RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2017.0019 Vol. 8 (2017), n. 3, pp. 231-246
STUDI
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will John Lemos(α)
Ricevuto: 01 febbraio 2017; accettato: 24 agosto 2017
█ Abstract This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ “Free Will” as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by criti- cal points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can be de- fended against points raised by both Dennett and Harris. KEYWORDS: Free Will; Libertarianism; Compatibilism; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris
█ Riassunto Una risposta libertaria a Dennett e Harris sul libero arbitrio – Questo articolo prende critica- mente in esame gli argomenti principali presentati nel volume di Sam Harris “Free Will” e gli aspetti princi- pali della concezione compatibilista proposta da Daniel Dennett sul libero arbitrio. Intendo sostenere che Dennett, pur rispondendo accuratamente alla critica del compatibilismo proposta da Harris, sostiene un compatibilismo che resta sotto il giogo delle critiche sollevate da Bruce Waller. Inoltre, cercherò di sostenere che il rifiuto della prospettiva libertaria proposto da Harris è una posizione male informata e illustrerò i principi di fondo della prospettiva libertaria di Robert Kane, affermando che la si può difendere dalle criti- che sollevate sia da Dennett che da Harris. PAROLE CHIAVE: Libero arbitrio; Libertarianismo; Compatibilismo; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris
SEVERAL YEARS AGO DANIEL DENNETT In what follows, I offer a defense of the published an essay, Reflections on Free Will, libertarian perspective on free will by ad- which was an extended discussion of Sam dressing key points raised in the works of Harris’ book, Free Will. Harris’ book offers both Dennett and Harris. I argue that while an extended critique of the compatibilist Dennett provides good replies to Harris’ cri- conception of free will which Dennett en- tique of compatibilism, there are deeper prob- dorses as well as a critique of libertarian con- lems with Dennett’s view which have been ceptions of free will. While differing on the raised poignantly by Bruce Waller. Addition- merits of compatibilism, Dennett and Harris ally, I contend that the challenges to libertari- both believe that libertarian views are deeply an free will voiced by both Harris and Dennett problematic. are answerable and in doing so, I support a
(α)Philosophy and Religion Faculty, Coe College, 1220 First Avenue NE – 52402 Cedar Rapids, Iowa USA E-mail: [email protected] ()
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232 Lemos libertarian view akin to that of Robert Kane. deficiencies in Dennett’s approach I can pro- Early on in Sam Harris’ book, Free Will, vide some motivation for giving the libertari- he states: an view another and closer examination. Sam Harris discusses two psychopaths, Ste- Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply ven Hayes and Joshua Komisarjevsky, who not of our own making. Thoughts and in- committed horrible crimes. Reflecting on these tentions emerge from background causes of psychopaths and their actions, he writes: which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have As sickening as I find their behavior, I the freedom we think we have. Free will is have to admit that if I were to trade places actually more than an illusion (or less), in with one of these men, atom for atom, I that it cannot be made conceptually coher- would be him: There is no extra part of ent. Either our wills are determined by pri- me that could decide to see the world dif- or causes and we are not responsible for ferently or to resist the impulse to victim- them, or they are the product of chance and ize other people. Even if you believe that we are not responsible for them.1 every human being harbors an immortal soul, the problem of responsibility re- Daniel Dennett and I both think this is a mains: I cannot take credit for the fact bad argument, but we do so for different rea- that I do not have the soul of a psycho- sons which reflect our different perspectives path. If I had truly been in Komisarjev- on the nature of free will and moral responsi- sky’s shoes on July 23, 2007 – that is, if I bility. As a compatibilist, Dennett attacks had his genes and life experience and an Harris’ assertion that «our wills are deter- identical brain (or soul) in an identical mined by prior causes and we are not respon- state – I would have acted exactly as he sible for them». As a libertarian, I find Har- did. There is simply no intellectually re- ris’ assertion that if our wills are not deter- spectable position from which to deny mined «then they are the product of chance this. The role of luck, therefore, appears and we are not responsible for them» to be decisive.2 problematic. It is my view that to have the kind of free Harris is suggesting that had he been born will which would make us morally responsi- into the world with exactly the same kind of ble in such a way as to be deserving of praise nervous system and faced exactly the same and blame and reward and punishment we environmental conditions as these two psy- must engage in some causally undetermined chopaths then Harris himself would have free acts which enable us to be the ultimate committed awful crimes. According to causal authors of our characters and the actions determinism, all future events, including hu- which proceed from them. Dennett and Har- man decisions and actions, are a necessary ris, indeed most contemporary philosophers, consequence of prior states and events and the reject such an approach. Nonetheless, in later laws of nature. Thus, given one’s starting stages of this essay I will try to take some points in life this makes all the difference to strides in showing why such a libertarian where one will end up and what one will do. view may be correct. Before doing so, howev- And since one’s starting points are a matter of er, I will turn my attention to Dennett’s re- luck beyond one’s control, then what one ul- sponse to Harris. While I agree, with many of timately does in later life is a matter of luck Dennett’s criticisms of Harris’ argumenta- beyond one’s control. In this way Harris be- tion, I do feel that the compatibilist view he lieves that free will is incompatible with a de- defends is problematic in significant respects. terministic picture of the universe. This in It is my hope that by revealing some of these turn helps explain his assertion that:
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 233
[A] neurological disorder appears to be tions is rightly held responsible for what she just a special case of physical events giving does. Such a person can understand the mor- rise to thoughts and actions. Understand- al norms and laws and the consequences for ing the neurophysiology of the brain, non-compliance and has the kind of self- therefore, would seem to be as exculpato- control to guide his or her conduct in accord- ry as finding a tumor in it.3 ance with such understanding. According to Dennett, these rationality and self-control On Harris’ view, a deterministic universe conditions for free morally responsible action is a universe in which the kind of free will can be met by the normal human being even which grounds just deserts responsibility if determinism is true. does not and cannot exist. Dennett replies that these arguments are [W]e don’t hold everybody responsible; as wrongheaded. He notes that while it’s true [Harris] notes, we excuse those wo are un- that our genetic heritage is a matter of luck responsive to demands, or in whom change and much of the environmental conditions we is impossible. That’s an important differ- are exposed to as we mature into adults is a ence, and it is based on the different abili- matter of luck, it does not follow from this ties or competences that people have. that determinism precludes us from having Some people (are determined to) have the the kind of free will that supports just deserts. abilities that justify our holding them re- sponsible, and some people (are deter- Harris can’t take credit for the luck of his mined to) lack those abilities. But deter- birth, his having had a normal moral edu- minism doesn’t do any work here; in par- cation – that’s just luck – but those borne ticular it doesn’t disqualify those we hold thus lucky are informed that they have a responsible from occupying that role.5 duty or obligation to preserve their com- petence, and grow it, and educate them- In his essay Dennett defends at length this selves, and Harris has responded admira- compatibilist conception of free and respon- bly to those incentives. He can take credit, sible action against the criticisms made by not Ultimate credit, whatever that might Harris. As noted, I think he provides an ad- be, but partial credit, for husbanding the mirable defense against these arguments. In resources he was endowed with.4 what follows, I would like to test the merit of his views by considering points raised in re- According to Dennett, while it’s a matter cent work by Bruce Waller.6 For Waller’s ar- of luck whether we are born with normal guments present a more serious challenge to human brains and whether we are provided Dennett’s position.7 with a normal moral education, if we are Waller believes we lack the kind of free will born normal brained and given a normal that makes us morally responsible in the basic moral education then we will rightly be held desert sense. Because of this he thinks practices morally responsible for our actions and of blame and punishment are ethically indefen- blamed and punished for our wrongdoing. sible, as they perpetrate unjust harms upon The normal brained human being who is giv- others. In supporting his view, he subjects both en a normal moral education will have the libertarian and compatibilist conceptions of kind of rationality and self-control which jus- free will and responsibility to significant criti- tifies ascriptions of responsibility. The nor- cisms. While I don’t find his case against liber- mal person, who is neither psychopathic nor tarianism to be all that compelling, I do find his suffering from other kinds of neurological or case against compatibilism to be convincing. psychological disorders nor acting under du- Waller contends that Dennett has «de- ress or threat, raised under normal condi- veloped the most philosophically famous ver-
234 Lemos sion of the plateau argument for moral re- fectually (had she continued deliberating, sponsibility».8 The plateau argument rests on as Barbara did, she would have remem- ideas noted above which Dennett develops in bered the relevant facts Barbara brings to response to Harris. The idea here is that once the equation and would have chosen and a person reaches a certain level of competence acted as Barbara did), while Barbara de- in terms of rationality and self-control she is liberates more thoroughly and effectively? rightly held morally responsible for her ac- Why – within a naturalistic scientific ex- tions. The typical adult human being meets planatory system – does one deliberate these conditions; those who don’t are the vic- well and the other poorly? Plateau advo- tims of especially deficient upbringings or cates of moral responsibility counsel that mental disorders or act under duress or we need not look more closely: both Ann threat.9 As noted, Dennett thinks that for and Barbara have reached the plateau of many of us it will be a matter of luck whether moral responsibility, both are capable of we meet the rationality and self-control condi- deliberation and choice, and both are tions for being a morally responsible person; morally responsible for their choices. In however, all those who meet these conditions contrast, moral responsibility abolitionists should be treated as equally responsible for insist on seeking an explanation for why their conduct. Thus, given two adults meeting Ann and Barbara chose differently.11 the plateau conditions for moral responsibil- ity, if they face the same choice and one acts Waller goes on to suggest that on a natu- badly while the other acts virtuously it is ap- ralistic world view we should expect there to propriate to reward the latter and to blame or be sufficient causal reasons why Ann deliber- punish the former. ated briefly and made the poor choice and Waller takes issue with this aspect of Barbara didn’t. Dennett’s view. Waller, a moral responsibil- ity abolitionist, writes: [G]iven a naturalistic framework and the character [Ann] has and the situation she Plateau advocates of moral responsibility was in, she could not have made the better insist that there is a general level of moral choice that Barbara made. Those consid- responsibility, and beyond that level, the erations do not imply that it was not Ann’s individual differences have no effect on own faulty choice, or that she should be moral responsibility. Moral responsibility deprived of all future opportunities to abolitionists reply that even very small make choices, or that she is an incompe- differences in capacities invalidate claims tent who should be excluded from our and ascriptions of moral responsibility.10 moral community, but it does mean that it is unfair to blame Ann for a choice she To support this point, Waller tells the story could not avoid making. In stark contrast of Ann and Barbara, each of whom must make stands the moral responsibility system, in the choice of whether to enjoy a weekend at which Ann has reached the plateau of the beach or keep a promise to help a friend competence, and therefore she is morally move. He has us suppose that they both meet responsible: no questions asked, no inquir- Dennett’s conditions for the plateau of moral ies allowed.12 responsibility and he says that Ann makes the choice to go to the beach while Barbara delib- Given the truth of the naturalistic erates longer and decides to keep her promise worldview, Waller believes there are deter- to help her friend. ministic causal reasons why Ann is the way she is and why she made the poor choice and Why does Ann deliberate briefly and inef- why Barbara made the good choice. He agrees
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 235 with Dennett that they may both meet the ra- The no-blame system only works against a tionality and self-control conditions which our background of blame and the omnipresent society has set as the conditions for responsi- threat of punishment, the suspenders that ble agency, but he thinks it is fundamentally hold up the pants.15 unfair to regard them as equally responsible and, thus, while the one deserves praise the In a response to Dennett’s review, Waller other deserves blame and punishment. He acknowledges that he has not provided a fully thinks Dennett’s view gives an accurate de- worked out alternative to the moral responsi- scription of how the moral responsibility sys- bility system, but he still contends that the tem works, but he doesn’t believe it accounts moral responsibility system should be abol- for the fairness of the system. It is because of ished as it is not fair enough. It is not fair the inherent unfairness of Dennett’s approach enough, because there is no rational alterna- to understanding the nature of free will and tive for us than to opt into this system which moral responsibility that Waller rejects it. treats all minimally rational and self- Dennett is familiar with Waller’s criti- controlled adults as equally responsible even cism. In a detailed review of Waller’s Against though on a deterministic naturalistic under- Moral Responsibility,13 he responds to it. standing of the world this is clearly not the Dennett argues that the societal rule which case. He reminds us how Dennett says the holds that those who meet certain minimal moral responsibility system is fair enough be- levels of rationality and self-control shall be cause we choose to play “the moral responsi- held equally moral responsible for their ac- bility game.” Waller states: tions is fair, because (1) having such rules is essential to the maintenance of a civilized so- But here the sports/game metaphor be- ciety and (2) we contract into living in such a comes less helpful. If I don’t like football civilized society due to the benefits it offers. and its rules, I can play a new game… But in life we can’t select another game, or choose You don’t have to play the moral responsi- a different social system: this is the only one bility game; you can be a hermit on an oth- available, unless we decide to be hermits. erwise deserted island, fishing and forag- For profoundly social animals, that’s not an ing. But if you want to enjoy the benefits of attractive option – especially when those living in a civilized society, you have to who remain in the game would classify us as play the game.14 demented, and fit only for treatment, and unworthy of respect or affection. If we don’t Dennett goes on to contend that to ade- play we are banished not just from society, quately refute him Waller must present a plau- but from the human community.16 sible way of maintaining a civilized society without the moral responsibility system that Waller’s response to Dennett is funda- Dennett endorses. He acknowledges that Wal- mentally sound. While Waller admits that he ler provides an account of this, but he contends has not fully worked out a no-blame system that it is utterly deficient. to replace the moral responsibility system, he Waller tries describing a society in which has still shown that Dennett cannot explain people would not be blamed and punished for why the moral responsibility system is fair their errors and crimes, but Dennett says the enough. The problem with Dennett’s ap- no-blame system he describes could plausibly proach is that he’s a compatibilist who thinks work only if there were some harsh, punitive that even if all events, including human ac- consequences for those who continually engage tions and decisions, are causally determined in wrongdoing and are not receptive to nonpu- by prior states and events, then we can still nitive measures. rightly be held morally responsible for our
236 Lemos actions. On Dennett’s view, even if determin- ternative to it which rejects the notion that ism is true then we can rightly be held re- people can be morally responsible in such a sponsible in acting if we meet his rationality way as to deserve blame and punishment. and self-control requirements. But, as Waller I would note that the driving force of Wal- shows quite forcefully, with his examples of ler’s critique of Dennett’s view is his spelling Ann and Barbara, once we accept a natural- out of the implications of determinism. He istic deterministic perspective we should also shows how it is that on the deterministic believe there are sufficient causal conditions model two people who meet Dennett’s com- which are beyond Ann’s control which have patibilist conditions of responsibility will still led her to be the way she is and which explain be shaped to be as they are by factors beyond why she could not have made the better their control and this will in turn shape the choice which Barbara made. Barbara and Ann way they respond to situations they face. In meet Dennett’s requirements for morally re- this way, we are led to see that it is a matter of sponsible agency, but once we accept a deter- constitutive luck that when faced with the ministic worldview we must also concede that same choices Ann makes a poor choice and Ann has come to be who she is through factors Barbara makes a good choice. We might won- beyond her control and because of who she is der here whether the belief in determinism is she makes the poor choice she makes. In this true and we might also wonder whether inde- way, a deterministic worldview really does terminism of the right sort in human decision- undermine the belief that people are morally making could help us make sense of morally responsible for what they do, and as such it responsible agency. undermines the belief that the moral respon- Now, both Dennett and Harris believe that sibility system is fair. indeterminism in human behavior and deci- Additionally, Dennett’s retort that the sion-making will offer no help in supporting a system is fair since we opt into it is misguided belief in free will and moral responsibility; in- for precisely the reasons Waller gives – it is deed, as I note above, most philosophers (in- “an offer one can’t refuse”, as Don Corleone cluding Waller) believe such a libertarian ap- would say. Opting out of the moral responsi- proach will not help matters. Notice how Har- bility system to live as an isolated hermit is ris says in a passage I quoted earlier: not a decision we can expect any reasonable person to make. Thus, the fact that we par- Either our wills are determined by prior ticipate in the moral responsibility game is no causes and we are not responsible for sign of its fairness. Now Dennett might say, them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them.17 But, still, the benefit we get from the mor- al responsibility system is a civilized socie- The presumption here is that if our actions ty. By having a system that allows for pun- or decisions are not determined then they ishment of those that don’t conform to would be chance happenings – matters of luck the rules which protect rights to life, liber- – not reflective of our free will and thus not ty, and property, we all stand to benefit. acts or decisions for which we could be moral- ly responsible. In this way, Dennett may feel that his Both Dennett and Harris reject the liber- compatibilist model of moral responsibility is tarian idea that indeterminacy in human de- justified. However, while Waller would have cision-making could help in making the case to concede that there are some benefits to the for free will and moral responsibility. In what moral responsibility system, it is still a system follows I will examine their criticisms of such that is unfair in significant respects and we libertarian approaches to free will and re- should continue to search for a workable al- spond to them.
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 237
█ Harris’ argument considered currences are by definition ones for which I can claim no responsibility. And if certain of Harris’ critique of the libertarian ap- my behaviors are truly the result of chance, proach has two prongs to it. First, as noted, they should be surprising even to me. How he thinks the indeterminacy involved in lib- would neurological ambushes of this kind ertarian accounts of free will suffer from a make me free? Imagine what your life problem of control robbing luck. Second, he would be like if all your actions, intentions, thinks the view is scientifically indefensible. beliefs, and desires were randomly “self- Regarding the latter he states: generated” in this way. You would scarcely seem to have a mind at all. You would live Today the only philosophically respectable as one blown about by an internal wind.20 way to endorse free will is to be a compati- bilist – because we know that determinism, Now, what are we to make of all of this? in every sense relevant to human behavior, Harris finds it scientifically implausible to is true. Unconscious neural events deter- think that any or our decisions could be caus- mine our thoughts and actions – and are ally undetermined. But do we really know this themselves determined by prior causes of to be true? And why does Harris think this is which we are subjectively unaware.18 true? In support of this he cites the empirical findings of Benjamin Libet21 and other neuro- He goes on to note how some thinkers be- scientists. Harris says he starts each day drink- lieve the occurrence of quantum level inde- ing either coffee or tea. He says he had coffee terminacy in brain functioning could allow today, but he says this choice could not have for causally undetermined free actions, not- been consciously made, because, ing that biologist Martin Heisenberg holds such a view. However, Harris responds: the intention to do one thing and not an- other does not originate in consciousness Quantum effects are unlikely to be biologi- – rather, it appears in consciousness, as cally salient in any case […] [F]ew neurosci- does any thought or impulse that might entists view the brain as a quantum com- oppose it.22 puter. And even if it were, quantum inde- terminacy does nothing to make the con- It is in supporting this point that he in- cept of free will scientifically intelligible.19 vokes the experiments of Benjamin Libet and others, which he believes to have shown that Clearly Harris believes that neuroscience with respect to all of our decision-making tells us that our decision-making is causally there are always unconscious neural processes determined, and, furthermore, even if some occurring prior to our conscious actions and of our decisions were causally undetermined decisions which determine them. it wouldn’t help matters any. This latter The problem with Harris’s argument here is point reflects his belief that undetermined that the experimental data from Libet and oth- decisions would essentially be random hap- ers have been significantly challenged in the penings unreflective of our free will. In fur- philosophical literature. In Alfred Mele’s Free ther support of this point, he states: Will and Luck,23 Ch. 2, he clearly demonstrates that Libet’s experiments do not in fact show If my decision to have a second cup of cof- that all of our actions are causally determined fee this morning was due to a random re- by unconscious neural activity. Libet’s findings lease of neurotransmitters, how could the are also criticized in Ch. 4 of Mark Balaguer’s indeterminacy of the initiating event count Free Will As An Open Scientific Problem.24 Since as the free exercise of my will? Chance oc- Harris appeals to the Libet experiments in
238 Lemos making his case for the claim that all of our ac- sion-making, citing work on the effects of tions are causally determined by unconscious “implementation intentions”.27 neural activity, he really should have included For the reasons cited above, we have good some response to the thoughtful criticisms of reason to believe that Harris’ argument for this line of argument which have been made by the view that all human decisions are causally Mele and Balaguer. determined by unconscious neural activity is As noted, Harris also cites other, more re- inadequate. However, it still might be cent empirical research which is in line with thought that Harris is correct in maintaining the research of Libet. For instance, he cites that causal indeterminacy in decision- the work of Haynes, Fried, Mukamel, and making wouldn’t help matters any. It might Kreiman, Haggard.25 In more recent writings, be thought that he is correct when he says Mele has developed arguments which sug- that causally undetermined decisions are gests these experimental findings also fail to chance events and not the sorts of events for show that all of our actions are determined which we can be morally responsible. In re- by unconscious neural activity. For instance, sponding to this other prong of Harris’ case he grants for the sake of argument that Libet against the libertarian view, it should be not- and these others may well have shown that in ed that Harris’ discussion of the issues is too the experiments they’ve performed the ex- brief. He seems unaware of the various re- perimental subjects did engage in decision- sources that are available to libertarian phi- making caused by unconscious neural activi- losophers in dealing with this criticism. Be- ty.26 However, it does not follow from these fore concluding that this problem of chance very limited findings that all human deci- or luck is decisive he should have given some sion-making is caused by unconscious neural consideration to the various ways in which activity. In the experiments performed, sub- libertarians, such as Mark Balaguer, Laura jects make trivial, morally neutral decisions Ekstrom, Robert Kane, and Timothy in a short frame of time. In these cases, it was O’Connor among others,28 have addressed learned that neural activity leading up to ac- this problem. In what follows, I will develop a tion occurred before the agents were con- response to this criticism of libertarianism sciously aware of intending to act, suggesting using key ideas and arguments from Robert that the decision to act occurs before one is Kane. Much of my own work on free will has consciously aware of it. Harris takes such ex- focused on Kane’s approach, and while my perimental findings to suggest that all of our own views differ from his in some respects, it decisions are causally determined by uncon- is safe to say that I find his approach to be scious neural processes. But, Mele notes that correct in its essentials.29 the experimental conditions in which these Kane’s libertarian view acknowledges that subjects act does not warrant such a universal most of the free willed acts we perform and claim about all human decision-making. He for which we are morally responsible are notes that we often make difficult moral de- causally determined by our character, by the cisions after consciously considering which kinds of persons we are. On his view, such option is best over an extended period of causally determined actions can have a deriv- time. Given the significant difference in the ative freedom and we can be morally respon- nature and duration of such deliberation, we sible for them insofar as we have shaped our have reason to doubt the claim that all hu- character through prior causally undeter- man decision making is causally determined mined free actions, which he calls “self- by unconscious neural processes. He goes on forming actions” (SFAs). So, for instance, I to note there are also some experimental am walking down the street and I see a wom- findings which suggest that our conscious an unknowingly drop her purse and without mental processes do play a role in our deci- thinking about it I pick it up and give it back
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 239 to her. This action is most likely determined must: (i) be reasons responsive; (ii) possess tel- by my character, the kind of person I am. At eological guidance control over his action; (iii) this point in my life, I am the kind of person be uncoerced; (iv) not be controlled or manipu- who is just the sort to do this kind of thing. lated by other agents; and (v) act intentionally But, on the Kanean view I can be said to act and not accidentally nor by mistake. The char- freely in returning this woman’s purse and I acter-forming SFAs themselves must also satis- can be morally responsible for doing so, inso- fy these criteria as well as being causally unde- far as I have in the past shaped my character termined and plural voluntary. Harris’ primary by engaging in causally undetermined free concern is how we can be responsible for such acts – SFAs – that have contributed to my SFAs if they are causally undetermined. His being the kind of person I am now. Notice thinking is that if they are causally undeter- already that we see one problem with Har- mined then they are mere chance occurrences, ris’s conception of the libertarian view. Earli- matters of luck, for which we cannot be morally er I noted how he says, responsible. Thus, they cannot be the basis for our moral responsibility when our acts are Imagine what your life would be like if all causally determined by our character. your actions, intentions, beliefs, and de- This argument is at the heart of Harris’s ob- sires were randomly “self-generated” in jection to libertarianism, but it is based on con- this way. You would scarcely seem to have fusion. Using certain points originally made by a mind at all. You would live as one blown J.L. Austin,31 Kane shows that the mere fact about by an internal wind.30 that an action is causally undetermined does not mean that it is an utterly random happen- Here, in talking about the libertarian con- ing for which we have no moral responsibility. ception of freedom, he has us imagine what Imagine that an assassin tries to shoot and kill our lives would be like if all of our actions the President, and imagine that it is causally were causally undetermined. But as we can undetermined whether he will have a nervous see the libertarian need not believe that all twitch as he pulls the trigger, leading him to human decisions need to be causally unde- miss his target. Suppose that despite this inde- termined in order for us to make sense of free terminacy in the process of firing his rifle, he will and moral responsibility. Kane, as well as succeeds in killing the President. If so, he will other libertarians, need not hold that all of have succeeded in what he was trying to do the free willed acts for which we are respon- and, thus, he will be responsible for killing him. sible are causally undetermined. Even if a jury knew the fact that he might have Nonetheless, Kane does believe that when twitched and instead missed the President, they we are causally determined to act as we do we would not regard him as any less responsible are free in such action and morally responsible for his action. Kane gives other similar sorts of for it only to the extent that we have shaped the examples which clearly demonstrate how one character from which these acts flow from pri- can be morally responsible for causally unde- or causally undetermined free acts, the SFAs. termined actions. To be more precise, Kane believes that we can Admittedly, there is a difference between only be ultimately free and responsible for acts the case of our assassin and someone who causally determined by our character when makes a causally undetermined decision. The those acts flow from a character formed by assassin’s mind was made up when he at- some prior SFAs and in addition when those tempted to kill the President. In the case of causally determined acts that flow from a char- the assassin, the causal indeterminacy rests in acter so formed also meet certain kinds of whether or not he will have a nervous twitch compatibilist criteria of free and responsible in his arm as he pulls the trigger. A critic, action. That is, in performing them the agent such as Harris, may feel that if the indeter-
240 Lemos minacy lies in the decision-making process of each other. Relating this to the example of an agent, then there may nonetheless be a re- the businesswoman, he states: sponsibility undermining luck involved that is not present in the case of the assassin. The input of one of these neural networks Kane addresses this worry in his writings. consists in the woman’s reasons for acting He argues that when we engage in causally morally and stopping to help the victim; undetermined SFAs we are torn between do- the input of the other network comprises ing two or more things which we would like her ambitious motives for going on to her to do and which we feel we have good reason meeting. The two networks are connected to do. This leads us to deliberate about what so that the indeterminism that is an ob- it is best to do, and such deliberation ends stacle to her making one of the choices is when me make a choice to do one thing or present because of her simultaneous con- the other. He often uses the example of an flicting desire to make the other choice – ambitious businesswoman on her way to an the indeterminism thus arising from a important business meeting. On her way, she tension – creating conflict in the will […] sees an assault taking place in alley. She This conflict […] would be reflected in wants very much to make it to her business appropriate regions of the brain by meeting, but she also feels obligated to stop movement away from thermodynamic and help prevent this assault. Consequently, equilibrium. The result would be a stir- she deliberates about what she should do. ring up of chaos in the neural networks Kane hypothesizes that in these sorts of situ- involved. Chaos in physical systems is a ations when we deliberate we are actually en- phenomenon in which very small changes gaged in efforts to do each of the things we in initial conditions are magnified so that want to do. So, on Kane’s view in her process they lead to large and unpredictable of deliberating the woman is trying to go on changes in the subsequent behavior of the to her business meeting and she is trying to system […] [S]ome scientists have suggest- stop and prevent the assault. The signifi- ed that a combination of chaos and quan- cance of this is that even if her decision is tum physics might provide the genuine in- causally undetermined she will be morally re- determinism one needs. If the processing sponsible for her choice either way, since of the brain does ‘make chaos in order to whichever choice she ends up making it will make sense of the world’ (as one recent re- be a result of her own effort – a result of search paper puts it), then the resulting what she was trying to do. Thus, as the assas- chaos might magnify quantum indetermi- sin was responsible for his causally undeter- nacies in the firings of individual neurons mined killing of the President because it was so that they would have large-scale inde- what he was trying to do, so too persons en- terministic effects on the activity of neural gaged in causally undetermined SFAs will be networks of the brain as a whole.32 responsible for their decisions either way. Kane argues that this conception of caus- Here Kane is suggesting some way in ally undetermined libertarian free choice which we might scientifically understand need not involve any appeal to mysterious how such causally undetermined SFAs could theories of dualism, agent-causality, or nou- occur, as opposed to appealing to the myste- menal selves. Rather, as he argues there are rious theories of dualism, agent-causation, or ways of accounting for such free causally un- noumenal selves, as various libertarians have determined decisions in naturalistic terms. done in the past. More recently, in The Ox- He suggests that in SFAs our conflicting ef- ford Handbook of Free Will,33 Kane has em- forts might be carried out in recurrent neural phasized a point made by philosopher of sci- networks in the brain which can influence ence, Robert Bishop. Bishop points out that
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 241 one need not even have to appeal only to to understanding free will and moral responsi- chaos to get these effects. For, as he notes, bility is overly brief. It overlooks the resources open to those who are sympathetic to such an the exquisite sensitivity needed for both the approach. Were he to make a convincing case sensitive dependence arguments and the for rejecting such an approach, he would need normal amplification of quantum effects is to engage the kinds of issues I raise here and a general feature of nonlinear dynamics and engage the abundant literature in which these is present whenever nonlinear effects are ideas and arguments have been made. Since he likely to make significant contributions to doesn’t do so, there is no reason for an in- the dynamics of the system.34 formed philosopher to take his critiques of the libertarian approach seriously. This is significant because it is generally agreed that nonlinear dynamics is a pervasive █ Dennett’s argument considered feature of the functioning of human brains.35 Kane is not saying that this is exactly what is Dennett, on the other hand, has presented going on in our brains when we make the kinds more serious challenges to the libertarian of difficult decisions like that of the business- theory of free will. He is well-versed in the woman. He would acknowledge that his views literature on free will, and he understands on this are speculative, while asserting that they that to refute the libertarian view one must are in the realm of possibility. His point is that delve more deeply into the arguments made if we have the kind of free will that makes us for the view. In his classic Freedom Evolves,37 morally responsible, then some of our actions he devotes a full 42 pages to the exposition must be causally undetermined. His theory of and critique of Kane’s libertarian view. In SFAs and the dual efforts involved in them is what follows, I will address two of the central intended to show that such a view is coherent, criticisms he makes against Kane’s view. and his discussion of recurrent neural networks The first criticism I want to consider is and the magnification of quantum indetermi- Dennett’s own version of the luck problem. nacies is intended to show how this theory In Freedom Evolves, Dennett argues that if might fit with a modern scientific world view. the decisions that establish our free will are Kane is a naturalist, and he believes that we will the products of quantum level indeterminacy not really know whether we have libertarian which occurs in some of our decisions, then free will until we learn more about the brain why shouldn’t we say that such decisions are and how it operates. free willed when the indeterminacy of our Admittedly, this view has been subject to a decisions is generated from a source external lot of criticism in the philosophical literature. to our brains? He has us imagine that when As noted, much of my own philosophical engaged in difficult decisions the indetermi- writing has focused on these criticisms; and, nacy doesn’t occur in your brain. while I have found some of them to be apt, I have found many of them to be answerable. I Suppose the indeterministic neurons in should note as well that Kane is not the only your faculty of practical reasoning died, philosopher to give a naturalistic account of leaving you disabled for any future SFAs. libertarian free will. For others, see the work But suppose, fortunately for you, that the of Balaguer, Ekstrom, and Mele.36 Regarding damaged part of your brain could be re- Mele’s work on the subject, I would note that placed by an indeterministic prosthetic de- he is not committed to a libertarian view, but vice implanted in just the right milieu in he has worked out a version of libertarianism the healthy part of your brain. A good way which he regards as plausible and coherent. to get genuine quantum indeterminism in- Harris’ rejection of the libertarian approach to a physical device is to use a little bit of
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decaying radium and a Geiger counter, but – whether inside the neurons of your brain or it might not be healthy to have such a radi- in an external randomizer – we should be um randomizer implanted in your brain, so concerned about whether such causally unde- it could be left in the lab, surrounded by a termined behavior is free willed behavior for lead shield, and its results could be fed into which we can be responsible. your brain on demand, by a radio link […] Dennett’s critique here focuses too much The location of the randomizer in the lab on randomness. On Kane’s view, free willed obviously shouldn’t make a difference, decisions are causally undetermined but they since it is functionally inside the system; it are not random. Think of our businesswom- would play exactly the same role as the an. Whichever act she does whether (A) pre- damaged neurons used to play, no matter venting the assault or (B) going to her busi- where it was geographically.38 ness meeting, it will be caused by her effort to A if she does A or by her effort to B if she Dennett knows we would be uncomforta- does B. Whichever act she does, it will be ble saying choices dictated by external ran- caused, but causally undetermined, by her dom processes are free willed. His point is effort. As such, what she does will not be a that there is no difference between having random happening but a product of her ef- these as the source of the indeterminacy or fort either way; and, as I’ve argued earlier, having the indeterminacy result from quan- she will be responsible either way. tum indeterminacy in neural functioning. Furthermore, technically, it does not nec- Thus, we should be skeptical of Kane’s view. essarily matter if one uses a prosthetic device He notes that in correspondence Kane external to one’s brain that allows one to has said, make the relevant causally undetermined de- cisions. As long as the device is, as Kane the indeterminacy-producing mechanism notes, «responsive to the dynamics within must be responsive to the dynamics with- the agent’s own will» such that it is respon- in the agent’s own will and not override sive to the competing efforts of the agent and them or it would be making the decisions her reasoning in all the ways that her normal and not the agent. functioning brain would be, then an agent using such a device would still not make ran- Dennett sees Kane as suggesting here that dom decisions. Rather, such an agent would an external source of randomness would make causally undetermined decisions for threaten the agent’s autonomy, the agent’s abil- which she’d be responsible, since either way ity to make decisions for himself. Thus, on her decisions would be reflective of her will. Kane’s view it would seem the causal indeter- The second criticism which I want to con- minacy must have its source in brain function- sider runs deeper. Dennett argues that if ing where it can be responsive to the will of the Kane’s view were true, then we would not ev- agent. er have any way of knowing whether a per- In response to this Dennett writes, son was morally responsible for his actions. For on Kane’s view to be morally responsible wouldn’t it be much safer – and hence more one must have engaged in some causally un- responsible – to keep the randomizer inside determined SFAs. But, as Dennett notes, for you, under your watchful eye in some sense? an act to be an SFA it will have to be a deci- No. Randomness is just randomness.39 sion resulting from magnification of quan- tum level indeterminism occurring in the The point seems to be that wherever the neurons of the brain. causal indeterminacy is situated randomness is just randomness. So, wherever you place it The price libertarians pay for sequester-
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 243
ing their pivotal moments in subatomic whether they have engaged in causally unde- transactions in some privileged place in termined SFAs which made them the mur- the brain (at time t) is that they render derers they are now. Yet, this is something we these all-important pivots undetectable by cannot know.43 both the everyday biographer and the ful- Dennett concludes: ly equipped cognitive neuroscientist.40 Why should the metaphysical feature of According to Dennett, on Kane’s view Ultimate Responsibility […] count more neither the common man on the street nor than the macroscopic features that can be fully trained cognitive scientists would ever defined independently of the issue of be able to discern whether a person is morally quantum indeterminism, and that are well responsible, because we could never tell motivated in terms of the decision- whether a person has engaged in the causally making competences that agents have or undetermined SFAs which are supposed to lack? Indeed, why should metaphysical make us responsible. Ultimate Responsibility count for any- Dennett says that in correspondence Kane thing at all? If it can’t be motivated as a has replied that any theory of free will shall be grounds for treating people differently, faced with difficulties in determining which why should anyone think it a variety of persons meet the conditions of moral responsi- free will worth wanting?44 bility. Thus, according to Kane, this shouldn’t count as good reason to reject his view. In re- Dennett’s view is that Kane’s conception sponse to this, Dennett says Kane’s view does of free will provides us with a free will not nonetheless have difficulties on this front that worth wanting because it will be useless in other views don’t have, and this can justify a distinguishing between those who are re- rejection of Kane’s view.41 sponsible and deserving of punishment and In support of this criticism, Dennett has those who are not. Kane has said in his de- us consider that we have 100 murderers. fense that any theory of free will runs into Suppose that 60 of them had either bad life problems making such distinctions, but Den- experiences and upbringings or neurological nett’s point is that other theories, such as his problems that give us good reason to believe own compatibilist view, will only have this they are not responsible for their crimes. Al- problem when dealing with the 10 marginal so, imagine that 10 of them are borderline; cases among our 100 murderers, whereas there are some problems in their life situa- Kane’s view won’t even allow us to determine tions or their neurology which lead us to the responsibility of the 30 normal brained wonder whether they had enough self- murderers with normal upbringings. control and understanding to be morally re- There is something to Dennett’s argu- sponsible for their crimes. Finally, suppose ment here. On the Kanean view we won’t be that the remaining 30 had healthy nervous able to know who is ultimately responsible systems and «normal-to-exemplary upbring- and who is not. Kane himself admits that we ings».42 According to Dennett, what we don’t know whether we engage in causally should want from our conception of free will undetermined decisions which are to serve as and moral responsibility is a concept that will the ground for our free will and morally re- help us determine who among these murder- sponsibility. Additionally, it must be conced- ers deserves punishment and who does not. ed that if it is correct, a compatibilist view, He claims that Kane’s view will not help. For such as Dennett’s, has the advantage that it even to determine whether any of the 30 would enable us to know who is responsible normal brained and normally raised murder- and who is not. For we can verify which per- ers are responsible we would have to know sons have the kind of self-control and rea-
244 Lemos sons responsiveness to understand the moral if we do have free will. The belief in free will is norms and conform to them. too important for moral notions like that of However, compatibilist views, like Den- desert, and notions of desert are too im- nett’s, have this advantage only if they are cor- portant to our sense of self-worth and human rect. As I argued earlier, using key arguments dignity. We should continue to search for the from Bruce Waller, such compatibilist views metaphysical and empirical evidence of liber- are problematic. The examples of Ann and tarian free will, while at the same time devel- Barbara make it clear that just because two oping the moral and pragmatic arguments for persons facing the same decisions and who living and acting as though we have this kind both meet Dennett’s competency conditions of free will. If the moral/pragmatic argument for responsibility might not both be responsi- is sound, then the libertarian could justify ble for their different choices. For if determin- holding the 30 normal brained murderers with ism is true then there will be sufficient causal normal upbringings responsible for their conditions for all events, meaning there will be crimes. For presumably, assuming the Kanean conditions external to these agents which ex- view is correct, then normal human beings will plain why the one makes the poor choice and have engaged in enough of these causally un- the other makes the good choice. This makes determined SFAs to make them responsible it clear why it is unfair to blame the one for for their actions. her poor choice, as her poor choice will be a These concluding remarks are, I know, matter of constitutive luck. Compatibilist too brief and sketchy. This is especially the views invariably run into this problem of con- case insofar as contemporary deniers of mor- stitutive luck and because of this they cannot al responsibility, such as Pereboom, Caruso, give an account of blame and punishment up- and Waller, have done so much to argue that on which such practices are fair. we would be morally and practically better As a consequence of this, libertarian views off by rejecting the belief in moral responsi- and theories of free will denial (either hard de- bility and the concomitant notion of just de- terminism or hard incompatibilism) are the serts. But, I don’t believe their rosy picture of only two credible options. Furthermore, as a world without belief in free will and moral noted, we cannot at this point provide suffi- responsibility will hold up under scrutiny. So, cient metaphysical or empirical evidence for I will end here having noted that the libertar- the existence of libertarian free will. And this ian view is a coherent, plausible view; and in turn means that from the theoretical point while we cannot know that such free will ex- of view we cannot know if anyone is morally ists, we should continue to defend its coher- responsible for what they do. So, what is to be ence and possible existence while also devel- done? Should we who find the libertarian view oping the moral/pragmatic grounds for liv- to be a coherent and plausible view but who ing and acting as if it were true. cannot give theoretical proof of its existence refuse to believe in its existence and give up on █ Acknowledgements the practices of blame and punishment? Should we, like Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caru- Many thanks to Robert Kane for reading so, Bruce Waller45 and other moral responsi- an earlier draft of this essay and for his help- bility deniers, abstain from believing that we ful comments and encouragement. have the kind of free will that grounds judg- ments of desert? In the end, I don’t think we █ Notes
should. While there is not at this point suffi- cient empirical or metaphysical evidence of 1 S. HARRIS, Free Will, Free Press, New York 2012, the existence of free will, there are still moral p. 5. 2 Ivi, p. 4. and pragmatic reasons for living and acting as
A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 245
3 Ivi, p. 5. LIBET, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of 4 D.C. DENNETT, Reflections onSam Harris’ “Free Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, in: «Behavioral Will”, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psi- and Brain Sciences», vol. VIII, n. 4, 1985, 529-566. cologia», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2017, pp. 214-230. 22 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 8. 5 Ivi, p. 220. 23 A. MELE, Free Will and Luck, Oxford University 6 B. WALLER, Against Moral Responsibility, MIT Press, New York 2006. Press, Cambridge (MA) 2011, p. 225. 24 See M. BALAGUER, Free Will as an Open Scientific 7 While I develop and defend Waller’s critique of Problem, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2010. compatibilism here, it should be noted that there 25 J.D. HAYNES, Decoding and Predicting Intentions, are various other philosophically sophisticated cri- in: «Annals of the New York Academy of Scienc- tiques of compatibilism that are worthy of serious es», Vol. MCCXXIV, n. 1, 2011, pp. 9-21; I. FRIED, consideration. Indeed, I am sympathetic with some R. MUKAMEL, G. KREIMAN, Internally Generated of these other arguments too. See van Inwagen’s Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial consequence argument (P. VAN INWAGEN, An Es- Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition, in: «Neuron», say on Free Will, Oxford University Press, Oxford vol. LXIX, n. 3, 2011, pp. 548-562; P. HAGGARD, 1983; P. VAN INWAGEN, Free Will Remains a Mys- Decisions Time for Free Will, in: «Neuron», vol. tery, in: R. KANE (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of LXIX, n. 3, 2011, pp. 404-406. Free Will, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, 26 A. MELE, Free Will and Neuroscience, in: «Philo- pp. 158-177); Robert Kane’s manipulation argu- sophic Exchange», vol. XLIII, n. 1, 2013, pp. 1-17. ment (R. KANE, The Significance of Free Will, Ox- 27 P. GOLLWITZER, Implementation Intentions. ford University Press, Oxford 1996); and Derk Pe- Strong Effects of Simple Plans, in: «American Psy- reboom’s four case manipulation argument (D. PE- chologist», vol. LIV, n. 7, 1999, pp. 493-503; P. REBOOM, Living without Free Will, Cambridge GOLLWITZER, P. SHEERAN, Implementation Inten- University Press, Cambridge 2001; D. PEREBOOM, tions and Goal Achievement: A Meta-analysis of Ef- Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Cambridge fects and Processes, in: «Advances in Experimental University Press, Cambridge 2014). Each of these Social Psychology», vol. XXXVIII, n. 6, 2006, pp. arguments has been the subject of numerous criti- 69-119. cal responses in the literature. 28 See M. BALAGUER, Free Will as an Open Scientific 8 B. WALLER, Against Moral Responsibility, cit., p. Problem, cit.; L. EKSTROM, Free Will: A Philosophical 225. Study, Westview Press, Boulder (CO) 2000; R. 9 See D.C. DENNETT, Elbow Room, MIT Press, KANE, The Significance of Free Will, cit.; R. KANE, Cambridge (MA) 1984, p. 96; D. DENNETT, Free- Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth, dom Evolves, Viking, New York 2003, p. 274. in: R. KANE (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 10 B. WALLER, Against Moral Responsibility, cit., p. Oxford University Press, New York 2002, pp.406- 227-228. 437; R. KANE, Libertarianism, in: FISCHER, R. KANE, 11 Ivi, p. 228. D. PEREBOOM, M. VARGAS, Four Views on Free Will, 12 Ivi, p. 229. Blackwell, Malden (MA) 2007, pp. 5-43; R. KANE, 13 D.C. DENNETT, Review of “Against Moral Respon- Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient sibility”, October 2012, available at https:// Problem, in: R. KANE (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of www.naturalism.org> Free Will, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, 14 Ibidem. pp. 381-404; R. KANE, Making Sense of Libertarian 15 Ibidem. Free Will: Consciousness, Science, and Laws of Nature, 16 B. WALLER, Reply from Waller, October 2012, in: A. MCCAY, M. SEVEL (eds.), Libertarian Free Will available at
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367; J. LEMOS, Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane’s 2013), who develops points similar to those of Theory of Free Will, in: «Dialectica», vol. LXV, n. 1, Bishop. 2011, pp. 31-48; J. LEMOS, Self-forming Acts and the 36 See M. BALAGUER, Free Will as an Open Scientific Grounds of Responsibility, in: «Philosophia», vol. Problem, cit.; L. EKSTROM, Free Will, cit.; A. MELE, XLIII, n. 1, 2015, pp. 135-146; J. LEMOS, Kane, Bala- Autonomous Agents, Oxford University Press, New guer, Libertarianism, and Luck, in: F. GRGIC, G. York 1995. PECNJAK (eds.), Free Will and Action: Historical and 37 See D.C. DENNETT, Freedom Evolves, cit. Contemporary Perspectives, forthcoming. 38 Ivi, p. 132 30 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 28. 39 Ivi, p. 133. 31 See J.L. AUSTIN, Ifs and Cans, in: J.L. AUSTIN, 40 Ivi, p. 129. Philosophical Papers, edited by J. URMSON, G. 41 See ivi, pp. 129-130. WARNOCK, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961, pp. 42 Ivi, p. 130. 153-180. 43 Ivi, p. 131. 32 R. KANE, Libertarianism, cit., pp. 28-29. 44 Ivi, pp. 131-132. 33 R. KANE, Rethinking Free Will, cit. 45 See D. PEREBOOM, Living without Free Will, cit.; 34 R. BISHOP, Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will, D. PEREBOOM, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in in: R. KANE (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Life, cit.; D. PEREBOOM, G.D. CARUSO, Hard- Will, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, pp. incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punish- 84-100, here p. 91. ment, and Meaning in Life, in: G.D. CARUSO, O. 35 I am indebted to Robert Kane for drawing my FLANAGAN, (eds.) Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, attention to these more recent developments of his Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, Ox- thinking on the neuro-scientific basis of his think- ford University Press, New York forthcoming; G.D. ing. For more relevant work on this see R. KANE CARUSO, Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behav- (Making Sense of Libertarian Free Will: Conscious- ior: A Public Health Quarantine Model, in: «South- ness, Science, and Laws of Nature, cit.) as well as R. west Philosophy Review», vol. XXXII, n. 1, 2016, Bishop (Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will, cit.) pp. 25-48; B. WALLER, Against Moral Responsibility, and Peter Ulric Tse (The Neural Basis of Free Will: cit.; B. WALLER, The Stubborn System of Moral Re- Criterial Causation, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) sponsibility, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2015.