RESPONDING TO CRISES: ARE CURRENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES THE ANSWER?

Doubt is widely expressed whether the United Nations can cope with the large increase in peace-keeping demands that have been made on it in recent years. Experience shows there is every reason to believe that it can. But assuring that it does will require both administrative reforms and a new commitment of resources and purpose from member countries, including some of those now expressing doubts. Julian Harston Dans bien des milieux, on met en doute l’aptitude des Nations Unies à répondre aux demandes, de plus en plus nombreuses ces dernières années, d’interventions pour le maintien de la paix. Or, l’expérience montre qu’on a toute raison de croire l’ONU à la hauteur de cette tâche. Pour cela, cependant, il lui faudra non seulement se réformer sur le plan administratif, mais aussi compter sur un plus ferme appui et de plus vastes ressources de la part des pays membres, y compris de certains d’entre eux qui expriment aujourd’hui des doutes à son égard.

efore dissecting the capabilities of the UN, I’d like to sions have been launched. Peacekeepers were usually sent to start by calling attention to Canada’s extraordinary cope with conflict between states. Today, peacekeeping B contribution to the UN in general and to peacekeep- forces are more often deployed to deal with civil conflict, in ing in particular. In 1948, Canada began its proud tradition which one or more of the parties are warlords. of participation in UN peacekeeping missions, starting with Some commentators have claimed that the UN is UNTSO (the UN Truce Supervision Operation) in the Middle unable to perform any tasks beyond “old” peacekeeping. East in 1948 and continuing through at least 30 other mis- The UN has demonstrated that it can do the job, and do it sions. I recall that when I worked with Kofi Annan at well, when it is given the right mandate, resources, organi- UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force) HQ in Zagreb, when- zational structure and political support. There is no reason ever there was a problem, his first response was always: the UN should always be less well equipped than regional “Let’s ask the Canadians.” organizations to undertake these tasks. In addition, there is As a UN peacekeeping official I will concentrate on the no guarantee that there will always be a suitable and willing role of the UN—one of the main players—in responding to regional organization to carry them out. international crises. I come to this issue with some level of At the start of this new century, the United Nations must experience. I was the head of the UNPROFOR political unit be equipped—managerially, structurally and politically—to during its last ill-fated days, followed by a year in Belgrade meet both short and long-term demands. International emer- dealing with the Yugoslavs: a challenging, frustrating, and gencies will demand that we continue to respond through always interesting experience. I then served as representative humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. of the Secretary-General and chief of the fourth peacekeep- Humanitarian assistance is essential, but it does not ing mission in Haiti. Now I find myself back in the Balkans address the root causes of crises. Similarly, peacekeeping, as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. despite its intrinsic value, is often a holding action—an The founders of the United Nations could not have attempt to give warring sides breathing room in which to set- envisaged the number and the complexity of the conflicts tle their differences. It is crucial that we focus more inten- and crises we now face. In its first 40 years, the UN deployed sively on longer-term peace-building. Recent experience in 13 peacekeeping operations. Since 1988, more than 40 mis- Haiti shows just how difficult this is—a case of no money and

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little co-operation from a country lacking politi- n the euphoric aftermath of the US-led and cians with any real sense of responsibility. Another I UN-sanctioned Gulf War in 1990 there were question for another day is: what are we to do unrealistic expectations of the capacity of the UN about failed states? to prevent, manage and resolve international con- The UN’s 50th flict. Many commentators on international affairs et me begin with humanitarian assistance. It said that the UN was belatedly fulfilling the anniversary L is essential that humanitarian assistance be dreams of its founders. The UN was given military turned into a delivered in accordance with certain principles. jobs that it was ill equipped to carry out in places First, it is intended for those “in need,” that is, like Angola, Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. wake rather those who are unable to obtain for themselves The UN’s 50th anniversary turned into a the basic essentials of life—food, clean water, wake rather than a celebration. The performance than a shelter and medical care—because of either natu- of the UN in field operations doomed former ral calamity or man-made disaster. It is not Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The celebration. intended to feed military personnel, unless they widespread conclusion was that the UN was inca- are being demobilized, and it is not intended to pable of conducting peacekeeping operations. The UN’s enrich the ruling or commercial classes. When former Under-Secretary-General for Second, humanitarian assistance must be Peacekeeping Bernard Miyet was appointed, he performance in delivered in a strictly impartial way. was told by a number of people that he had field operations Organizations must not select their beneficiaries secured an international sinecure, as the organi- on the basis of ethnic origin, religious persuasion, zation would never again be actively engaged in doomed former or political affiliation. Children, of course, may be peacekeeping. given priority, and programs should recognize the Those difficult missions were flawed in con- Secretary- particular needs of women in disaster situations. ception and inadequate in execution. In the Third, if governments are unable to provide words of the Brahimi report on UN Peace General Boutros for the humanitarian needs of the victims of dis- Operations (available at http://www.un.org/ asters, they are under strong moral obligation to peace/reports/peace_operations/): Boutros-Ghali. allow humanitarian organizations to do so. In It should have come as no surprise to anyone fact, gaining access to victims is a major chal- that some of the missions of the past decade The widespread lenge in day-to-day fieldwork, and in recent con- would be particularly hard to accomplish: they conclusion was flicts has become part of the strategy of the war- tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in ring parties. If the UN and other international victory for any side, where a military stalemate or that that UN players cannot reach the victims, we are funda- international pressure or both had brought fight- mentally impaired in doing our work. It is impor- ing to a halt but at least some of the parties to the was incapable of tant and tragic to note that since January 1994, conflict were not seriously committed to ending 177 UN civilian staff members have been killed the confrontation. United Nations operations thus conducting in the field and some 240 have been taken did not deploy into post-conflict situations but hostage or kidnapped in places where the blue tried to create them. peacekeeping flag failed to protect them. Only three culprits Those who had been eager to give the were brought to justice by their national govern- United Nations expanded responsibilities, operations. ments for the murders of UN staffers. including key members of the Security Council, Interaction between the political and were now among the loudest critics of the organ- humanitarian spheres must improve. Since the ization. They did not avoid the politics of blame, start of the last decade, major humanitarian but neither did they own up to their fair share of operations have been mounted in the midst of responsibility for the UN’s failures. In addition, armed conflict in different areas around the many Western politicians and the international world, but the political and humanitarian agen- media seemed unable to recall the other UN suc- das are often at odds. cesses of recent years—in Mozambique, Namibia The impact of the global media on humani- and, to a degree, Cambodia. tarian assistance is another complicating factor. The price of failure was a crisis of confidence Sensational coverage of major humanitarian within the Security Council and a significant crises certainly helps to secure funding for decline in commitment to United Nations peace- much-needed assistance, but it also distracts keeping. In July 1995, 67,269 troops were attention from already “forgotten” emergencies deployed in UN missions as compared with only and creates competition between immediate and 24,657 troops in July 1996. long-term assistance. In response to the reduction in peacekeeping

52 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2001 Responding to crises and in light of the financial crisis afflicting the the value of UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the organization, the UN encouraged other institu- UN has become a more cautious bride. Brahimi tions, mainly regional organizations, to take a even comes close to suggesting that in certain more active role in the maintenance of interna- circumstances the Secretary-General can, and tional peace and security. This policy was also should, say no. After a few based on the logic that regional peacekeeping As the United Nations begins another era of operations might be more effective because they broad engagement in peacekeeping, it may be years of have a greater stake in resolving conflicts close to asked: Have we learned the lessons of the recent unpopularity, home and a greater sensitivity to the needs of past? Can the United Nations do better in the warring factions. Moreover, it reflected the real- future? Or is the UN being sent into new opera- international ization that the United Nations has no monopoly tions that are doomed to failure? on peacekeeping. Some of my answers, which I submitted to peacekeeping is It didn’t take much for the United Nations to the Brahimi panel on UN Peace Operations, are persuade regional organizations to conduct reflected in the panel’s report: again in fashion. peacekeeping operations. In fact, some had been Certain axiomatic pre-requisites for success- the most vociferous critics of UN peacekeeping ful peace operations are well known and will New missions and were keen to embrace a greater operational doubtless form the basis for the panel’s examina- role for themselves. tion of their task. These are that each operation have been However, the general record of regional should have an achievable mandate, the co-oper- established in peacekeeping has proved to be as mixed as that of ation of the parties and proper resources to do the the United Nations. The ECOWAS (Economic job, to which we might add the political will of Kosovo, East Community of West African States) Monitoring the Security Council to see the job through and the Group, ECOMOG (Economic Community flexibility of the Secretariat to allow the adminis- Timor, Sierra Monitoring Group), was deployed in Liberia with tration to base its work on the overall priorities of a mandate to gain a cease-fire, to protect civilians, the mandate. Leone, and and restore law and order. The force was not able And on the United Nations’ capacity for to impose a cease-fire. A UN peacekeeping mis- rapid deployment: Ethiopia and sion, UNOMIL (UN Observer Mission in Liberia), When the Security Council has decided to was established and worked to implement the establish a peace mission it is vital that the var- Eritrea. ECOWAS-brokered peace agreement leading to ious components—military, civilian police, civil- In some ways, the successful joint monitoring of the 1997 elec- ian staff arrive swiftly—even if the early arrivals tions, which ended Liberia’s terrible civil war. are only temporary. Member States must be asked this is at least a In Georgia, another UN operation, UNOMIG to take measures to ensure the rapid recruitment (UN Observer Mission in Georgia), works closely and deployment of competent military personnel tacit recognition with OSCE (the Organisation for Security and police ... Countries, which are able to do so, Cooperation in Europe) and the peacekeeping should place stand-by forces and police at the of the value force of the Commonwealth of Independent disposal of the Secretary-General. Special atten- States (CIS). tion should be paid to the importance of provid- of UN In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton ing a number of “instant packages” deliverable Agreement authorized NATO to deploy a combat- at short notice. peacekeeping. ready force of more than 60,000 heavily armed Finally, on resources and structure at troops to supervise an established cease-fire and Department Headquarters: to separate the former warring parties. IFOR and The abiding impression of senior visitors to its leaner successor SFOR (the NATO Stabilization the policy areas of the Department of Force) have been successful in creating a secure Peacekeeping in New York is one of a department environment and stabilizing the military situa- which is working under enormous pressure with a tion. Regional peacekeeping has dramatized the lack of human resources and above all a lack of varying political, financial and technical capabil- time. The constant pressure of in-house meetings ities of regional organizations. coupled with the demands of Member States and the inexorable tidal flow of events in the Security fter a few years of unpopularity, internation- Council mean that there is little time to draw A al peacekeeping is again in fashion. New breath, let alone indulge in the “luxury” of dia- missions have been established in Kosovo, East logue and policy development. The answer to this Timor, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia and Eritrea. In lacuna is relatively simple—additional middle- some ways, this is at least a tacit recognition of level staff in the relevant departments and a

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much closer relationship between the Department ecently I was talking to Dr. John Mackinlay of of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department R Kings’ College London, who said, “in of Political Affairs. UNTAES, you have shown that the UN can run an operation—keep the peace—when the weather is There needs to efore going any further, let me set for you a relatively fine, but the perception is still that you B scenario: A country, divided for two or more can not do so in a storm. You can not do it in par- be a change of years as a result of areas that had a minority eth- ticular because the Department of Peacekeeping in culture in nic group breaking away from the central gov- New York is weak and the culture there is wrong. ernment. All but one of those areas has been Under these circumstances it would be a coura- New York ... returned to central government control by force. geous permanent representative of the UK in New The remaining “rebel” area is small, with a pop- York who encouraged Her Majesty’s Government The capabilities ulation of less than a quarter of a million, but to commit a battalion of UK forces under UN con- contiguous with a large and supportive neigh- trol in a warlike situation.” of the bour. The military liberation of this last corner My immediate reaction was to rehearse the would cause much bloodshed and is considered usual arguments about P-5 (the five permanent Department undesirable by the international community. members of the Security Council) responsibility, A peace accord is put in place, which guar- plethora of mandates and resolutions. But actual- of Peacekeeping antees the peaceful transition of this territory ly he is right. There needs to be a change of cul- Operations back into the mother country over a given peri- ture in New York—and I am glad to say Brahimi od of time with considerable protection for the goes some way to address this. The capabilities of need to be remaining minority population. The accord is DPKO (the Department of Peacekeeping followed by the intervention of a large UN force Operations) need to be augmented; with this and augmented; together with a civilian component and an SRSG the careful choice of senior experienced staff, I with plenipotentiary power. Over a two-year believe that in the medium term the UN will with this and period, there is a slow withdrawal of forces and a present a more convincing case to manage peace- transition of power. The transition works. keeping even when the glass is falling. the careful This scenario sounds idealistic, but it actu- The new Under-Secretary-General for ally happened in UNTAES (the UN Transitional Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, choice of senior Administration in Eastern Slavonia), one of the is taking vigorous measures to make DPKO’s man- experienced most successful UN missions in 50 years. agement capacities more effective, and to Clearly, there are many lessons to be learned strengthen and reform the department’s structure. staff, I believe from this. He outlined some of these measures to the Fourth The advantages of the plan for UNTAES were Committee in November, including some key that in the (1) its conciseness, (2) the extent of governing structural changes that are essential at this stage. authority it bestowed on the transitional admin- First, the creation of a third Assistant medium term istrator, (3) the integrated chain of command Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police from the transitional administrator on down Affairs to bolster the management team of an the UN will and encompassing all military units, and (4) the expanding department and to give priority to the clarity of mission objectives, including full relations between the department and troop- and present a more demilitarization and the establishment of a tran- police-contributing states. convincing case sitional police force and civilian government Second, a restructuring of the military divi- structures to replace illegitimate authority. All sion, including the designation of senior officers to manage this was incorporated in (5) a rigorous time to oversee the distinct tasks related to: mission schedule. planning, force generation and management of peacekeeping In contrast to the fully integrated UNTAES the UNSAS (the UN Standby Arrangement mission, the Dayton Accord mandated an System) for military personnel, training and eval- even when the unprecedented number of international organi- uation and military operations. zations to pursue peace, but did not create an Third, strengthening of the Civilian Police glass is falling. effective co-ordinating mechanism. In Europe, Unit in DPKO and enhancing the role of the so many organizations are seeking a role that Civilian Police Adviser. what seems to result is an inefficient and dys- Fourth, creation within DPKO of a public functional structure as was the case in Kosovo, information unit, drawing on the support of DPI where an assortment of international institu- (the Department of Public Information). tions is involved in peace building. Apparently, Fifth, transformation of the Lessons Learned the lessons of the past are learned slowly. Unit into a peacekeeping doctrine and best-prac-

54 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2001 Responding to crises tices unit. He wants the new unit “to become the There is no doubt in my mind that the change manager of the department, developing United Nations can respond effectively to inter- best-practice procedures, enhancing the institu- national crises. The question is, do its members tional memory of DPKO, and having a strong want it to and are they prepared to pay for it? input during the planning of new operations.” There is no Lastly, creation of a small gender unit in Julian Harston is Deputy Special Representative of the DPKO to ensure the systematic integration of Secretary-General UNMIBH (the UN Mission in doubt in my gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations. Bosnia and Herzegovina). mind that the United Nations Letter—Courrier attract the mainstream. Like their Japanese coun- terparts, mainstream Canadian voters don’t find can respond any credible alternative to the Liberals. Moreover, SIR—Regarding “Canadian Politics and One-Party effectively to Government,” by Jeffrey Simpson (Jan/Feb. 2001). the Liberals seem to have taken most of the wind While newspaper editorials are promoting the idea out of the Alliance’s sails by adopting the most international that the Progressive Conservative party should join stringent budgetary regime in generations and hands with the right-wing Alliance under the rubric replacing the budget deficit with an enormous sur- crises. of uniting the right, it is overlooked that the Liberal plus. Public concerns have shifted to finding more Party has been able to unite the centre, where most resources for health care, education and the envi- The question is, voters reside, and is in the process of becoming, like ronment—hardly strong points for the Alliance. the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, the sole The Liberals’ $100 billion in tax cuts is another do its members governing party of Canada. page stolen from the Alliance platform. The Despite many scandals, the LDP has ruled Japan Liberals now seem unassailable from the right, want it to and which leaves the right-wing parties in disarray. since the end of the World War II mainly because are they Japanese voters don’t see any credible non-ideologi- The Progressive Conservative party used to be cal alternative. Of course, the LDP also benefited a mainstream party, one the voters could elect if prepared to from Japan’s post-war economic boom. But through the Liberals veered too much to the right. Now most of the 1990s Japan has been in recession and with the Conservative Party trying to become pay for it? scandal after scandal has rocked the LDP. Yet another right-wing party and with right-wing vot- Japanese voters continue to make it the largest con- ers being such a small minority, the Liberal Party tingent in the Diet. The party has been able to seems poised for permanent victory. In the last regroup after every scandal and win the election election, Japan’s united right-wing populist parties mainly because its right-wing and left-wing oppo- went down to stunning defeat at the hands of the nents have failed to inspire. The LDP’s strength lies in LDP. Canada’s Liberals will do the same to any the fact that, like the Liberal Party of Canada, it is not united right-wing party, since most Conservative tied to either right-wing or left-wing ideology. voters are likely to switch to the Liberals if the PC The current Prime Minister, Yshiro Mori, is Party and the Alliance join hands. extremely unpopular as a result of his inability to act As McGill Prof. Elisabeth Gidengil pointed out decisively during the recent accidental sinking of a in The 1997 Canadian Federal Election: “The Liberal Japanese fishing trawler by an American nuclear party was acceptable to a definite majority of submarine. Under pressure from his own party, he Canadians: ... as many as 60 per cent of voters has announced that he will resign next month after would have had the party as their first or second presenting the budget. Yet despite the LDP’s woes choice. And somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the the opposition parties are so divided between right Conservatives were the most frequent second and left that they have failed to gain support. The choice, especially those who voted Liberal ... only party that has gained in popularity is the Arguably, Charest and his advisers made the Communist Party of Japan, which has presented wrong strategic calculation in 1997 election. itself as market-oriented socialist party. But this will Instead of targeting Reform, they might have done not be enough to beat the LDP, which retains its better to focus on disgruntled Liberal supporters.” credibility among mainstream voters. Joe Clark may be making the same wrong cal- The same has happened to Canada. While the culation by trying to join hands with the Alliance. Conservatives and the Alliance are trying to win right-wing votes, the Liberal Party has been able to Mahmood ELAHI, Ottawa

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