General Assembly 15 November 1999
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United Nations A/54/549 Distr.: General General Assembly 15 November 1999 Original: English Fifty-fourth session Agenda item 42 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35 The fall of Srebrenica Contents Paragraphs Page I. Introduction ..................................................... 1–9 6 II. Background ..................................................... 10–40 8 A. Break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force ............... 10–14 8 B. Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the outbreak of war ..... 15–19 9 C. Humanitarian activities ....................................... 20–23 9 D. Proposals for a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina ...... 24–28 10 E. The peace process ........................................... 29–32 11 F. Srebrenica prior to the safe area resolutions ....................... 33–40 13 III. Adoption of Security Council resolutions 819 (1993), 824 (1993) and 836 41–102 16 (1993) ......................................................... A. Minimal consensus within the Security Council .................... 41–44 16 B. The concept of safe areas ...................................... 45–51 16 C. Security Council resolution 819 (1993) ........................... 52–58 18 D. Srebrenica demilitarization agreement of 18 April 1993 ............. 59–62 19 E. Security Council mission to Srebrenica and further demilitarization agreement of 8 May 1993 ...................................... 63–65 19 99-34876 (E) 271199 A/54/549 F. Security Council resolution 824 (1993) ........................... 66–69 20 G. End of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; moves to strengthen the safe area regime ..................................................... 70–77 21 H. Security Council resolution 836 (1993) ........................... 78–79 22 I. Positions of Security Council members on resolution 836 (1993) ...... 80–92 23 J. Reluctance to use force to deter attacks on safe areas ............... 93–95 25 K. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 836 (1993) (S/25939) .................................................. 96–98 26 L. Efforts to lift the arms embargo ................................. 99–102 26 IV. Evolution of the safe area policy: June 1993-December 1994 ............. 103–174 29 A. Initial implementation of the safe area policy ...................... 103–105 29 B. Mount Igman crisis .......................................... 106–113 29 C. Proposals to exchange Srebrenica and • epa for Serb-held territory around Sarajevo ................................................... 114–116 30 D. Markale massacre and disagreements on the use of air power ......... 117–123 31 E. United Nations assessment of the safe area policy as of March 1994 . 124–130 32 F. Attack on Gora• de: March-April 1994 ........................... 131–145 34 G. Report of the Secretary-General of 9 May 1994 (S/1994/555) ......... 146–152 36 H. Contact Group peace plan ..................................... 153–156 37 I. Serb assault on the safe area of Bihae: October-December 1994 ....... 157–163 38 J. Report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389) . 164–174 39 V. Events of January-June 1995 ........................................ 175–225 44 A. Cessation of hostilities agreement and its collapse .................. 175–184 44 B. Air strikes around Sarajevo .................................... 185–189 45 C. United Nations Protection Force hostage crisis ..................... 190–200 46 D. Report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444) ........ 201–209 48 E. Bosniac attempt to break the siege of Sarajevo and its consequences for the United Nations ........................................... 210–212 49 F. Rapid reaction force .......................................... 213–220 49 G. Fighting around Srebrenica .................................... 221–225 51 VI. Overview of deployment in Srebrenica: February-July 1995 ............... 226–238 53 VII. Fall of Srebrenica: 6-11 July 1995 .................................... 239–317 57 A. 6 July: attack on observation post Foxtrot; request for close air support . 239–245 57 B. 7 July: pause in Serb attack .................................... 246–249 58 C. 8 July: request for close air support discouraged; Bosnian Serb Army overruns observation post Foxtrot; ARBiH kill Dutchbat soldier ....... 250–261 59 2 A/54/549 D. 9 July: events leading to blocking position and warning to Serbs ...... 262–276 61 E. 10 July: Bosnian Serb Army violates warning; use of close air support deferred ................................................... 277–296 63 F. 11 July: initial confusion over air support; Srebrenica falls .......... 297–317 67 VIII. Aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica: 12-20 July 1995 .................... 318–393 72 A. 12 July: meetings with Mladie; deportation commences .............. 318–328 72 B. 12 July: Security Council resolution 1004 (1995) ................... 329–339 75 C. Night of 12 July: sporadic killing begins .......................... 340–345 76 D. 13 July: killing of hundreds of unarmed men and boys begins ........ 346–360 77 E. 14 July: mass executions commence; European Union negotiator meets Miloševie and Mladie ........................................ 361–374 80 F. 15 July: massacres continue; agreement reached between Mladie and the United Nations Protection Force ................................ 375–382 82 G. 16-18 July: reports of atrocities begin to surface .................... 383–390 83 H. 19 July: Mladie and United Nations Protection Force Commander meet again and conclude agreement .................................. 391–393 85 IX. Fall of • epa and the new safe area policy: July-October 1995 ............. 394–464 87 A. Preparations for the attack on • epa: 11-14 July 1995 ............... 394–396 87 B. Attack, resistance and negotiations in • epa: 14-20 July 1995 ........ 397–402 87 C. First formal reports of atrocities from Srebrenica ................... 403–404 88 D. London meeting and changes in the approach to the use of air strikes . 405–410 89 E. Operational arrangements resulting from the London meeting ......... 411–414 90 F. Fall of • epa and the flight to Serbia ............................. 415–431 90 G. Operation Storm and the United States-led peace initiative ........... 432–437 93 H. Attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo ....................... 438–441 94 I. Operation Deliberate Force .................................... 442–445 95 J. Serb assessment of Operation Deliberate Force ..................... 446–447 95 K. Pause; a new peace map; opening a road into Sarajevo .............. 448–450 96 L. Resumption of air and ground attacks ............................ 451–455 97 M. United States-led peace initiative; concerns about the mandate ........ 456–459 98 N. Croatian offensive and the end of hostilities ....................... 460–464 99 X. Peacekeeping and the Peace Agreement: October-December 1995 .......... 465–466 100 XI. The fall of Srebrenica: an assessment ................................. 467–506 102 A. Role of the United Nations Protection Force in Srebrenica ............ 470–474 102 B. Role of Bosniac forces on the ground ............................. 475–479 103 3 A/54/549 C. Role of air power............................................. 480–483 104 D. Unanswered questions......................................... 484–487 104 E. Role of the Security Council and Member States .................... 488–493 105 F. Failure to fully comprehend the Serb war aims ..................... 494–497 106 G. Lessons for the future ......................................... 498–506 107 Annexes I. Senior United Nations personnel in the former Yugoslavia referred to in the report by their titles ...................................................................... 110 II. Individuals interviewed in the preparation of the report ............................ 111 Maps The former Yugoslavia ....................................................... 5 Vance-Owen Peace Plan (January 1993) .......................................... 15 Safe areas designated under Security Council resolution 824 (1993) ................... 28 Union of three republics plan (August 1993) ..................................... 42 Contact Group peace plan (July 1994) ........................................... 43 Dutchbat deployment around Srebrenica (June 1995) ............................... 56 Bosnian Serb Army attack on Srebrenica (July 1995) ............................... 71 Execution sites and mass graves ................................................ 86 Inter-entity boundary line established by the Dayton Peace Agreement ................. 101 4 A/54/549 5 A/54/549 I. Introduction 1. This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of General Assembly has afforded me the opportunity to General Assembly resolution 53/35 of 30 November 1998. explain why the United Nations failed to deter the Serb In that paragraph, the General Assembly requested: attack on Srebrenica and the appalling events that “a comprehensive report, including an assessment, followed. on the events dating from the establishment of the 4. In my effort to get closer to the truth, I have returned safe area of Srebrenica on 16 April 1993 under to the origins of the safe area policy, discussing the Security Council resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April evolution of that policy over a period of several years. I 1993, which was followed by the establishment