RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2017.0019 Vol. 8 (2017), n. 3, pp. 231-246 STUDI A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will John Lemos(α) Ricevuto: 01 febbraio 2017; accettato: 24 agosto 2017 █ Abstract This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ “Free Will” as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by criti- cal points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can be de- fended against points raised by both Dennett and Harris. KEYWORDS: Free Will; Libertarianism; Compatibilism; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris █ Riassunto Una risposta libertaria a Dennett e Harris sul libero arbitrio – Questo articolo prende critica- mente in esame gli argomenti principali presentati nel volume di Sam Harris “Free Will” e gli aspetti princi- pali della concezione compatibilista proposta da Daniel Dennett sul libero arbitrio. Intendo sostenere che Dennett, pur rispondendo accuratamente alla critica del compatibilismo proposta da Harris, sostiene un compatibilismo che resta sotto il giogo delle critiche sollevate da Bruce Waller. Inoltre, cercherò di sostenere che il rifiuto della prospettiva libertaria proposto da Harris è una posizione male informata e illustrerò i principi di fondo della prospettiva libertaria di Robert Kane, affermando che la si può difendere dalle criti- che sollevate sia da Dennett che da Harris. PAROLE CHIAVE: Libero arbitrio; Libertarianismo; Compatibilismo; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris SEVERAL YEARS AGO DANIEL DENNETT In what follows, I offer a defense of the published an essay, Reflections on Free Will, libertarian perspective on free will by ad- which was an extended discussion of Sam dressing key points raised in the works of Harris’ book, Free Will. Harris’ book offers both Dennett and Harris. I argue that while an extended critique of the compatibilist Dennett provides good replies to Harris’ cri- conception of free will which Dennett en- tique of compatibilism, there are deeper prob- dorses as well as a critique of libertarian con- lems with Dennett’s view which have been ceptions of free will. While differing on the raised poignantly by Bruce Waller. Addition- merits of compatibilism, Dennett and Harris ally, I contend that the challenges to libertari- both believe that libertarian views are deeply an free will voiced by both Harris and Dennett problematic. are answerable and in doing so, I support a (α)Philosophy and Religion Faculty, Coe College, 1220 First Avenue NE – 52402 Cedar Rapids, Iowa USA E-mail: [email protected] () Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale 232 Lemos libertarian view akin to that of Robert Kane. deficiencies in Dennett’s approach I can pro- Early on in Sam Harris’ book, Free Will, vide some motivation for giving the libertari- he states: an view another and closer examination. Sam Harris discusses two psychopaths, Ste- Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply ven Hayes and Joshua Komisarjevsky, who not of our own making. Thoughts and in- committed horrible crimes. Reflecting on these tentions emerge from background causes of psychopaths and their actions, he writes: which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have As sickening as I find their behavior, I the freedom we think we have. Free will is have to admit that if I were to trade places actually more than an illusion (or less), in with one of these men, atom for atom, I that it cannot be made conceptually coher- would be him: There is no extra part of ent. Either our wills are determined by pri- me that could decide to see the world dif- or causes and we are not responsible for ferently or to resist the impulse to victim- them, or they are the product of chance and ize other people. Even if you believe that we are not responsible for them.1 every human being harbors an immortal soul, the problem of responsibility re- Daniel Dennett and I both think this is a mains: I cannot take credit for the fact bad argument, but we do so for different rea- that I do not have the soul of a psycho- sons which reflect our different perspectives path. If I had truly been in Komisarjev- on the nature of free will and moral responsi- sky’s shoes on July 23, 2007 – that is, if I bility. As a compatibilist, Dennett attacks had his genes and life experience and an Harris’ assertion that «our wills are deter- identical brain (or soul) in an identical mined by prior causes and we are not respon- state – I would have acted exactly as he sible for them». As a libertarian, I find Har- did. There is simply no intellectually re- ris’ assertion that if our wills are not deter- spectable position from which to deny mined «then they are the product of chance this. The role of luck, therefore, appears and we are not responsible for them» to be decisive.2 problematic. It is my view that to have the kind of free Harris is suggesting that had he been born will which would make us morally responsi- into the world with exactly the same kind of ble in such a way as to be deserving of praise nervous system and faced exactly the same and blame and reward and punishment we environmental conditions as these two psy- must engage in some causally undetermined chopaths then Harris himself would have free acts which enable us to be the ultimate committed awful crimes. According to causal authors of our characters and the actions determinism, all future events, including hu- which proceed from them. Dennett and Har- man decisions and actions, are a necessary ris, indeed most contemporary philosophers, consequence of prior states and events and the reject such an approach. Nonetheless, in later laws of nature. Thus, given one’s starting stages of this essay I will try to take some points in life this makes all the difference to strides in showing why such a libertarian where one will end up and what one will do. view may be correct. Before doing so, howev- And since one’s starting points are a matter of er, I will turn my attention to Dennett’s re- luck beyond one’s control, then what one ul- sponse to Harris. While I agree, with many of timately does in later life is a matter of luck Dennett’s criticisms of Harris’ argumenta- beyond one’s control. In this way Harris be- tion, I do feel that the compatibilist view he lieves that free will is incompatible with a de- defends is problematic in significant respects. terministic picture of the universe. This in It is my hope that by revealing some of these turn helps explain his assertion that: A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will 233 [A] neurological disorder appears to be tions is rightly held responsible for what she just a special case of physical events giving does. Such a person can understand the mor- rise to thoughts and actions. Understand- al norms and laws and the consequences for ing the neurophysiology of the brain, non-compliance and has the kind of self- therefore, would seem to be as exculpato- control to guide his or her conduct in accord- ry as finding a tumor in it.3 ance with such understanding. According to Dennett, these rationality and self-control On Harris’ view, a deterministic universe conditions for free morally responsible action is a universe in which the kind of free will can be met by the normal human being even which grounds just deserts responsibility if determinism is true. does not and cannot exist. Dennett replies that these arguments are [W]e don’t hold everybody responsible; as wrongheaded. He notes that while it’s true [Harris] notes, we excuse those wo are un- that our genetic heritage is a matter of luck responsive to demands, or in whom change and much of the environmental conditions we is impossible. That’s an important differ- are exposed to as we mature into adults is a ence, and it is based on the different abili- matter of luck, it does not follow from this ties or competences that people have. that determinism precludes us from having Some people (are determined to) have the the kind of free will that supports just deserts. abilities that justify our holding them re- sponsible, and some people (are deter- Harris can’t take credit for the luck of his mined to) lack those abilities. But deter- birth, his having had a normal moral edu- minism doesn’t do any work here; in par- cation – that’s just luck – but those borne ticular it doesn’t disqualify those we hold thus lucky are informed that they have a responsible from occupying that role.5 duty or obligation to preserve their com- petence, and grow it, and educate them- In his essay Dennett defends at length this selves, and Harris has responded admira- compatibilist conception of free and respon- bly to those incentives. He can take credit, sible action against the criticisms made by not Ultimate credit, whatever that might Harris. As noted, I think he provides an ad- be, but partial credit, for husbanding the mirable defense against these arguments. In resources he was endowed with.4 what follows, I would like to test the merit of his views by considering points raised in re- According to Dennett, while it’s a matter cent work by Bruce Waller.6 For Waller’s ar- of luck whether we are born with normal guments present a more serious challenge to human brains and whether we are provided Dennett’s position.7 with a normal moral education, if we are Waller believes we lack the kind of free will born normal brained and given a normal that makes us morally responsible in the basic moral education then we will rightly be held desert sense.