DOCSLIB.ORG

Journal File

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Journal File Biannual of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs Institute for Strategic 26 Research Vol. 8. No.2. Summer &Fall 2017 Advisory Board Mohsen Rezaee Mirghaed, Kamal Kharazi, Ali Akbar Velayati, Ahmad Vahidi, Saeed Jalili, Publisher Ali Shamkhanim, Hosein Amirabdolahian Institute for Strategic Research Editorial Board Expediency Council Seyyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour Professor, University of Tehran Managing Director Gulshan Dietl Mohsen Rezaee Mirghaed Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University Associate Professor, Mohammad Marandi Imam Hossein University Professor, University of Tehran Jamshid Momtaz Professor, University of Tehran Editor-in-Chief Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour Mohammad Javad Zarif Professor of the University of Professor, School of International Relations Tehran Mohiaddin Mesbahi Professor, Florida International University Hosein Salimi Professor, Allameh Tabatabii University Chairman of advisory board Seyed Jalal Dehghani Mohammad Nazari Professor, Allameh Tabatabii University Naser Hadian Director of Executive Affairs Assistant professor, Universuty of Tehran Hadi Gholamnia Vitaly Naumkin Copyediting Professor, Moscow State University Zeinab Ghasemi Tari Hassan Hoseini Assistant Professor, University of Tehran Layout and Graphics Mohammad Ali Shirkhani Najmeh Ghaderi Professor, University of Tehran Foad Izadi Professor, University of Tehran Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs (IRFA) achieved the highest ISSN: 2008-8221 scientific grade from the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology of Iran since 22 February 2012.Articles Published in this Journal are Indexed at the Islamic World Science Citation Center (ISC). Publication Address: No. 376,Taleghani Ave, Before Hafez Bridge, Tehran, Iran Institute for Postcode: 1591816911 Tel: +98 21 86046957 Strategic Research Website: irfajournal.csr.ir Email: [email protected] & [email protected] Price: 200000 Rials Contents The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) 5 Ehsan Egazi, Reza Simbar, Arsalan Ghorbani, Ahmad jansiz Syrian Crisis and Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership 25 Seyed Hasan Mirfakhraei Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy: Dialectics of Agent-Structure 51 Mehdi Kamkar, Rahman Najafi Sayar Cultural Diplomacy; Iran-Japan Relations during the Sanction Period 79 Faezeh Janati Moheb, Seyed Abbas Araghchi An Iranian Narrative of Tehran-Riyadh Tention Escalation 111 Ali Omidi, Zahra Aghmohamadi The Political economy of Iran and Germany Relations: The Case of Foreign Investment 139 Majid Rnjbardar, Davood Aghaee Refferees of this Issue Seyyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour Gulshan Dietl Mohammad Marandi Jamshid Momtaz Mohammad Javad Zarif Mohiaddin Mesbahi Hosein Salimi Seyed Jalal Dehghani Naser Hadian Vitaly Naumkin Mohammad Ali Shirkhani Foad Izadi The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) Ehsan Egazi Reza Simbar Arsalan Ghorbani Ahmad jansiz Abstract The US Congress, as a legislative pillar of democracy, has a significant impact on American foreign policy. Nevertheless, the role of the US Congress is not limited to domestic politics rather they would usually shape the country’s foreign policy. Since the Islamic Revolution, the US Congress has adopted an aggressive approach towards Iran. The US legislative institution, as a domestic source of US foreign policy, has shaped US foreign policy toward Iran by imposing economic sanctions. The purpose of the research is to increase the Iranian officials’ understanding of US domestic politics. Therefore, the main question of the research is concerned with the impact of the US congress on American foreign policy towards Iran (2005-2017). In order to answer the main question, the authors would use neo-classical theory. In addition to systemic factors, neoclassic realism considers domestic factors to explain foreign policy. The findings of research suggest that the US congress has encouraged the US administrations to pursue an aggressive policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran by imposing economic sanctions and persuading the US administrations to implement them. Keywords: Congress, US Foreign Policy, Islamic Republic of Iran, Neoclassic Realism, Foreign Policy Phd in International Relations, [email protected] Professor of International Relations, [email protected] Associate professor of International Relations, [email protected] Associate professor of international relations, jansiz@[email protected] Received: 29/8/2019 Accepted: 28/10/2019 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2017, pp. 5-24 Introduction Ever since the founding fathers established the United States as a nation-state, they decided to apply the principle of Montesquieu’s ideas on the separation of powers in the US political structure. Among the governmental powers, the Congress plays an exclusive role in the US political system to the extent that according to the US constitutions, this body is prioritized over the executive power and Supreme Court. For many years The Congress enjoys legal tools to restrict the authority of other branches of power, particularly that of the White House domestic and foreign policy sphere. Generally, when the Americans feel foreign threats and/or they suspect that internationalism may create a threat, they pay less attention to foreign policy recommendations coming from the White House. In such cases, they highly valorize the Congress activism in the area of foreign policy. It is hardly expected that in such conditions, disengagement from the international system imposes an enormous cost and above all, they believe that the US remains on the safe side. However, when the public believes that the country is facing a foreign threat, they feel the need for a powerful president. While any disagreement in the Congress is often welcomed at the time of peace, the disagreement would have best interpreted as inappropriate interference in vain or the worst interpreted as an “unpatriotic” action at the time of threat. In such conditions, the members of the Congress could feel the changes in the public opinion on the presidency and try to avoid being on the wrong side of the history because it may result in failure in the upcoming election. On occasions when the US is safe from the immediate foreign threat, we witness the period of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs / 7 “Congressional government”, “Congressional supremacy” and “government by Congress”; however, the power of making decision in foreign policy will be shifted to the White House at time of the crises such as 9/11 (Lindsay, 2012: 227-230) Taking into consideration the aggressive foreign policy of the US adopted against Iran after the Islamic revolution, it is of high importance to notify the impact of the US political domestic institutions on the foreign policy of this country against Iran. Therefore, this research attempts to assist the Iranian policymakers to pay more attention to the impact level of the US domestic policy on its foreign policy against Iran. One of the objectives of this research is finding an answer to the question that in case of any changes in the US domestic policy, should the Iranian policymakers expect any changes in the US foreign policy, or they should assume that the US foreign policy against Iran remains unchanged and consistent regardless of its domestic policy. Moreover, this research is going to minimize or possibly eliminate the Iranian policymakers' misunderstanding as for the US foreign policy against Iran. Due to different reasons such as the Iran nuclear program, the US has tried to apply various means like economic sanctions to prevent Iran’s empowerment in military and economic sectors within the last decade. The US has also been afraid of increasing Iran's influence in the region. Accordingly, the US has tried to have a tougher approach to make it impossible for Iran to achieve its goals. Taking into account the role played by the Congress as one of the internal foundations of the US foreign policy against Iran, this research analyzes the impact of the Congress on this process during the last decade. Accordingly, this research is going to find an answer to the question that how much the US Congress has affected the US foreign policy adopted against Iran (2005-2017). The authors will argue that the US Congress has formed the aggressive policy against Iran through the financial instruments including Iran sanction, military budget allocation to confront 8 / The Policy of the United States Congress Toward Iran (2005-2017) Iran, democracy promotion, and providing consultation for the White House. This article attempts to review the role played by the US Congress as one of the domestic resources of the US foreign policy, as notified by James N. Rosenau, on the foreign policy of the US against Iran. Taking into account the Congress extensiveness, this research has particularly and technically focused on the role played by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the most important members of the Congress in formation of foreign policy. The Congress is a "bicameral legislature" which was founded in Connecticut upon a compromise. Accordingly, the legislation right of the states with more population is protected through the establishment of the House of Representative and the request made by the small states for equality in legislation is met by the establishment of Senate. This structure reflects the orientation of the social class of the US founding fathers. They were looking for a balance between the interests gained by the regular
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iran's Persian Gulf Policy
    IRAN’S PERSIAN GULF POLICY This book discusses the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the states of the Persian Gulf from 1979 to 1998. It covers the perceptions Iranians and Arabs have of each other, Islamic revolutionary ideology, the Iran–Iraq war, the Gulf Crisis, the election of President Khatami and finally the role of external powers, such as the United States, in the region. Iran’s foreign policy has been more ideology based in the past but has become increasingly pragmatic. Today, Iran’s Persian Gulf policy does not differ greatly from that under the Shah. By tracing the policy over the past two decades, including a large number of interviews, the book helps to anticipate the relationship between Iran and the Gulf states. Christin Marschall completed her MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and received her PhD in History and Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University. She lives in London and travels frequently to Iran and the Arab world. The mightiest of the princes of the world Came to the least considered of his courtiers; Sat down upon the fountain’s marble edge, One hand amid the goldfish in the pool; And thereupon a colloquy took place That I commend to all the chroniclers To show how violent great hearts can lose Their bitterness and find the honeycomb. ‘The Gift of Harun al-Rashid’, W.B. Yeats IRAN’S PERSIAN GULF POLICY From Khomeini to Khatami Christin Marschall TO TIM First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.
    [Show full text]
  • Timeline of Iran's Foreign Relations Semira N
    Timeline of Iran's Foreign Relations Semira N. Nikou 1979 Feb. 12 – Syria was the first Arab country to recognize the revolutionary regime when President Hafez al Assad sent a telegram of congratulations to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The revolution transformed relations between Iran and Syria, which had often been hostile under the shah. Feb. 14 – Students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, but were evicted by the deputy foreign minister and Iranian security forces. Feb. 18 – Iran cut diplomatic relations with Israel. Oct. 22 – The shah entered the United States for medical treatment. Iran demanded the shah’s return to Tehran. Nov. 4 – Students belonging to the Students Following the Imam’s Line seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The hostage crisis lasted 444 days. On Nov. 12, Washington cut off oil imports from Iran. On Nov. 14, President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 ordering a freeze on an estimated $6 billion of Iranian assets and official bank deposits in the United States. March – Iran severed formal diplomatic ties with Egypt after it signed a peace deal with Israel. Three decades later, Egypt was still the only Arab country that did not have an embassy in Tehran. 1980 April 7 – The United States cut off diplomatic relations with Iran. April 25 – The United States attempted a rescue mission of the American hostages during Operation Eagle Claw. The mission failed due to a sandstorm and eight American servicemen were killed. Ayatollah Khomeini credited the failure to divine intervention. Sept. 22 – Iraq invaded Iran in a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
    [Show full text]
  • Full Issue File
    Biannual of Research Institute for Strategic Strategic for Institute Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 31 Vol. 11. No.1. Winter&Spring2020 Advisory Board Mohsen Rezaee Mirghaed, Kamal Kharazi, Ali Akbar Velayati, Ahmad Vahidi, Saeed Jalili, Publisher Ali Shamkhanim, Hosein Amirabdolahian, Ali Bagheri Institute for Strategic Research Editorial Board Expediency Council Seyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour Director Professor, School of International Relations Mohsen Rezaee Mirghaed Gulshan Dietl Associate Professor, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University Imam Hossein University Mohammad Marandi Professor, University of Tehran Jamshid Momtaz Editor-in-Chief Professor, University of Tehran Seyed Mohammad Kazem Mohammad Javad Zarif Sajjadpour Associate Professor, School of World Studies Professor of School of Mohiaddin Mesbahi International Relations Professor, Florida International University Hosein Salimi Professor, Allameh Tabatabii University Secretary of advisory board Seyed Jalal Dehghani Mohammad Nazari Professor, Allameh Tabatabii University Naser Hadian Director of Executive Affairs Assistant professor, University of Tehran Hadi Gholamnia Vitaly Naumkin Professor, Moscow State University Copyediting Hassan Hoseini Zeinab Ghasemi Tari Assistant Professor, University of Tehran Mohammad Ali Shirkhani Layout and Graphics Najmeh Ghaderi Professor, University of Tehran Foad Izadi Assistant Professor, University of Tehran Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs (IRFA) achieved the highest scientific ISSN: 2008-8221 grade from the Ministry of Science,
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making
    The London School of Economics and Political Science UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF STATE IDENTITY IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING The Rise and Demise of Saudi–Iranian Rapprochement (1997–2009) ADEL ALTORAIFI A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London, October 2012 1 To Mom and Dad—for everything. 2 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. The final word count of this thesis, including titles, footnotes and in-text citations, is 105,889 words. 3 ABSTRACT The objective of the thesis is to study the concept of state identity and its role in foreign policy decision-making through a constructivist analysis, with particular focus on the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement of 1997. While there has been a recent growth in the study of ideational factors and their effects on foreign policy in the Gulf, state identity remains understudied within mainstream International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and even Middle Eastern studies literature, despite its importance and manifestation in the region’s foreign policy discourses. The aim is to challenge purely realist and power-based explanations that have dominated the discourse on Middle Eastern foreign policy—and in particular, the examination of Saudi–Iranian relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Case File (April 2019)
    IRAN CASE FILE July 2020 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 The Executive Summary .............................................................4 Internal Affairs .........................................................................7 The Ideological File ......................................................................... 8 I. Supporters of Velayat-e Faqih and the Call to End the US Presence in Iraq .......................................................................... 8 II. Coronavirus Amid Muharram Gatherings in Najaf ............................ 9 The Political File ............................................................................12 I. The Bill to Hold Rouhani Accountable and the Conservatives’ Call for Him to Be Deposed .......................................12 II. The Supreme Leader Saves Rouhani From Interrogation and Rejects His Ouster .....................................................13 The Economic File ..........................................................................16 I. History of Economic Relations Between Iran and China .....................16 II. The Nature and Provisions of the 25-year Partnership Agreement ..... 17 III. Prospects of the Long Term Iranian-Chinese Partnership .................18 The Military File............................................................................ 20 Arab Affairs ............................................................................25
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Shifting Nuclear Narratives | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2469 Iran's Shifting Nuclear Narratives by Mehdi Khalaji Aug 12, 2015 Also available in Arabic / Farsi ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mehdi Khalaji Mehdi Khalaji, a Qom-trained Shiite theologian, is the Libitzky Family Fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis Detailed accounts by top Iranian negotiators and Khamenei himself show that the initial nuclear overtures between Washington and Tehran began well before President Rouhani took office, yet the Supreme Leader still seems intent on ducking responsibility. he debate in Iran about the nuclear deal has been heating up. The latest maneuvering centers on competing T narratives about the extent of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's responsibility for the negotiations and their outcome. KHAMENEI, THE MAJLIS, AND THE NUCLEAR TALKS P resident Hassan Rouhani's team insists that the deal should be adopted by Supreme National Security Council rather than the Majlis, partly because Rouhani has no authority to overrule the parliament's decision, but even more important because a Majlis vote would give the Supreme Leader a way to quietly reject the deal. Khamenei could not easily disguise his responsibility for a Supreme National Security Council decision because unlike Majlis bills, the council's decisions become law only after Khamenei's official approval. Khamenei has a long history of using unpublicized instructions to the Majlis as a way to have the government adopt policies for which he does not have to take responsibility. When he intervenes in Majlis affairs, he
    [Show full text]
  • The Long Road to Tehran the Iran Nuclear Deal in Perspective
    THE LONG ROAD TO TEHRAN THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL IN PERSPECTIVE BRYAN R. GIBSON STRATEGIC UPDATE 15.6 DECEMBER 2015 THE AUTHOR Bryan R. Gibson holds a PhD in International History from the London School of Economics, was a post- doctoral research fellow at the LSE’s Centre for Diplomacy and Strategy, and an instructor on Middle Eastern politics in the LSE’s Department of International History and the University of East Anglia’s Department of Political, Social and International Studies (PSI). He has taught undergraduate courses on U.S. and British politics toward the Gulf region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Arab nationalism, winning a departmental teaching excellence award in 2011. He also taught undergraduate and postgraduate courses on Middle Eastern politics at the University of East Anglia. He is the author of Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), Covert Relationship: U.S. Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran-Iraq War (Praeger, 2010), and co-edited with Professor Nigel Ashton, The Iran- Iraq War: New International Perspectives (Routledge, 2012). He also contributes regularly to publications dealing with Middle Eastern issues, like Foreign Policy, Middle East Eye, CNN, and Huffington Post. His research focuses on foreign policy decision- making with respect to the Middle East and Gulf regions. Specifically, he analyses U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf. Gibson 1 THE LONG ROAD TO TEHRAN THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL IN PERSPECTIVE The history of the Iranian nuclear issue is littered with missed opportunities. It is a history in which fixation on the perfect crowded out the good, and in whose rearview mirror we can see deals that look a lot better now than they seemed then.
    [Show full text]
  • The View from Tehran
    The View from Tehran Iranian Leaders’ Perspectives on the International Framework Agreement Centre for the New Middle East Policy Paper No. 3 (2015) Tom Wilson The Henry Jackson Society June 2015 THE VIEW FROM TEHRAN Summary • In the wake of the release of the negotiated framework agreement, Iranian leaders have categorically denied the validity of that agreement as presented in the US State Department fact sheet outlining what was agreed by the sides. All of the most critical components of the framework agreement have subsequently been challenged in the statements of Iranian officials. In addition to disputing that the fact sheet represents what was agreed at the Lausanne talks, Iran’s most senior figures have also claimed that the framework agreement is not in any way binding upon Iran. • It is apparent from the statements of the Iranian leadership that the regime regards the negotiations on the nuclear issue as a tactical step for advancing its national objectives, rather than as an opportunity for rapprochement with America and the West. In the regime’s narrative, Iranian negotiators have succeeded in forcing the international community to acquiesce and accept Iran’s nuclear programme. Indeed, Iranian leaders have presented their country’s gains in the negotiations as both a form of “resistance” against America, and as a victory over the West. • The view of the nuclear negotiations expressed by Iranian leaders fits into a wider pattern of hostility to the West, with the advancement of the nuclear programme being a core element of Iranian ascendancy. Rather than moderating anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric during the negotiations period, several Iranian figures – including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei – have continued, and even intensified, their use of aggressively anti-American language.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's New Narrative: the Regime Is Not in A
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 3434 Iran’s New Narrative: The Regime Is Not in a Hurry, But Washington Should Be by Omer Carmi Feb 11, 2021 Also available in Arabic / Farsi ABOUT THE AUTHORS Omer Carmi Omer Carmi was a 2017 military fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis By steadily implementing parliament’s anti-JCPOA law and making public statements about “cornered cats” and “closing windows,” Tehran has sought to give Washington a sense of urgency, but this approach could be a double- edged sword. n January 8, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explained that Iran is not “in a hurry” for Washington to return O to the nuclear deal, and that if sanctions are not lifted beforehand, then a U.S. return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action “may even be detrimental” to the Islamic Republic. He further hardened this stance in a February 7 speech, refuting proposals for any sequencing mechanism in which both countries make incremental moves back to the JCPOA. Instead, he emphasized that after Washington agrees to remove sanctions, Iran “will check if [they] have truly been lifted,” and only then resume its nuclear commitments. President Hassan Rouhani fell in with this narrative three days later, declaring that he supports “negotiations with enemies” in the framework of the Islamic Republic’s national interests, and noting that Tehran will fulfill its commitments once the United States and other parties implement theirs. These remarks are just part of a broader regime campaign to show Washington that Iran will not arrive at the negotiating table from a position of weakness, but rather with clear unity of purpose.
    [Show full text]
  • STRANGER THAN (SCIENCE) FICTION the Unpredicted Shrinking 2021 April of Ursula Von Der Leyen E
    EUR PE Diplomatic IRANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Looming uncertainties… concerns…dangers COCAINE AND CASTANETS Spain’s rôle in the international drugs trade STRANGER THAN (SCIENCE) FICTION The unpredicted shrinking 2021 April of Ursula von der Leyen E 3 BRUSSELS - PARIS - GENEVA - MONACO EUROPEDIPLOMATIC IN THIS ISSUE n JABS, JOBS, AND JACKASSES The few successes and many failures of the EU Covid vaccination programme .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................p.5 n STRANGER THAN (SCIENCE) FICTION 5 The unpredicted shrinking of Ursula von der Leyen .......................................................................p.12 n IRANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Looming uncertainties…concerns…dangers ......................................................................................................... p.18 n COCAINE AND CASTANETS 12 Spain’s rôle in the international drugs trade .................................................................................................p.28 n 20,000 TONNES UNDER THE SEA The growing use of narco-submarines in Europe .............................................................................. p.35 n NEWS IN BRIEF ....................................................................................................................................................................................................p.40 35 n POISONED ENTRAILS
    [Show full text]
  • Idden Rivalries Behind Iranian Foreign-Policy Making
    idden Rivalries behind Iranian Foreign-Policy Making: H The Case of Zarif’s Resignation The Background: Foreign-policy Circles of Power in the Islamic Republic Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era: From Apex to Zenith The Present: Resignation and Back amid a Troublesome Presidential Chief of Staff Rajjab 1440 40 March 2019 2 © KFCRIS, 2019 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 40 - 25/3/2019 L.D. No: 1440/8472 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 3 Hidden Rivalries behind Iranian Foreign-Policy Making: The Case of Zarif’s Resignation Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 4 Abstract Iran’s government and foreign policy have been thrust into turmoil by the sudden resignation from his post and subsequent reinstatement of foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The unexpected development adds to the increasing difficulty of the Hassan Rouhani administration to avoid slipping into the classic “lame-duck” position of presidential tenures approaching their end. With little over two years remaining of his second and last mandate, Rouhani is increasingly hemmed in by a growing inability to direct the key levers of policy, particularly the economic and foreign-policy components, and has now been hit by a salvo of unexpected friendly fire. This article will provide the background to Zarif’s decision, the reasons behind its rescinding by Rouhani, and the consequences for the government and the rest of the establishment. Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 5 The Background: Foreign-policy Circles of Power in the Islamic Republic Since reaching the unmatched pinnacle In order to gain a better understanding of the of having successfully negotiated the Joint reasons that led to Zarif’s sudden departure, it is Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of worth casting a brief glance at the institutional 2015 to the Supreme Leader’s satisfaction positioning of the foreign minister position in and approval, Javad Zarif’s tenure as foreign the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Russian Conundrum
    Iran’s Russian Conundrum By Alex Vatanka Summary Following Russia’s decision in September 2015 to intervene militarily in the Syrian war, speculation has been rife in Washington that President Vladimir Putin’s ultimate end-goal is to eclipse America’s long-held dominance in the Middle East. To that end: Moscow needs regional allies that can abet its ambitions. At least in American eyes, no other state can be more useful to Russian machinations than the ardently anti-American Islamic Republic of Iran. Given the fluid state of geopolitics in the Middle East—defined by ongoing conflicts in a number of theaters and uncertainty among US partners and allies about Washington’s commitment to the region—the question of Iran as a conduit for Russian ascendency is both timely and proper. That said, Iran’s checkered history with the Russian Federation since 1991 informs that while Tehran and Moscow have common interests at times, the path toward a possible strategic partnership is bound to be long and arduous at best. Historical Context One might believe that Iran and Russia today enjoy a semblance of “strategic cooperation.” Defenders of such grand assertions most often point to the ongoing joint Iranian-Russian military campaign to keep Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in power. In reality, Russian and Iranian officials have labeled their bilateral relations “strategic” as early as the dawn of the 1990s. It was then, during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, when major defense and economic agreements were first announced. 1 In other words, those championing closer Iranian-Russian ties will argue that this so-called fraternity did not begin in Syria in 2015 but that it came to a climax in that Arab state’s civil war: at that point, Tehran and Moscow’s interests dovetailed to a great extent.
    [Show full text]