcome of the hostile aggressive policies of Iran. We could not allow ourselves to be sentenced to death and then be expected to overlook” (Middleeast eye, 2018). By the same token, it is observed that features, thoughts and the discourse current in the agent system of Saudi Arabia and in the related officials, besides macro structural variables (regional-international) which were noted earlier, finally led to Saudi’s aggressive foreign policy against the IRI. This kind of foreign policy features signals and indices in structure and agency, out of which the most substantial ones are dealt with in the rest.

III. Case of Iran The most substantial measures and procedures adopted by Saudi Arabia against the IRI at the regional-international level are: 1. Forging Security-Military Coalitions: This policy in the Saudi foreign policy has been countinous since the very early days of the Islamic Revolution and as one of the major reasons behind the foundation of the GCC, to confrontn the IRI. Nevertheless, the Saudi coalition-building policy was invigorated in recent years after the Arab uprisings of 2011. Saudi Arabia, during the summit of Arab leaders in Sharm El Sheikh in March 2015, put forward the establishment of the “United Arab Army” or “Arab NATO”.

1. Along with Qatar and Turkey 66 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure This country tried to operate the Arab NATO with arranging Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia and inviting the leaders of 17 Arab countries to travel to Riyadh and visit the US president. The US president, in the Riyadh summit 2017, fomented this idea of Saudi Arabia with Iran-phobia speeches. In the summit, held on 21 and 22 January 2017, Trump said: “Iran is responsible for the regional instability. Iran trains terrorists and it has fomented sectarian war for decades. Iran calls for destruction of Israel. We witness Iran’s adventures in Syria. We all should endeavor to isolate Iran in the region. We aim to forge a coalition to counter Iran and extremism in the region” (Whitehouse.gov 2017). Besides, the “military Islamic coalition to counter terrorism” with 34 Arab Islamic countries and the support of 10 foreign countries of the coalition in December 2015, is another Saudi’s foreign policy indices. The center of this coalition which is separate from that of “Arab Coalition”, active in Yemen, is located in Riyadh. Although Saudi Arabia has announced the purpose of this coalition as struggle with terrorism, many experts deem the main purpose of this endeavor to play role and to have more tangible presence in Syria, Libya and Iraq and more importantly, the foundation of Sunni coalition in the face of the Shiite one led by Iran (Salavatian & other, 2015: 146). 2. Institutional Pressures Against Iran: the other aggressive measure of Saudi Arabia against Iran at macro structural level is institutional pressure on Iran using the capacity of the international organizations and institutions. Saudi Arabia as a member of the regional and international institutions like the GCC, Arab Union, OIC, UNSC, seeks to exploit the institutional capacity of these bodies and the existing structural power of international system in the recent years, particularly in the realm of Malik Salman, to ramp up pressures against Iran. In the same vein, after execution of Sheikh Nimr and strike on Riyadh Consulate in Mashhad and its Embassy in Tehran in 2015, Saudi Arabia encouraged some Arab, Islamic and non-Arab governments, including African countries to sever or cut down Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 67 their relations with Iran; this issue was put on the agenda of Saudi Arabia in the final statement of the Islamic Cooperation Summit in January 2015. But the furthest Saudi’s exploitation of the regional institutions to counter Iran was the GCC. One evidence of this was Malik Salman’s endeavor on the 37th summit of the GCC in December 2016 to forge the “Persian Gulf Confederation/Union” for a more effective serious confrontation with Iran. In this summit, the Saudi king invited Thresa May, the British premier to forge a united strong block out of the regional and ultra-regional countries (Abdul Latif bin Rashid, 2016). Likewise, Saudi Arabia utilized the capacity of international organizations to exert pressure on Iran. The Saudi membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council, which occurred in the 33th meeting in 2016, was one of Riyadh’s means to put pressure on the IRI in the field of human rights. In addition, Saudi Arabia exploits the UNSC to exert pressure on Iran. Instantly, one of the most recent measures taken by Saudi Arabia is complaint against Iran in the Security Council for the pretext of transferring ballistic missiles to Yemen and the violation of resolution 2216. The Saudi report on the violation of the UNSC resolution on Sept. 14, 2016 was delivered to the UN by her permanent representative to the UN Yahya Al-Moalem (Arab News, 2017). These are just a part of Saudi endeavors at macro structural level to exploit the capacity of the regional-international organizations against the IR of Iran. 3. Closeness and Restoration of Ties with Israel: Of the Saudi’s aggressive measures and procedures against Iran at macro structural level is to have close ties and restore relations with the main enemy of Iran, Israel. The developments occur while the Riyadh government was on the forefront of struggle against Tel Aviv in pre-Islamic revolution, and the main reason behind the formation of the Islamic Conference organization by Riyadh was the Israelite acts in blazing Masjid aL-Aqsa. But in the recent years, in order to play an influential role in the region, Saudi Arabia is establishing close relations and interrelations with 68 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure Israel1. “At the present, Saudi Arabia, due to multiple commonalties, looks to Tel Aviv as an ally not an enemy”, Says Netanyahu. In the following, he adds, “In Arabs’ policies particularly in that adopted by Saudi Arabia towards the issue of Palestine, a dramatic change is happening”. Fareed Zakaria, in this field and on the sidelines of Davus Economic Forum, says, “Rather than an enemy, Saudi Arabia deems Israel an ally because they both face two significant threats: Iran and ISIS” (Press TV, 2016). For instance, Iran-Hezbollah threat and the necessity to forge Hebrew-Arab coalition were the most substantial issues of the 17th annual summit of Hertzelia in Tel Aviv 2017. One of the most significant issues which was discussed in the meeting was that an isolated Israel without the assistance from the Arab coalition, along with the United States, is unable to confront the threats posed by the axis of resistance. In this line, Yisrael Katz the Zionist transportation minister called Arab countries to take more decisive steps for negotiation with Israel. He also called Salman bin Abdolaziz the Saudi king to lead the littoral states of Persian Gulf for taking a decisive step to negotiate with Israel. Katz said, “We need to advise security cooperation to Saudi Arabia and to the Persian Gulf littoral states (Dorell, 2017: 2).”

1. On Saudi’s closeness and interaction with Israel, it has to be said, although both actors deem the IR of Iran the main threat for themselves and for the region in a common approach, due to the sensitivity of Wahhabi groups to the Zionist regime in Saudi Arabia and the low legitimacy of this regime in the common thoughts of Middle East, they fail to consider Israel a clear ally for Saudi Arabia (McKernan, 2017). Therefore, these actors mostly take steps in line with the Track-two Diplomacy to approximate their views on Iran. The Track-two Diplomacy is referred to as political dialogues which are held between former officials, academic figures and think-tank experts. However, governments do not tackle with it, the outcome of these visits are mostly used in the formal diplomacy. This kind of diplomacy is established between and among countries which lack formal diplomatic relations. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 69 IV. Agency level The most substantial measures taken by the Saudi against Iran at agent level are the following: 1. Economic pressure through energy: Saudi Arabia wields 1/4 of the world’s oil and it is considered the 1st oil exporter with 10 million barrels a day.Beside politically exploiting the holy shrines, it has turned oil into aother political tool against Iran. Saudi’s exploitation of oil has been running since the outbreak of the imposed war against Iran by Iraq, but in the recent years, it has become the most tangible anti-Iran policy of Al-e-Saud. In Iran’s nuclear issue, while the the Iranian oil export had reached less than one million barrels per day and the international financial limitations had hindered the receipt of the dollars from the oil revenue to international sanctions, Saudi Arabia severely increased oil export and decreased the oil price. These policies have hurt the economy of Saudi Arabia and led to the severe cut of oil price in the recent years. After the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia tried to pursue the increment of oil production and impose abundant limitations on the Persian financial resources. In this field, Muhammad bin Salman the Saudi crown prince, on the eve of OPEC ministerial summit in April 2016, told that his country could drop its oil production at 11.5 million barrels in short term, and in 6 to 9 months to 12.5 barrels; even in case of investment, it could drop the production at 20 million barrels (per day) (Kemp, 2016). Having adopted this approach, Saudi Arabia opposed to oil production decrease in the late 2016 and the oil price faced a drastic decline again to the extent that the then Saudi oil minister stated, even if the oil price hits less than 20 dollars, they will not reduce their production (Ellyatt, 2016). The Saudi officials, in the current conditions in which the American government has exited the JCPOA and tries to return the oil sanctions against Iran, seek to fill the gap of Iran’s oil share in the global markets with oil production increase. Hence, exploitation of oil as a means, is one of the most substantial counteractive procedures at the level of agency against Iran and it is mostly conducted in line with the 70 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure goals of major actors in the international system, particularly those of US. 2. Supporting Iran’s Domestic Unrests :One of the Arabia’s aggressive measures against Iran at the agency level, is attempting to foment domestic unrests in Iran. The Saudi Government, particularly after the rise of Malik Salman in 2015, has taken serious measures to disturb Irna’s security. In this field, Muhammad bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and minister of defense, in an interview, clearly declared that he will draw the war into Iran (Al-Alam network). As a result, Iran deems ISIS attacks on the parliament and the holy shrine of Imam Khumeini (ra.) as acts commited by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, while maintaining silence on the unrests in January 2017, Iran the most stirring hashtags and invitations to unrests in Iran in its affiliated the social media. The Saudi officials have expressed many supports for the groups opposite to Iran’s government in the recent years (Arab news, 2017). In this field, Turki Faisal, as the head of the Saudi intelligence services for years, participated in the annual summit of Mujahedin (MEK) in Paris in 2017-2018. His presence and direct speech against Iran are interpreted as the blatant evidence for disturbing Iran’s security. The Saudi papers and news gencies like Asharq Al-Awsat, Arab News, Al-Arabiah and Saudi Gazette simultaneously and widely covered the summit in Paris and delivered analysis on the gathering. These media acted in such a harmony that they seemed to publish similar content. For instance, all the media selected this headline, “100 thousand people call for regime change in Iran in the greatest forum of the IRI’s opposites”. Saudi Gazette: Turki Faisal was one of the lecturers whose comments were fused with emotions and slogans. He stated, “People are the first and foremost victims of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Islamic Revolution. They want to provide for the advent of the 12th Imam with export of revolution.” Like Israelite officials, he continued, “Arabs accord a special respect to Persians” (Saudi Gazette, 2016). Some days, after Turki Faisal’s participation in MEK summit and chanting the Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 71

in unison with them, the ,النظعط اسعاط یریع الشعب ,Arabic slogan Saudi Gazette, in more meddling comments, reiterated the very statements of Saddam on the eve of the imposed war. The headline of this Saudi paper, having pointed to the Iranian interests and reserves in Khuzestan province and applying the fake name of Arabia for this region, called for specifying a seat to the settlers in the Arab Union (Saudi Gazette, 2016). 3. Propaganda and Media War: As Saudi Arabia wields a pre- modern polity, its security and stability in the age of media is severely challenged. Consequenlty, the Saudi government has done abundant investments on this sphere. After the rise of bin Salman in 2015, Saudi Arabia tried to divert the focus from her domestic legitimacy issues to Iran and introduce it a threat. In the past years, the Saudis have established the Al-Arabiah Network, the main orientation of which is to introduce Iran a regional threat (Arab news 2017). Arab-language papers like Asharq Al-Awsat and Arab News, during the recent three years, have constructed a narrative of Iran as the regional “other” through publishing the articles written by anti-Iran and opposition writers. Revealed to be the accomplice of Israel, Al-Arabiah was substituted by Al- Mayadeen. Saudi Arabia, with a wide financial support and having made a division of media figures, invites them to varied networks and since 2015-2018, it has exacerbated its propaganda war against Iran (Alkhalij online). In addition to directing the public thoughts in the region, Saudi Arabia, having established a Farsi-language network and embedding the Farsi version of Saudi’s formal news agency, VAS, seeks to induce the directed information and affect the behavior, culture, and performance of the Iranian people and officials in order to hamper the current or routine affairs (Pourhassan, 2017: 42).

Conclusion The current study, attempted to explore that the structure development at the regional-international level along with domestic or agent ones in Saudi Arabia, which have led to Saudi’s 72 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure aggressive foreign policy against the IR of Iran in 2011-2018. In this period, substantial developments occurred at both structure- agent levels, each one of which in the dialectical relation to the other, has played a key part in shaping Arabia’s aggressive behavior against Iran. At the structural level and in the international system, besides fostering instability and dominance of anarchy in the international security relations, we witness change in the US strategic approach towards the Middle East which on the one hand emphasizes the reduction of US engagement in the region and on the other hand, it deals with assigning an autonomous part to the regional allies of Washington, particularly Saudi Arabia. Such an approach has led to the further engagement of Saudi Arabia as a traditional US ally in securing the costs of regional security, creating power vacuum and most substantially, the expansion of Saudi rivalry against the main anti-hegemony actor in the region (from the view of the West and Saudi Arabia), i.e. the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, at the structural level, major security developments have occurred in the region in post-Arab revolutions in 2011 which have created instability and unrest for many traditional allies of Saudi Arabia including Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Tunisia. These security developments in the structure of regional environment have also been drawn into the domstic spheres of Saudi Arabia and have disturbed its security. Saudi Arabia deems the root of all these movements in the regional influence of Iran and hence, she tries to hinder it through an active aggressive approach. Beside structural elements effective in shaping the Saudi aggressive behavior against Iran, in the frame of Structure- Agent Theory, the role of the emerging Saudi agents should not be taken for granted. The emerging agents of Saudi Arabia particularly Muhammad bin Salman sustains that a way for their country to get out of security pressures in the region specially in their influence sphere, which are exerted from Iran, is to abandon the former conservative approach and adopt an active, intrusive Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 73 and aggressive approach against the anti-hegemony actor in the region. By the same token, a set of factors and developments at the macro structural level (regional-international) and at the agent level in Saudi Arabia, in an interconnected dialectical relation caused the Saudi aggressive behavior against the IR of Iran. The proofs of this behavior against Iran in reliance with structure- agent theory include the building of military-security coalitions, establishment of close relations with Israel, exertion of institutional pressures and intensifying economic war, media- propaganda war and endeavor to foment Iran's home unrests. The last point is that in regard with the impact of the two sets of structure-agent elements and factors on shaping the Saudi aggressive foreign policy against Iran, any kind of measure and endeavor must be put on the agenda to lessen the animosity between the two countries at the two structure-agent levels. At the level of structure and in the regional environment, Iran and Saudi Arabia, while accepting some disagreements and rivalries in the region, should seek to formulate rivalries and recognize their sphere of influence. Doing so, both countries, through priority of their sphere of influence, should recognize the interests and concerns of each other and seek to end the security destabilization in their own surrounding environment. For instance, Iran could take measure in line with lessening the security concerns of Saudi Arabia in Yemen; mutually, Saudi Arabia could act to lessen Iran’s concerns in Syria (in regard with the significance of these countries for both). Both countries could, in their sphere of influence, establish a division of work based on their security and interests. This issue could also lessen the role of superpowers as a cause of conflict in the region. Likewise, at the agent level, the Saudi and Iranian officials could, through pursuing bilateral economic, political and cultural relations, reinforce ties and improve mindsets. Conversation in Hajj rituals, the religious approximation and the concerned international forums may be of significant solutions to improve the ties between Iran and Arabia. In particular, encouraging conversation 74 / Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure and politico-cultural discussions in informal meetings between the two countries (non-government academic figures and thinkers), which is infused with less sensitivity, could highly contribute to mitigation of conflicts between the two.

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Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period Faezeh Janati Moheb Seyed Abbas Araghchi

Abstract Considering the developments of the international community and the emergence of a relative turn from materialism and central security to culture-based discourse, "culture" and "cultural relations" have become an important element in the foreign policy of countries. Accordingly, "cultural diplomacy" is considered as a major priorities of foreign policy. The adoption of cultural diplomacy by the two states of Iran and Japan and the pursuit of cultural activities to maintain and develop mutual relations between the two countries under the conditions of Iran's nuclear sanctions indicate the importance of cultural relations at a time when political and economic relations undergo some inadequacies. Two countries of Iran and Japan, through various cultural exchanges under the tough conditions arising from sanctions, have attempted to mitigate the already generated negative space and keep communication channels open so that political and economic ties can be quickly restored to the normal state when the required conditions are met. Keywords: cultural diplomacy, political and economic relations, Iran, Japan, sanction period

 Phd student of international relations [email protected]  Associate professor of International Relations, [email protected] Received: 24/9/2019 Accepted: 30/11/2019 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer- Fall 2017, pp. 79-109

Introduction The developments of the international community over the past centuries and the relative turn from materialism and central security to culture-based discourse in the international system have highlighted the role of culture in various dimensions of human life and in the establishment of relations among countries. Accordingly, considering the existential nature of culture and its ability to bring about a convergence among nations and states, the role of culture has assumed great importance in country’s foreign policy. Boosing cultural diplomacy has a key role in establishing good relations and providing the grounds for greater mobility in political, economic, and social relations between countries. Today, experts in cultural diplomacy and foreign policy acknowledge that success in achieving national interests is largely contingent upon the employment of culture and cultural diplomacy in order to persuade public opinion. To this end, governments have regarded cultural diplomacy as an effective and important approach to maintain and develop mutual relationships; in this way, they provide the necessary grounds to develop relationships with one another. Iran and Japan are two important and decisive countries in global relations on both ends of the West and East Asia and are not an exception in this case. Indeed, they have always sought to opt for cultural policy making and embarked on maintaining and enhancing bilateral relationships, especially after the introduction of Iran's nuclear case and the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Iran. Japan is today regarded as the third largest economic power in the world and is striving to play a major role Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 81 in maintaining international peace and security. This country was already considered a military and colonial power in the early twentieth century; however, it has attempted to shift its strength from the military arena to the economic and cultural spheres and to help in the realization of international understanding and peace by developing cultural diplomacy after failure in the World War II and undergoing abundant restrictions on part of the conquerors of the war. As a country with cultural and civilizational richness, Iran has always sought to have friendly and peaceful relations with other countries (in various scopes, i.e. politics, economics, etc.) through its Iranian-Islamic culture and civilization in order to both help develop its own rich culture and benefit from it to expand its relations with other countries. This important issue has been at play throughout Iranian history and has undergone innumerable ups and downs depending on the circumstances. The realization of the Islamic Revolution, the outbreak of the imposed war, the introduction of Iran's nuclear case, the imposition of comprehensive sanctions, and, ultimately, the introduction of Iran as a so-called country that violates international peace and threatens security have all made the statesmen pursue cultural diplomacy as a top priority and use the cultural and civilization approach to confront Iranophobia and Islamophobia. In this way, Iran has tried to maintain and expand its relations with other countries, including Japan. The main question of this paper is concerned with the ways in which cultural diplomacy can affect the maintenance and development of political and economic relations between Iran and Japan following the incidence of Iran's nuclear program and the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Iran. The main hypothesis held by the current authors is that Iran and Japan have attempted to mitigate the negative atmosphere and keep the communication channels open in order to maintain and expand bilateral political and economic relation by adopting cultural diplomacy during the sanction period.

82 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period І. Conceptual Framework Cultural Turn: Many Western scholars and thinkers believe that a cultural shift has come into play in advanced industrialized countries in the late twentieth century that has affected various aspects of human life in such a way that many arenas, including social, leisure, political, and even economic scopes have found strong cultural aspects (Panahi, 2014: 3). This turn has contained a shift towards cultural discourse and a departure from Marxism- influenced materialism and political economy that flourished heavily in the 1980s and early 1990s (Larry Ray & Andrew Sayer, 1999: 1). Disseminating into in all spheres, including political, economic, social domains, and so forth, cultural turn has affected inter-state relations and plays a significant role in international relations by turning culture into an important element in inter-state relations. In Culturalism, Globalization and Human Rights, the authors state that, unlike classical theorists of international relations who believe that inter-state relations are founded upon two elements of politics and economics, J. M. Michael, Keneth Thompson, and Sovdjet Moko emphasize the important role of culture and regard it as an indispensable element in international relations under the inspiration of cultural turn theory and by considering the extension of the role of culture to other domains. J. M. Michael has considered culture as the third dimension of international relations and believes that some affairs beyond formal relations between states are at play in human life. These affairs, like cultural issues, have a profound effect on international relations and are considered as the third dimension of inter-state relations after politics and trade, which are the first two dimensions of international relations. In an other article entitled Cultural Diplomacy, Keneth Thompson and Sovdjet Moko have also presented a functional insight into the role of culture. They believe that cultural relations are a comprehensive arena of international relations that can provide the grounds for a peaceful life and pave the way for global reconstruction. In other words, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 83 From Thompson and Moko's perspective, the broad domain of culture is in fact an inclusive dimension of international human life that can ultimately facilitate political and economic relations and provide the grounds for bringing changes into the global structure (Salimi, 2006: 67-76). There are two types of cultural turns at play in the study of cultural turn: 1. Cultural turn I: Culture as a tool. 2. Cultural Turn II: Culture as an object (AOKI-OKABE, KAWAMURA & MAKITA, 2006: 6). In cultural turn I, culture is viewed a tool that is used to achieve other goals. In this kind of cultural turn, culture in itself is not important and is merely a tool for the achievement of other interests, both political and economic ones. In contrast, in cultural turn II, culture is of great importance and is considered as the main object of study unlike cultural turn I. In this kind of cultural turn, culture is a goal and other tools, such as political and economic ones are used to achieve this goal. Based on the theory of cultural rotation and its match with the current discussion, we arrive at the theoretical approach that Japan acts in accordance with cultural turn I while the Islamic Republic of Iran acts according to a combination of cultural turns I and II. From the post-World War II era to date, Japan has attempted to theorize and conceptualize its relations with its surrounding environment on the basis of international cultural relations. This means that culture is used as a tool by Japanese foreign policy practitioners and, thereby, cultural diplomacy is regarded as an important element in the foreign policy of this country with the aim of serving the development, producing wealth, and enhancing interactions in various subject areas, including economics, politics, and even security. As a country with a rich discourse, ideology, and cultural history, Iran both makes use of culture as a tool to foster international relations and finds it important and valuable and, thereby, seeks to view the transmission of its national and Islamic culture in the international arena as a mission. 84 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period The study of the cultural turn theory indicates that all countries, as constituent units of the international system, seek to adopt soft policies based on cultural issues in order to acquire reputation and credibility in the international community. In this way, countries take advantage of cultural tools to transmit the richness of their civilization and culture to other nations, influence the public opinion, and, thereby, regulate their relations with other nations. Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural diplomacy refers to the promotion of foreign relations through cultural exchanges; in other words, countries adopt cultural diplomacy and, thereby, embark on disseminating and exposing patterns of their national culture abroad in order to present a positive and justified image of themselves in the international environment. Joseph Nye believes that cultural diplomacy is the best example of soft power that seeks to establish relations through culture, values, and ideas (Ryniejska: 12). To put it better, cultural diplomacy is fulfilled through flexible tools, such as culture, art, knowledge, and so on to promote mutual understanding among nations and states. In fact, countries use cultural diplomacy to gain international reputation, consolidate their status in the system, influence the behavior of other international units, and, ultimately, achieve political and economic goals as well as other goals. Accordingly, it can be argued that culture, as one of the manifestations of soft power, is a tool at the mercy of the foreign policy of countries and and security, and وhas a great role in producing wealth, authority also plays an undeniable role in shaping political, economic, and social relations of countries. The basics of cultural diplomacy are as follows: 1. Cultural policies of the source country, 2. Cultural policies of the target country, 3. Recognition of culture as a soft power, 5. Attention to modern diplomacy (non-governmental and intergovernmental actors and the importance of communications technology) (Sadegh Salimi Bani, & Mohammad Mojaver-Sheikhan, 2014: 177) Governments pursue three major goals through cultural Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 85 diplomacy: 1. Acquisition of an international reputation among ethnics and nations and its effectiveness in their behavior. 2. Establishment of new scientific and cultural institutions to bring about more lasting relations and closer intimacy: Cultural diplomacy can lead to the establishment of cultural institutions or centers in other countries. These institutions themselves pave the way for the stability of relations in the uncertain environment of international politics. 3. Precise understanding of the existing principles of the culture of other nations and exploration in the cultural and social roots of other societies with the aim of promoting mutual understanding among nations (Dehshiri, 2014: 30). Taking these goals into account makes it essential to mention that countries pursue their political and economic interests by adopting cultural diplomacy and, consequently, expand political and economic relations. Cultural tools and methods of cultural diplomacy: 1. Highlighting the role and influence of past and contemporary scholars and thinkers of the respective country in advancing science and literature throughout the world and benefiting from their reputation, popularity, and credit for meeting the strategic goals of cultural diplomacy; 2. Using the latent capacities of the country's language and literature, promoting cultural diplomacy through the establishment of language and literature courses of the respective country at major universities around the world, and granting regular and ongoing scholarships at postgraduate and doctoral levels; 3. Attending international forums and conferences alongside participating in international art and sport festivals (international film festivals, stories, theaters, and the Olympic Games) as well as holding regular exhibitions, gatherings, workshops, and cultural seminars in the target country; 4. Placing special emphasis on the provision of specific cultural training for diplomats and bringing up cultured diplomats who are familiar with the cultural strengths and weaknesses of 86 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period both the origin and target countries; 5. Helping with the establishment of ethnological centers (Iranology, Japanology, etc.), establishing this course at prestigious universities around the world, and providing short- term sabbatical leaves for academic experts and those interested in the country's culture and literature with the aim of attracting elites and intellectuals from target countries (Khani, 2007: 229-230).

Ⅱ. Japan's Cultural Diplomacy In general, diplomacy is a means of achieving the political goals based on the national interests of countries. Since economic interests after the World War II are of great importance to Japan and have become a focal point of diplomacy for this country, culture is used as a tool for achieving economic benefits. In addition, cultural collaborations, which are rooted in relations among cultures or humans with different backgrounds, play an important role in advancing friendly relations between countries. Accordingly, the Japanese government uses cultural diplomacy to establish relations with other countries and to achieve economic benefits. From the viewpoint of Kazuo Ogura (和夫小倉)- president of the Japan Foundation (国際交流基金)- cultural diplomacy refers to the use of cultural tools through which one country exerts political influence on other nations. Cultural diplomacy is considered as a part of a country's foreign policy and has a political influence. The main purpose of cultural diplomacy is to improve one state's image and credibility through cultural aspects, such as performing arts, language teaching, and intellectual traditions. Japan's cultural diplomacy has always sought to eradicate any negative image about Japan and/or to differentiate it and correct foreign misperceptions. According to Ogoura, Japan today must go beyond the traditional patterns of cultural diplomacy and take steps to rely on and share its own proud cultural traditions with people from other countries. This is not to improving the foreign image of country, but to cooperate on the Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 87 achievement of human society, the survival of global peace, and cultural diversity (Ogoura, 2008: 44-53). On this basis, it can be argued that culture, in the same line with politics and economics, is considered a very effective element in the diplomacy of this country, which has witnessed a growing trend in recent years. Japan has introduced its cultural diplomacy as "cultural exchanges" and has divided it into three categories as follows: 1. Intellectual exchanges 2. Lifestyle exchanges 3. Exchanges of science, technology, and, art (文化交流と文化外交, 2016: 9- 10) To gain a better understanding of Japan's cultural diplomacy, it is required to know the most important cultural character of Japan, which is also important in relation to the international environment. It is noteworthy that one of the most significant cultural features of Japan is the integration of tradition and modernity while preserving Japanese tradition and culture in all aspects of society. Accordingly, in an article entitled The Impact of Globalization on Culture: Case Study of Japan, Tenko has been introduced as Japan's main cultural foundation, which is also of great importance in interaction with the international Community. The term Tenko means to change one's beliefs for the sake of gaining higher power. This belief is founded upon three principles: 1. Enthusiastic welcome of some Western thoughts and ideas, 2. In-depth examination of new faiths and beliefs, and 3. Re-belief in or return to old Japanese values (Hossein Salimi and Hafezeh Seifi Atashgah, 189-190: 2008). Based on this belief, it can be calmed that the Japanese culture is a combination of Shintoism, Buddhism, Confucius, and Western thoughts, and this combination is unavoidable for the achievement of benefits. In the words of Mohsen Talayi- the former ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Japan-, if one is aware of the extent to which Confucian thought has influenced Japanese individual and social culture and behavior, it will become clear that one of the main foundations of Japanese cultural diplomacy with the aim of 88 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period culturalization in other countries is defined as follows (based on one of the principles of Confucius), "Sow repetition, and you reap a habit. Sow a habit and you reap culture" (Talayi, 2016). Japan's cultural diplomacy is generally divided into five periods. The first period was shaped in the 1950s and 1960s with the aim of reforming the international image of this country from a military to a peace-loving state. In the second period, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the policy of Japan's cultural diplomacy shifted from a peace-loving country to an economically advanced one. During this period and in 1972, the Japan Foundation1 (the principal custodian of Japanese cultural diplomacy) was established. The third period of Japan's cultural diplomacy became operational in the 1980s with the aim of participating in peacekeeping activities and economic assistance for the development of other countries. In the fourth period, i.e., in the 1980s, Japan showed an interest in active participation in global relations in order to have a serious presence in the international community. Finally, from 2000 to present, the policy of assistance with peace promotion has been pursued through cultural exchanges so that this diplomacy can contribute to international peace and stability (Ogoura, Japan's Postwar Cultural Diplomacy, 2008: 2-5). The present paper assumes a special importance in the fifth period of Japanese cultural diplomacy and the reasons for its adoption. During this period, the incidence of September 11 attacks, the initiation of the Iranian nuclear case, the emergence of

1. The Japan Foundation is the principal custodian of cultural diplomacy, cross- border cultural activities, and, in other words, the cultural arm of Japanese Foreign Ministry. This Foundation was established in October 1972, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this country with the aim of promoting international cultural exchanges throughout the world. The basis of formation of the Japan Foundation is to introduce the culture of this country to other countries and to provide some help with the introduction of the culture of other countries to the Japanese people. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 89 some sort of Islamophobia and Iranophobia, the imposition of comprehensive sanctions on Iran, Japan endeavored to use its cultural tools to play an active role in establishing peace in the region and, ultimately, achieving its own interests. Japan's relations with Iran have been conceptualized and theorized on the basis of this diplomacy from 2000 onward in order to compensate for its weak political and economic ties with Iran through increased cooperation and cultural relations between the two countries. In this regard, Kin-ichi Komano (欽一駒野) -the former Japanese Ambassador to Iran-, has expressed the following with respect to the importance of cultural relations with Iran, “There are commonalities between the Iranian and Japanese people and the Iranian-Japanese cultural relations are not only long-standing, but are also considered as the most important pillar of relations between the two countries. In this way, in the event of problems in establishing economic and political relations between the two countries, such cultural cooperation plays a significant role in resuming the relations and removing the barriers to political and economic relations” (Komano, 17: 2012). Hiroyasu Kobayashi (小林博康), Japan's current ambassador to Iran, also states, “Taking advantage of cultural diplomacy is considered an undeniable element in the establishment and development of relations among countries, and cultural cooperation is of vital importance in relations between Iran and Japan, both of which are rich in culture” (Kobayashi, 2016). According to Kobayashi, unlike political and economic relations that are unstable and can undergo changes in the short run due to their dependence on various factors, cultural cooperation and relations are long-lasting and sustainable and can serve as an independent element in inter-state relations. In this regard, Japan should have a thorough understanding of its own culture and closely examine the cultures of other countries (Kobayashi, 2016). The important point about Japan's cultural diplomacy is that culture in itself is not that much important to Japan; and cultural 90 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period diplomacy is used as a tool to establish relations, especially economic relations with other countries, including Iran and, ultimately, to achieve transcendence and development and serve its national interests. For this reason, Japan, after the World War II, seeks to achieve a high position in the international arena and to secure its national interests through its keen policy planning and investment in cultural diplomacy as an important part of its foreign policy. Considering the variety of contradictory contexts in the present world, one of the main objectives of Japanese diplomacy is to cooperate in conducting research on international understanding and cultural exchanges. According to the Japanese people, knowing other cultures of the world guarantees the higher dynamism of their economy through familiarity with different consumer markets and the psychological and social characteristics of the end users of their goods. Therefore, cultural cooperation with the target countries, including Iran, has led to a greater understanding of Iranian culture, which eventually guarantees the continuation of Iran-Japan cooperation in other sectors, especially in the economic sector.

III. Cultural Diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Iran, as a country benefiting from thousands of years of rich civilization and culture, has sought to define its relations with other countries on the basis of friendship, rapport, and mutual interests during history by means of cultural and civilization tools. In this way, while transferring Iranian civilization and culture to other countries, it can use such cultural tools to develop its political and economic relations with members of the international community. Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the use of cultural tools to develop relations with other countries in the form of cultural diplomacy has come into play, and the adoption of cultural policies has been considered as one of the main foreign policy priorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, what is important in this article is the increasing attention of the Iranian authorities to the importance of cultural diplomacy from 2002 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 91 onward and in the sanction period. Since 2002, the incidence of issues, such as the increasing sensitivity of Western countries to Iran's nuclear program, imposition of comprehensive sanctions, creation of a negative international atmosphere, and, ultimately, and overshadowing Iran's relations with other countries, including Japan, have all prompted officials to mitigate the existing negative atmosphere with the adoption of more cultural policies and to correct the wrongly drawn image of Iran. In this vein, they can maintain and develop their relations with other countries. As it was mentioned earlier, cultural diplomacy aims at introducing the culture of the source country and getting familiar with the culture of the target country, and cultural diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is no exception. Accordingly, it can be argued that Iran has primarily sought to introduce Iranian- Islamic culture to other countries by adopting cultural diplomacy and has secondarily attempted to recognize the culture of other countries in order to establish better relations based on mutual respect and the better fulfillment of national interests. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, describes the importance of cultural diplomacy and the need for serious attention to this issue, remarking that, "the Islamic Republic of Iran's cultural ambassadors are at the forefront of the international cultural front. Providing a true and fair image of the Islamic Republic's system and realities and today's developments in Iran, along with the promotion of the Persian language and literature, are among the heavy tasks of the cultural ambassadors of the Islamic government". (Meeting of the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Iranian officials, and cultural representatives abroad with the Supreme Leader, 2009). Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution to present, nearly 30 public and non-governmental institutions have been responsible for cultural activities abroad, out of which only nine have statutes approved by the leadership (Kalhor & Sadeghi, 19: 2010). From among these nine institutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Organization for Islamic Culture and 92 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period Communications are the two main active institutions in the field of cultural diplomacy. The Cultural Policy Document of the Islamic Republic of Iran, approved by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, is considered as a foundation for cultural diplomacy. In connection with cultural cooperation and exchanges with Japan, the majority of the principles of this document have been regarded as the basis. These principles are as follows:

 Part "C" - Principle 2: A comprehensive understanding of the culture and civilization of Islam and Iran, promotion of Islamic ethics and knowledge, and introduction of prominent figures of Islamic and Iranian history- Principle 4: Understanding human culture and experiences and use of global scientific and cultural achievements through appropriate methods and tools-Principle 7: Attempt to promote and develop Persian language and literature

 Part "E" - Principle 25: Assisting in development of constructive relations between domestic and foreign artists, writers, and researchers- Principle 26: Establishing, strengthening, and providing equipment of cultural-artistic information centers and centers for the preservation and regulation of cultural and artistic documents and certificates-Principle 27: Establishing and strengthening of research complexes and applied research in various cultural fields and sectors-Principle 29: Development and strengthening of the Persian language and literature courses in academic centers and colleges inside and outside the country, as well as the reinforcement of the Academy of the Persian Language and Literature -Principle 45: Development of domestic and foreign tourism and production of cultural and artistic materials required for introducing pilgrimage and touristic areas of Iran and planning to attract foreign and domestic travelers with increased productivity of visiting, tourism, and recreational facilities in Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 93 compliance with the laws and values of the Revolution in order to identify the culture and civilization of Islam and Iran The Foreign Relations section of the document reads as follows: - Principle 46: Establishment and consolidation of relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran's academies with other academies, the expansion of cultural associations with other countries, and the establishment and strengthening of centers, such as cultural counseling, Islamic International University, and International Cultural Research Center- Principle 48: Dispatch of cultural and artistic groups and facilities to different parts of the world and equipment of Iranian cultural agencies to expand and increase the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran's cultural, artistic, media, news, and press in the international arena (Approvals Adopted by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, Politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1992) The Cultural Section of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Organization for Islamic Culture and Communications, as sponsors of the implementation of the Iranian Cultural Diplomacy, have endeavored to operationalize the above- mentioned principles in Japan in order to take a positive step towards benefiting from Japan's scientific and cultural achievements, transferring Iran's culture and civilization to Japan, and, ultimately, maintaining and developing political and economic relations between the two countries. Given the cultural policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it can be maintained that Iran has been seeking to achieve the following two goals by adopting cultural diplomacy in its relations with Japan: 1. Introducing the ture Iranian-Islamic culture and values to the Japanese people in order to counter Iranophobia and Islamophobia 2. Using cultural cooperation to maintain and expand relations with Japan: Iran, as a powerful and prominent Asian actor and the owner of one of the world's oldest civilizations, has always looked 94 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period at Japan with confidence and has long believed in the goodwill of that country through its cultural ties with East Asian countries, including Japan, during the years of sanctions. As a result, it has sought to take steps to maintain and develop relations with Japan and, ultimately, to achieve national goals and interests by means of cultural ties, establishment of common ground for cooperation, and adoption of appropriate policies. Finally, it should be stated that Iran has used culture both as a tool to provide the necessary conditions for the development and expansion of relations with Japan and has considered it important in itself and regards exchanging Iranian-Islamic culture as a mission.

IV. Iran and Japan Relation in during Sanctions Western sanctions against Iran began after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and have continued in various forms over the past 38 years. However, with the increased sensitivity of Western countries to Iran's nuclear activities and the introduction of Iran's nuclear case to the IAEA in 2002-2003, the Iranian nuclear issue gained international momentum and more severe sanctions were imposed against the country. As a result of the increasing international sensitivity to the Iranian nuclear issue, different countries’ relation with has been significantly affected by US policies, and Japan is not an exception. Accordingly, the atmosphere of the international community was shaped by the issuance of Security Council resolutions, comprehensive sanctions, and negative media propaganda against Iran and; thereby, Iran's relations with other countries, including Japan were severely affected. This led Japan to take an opposing stand against the Islamic Republic of Iran despite friendly relations at two meetings of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in September and September 2003. Japan embarked on the imposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran with the intensification of the Iranian nuclear issue and the significant increase of United States pressure on its allies. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 95 Japan's ambassador to Iran, Hiroyasu Kobayashi, explains the sanctions imposed by Japan stating that, "Due to the origin of the issuance of these resolutions, namely the United Nations and Japan as a member, the country had to abide the sanctions and, thereby, it has imposed economic sanctions on Iran according to the resolutions issued by the Security Council. As a result, the amount of trade between the two countries and Iran's oil exports to Japan during this period significantly reduced (Kobayashi, 2017). After the imposition of the Security Council sanctions, Japan imposed its unilateral sanctions against Iran in 2010 due to US pressure and named it "complementary measures". In other words, Japan refused to use the title "unilateral sanctions against Iran" and introduced its sanctions as measures to complement the Security Council sanctions. Japan's decision regarding unilateral sanctions against Iran had a negative impact on Iran's attitude to Japan at that time and severely undermined relations between the two countries. In a Japanese article, entitled The Difficult Future of Exporting to Iran amid Intensified Competitions, the author states that Japan seized Iran's assets following the resolution pertaining to UN Security Council's economic sanctions on Iran's nuclear issue and the relations between the two countries reached their lowest level in the previous two years by cutting off banking relations with Iran in 2010 (秋山文子, 2016). Export to Iran (unit of 1 billion yens)

Source: Ministry of Finance of Japan 96 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period During the sanctions era, Iran's oil sales to Japan and Japanese exports to Iran declined; Japanese offices in Iran closed one after the other; Japanese companies withdrew from joint ventures with Iran, and Iran-Japan relations were at risk of getting into a coma. During this period, the two countries realized the role and importance of cultural activities and cooperation, and tried to keep the communication channels between the two countries open as much as possible by means of cultural diplomacy so that they can use these channels to bring the relationship back to the normal state when the conditions for the re-establishment of relations are met. In other words, political channels were almost closed and relations in the economic sphere underwent a declining trend in the Iran-Japan relationship during the sanction period, while cultural domain was the only area wherein relations could be maintained and expanded. During this period, efforts were made to develop cooperation and cultural relations between the two countries in order to enable negotiation on political and economic issues between the two countries through this alternative. For example, during the sanction period, many discussions were hold on human rights, the environment, disarmament, developments in West Asia (Middle East), and so on between the two countries due to the increasing attention to the adoption of cultural diplomacy by Iran and Japan and the creation of appropriate space to provide the necessary background for political and economic relations. Moreover, hundreds of meetings were held between Iranian and Japanese officials, the most important of which was the annual meeting of the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of Iran on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly summit in New York in the years of sanctions. The result of all these efforts was the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to Iran on May 2009 and the visit of the Speaker of the Parliament of Iran to Japan in February 2010, which was contrary to the prevailing situations in the years of sanctions. In this regard, with reference to the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives, it was the first time that, after Japanese Foreign Minister Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 97 -Yoriko Kawaguchi's (川口 順子) -visit to Iran in January 2004, a high-ranking Japanese official traveled to Iran during the sanctions and post-war period after the passage of five and a half years. However, it is noteworthy that negotiations between the foreign ministers of Iran and Japan have taken place sixteen times since 2006 where there have been five face-to-face meetings and eleven telephone negotiations (Japan-Iran relations, 2009). In all these visits, the Japanese side acknowledged that Iran was an important partner for Japan and, throughout history, excellent relations have prevailed between the two countries and these relations should continue. According to Reza Nazar-Ahari - Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Japan-, Japan dispatched its ambassador, Kinichi Komano, who was a fluent Persian speaker, to Iran during the height of the sanctions to improve relations between the two countries through cultural cooperation. The reason for the election of Komano was the importance of cultural issues in the relation between the two countries and their effectiveness in the political and economic relations between them. This is so while the nature of the two countries' relations had been economic and the axis of relations between Iran and Japan had been consistent with the economy (Nazar-Ahari, 2016). Hiroyasu Kobayashi, the current Japanese ambassador to Iran, also believes that, "The economic ties between the two countries have been significantly diminished during the sanctions and, instead, cultural relations have assumed great importance; therefore, the Japanese Embassy does undertake significant cultural efforts in Iran" (Kobayashi, 2016). Regarding the importance of nuclear negotiations and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Japan, it should be noted that although Japan was not a direct party to the Iran-P5 + 1 nuclear deal, it is considered one of a major and the potentially major beneficiaries of the agreement. Since the beginning of the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5 + 1, and given that Iran's nuclear negotiations have not been merely bilateral between Iran and the P5 + 1 and contained various 98 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period domestic, regional, and international aspects, Japan has been following the talks with special focus from the very early days of the negotiations and sought to play an effective role in helping resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Japan's positive role in this direction was such that it provided necessary cooperation and accelerated the bank openings required for the implementation of the Geneva Agreement before the JCPOA and between the Geneva Agreement (which was a temporary agreement) and JCPOA. As a result, all three major Japanese banks resumed working with Iranian banks immediately after the JCPOA. The Japanese foreign minister was the only foreign minister who traveled to Iran twice from the initiation of the negotiations to the finalization of JCPOA. After the JCPOA between Iran and the P5 + 1 countries came into effect on January 16, 2016, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations announced that they have lifted anti-Iranian sanctions on Iran's nuclear issue. Welcoming Iran's nuclear deal with the P5 + 1, Japanese Foreign Minister -Fumio Kishida, 岸田文夫- called for the enforcement of the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 as soon as possible on January 17, 2016. Accordingly, the Japanese government lifted its unilateral sanctions on Iran on January 22 (増野 伊登, 2016). Following the lifting of sanctions, Iran and Japan signed "Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA)" to support Japanese companies interested in reinvesting in Iran in February 2016. In addition, a Japanese bank (JBIC), backed by the Japanese State, supports international cooperation, Japanese exports, and foreign investment of this country and it provided Iran with a ten-billion-dollar credit line (KYODO, 2016). The signature of FIPPA by Japanese Foreign Minister -Fomio Kishida- and Iranian Minister of Economy and Finance -Ali Tayebinia- on February 5, 2016 operationalized the obligations formed on economic relations between the leaders of the two countries (obtained on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly's annual meeting in October 2015). In this meeting, Hassan Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 99 Rouhani and Shinzō Abe agreed that the two sides would take all necessary measures to provide the grounds for the reinvestment of Japanese companies in Iran. What is of great importance to Japan in this agreement is the issue of investment in Iran's energy sectors and participation in Azadegan oil project. It is noteworthy that China seized many of the investment portions of this project in 2010 and overtook Japan with the withdrawal of Japan from Azadegan project during the sanctions. For this reason, Japan seeks to compensate for this loss in competition with China by signing this agreement (Miller, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued that the maintenance of relations between the two countries over these years by means of culture and cultural cooperation has led Japan to re-establish ties with Iran faster than other countries after the JCPOA. Thus, it lifted its unilateral sanctions against Iran in the early days and encouraged commercial and industrial companies to reinvest in Iran. Hiroyasu Kobayashi, the Japanese ambassador to Iran, has stated that, "After the lifting of sanctions and the enforcement of JCPOA by the parties, economic relations between Iran and Japan will expand and a new level of economic cooperation will be opened between the two countries" (Kobayashi, 2016).

V. Iran and Japan’s Cultural Measures In spite of the long history of cultural relations between the two countries, the major development of cultural relations between Iran and Japan has taken place over the last century, especially after the signing of the cultural agreement on April 16, 1957 and, thereby, the increasing cultural exchanges between the two countries have been at play. In Iran, after the Islamic Revolution, the perspective towards the East and the Eastern nations and the emphasis on dialogue among civilizations and the exchange of cultures have led to the expansion of cultural relations and exchanges between Japan and Iran. However, the role of culture and the adoption of cultural diplomacy by the two countries are of paramount importance in maintaining and expanding bilateral 100 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period political and economic ties during the years of sanctions. As it was mentioned, the increasing sensitivity of Western countries toward the Iranian nuclear issue and the imposition of international sanctions and pressures have pervaded a negative attitude towards Iran in the international environment; therefore, Iran's relations with other countries have been negatively affected and, consequently, its relations with Japan have also been seriously affected. As a result, the authorities in charge of the two countries decided to rescue their political and economic relations from the risk of collapsing by adopting cultural diplomacy and taking some relevant measures. In this regard, the two countries, Iran and Japan, have been seeking to mitigate the existing atmosphere and keep the communication channels open by taking various cultural measures in order to restore the political and economic relations between the two countries. The most important cultural measures taken by the two countries to maintain and develop political and economic relations includes, 1. Efforts made by the two sides for the development of relations and promotion of friendship and understanding through the Japan-Iran Association (in Japan) and the Iran-Japan Friendship Association (in Iran) with the aim of expanding cultural, political, and economic relations (Archives of the Organization for Islamic Culture and Communications, 1998: Document No. 1) 2. Attempt to expand the courses of teaching the Persian language and literature in Japan (Archives of Islamic Culture and Communication Organization, Document No. 1242.1.1, 1998) and the Japanese language in Iran (Department of Japanese Language, Faculty of Foreign Languages, University of Tehran) considering the important role of language in the relations between the two countries and greater mutual understanding 3. Efforts made by the two sides for the development of Iranology in Japan (Archives of Islamic Culture and Communication Organization, Document No. 4269) and Japanese Studies in Iran (academic field of Japanese Studies) with the aim Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 101 of conducting scientific research on the different historical, sociocultural, and political-economic aspects of the two countries; gaining a greater and deeper awareness of each other's society, culture, politics, government, and economy; and, ultimately, taking advantage of these measures to develop cultural, political, and economic relations 4. Holding joint meetings between Office of Political and International Studies pertaining to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan Institute for International Affairs and Sasakawa Peace Foundation in various domains of culture, politics, economics, women, the environment, etc. 5. Establishment of links between Iranian and Japanese universities and efforts to expand academic and scientific connections through various scientific meetings 6. Establishment of the Persian section of Japan's transboundary Radio and Japan's efforts to enhance communications between Japan and Persian-speaking countries, including Iran, through the broadcast of programs with the centrality of Japanese developments, Asian developments, Iran- Japan relations, the global economy, and major global events, as well as multimedia teaching of Japanese to the Persian audience of Radio Japan (Ghorghani, 2016). 7. Establishment of the Japanese section of the Islamic Republic of Iran's transboundary Radio and strive to expand its activities with the aim of introducing the facts of Islam, introducing the cultural and social interactions of the two ancient nations of Iran and Japan, explaining the history of the magnificent Islamic-Iranian civilization, presenting a critique of liberal western democracy, introducing Iran's achievements and success in the scientific, industrial, economic, and social spheres, introducing Iran's natural, historical, and cultural attractions, and explaining the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on global, regional, and Islamic issues to Japanese audience of Radio Iran (Ghorghani, 2016). Cultural Activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Japan: 102 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period Custodians of Iranian cultural policy in Japan, i.e. the Cultural Section of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Representative of the Organization of Islamic Culture and Communications in Japan have taken significant measures to expand cultural cooperation and, ultimately, generalize it to political and economic spheres, especially during the sanctions. Some of the most important cultural measures are as follows: 1. Granting scholarships to Japanese students. 2. Establishment of a representative of Al-Mustafa International University in Japan with the aim of expanding academic exchanges in the field of humanities and Islamic sciences. 3. Translation of Iranian books into Japanese in various fields, especially in the areas of language, Persian literature, and stories of Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults. 4. Promotion of Iranian visual arts, such as calligraphy and gilding as well as holding art exhibitions in Japanese museums. 5. Holding exhibitions on selected works as well as other works loaned from the National Museum of Iran (monuments of ancient Iran and also valuables of the Islamic era) 6. Holding Iranian carpet exhibitions, especially the Iran Silk Carpet Exhibition in Japan wherein twenty pieces of antique and valuable carpet from the Iranian Carpet Museum were exited from the country and exhibited at Yokohama Silk Museum for the first time. 7. Holding joint art exhibitions for Iranian and Japanese artists. 8. Holding Iranian handicraft fairs and helping teach some Iranian crafts to Japanese fans 9. Performance of Persian Traditional Music and organization of poetry night ceremony, reading Hafez, Shahnameh narrative for the Persian Language and Literature fans. 10. Holding research seminars and scientific studies to exchange thoughts and establish more relations among students, researchers, and professors of both countries. 11. Holding religious seminars between religious scholars of the two countries 12. Providing sabbatical leaves and research opportunities for Japanese elites by traveling to Iran and delivering lectures in Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 103 academic communities. 13. Signing of cooperation agreement between Iranian and Japanese Universities. 14. Holding Persian language classes and encouraging those interested in learning this language in order to expand the economic relations between the two countries. 15. Holding theater, participating in Tokyo Film Festival, and screening of Iranian films with Japanese translation 16. Holding the seminar on Iranian cinema history in cultural consultationa. 17. Display of Iranian athletic sports in Japan by the International Federation of Zurkhaneh Sports 18. Participation in Tokyo International Book Fair. 19. Holding various meetings between the members of the Iranian- Japanese Cultural Exchange. 20. Holding the Seminar on Iranian Studies in Japan 21. Holding the Millennium Conference on Avicenna's Canon of Medicine under the title of Traditional Medicine Conference at Tokyo University. 22. Commemoration of Nisshin Maru Ship Event and Purchase of Iranian Oil by Japan during the Prime Ministry of Mohammad Mosaddegh. 23. Introduction of Iranian cultural and tourist attractions to the Japanese people. 24. Collaboration with Japanese television networks to introduce Iran to the Japanese people. 25. Women's issue and cooperation between the Japanese Women's Federation and the Presidential Women's Affairs of Iran towards the establishment of world peace 26. Holding Iran's Cultural Week in Japan (Yousefi, 2016). The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in collaboration with the Japan Foundation, annually organizes the Iranian Cultural Week in Japan on the following three axes:  Introducing the culture, art, and civilization of the Iranian land to the Japanese people  Strengthening bilateral cultural relations and promoting mutual understanding between the people of the two countries  Improving the Image of Iran and Iranian people in public opinion of Japanese society (Islamic Culture and Communications Organization Archives, Document No. 3520, 2013) Cultural activities of Japan in Iran: The Cultural Section of 104 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period the Embassy of Japan in Tehran is responsible for organizing Japanese cultural events in the Islamic Republic of Iran. These cultural programs include: 1. Holding annual competitions on lecture delivery in the Japanese Language. 2. Presentation of Japanese Government Scholarships in Associate's program, Bachelor's program, and Research Scholarship 3. Holding traditional Japanese music concerts. 4. Holding Japanese culture exhibition 5. Holding Japanese painting and calligraphy workshops (Shodō, 書道). 6. Holding exhibition of contemporary Japanese artwork. 7. Holding a Japanese art exhibition of woodcut 8. Presenting cultural programs of the Japan Foundation to be used by Iranian cultural institutions and citizens. 9. Attending Tehran International Book Exhibition 10. Holding speech sessions on economics at the invitation of Japanese economists. 11. Organizing Origami workshops (the art of paper folding, 折り紙). 12. Holding acquaintance meetings with Japan in Iranian schools and cultural institutes 13. Holding the exhibition of Japanese photographers' photos. 14. Display of the Japanese cinema works 15. Display of Japanese animation. 16. Holding Manga tournament (漫画) 17. Introducing Japanese culture in the field of "Animation and Manga" by specialists from the Japan Foundation. 18. Participating in Tehran International Short Film Festival. 19. Holding the exhibition of cherry blossoms and Japanese legend Genji (Genji Monogatari, 源氏物語) 20. Organizing traditional tea ceremony. 21. Holding workshops on "Kabuki Theater" (Kabuki, 歌舞伎) and "New Theater" that are among traditional Japanese theaters. 22. Holding the seminar on restoration of Restoration of Bam Cultural Work using three-dimensional images. 23. Participating in International Conference on the role of cultural heritage in the formation of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 105 national identity in Iran. 24. Holding Japan's Cultural Week in Iran (Cultural Section of the Japanese Embassy in Iran).

Conclusion The examination of the cultural diplomacy of Iran and Japan and the cultural actions taken by the two countries reveals that both Iran and Japan are seeking to maintain and develop relations with each other and are determined to achieve the desired result through cultural cooperation and actions. Despite the political and social developments of the two countries during different periods, the relations between them have always been based on mutual friendship by means of cultural principles. In addition, the preservation and development of cultural, economic, and political relations between Iran (as a country on the edge of West Asia) and Japan (as a country on the edge of East Asia) have been extremely important. The examination of the cultural practices made by the two countries of Iran and Japan leads us to the conclusion that all the mentioned cultural practices and measures are aimed at understanding the two countries as much as possible. Moreover, the durability and consistency of these practices reflect the tendency of Iran and Japan to develop mutual relations with each other. Accordingly, Japan, on the one hand, have taken such steps as the establishment of Japan-Iran Association, promotion of the Persian language and literature teaching, and assignment of attention to Iranian studies and scientific research on various cultural, social, and political-economic aspects of Iran in order to gain more knowledge and a deeper awareness of the society, culture, politics, government, and economy of Iran. On the other hand, Japan seek to introduce their society, culture, economy, and technology to Iranians by pursuing cultural policies, such as broadcast of radio programs in the Persian Language and the conduct of various cultural activities through the embassy. In this way, they intend to maintain friendly and cultural relationships and further their interests through political and economic 106 / Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period cooperation and relations with Iran as the most effective West Asian country. Considering the foundations of cultural diplomacy, Iran is also seeking to introduce its own civilization, culture, society, economy, government, and international politics by broadcasting radio programs in Japanese and conducting various cultural activities through the Cultural Consultation and Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Japan. In addition, with the establishment of the Japanese Studies and Language Department at the University of Tehran, Iran has pursued its East Asian focus on foreign policy with a scientific approach to be able to establish significant cultural, political, and economic ties with Japan as the world's third largest economic power of the world. Finally, it can be concluded that the two countries, i.e. Iran and Japan, place great importance on their bilateral relations and have always, especially during the sanctions, been seeking to provide the grounds for the maintenance and expansion of political and economic ties by cultural tools, while considering economic issues as the center of relations. Iran and Japan have been able to maintain their relations during the sanctions through cultural diplomacy despite all the pressures and disruptions. By means of mutual efforts towards keeping political and economic channels open, they have tried to help with the development of mutual relations with each other during the post-JCPOA period.

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An Iranian Narrative of Tehran- Riyadh Tention Escalation Ali Omidi Zahra Aghmohamadi

Abstract The relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia have always been based on tension, political misunderstandings and on some occasions, a kind of limited détente. Presently (early 2019) most researchers employ the term “cold war” to describe the nature of this relationship. This situation has deteriorated after the Syrian crisis (since 2011), and the reign of King Salman and his son, especially with the arrival of Donald Trump at the White House. By using the neoclassical realism theory, the present paper seeks to explain the question of leading causes of Tehran-Riyadh hostility from an Iranian perspective and prospects that can be drawn for it. The findings suggest that the causes of this hostility can be analyzed at the domestic, regional and transnational levels. As long as Riyadh perceives Iran as a threat to its survival, Trump and Mohammed bin Salman remain in power, Riyadh's internal concerns stay in place, and no strategic shift happens from Saudi side (for example, alliance with Russia), the tension in Tehran-Riyadh relations will continue. The method used by the authors in this research is descriptive-analytic, and it is mostly focused on how Tehran interprets the deep reasons for this hostility. Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Neoclassical Realism, the United States, Cold War, Foreign Policy

 Associate professor of International Relations)[email protected]  PHD Student of International Relations Received: 04/09/2019 Accepted: 30/10/2019 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer- Fall 2017, pp. 111-137

Introduction The Middle East has been moving towards greater instability and insecurity because of the numerous crises, growing tensions, and confrontation among some countries in the region. Political developments along with the strategic rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia have brought about instability in the region. Disagreements between the two countries on many issues such as Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen, Iran nuclear deal, oil, and attitude toward Israel have currently intensified the differences. The overriding concern is that the crisis escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, may ultimately culminate to an armed conflict. In 2018, The Council on Foreign Relations categorized the conflict between Tehran and Riyadh as one of the 8 important world crises and ranked it second after the North Korean dilemma (Brimelow, Dec. 14, 2017). In an article in Foreign Policy, Robert Malley put the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia among the ten international crises in 2019 that may result in war. Of course, Malley ranked it fourth among the international tensions after those in Yemen and Afghanistan and the one between the US and China (Malley, 2018:4). With the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Saudi Arabia considered Iran as an existential threat. Therefore, it stood alongside Saddam during the eight-year war (1980-1988) to reduce threats to to its national security resulting from the Islamic Revolution. However, after the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1988), a partial détente began between the two countries, and the new variables including the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) which turned Baghdad into a joint Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 113 enemy brought them close for a temporary compromise. However, soon tensions cast a shadow over their relations, and the US invasion against Iraq (2003) and Iran’s nuclear issue among the factors became base for strained relations between the two states. These tensions reached to a climax with the occurrence of new developments in the region, known as the Arab Spring, followed by military intervention in Bahrain by Saudi Arabia as well as the suppression of the Shiites in Bahrain, political-military intervention in Yemen and, most importantly, supporting Assad’s opponents in the Syria civil war by Riyadh. The relations between the two countries became so tense that Mohammed bin Salman once stated that it was impossible for Tehran and Riyadh to enter into a dialogue and reach a compromise. He added, "How can we enter into a dialogue with a regime that has an extremist ideology and believes that the Imam of the Time will appear in Iran and will spread Islam throughout the world, even in the United States .The Middle East is now divided into two groups: one the trilateral axis of evil consisting of Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Sunni terrorist groups and the other the moderate countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, etc." (Goldberg, 2018:5). Adel al-Jubeir, the anti-Iranian Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, repeatedly has accused Iran of expansionism, sectarianism, a hegemon-seeker, and a country that does not obey international law as well as continuing to be a revolutionary nation rather a normal nation-state. He believed, “Since 1979 (the victory of the Islamic Revolution), Iran has supported terrorism throughout the world and sheltered terrorists and facilitated their movements. It has also established Hezbollah in Lebanon to use it for money laundering and drug trafficking” (B.B.C., 2018:3). On the other hand, M. J. Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister has accused Saudi Arabia of supporting Takfiri terrorism on numerous occasions. In a note on the New York Times, he called Wahhabism, as the official ideology of Saudi Arabia as well as the intellectual source of Takfiri terrorists. He also opined that Saudi 114 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation

Arabia used enmity with Iran as a tool for promoting its extremist policies: Virtually every terrorist group abusing the name of Islam — from Al Qaeda and its offshoots in Syria to Boko Haram in Nigeria — has been inspired by this death cult (Wahhabism). So far, the Saudis have succeeded in inducing their allies to go along with their folly, whether in Syria or Yemen, by playing the Iran card (Zarif, 2016:5). However, in many occasions, the Iranian side has shown more positive signals in breaking the ice which was replied by negative answer repeatedly by the Saudis. It was Saudi Arabia that siezed diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016, despite the Iranian commitment to pay all damages inflicted to its Embassy in Tehran. During the Munich Security Conference in 2018, Zarif put forward his plan for creating a new “Peace Architecture” based on the 1975 Helsinki Treaty for Iran-Saudi Arabia relations that was not welcomed by Riyadh (Deutsche Welle Farsi, 2018). This Treaty with its ten nonbinding principles for “guiding relations” helped the East- and West-Bloc countries to reduce the tensions resulting from the Cold War. Hasan Rouhani suggested that the Islamic Republic of Iran was ready to defend, “the people of Saudi Arabia against terrorism and superpowers with all its power,” and would not even “insult” Saudi Arabia either, lampooning Trump language towards Saudi Arabia. However, this reconciliation gestures from Rouhani and Zarif did not receive any positive response from Riyadh (BBC Persian, 2018:2). Therefore, this article is concerned with the question of what are the main reasons for the Tehran-Riyadh animosity and what possible future can be envisioned for the relation between the two countries? The basis of the hypothesis at this research is that the Saudis’ concern for their survival and security, the fact that they perceive Iran as the major threat to their survival are the main factors explain their animosity toward Tehran. Moreover, the requirements of the U.S.-Saudi Arabia alliance as well as Washington and Israel’s exploiting of Iranophobia, have Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 115 exacerbated the Iran-Saudi Arabia relations. As long as the two players insist on maintaining their positions, scapegoating Tehran by Trump and Mohammed bin Salman function politically well, and no strategic shifts happen in Saudi Arabia’s positions (for example, shifting towards Russia), tensions will persist in Tehran- Riyadh relations. Findings of this study indicate that the cold war in the relations between Tehran-Riyadh will continue at least until 2020 (when Trump’s first term as president ends).This article presumes Iran is not a major existential threat to Saudi Arabia, but Iran’s ploy functions well in Riyadh politics. In other words, Saudi Arabia’s perception of security concerns from Iranian side is far from reality which has led to the cold war situation between Tehran-Riyadh. The topics discussed in this article are organized as follows: the first part of the paper deals with the theoretical framework, i.e., the neoclassical realism and its pertinence to the subject- matter. Part two addresses the brief history of relations between the two countries. The third part investigates the reasons for hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the domestic, regional, and trans-regional levels. The final part tackles the outlook for these relations by the end of 2020. To answer the research questions, the most relevant theory that considers concerns for survival and security as the main driver of states´ foreign policies is Realism. However, the reading of the realist theory which also believes that states are not like billiard balls to produce similar foreign policies, and elements like the personality of the ruling elites, perception and misperception of threats, implications of an alliance system, and efficiency and legitimacy of a political system also play role in shaping the foreign policy of a country is the neoclassical realist theory. Neoclassical realism is, in fact, a title that Gideon Rose gave to a collection of works on international relations that apply major realist insights in explaining foreign policy and international relations as well (Rose, 1998:146). This theory commingles elements and principles taken from classical realism and 116 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation neorealism, and believes that stances taken by states in the international system can be evaluated through a series of systemic variables like power distribution capabilities, cognitive variables, perception and misperception of other states' intentions and threats, and by internal parameters such as the nature of the political system, governmental institutions, the elites, intra- governmental players, etc. Those numerous factors influence the power and freedom of foreign policy decision makers (Rose, 1998: 144-145). This theory gradually developed in the works of J. W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Randall L Schuler, and others. Its major presumption is that no significant theory can hold true for all times, and no policy can be suitable for all situations in a complex world. The most important task of scholars is to determine which diverse theories under what conditions discover significant causal relationships and can hence provide policy recommendations that will be efficient (Wohlforth, 1996:195). Based on the same belief, neoclassical realism employ variables from other Realist theories in order to explain the events or to reject their importance while still adhering to the realist paradigm. Despite criticisms leveled against the explanatory power of realism, precisely following its incapability to predict the end of the Cold War, neoclassical realism nonetheless considers realism to be solid in explaining international politics (Salimi and Ebrahimi, 2014:38). According to Taliaferro (1994), the hypotheses of neoclassical realism, with some modifications, are more or less similar to those of classical and structural realism. Survival and security remain the main concerns of states. Sometimes, attempts of a state to increase its security decrease the invulnerability of other states. To make certain of their security, states will constantly seek security and will face the security dilemma. Therefore, they may misunderstand each other’s intentions, conflicts can arise between them, or they will likely become enemies toward one another. Scholars like Fareed Zakaria and John Mearsheimer believe that states adopt strategies to expand their power and influence for Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 117 overcoming the problem of lack of security in international arena in order to increase their control on their environment (Tang, 2008:455-458). International actions and reactions are influenced by an intervening variable that is called national leaders' imaginations or perceptions. Leaders usually process received information based on historical analogies and on other perceptual shortcuts to make decisions. Moreover, national political developments strongly affect the foreign policies of states. States independence against the civil societies, the internal vulnerability of regimes, types of internal political coalitions, consensus or division among the elites, bureaucratic politics and relations between the civil and military sectors all can influence the ability of leaders to mobilize resources (Lobell, et. al., 2016:140). Like classical realists, neoclassical realists evaluate the alliance system as a mechanism for power balance and maintenance of security. However, although establishing alliances removes security anxieties of states (and provides weapons for them, if needed), removal of security concerns represents not the only driving force of great powers s in forging alliances. The reason for this is that more powerful states do not necessarily achieve security advantages from this type of relations with less powerful state, but rather obtain other advantages like increased freedom of action and even access to military bases as well as desirable trade relations such as extensive sales of military equipment (Sprecher, 2006:234). Although establishing power and threat balance, provide the main incentive in forging alliances; however, David points out that non-democratic leaders first tend to forge an alliance with a foreign power to repel threats from internal enemies and then employ all their power resources to confront the foreign enemy. Since the primary goal of the leaders of non-democratic states is to remain in power, they fortify themselves at the expense of their national interests. In other words, they sacrifice the national interests of their states for their own personal interests (David, 1991:235-237).

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І. Swing in Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations When Pan-Arabism led by Gamal Abdel Nasser diminished in 1967 and Egypt lost its principal status in the Middle East, the regional roles of Saudi Arabia and Iran strengthened. Regional challenges like the emergence of a revolutionary Iraq, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (that established close ties with the former Soviet Union), and the saber-rattling the Dhofar Liberation Front in Oman, threatened the status quo in the region that encouraged both Iran and Saudi Arabia to collaborate. Nevertheless, even after the emergence of these joint threats, rivalry in the oil market and regional leadership remained as the two key factors which overshadowed the relations between the two states before the 1979 revolution (Devine, 2017:3). The emergence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 ended both regional cooperation between Tehran-Riyadh, and disrupted strategic partnership between Iran and the United States at the same time. At present (Jan. 2019), the relations between Tehran and Riyadh are hostile in multi-faceted ways. After the the 1979 Islamic Revolution followed by the war between Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia and its allies formed the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 as a security-oriented association against revolutionary Iran (Anthony, 2012:78). The tensions in the relations between the two states in the 1980s somewhat subsided with the détente initiatives in the 1990s during administrations of Ali Akabar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his successor as Iranian Presidents (Gasiorowski, 2000:3). Limited cooperation accordingly began in an ambiance of suspicion together with the rivalry. Despite ups and downs in this collaboration, agreements on cooperation in 1998 and on security in 2001 were signed by the two countries (Mojtahedzadeh, 1996: 620). Nevertheless, political, ideological, and identify differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia indicated that these formal diplomatic relations merely hid their deep differences. The September 11 events, halted the process of détente between the two countries, and the US invasion against Iraq in 2003 mark a Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 119 turning point in the relations between Riyadh-Tehran. The democratic political system led by the majority Shiites in Iraq meant the further influence of a friendly neighbor i.e., Iran and, at the same time, improvement of relations between Iran and Iraq has increased Saudi Arabia’s fears of perceived Iranian influence in the region. Therefore, Saudi Arabia refused to accept the new developments and realities in Iraq and did not establish diplomatic relations with Iraq until 2015 (Fathollah-Nejad, 2017: 3). During the presidency of George W Bush, when it seemed that Iran and the United States would most likely engage in a war, especially after two states confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia aligned itself further with the United States to fight Iran’s influence in the region. To the extent that the then Saudi King exhorted the U.S. to “cut off the head of the snake” and proposed an invasion to Iran’s nuclear installations and imposition of more sanctions (Colvin, 2010:3). Afterwards, Saudi Arabia together with its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council have undertaken an aggressive policy against Iran (Dazi-Heni, 2014: 4). The Arab Spring was regarded as shocking and frightening for Saudi Arabia and, and it intensified the enmity between the two countries. As a country with a majority of Shiites, Bahrain was the first scene of the Arab Spring in the Persian Gulf region. Although Iran intended not to get involved directly in the Bahrain’s developments, it announced its verbal political support to the demands made by Bahrain’s Shiite people. However, Saudi Arabia opted for armed intervention in support of its allies in Bahrain (Friedman, 2016: 4). This intervention and Tehran’s negative reaction increased the hostility level between the two states. Saudi Arabia accused Iran of meddling in Bahrain and of inciting Bahraini Shiites to topple the regime. Iran strongly rejected Saudi Arabia’s accusations and, in turn, accused it of occupying Bahrain. Nevertheless, the developments in Bahrain demonstrated a vast increase in the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. When the Syrian crisis started, Iran and Saudi Arabia stayed at opposing fronts once more. For Riyadh, Syria seemed to remain an 120 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation opportunity to curtail the spread of Iranian regional influence. After the United States expressed its hope in August 2011 for the regime change in Syria and started to support the Syrian dissidents, Saudi Arabia closed its embassy in Damascus and asked Bashar Assad, the Syrian President, to leave power (Alrifai, 2017: 2-3). However, Iran expressed concern that regime change in Syria would display vastly dreadful consequences, because it considered the Iran-Syria axis necessary for confronting the American-Israeli order in the Middle East. Iran’s strategic goals in Syria, completely against those of Saudi Arabia, can be summarized in three parts: defeat of terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) and the Al-Nusra Front, survival of Bashar Assad’s regime and preservation of the strategic ties between Iran, Syria and Lebanon. Consequently, Iran, seeing its traditional ally endangered, perceived it as a strategic challenge; therefore waging war against Assad by Saudi Arabia affiliated groups ran counter to Iran’s interests in Syria (Dobbins et. al., 2015: 6). The political developments in Yemen represent the last surprising events for Iran. Armed intervention in Yemen through aerial attacks code-named Operation Decisive Storm by a Saudi- led coalition started on 25 March 2015 and continued from 22 April 2015 with the code name of Operation Restoring Hope (Cordesman, 2015: 1). These operations were carried out in support of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s Administration against the Houthis and former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who controlled Sana’a, Yemen’s capital and most regions in northern Yemen since 2015. The US and Riyadh regime accused Iran of supporting and sending arms to Ansar Allah from the beginning of the Yemen crisis, while this part of Yemen has been under severe siege. Iran has repeatedly denied such accusations and has called this military intervention, which has taken place in line with the aggressive approach of Saudi Arabia and the United States, a dangerous invasion which carried out to intensify destabilization of the region (Reuters, 2017: 1-3). More impressive improvement in the relations of Washington- Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 121 Riyadh since Donald Trump has taken the office in the White House. His anti-Iran policies (especially withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the JCPOA), and the dominant view in Washington and Riyadh that Iran is a common enemy of both states, have deteriorated the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia more significantly. The trend is so grave that several analysts believe that intensified confrontation between the two countries has placed two states at brinkmanship of a likely war. (Feierstein, 2017: 3). The Vicissitudes in Iran-Saudi Relations Over the Past 30Years -Massacre of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca cut-off in -Raiding the Saudi embassy in Tehran by protesters and the diplomatic 1987 death of a Saudi diplomat relations -Cut -off diplomatic relations in April 1988 -King Fahd Congratulation to Khatami as the new president of Iran in 2001 -Khatami's visit to Saudi Arabia in 1999 as the first post- Improving 1999 revolutionary Iranian president relationships -Concluding a Security treaty between the two countries in April 2001 in order to establish better relations -The overthrow of Saddam Hussein and subsequently the rise of power of the Shiite majority Regional -Iran's nuclear program and increasing fear of Saudi Arabia 2003 competition -Saudi Arabia's 2007 statement on the relationship between Iran and Iraq and introducing Tehran as a threat to the Persian Gulf -Deploying Saudi Arabia forces to Bahrain -Pressing the United States to take tougher positions towards the Iranian nuclear program Arab Spring 2011 -The US and Saudi Arabia accused Iran of assassinating attempt of the Saudi ambassador to the United States Saudi Arabia's military invasion in Yemen in March 2015 and Proxy Wars 2015 accusing Iran of supporting Houthis -The execution of Sheikh Nimr who was against the Saudi The Cut-off government policies and the entry of some protesters inside the in diplomatic 2016 Saudi embassy in Tehran and eventually the severance of Saudi relations diplomatic relations with Iran -Trump anti-Iran policy and signing hundred billion arms deal with Riyadh, 2017 - Confrontation -The escalation of Saudi hostility towards Iran and the failure of present diplomacy in two neighbors relations Table by Authors 122 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation

At present (early 2019), Saudi Arabia rulers, especially under the leadership of King Salman and his son, are intensely hostile toward Iran. The main reason for this hostility is the natural instinct of feeling threat to their survival. However, there are at least six interconnected reasons for this hostility all of which are relevant to understanding of fear by Saudi rulers. These reasons are categorized at domestic, regional, and trans-regional levels. Therefore, at any category, two main reason are elaborated.

Ⅱ. The Domestic Level At the domestic level, the inherently unstable political system in Saudi Arabia explains some of tensions in Tehran-Riyadh relations. Since its creation, the modern state of Saudi Arabia has been suffering from one family-ruling monopoly. This is why it insists on its overt and covert hostility with Iran as a country based on semi-democracy or hybrid democracy-authoritarianism system. This is one of the reasons for Saudi Arabia’s opposition to Iran. In Saudi Arabia, one family enjoys most of the power, wealth, and prestige, which such a structure is not considered as legitimate and inherently stable in the 21st century. By highlighting the Iranian threat, Saudi Arabia tries to hide the unjust power structure from its people. Moreover, one of the basic dilemmas of the Saudi system is the succession crisis after King Salman and the position of crown prince Mohammed bin Salman especially, after Jamal Khoshoggi fiasco. Madawi al-Rasheed, a professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, in a note published in the New York Times addressed the internal reasons as the main reason for the intensification of tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, Mohammed bin Salman, often talks about pushing back a dangerous Iranian threat. But the truth is, despite this position, the foreign policy emanating from Riyadh is driven primarily by domestic politics. Prince Mohammed knows that a fearful enemy is a key to his own strength (Al-Rasheed, April 23, 2018). Therefore, part of roots in making perpetual the conflict with Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 123 Iran are hidden in the internal contexts of Saudi Arabia. Bin Salman uses hostility towards Iran as a tool to divert attention from the succession crisis and internal challenges. He has tried to consolidate the power and concentrates it in his hand in order to make his big political ambitions; therefore, deprive other numerous and ambitious princes of the House of Saud. He is personally restless; the reason is that the unprecedented belittling and marginalizing of high-ranking princes in order to repel the likelihood of collusion between them, scares the young crown prince. It is believed that these shaky domestically power base directed him to intense anti-Iranian and populist rhetoric, as well as actions taken to push back Iranian perceptual influence in Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In this way, he could make the internal dissidence strangled. He holds Iran responsible for clashes by the Saudi Shiites in the eastern region of the country, and accuse the Saudi Shiite citizens of being agents of Iran. The voice of the internal critics towards Crown Prince’s policies is silenced by reminding them of the war situation in Yemen and likely war with Iran. The Saudis also consider the so- called rising Iranian influence in the region as the revival of the Iranians’ ancient Persian nationalism. The emphasis on the Iranian threat allows bin Salman to magnify his own role as the saviour of Saudi Arabia and of the entire Arab region from Persianization and Shiitization. During the reign of Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudis replaced the old ideology of Wahhabism with Saudi populist and militaristic nationalism; this Saudi new nationalism feeds on the Iranian threat and its “Shiite nationalism” (Workman, 2018: 2-3). The second internal factor for stoking Iranophobia is Saudi Arabia’s political economy and its heavy dependence on oil revenues. Among the 12 OPEC members, the top three producers are Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq before the renewal of sanctions in 2018 against Tehran. The most important issue is Iran’s vast gas reserves that have not been utilized yet as an economic resource. Environmentally, natural gas is a much cleaner fuel than oil and 124 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation its combustion produces considerably less harmful environmentally compared to oil. According to the estimates made by British Petrolium in 2018, Iran with 33 trillion cubic meters, ranked second as having the largest gas reserves in the world (BP, Statistical Review of World Energy: 2018). If Iran’s international is normalized by lifting the economic sanctions, it can turn it potentially into an even more powerful global energy player. The European market is of special strategic importance and Iran together with Russia, which is not an OPEC member, will potentially become the top energy suppliers to this market. Wealthy Qatar owes its status to export of vast quantities of natural gas. The Saudis regard this as a certain threat. Saudi Arabia is well endowed regarding oil resources, but has much smaller gas reserves. Therefore, its strategic value as an energy producer may be waning, if Iran is treated normally in international politics (Workman, 2018:4). According to Worlds Top Exports, China’s most important oil provider after Russia was Saudi Arabia in 2017 that accounted for 6.12% of China’s oil imports. During the same year, India imported about 11.5 million barrels of oil from Iraq, 10.3 million from Saudi Arabia, and 6.2 million from Iran (Workman, 2018: World’s Top Exports). Consequently, Saudi Arabia was the second largest oil exporter to India. However, Iran took Saudi Arabia’s position in the first half of 2018. According to the statistics published by India’s Ministry of Energy, this country imported 457 thousand barrels of oil per day from Iran before the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, but Saudi Arabia regained its position in the second half of 2018 after re-imposition of the sanctions on Iran by the United States in 2018 (Workman, 2019:World’s Top Exports). Saudi Arabia has extensive plans for expanding its presence in the Indian energy market. It has allocated a large part of the 500 billion dollars as investment funds to India. The regional tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have caused Saudi Arabia to use its investment leverages in India’s energy infrastructure as a means of reducing Iran’s share Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 125 of the Indian energy market. In April 2018, the Saudi Arabian Aramco and a consortium consisting of three Indian state companies signed a $44 billion agreement to build an oil refinery in Maharashtra Province in western India. Each party will have 50% ownership of the refinery. Amin Al-Nasser the president and chief executive officer of Saudi Aramco believed that the full capacity of the refinery would be 120,000 barrels per day. Aramco is investing in foreign refineries to supply their petroleum needs and increase Saudi share in the world markets. Saudi Arabia wants to increase its oil production in order to replace Iraq as the major supplier of oil to India and to take Iran’s share of the Indian oil market after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA (Shokri, 2018). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia produces 500 million cubic meters of natural gas from the Farzad-A gas field, the Saudi share of which is called the Hasbah gas field, but Iran has not extracted any gas from the Farzad-A or from the Farzad-B gas fields yet. In 2016, Saudi Arabia signed a $1billion agreement with Indian and Singaporean companies to raise its production from the current 500 million to 2 billion cubic meters per day. Saudi Arabia hopes Iranian investments in this jointly-owned oil field are postponed for a long time so that it can be the only country utilizing these resources (Trade Arabia, 2016). From the Saudi side, everything possible must be done to prevent Iran from developing its potential energy resources (especially natural gas), so that it cannot replace Saudi Arabia in, or reduce its share of the global energy market. This way, the Saudis guarantee or increase their revenues and further weaken Iran economically and politically. Moreover, the US political and economic superiority is tied to the oil-based economies of Saudi Arabia and other kingdoms in the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. dollar at present largely owes its life to Saudi Arabia and other Sheikhdoms, because the Saudis and the Sheikhdoms main currency to transact goods is in US dollar and provide the U.S. Treasury with the strong dollar; thus strengthen the value of dollar worldwide. Large purchases of US weapons and military equipment worth billions of dollars serve 126 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation the same purpose. If Iran was able to completely develop its potential energy power, its trade in oil, and more importantly in natural gas, would very probably be in Euro, Ruble, Yen, and Yuan. This would be a tragic scenario for the US currency.

Ⅲ. Regional level All hostilities in Saudi-Iran relations date back to emergence of the Islamic Revolution in 1979; with toppling a client regime of the US in Iran, other autocratic rulers in the region felt threatened. The policies of the Iranian revolutionaries also strengthened this feeling of being threatened. That was why the Saudi rulers immediately reacted to the by forming a political-defensive alliance called “the Gulf Cooperation Council” consisting of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman in the early1980s. In fact, the Saudi rulers’ hatred of Iran has been intensifying onwards since the Iranian Revolution. The more Iran’s political influence increases in the region, the more the Saudi rulers fear a threat to their existence. The first reason explaining the hostility at the regional level is geopolitical rivalry. From the time of Nixon-Kissinger doctrine that considered Saudi Arabia and Iran as two pillars providing the security of the region, especially of the Persian Gulf, till now (early 2019), the Saudis have been competing with Iran for expanding regional influence. In the aftermath of the September 11 as well as the US invasions as of 2001, there were five major incidents in the region that have caused major changes in the geopolitical façade of the region. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, and by removing Saddam, Baghdad was eliminated as a major power of the Persian Gulf equations. The Arab Spring's outbreak in the West Asia and North Africa region in 2011 led to the collapse of the four Arab dictators; and as a result, Syria and Egypt, as the two powerful Arab countries were diminished in the power equations of the region. The third event was reclaiming power by Bashar Assad which symbolically means victory for Iran in the Syrian civil war. Prolongation of Yemen war (since Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 127 2015), convenience coalition between Qatar and Iran (2018) and Jamal Khoshoggi fiasco (2018) were the latest events which deteriorated the Saudi Arabia’s position in the Middle East. These events that have led to the elimination of Iraq, Egypt and Syria from the regional rivalry and the emergence of Iran as regional power have brought about significant changes in the power politics of the regional powers. Therefore, the most important reasons for changing relations from rivalry to hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia are the geopolitical developments in Western Asia, which Riyadh perceived it as changing regional balance of power in favor of Iran. In fact, the Saudis consider those developments as expansion of Iran’s regional influence tantamount to their being put under siege and a serious threat to their survival. While Iran believes that Tehran is not the main cause of the crises in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon, but rather a set of various factors shaped these crises, and Tehran welcome a fair initiatives to overcome those crises. Zarif in many occasions opined that Iran is no threat to Saudi Arabia, “If Saudi Arabia would be attacked, Iran is the first one rush to support it” (fa.euronews, 2018). Iran and Saudi Arabia influence areas

Graphic by Shaeen, Guardian: 2018 128 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation

The religious identity and its politicization is another factor explaining the tension in Iran-Saudi Arabia relations. Due to historical reasons, Iran is the regional and global centre of Shi’ism. Therefore, one main reason of Saudi Arabia’s hostile policy towards Iran is that it considers itself as the heart of Islamic world as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. While the geopolitical change in the Middle East as delineated has been proceeding at its loss, Riyadh believes that Shiites in the whole region receive various forms of financial and spiritual support from Iran. Iran purposely has been expanding its influence to contain Saudis. As a result, the Shiite minority is turning into parallel power that the Sunnis led by Saudi Arabia enjoy predominantly at present. Saudi officials perceive that Saudi Arabia is Iran’s main target in creating the Shi’a-Sunni confrontation. Despite the denial of this claim by Iranian officials at various levels, Saudi Arabia continues to employ a quasi- ideological policy for inciting the majority Sunnis in the region against Iran. While Tehran believes that the main target is not Riyadh, Tehran was dragged into Iraq, Syria and Yemen developments. Tehran main target is making a geopolitical corridor to make vulnerable Israel, not containing the Saudi regime. However, some conservative figures in Tehran might refer to Saudi’s suspicion toward Iran. Alireza Zakani, a former member of the Iranian Parliament who belong to the conservetaive camp, once noted, “There are two opposing views in Iran regarding the Islamic Awakening (Arab Spring)... In the first view, Islamic awakening is considered one of the requirements of (Iranian) revolutionary movement and its enhancement across the region is regarded as a religious duty (to Iran)”. He quoted sympathetically Abdullah al-Nafisi: “Prior to the events in Yemen, Iran had taken over Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut, three capital cities of the Arab World, and the file of the old-fashioned people(i.e., Wahhabis or Salafis) would be closed if it could take over Sanaa. This event did take place and the regional conditions have Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 129 changed completely” (Farda News, 2015). The Fars News Agency quoted Qasem Soleimani as saying in a gathering in Kerman on 11 February, “Today, we witness signs that the Islamic Revolution has been exported throughout the region from Bahrain and Iraq to Syria and Yemen and North Africa” (Fars News, 2015). These rhetoric have led Riyadh to the conclusion that Iran has an aggressive policy to put Saudi Arabia under siege, to threaten its security and, finally, to disintegrate it. However Iranian top officials reject Iran’s policy of expansionism, and call Iran’s influence as spiritual. Kemal Kharrazi, top advisor to the Supreme leader believes, “Iran is open to dialogue to the regional states….. It is true that we have influence in Arabic and non-Arab countries, because Iran is the source of inspiration for others; and naturally a country that has been able to achieve progress without the support of foreigners is an inspirational model” (Jamaran, 2019).

Ⅳ. The Trans-Regional Level Since the WWII that the United States emerged as a superpower, Saudi Arabia, as an absolute monarchy, has been strongly dependent on the United States for its security. The closed, familial, and traditional government system which lacks any theoretical and legibility foundations in the 21st century has left the kings in Riyadh no choice but to follow American policies. This is the only way that keeps them safe from the political pressures from inside and outside. The inside threat is raised by potential domestic opponents and the outside threat is levied by those who consider Saudi Arabia as violator of human rights (Behravesh, 2017: 3). In other words, by tying its internal and external security to the United States, Saudi Arabia tries to cover up its weak points of lack of popular legitimacy and therefore repel pressures of inside and outside potential critics. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s hostility towards Iran partly divert its domestic opponents toward the foreign enemy and moreover, the Iranophobia serve both Saudi-US domestic and Middle East 130 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation policies in the Middle East (Ayatollahi Tabaar, 2018: 7). Adopting mainly anti-Iran policy are one of the major reasons of the U.S. support of MBS and his strategic approaches in the region even after the scandal of Jamal Khashoggi assassination. This is quite obvious in Trump’s supportive messages after Khoshoggi fiasco, “Our relationship is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They have been a great ally in our very important fight against Iran. The United States intends to remain a steadfast partner of Saudi Arabia to ensure the interests of our country, Israel and all other partners in the region” (Trump statement on Nov. 20, 2018). Put differently, the trend in domestic and Saudi foreign policy as well as its unshakable alliance with the US prove that the Saudis are sure of American strategic support in any event. In other words, Saudi Arabia, in the position of a strategic ally, has a substantial role in paving the way for the US regional policies and security strategy in the region. US President Donald Trump in an interview with the press admitted to the fact that previously the former American administrations have always dodged it, “In terms of the order of $110 billion — think of that, $110 billion — all they’re going to do is give it to other countries and I think that would be very foolish of our country (CNN,2018). Although there is no exact figures of arms deal between the US and Saudis in the past, according to a CNN report out of 110 billion arms deal in 2018, Saudi Arabia has so far followed through on $14.5 billion in purchases, it is a significant deal which cannot be ignored by statesmen. SIPRI estimated that the Saudi Arabia the third country in the world in military expenses in 2016-2018, and %20 the Saudi deals belong the US in the last couple of years (below figure). Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei characterized the Saudi Arabia clientele attitude as “milk cows for the Americans, when the milk finished, they (Americans) eat their meat”(farsi.khamenei.ir, 2018).

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Share of Saudi Arabia in the US Arms Export in 2013-2017

Source: SIPRI and World Economic Forum In fact, Washington’s macro policy toward the Middle East is mainly focused on containing Iran and preventing Moscow’s influence in the region. Consequently, isolating Iran and encouraging the Saudis in confronting Iran in the region, as well as creating serious barriers in the way of Tehran’s regional influence constitute the principles of the U.S. strategy in the Middle East especially in Trump era. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, as one of the strategic partners of the US in the Middle East, can highlight its conflicts with Iran both to satisfy Washington’s objectives and intentions in the region and help the crown prince in bolstering his leadership internally and externally (Postel & Hashemi, 2018: 62).

Conclusions Prediction is a difficult task in the humanities, especially for the Middle East where many factors are involved. As was explained in this article, the following six factors play an important role in shaping future trends: (1) internal politics of Saudi Arabia, (2) Political economy of energy, (3) geopolitical rivalry, (4) the Shiite-Sunni cleavages, (5) Trump anti-Iran strategy, and (6) political economy of arms sale. The future of Iran-Saudi Arabia relations will be influenced by the direction of these factors. 132 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation

Power, ambition, and anxiety are all that can be seen in Riyadh foreign policy these days. Saudi Arabia, which was once a cautious and passive regional power, has resorted to aggressive policies. Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitions have manifested both internally by cracking down on rich princes who are reckoned as his potential rivals, as well as carrying out reforms and suppressing his opponents (like Jamal Kashoggi murder) and externally by Saudi participation in the war in Yemen, supporting the minority Sunni rule in Bahrain, forcible detention of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Qatar blockade, continued support of Bashar Assad’s opponents, and the last, not least, pursuing enmity with Iran. Mohammed bin Salman believes that Iran intends to weaken Saudi Arabia and change into the superior and dominant power in the Middle East. This problem has been exacerbated by the undemocratic nature of the Riyadh political system and the one-family oligarchy ruling a vast country. As long as the internal security anxiety exists, Iran will be a suitable scapegoat for the ambitious crown prince. After achieving the mentioned goals and feeling secure in the new position, the Saudi leadership may begin a policy of détente in its foreign policy because it will no longer greatly need external threat for internal consumption. The intensification of anti-Iranian sentiment by MBS before becoming the crown prince and the relative softening in his approach in relation to Iran after being elected crown prince may be attributed to such a process. In the same vein, after bin Salman become the king and is sure of his status and power, he might change Riyadh’s foreign policy approach towards Iran and begin implementing a policy of détente. However, it is not clear when King Salman will die and, hence, the situation of uncertainty inside Saudi Arabia will continue. Replacing Adel al-Jubeir, who pursued a strictly anti-Iran policy, and appointing Ibrahim Al- Assaf, who is a technocrat, may modify the extreme rhetoric against Tehran. However, it is quite clear that these changes have taken place to decrease the pressures on bin Salman following the Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 133 scandal of Jamal Khashoggi murder, not to change attitude towards Tehran. The key to Saudi’s foreign policy is in the hands of King Salman and his son Mohammed. Meanwhile, Russia’s role is also important; if Riyadh decides to exhibit greater inclination towards Moscow in the wake of international pressures after Jamal Khashoggi murder and reduce its strong security dependence on Washington, this can also play a modifying role in the Tehran-Riyadh relations. To be sure, restoration of relative stability in Iraq and the moderate foreign policy of this country, the return of ambassadors of a few Arab countries to Syria, renewed recognition of Bashar Assad as the de facto leader of the Syria, a peace agreement in Yemen, and the formation of a broad national government in Lebanon can all help reduce Tehran-Riyadh tensions. However, exacerbation of these variables will once again negatively influence Tehran-Riyadh relations. However, Saudi Arabia is a regime must follow the US and Western powers that have provided the basis of its stability. If the Saudis leave the framework of Western policies, it will lose this status and the House of Saud will further become weak. In general, the US of the Trump era does not like to witness the developments in the region which benefit Iran, and stoking Iranophobia is considered to be in line with Washington and Israel’s grand politico- economic interests. On this basis, Mohammed bin Salman is a suitable choice for confronting Iran as well as carrying out Washington and Israel’s strategy in the Persian Gulf. Riyadh’s understanding is that Washington is decisive to confront Iran especially after US withdrawal from the JCPOA and, therefore, Saudi Arabia can utilize Iranophobia along its domestic and regional policies. Finally, it is not very clear which scenarios will be materialized in the future; however, it can be said that Iran’s internal developments may change the circumstances. If Trump’s sanctions are so severe that it will become practically impossible for Iran to export its oil, it is very likely that war will break out in 134 / An Iranian Narrative Tehran-Riyadh Escalation the Persian Gulf and Iran and Saudi Arabia will enter into a military confrontation; although both countries know that this war will only lead to their mutual destruction. All the evidences suggest that the next Iranian president will be a conservative. If a hardline president adopts a more extreme policy towards the US, its repercussions will certainly influence Iran-Saudi Arabia relations leading to an uncertain future for the two countries. All in all, the outlook for future Iran-Saudi Arabia relations is not clear and it is estimated that there will be no thaw in their relations´ ice at least before the end of Trump’s term in office by 2020.

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The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations: The Case of Foreign Investment Majid Rnjbardar Davood Aghaee

Abstract Today, foreign investment is one of the most sophisticated financing sources in the world. Most of the countries are seeking to attract these resources by creating political and legal reforms. Political factors are very influential on the attraction of foreign investment. In early 2001, by adoption of Foreign Investment Protection Act, Iran has been struggling to attract foreign investment in the country. In this regard, Germany was one of the most important partner and target country for Iran. During 1997 to 2017, there were some fluctuation in trend of German investment into Iran, due to various political components.. From 1997 to 2004 when the political tensions were at the lowest level, the German investment in Iran were at the best position. The question raised here is concerned with factor which served as a basis for the political economy of German FDI in Iran. Hypothetically, the fluctuations in trend of German investment in Iran is a sequent of various components including US policy, Middle Eastern peace processes, terrorism and human rights. The method of research is explanatory with referring to statistics and analyzing the trend of German investments in last 20 years. We will consider the influence of political component on the FDI of German companies during the presidency of Khatami,

 PHD in regional studies, [email protected]  Professor, faculty of law and political science, [email protected] Received: 26/09/2019 Accepted: 30/11/2019 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer- Fall 2017, pp. 139-168 140 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations...

Ahmadinejad and Rouhani especially after the US withdraws from the JCPOA. Keyword: Iran, Germany, Foreign Investment, Economic Diplomacy

Introduction As a pioneer of economic reforms and advances as well as the exports of technical and engineering services, the Federal Republic of Germany has always been a point of interest for many nations, including Iran. In the 2007–2017 period, Germany conducted an average annual investment of 92 billion dollars across the world and had a prominent presence in different areas and reputable economic projects via capable companies. During this period, the highest investment by Germany was in 2007 amounting to 169.351 million dollars and the least was in 2013 amounting to 39.492 million dollars. Further, in 2014 more than 9.49 percent of the investments of the EU nations were in Germany and in 2019 more than 3.12 percent of the total investments by members of the Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development was performed by Germany. Iran has sought after international financial resources considering major changes such as the eight-years of Iran-Iraq war, international or unilateral US sanctions, and the increasing need for employment, economic growth, and comprehensive development. Considering the effects and importance of employing German industries in different economic sectors of Iran and the potentials for cooperation and benefiting from the financial and technical capabilities of Germany, as well as the nation's willingness for economic presence in the Middle East and improving its independent political position; there is a very suitable condition for cooperation between the two sides. One of the major aspects of this mutual cooperation can be the use of potentials via attracting foreign investment from Germany. 142 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... Considering investment by nations, there are a number of effective sociopolitical factors causing foreign corporations to enter the market of another country. The main question of the paper concerns the political economy of Germany's investment in Iran and the contributing political factors. The paper hypothesizes that the trend of German investment attraction by Iran is fluctuating and follows variables such as US policies, Israel policies, the Middle East peace, human rights, and terrorism. It investigates the 20-year investment trend of German investment in Iran to identify the impact of key political factors on the amount and trend of this investment at the times of Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani cabinets, especially following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. It uses a descriptive method relying on statistical analysis. The first part investigates the literature background of the subject. Second part describes the foundations of German economic diplomacy and its approach to the Middle East. The third part addresses Iran's position in Germany's foreign policy and investigates the effective political variables in the economic relationships of the two nations. In the final part, the investment of German companies during Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani governments is investigated, the research hypothesis tested, and the result presented. І. The Foundations of Germany's Economic Diplomacy The foreign relations of the Federal Republic of Germany consist of the theories, principles, and objectives of its foreign policy. Despite major changes caused by the collapse of the USSR and the bipolar system, the fundamental principles remain intact. The key points of this policy is multilateralism, Eurocentrism, supporting the development of the European system, strengthening beyond-Atlantics relations, increasing activities in international and regional organizations, enhancing economic capabilities, increasing economic relations with other nations, maintaining peace, defending collective security and human rights, and combating terrorism. Overall, Germany's foreign Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 143 policy consists of four major directions: 1. Maintained and deepened cooperation with the EU; 2. Maintained and enhanced NATO participation; 3. Subsiding the conflicts with the east; And 4. Cooperating with third-world countries. (Kiani, Germany`s Forein Policy and the New International Geopolitics and European Union, 2012, pp. 140). As a non-military power, the Federal Republic of Germany is interested in using economic partnerships as a mean towards its foreign policy objectives, which is why it is also referred to as a geo-economic power. In nations relying on geo-economic power, the state-society relationship differs. As German corporations provide half of the nation's GDP and the foreign policy relies on exports, the economic community of Germany plays a significant role in directing the foreign policies(Kiani, Germany`s Forein Policy and the New International Geopolitics and European Union, 2012, pp. 156) Germany's foreign policy focuses on creating a reliable, fair financial and economic system. This policy supports an economic framework that can facilitate sustainable development across the globe using multilateral levers (External economic policy, 2018). With the gradual efforts of German leaders toward normalizing its foreign policies after its reunion, the Middle East policies also changed. A concise classification of Germany's Middle East foreign policy: 1. After the WWII until 1999 ; Since 1995 until now. In the first period, the Federal Republic of Germany had to follow a two-sided policy towards the Middle East due to the conditions enforced by greater powers: A. Moral obligation to defend the existence of Israel; B. Forming merely economic and commercial relations with the nations in the region. The Federal Republic of Germany supports its corporations in third countries and the EU members to attain its economic goals. The main duty of these three bodies is collecting information and 144 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... giving consultation services to corporations and investors to maximize profit and minimize risk. Further, the domestic sector sees planning and efforts by industrial federations and provinces to increase foreign investment and trade. The said institutions are (External Economic Policy, 2018). The envoys sent by Germany to foreign nations as embassies or consulates: Enhancing foreign investment and trade is one of the main duties of the foreign services department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in Germany. More than 230 representatives of these three bodies pursue German corporation interests in the host countries. All of these bodies have a coordinating sector responsible for economic, agricultural, technological, scientific, financial and social collaborations and affairs. The offices of German trade chambers in foreign nations and the representative offices of industrial and commercial associations The extra-national trade chambers of Germany are : the envoys sent by the industry and comprise volunteer economic activists with a background of partnering with the host country or those with a very high potential for partnering with it. These common chambers are supported by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Their main goal is aiding the corporations to enhance their exports and to form consortiums for investment or shared brands for industrial or agricultural products according to the advantages of each hosting nation. These trade chambers have about 50,000 member companies. In some nations with little activity by German corporates or their trade chambers, embassies or consulates perform these duties. Currently, the Trade chamber of Germany has more than 130 offices in more than 90 countries. Therefore, identifying trade and investment opportunities and introducing them to the German trade or investment corporations is the primary duty of the said centers. They also provide meetings with local companies, multilateral sessions, and meetings with local authorities, pursuing the problems, resolving trade disputes and providing consultation for investment disagreements if Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 145 requested by German corporations. Germany's Trade and Investment Agency (GTIA): Germany's Trade and Investment Agency is tasked with providing exact economic and investment information, status reporting on major economic indicators of target nations, determining political and economic risk hedging for each nation according to the Hermes Exports Insurance, attracting foreign investors, marketing and forming commercial and investment relations, requesting tenders, evaluating the commercial sectors and market analysis, publishing the imports and exports regulations, and providing trade guidance for nations. It attempts to facilitate the access of German corporations to international markets. The Investment and Trade Department procures and publishes the information required by foreign corporations regarding the economic divisions and markets, projects, tenders, customs regulations. It provides foreign companies and economic activists with the guidelines for partnership with more than 70 German bodies. It is a subset of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Germany Trade & Invest, 2018) . German Foreign policies and economy: Germany's economic foreign policy pursues the two goals of increasing competitiveness for German corporations and maintaining Germany's appeal for foreign investment and business. These goals surpass conventional cross-border actions and include many domestic policies such as competitiveness, technology and regulations over subsides. These two factors are increasingly focused on in international competition. Its foreign policy at domestic, extra- national (EU), and international levels is subject to certain constraints. Internationalizing domestic rules such as free trade, competitiveness, peace, stability, and security are highly pursued by the government and aim to contribute to national and international welfare and economic development (Koopmann, 2012, p. 8). In theory, Germany's economic diplomacy completes the foreign aspect of the market-oriented structural policy of its economy. This is pursued via three routes: 146 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... 1-Implementing policies aiming to create regulations based on legal frameworks and economic institutions;2- Supporting competitiveness, free trade, and corporations;3- Market policy and ensuring its good performance. The structural policy of Germany aims to contribute to growth and stability while adhering to the non-interference policy of government in corporate businesses in what or how to produce their goods. Accordingly, the nation's priority in foreign policy and involvement in other markets are first political stability and then, non-discrimination between the native and foreign investors (Maull, 2012, p. 159). This strategy has made Germany one of the great economic powers of the world. Currently, it has the largest European economy and the fourth highest GDP in the world. It is also a founder of EU and Euro monetary system. Its economic place in the world was defined after the industrial revolution and at the same time with it. It still remains a pioneering and innovative country which invests in research projects. Its economy follows the social economy of market. In 2014, Germany hit the record of the highest trade surplus (285 billion dollars). Its exports constitute 41 percent of the national product. Its GDP consists of services (70%), industry (29%), and agriculture (1%). 99 percent of German corporations are small to mid-size and are mostly run by families. of the 500 mega corporations by income, the central offices of 53 are in Germany (Krewson, 2018, p. 2). Germany's Middle East Economic Diplomacy: With the publication of Germany's Foreign Policy Guideline [1] in 2002 by Joschka Fischer, the then foreign minister regarding the Arab- Israel conflict, the Middle-East foreign policy of this country was founded. Later, it further expanded this policy by mediating between the Palestinian National Authority and Israel, dispatching troops as international peacekeepers to the Middle East, dispatching troops to Afghanistan, going against the military action against Iraq, and innovating the plan for Iran's nuclear negotiations (Shafiie & Rezaee, 2015, pp. 544-545). Economic partnerships, especially providing the grounds for German Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 147 corporate in different regions—especially the Middle East—plays a prominent role in the foreign policy and foreign economic relationships of Germany. Its Middle East foreign policy must be regarded part of the common EU policy. Germany's interests lie in increased uniformity of this region and thus, it has to promote the role of itself and EU in key Middle East issues such as the Arab- Israel peace, human rights, Iran's nuclear program, and stability in North Africa and Persian Gulf nations. Germany is one of the main partners of the Middle East nations. However, its trade with Iran, Israel, and marginal Persian Gulf countries forms less than 3% of its total exports. Its investments in the region have not been significant so far; yet, areas such as oil and gas as strategic products are of high importance for some German corporations. There is a great capacity for enhancement of the economic partnership between Germany and the Middle East. Further, economic liberalization not only contributes to the economic development of the countries of the region but also provides some of the economic and political interests of Germany (Grohe, Moosbauer, Perthes, & Sterzing, 2009, p. 22). The Arab-Israel dispute, especially concerning the relationships with Palestine, is the primary topic of Germany's foreign policy in the Middle East. Resolving this dispute is of high importance for Germany. It supports the formation of an independent Palestinian government. Since the constitution of the independent Palestinian government, Germany has remained one of the main supporting nations, always counting it as one of the highlights of its Middle East foreign policy. Nevertheless, Germany insists on the non- conditionality of this aid and maintains that it pursues the formation of a democratic government respecting human rights and peaceful cooperation with its neighbors. In recent years, Germany has promoted its role in the Middle East. This pivotal role is affected by its responsibility within the EU principles and policies as well as some recent issues: First, the nation has received thousands of Syrian refugees which have increased the significance of Middle East changes for 148 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... it. Germany is one of the key players in negotiations concerning Syrian refugees; hence it’s increased role in the formation of Syria's future. For European countries, refugees are a primary concern and a threat against the population integrity and existence of the EU. Germany's open-door policy to Syrian refugees has enhanced the inter-population relations, cultural exchange, and treatment of Syria. This can enhance the economic partnerships of Germany and the Middle East. Second, some Turkish immigrants to Germany are not significantly attracted to Turkey under the influence of Erdogan policies and propaganda. This affects the policies and attitude of Germany towards Turkey. Turkey's efforts to combat the Gülen terrorism some of the contributors of which reside in Germany have increased their disputes. Further, as a powerful group of the chiefs of Kurd parties reside in Germany, a different Turkish population has formed in Germany which has further increased this nation’s interest in the Middle East changes. Third, Germany is one of the influential powers in Iran's nuclear program negotiations. With the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, the role of European nations, especially Germany, has increased. As one of the pioneers of the deal, it has to bear a stronger pressure and effort to preserve the agreement. The Middle East is also going to face further problems. The influence and presence of Russia in Syria, as well as Trump's policies, will increase the movement of refugees. Meanwhile, the Iran-Russia coalition against the US and its allies in Syria leads to a deepening crisis which increases the balancing role of the EU, notably Germany (Fakude, 2017, p. 2). Joachim Gauk, the former president of the nation announced at the 50th Security Conference of Munich in 2014 that Germany now has to play an effective role in Middle East due to its political, military, and economic importance. He asked for dispensing with the self-incurred isolation from political changes and an effective role in international system. The said changes led Germany to turn from a silent player into an active one. This Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 149 change in direction was intensified after Brexit. The nation's affectedness by the Middle East risks and threats such as terrorism and illegal migration in addition to the US and Russian actions that have further intensified the regional chaos have led Berlin to seek a proper strategy toward addressing these problems. Accordingly, Angela Merkel has stated the following as its country's prioritized foreign policies towards the Middle East: 1-Key political and economic partnerships with important regional nations such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel; 2-Resolving the disputes among Arab nations, including Syria; 3-Balance of power among the regional nations; 4-Battling terrorist and militia groups; 5-Aiding the post-war rebuilding of nations (Pillars of Germany Foreign Policy for Middle Eastern Conflicts, 2017). Ⅱ. Germany's Economic Diplomacy toward Iran For more than a century, Germany has held a political representative in Iran. On June 11, 1873, Iran and the German Empire signed a friendship and sailing pact which also included permanent embassies in both nations. Eleven years after the pact and on Oct 20, 1884, the first German embassy was formed in Naseraldin Shah's court and Ernest Von Brunswick was dispatched to Iran as Germany's special agent. The German embassy has been active in Iran ever since. Currently, it pursues its mutual relations with Iran employing experts in economy, culture, and science-education. On July 21, 1975, the Chamber of Iran and Germany commerce was registered in the Company Registration General Office of Iran. At the onset, it had more than 137 Iranian and German members. Currently, with more than 2000 member companies, it is one of the strongest commerce chambers outside Germany. It is a significant institution in the trade and investment relations of Iran and Germany. Moreover, it is the only independent European chamber of commerce and industry in Iran which not only provides legal and natural persons with services, but enables the formation of new trade relations between the two countries and facilitates the expansion of current 150 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... links (Informationen zur Wirtschaft in Iran , 2018). After the Islamic Revolution, despite the pessimistic attitude toward Iran and the support of the West for Iraq in the war, on July 1984 Genschner, the then German foreign minister visited Iran. It was the first trip of the foreign minister of a western, European and NATO country to the post-revolutionary Iran. He attempted to acknowledge the revolutionary identity and its sense of contrast with western values, separating Germany's attitude from that of other western nations. Germany also played a significant role in the adoption of 598 protocol of the Security Council acknowledging Iraq as the invading party. With the Rafsanjani government in Iran and the union of East Germany and West Germany in 1990, Germany could officially regain its whole independence and started a new level of multilateral cooperation between the two countries, especially in economy. At this time, the transactions of the countries reached over 10 million Marks (Shafiie & Rezaee, 2015, p. 546). Although at the same time, issues such as the death sentence for Salman Roshdi, the assassination of Kurd leaders in Mykonos restaurant and the court verdict, the detainment and trail of German citizens, and the assassination of Reza Mazlooman created tensions between the two countries, many analysts believe this period to be a special point in their relationships. At the time of Mohammad Khatami and with the tension-reduction policies and participation in international debates such as the idea of the dialogue among civilizations, these relationships increased. However, with the rise of Ahmadinejad in Iran and Merkel in Germany and the closeness of Germany with the US as well as the surfacing of topics such as holocaust, Iran's nuclear program, and Iran's aggressive regional policies toward Israel, these relationships faced a period of decline. In short, Germany's attitude towards Iran can be categorized as the Iran-EU talks. Accordingly, in the 1979-98 period, the critical interaction, from 1998 to 2003 constructive interaction, from 2003 to 2006 the conditional interaction, from 2006 to 2013 interactive restraint, and from 2013 onwards Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 151 increased economic and political cooperation were adopted. The foreign policy of the eleventh government and the effort to resolve problems with foreign states were welcomed by Europe, especially Germany. In such a development, the shared political, economic, and security interests make the nations closer in the future (Sanaee, 2015, p. 14). Political factors affecting the economic relations of Iran and Germany: According to the above structure and to better understand the special role of Germany as a European power regarding Iran, we must take into account three key issues: First: Germany is a main, strong player in preserving the geographic integrity of Israel while maintaining a traditional and stable relationship with Islamic Republic of Iran. Hence, it has always been acknowledged as a reliable negotiation partner by both sides. Second: On one hand, Germany is a main, strong player in diplomacy and a critic of the US interferences. On the other hand, it has extensive economic interests in Iran. These two issues have led to the significant political and economic influence of Germany in the region and has rarely given rise to protests by Iran. Third: Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has noticeable technical knowledge in leading and furthering multilateral negotiations. Accordingly, Helga Schmidt was chosen as the senior negotiator to the EU for multilateral negotiations with Iran (Joukar, 2017, pp. 50-52) As stated, many factors affect the Iran-Germany relationships which can be discussed. However, as the paper intend to focus on the key topics, it is attempted to discuss and study factors such as the role of terrorism and extremism, the US, Israel, and human rights as the key factors constantly affecting the mutual relations. Combating international terrorism and extremism: The security cooperations of the two nations for combating terrorism started after the visit to Tehran by Brand Schmidt Bauer, the advisor to German Chancellor and the Federal Intelligence Coordinator in 1992. As a nation with a security and intelligence 152 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... system dominant over terrorist currents can aid Germany in combating terrorism and achieving one of the primary objectives of its national security (Sanaei, 2015:11). Combating terrorism has always been present in the Iran-Germany relationships on two different levels. The first level is combating ISIS in the last three years which was one of the primary issues linking Iran to regional problems and combating terrorism and extremism. This battle provided a good opportunity to negotiate with Iran and limited cooperations with the west, especially Germany. Stability in Iraq and Syria is the shared concern for both parties. While at the beginning of combating ISIS Iran sought to maintain a limited presence to lead the battle forces from the rear (within its own borders), it did not hesitate to empower local groups to fight ISIS. Attempting to weaken cultism in fighting ISIS in Iraq, Iran armed several forces including the Iraqi army and Sunni Kurds. This led to Iran's continuous presence in Iraq. Iran's ability to limit and control Shia forces in the fight against ISIS clarified the attitude of the Iraqi, regional powers, and the rest of the international community to Iran and its policies. Iran and Germany pursue similar goals in Iraq: Preventing the division, possible civil war and cult conflicts, the defeat of ISIS (Parsi, An Eu Strategy for Relations with Iran after the nuclear deal, 2016, p. 19). Although fighting ISIS in Iraq provides an opportunity to negotitate with Iran, Syria conflicts are more challenging. There, Iran and Germany pursue different goals. Iran wishes for the Alavi regime to remain in power, while Germany wants Asad and his regime to resign from power. Nevertheless, both wish to rid Syria of ISIS (Iran's Spoiler Role in Syria Peace Process, 2018). The second level of terrorism-related issues in Iran-Germany relationships is terrorist or saboteur forces active in Iran or Europe. In general, the leaders of such terrorist forces inhabit other nations. On the Iranian side, one of the factors influencing Iran-Germany relations is the Terrorist group of Pejak which— despite numerous terrorist operations in Iran—some of its heads live in Germany as citizens. In the visit of Guido Westerwelle to Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 153 Iran, Salehi the Iranian Foreign Minister of the time requested him to prevent the activities of this terrorist group (Sanaee, 2015, p. 12). Part of the Mojahedin Khalg (MEK) terrorist group also remains active in Germany, a subject constantly protested against by Iran. Further, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution some nations, courts, or organizations have accused or convicted Iran for involvement in acts of terrorism or supporting terrorist groups. France, Germany, Argentina, Sweden, and Britain are among such nations. Germany has declared legal persecution against several high-ranking Iranian officials who were convicted to engagement in Terrorist acts in Mykonos court (Katzman, 2018, p. 55). Select Iran-Sponsored Operational Activity in Europe, (2018) th Before September 11 in Brussels talks, the issue of terrorism was overshadowed by economic topics. However, after September 11th and with the increased US pressure on the EU, the attitude of the union became closer to the US and for the first time, a global alliance was formed to resolve this issue. The American government accused Iran of supporting multiple terrorist groups across the world, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. In the America's report on terrorism in 2016 published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Jan 2017 and in seven chapters, it is claimed that Iran is still the main terrorism-supporting nation and its threats against the US and its allies have remained (Terrorism, 2016, p. 218). The US Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that despite the consensus of global powers on Iran's nuclear program, it remains the primary supporter of terrorism in the world (Treasury Designates Iran, 2016). The role of the USA: The first departure of Germany from the US attitudes in foreign policy was related to the restraint policy. Although after the cold war, the US has constantly attempted to isolate Iran via sanctions and international pressure, Germany not only adopted interactive change for its foreign policy toward Iran, but also turned it into a European approach within the framework of the shared European foreign policy (Kiani, 2013:170). However, this cooperation and intimacy declined for various 154 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... reasons. One of the main reasons for that was the rise of Christian Democratic Party led by Merkel in the 2005 elections as well as the success of the right-wing party in Iran and the presidency of Ahmadinejad. At the time, Iran's foreign policy discourse also changed. Among the European nations, Germany was the most affected by this policy, because it was the true inventor of critical negotiations and had made great efforts to resolve the nuclear issue. The new nuclear approach as well as denial of holocaust made Iran's case more prominent. At the same time, because German corporations adopted relatively independent policies towards relations with Iran, the US political pressures on Germany increased. After the referral of Iran's case to the UN Security Council and the issue of four protocols in four years according to Article Seven of the UN charter, the US pressure on Germany to reduce trade with Iran increased and even the German corporations contracting with Iran were threatened by the US. Accordingly, Hermes Insurance reduced the exports insurance limit of German corporations from 3.3 to 2.1 billion dollars. These changes greatly affected the Iran-Germany relationships (Najafi, 2017, pp. 128-129). After the nuclear deal and lifting of international sanctions, the influence of the US on European nations, especially Germany, somewhat diminished. Nevertheless, with the rise of Trump to power and the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the return of sanctions, the limitations and constraints of German companies and banks in partnering with Iran renewed. Despite the joint declaration of the Foreign Affairs Representative of the EU and the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Germany, France, Britain as well as the joint declaration of their Ministers of Economy indicating their commitment to cooperate with Iran, some German companies that had announced their readiness to enter the Iranian market and invest in different industries withdrew due to the fear of US penalties. The primary such cases are: Deutsche Bahn Co .The Deutsche Bahn Railway Company that intended to execute two projects in Iran via its subsidiary Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 155 company, the DB Consulting and Engineering Co., announced to Reuters in August that these projects were ceasing in August and September (Corporation which left Dreadinf the USA, 2018). Siemens Co The CEO of Siemens announced in May that due : to the return of US sanctions, the company will not sign a new contract with Iran. The electrical railway between Tehran and Mashhad and the High-speed railway of Tehran-Isfahan were some of the projects included in the contract. The delivery of three gas turbines to Iran were also suspended (Wald, 2018). Doerr Co. The Doerr automobile parts company announced in August that it ceases its activities in Iran due to US sanctions. One of the directors announced that in 2017 Doerr had signed two contracts with Iran. According to them, despite the flourishing of business in the last year, they had to abandon their activities for the time (Wald, 2018). Daimler Automotive Co. In August, the company announced that until further notice, they cease their activities in Iran due to US sanctions. The company announced that Iranian market was weaker than what they expected and emphasized that they had not restarted the production or sales of automobiles or trucks in Iran. On Sep 12, 2017 the Daimler Trucks Co. had told BBC Persian that they had signed a contract for producing and distributing Daimler trucks in Iran with the IKCO or Iran (Corporation which left Dreadinf the USA, 2018). The DZ Bank of Germany This bank announced that from the beginning of June, they would cease their transactions with Iran. Allianz Company of Germany: This large insurance company announced a week after the withdrawal of US from the JCPOA that it was studying plans for reducing activities in Iran (Wald, 2018). BASF Company or Germany: The largest chemicals corporations in the world announced its commitment to the US sanctions against Iran in September. It declared that it would attempt to maintain its business presence in Iran, but would adhere to all regulations. The company which intended to invest in Iran's 156 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... oil and gas industry faced severe limitations with the second phase of US sanctions and with its declared commitment to them. Bilfinger Co. The Bilfinger engineering co. accounted in August that they would not sign any new contract with Iran. In 2016 the company signed a contract for controlling the systems of an Iranian refinery. Deutsche Telekom Co. The company ceased its consulting operations in Iran in August. A spokesman told Reuters that until the time of ceasing their activities, their revenues in Iran had reached nearly 300,000 EUR (Corporation which left Dreadinf the USA, 2018) . Ⅲ. Germany's Investment in Iran After the nuclear deal and the lifting of sanctions by the UN, EU, and US, in May 2016 more than 100 German corporations participated in the Iran-Germany trade and investment seminar. In the June of the same year, Iran repaid its great debt of 575 million EUR to Hermes Insurance, a debt that remained from the pre- sanction period. Since then, this insurance announced its readiness for giving new credit to trade corporations and issuing business guarantees for German investors. Accordingly, the fifth meeting of the commission of economic cooperation of the two nations was held in Tehran after a fifteen-year halt and multiple documents of cooperation and contracts were signed between the companies of the two nations (External economic policy, 2018). At this time, the trade value of the two countries increased by 25% and reached more than four billion EUR. In the numerous visits by the officials of both nations, the two sides always stressed the necessity of and their willingness for increasing their business and investment cooperations.

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Fig 1. The Iran-Germany trade balance in the 1992-2017 period

(Iran Trade Statistics, 2017) As shown, the peak trade was in the 2003-2009 period, which reduced with the increasing nuclear tensions and the international financial crisis. However, after JCPOA (2015-2017) the exports of Germany to Iran increased, yet it still was significantly lower than the previous level. Further, in the 1994-2001 period, despite the declared willingness of Iran for expanding economic cooperation with Europe, especially Germany, the trade value was not significant. In addition, political problems and disputes such as the Mykonos crisis, the issuance of the order for the murder of Salman Rushdie and so on were also effective at this time. The Federal Republic of Germany has always been a point of attention for IR Iran from two aspects: First, its use of the technology and capabilities of German companies, and second, its use of their financial assets and investments for different economic sectors with high potential for partnership with German corporations. In spite of the history of the economic and political relations between the nations, the investment value of German companies in Iran is not comparable with that of other European nations, and also is not indicative of the potentials in both countries. Statistics suggest that the first investment of German companies in the post-revolutionary Iran occurred in 1994. Many German corporations have invested in different economic sectors of Iran over the past 20 years (1997-2017). 158 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... Khatami Government in 1997-2004: During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami and the comprehensive talks between Iran and European nations, the level of the economic and political relations of Iran and Germany reached its peak with the least vulnerability. At this time, German corporations collectively invested more than 225.1 billion dollars in different economic projects in Iran. Table 2 presents the said statistics. Table 2: Investment statistics of German corporations in Iran between1997 to 2004 Year declared implement 1997 4 332 12 354 1998 295 4 332 1999 50 916 295 2000 99 300 15 501 2001 26 653 523 2002 574 775 100 257 2003 457 983 588 645 2004 11 276 42 637 (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, 2018) (https://unctad.org, 2018) As shown in Fig. 2, the investment current and interest of European companies for investment in Iran had a growing, promising trend. During the first and second governments of Khatami, Germany participated in multiple projects in Iran. For example, the visit of Werner Muller, the German Minister of Economy on Oct 2, 2009 to Iran in which two large projects for expanding the Imam Port Petrochemical Complex and the South Pars Zone (amounting to 850 million pounds) were assigned to Linde, a German Company. The dotted arrow indicates the declared investment while the solid arrow shows the capital entering the country. Hence, we can claim that the investment relations were not very affected in this period in spite of some political differences, and German companies had sufficient confidence for involvement in Iranian market.

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Fig 2. Investment of German corporations in Iran in the 1997-2004 700.000 600.000 500.000 400.000 300.000 200.000 100.000 0.000 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 -100.000

The contract for building six ocean Cruiser ships in 2002 (amounting to 189 million dollars) between IRISL and the Acker Shipbuilding Co. of Germany and giving the technology for container-carrier ships to Iranian companies was one such agreement. Further projects include a PVC factory by the UHDE Co. (509 million dollars) in the Imam Khomeini Special Economic Zone with the participation of the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran and the project for collaborative manufacture of engines for the buses produced by Idem Co. of Tabriz (supervised by IKCO), which amounted to 7 million EUR and 4000 engines per year. 22.5% of the company's share belonged to IKCO and 30% for Daimler. This period witnessed the lowest level of political disputes and differences in the mutual relationships. Ahmadinejad government in 2005-2012: In this period, the rise of Christian Democratic Party in Germany, led by Merkel and the presidency of conservative candidate in Iran changed the attitude governing Iran's foreign policy. The new nuclear approach as well as denial of holocaust made Iran's case more prominent. Table 3 shows the investment of German corporations in Iran during this period.

160 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations...

Table 3: Investment statistics of German corporations in IR Iran; between 2005 to 2012 Year declared implement 2005 99 946 1 994 2006 2 049 95 010 2007 11 322 4 936 2008 10 125 9 838 2009 1 100 0 2010 896 0 2011 18 956 896 2012 22 030 1 452 (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, 2018) (https://unctad.org, 2018) At the same time, because German corporations adopted relatively independent policies towards relations with Iran, the US political pressures on Germany increased. After the referral of Iran's case to the UN Security Council and the issue of four protocols in four years according to Article Seven of the UN charter, the US pressure on Germany to reduce trade and investment with Iran increased and even the German corporations contracting with Iran were threatened by the US. The dotted arrow represents the trend of the reported statistics of German corporations’ investment which declined noticeably in this period. The investment- attraction statistics also gravitated to zero or negative direction with the same gradient. The political tension governing the mutual relations, including the cooperation of Germany with the US and international sanctions were among the key political factors affecting investment relationships in this period.

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Fig 3. Investment of German corporations in Iran in the 2005-2012

120.000

100.000

80.000

60.000

40.000

20.000

0.000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 -20.000

-40.000

Rouhani Government in 2012-2018: As Rouhani rose to presidency in the eleventh government, Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulated him on this success and declared its hope for improved relationships with Iran. Further, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany congratulated this occasion via a letter. The message contained the following statement, "You are shouldering huge responsibility in difficult times. Your election promises the fruition of the hope that a new era of productive cooperation for regional and global peace and security may follow. Same as before, Germany will cooperate with its international partners to perform its part in order to find suitable resolutions for the current challenges via dialogue. I will be very glad if a good opportunity for deepening the good relationships between the two nations presents itself during your mission". After the nuclear deal and the lifting of sanctions by the UN, the EU, and US, in May 2016 more than 100 German corporations participated in the Iran-Germany trade and investment seminar. In the June of the same year, Iran repaid its great debt of 575 million EUR to Hermes Insurance, a debt that had remained from the pre- sanction period. Since then, this insurance announced its readiness for giving new credit to trade corporations and issuing business guarantees for German investors. Accordingly, the fifth meeting of the commission of economic cooperations of the two nations 162 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... was held in Tehran after a fifteen-year halt and multiple documents of cooperation and contracts were signed between the companies of the two nations (External economic policy, 2018). At this time, the trade value of the two countries increased by 25% and reached more than four billion EUR. In the numerous visits by the officials of both nations, the two sides always stressed the necessity of and their willingness for increasing their business and investment cooperation. Table 4 shows the investment of German corporations in Iran during this period. Table 3: Investment statistics of German corporations in IR Iran between 2013 to 2018 Year declared implement 2013 300 15 2014 276 415 683 2015 2 956 659 193 2016 1 877 013 427 2017 112 134 0 (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, 2018) (https://unctad.org, 2018) At this time, despite the eagerness of German corporations for investing in Iran, the attraction and entry of capital was quite slow due to two key reasons: First, the companies were concerned about the recurrence of sanctions or a change in attitude by Iran or any party to the JCPOA. Second, with the presidency of Trump in the US and his criticism and subsequent resignation from the deal, these concerns became real and led to the quitting of numerous European corporations from Iran, including Germans. Figure 4 shows the investment trend of German companies in Iran in this period. As indicated, despite the eager reception of German corporations (the dotted arrow) which led to growing involvement, the capital amount is not good and is declining.

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Fig 4. Investment of German corporations in Iran in the 2013-2017 3,500.000

3,000.000

2,500.000

2,000.000

1,500.000

1,000.000

500.000

0.000 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

A topic that must be considered in foreign investment is the difference between the declared investment and the received investment. The value of contracts and permits for the investment of German companies in Iran has always been on the rise with a significant value. However, the amount of the received investment is not that significant for different reasons. Considering the distribution of some of the said investments, note that of the total investments of the German companies in Iran, the industry sector with more than 46% has had the highest share. Further, the service and energy sectors each with more than 24% ranked after. Bear in mind that the agriculture and construction sectors with respectively 0.7 and 0.8 percent had the least attracted investment. Figure 5 shows the investment rate in each sector. Fig 5. Investment categories of German corporations in Iran in the 1997- 2018 periods Agriculture 0/7 Energy 23/13 Industry 46/69

Service 24/13

Construction 0/83

164 / The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations... Considering these sectors and their attracted investment, we can conclude that the industry sector has the highest appeal for German corporations in Iran. Fig 6. Investment of German corporations in Iran in the 1997-2017 3,500.000

3,000.000

2,500.000

2,000.000

1,500.000

1,000.000

500.000

0.000

2004 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 -500.000 1997

Conclusion Based on the study, the political variables in the mutual relationships significantly affect the investment of German corporations in Iran. Figure 6 shows the dotted arrow indicating the direction of foreign investment including projects ratified in Iran. This trend shows the interest of German companies for involvement in Iran's economy. Considering the potentials and opportunities presentable to the said corporations, it shows a good value. The solid arrow shows the actual capital entering Iran via the transfer of capital, technology, or equipment by German companies. It properly shows the effectiveness of political factors on the investment of German companies in different economic sectors of Iran which mostly results from the constant political differences in the relationships of the two countries. Hence, the high fluctuations of the said trend are caused by factors such as regional disputes, US limitations over trade and investment in Iran, deep differences concerning human rights and terrorism, and especially the issue of Israel. The discussed factors Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 165 significantly affect the investment of German corporations in Iran. As stated before, the highest political conflicts occurred in the 2005-2012 period. The above diagram properly shows the declining trend of investment in that period. During Ahmadinejad's time, the closeness of Germany to the US for countering Iran's nuclear program and numerous sanctions, Germany's criticism of human rights in Iran—especially after the protests following the second presidency elections—tensions over Israel and holocaust and the battle against terrorism, all led to the zero investment by German companies in Iran. In addition, after the nuclear deal and despite the numerous visits of the officials of the two nations and the declaration of willingness from investment companies for presence in Iran's market and the restarting of talks about terrorism, human rights and macro-level economics; the mentality of German banks and companies regarding the sanctions and the punishing acts of the US prevented a serious development in mutual cooperation. Note that the said cooperation had a positive trend in the 1997-2004 period, which was a result of the policy of tension-reduction and normalization of relationships in Khatami period. Hence, it is obvious that managing the effects of the said political variables can reduce their effect on foreign investment relations. To conclude, the development of political and economic relations will be in the interest of both nations. Accordingly, employing smart diplomacy, public diplomacy, and personal relationships with key political and economic figures of Germany can help promote the relationships of the two nations.

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