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FOREWORD

This is the story of Operation WOWSER.

It is the story of the greatest heavy bomber effort ever launched by the Fifteenth Air Force in cooperation with Allied Ground Armies in ITALY. The operation brought to the peak of success the use of heavy bombers in a tactical role in ITALY. This report documents the part played by Fifteenth Air Force planes and men in aiding the Fifteenth Army Group to start their mighty 1945 Spring Offensive which crushed completely the German Armies in ITALY.

Of the six WOWSER operations the most outstanding mission was flown on 15 April. On that memorable day 1233 heavy bombers were airborne against the enemy. This force represented 98.6 percent of all the combat heavy bombers in ITALY. Such a near- perfect achievement of the theoretical "maximum effort" is cer­ tainly an accomplishment without parallel in the history of large scale heavy bomber operations.

The execution of Operation WOWSER was a fitting climax to the hard bitter months of aerial warfare carried on from ITALY by the Fifteenth Air Force. It demonstrated in a final and un­ forgettable manner that when the combined efforts of every in­ dividual within the Air Force are devoted to a common purpose, there is forged an overwhelming weapon for victory.

N. F. TWINING V MAJOR GENERAL, USA COMMANDING CONTENTS

PAGE

SITUATION OF ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY 9 APRIL 1945 1

PLANNING 5

OPERATION OF 10 APRIL 1945 IN COOPERATION WITH THE EIGHTH ARMY 11

OPERATION OF 15 APRIL 1945 IN COOPERATION WITH THE FIFTH ARMY 29

EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT BCMBERS 57

TARGET MATERIALS 59

TRAINING 68

COMMUNICATIONS 69

RESULTS ACHIEVED 71

ANALYSIS OF BOEING' 79

STATISTICAL SUMARY 87

* * * * * INTRODUCTION

Operation WOWSER was a series of six missions flown by the Strategic Air Force in ITALY in cooperation with the Spring Offensive of the 15th Army Group. The first mission was flown on 9 April and the last mission was flown on 19 April. During this period 7,152 aircraft were airborne and 6,308 aircraft completed effective sorties. On 16 April the bulk of 675 non-effective sorties were caused by excessive cloud cover at the target. On the remaining five days more than 95# of the aircraft airborne flew effective sorties. The total tonnage of bombs dropped during the operation was 9,250 tons. The Fifteenth Air Force lost 21 aircraft to all causes while the feeble Luftwaffe suffered a further reduction of 16 planes in their forces, all but one of which were destroyed in the air.

Our losses were 3/10 of one percent of our total force.

The results of the bombing were generally excellent. A detailed assessment of bomb damage and a study of the effect on the morale of enemy troops may be found in another section of this report.

Sections U and 5 contain detailed presentations of the tactical planning and execution of the attacks of April 10 and 15, on the Eighth and Fifth Army fronts respectively. The remaining four operations differed from these only in scale of attack and location of targets.

Details of all six attacks aire indicated in the statisti­ cal summary at the end of this report. THE SITUATION ON THE ITALIAN FRONT - 9 APRIL 1945

Despite the almost catastrophic sequence of events on Germany's Western Front, there was little apparent change in the enemy's policy and capabilities in Italy prior to the commencement of the Fifteenth Army Group offensive on 9 April, 1945* He showed considerable nervousness as to Allied intentions, but was obviously determined to meet any offensive operation in his strongly held positions. This was the only possible course open to him. Condemned, as a result of his virtual isolation from the Reich, to retain a large force in Italy and to occupy large areas of Italian territory, he was nevertheless unable to carry out a general voluntary withdrawal to a militarily more economical line behind the Adige because of diminishing fuel resources which had to be conserved for the more vital demand of a possible rear-guard action towards the PO. The enemy could do no better than await the inevitable attack where he stood. Hie Germans were also short of transport and ammunition. Furthermore, the continued interdiction of their supply routes into Italy made impossible any amelioration of their position. However, they were occupying well prepared and heavily de­ fended positions backed by a series of switch lines. The formations were better found in men and materiel than any other in the Germany Army, and while it was unlikely that the shortages of materiel would effect the intitial stages of the battle the situation was such that over a prolonged period of time the Germans would be unable to conduct a mobile battle against the well supplied Allied Forces on the offensive. To the enemy, Italy provided decided economical ad­ vantages plus the moral advantage of fighting on foreign soil while protecting the Southern approaches to Germany. The possession of Italian territory, al­ though a heavy commitment to the enemy, was an invaluable source of supply. This and the presence of the German forces therein afforded a hindrance to Allied efforts toward a complete and rapid defeat of Germany.

Available for the defense of Northern Italy and the Southern approaches to the Reich, General von Vietinghof, German C-in-C Southwest, had 23 Divisions plus 2 Divisions in the process of formation. His two Armies, the 10th and 14th were the two best organized armies remaining in the Wehrmacht. They were respon­ sible for the main Italian front from the West coast through the Central Appenines and along the SENIO River to LAGO DI CCltACCHIO on the East coast. Of the 23 Divi­ sions, 15 were in the line on the main front. Two Panzer Grenadier Divisions were in mobile reserve, one north of BOLOGNA and the other held against a possible Allied seaborne landing in the Venetian area but still accessible for intervention on the main front if necessary. One division was on the Adriatic Coast North of LAGO DI CC4£ACCHI0, two on the FRANCO-ITALO front and three in Northeastern Italy.

Certain Italian Infantry Divisions were also available to the C-in-C South­ west, but played an insignificant part in the subsequent operations.

General Mark Clark's Fifth and Eighth Armies were well prepared to strike the last devastating blow. From CASSINO and ANZIO, victorious through all the bitter fighting, they had marched steadily northward, overcoming all resistance. Halted in the Appenines south of BOLOGNA by the difficult terrain, of which the enemy was taking every advantage, and the appalling winter conditions, the Fifth Army had continued to engage the enemy and make limited gains. On 4 December, the Eighth Army troops entered RAVENNA, the Eastern gateway to the PO Valley and steadily moved forward during December and January to reach the SENIO River thus threatening to turn the enemy's Appenine Line. The following weeks found the amies preparing for the forthcoming major attack - resting, refitting and build­ ing up. Eighth Army with four Corps composed of Polish, New Zealand, Indian and Italian troops was along a front from the ADRIATIC to Southeast of BOLOGNA. Fifth Army with two Corps composed of American, South African and Brazilian troops were on the remainder of the front from South of BOLOGNA through the rugged Appenines to the West coast.

The battle order of the opposing forces is indicated in the attachea diagrams.

I Throughout the long Italian campaign, from SALERNO onwards, Allied air attacks had gradually destroyed the enemy air forces. By the spring of 1945 the GAF had withdrawn the fragments of its Italy-based units into the Reich, with the exception of a few reconnaissance planes which continued to make sporadic short sorties over the Allied lines, chiefly at night. The Italian Air Force had been reduced to two ineffective fighter groups, which occasion­ ally attacked straggling or crippled bombers which had become separated from formations returning from Germany or the Brenner Pass. Otherwise, the IAF devoted its effort to hiding its ME 109's, by dispersal and camouflage, from the constant airdrome attacks of Allied bombers and fighters.

The energy and efficiency of the German ground forces in organizing de­ fensive positions during the winter months of 1944-45 however, had enabled him to build up formidable powers of resistance to an Allied ground offensive. Southwest of Lake Comacchio, the Eighth Army was confronted by a series of canals and rivers, each heavily defended by mortar, machine gun, artillery, antitank and rifle emplacements, and interspersed with extensive minefields. Opposite the Fifth Army, the mountainous ridges and valleys had been developed into a succession of well organized defenses in depth.

Throughout the Italian campaign the two primary objectives of Allied tac­ tical and strategic air power had been to maintain the elimination of the enemy's air forces; and to interdict and destroy his lines of communications and supply columns. In the final offensive, the Mediterranean Allied Strategic and Tactical Air Forces undertook a third task, - the neutralization, - and so far as possible the destruction, of the enemy personnel, weapons, supplies and emplacements in the forward positions of the German defensive system. The plan and operations by which the Strategic Air Force (Fifteenth Air Force and 205 Group, RAF) shared in this mission are described in the following pages.

2 ALLIED BATTLE ORDER IN ITALY 9 APRIL 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER - MEDITERRANEAN Field Marshal Alexander

FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP - (General Mark Clark)

EIGHTH ARMY - (Lieutenant General McCreerv)

V CORPS - 56 Div; 78 Div; 2 N.Z. Div; 8 Indian Div.

II POLISH CORPS - 3 Carpathian Div; 5 Kresowa Div,

XIII CORPS - 10 Indian Div; Folgore Group

X CORPS - Friuli Group; Jewish Brigade

Army Reserve - 6 British Armored Div.

FIFTH ARMY - (Lieutenant General Truscott)

II CORPS - 34 Inf. Div; 88 Inf Div; 91 Inf Div; 6 S, African Arm. Div; Legnano Group

IV CORPS - 1 Arm. Div; 10 Mtn Div; 85 Inf Div; Brazilian Exped. Force

ARMY TROOPS - 92 Inf. Div.

3 GERMAN BATTLE ORDER IN ITALY 9 APRIL 194.5

COMMANDER-IN-CHip. SOUTHWEST General Von Vietlnghoff

FOURTEENTH ARMY

51 MOUNTAIN CORPS

148 Inf Div 232 Inf Div 334 Inf Div 114 Lt. Div Italia Div

14 PANZER CORPS

94 Inf Div 65 Inf Div 157 Mtn Div

TENTH ARMY

1 PARA CORPS

305 Inf Div 278 Inf Div 1 Para Div 4 Para Div

76 PANZER CORPS

26 Pz Div 98 Inf Div 326 Inf Div 162 Inf Div 42 Lt. Div

RESERVE

90 P.G. Div 29 P.G. Div

73 CORPS

155 Fd Trng Div 10 Mas Flottila

97 CORPS

24 SS Mtn. Div 710 Inf Div 188 Res Mtn Div 237 Inf Div

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75 CORPS

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Introduction. The planning for operation WOWSER was begun 'well in advance with a conference of MATAF and MASAF operations, intelligence and communications officers and representatives of Fifteenth Army Group. At this conference the broad solutions to all of the problems were evolved and a firm idea of the pur­ poses and capabilities of air cooperation was established. In accord with Army desires, the entire WOWSER operation was designed to be as flexible as possible and the attacks in cooperation with each amy sector were planned as two separate operations. To ensure the flexibility and cooperation necessary to the success of the operation, the Fifteenth Air Force appointed liaison officers from opera­ tions, intelligence and communications to remain at MATAF Headquarters, where Army Group Headquarters was also located, from the time of the initial planning stages until the last WOWSER sortie had been flown.

Target Selection. At the outset it was decided that any targets selected for heavy bomber attack should be at least 3000 yards from Allied forward posi­ tions in order that risk to our own troops would be at a minimum. It was also recognized that the targets which were available, such as personnel, mortar in­ stallations, machine guns and supply centers, could not be bombed from above 20,000 feet with normal damage expectancy because of the difficulties of identify­ ing precise aiming points on such small targets. However, this was not considered sufficient reason for rejecting such targets, so long as the selected targets were located in an area densely populated with enemy troops where the presence of ex­ ploding bombs would contain in itself a deleterious effect on the morale of those troops in addition to the actual material damage inflicted

With these two considerations in mind, targets were selected on both the Eighth and Fifth Army fronts. In the Eighth Army sector it was decided to bomb areas that were densely occupied by enemy troop concentrations and gun installa­ tions. Two areas, Apricot and Apple, were selected for D Day, and two areas, Baker and Charlie, were selected for D+l Day. In addition, the night bombers of the 20$ Group (RAF) were assigned the task of attacking a communications area a few miles behind the front on the night of D/D+l.

In the Fifth Army sector, most of the targets were more precise and included supply and ammunition dumps, enemy troop concentrations, gun emplacements and Army Headquarters located along highways 64 and 65 and in and around the city of BOLOGNA, They were to be attacked on D+4 and D+5 days.

Method of Attack. All wings were to bomb at normal altitudes by columns of attack units consisting of 18 aircraft. On the Eighth Army front area Apricot was to be attacked first and area Apple last. On the Fifth Army front the groups of the several wings were to attack targets in both highway areas as nearly simul­ taneously as practicable. The Air Force formation for both fronts was to be a column of wings in order: 5th Wing, 304th Wing, 47th Wing, 55th Wing and 49th Wing.

Bomb Load. It was agreed tentatively that all targets would be attacked best with clustered fragmentation bombs, but final decision on bomb loads was postponed until detailed studies of individual targets could be made.

Time of Attack. All attacks were to take place over a period of one and one-half hours with the exception of the attack on D+5 day which would be allowed a period of two hours.

Weather Requirements. Minimum weather requirements for heavy bomber attacks were set at: Visibility 6 to 7 miles; cloud cover 2/10 to 3/10 below 25,000 feet. Inasmuch as haze is always a problem in the P0 Valley, the axes of attack were , planned so as to incur minimum interference from refraction of the sun's rays and thus a fairly low standard of visibility could be accepted. Initial Point. The initial point selected for attacks on the Eighth Army front was CESENATIC0 which is located on the ADRIATIC Coast. The initial points selected for each of the parallel axes of attack on the Fifth Army front were in the vicinity of PIST0IA and FRAT0. 7 Axis of Attack. The axis of attack selected for the Eighth Army front was 302 degrees. The axis of attack selected for the Fifth Army front was 05 degrees. In both cases the axes were generally perpendicular to the front line of our troops.

Safety Precautions. Elaborate plans were made to prevent our bombs from falling upon friendly troops. There were three types of safeguards available, all of which were used to the fullest possible extent. These were: Radio aids, visual aids, and pre-attack familiarization flights. The familiarization pro­ gram is described in the section on training, and the radio aids are discussed under "Communication". Visual aids are treated below.

For the attack on the Eighth Army front the following visual aids were planned:

1. Heavy concentrations of white smoke were to be laid at a pinpoint adja­ cent to the initial point CESENATICO, beginning fifteen minutes before target time.

2. Three sets of ground markers were to be displayed at pin points along the bomb run as follows:

a. One white bar, 100 yards x 50 yards, at SAVIG River. b. Two white bars, each 100 x 50 yards, on the RAVEh'NA-FORLI highway. c. Three white bars, each 100 x 50 yards, on the RAVENNA-FAENZA highway.

White smoke was to be placed downwind from each bar location in order to draw attention to its position.

3. The front line was to be indicated by a series of white "T" letters 100 yards in length and spaced 1000 yards apart along Jthe whole front of area APPLE, and as close to the SENI0 River as the forward positions of our troops would allow. Yellow smoke canisters were to be located along the line of the "T" letters to aid in their recognition. There was some doubt about whether these smoke aids would be visible from 20,000 feet, if the customary haze in the PO Valley was present at the time of the attacks.

4. Small, red fluorescent panels were to be located in front of area APRICOT and APPLE.

5. An indication line of AA shell bursts would mark the highway from FAENZA to BAGN0 CAVALL0, as follows:

a. Three lots of four bursts 300 yards apart, to be employed opposite each target. One lot of four burst would be opposite each end of each target, and one lot of four bursts opposite the center of each target. Shell bursts would be in salvo at 30 second intervals at 15,000 feet above sea level.

For the Fifth Army front visual aids would be much the same as those out­ lined above for the Eighth Army front. »'

One other important safety precaution was specified in the original planning, namely, all bomb doors were to be opened over the ADRIATIC SEA before approaching the initial point in order to prevent dropping bombs on Allied troous as a result of bomb rack malfunction.

Recalls and Cancellations. It was deemed necessary to establish a means of "last resort" cancellation of the heavy bomber attacks in addition to routine re­ call methods. Accordingly, a VHF forward radio control was to be set up at Head­ quarters of 22 Tactical Air Command for emergency cancellation of the heavy bomber attack. VHF Channel "A" would be monitored by all bomber formations.

In addition, on the Eighth Army front, flak bursts forming the letter "X" over the initial point of CESENATICO at 15,000 feet would also indicate that the heavy bomber attacks had been cancelled.

8 Anti-Flak Measures. At the request of the Fifteenth Air Force, the army artillery agreed to place anti-flak shell bursts over enemy forward gun posi­ tions during the attack of the heavy bombers. It was hoped that this would reduce the intense flak curtain which had been placed in front of heavy bombers upon previous close support missions.

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WHITE SMOKE

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OBLIQUE OF SAFETY CESENATICO DENSE WHITEo PRECAUTIONS SMOKE

10 OPERATION 10 APRIL 1945 OPERATION OF 2Q APRIL

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The British Eighth Army, spearheading the Spring Offensive in North ITALY, planned to establish a bridgehead over the SANTERNO River with a view toward rapid exploitation to FERRARA and, in conjunction with operations of the U. S. Fifth Ai-aiy, westwards towards BOLOGNA.

The Fifteenth Air Force, in close cooperation with the ground forces, was assigned to attack enemy troop concentrations, gun positions, and defense in­ stallations in the areas ahead of the Eighth Army between the SENIO River and points Northwest of the River SANTERNO with the objective of disorganizing the enemy forces opposing the Eighth Army.

WEATHER

Forecast given 1100 hours 9 April for operations 10 April.

Bases: 2-4 Base 9,000 top 10,000 10

3 Afternoon cumulus 10

Route: Same as bases Target: 0-4 Base 3000 top 6000 visibility 6-8 miles in hase 10

Consolidated pilot report from mission 10 April

Bases & Route: 2/10 cumulus base 4,000 top 6,000 along east Italian coast. Target: Few high clouds above 25,000, visibility 15 miles.

PHASING THE OPERATION 10 APRIL

AIR FORCE

1. Twenty-one bombardment groups employing maximum effort will attack gun positions and other military targets in cooperation with the ground forces of the Eighth Army.

2. Alternate targets: None

3. Order of flight: Close column of wings, 5th rting lead, 304th Wing second, 47th «ing third, 55th rting fourth, and 49th Wing last.

4. Route out: Bases to Keypoint (4340N, 1350E) to initial point to target.

5» Keypoint altitude: (See Wing Field Orders)

6. Initial point: CESENATICA (4412N 1224E).

\ 7. Rally: Left.

8. Route back: Target to S. PIERO (4352N 1159E) to bases.

9. PFF: Lead for navigation only. This is a planned visual mission.

10. RCM: No chaff will be carried on this mission. Carpet and spot jamming may be employed.

13 OPERATIONAL AREA WEATHER FORECAST 10APRIL 1945

20,000

15,000

—

10,000 . • • —

. * # ' — 5,000 <=3 —

HT. OF MTS. TO LEFT OF ROUTE BASE •TARGET SEA LEVEL i i i i i i i i v \ \A F066IA TERMOLI ANCONA BOLOGNA 11. Bomb load: Clustered frags.

12. Special Instructions:

a. 154th Weather Recon Squadron will provide early morning and route and target weather recon.

b. 5th Photo Group will provide recon and bomb damage according to current target priorities.

c. XVth Fighter Command will provide target cover for all wings and will provide forces for dive-bombing and strafing.

d. Wings will bomb by columns of attack units consisting of 18 air­ craft.

e. All wings will bomb at altitudes as low as possible consistent with the scale of expected enemy defense, in no case below 18,000 feet, nor above 22,000 feet.

f. No bombing will be conducted after 1230B.

g. No target will be attacked unless positively identified. If primary target cannot be attacked, bombs will be returned to base.

h. Timing at Keypoint and Target will be adhered to.

i. If it is necessary for a last resort cancellation the following measures will, in addition to routine recall procedures, be used.

(1) A VHF forward radio control will be set up at TAC HQ Eighth Army. It will use Channel "A".

(2) Flak bursts for the letter "X" will be fired over the initial point, CESENATICO at 15,000 feet.

13. Safety Precautions:

a. To insure positive route and target identification the following aids will be set up:

(1) A radio marker system of SCS 51 will be installed with the "V" frequency indicating a line perpendicular to the axis of attack and running just behind and roughly parallel to the Allied front lines through FAENZA and BAGNACAVALLO on a magnetic heading of 30°. "X" and "Y" frequencies will mark parallel axes of attack with the "Xw frequency track leading through RUSSI and LUGO on a magnetic heading of 299° to target Baker. "Y" frequency track will lead through BAGNOLO and S0LAR0L0 on a magnetic heading of 305° to target Charlie. "V" and "X" and "Y" bands will all be in operation. Magnetic headings of "V", "X" and "Y" beams are correct as listed but heading of aircraft may differ due to drift.

(2) Heavy concentrations of white smoke will be laid at M-731123 adjacent to the IP, CESENATICO, commencing fifteen minutes before first time over target.

(3) Three sets of ground markers will be displayed running along a straight line between CESENATICO and COTIGNOLA as follows:

(a) One white arrow, 100 x 16 yards, on SAVIO River, at M-60U93.

(b) Two white bars each 100 x 16 yards on the RAVENNA-FORLI Highway at M-493270.

15 16

(c) Three white bars, each 100 x 16 yards, on the RAVENNA- FAENZA Highway at M-409318.

(d) White smoke will be placed down wind from each bar location to draw attention to it.

(4) The Front Line will be indicated by a series of white letters, "T", 100 yards in length and spaced 1,000 yards along the SENIO River. They will be located at K-405427, M-392421, M-387410, M-378394, M-374376, M-376365, M-377355, M-378344, M-358328, M-337324, M-321312, M-307291, M-282268, and M-271254. (5) Three groups of yellow smoke canisters will be located along the line of "T" letters at M-405427, M-378344 and M-307291.

(6) Four smaller red fluorescent panels will be located in front of areas Apricot and Apple at M-405428, M-378378, M-376341, and M-307287.

(7) An indication line of AA shell bursts will mark the highway from FAENZA to BAGNACAVALLO. Three lots of four bursts 300 yards apart will be employed opposite each target. One lot of four will be opposite each end of each target, one lot of four will be opposite the center of each target. Shell bursts will be in salvo at 30 second intervals at 15,000 feet. Flak bursts opposite Charlie target will be fired from 1100B to 1145 B at M-360329, M-348308 and M-336287. Flak bursts opposite Baker Target will be fired from 1145B to 1230B at M-400407, M-378368 and M-360329. b. Bombay doors will be opened over water before IP and will be closed before passing over friendly troops on the withdrawal. 5TH WING

1. Target assignment: Area Charlie as follows, 2nd, M-245331; 301st, M- 248342; 99th, M-257346; 463rd, M-254325; 97th, M-258332; and 483rd, M-262339. 2. Wing formation: Column of 18 a/c attack units at 2 minute intervals. Each group will fly two attack units. Order of flight will be, all first attack units of 2nd, 301st, 99th, 463rd, 97th and 483rdj then the second attack units in the same order.

3. Departure point: TERMOLI, 2nd - 1st attack unit at 0957^, 2nd attack unit at 1009B. Other attack units follow at 2 minute intervals. Alti­ tudes, 2nd - 21,000 feet, 301st - 20,000 feet, 99th - 18,000 feet, 463rd • 19,000 feet, 97th - 20,000 feet, and 483rd - 21,000 feet. 4. Keypoint altitude: Group bombing altitude. 5. Timing: Keypoint time - 1st attack unit, 2nd will be 1032B, other units follow at 2 minute intervals. Target time - lead attack unit, 1100B.

6. Axis of attack: 293°• 7. Bombing altitude: 2nd, 21,000 feet; 301st, 20,000 feet; 99th, 18,000 feet; 463rd, 19,000 feet; 97th, 20,000 feet; and 483rd, 21,000 feet. 304TH WING 1. Target assignment: Area Charlie as follows, 456th, M-266347, 455th, M-260358; 459th, M-271354; and 454th, M-264363.

19 2. Wing formation: There will be a red and blue force. Each group will fly an 18 a/c attack unit in each force. There will be one minute spacing between units in each force. There will be a six minute interval between forces. The order within the forces will be 456th lead, 455th second, 459th third and 454th last. The red force will precede the blue force.

3. Bomber rendezvous: CERIGNOLA. Red, 456th at 0959B, and Blue, 456th at 1008B, others follow in order. Altitudes, 456th Red and 459th Red, 13,000 ftj 455th Red and 454th Red, 14,000 ft; 456th Blue and 459th Blue, 11,000 ft; 455th Blue and 454th Blue, 12,000 ft.

4. Keypoint altitude: 20,000 ft.

5. Timing: Keypoint time, Red - 1059B and Blue - 1108B. Target time, Red - 1127B to 1135B and Blue - 1136B to 1144B.

6. Axis of attack: 300° M.

7. Bombing altitude: 456th, 21,000 feet; 455th, 21,500 feet; 459th, 20,500 feet; and 454th, 20,000 feet.

8. 456th will provide a weather recon a/c to survey weather conditions over the base and ADRIATIC areas.

47TH WING

1. Target assignment: Area Baker as follows, 376th, M-273378; 98th, M-278386; 449th, M-282393; and 450th, M-286399.

2. Wing formation: Close column of waves with right echelon in each wave. Order of flight, 376th lead, 98th second, 449th third and 450th last.

3. Bomber rendezvous: 376th and 98th rendezvous at SAN PANCRAZIO on course to SAN VITO, 376th, 13,000 feet at 0949B and 98th - 14,000 feet at 0950B. 449th and 450th rendezvous at MANDURIA on course to SAN VITO, 449th - 14,000 feet at 0952B and 450th - 15,000 feet at 0953B.

4. Keypoint altitude: Bombing altitude.

5. Timing: Keypoint time - 1117B. Target time - 1145B, no bombing after 1201B.

6. Axis of attack: 302° T.

7. Bombing altitude: 376th, 20,000 feet; 98th, 21,500 feet; 449th, 20,500 feet; and 450th, 22,000 feet. 8. Groups will use nine ship boxes and the last element will uncover to the right on the bomb run and spread formation to give maximum coverage for frags.

9. An extra four minutes has been allowed between the rendezvous points and the keypoint for any discrepancy not planned, that is winds being off or a rendezvous time not being met. If this time is not needed a dog leg will be introduced to the west at the discretion of the Wing Air Commander.

10. 376th will furnish wx recon to precede formation on route out and 449th will furnish wx recon in local area.

55TH WING

1. Target assignment: Area Baker as follows: 464th, M-291407; 465th, M-294414; 460th, 14-298420; and 485th, M303428.

2. Wing formation: Groups at 4 minute intervals, 464th first, 465th second, 460th third, and 485th last.

20 3. Departure point: SPINAZZOLA, 464th leave at 1026B, others follow at 4 minute intervals. Altitudes, 464th, 12,000 feet; 465th, 13,000 feet; 460th, 14,000 feet and 485th, 15,000 feet.

4. Keypoint altitude: 1,000 feet lower than bombing altitude.

5. Timing: Keypoint time - 1133B. Target time - 1201B, no bombing before 1201B or after 1217B.

6. Axis of attack: 302°.

7. Bombing altitude: 464th, 19,000 feet; 465th, 20,000 feet; 460th, 21,000 feet; and 485th, 22,000.

8. A bombardier will fly in every airplane and only he will drop the bombs. There will be no toggling on the part of any other crew member.

49TH WING

1. Target assignment: Area Baker as follows: 46lst, M-307435; 484th, M-316449; and 451st, M-311442.

2. Wing formation: Red and blue forces will be employed. Each group will fly an 18 a/c attack unit in each force in the same position. Order of flight, 46lst lead, 451st second, and 484th last.

3. Departure Point: BOVINO, each attack unit will depart at two minute intervals beginning at 1059B. Altitudes, 13,000 feet for 46lst Red, 484th Red and 451st Blue and 14,000 feet for 451st Red, 461st Blue and 484th Blue.

4. Keypoint altitude: 19,000 feet for 461st Red, 484th Red and 451st Blue, and 20,000 for 451st Red, 461st Blue and 484th Blue.

5. Timing: Keypoint time - 11593 for 461st Red. Target time - 1217B for 461st Red. Other attack units will follow in order at two minute intervals.

6. Axis of attack: 307° TC.

7. Bombing altitude: 20,000 feet for 461st Red, 484th Red and 451st Blue, and 21,000 feet for 451st Red, 461st Blue and 484th Blue.

8. All attack units will employ frag formation "A".

XVTH FIGHTER COMMAND

1. 305th Wing

a< 3 groups will destroy by diving bombing the SEEFELD and RATTENBURG RR Bridges.

2. 306th Wing.

a. 332nd Fighter Group will provide target cover for Bomb Wings from 1055B to 1200B.

b. 52nd Fighter Group will provide target cover for Bomb Wings from 1130B until last bombers have left area.

c. 31st Fighter Group will strafe in Southern Germany.

3. Optional effort will be employed.

21 >R KLAQENFUST BOLZA| M- />

MOSO^PO * Q AVIANOV ' UO'LNFP

PERRA

EDER, TALW

22 5TH WING (Area Charlie)

1. The navigators of both Red and Blue forces experienced no trouble in pinpointing the position of the formations. However a wind change caused the lead attack unit of Red force to begin its attack 3^ minutes late. Since each unit was similarly effected, no difficul­ ties were experienced. The visual and radio navigational aids were all easy to pick up.

2. In general the MPI's were readily identified and bombing runs from 6 to 10 minutes long were made. The last attack units of the Red and Blue forces encountered some difficulty because of smoke frcm previous­ ly dropped bombs, but the lead crews oriented themselves well and did excellent bombing.

30LTR WING (Area Charlie)

1. Red Force.

a. The briefed route was flown without difficulty. The lead unit was briefed to attack at 1127B, but it actually attacked at 1129B. Navigation on the return route was as briefed.

b. Two attack units had normal visual runs, but the other two attack units experienced seme difficulty in identifing their aiming points because of smoke and haze. This caused one unit to have a gross error in range; long. The other unit had seme aiming error, but the pattern covered the target area satisfactorily.

2. Blue Force.

a. The briefed route was flown without difficulty. The lead unit was briefed to attack at 1136B, but actually attacked at 1145B. No formation difficulties were encountered due to the late timing.

b. Three attack units had normal visual runs, but one unit was unable to identify the exact aiming point because of smoke and haze. How­ ever, the general target area was positively identified so bombs were released. The bombs fell generally short and left of the briefed MPI but within Area Charlie.

47TH WING (Area Baker)

1. All groups utilized the same lead personnel as used on the 9 April mission thus eliminating confusion in identity and procedure. All units followed the briefed route except for minor dog legs for timing. All forms of navigational aids used were plainly visible. The first attack unit attacked at 1152B, which was seven minutes later than the briefed target time.

2. Some formation difficulties were experienced in this Wing.

a. The second attack unit of the 376th Bomb Group was forced to make an erratic turn on the run when a unit from another group formed a collision course with it. However, the unit managed to get squared away again in time to drop its bombs with satisfactory results.

b. The first attack unit of the 98th Bomb Group did not get squared away during the first part of the run because of interference from another unit, but were squared away in time for a normal run.

c. The first attack unit of the 450th Bomb Group synchronized, but just before the bomb release point was reached another unit fell back under the formation and prevented the dropping the bombs at the right instant. When released the bombs fell on the upside of the target area. 23 3. All other attack units had normal visual runs.

55TH WING (Area Baker)

1. The navigation on this mission was quite good, the only trouble being a change in winds that made all groups late at the keypoint and target. The briefed target time was 1101B; the actual target time was 1107B for the first attack unit.

a. The autopilot of the lead aircraft in the lead attack unit malfunc­ tioned too late to change to PDI therefore course corrections were poor. The bombs fell to the left with the right side of the pattern covering the MPI.

b. One attack unit turned short of the IP in an effort to make up time. This did not effect the bomb run.,

c. The 460th Bomb Group bombed from 21,500 feet, which was 500 feet above the assigned altitude, because a box of the preceding group interfered.

d. The lead aircraft of the second attack unit of the 464th Bomb Group and lead aircraft of the first attack unit of the 485th Bomb Groups were lost to flak soon after "bombs away".

49TH WING (Area Baker)

1. Red Force.

a. Metro winds were off both in direction and velocity. Target time for the lead unit was briefed at 1217B; the actual target time was 1219^B. The briefed course was maintained throughout.

b. Each lead team identified the target early and had smooth runs.

2. Blue Force.

a. The briefed course was maintained throughout, but prop wash caused the formation to vary slightly from the briefed route altitudes. The briefed target time was 1223B; the actual target time was 1226B for the lead unit.

b. The lead aircraft of the 461st Bomb Group had a C-l malfunction which caused the aircraft to skid to the left near the end of the run. Strikes were left and slightly long.

c. All other units had normal smooth visual runs.

3. The last bombs were dropped at 1230B.

24 25 26 TARGETS: Bomber Missions: (B) Baker Area Northern Italy; (C) Charlie Area Northern Italy, Dive-Bombing Missions: (D) Seefeld R/R Bridge; (E) Vorgl R/R Bridge. Escort Missions:(F) Longastrino/Lavezzola Area; (G) Massa/Lombardo Area; (H) Battlefield Area Northern Italy. Strafing Missions: (J) Kunich/Passau Area; (K) Linz/Salzburg Area

DATE: 10 April 1945

Grand Bombers Fighters Total Total B-17 B-24 Total P-38 ZzSl Strength of Attack Aircraft Airborne 1261 869 249 620 392 166 226 Less Early Returns _22 Jtk —2 —2 6 No. of Aircraft Crossing Enemy Lines 1238 855 244 611 383 160 223 Less Non-Effective Sorties 18 8 2 6 10 8 2 Effective Sorties 1220 847 242 605 373 152 221

Percent of A/C Airborne Effective 97% 97% 97% 98% 95% 92% 98%

Tonnage Dropped 1901 1807 525 1282 94 94

Tonnage per Effective Bomber Sortie 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 - - -

Number of Encounters with S/A 9 -- - 9 - 9

Our Losses 4 By Enemy Aircraft ------By Flak 2 2 - 2 - - - Others 2 1 2 = 2 Total Losses 7 5 2 3 2 - 2

Percent of Attacking Force 0.6* 0,6% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% - 0.9%

Victories

E/A Destroyed in the Air 6 - - - 6 - 6

Relative Comparisons Victories in Air per Lose .9 - - - 3.0 - 3.0 Tons Bombs Dropped per Bomber Loss 361 361 263 427 - - - Victories in Air per 100 Encounters 66.7 - - - 66.7 - 66.7 Losses by E/A per 100 Encounters ------

Strength of Attack A/C Less E/R Conditions Number Tar- Air­ & Non-Eff. Eff. % A/B of Attack of Losses A/C Damaged get borne Sorties Sorties Eff. Time Altitude Encounters Flak Victories E/A Flak Other CatI Cat II 5TH WING 2nd B.G. C 42 3 39 93% 1053-1103 20800-21000 - SIH - 1 1 - 97th B.G. C 40 1 39 98% 1115-1123 20000 - IIH . - 1 99th B.G. c 42 - 42 100# 1100-1122 18000 . SAH - _ - 8 - 301st B.G. c 40 1 39 98% 1105-1109 20000 - SIH - - - - 463rd B.G. c 43 1 42 98% 1111-1122 18500-19000 - SIH . 1 - - 483rd B.G. c 1 98% 1105-1113 19000 - SAH - - JL. - TOTAL 5TH WING 249 7 212 97% - - 2 14 -

98th B.G. B 40 1 39 98% 1152-1155 21000-22500 SIH _ _ 376th B.G. B - 40 1 39 98% 1147-1155 18600-20700 - SIH - - - 449th B.G. B 40 1 39 98% 1149-1155 19800-21600 - SIH - - 4 450th B.G. B J2 2 Jl 95% 1158 21000-24000 - SIH - - -

TOTAL 47TH WING 159 5 154 97% - - - 4

49TH WING Red Force: 451st B.G. B 21 - 21 100% 1215-1222 20000-21000 - SIH _ - - 461st B.G. B 21 - 21 100% 1218-1220 20000-20500 _ SIH - - 1 484th B.G. B 21 - 21 100% 1223-1225 20000 - - - - -

Total Red Force 63 - 63 100% -- - 1 Blue Force: 451st B.G. B 21 1 20 95% 1221-1226 19500-21800 - SIH -- - 461st B.G. B • 21 - 21 100% 1223-1226 22000-22500 - SIH -- - 484th B.G. B 21 1 _20 95% 1229-1331 21000 - - -- -

Total Blue Force 63 2 61 97% -- - -

TOTAL 49TH WING 126 2 124 99% _ - 1

27 Strength of Attack A/C Less E/R Conditions Number Tar­ Air­ f Non-Eff. Eff. # A/C of Attack of Losses A/C Damaged get borne Sortie8 Sorties Eff. Time Altitude Encounters Flak Victories E/A Flak Other Cat I Cat II 55TH uING 460th B.G. B 41 - 41 100% 1215-1217 19000-21700 _ MAH - - - 9 464th B.G. B 42 1 41 98$ 1203-1210 17200-20000 _ MAH _ 1 _ 7 465th B.G. B 42 2 40 95# 1212 20000 - SAH - - - 485th B.G. B 2 Jko -22$ 1219 22000 - SAH - - 1 - JL. TOTAL 55TH WING 167 5 162 97# - - 2 - 21 304TH WING Red Force: 454th B.G. C 21 - 21 100# 1137-1139 19400-21000 - MAH - - - 455th B.G. C 21 1 20 95# 1122-1130 22000-22750 - SIH - - - 456th B.G. C 21 - 21 100# 1129-1130 21000 _ MAH . - _ 459th B.G. C 21 - 21 100# 1133-1140 20500-21400 - SAH - - - - Total Red Force 84 1 83 99# - - - - T Blue Force: 454th B.G. C 21 2 19 90# 1149-1151 19600-20300 - MAH - - 1 5 455th B.G. C 21 - 21 100# 1139-1147 21700-22700 - MAH - - - 3 456th B.G. C 21 - 21 100# il45-H46 21000 - MAH - - - 459th B.G. C 21 - 21 100# 1150-1200 20500-21400 - SAH - - -

Total Blue Force 84 2 82 98#-98#- - - - 1 8

TOTAL 304TH WING 168 3 165 98# - - - 1 14 XV Fighter Command 305TH 7/ING 1st F.G. D 51 2 49 96# 1045-1145 6000-12000 - SAL - - - 14th F.G. E 51 3 48 94# 1100-1200 2000-8000 - - - - - 82nd F.G. DE JL 86# 1150-1220 9000-10000 - - - - - TOTAL 305TH WING 166 14 152 92# - - - 306TH WING 31st F.G. FG 83 - 83 100# 0955& 1500 5000-1800 - SIH - - - 52nd F.G. H 54 - 54 100# 1125-1250 - - - - - 1 325th F.G. JK 53 3 50 94# 1445-1615 - 9 - 6 - - 332nd F.G. H Jk 2 _2k 94# 1055-1200 22000-25000 - IAH - - 1 TOTAL 306TH WING 226 5 221 98# 9 6 - - 2 GRAND TOTAL 1261 41 1220 97# 9 6 2 5 54

CAUSES OF ABORTIVE SORTIES

Type A/C Total Mechanical Armament Escorting E/R Spares Structural Radio Instruments Other

B-17 7 7 ------

B-24 15 10 4 - - - - 1

P-38 14 6 1 3 - 2 1 -

P-51 5 1 - 1 3 - - -

TOTAL ALL A/C 41 24

TONNAGE BY TYPE BOMBS

Type 120 lb. Frag. 1000 lb. 1000 lb. 500 lb. A/C Cluster GP RDX GP Total Tonnage

B-17 524.70 524.70

B-24 1282.47 1282.47

P-38 46.j>0 27.50 20.25 94.25 TOTAL FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE 1807.17 46.50 27.50 20.25 1901.42

28 OPERATION 15 APRIL 1945

£ BOLOGNA OPERATION OF 15 APRIL

ESTIMATE OF SITUATION

A. Red Force; On 15 April the Red Force was directed against 21 targets in the area south of BOLOGNA. These consisted of command posts, dumps and enemy occupied areas nominated by the 5th Army. All but two of the targets were concentrated along highways 64 and 65. The two exceptions were slightly further to the east of the city on highway 9*

The Red Force operation was planned in conjunction with an attack by the US II and IV Corps designed to capture BOLOGNA. The air operation was directed toward facilitating this attack by the destruction of supply installations and troops concentrations in the path of the amy advance.

B. Blue Force: Photo cover of 8 and 9 April revealed intensified repairs under way at NERVESA, PONTE DI PIAVE, and CASARSA Rail Diversions. At all 3 sites damage had been inflicted several weeks previously and no attempt had been made to repair the bridges. CASARSA, PONTE DI PIAVE, and MOTTO DI LIVENZA, which were being attacked by MATAF were the only cuts on the rail line from TREVISO east to GQJONA on the TARVISIO Line, and repairs at all 3 points clearly indicated the German intention to reactivate this stretch of line. PONTE DI PIAVE was bombed on 12 April but repeated attacks to increase the strain on repair facilities prob­ lem was warranted. Specific targets at the Rail diversions were the bridge sec­ tions across the river channels. Bridge sections were 10/15 steel spans on short pilings.

Objective of strafing and dive bombing mission in MUNICH-LINZ-PILSEN area was further disorganization of rail leading to Italian and Southeastern fronts by destroying trains and blocking rail lines.

Forecast given 1100 14 April for Operations 15 April

Bases: Early morning fog & stratus breaking by 1030 to 3-5/10. Base 2-3000 top 5-7000, 2-4/10 thin middle and high

Route: 7-10/10 cumulus top 6000 along east Italian coast

Target: 4/10 Base 2000 top 6000 (BOLOGNA Area) 5-7/10 Base Mtns tops 10-15000 (Foothills N. of UDINE)

Consolidated Pilot Report from Mission 15 April

Bases: 9/10 Base 500-2000 top 5000

Route: 8-9/10 tops 10,000 (Over mountains) 6-7/10 top 6,000 (West side of Appenines)

Target: 0-3/10 Top 10,000 (BOLOGNA) 6-8/10 Top 10,000 (TREVISIO)

PHASING THE OPERATION 1£ APRIL

Note: There will be a Red Force and a Blue Force on this operation.

Red Force:

1. Twenty-one bombardment groups employing a Red Force of maximum effort of 36 aircraft per group plus spares will attack gun positions, supply dumps, troop concentrations and German Headquarters in the BOLOGNA Area.

2. Alternate targets: None

31 OPERATIONAL AREA WEATHER FORECAST 15APRIL 1945

20,000

15,000

10,000

SEA .LEVEL FOGGIA ANCONA FLORENCE BOLOGNA 3. Order of Flight: Close column of wings, 5th Wing lead, 304th Wing second, 47th Wing third, 55th Wing fourth, 49th Wing last.

4. Route Out: Bases to keypoint, GIGLIO (4222N 1054E) to PKJiBINO (4256N 1032E) to VOLTERRA (4234N 1052E) to targets.

5* Keypoint altitude: (See Wing Field Orders)

6. Initial Point: According to targets, East targets: VERNIO (4403N 1109E), West targets: PISTOIA (4356N 1055E).

7. Rally: Left.

8. Route back: Targets to KONFESTINO (4425N 1047E) to BOHGO (4359N 1032E) to GORGONA (4356N 0954E) to MONTE CRISTO (4220N 1019E) to bases.

9. PFF: Lead for navigation only. This is a planned visual mission.

10. RCM: Carpet will be employed. Chaff will not be carried in any aircraft.

11. Bombload: (See Wing Field Orders).

12. Special Instructions:

a. 154th Weather Recon Squadron will provide early morning route and target weather recon.

b. 5th Photo Group will provide bomb damage and photo recon according to current target priorities.

c. XVth Fighter Command will provide route and target cover for all Wings; provide escort for MATAF bombers as previously arranged; and employ maximum remaining aircraft for strafing operations.

d. Each wing will provide its own weather recon aircraft to lead the Wing formation on route out to FLORENCE.

e. All Wings except the 49th Wing will have targets both on Highway 64 and 65. Groups within these Wings will attack targets in both areas as nearly simultaneously as practicable. Targets of the 49th Wing will all be along Highway 64.

f. The period of attack will be l£ hours in duration, and will continue from 1300B to 1430B. No boobs will be dropped after 1430B. However, bombs may be dropped before 1300B if bombers arrive over target several minutes early due to errors in navigation.

g. Targets will be positively identified before release of bombs. It is more desirable to have bombs returned to base than have friendly troops endangered.

h. If any doubt exists in the minds of lead bombardiers as to location of front lines and position of target, bombs will not be released until positively over enemy held territory.

i. In addition to routine recall measures, there will be a VHF forward radio control set up at 22nd TAC for emergency cancellation of the operation. Channel "A" will be monitored.

j. Bombers will make every effort to obtain maximum photo coverage.

13. Safety Precautions:

a. To insure positive rcute and target identification the following Radio Marker System and Visual Aids have been set up.

33 (1) A radio marker system of MRN 1 will be installed with the "V" frequency indicating a line generally perpendicular to the axis of attack and passing through RIOVEGGIO and LOIANO on a "true heading of 92°. "X" and "t" frequencies will mark gener­ ally axes of attack with the "Xn frequency track leading through LOIANO and PIANORO on a true heading of 08° 31'• "Y" frequency track leads through OREDA and POLVERARA on a true heading of 15° 03»

(2) A line of red fluorescent panels, 60* by 10' spaced at approxi­ mately l/4 mile intervals from L-720235 to L-895235.

(3) White letters which will serve as additional visual assists while on the axis of attack, will be placed behind the front line at the following locations: a "T" at L-877293, a "P" at L-632204, a "V" at L-862233, an "X" at 1-943318, a "U" at L-823236, and "0" in block style at L-782244, and an nM" at M-046221.

(4) There will be a flak line from L-7423 to L-8923. It will con­ sist of 32 bursts, spaced 500 yards apart, at 15000 feet, every 30 seconds from 1255B to 1430B.

(5) Two fluorescent panels, which will aid in the identification of the road leading north into the area of eastern targets, will be displayed with their long axes extending north and south on either side of the road. A yellow panel, 300' x 8* will be located on the right at L-842076 and a red panel on the left at L-840076.

(6) A large white cross near PRATO at Q-625815 and a large white triangle near FISTOIA at Q-514867 will be displayed to identify the initial points. White smoke generators will be located downwind from the white cross and white triangle,

b. To insure that no malfunctions or gross errors will cause bombs to drop with possible danger to our troops, the following procedures will be observed. (1) Bomb bay doors will be opened over the TYRRHENIAN Sea before approaching the initial point. They will be closed before passing over friendly troops on withdrawal.

(2) Each bombardier at approximately 2 minutes before bombs away will call on the interphone at 15 second intervals his esti­ mate of the number of seconds remaining before bombs away. Pilots and Navigators will double check the Bombardiers' estimate.

(3) Bombardiers will pre-compute release lines to be checked by navigators.

• (4) Navigators will check bombsight extended vision knob.

(5) Lead bombardiers will fire signal flare 60 seconds before bomb release line. Under no circumstances will toggeliers release their bombs before the flare is fired.

(6) Before starting bomb run bombardier will inform pilot of number of seconds after crossing "V" beam and flak line when bombs can be dropped without endangering friendly troops. This will allow pilot to dcwblecheck.

5TH WING

1. Target Assignment: 2nd, MA-16; 99th, VA-14; 97th, MA-21; 301st, MA-7; 463rd, MA-23; 483rd, MA-2.

34

36 2. Wing Formation: Six waves at five minute intervals, each consisting of two 18 a/c attack units. 2nd will provide lead attack units for the 1st and 4th waves, 99th will provide lead attack units for the 2nd and 5th waves, 97th will provide lead attack units for the 3rd and 6th waves. Low left will be flown by the 301st, in the 1st and 4th waves; by the 463rd, in the 2nd and 5th waves; and the 483rd, in the 3rd and 6th waves.

3. Departure Point: TKRMOLI, 1st wave at 1106B. Wave leads will be at 18,000 feet, low lefts will be at 17>000.

4. Keypoint altitude: Bombing altitudes.

5. Initial points: 301st, 463rd, and 483rd - PISTOIA. 2nd, 99th, and 97th VERNIO.

6. Timing: Keypoint time for 1st wave 1210B. Target time for 1st wave 1300B. Successive waves will be at 5 minute intervals.

7. Bombing altitude: 2nd at 22,000; 301st at 21,000; 99th at 20,000; 463rd at 19,000; 97th at 21,000; and 483rd at 20,000.

8. Axis of Attack: 26° - 301st, 463rd and 483rd. 22° - 2nd, 99th and 97th.

9. Rally: 301st, 463rd and 483rd, straight then left to ARGELATO (4438N 1120E). 2nd, 99th and 97th, sharp left.

10. Bomb load: 100 lb GP clustered, fused .1 nose and .01 tail.

11. Bombing will be by boxen in trail.

304TH WING

1. Target Assignment: 459th, MA-27; 454th, MA-9; 455th, MA-10; and 456th, MA-13.

2. Wing Formation: 459th lead, 454th second, 455th third, and 456th last.

3. Bomber rendezvous: Over CERIGNOLA - 459th at 1119B, other groups follow in order at one minute intervals. 459th will be 7000 feet, 454th at 8000 feet, 455th at 7000 and 456th at 8000 feet.

4. Keypoint Altitude: 18,000 feet.

5. Timing: Keypoint Time - 1242B, Target Time - 1330B.

6. Initial Point: 459th and 454th - PISTOIA, 455th and 456th - VERNIO.

7. Axis of Attack: 459th and 454th - 32°M, 455th and 456th - 30°M.

8. Bombing altitude: 459th, 20,000 feet; 454th, 21,500 feet, 455th, 20,500 feet, 456th, 22,000 feet.

9. Bomb Load: 100 lb GP clustered, fused .1 nose and .01 tail.

10. Bombing Formation: Nine ship front for each attack unit. Each leader of 18 a/c attack unit will sight for course and rate, others will toggle.

47TH WING

1. Target assignment: 98th, MA-26; 376th, MA-20; 449th, MA-24; and 450th, UA-19.

2. Wing Formation: 98th, lead; 376th, second; 449th, third; and 450th, last.

37 3. Bomber rendezvous: 98th and 376th at SAN PANCRAZIO on course to SAN VITO, 98th at 8000 feet at 1100B, 376th at 9000 feet at I101B. 449th and 450th rendezvous at MANDURIA on course to SAN VITO, 449th at 9000 feet at 1103B, 450th at 10,000 feet at"ll04B.

4. Keypoint altitude; 18,000 feet.

5. Timing: Keypoint time - 1258B to 1314B. Target time - 1346B to 1402B.

6. Initial Point: 98th and 449th, PISTOIA; 376th and 450th, VERNIO.

7. Axis of attack: 98th and 449th, 28°T. 376th and 450th, 21°T.

8. Bombing altitude: 98th at 20,000 feetj 376th at 21,500 feetj 449th at 20,500 feet; and 450th at 22,000 feet.

9. Bomb load: 250 lb RDX clustered, fused ,1 nose and .01 tail.

10. Bombing will be by individual squadrons.

55TH WING

1. Target assignment: 465th, MA-18j 464th, MA-22; 485th, MA-17; and 460th, MA-5.

2. Wing Formation: IWo combat waves of two groups in very close column, 465th and 464th comprising 1st wave, and 485th and 460th comprising 2nd wave. Second group of each wave in close left echelon at PICMBINO.

3. Bomber rendezvous: 465th and 464th in normal areas at 9000 and 10,000 feet, 465th over ANDRIA at 1131B. 485th and 460th in normal areas at 11,000 and 12,000 feet, 485th over ALTAMURA at 1137B. Then the 465th will lead over SPINAZZQLA at 1146B.

4* Keypoint Altitude: 20,000 feet.

5. Timing: Xeypoint Time - 1314B. Target time - 1402B.

6. Initial Point: 465th and 485th, VERNIO. 464th and 460th, PISTOIA.

7. Axis of attack: 465th and 485th, 20°. 464th and 460th, 25°.

8. Bombing altitude: 465th, 21,000 feetj 464th, 22,000 feet; 485th, 21,500 feet and 460th, 22,500 feet.

9. Rally: 465th and 485th, left to CASTELFRANCO (4436N 1103E). 464th and 460th, left to BAZZANO (4430N 1104E).

10. Bomb load: 40 clustered 100 lb GP bombs fused .1 nose and .01 tail.

11. A bombardier will fly in every a/c and he only will drop the bombs. There will be no toggling on the part of any other crew member.

12. Bombing will be by attack units of 18 a/c. All a/c will drop on attack unit lead or deputy lead, whichever bombs first, and then only after each airplane commander and bombardier is positive that the front lines have been crossed.

49TH WING

1. Target Assignment: 451st, MA-22; 484th, MA-6; 461st, MA-5.

2. Wing Formation: Loose column of groups stepped up and down, 451st lead, 484th second and 461st last.

38 3. Departure Point: BOVINO, 451st will leave 1215B, 484th at 1222B, 461st at 1225B. Altitudes: 451st and 461st, 10,000 feet; 484th, 12,000 feet.

4. Keypoint altitude: 451st and 461st, 18,000 feet; 484th, 20,000 feet.

5. Timing: Keypoint time - 451st, 1330B; 484th, 1335B; and 461st, 1340B. Target time - 451st, 1418B; 484th, 1423B; and 46lst, 1428B.

6. Initial Point: FIST0IA.

7. Axis of Attack: 28° TC.

8. Bombing altitude: 451st, 20,000 feet; 484th, 22,000 feet and 461st, 20,000 feet.

9. Bomb Load: 250 lb GP clustered, fused .1 nose and .01 tail*

XV FIGHTER COMMAND

1. 305th Wing

a. 1st FG will provide two forces. 1 force will provide target and withdrawal cover for 5th Wing Red Force beginning at 1300B at 24,000 feet. 2nd force will straf.e rail targets in MUNICH- SALZBURG-LINZ-PILSEN-REGENSBURG-MUNICH Area at 1000B or as soon thereafter as practicable.

b. 14th FG will provide two forces. 1 force will provide target and withdrawal cover for 304th Wing Red Force beginning at 1300B. 2nd Force will provide target and withdrawal cover for 47th Wing Red Force beginning at 1346B.

c. 82nd FG will provide two forces. 1 force will provide target and withdrawal cover for 55th Wing Red Force beginning at 1402B. 2nd Force provide target and withdrawal cover for 49th Wing Red Force beginning at 1418B.

d. Strafe targets on main rail line leading from INNSBRUCK to LINZ and from LINZ to MUNICH.

2. 306th Wine

a. 31st FG will provide two forces. 1 force will intercept 5th Wing Blue Force at SESTRI at 1049B at 24,000 feet and provide route cover on PTW. 2nd force will intercept 47th Wing Blue Force at SESTRI at 1131B at 22,000 feet to provide route cover on PTW.

b. 325th FG will stand by for MATAF commitments.

c. 52nd FG will provide two forces. 1 force will intercept 49th Wing Blue Force at SESTRI at 1155B at 22,000 feet to provide route cover on PTW. 2nd force will intercept 55th Wing Blue Force at SESTRI at 1216B at 22,000 feet to provide route cover on PTW.

d. 332nd FG will provide two forces. 1 force will intercept 304th Wing Blue Force at SESTRI at 1236B at 22,000 feet to provide route cover on PTW. 2nd force will strafe rail targets in the MUNICH-SALZBURG-LINZ-PILSEN-REGENSBURG-MUNICH area at 1330B.

39 3. Special Instructions:

a. All groups will employ every available aircraft on this plan after scheduling recce escorts and special missions.

b. Remind all pilots to attack aircraft in Northern Italy only after positively identifying them as enemy.

c. Brief on all latest strafing restrictions.

d. Strafing aircraft must remain in assigned areas.

BLUE FORCE

1. Twenty-one bombardment groups employing 14 aircraft per group will attack communications targets and an ammo factory in Northern ITALY.

2. Alternate targets: 1 - CASARSA RR Diversion, 2 - NEVERSA RR Diversion, 3 - FADUA North RR Bridge, 4 - PONTE DI PIAVE RR Diversion, 5 - PESCHIERA Todt Supply Dump, 6 - CORTINA D'AMPEZZO/CIMOBANCHI Explosive Stores and 7 - CASQNI DI ST ALBINI Munition Dump.

3. Order of Flight: Loose column of wings: 5th Wing lead, 47th Wing second, 49th Wing third, 55th Wing fourth and 304th Wing last.

4. Route out: (See Wing Field Orders)

5. Keypoint: MONTE CRISTO (4220N 1018E)

6. Keypoint altitude: Optional for 304th Wing, other wings at 15,000 feet.

7. Route back: (See Wing Field Orders)

8. PFF: Lead for navigation only. This is a planned visual mission.

9. RCM: Carpet will be employed. Chaff will be dispensed at heavy flak defended targets.

10. Bomb Load: 500 lb RDX, fused .1 nose and .01 tail.

11. Special Instructions:

a. 154th Weather Recon Squadron will provide:

(1) Weather recon aircraft to precede Air Force formation on route out.

(2) Provide route and target weather recon at first light.

b. 5th Photo group will provide bomb damage and photo recon according to current target priorities.

c. XVth Fighter Command will provide reducedescort for all wings on penetration and over the target. All other available aircraft not employed in Red and Blue Forces will be used to strafe in areas designated by Commanding General, XVth Fighter Command,

d. Precautions and restrictions set forth in Fifteenth Air Force Ops Memo 5-11, dated 1 April 1945 and subsequent amendments will be observed.

e. Routing is so planned to avoid interference with Red Force and to take advantage of best route weather.

5TH WING

1. Target assignment: NERVESA RR Bridge Diversion.

40 2. Alternate targets: Alternates #'1, /?3 and tik.

3. Wing formation: Column of Groups at five minute intervals, 97th first, 483rd second, 463rd third, 301st fourth, 99th fifth and 2nd last.

4* Departure Point: TERMOLI at 15,OCX) feet 97th at 0846B.

5. Route out: Departure point to Keypoint to SSSTRI (4417N 09232) to SAN FELICE (4451N 1109S) to B0RG0 (4603N 1127E) to SAN V1ARTIN0 (46I6N 1149E) to IP to target.

6. Keypoint altitude: 16,000 feet.

7. Timing: Keypoint time - 97th at 1001B. Target time - 97th at 1200B.

8. Initial Point: SEDICO (4607N 1206E)

9. Axis of attack: 160°

10. Bombing altitude: 24>000 feet - 463rd and 2nd. 25,000 feet - 97th and 301st. 26,000 feet - 483rd and 99th.

11. Rally: Left to CAORLE (4536N 12532)

12. Route back: Rally point to Base.

13. All available aircraft not committed to the Red Force will be used.

47TH WING

1. Target assignment: CASARSA RR Diversion.

2. Alternate targets: Alternates #2 and #6.

3. Wing formation: 98th lead, 376th second, 449th third and 450th last.

4. Bomber rendezvous: 98th and 376th rendezvous at SAN PANCRAZIO on course to SAN VITO, 98th at 0827 at 5,000 feet and 376th at 0828 at 6,000 feet. 449th and 450th rendezvous at MANDURIA on course to SAN VITO, 449th at 0837 at 6,000 feet and 450th at 0838 at 7,000 feet.

5. Route out: SAM VITO to Keypoint to SESTRI to SAN FELICE to SCHIO (4543N 1121E) to MUDA (4615N 1207E) to Initial Point to target.

6. Timing: Keypoint time - 98th and 376th - 1045B, 449th and 450th - 1055B. Target time - 98th and 376th - 1240B, 449th and 450th - 1250B.

7. Initial point: BARCIS (4612N 1233S).

8. Axis of attack: 136°.

9. Bombing altitude: 98th, 20,000 feet; 376th, 21,500 feet; 449th, 20,500 feet and 450th, 22,000 feet.

10. Rally: Right.

11. Route back: Target to Rally Point, PRAMAGGIORE (4548N 12443) to CAORLE to 4350N 13503 to base.

12. Chaff: According to SOP.

13. All remaining combat aircraft will be used.

14. 449th will furnish weather recce to check local rendezvous area and to precede Blue Force on initial part of route out. Take-off will be at 0630B.

41 L9TH WING

1. Target assignment: NEBVXSA BR Bridge Diversion. 2. Alternate Targets: Alternates #1, #3 and #4. 3. ^lng formation: Loose column of groups stepped up and down, 451st lead, 484th second and 461st last. 4* Departure Point: BOVINQ at 10,000 feet, 451st and 0944&, 434th eight minutes later and 461st seven minutes after the 484th. 5* Route out: Departure point to keypoint to SESTRI to SAN FELICE to B0RG0 to SAN MARTINO to IP to target. 6* Keypoint altitude: 16,000 feet. 7* Timing: Keypoint time - 451st at 1109B. Target time - 451st at 1300B. 8. Initial Point: SEDIC0. 9* Axis of attack: 161° TC. 10* Bombing altitude: 451st and 461st - 20,000 feet, 484th - 21,000 feet. 11. Rally: Sharp left. 12* Route back: Target to CAORLE to bases. 13* Chaff: Dispensing will begin 3 minutes before IP and continue at the rate of 3 bundles every 20 seconds until clear of flak* 14* Groups will be at bombing altitude at SAN MARTINO. 15* Bombing will be by individual boxes. 55TH WING 1. Target assignment: NERVESA RR Bridge Diversion. 2. Alternate Targets: Alternates #2 and #4* 3* Wing formation: 465th lead, 464th second, 485th third and 460th last* 4* Bomber rendezvous: 465th at 8000 feet lead 464th at 8,500 feet over SPINAZZQLA at 0951B. 485th at 8,000 feet will lead 460th at 8,500 feet over SPINAZZOLA at 1006B. 5. Route out: SPINAZZOLA to Keypoint to SESTRI to SAN FELICE to SCHIO to MUDA to IP to target. 6* Timing: Keypoint time - 1130B. Target time - 1325B. 7. Initiaj. Point: BARCIS. 8. Axis of attack: 135°. 9. Bombing altitudes: 465th, 22,000 feet; 464th, 22,500 feet; 485th, 23,000 feet and 460th, 23,500 feet. 10. Rally: Right to PRAMAGGIORE. 11* Route back: Rally Point to CAORLE to bases. 12. Chaff: According to SOP 13* Bomb by boxes in trail.

42 30L.TH WING

1. Target assignment: GHEDI AMMO Factory and Stores.

2. Alternate targets: Alternates #5 and #7.

3. "»ing formation: 459th lead, 454th second, 455th third and 456th last.

4. Bomber rendezvous: CERIGNOLA, at one minute intervals, 459th at 1020B. Altitudes, 459th and 455th - 4,000 feetj 454th and 456th - 4,500 feet.

5. Route out: CERIGNOLA to Keypoint to SESTRI to IP to target.

6. Timing: Keypoint time - 1150B. Target time - 1305B.

7. Keypoint altitude: 18,000 feet.

8. Initial- point: B0ZZ0L0 (4507N 1029E)

9. Axis of attack: 348° M.

10. Bombing altitude: 459th, 18,000j 455th, 19,000; and 454th and 456th 18,500 feet.

11. Rally: Left.

12. Route back: Target to SESTRI to keypoint to bases.

13. Chaff: Will be dispensed at heavy flak defended targets.

14. Bombing formation: Column of boxes.

15. All groups will maintain at least 20,000 feet altitude over enemy territory except for specified bombing altitudes.

XVTH FIGHTER COMMAND

See XVth Fighter Command Field Order under Red Force.

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44 EXECUTION OF MISSION

5TH WING - RED FORCE

1. Each Group of the 5th Wing dispatched forty-two (42) aircraft to attack troop concentrations in the BOLOGNA Area. All groups were carrying 100 lb General Purpose clustered bombs fused .1 nose and .01 tail. The IP was clear, on the bomb run the clouds increased to seven or eight-tenths, but broke to one-tenth in the target area with haze restricting visibil­ ity to ten miles.

a. No difficulty from weather was reported at rendezvous, enroute or at the target.

b. Briefed route to and from the target was adhered to closely.

c. No route flak was reported.

d. Escort was reported to be in the target area.

2. All groups achieved excellent to superior bombing results. The 301st Bomb Group attacked its target in a company front formation with the wave leaders performing the only sighting operation. The other five groups attacked by squadrons in trail. No comment on the attacks is necessary except that the intervalometer setting used by the 301st Bomb Group did not enable them to cover the length of their target with their company front formation.

47TH WING - RED FORCE

1. Each group dispatched a maximum effort of 36 aircraft plus spares to aid the ground forces in the BOLOGNA area.

a. No difficulty from weather was reported at rendezvous, enroute or at the target.

b. Briefed route was followed closely with the exception of one squadron.

c. No route flak was reported.

d. Friendly fighters were seen in the target area, but were not identified as the escort.

2. Of the sixteen separate attacks launched by the four groups eight scored superior results. Only two boxes bombed in unsatisfactory fashion. The squadron which failed to follow the briefed route was three minutes late over the target and was forced to bomb into smoke. Fortunately, this squadron was last in the wing formation and its errors did not affect the other attacking units. Nor was the squadron late enough to hinder the following wing. The extra time allotted to each wing avoided that eventuality. All units regardless of their position in the formation, reported that smoke and haze were a handicap to ideal bombing.

304TH WING - RED FORCE

1. Each of the four groups in this wing dispatched six seven-ship boxes flying in a nine-ship front with two attack units to attack enemy troop concentration and installations in the BOLOGNA area.

a. Poor weather and cloud conditions hampered rendezvous, causing one group to rendezvous considerably late because its attack units were unable to locate each other. However, all groups were able to close up in good formation by the time they reached the keypoint.

45 b. Two groups of this wing were consistently twenty to twenty five miles off course all the way to the keypoint.

c. No route flak was reported.

d. All groups reported fighter escort as briefed.

2. All attack units achieved good bombing results, with considerable dam­ age being done to all of the assigned areas. No bombs were dropped short and no unusual incidents occurred to mar a routine excellent performance by this wing.

55TH WING - RED FORCE

1, Each group dispatched a maximum effort of 36 aircraft plus spares to attack tactical targets in the BOLOGNA Area.

a. The lead group encountered considerable difficulty in the weather at rendezvous and were forced to depart on course three minutes late. Because of an almost complete undercast, PFF was used in assembly and rendezvous. All groups assumed their proper posi­ tions in wing formation enroute to the target.

b. All groups flew the briefed route.

c. No route flak was encountered.

d. Approximately 15 P-381s of escort were sighted.

2. Each group bombed with a 9-ship front. All attack units reported that clouds covered the first portion of the bomb run, but that they cleared rapidly just in front of the target, enabling all units to get good sightings and good results. In one attack unit the leader had a mal­ function which prevented his bombs from releasing at the proper time, but the other aircraft in the formation dropped on the deputy, who had a normal release and only the bombs of the one aircraft fell outside of the assigned area.

49TH WING - RED FORCE

1, This wing dispatched three groups of 37, 39 and U0 aircraft each against tactical targets in the BOLOGNA area. Each group attacked with two units flying in a nine-ship front.

a. Weather provided no difficulty at the target or enroute.

b. All units flew courses as briefed.

c. No route flak was reported.

d. Escort comprising both P-51s and P-38s was sighted in the target area.

2. The lead group reported that smoke and haze made it very difficult to pick up the target area, but that toward the end of the run it was sighted through breaks in the clouds. Good results were observed. The second group hit the target with good results in spite of ground haze. Part of one box dropped approximately one mile short when the box deputy dropped prematurely. The third group experienced no diffi­ culties at all and achieved excellent results.

5TH WING - BLUE FORCE

1* Each group dispatched the remainder of their serviceable aircraft, as a Blue Force, to attack the NERVESA RR Bridge Diversion.

46 a. Weather caused no difficulty at departure or enroute.

b. All routes to the target were flown as briefed.

c. No route flak was reported.

d. Escort was first sighted at 10456 at 4345N 0932E.

2. All groups experienced difficulty with weather in the target area. Only two groups bombed the primary successfully, the 463rd Bomb Group scoring excellent results and the 483rd Bomb Group hitting it well with two boxes. The last group over the target attacked the highway bridge near the pri­ mary, because the smoke and haze created in the area by the previous five groups prevented sighting on the assigned target. The other groups made offset releases or bombed into smoke and, in general, found the poor visibility too great a handicap for good bombing.

47TH WING - BLUE FORCE

1. All aircraft remaining in the wing after the Red Force commitment had been met were dispatched against the CASARSA Railroad Diversion.

a. Weather offered no difficulty at rendezvous or along the route. But cloud cover of as high as 8/10s over the IP made it extremely difficult for navigators to pin-point their units, especially since the IP was located in a steep valley.

b. All units followed the briefed route quite closely to the vicinity of the IP with the exception of two squadrons who strayed slightly left of course as their wave went through the UDINE falley.

c. Only route flak reported was experienced by two squadrons mentioned in sub-paragraph "b" who were hit while they were left of course.

d. The escort, briefed to be P-38's, was not sighted.

2. The first group over the target, despite the hazards mentioned in para­ graph one, scored generally excellent results. The next two groups scattered bombs over the countryside as a result of the shifting clouds which prevented any truly precision sighting.

The last group made a double run over the target and by virtue of this maneuver one squadron scored excellent results. The other two attack units had no better luck on their second run than they had on their first and one unit dropped into smoke and the other returned its bombs to base.

304TH WING - BLUE FORCE

1. All remaining aircraft in each group were dispatched in seven-ship boxes to attack GHEDI Ammunition Dump, Italy.

a. Poor weather hampered rendezvous and the following of the briefed route. However, under the guidance of the wing weather ship, three of the groups accomplished an effective rendezvous 4,000 feet higher and ten minutes later than briefed. The group which failed to rendez­ vous departed on course eight minutes late and from then on failed to catch the formation and for all intents and purposes performed an independent mission.

b. All except the one group flew the briefed route. The independent group flew an intercepting route, but still failed to catch the wing formation.

c. The three groups in formation reported good fighter escort as briefed.

47 2. All groups hit the target with fair to good results. However, better coverage of the target would have been possible if more ships could have been dispatched.

55TH WING - BLUE FCRCE

1. This Wing dispatched all the remaining aircraft of four groups against the CASARSA RR Diversion. The attack formation was two boxes of seven aircraft per group.

a. Weather proved no difficulty at rendezvous or enroute.

b. Routes to the target area were flown as briefed, with the exception of one group which turned off course to go to an alternate target when advised by radio that the primary was cloud-covered.

c. No route flak was encountered.

d. Escort was encountered as briefed.

2. Two groups failed to bomb because of weather at the primary and the alternates. The other groups bombed under very adverse conditions and did not achieve successful results.

49TH WING - BLUE FORCE

1. Three groups dispatched Ik, 17 and 18 aircraft each against NERVERSA RR Bridge Diversion. All groups attacked by column of boxes in trail, there being two attack units in the first group and three in each of the last two.

a. Weather provided no difficulty enroute or at rendezvous.

b. Routes to the target were flown as briefed.

c. No route flak was encountered.

d. The escort of F-51s was executed as briefed.

2. Five of the attack units performed double runs over the target, which indicated in some measure the scope of opposition which was being en­ countered on short raids during the closing phases of the battle in Italy. Despite these extra efforts dhly two boxes hit in the target area. The best pattern was achieved by a box which hit on the first time over the target. One of the "second-timers" hit short, but had bombs walk into the target area.

48 49 50 51

Target Area M. A. 13 53 DATE: 15 April 1945

Grand Bombers Fighters Total Total BzlZ B-24 Total P-38 P-51 Strength of Attack Aircraft Airborne 1790 1233 362 871 557 197 360 Less Early Returns bl 33 8 25 14 2 11 No, of Aircraft Crossing Enemy Lines 1743 1200 354 846 543 194 349 Less Non-Effective Sorties 59. ^ £2 2, 1 2 Effective Sorties 1684 1144 350 794 540 193 347

Percent of A/C Airborne Effective 94# 93% 97# 91# 97# 98# 96#

Tonnage DroDDed 2376 2369 745 1624 7 7 Tonnage per Effective Bomber Sortie 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 .4 .4 -

Number of Encounters with E/A 2 - - - 2 1 1 Our Losses By Enemy Aircraft ------_ By Flak 6 - - - 6 5 1 Others ^ 3 - 2 1 - 1 Total Losses 10 3 - 3 7 5 2

Percent of Attacking Force 0.6# 0.3# 0# 0.4# 1.3# 2.6# 0.6#

Victories

E/A Destroyed in the Air 2 - - - 2 1 1

Relative Comparisons Victories in Air per Loss 0.2 - - - 0.3 0.2 0.5 Tons Bombs Dropped per Bomber Loss 790 790 745/0 541 - - - Victories in Air per 100 encounters 100.0 - - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 Losses by E/A per 100 Encounters ------

TARGETS: (A) Nervesa R/R Bridge; (B) Casarsa R/R Bridge; (C) Ghedi Ammunition Factory; (D) Ponte di Piave R/R Bridge (A/T); (E) Munich/Salzburg; (F) Salzburg/Linz; (G) Munich/Regensburg; (H) Bologna; (I) Pianora/Pradua T/C; (J) Steinach/Matrei' Bridges

DATE: 15 April 1945

Strength of Attack Bomb­ - A/C Less E/R Condition Number ing Tar- Air- & Non-Eff. Eff. # A/B of Attack of Losses A/C Damaged Accur get Borne Sorties Sorties Eff. Time Altitude Encounters Flak Victories E/A Flak Other Cat I Cat II acy

"RED FORCE" 5TH WING 2nd B.G. H 42 1 41 98# 1243-1257 21000-22800 - SIH - - 1 - N.Ao 97th B.G. H 42 - 42 100% 1307-1324 21000-21500 - MIH - - 2 - N.A. 99th B.G. H 42 1 a 98% 1256-1319 19000-20000 - MAH - - 6 1 N.A. 301st B.G. H 41 1 40 98% 1257-1259 21000 - SAH - - 1 1 N.A. 463rd B.G. H 42 3 39 93% 1308-1321 19000 - MAH ------N.A. 483rd B.G. H -41 1 Jt2 98% 1255-1310 20000 SIH — " ~ ~ 12. — N.A. TOTAL 5TH WING 252 7 245 97# - - 23 2

47TH WING 98th H.G. H 39 2 37 95% 1343-1348 19000-20700 - SIH - *- 3 - N.A. 376th B.G. H 40 3 37 93% 1345-1350 20000-22000 - SIH ------N.A. 449th B.G. H 40 2 38 95% 1344-1352 19700-21600 - SIH - -- - 1 - N.A. 450th B.G. H 1 -22 98# 1355-1402 21500-23000 - SIH — -- - 1 — N.A. TOTAL 47TH V /ING 159 8 151 95# - - - 5 -

49TH WING 451st B.G. H 37 - 37 100# 1407-1421 18400-20000 - SIH ------N.A. 461st B.G. H 42 3 39 93# 1428-1429 20000-20500 - - - 1 - - N.A. 484th B.G. H J±o 1 _22 98# 1421-1423 22230 — SIH — — — ~ — ~ N.A. TOTAL 49TH ,;ING 119 4 115 97# - - 1 - -

55TH .7ING 460th B.G. H 41 2 39 95# 1409-1412 20500-21500 ------N.A. 464th B.G. H 42 - 42 100# 1403-1408 20900-22200 - SIH - _ - - N.A. 465th B.G. H 39 - 39 100# 1404 21000 - SIH - - 1 N.A. SIH N.A. 485th B.G. H JfcO 1 _22 _28# 1407 22000 ~ — 1 -- ~ TOTAL 55TH WING 162 3 159 98% - - 1 - 1

54 Bomb- A/C Less E/R Condition Number ing Tar- Air- & Non-Sff. Eff. % A/B of Attack of Losses A/C Damaged Accur­ get Borne Sorties Sorties Eff, Time Altitude Encounters Flak Victories E/A Flak Other Cat I Cat II acy 304TH WING 454th B.G. H 41 - 41 100* 1333-1335 20900-22200 - l/.IH - - -' - N.A. 455th B.G. H 41 3 38 93% 1330-1336 21000-22000 - SAH. - - - - 9 - N.A. 456th B.G. H 42 2 40 95% 1338-1339 22000 - MAH ------N.A. 459th B.G. H - 100% 1331-1345 19500-20900 - MAH - *~ ~ — 1 N.A.

TOTAL 304TH WING 166 5 161 97% - - - 9 1 "BLUE FORCE"

5TH WING 2nd B.G. AD 18 - 18 100# 1215-1221 26000-26500 - SIH ------9.9% 97th B.G. A 21 1 20 95% 1200-1219 24750 - SIH - - 1 1 N.A. 99th B.G. A 18 1 17 94% 1213-1218 23500-24500 - SAH - - - - 2 - 25.0% 301st B.G. A 16 2 14 88% 1221-1224 24400-25200 - SIH - - - - 50.0% 463rd B.G. A 21 1 20 95% 1212 25000 - SAH - - - - 87.9% 463rd B.G. A 16 ** 16 100% 1152-1202 24600 — MAH — — "" — _JL — 79.6%

TOTAL 5TH WING 110 5 105 96% - - - 8 1 50.5%

47TH WING 98th B.G. B 26 3 23 88% 1241-1243 18500-20500 - SAH - - - - 1 - 47.5% 376th B.G. B 26 - 26 100% 1244-1248 20700-22700 - SIH - - - - N.A. 449th B.G. B 24 - 24 100% 1246-1255 19650-21650 - MAH - - 3 - 2.4% 450th B.G. B .21 JL. 61% 1320 22000-24000 - SIH - - - - 2 - N.A. - TOTAL 47TH WING 99 12 87 88% - - 6 - 25.0%

49TH WING 451st B.G. A 17 3 14 82% 1330-1333 19000-22000 - SIH - - - - 28.7% 461st B.G. A 19 6 13 68% 1331-1332 20000 - SIH - - - - 2 - 36.1% SAH 2 484th B.G. A -12 JL. 79% 1313-1344 21000 — — — ~ **~ *" 2itl* TOTAL 49TH WING 55 13 42 76% - — 4 - 32.7%

55TH WING 460th B.G. D 10 3 7 70% 1343-1344 24000 - - - 1 - - 28.6% 464th B.G. B 16 16 - 0% ------465th B.G. B 16 - 16 100% 1328 22000 - SIH - - - - - 485th B.G. B 11 11 0% - - — - ~ —I_ _z_ — TOTAL 55TH WING 53 30 23 43% - - ! - - 28.6%

Strength of Attack A/C Less E/R Condition Number ing Tar- Air- & Non-Eff. Eff. % A/B of Attack of Losses A/C Damaged Accur­ get Borne Sorties Sorties Eff. Time Altitude Encounters Flak Victories E/A Flak Other Cat I Cat II acy 304TH WING 454th B.G. C 14 - 14 100% 1323-1325 18300-19000 ------N.A. 455th B.G. C 7 1 6 86% 1328-1338 19200-19400 ------100.0# 456th B.G. C 18 - 18 100% 1328-1329 19500 ------N.A. 459th B.G. C .22 _1 18 95% 1322-1331 17200-18800 ------87-4# TOTAL. 304TH WING 58 2 56 97% - - - - - 75.0%

"ESCORTS" XV FIGHTER COMMAND 305TH WING 1st F.G. H 32 - 32 100% 1250-1350 22000-26000 - IAH ------14th F.G. H 64 1 63 98% 1329-1345 25000-26000 ------82nd F.G. H _io 1 _i2 98% 1405-1440 25000 ~ SIH — — — — — —

TOTAL 305TH WING 146 2 144 99% - - - - -

306TH WING 31st F.G. ABDI 107 1 106 99% 1230-1335 18000-27000 - SIH ------52nd F.G. AB 79 5 74 94% 1310-1345 - - SIH - - - - 325th F.G. HJ 107 6 101 94% 1215-1240 14000-18000 ------1735-1815 332nd F.G. C -20 — -22 100% 1320-1335 21000-25000 - — — — — — —

TOTAL 306TH WING 323 12 311 96% ------

"STRAFING AND DIVE-BOMBING" XV FIGHTER COMMAND 1st F.G. E 33 - 33 100% 1050-1143 0-9000 1 IAL 1 5 - 1 82nd F.G. F 18 2 16 89% 1115-1220 500-2000 - SIL - - - - 2 - 332nd F.G. G -ZL 1 -2k 97% 1345-1430 0-4000 1 IAL 1 - 1 1 — 1 TOTAL 88 3 85 97% 2 2 6 1 2 2

GRAND TOTAL 1790 106 1684 94% 2 2 - 6 4 57 7 46.0%

55 CAUSES OF ABORTIVE SORTIES

Type Target Mech­ Pers­ Weather Instr- Escorting A/C Total Obscured anical Structural onnel to Target Armament Spares Oxygen Radio uments E/R»s Other

B-17 12 - 8 - - - 1 - - - 3

B-24 77 37 20 6 5 6 3 - - - -

P-38 4 - 1 1 - - - 1 - 1 -

P-51 -i2- - 8 1 1 - - - 1 1 1 TOTAL ALL AIRCRAFT 106 37 37 8 6 6 4 1 1 1 1 1 3

TONNAGE BY TYPE BCMBS

Type Aircraft 500 lb. GP 500 lb. RDX 250 lb.GP ICO lb. GP Total Tonnag

B-17 - 305.0 - 440.45 745.45

B-24 - 486.5 564.75 572.7 1623.95

_ _ P-38 7a0 _ 7.0

TOTAL FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE 7.0 791.5 564.75 1013.15 2376.4

56 EMPLOYMENT OF WIGHT B&tBERS

The use of night bombers of 205 Group RAF made possible an around-the-clock strategy in planning the role that heavy bombers would play in the final all-out drive for North ITALY. The night attacks denied the enemy the possibility of regrouping after a day attack or of any large scale movements under cover of dark­ ness. The cutting of his retreat routes put him in an ever increasing state of congestion thus making him more vulnerable to the large scale daylight blows.

I. Operation of Night 9/10 April; (Areas Pig and Whistle)

A. Target: Two areas along the SANTERNO River, W and SW of LUGO (44-26N 11-54S), contained front line military targets. The object of these attacks was to disorganize the enemy and his defenses in order to facilitate the crossing of the SANTERNO the following day. Eighth Army troops were at that time halted along a canal, which in some places was only 2,000 yards from the SANTERNO River.

B. Execution: 72 Liberators of 205 Group RAF dropped 209.7 tons of 500-lb bombs between 0400/0406 hours from 8,000/11,500 feet. 8 Liberators illuminated and marked the target. The army marked the center of each area with red marker shells but to prevent misidentification in the confusion of the battle the standard target indicators were also dropped by the marker a/c. This system of double mark­ ing was very successful on the more northerly target. However, the southern target was not marked by the army in time and was not attacked.

C. Results: Crews reported good concentrations on the target area. No photo reconnaissance could be secured as the nature of the targets made photo­ graphic assessment impractical. The evaluation of this attack can best be shown in the detailed analysis of results that appears in the next section (Page No.77).

II. Operation of Night 11/12 April: (Bastia Area 4434N - 1152E)

A. Target: The area was located where Highway 16 crosses the RENO River and contained troops concentrations, defenses and dumps.

B. Execution: 76 Liberators dropped 224.75 tons of 500-lb bombs between 2100/2103 hours frem 8,000/11,000 feet. 8 Liberators illuminated and marked the target.

C. Results: Bomb strike photos showed an excellent concentration in the assigned area. The disruption of the enemy's communications at this point forced him to use another route of retreat over the RENO River.

III. Operation of Night 12/13 April: (The Communication Center of ARGENTA 4437N - 1150E)

A. Target: The communication center of ARGENTA contained enemy troop con­ centrations and formed a bottleneck in the enemy's main line of retreat through the ARGENTA Gap.

B. Execution: 42 Liberators dropped 143.75 tons of bombs (74 x 100 lb, 368 x 500-lb and 59 x 500-lb incendiary cluster bombs) between 2115/2121 hours from 6,000/8,000 feet. 8 Liberators illuminated and marked the target.

Results: Crews reported a good concentration of bombs in the town with fires and explosions resulting. It is now know from ground sources that the de­ struction was very great. Roads were cratered and blocked with rubble thus deny­ ing the enemy this vital escape route.

IV. Operations Night 13/14 April: (P0RT0 i/.AGGIORE 4441N 1149E)

A. Target: The town of PORTO MAGGI0RE, like ARGENTA, was a key point con­ trolling the escape route through the ARGENTA Gap.

57 B. Execution: 57 Liberators dropped 197.75 tons of bombs (4 x 2,000-lb; 107 x 1,000-lb; 537 x 500-lb and 24 x 500-lb incendiary bombs) between 2114/ 2122 hours frctn 5000/10,000 feet. 8 Liberators illuminated and marked the target.

C. Results: Crews reported that a good concentration of hits was scored on the target. One large and several small fires were left burning in the town.

V. Operation Night 16/17 April: (Communications Center of CASALSCCHIO 4428N 11182)

A. Target: The communications center of CASALECCHIO is located 3 miles Southwest of the center of BOLOGNA along the RENO River. The Fifth Army was then attempting to by-pass BOLOGNA on its dash to the FO and this communica­ tions center and bridge offered an ideal interdiction of the flow of German reserves from BOLOGNA.

B. Execution: 58 Liberators dropped 226.75 tons of bombs (4 x 2000-lb; 210 x 1000-lb and 471 x 500-lb bombs between 2100/2106 hours from 8,000/11,600 feet. 8 Liberators illuminated and marked the target.

C. Results: Crews reported an excellent concentration on the assigned area with the target markers completely extinguished near the end of the attack, thus forcing 18 a/c to return bombs to base. The bridge was destroyed and suffi­ cient damage was done in the town to disrupt enemy communications.

VI. Operation Night 17/18 April: (The Communications Center of PORTO MAGGIQRE)

A. Target: This vital link in the ARGENTA Gap was again attacked in the attempt to completely eliminate it as a communication center.

B. Execution: 39 Liberators dropped 152.75 tons of bombs (146 x 1,000-lbj 311 x 500-lb incendiaries and 8 x 500-lb bombs) between 2130/2132 hours from 6,500/8,700 feet. 8 Liberators illuminated and marked the target.

C. Results: Crews reported the bombing well concentrated on the target. As a result of this and the attack of the night 13/14 April the roads were en­ tirely covered with rubble and craters, bridges were destroyed, and rail communica­ tions were severed, thus denying to the enemy another escape route.

VII. Operation of Night 19/20 April: (The Communications Center of MALALBERGO)

A. Target: MALALBERGO is situated on Highway 64, 15 miles North of BOLOGNA. The town at this time was being used as a lateral communication for enemy troops facing the Eighth Army and as a normal rear communications route to the Fifth Army front.

B. Execution: 62 Liberators dropped 246.5 tons of bombs (244 x 1000-lb and 498 x 500-lb bombs) between 2143/2149 hours from 6000/11,000 feet. 7 Libera­ tors illuminated.

C. Results: Crews reported the center of town well covered with strikes. Later photography showed the attack to have been very successful with MALALBERGO ceasing to exist as a communications center.

VIII. Summary

On the seven army cooperation attacks made at night between 9 and 19 April, 507 heavy bombers of 205 Group RAF dropped 1401.95 tons of bombs on enemy defensive positions, supply, and withdrawal routes in the battle areas.

58 TARGET MATERIALS

The success of a heavy bomber attack depends largely on the ability of the aircrews to identify the target to be attacked in sufficient time to allow the proper bomb run. This problem is difficult enough in a high level precision attack on such installations as oil refineries, aircraft factories and marshall­ ing yards, all of which have definite identifying characteristics, but in the case of a precision attack against field fortifications and scattered buildings near friendly lines, the problem is even more complex and confusing for the attacking crews. For this reason extreme care was taken in planning '.70WSER to" prepare briefing material for pre-attack study and to assemble as complete a set of target material to be carried by each crew as had ever been used on an important target.

The following pages of target material are typical examples of the material used in briefing and flying the missions. The completeness and clarity of this material was clearly shown in the excellent results obtained in identifying each objective.

The necessary photo reconnaissance was flown by Fifth Fhoto Group and re­ produced for distribution by the Fourth Photo Tech. Squadron and Company "A" of the 941st Engineer Battalion, both attached to the Fifth Fhoto Group at Head­ quarters Fifteenth Air Force. Additional aid was given by the Third Photo Group, Tactical Air Force, in the form of material required for additional cover and also as a reserve stock.

The D-Day target material was planned, flown, reproduced and delivered to the Wings in seventy-two hours.

. MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED FOR D-DAY

1:50,000 Maps 15 per Group 1:100,000 Maps 15 per Group 6" Photographs 20 per Group 24" Photographs (Annotated) 10 per Group Photo'Mosaic (l:50,000) 4 per Group Oblique Fhotograph of I.P. 20 per Group Obliques of Target Areas 10 per Group

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED FOR D*5 'DAY

1:50,000 Maps (Annotated) 4 per Group 1:50,000 " (Unannotated) 15 per Croup 1:.100,000 " (Unannotated) 15 per Croup Photo Mosaic (1:50,000) (Unannotated) 4 per Group Fhoto Mosaic (1:50,000) (Annotated) 4 per Group 6" Photographs 20 per Group 24" Photographs 20 per Group 6" Photographs of I.P. 20 per Group Obliques of Target Areas 10 per Group 1:250,000 Approach Map 20 per Group

59 FORLI

60 Ii0- "i - X The map on the following page is an example of the 1/50,000 sheet showing the

IMOLA-LUGO area. This map was carried by all crews flying in cooperation attacks on the Eighth Army sector.

62

East North Take West edge ot square in 12 Take South edge of square in 79 y/° u ip—f )T ° f/ it which point lies, and read the which point lies, and read the jglkjarighe/la S0< ''•,•> S . /hi figure printed opposite this figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin line on East or West margin dorgo S Giorgio-*^ fcf /-( Sft 7/ S •;/. // V or on the line itself on the or on the line itself on the 0 , face of the map. face of the map. Estimate tenths Eastwards 3 Estimate tenths Northwards 6 5 s • ° *t*V il Seminario, S^kP>' .*//•• ryJ/Coccomarro di'/ East 123 North 796 • 5 rv/N morto REFERENCE 123796 To nearest 100 meters \ Fornace 9/0$, l'\^aL"jS^rFo9o imeo Unit - _ Meter YWq*S*5«iA * qU V Square 1.000 meters «i(My Nearest similar reference on this grid _ 100 Kms THIS SHEET FALLS IN GRID LETTERS "M" AND "L"

• KMl 5 ^ ;fontana. Agascello Ih'irfsoPdel Fosso NORTH ITALY ZONE GRID Projection. Lambert Conical Orthomorphic Spheroid: Bessel Origin: 45°54'N and 14°E False Co-ordinates 800,000 meters East of Origin: 601,000 meters North Scale Factor: 998992911 • 1 I o^\ ilCasteiioj CONVERGENCE FOR CENTER OF EAST AND WEST EDGES OF THIS SHEET

Magnetic N. (1944) and True N. from Grid N. for center of sheet \Fabbreria, TRUE N. Vc.Pasta< GRID N. * li S.MVco MAG. N. 2*25' , 31 MILS 43 MILS DO NOT USE DIAGRAM EXCEPT //•f L:__ TO OBTAIN NUMERICAL '/T'RE.Dl VALUES OF ANGLES.

Martino Palrnirano Annual Variation about 9' Easterly Magnetic data: 1st. Geo. Mil.

srmata . ^di Pallarano REFERENCE Railway, two or more tracks, with Station Railway, single track, under construction Railway, electrified; single track, double track Railway, narrow gauge or tramway arnaceN Tram lines on a road AO 9 £Ga'ibar Cable railway S.Egidio x- -x—x- National Highways (Autostrada) Under Constr. 1 II 11 8 Meters wide, metalled II Main Roads (Strada Statale with route No.133 CJpscinetto numbers) 6 Meters wide or over, metalled mm. Oratorio*^ >0 Other Main Roads (Strada di grande Pnob#.t+A ' * k Fornace della comunicazione) 5 Meters wide or over, metalled Secondary Roads. 3-5 Meters wide, generally metalled •Colombaij Other Roads and Cart Tracks, generally unmetalled j ^ttoria- Mule Tracks p Sabbioni Paths Boundaries, state Mir y// x °% JEl ^= province (-••+••+ ••+ •• + •• +••

district ^%rWortestirolq^' commune

Oans! _ ___ Over 3M Wide Under 3M Aqueducts; (a) raised, (b) underground, (c) surface •

wy\ Mil Conventone* Wells, perennial, non-perennial 0P o Forn c< g^ga^ Marsh and Swamp ^ ^^ ^ .uogo Passo del Gall Church, Chapel, Shrine, Cemetery 4* 2 $ cS3 .'Marrara^ Lighthouse _ o Radio Telegraph Station 5 Mine. Mill— X # Factory Wt* M Wf Power Station fi

\Tenuta Penne Woods. Scattered Trees

^Fornxe. ^%Vecchi< Stanga; Ml Bottl X\' INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS AND INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS

rv F- N 1 IV COMPARATIVE INDEX Forn'ce. hi II III ' dG Itl < Q.3.&S. 4164.G.S.G.S. 4229. & G.S.G.S. 4228 NW ! NE IV 1 IV • IV IV I —- MILES FROM TARGET

TARGET

/ SAN GIOVANNI

MILES FROM ~ TARGET

TARGET 65 The map on the following page is an example of the 1/100,000 sheet showing the

BOLOGNA area. This map was carried by all crews flying in the cooperation attack on the Fifth Army area.

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iT W/ jTK.-~rfS^SaLNf^-Wl\Zpcca"L iI .-Ka^T°KlT Stiftd VI' \ 67 TRAINING FOR OPERATION WOWSER

In order to insure positive target identification and precise navigation to the target, lead bombardiers and navigators of each group were supplied with oblique photographs of the target areas and flown over the bombing course in P-38 droop-snoots for a first hand study of the initial point, course markers and target. "Droop-snoots", it will be remembered are modified P-38 aircraft with space for one passenger in the nose in place of the guns. A plexiglass nose section provides excellent visibility for the passenger. Four P-38 pilots made a total of 175 flights over the area carrying the navigators and bombardiers. These pilots, already familiar with the route, assisted in pointing out front line markers and markers leading to the target. The flights averaged one hour and fifteen minutes each, leather conditions prevented some of the f_ights from being flown at bombing altitudes, but all were flown at altitudes above 15,000 feet. Only two enemy aircraft were seen on these flights and top cover was used only when considered necessary. The bombardiers whose targets were in the Apple and Apricot areas were each given two flights over the course because of the proximity of these areas to the front lines.

The training program would have been more effective had the school operated from a field having normal P-38 maintenance, fcuch time was lost in getting re­ pair supplies to the selected base because the most suitable base from all stand­ points was occupied by a F-51 group who did not have proper supplies in stock.

Pilot training for this operation consisted of familiarizing pilots with the use of the runway localizer system at high altitudes. A practice course was established and each lead pilot practiced flying the localizer at bombing altitudes for a distance equal to that of the bombing run.

68 COMMUNICATIONS

The role played by communications in the close cooperation assignment of the Fifteenth Air Force during the Spring Offensive in ITALY was a vital one and contributed substantially to the overall success of the program. The fol­ lowing narrative, compiled by the Fifteenth Air Force Communications Officer, deals with this phase of Operation WOWSER.

In mid-March, 1945, A-3 requested that the communications section organize and set up the radio facilities which were to be required in connection with the Fifteenth Air Force's maximum effort in cooperation with 15th Army Group.

Two separate radio set ups were put into operation, one on the British Eighth Army front and the other in the central sector of the Fifth Army area.

EIGHTH ARM SECTOR

Facilities on the Eighth Army front were the first to be set up and the first to be used. Equipment consisted of three AN/MRN-1 runway localizers; one SCR-299 radio set; and one AN/CRC-1 VHF radio set. Telephone communica­ tions linked up each station.

One MRN-1 van was set up two kilometers West of the town of RUSSI opera­ ting on Xray band on a line RU3SI-LUG0 with beam 301 degrees 41 minutes. This equipment was operated by three radio operators (933) from 58th AACS Group on detached service to this Air Force and one officer from 58th AACS Group. This beam was the east target approach line.

Another MRN-1 van was operating on Yoke band. This station was located 7 kilometers North of FAENZA on the FAENZA-RUSSI road on a line SAN ANDREA through SALARALO with a heading of 298 degrees 25 minutes. Two radio operators (933) operated this equipment. The Y beam was the west target approach line.

The remaining MRN-1 was the radio bomb line. It operated on Victor band and was set up two kilometers Northeast of Yoke station in the village of FIEVE DE CESATA. The heading was 210 degrees 11 minutes. The van was operated by two operators (933). Along this same line were the visual bomb line markings. Flak, panel strips and yellow smoke.

The SCR-299 was used as the point-to-point radio station. This set was located at PIEVE DE CESATA with four radio operators (756), one driver who did maintenance on power units and supplied gasoline and oil for the vehicles and power plants. An officer of the 416th Signal Company (Avn) was OIC. The call sign was 2B and the station was operated in LAT-53 net between this Headquarters and MATAF.

A VHF radio was installed at Desert Air Force Headquarters and was operated by the OIC selected for units on the 8th Army Sector. This equipment was set up on Fifteenth Air Force "A" Channel for recall of bombers if necessary.

The beams were flight checked on 4 April and were used by the Air Force on 9 April when the Eighth Army pushed off on the Spring Offensive. Engineers from the Eighth Army located and marked off the sites used prior to the arrival of the equipment.

FIFTH ARMY SECTOR

Organization on the Fifth Amy Central sector was primarily the same as that used on the Eighth Army side.

The equipment consisted of 3 AN/MRN-1 Localizers; one SCR-299 Radio Set, and one AN/CRC-1 VHF radio set.

69 Xray beam was the East target approach line. The station was set up in the town of LOIANO on a line LOIANO through PIANORO with a heading of 08 degrees 30 minutes. This line was on Highway 65. The van was operated by one radio operas- tor (933) from 58th AACS Group.

The West target approach line going up highway 64 was the Yoke beam. The station was located in the town of CREDA with the line running CRSDA through PRADURO with a heading of 15 degrees 03 minutes. One radio man (933) from 58th AACS Group and one motor mechanic from 301st Signal Company group operated this station.

The station operating on Victor beam for the bomb line was located 1000 yards south of the village of MONGUNO on a line from VERGGATO through LOIANO. The heading of this beam was 92 degrees 00 minutes. The station was operated by one radio operator (933) from the 58th AACS Group and a motor mechanic from the 416th Signal Company. Rations and gasoline had to be taken to this station every other day over a route that was subjected1 to accurate enemy artillery fire.

The SCR-299 was set up at the Command Post in LOIANO operating in LAT-53 net using 31J as the callsign. At this station were two radio operators (756), one radio mechanic (754), one driver for delivering gasoline, oil, rations, and water, and one officer who was in charge of operations of the special communica­ tion equipment on the Fifth Army Sector.

The VHF radio for recall of aircraft if necessary was set up at XXII Tacti­ cal Air Command (Adv) Hq and was operated by the communications officer in charge.

All MRN-1 stations and Conmand Post were linked by telephone communications.

The beams were flight checked on 8 April and were used on Sunday, 15 April, when the Fifth Army started its final offensive.

70 RESULTS ACHIEVED BY HEAVY BOMBARDMENT

The tactical employment of heavy bombardment in extreme close army coopera­ tion is a radical departure from the doctrine of precision bombing from high al­ titudes for which the strategic bombers were conceived and principally used in the Battle of Germany. Although this use of Fortresses and Liberators is not new, its great difference from pinpoint bombardment of priority objectives pre­ sents a vastly altered picture to the analyst in his attempt to evaluate reason­ ably the overall effects of this type of operation.

The maximum expMtation of the Fifteenth Air Force for this type of attack between the 9th and 19th of April in conjunction with the Fifteenth Anr.y Group's Spring Offensive 1945 is believed to have been one of the USAAF's most brilliant uses of heavy bombers for purely tactical purposes. This conclusion is based on the careful examination of all available evidence which has been gathered during and subsequent to the first mass capitulation of the Wehrmacht on 28 April 1945 when Army Group Southwest surrendered to Field .Marshall Sir Harold Alexander's Allied Troops in Italy. This surrender involved about 1,000,000 enemy troops and an area comprising all of Northern ITALY and most of the Austrian Redoubt. It came only 19 days after the Allied offensive was launched and rapidly shattered, beyond hope of reforming, the once powerful German armies which had fought stubborn­ ly for 20 months a series of delaying action against the Allied advance up the Italian peninsula.

The yardstick which has been applied to measure the degree of success achieved by heavy bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force in these operations, and their contribution to the ultimate smashing victory of the ground forces, is far different than that employed in the detailed assessment of damage to con­ ventional strategic targets. The convictions which are expressed in this re­ port as to tfte success of these operations are based on the careful examination of information from various sources. Before issuing any definite statements of overall effect on the enemy, the method used in assessing the results and the reasons for employing them will be reviewed to obtain the clearest picture.

METHODS USED IN ASSESSING RESULTS

The targets selected for the heavy bombers during the course of the Italian offensive were as follows:

A. Bridges (Road and Rail): No problem is raised by these targets as to damage assessment for photo reconnaissance and ground inspection leave no room for doubt as to the success or failure of the interdiction bombing attacks.

B. Ammunition. Fuel. Supply Dumps: Again with this type of target, par­ ticularly ammunition and fuel dumps, visual and photographic evidence is. avail­ able and clear cut.

C. Tactical Target Areas Immediately in Front of Allied Armies: It is this category of targets with which this report is concerned and it is this type of target which presents a somewhat complex problem as to evaluation of results.

During the period 9-19th April the Fifteenth Air Force flew six missions in direct cooperation with the ground forces, 2 on the Eighth Army Front and 4 on the Fifth Army Front. The initial attacks were made on 9 and 10 April just prior to and during the very-early stages of the Eighth Army's offensive across the SEN10 and SANTtflNO Rivers.

The targets the Eighth Army selected for the heavy bombers on these two days were large areas approximately 9 miles in length and varying from 1-2 miles in width. This was the enemy frontal defense zone, containing troop concentrations, gun positions, headquarters, billets, forward supply areas and communications. The plan was to carpet bomb these areas, primarily with fragmentation bombs, and to shatter the stability of the line, thus enabling its penetration by our forces with maximum efficiency and speed and with minimum loss of life.

71 The four missions conducted ahead of the Fifth Army front were directed against a variety of small military targets along Highways 64, 65 and 9 lead­ ing in a southerly direction from BOLOGNA. Over these routes advancing Allied troops would advance toward this key city and thence to the PO. Army intelli­ gence indicated that the selected target areas contained gun positions, supply dumps, troop concentrations, and maintenance installations. Aircraft were loaded with fragmentations, 100, 250, 300 and 500 pound bombs depending on the nature of their target. It should be noted that assigned targets on the Fifth Army Front were far more precise than those attacked before the British Eighth Army and hence it has been easier to establish specific damage from aerial photo reconnaissance and subsequent ground inspection.

These targets were important not so much in themselves but as vital links in a great chain of installations on which the mobility and battle efficiency of the GiRk'AN divisions in the field depended. The cumulative effect of their bombard­ ment, the successive loss of important supply dumps, disruption of communications (particularly telephonic), and even the destruction of personal effects and billets would be a serious factor to an army attempting to stem a furious assault from the ground.

Thus to list solely specific, isolated items of damage does not assist in arriving at a reasonable conclusion as to the overall result. Therefore, in the statement which follows the conclusions are based on known target damage as assessed from aerial photo reconnaissance, inspection of some of the areas shortly after they were captured, and a close examination of prisoner of war reports. In connection with the latter it must be emphasized that in themselves these inter­ rogations cannot be regarded as wholly reliable but as indications of trends they represent an important factor in measuring the results achieved.

THE RESULTS

It has been established beyond doubt that the bombing accuracy of the tacti­ cal units participating in these operations was good to excellent as is graphic­ ally represented on the consolidated bomb fall overlap in this report. Specific damage inflicted by attack, insofar as is conclusively known, is listed below under the battle front concerned.

EIGHTH ARMY FRONT

I. Operation of 9 April - Areas Apple and Apricot:

A. Target: Two areas SE of BGLOC-NA, W and SW of LUGO (44-26N 11-54E), direct­ ly ahead of the Eighth Army and running generally parallel to the SENIO and SAN- TERNO Rivers. These areas were designated as "Apricot" and "Apple", covered an area approximately 9 miles in length and 1-2 miles in width, and contained front line military targets. The objective of these attacks was to disorganize the enemy and make possible the crossing of the SEN10 River by Eighth Army troops as they launched their offensive.

B. Execution: 242 B-17»s of the 5th Wing and 583 B-24's of the 47th, 49th, 55th and 304th »»ings - 825 heavy bombers in all - dropped 1,692.4 tons of bombs (1433.85 tons were 20 lb fragmentation bombs) between 1342 and 1514 hours from 18,000/23,000 feet. Bombing was visual for all groups.

C. Results (Specific): Strike photos indicated excellent concentrations on target areas (see overlay ho.1 ). No photo reconnaissance was secured of the target areas, for it was felt that no photographic assessment could be made due to the nature of the targets and the size of the bombs. Much of the area was wooded, precluding damage assessment. An evaluation of the effects of this attack and the one of the following day, based primarily on FOW reports, inspec­ tion of the areas, and discussion with Allied Army Commanders will be treated in the final section of this report,

II. Operation of 10 April - Areas "Baker" and "Charlie".

A. Target: Two areas located along the SANTERNO River (generally between 44-28N 11-52E and 44-22N - 11-47E). As in the previous days operation, the tar­ get areas contained military targets ahead of the Eighth Army itfiich had succeeded in crossing the SENIO and were advancing toward the next river barrier - the line 72 of the SANTERNO.

B. Execution: 242 B-17s of 5th «'ing and 606 B-24s of 47th, 49th, 55th and 304th «ing - 848 heavy bombers in all - dropped 1791.9 tons of bombs (all 20 lb fragmentation bombs) between 1100 and 1300 hours from 18000/24000 feet. Bombing was visual for all groups.

C. Results (Specific): Excellent coverage was obtained on target areas (see overlay No.2 ). The same situation prevailed in areas Baker and Charlie as did in Apricot and Apple. Final evaluation will be included in final por­ tion of this statement.

FIFTH ARM FRONT

I. Operation of 15 April - Tactical Targets South of Bologna. Rail Diversions, and kunitions Plant:

A. Targets:

Tactical: Nineteen specific target areas located along Highways 64 and 65 running due south from BOLOGNA, and on Highway 9 running Southeast from this key city. Target areas included dumps, gun positions, troops, maintenance installations, and numerous other military objectives. The ground forces would advance over these routes and maximum disorganization of the enemy forces, with destruction of his equipment was a logical and desirable preliminary to the sub­ sequent onslaught ftot the ground.

2* Rail Diversions: NERVSSA Rail Diversion Bridge (45-49N 12-12E). CASARSA Rail Diversion Bridge (45-58N 12-45E). These had been previously dam­ aged but repairs had progressed to a point where further attack was deemed nec­ essary. With the virtual stoppage of all movement through the BRENNER Trans­ portation System and deterioration of all other routes, the enemy made frantic efforts to the last to keep his few remaining lines of supply or avenues of escape open. No better illustration of this can be found than in the case of the rail diversion bridges. Original bridges had been hammered incessantly from the air and when repairs to these became hopeless, the enemy constructed diversions to replace them and over which his supplies, slowed down to a walk, were shipped. These then were important objectives in the overall strategy of softening up the enemy in his front line positions and cutting his communications behind him.

3. GHEDI Ammunition Factory and Stores (45-27N 10-19E): This and other small ammunition factories were producing and supplying front line troops with ammunition. As such they represented profitable targets from which rich divi­ dends might be expected in terms of actual and acute shortages as separated areas became isolated and subject to the increasing tempo of the allied ground and air offensive.

B. Execution: (Note: This day's operation was the largest one-day effort ever put forth by the Fifteenth Air Force). 1233 Heavy bombers effectively and successfully bombed the assigned target areas. 93$ Of the Air Force was opera­ tional for this mission.

1. Tactical Targets:

245 B-17s of 5 Wing 585 B-24s of 47, 49, 55 «• 304 Wings 830 Heavy Bombers

Dropped 20,240 100 lb GP 1012 Tons 2,520 250 lb GF 315 " 2,000 250 lb RDX 250 " 24,760 Bombs 1577 Tons

73 From - 18,400/23,000 feet

Between - 1257/1428 hours

Bombing - Visual

2. Rail Diversion Bridges

a. NERVESA:

88 B-17s of 5 Wing 41 B-24s of 49 Wing 129 Heavy Bombers

Dropped 1,439 x 500 lb RDX bombs, 359.75 tons

Between 1200/1344 hours

From 19,000/26,400 feet

Bombing - Visual

b. CASARSA

103 B-24s of 47 and 55 «'*ing

Dropped 761 x 500 lb RDX bombs 21k x 500 lb GP " 975 Bombs or 243.75 tons

Between 1241/1348 hours

From 18,500/24,000 feet

Bombing visual by 5 groups, offset by one. 6 groups attacked.

c. PONTE PI PIAVE (Alternate)

17 B-17s of 5 Wing 7 B-24s 24 Heavy bombers

Dropped 263 x 500 lb RDX bombs or 67 tons

Between l?ll/l343 hours

From 24/26,000 feet

Bombing - Visual

3. GHEDI Ammunition Factory and Stores

56 E-24's of 304 <*ing

Dropped 506 x 500 lb RDX bombs or 126.5 tons

Between 1322/1338 hours

From 17,200/24,000 feet

Bombing visual

C. Results (Specific)

1. Tactical Targets; Fhoto reconnaissance was flown the same day as the attack by 15th Photo Recon Squadron (Sorties 15SG/1485 and I5SG/1486-PIR No. 15 DB/ 43). Items of damage follow on the bomb damage report.

74 Eighteen of the nineteen assigned areas- attacked received excellent cover­ age with dense concentrations of craters blanketing virtually all of the sectors. (See overlay No.3 ). In most instances the majority of buildings in these areas were destroyed, partially destroyed or heavily damaged and roadways were rendered unserviceable. These elements of damage could readily be determined from recon­ naissance photos but as in the case of the preceding close cooperation attacks final evaluation of damage will be treated in the final portion of this report.

2. Rail Diversion Bridges

a. NERVESA Rail Diversion Bridge: An excellent concentration was scored on the diversion. Sections of the track totaling more than 400 feet in the stream bed were obliterated and the rail line was cut at one point South of the river.

b. CASARSA Rail Diversion Bridge: Photo reconnaissance was not ob­ tained of this target, however, bomb strike photos disclosed several concentra­ tions fell in and around the center of the diversion bridge and extended over the main line bridge. A good concentration also fell on the highway and highway bridge.

c. PONTE PI PIAVE Rail Diversion Bridge (Alternate): Photo recon­ naissance was not obtained of this target but bomb strike photos showed the bridge heavily damaged with the main concentrations falling on the South end of the struc­ ture.

3. GHEDI Ammunition Factory and Stores: Reconnaissance photos disclosed a good concentration of hits scored across the center of the factory area. Six revetted storage sheds were destroyed in the ammo storage area, nine filling houses were destroyed, one unidentified building in the Southwest end of the area was partially destroyed by a direct hit and another probably damaged by blast, and several sheds were completely destroyed.

IX, Operation of 16 April - Tactical Targets South of Bologna

A. Targets

1. Tactical: 790 Heavy bombers were dispatched to attack gun positions, supply dumps, troops concentrations and enemy headquarters in the BOLOGNA area in close cooperation with the Fifth Army. Due to weather conditions only part of'the attacking force was able to complete the operation, visually bombing targets lo­ cated on the West side of Highway 64 approximately 9 miles South of BOLOGNA.

B. Execution

1. Tactical Targets

98 B-24s of the 55 Wing and 484 Bomb Group

Dropped 1,729 x 250 lb GP bombs (216.125 tons).

From 20,000/23,000 feet.

Between:1321/1400 hours

Bombing - Visually

(252 B-17s and 440B-24s found their assigned target cloud obscured and returned bombs to base having been briefed to bomb by visual methods only).

C. Results (Specific)

1. Tactical Targets: Post attack reconnaissance photos and cloud ob­ scured bomb strike photos showed one good concentration of hits destroyed or damaged several small buildings and cratered roads in the target area.

75 III. Operation of 17 April - Tactical Targets South of BOLOGNA

A. Targets

1. Tactical: 21 Specific target areas located along the West side of Highway 64 running Northwest of BOLOGNA and Highway 65, running due South of BOLOGNA. The target areas included troop concentrations, supply dumps, gun positions, and enemy headquarters. The objective, as in the preceding attacks, was maximum disorganization of enemy forces, destruction of equipment and instal­ lations prior to attack by allied ground forces.

B. Execution:

1. Tactical Targets

248 B-17s of 5 Wing 503 B-24S of 47, 49, 55 and 304 Wings 751 Heavy bombers

Dropped: 1035 x 300 lb GP 155.25 tons 11318 x 250 lb GP . 1414.75 tons 745 x 100 lb GP 37.25 tons 13,098 Bombs 1,607.25 tons

From 19,000/23,000 feet

Between 1254/1459 hours

Bombing - Visual

C. Results (Specific)

1. Tactical Targets:

Photo reconnaissance was obtained on the same day as the attack, by 15th Photo Recon Squadron. (Sorties 15SG/1495 and I5SG/1496 - P.I.R. No. 15DB/45). Reconnaissance photos disclosed excellent results obtained with good coverage of all assigned target areas with the exception of one. As in the case of the prev­ ious attacks in many areas virtually every building was destroyed or heavily dam­ aged by hits or near misses (See overlay No.4).

17. Operation of 18 April - Tactical Targets South of Bologna

A. Targets

1. Tactical

13 Specific target areas along the i/Vest side of Highway 65 due South of BOLOGNA and on both sides of Highway 64, Southwest of BOLOGNA were attacked. The target areas included troop concentrations, supply dumps, gun positions and other military installations and the objective of the attacks were the same as in the preceding day's operations.

B. Execution

1. Tactical Targets

231 B-17s of 5 «ing 242 B-24s of 47 and 304 Wings 473 Heavy Bombers

Dropped: 2,319 500 lb RDX 579.75 tons 51.168 20 lb Frags 511.68 tons 53,487 Bombs 1091.43 tons

76 Frcm 18,400/26,000 feet

Between 1548/1649 hours

Bombing - Visual

C. Results (Specific)

1. Tactical Targets: Post attack reconnaissance was obtained by 15th Photo Recon Squadron on the same day as the attack (Sorties 15 SG/1497* 15SG/1500 and 15SG/1501 - P.I.R. No. 15 OB/47). Recce photos showed a heavy concentration of frags covering most target areas, destroying 23 buildings and seriously damag­ ing other buildings and defense positions. Bomb strike photos showed areas well covered with concentrations across Highways 64 and 65 and cutting rail lines into BOLOGNA. One direct hit or near miss was scored on a road bridge across the RENO River, and one concentration fell on a rail junction near the town of BORGO PANIGALE just NVV of BOLOGNA. Overall evaluation is included in the final section of this report. (See overlay No. 5).

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE

The overall results of the Strategic Air Force attacks on tactical targets were excellent, especially with regard to effects on gun positions, personnel, supply dumps, troop concentrations, maintenance installations and communications.

Bomb craters ranging in size from 9 to 14 feet in diameter and 3 to 6 feet in depth marked the entire area covered by HE bombs and communications in these sectors were cut or rendered wholly useless. In many cases gun positions re­ ceived direct hits and the installations were totally obliterated. Numerous direct hits also caused the complete destruction of many enemy occupied build­ ings and strongpoints, while personnel entrenched in "bunkers", fox holes or slit trenches were buried in their positions or became casualties. In the areas re­ ceiving the heaviest concentrations, the roads were blocked by craters and scattered debris.

In sectors covered by 20-lb fragmentation bombs all supplies, vehicles, and lightly protected equipment were rendered useless and though the heavier guns and motorized equipment generally sustained only slight damage they had to be abandoned by the enemy in many instances. Enemy movements were thrown into complete confusion by the blocking of roads; wire communications were cut and disorganized.

The effect of the bombing upon enemy personnel was severe and decisive but cannot be expressed in quantitative terms. It is known that casualties, in killed and wounded, were heavy in spite of the protection sought in slit trenches and bunkers, but statistics on such losses cannot be assembled. Interrogation of many prisoners indicates definitely, however, that the bombard­ ment had shattering effpct upon the morale of the survivors. Dazed and terri­ fied by the sudden, overwhelming power of explosions around them, they had no physical or moral powers of resistance against the Allied ground forces which advanced immediately after the bombs ceased falling.

Interrogation revealed that the tactical employment of heavy bombers came as a complete surprise to the enemy and the obvious fact that our bombers were operating without any counter-air resistance proved a source of great discourage­ ment. In many instances troops in the attack zones were so confused and demoral­ ized by the attacks that they offered no resistance to advancing Allied forces and surrendered without a struggle. Enemy troops in areas adjacent to those attacked were dismayed by the destruction and disruption of supplies, ammunition and equipment in the areas covered by the bombs. All P.V's agreed that it had been a nerve-shattering experience and was a paramount factor in bringing about a full realization that their position was virtually hopeless and that the Allies were capable of smashing all enemy resistance in ITALY by utilization of each and every weapon at hand.

77 The cumulative and significant effect of the air bombardment of the enemy was its destruction of his ability to oppose the Allied ground forces. It de­ stroyed his arms, ammunition and defensive positions. His transport was rendered useless either by destruction or by blocking of both lateral and rearward roads. Cutting of wire lines isolated combat units and destroyed the channels of command. Personnel who survived the air attacks lost completely both the means and the will to resist. The final and decisive result was that the forces of the Fifth and Eighth Armies encountered only scattered and ineffective resistance as they ad­ vanced against the enemy forward positions upon which the heavy bcmbers had dis­ charged their thousands of demolition and fragmentation bombs.

Following are a few excerpts from the many interrogations that followed the mass surrendering of German troops below the PO River.

A German N.C.O., Age 27! "Someone shouted *Here they come'. It was utterly amazing to see a group of normal soldiers run for their lives. Comrades who a few minutes before were joking, became helpless animals. Never again can I be­ come accustomed to the real faces of my friends who in such a short time, revealed their animal-like natures. Our Commanding Officer, too, forgot himself, and ran like a blind helpless dog. Once in the bunkers we were all ashamed to face each other, knowing that the real display of our fear and emotion had overcome us".

A German Officer, Age 32: "The effect on the morale of our troops was in­ describable. We know now that you mean business in Italy and that we will not be able to stand up to these terrifying attacks much longer. I believe that my men were quite content to be taken prisoner a few days after this last raid".

A German ex-pilot, Age 22: "Successive bcmbing formation which passed over us during the following days so completely stunned us that we had little resist­ ance to offer against the advancing ground forces.—I must say ior myself and for most of my comrades who had been around BOLOGNA these last few days, that we were all glad that our solution to what may follow up has been solved by being taken prisoners".

A German N.C.O., Age 27: "Dust clouds rose in the air as one formation after the other laid a pattern of bombs along the highway. We observed dirt and rocks rolling down the hillsides, completely blocking the roads".

A German ex-pilot, Age 22: "We observed from our hill-top that our supply dumps (food and ammunition) were being blown sky-high. Up till now, food and supplies from these dumps were being brought up at night, but now they no longer existed. At first our AA started to fire at these aircraft, but as the second wave of bcmbers passed over, we knew these AA positions had been silenced".

A German soldier describing the attack of 9 April: "The ground was covered with deep (2^ metres) craters. The frags hit the houses and the heavy bombs landed in the fields. I have been a soldier for 6 years but I will never forget that day. We asked ourselves, what have we done to deserve this? The next day I was again in the middle of the attack on the SANTERNO. After this attack many of my platoon had deserted. I was taken prisoner the next rlay by an armored recce car."

Conversely, the morale of the Allied troops w^s reported to be unusually high due to the appearance of the huge number of heavy bombers and the easily visible attacks on the opposing ground forces. The success of the bombing was epitomized in a subsequent report from Allied ground forces to the effect that the SENIO River crossing was accomplished with "negligible" losses. Casualties of the Fifth and Eighth Armies were lighter than expected, and on both fronts little resistance was encountered in the enemy positions which had been attacked by the Strategic Air Force.

78 ANALYSIS OF BOMBING

The following pages show the bomb fall plots for the attacks of 9, 10, 15, 17 and

18 April. Cloud cover prevented the plotting of bomb fall patterns in the attack of 16

April. The assigned areas are shown on the maps in red. The green crosshatched areas indicate the bomb fall pattern as plotted from complete sets of bcmb strike photos of all groups participating in the attacks.

79 50,000 IMOLA SECOND EDITION SHEET 88-11 West of Rome

6 0m OOOm. ATTACK 36 37°° E. 0°3ff

C. Pasetti C. Golfera Paswlon l ^ . Giugn Villa Serre^g $!/ ^Vla^amazzina 'd$l Signdre na. dell spedale C. Torchi v .4^/1 V'la/ Bellaria*;

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na.Grande ello Pi //^/i udrio C. Scardovi aradora// wontajparj

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S17000m.E 18 5' West of Rome ITALY 1:50,000 SECOND EDITION

0°45' 618000mE. 19 AREAS BOMBED 10 APRIL 1945 36 637000m 44V r C. Pasetti ^5^ PollaTola C. Gottera Piqcola Villa Serrag fxtel Signbre 'na. dell 0 spedale torchi v'ly Bellaria^

C. Mel^jdri Cap'na. del // }%* C. CavaMini'/ U TJucato 1 "oachetto M o. di S Patrijio Patrizic f .#// p- * ... :» T; OlmiSecc >// I • •// i Castellino Tabanell*- Sassoli . Maria di Fabria

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f/lalcantoqe ^af'zo. M01 'la. Pasolini Canova S. Spirito' // asalecch rr^ntali, \|^| /Officini igona ..Xik- t/L C. Lumina 44°20' [FAENZA) 6 0m no 17°° E. 18 27 000m. 0 45' Scale 1:50,000 W For use by Wor and Navy Department Agencies only ITALY 1:50,000 Not for sale or distribution SECOND EDITION - AMS 2 SHEET 87-11

West of Rome : 1°i5' "78°°°' L 79 u n 84 iff AREAS BOMBED 15 APRIL 1945 97" " E. Toa

( e rn s -1 Pal" 44° Via Leona ' arsioli* Ja^Palazzina/^~- Pancralio tab't S.Anna i Falsing 1 PalV ji> / Ceramtche V.Gan Cavazza i *49 V'la Alberani Portoni'/ < Antonio^ S-Vital io di SooVa o FahurftntS^-L_ .* 1 Pal'/d ^ ""4U—sS Ranuzjy ij~ V-. '/Kfela / fndQ di Vign •jgif " ' '"£5^ T^nari • ..M.. ^I £ e dellBian edosa42 He quatr^Torn J. Wm&g£m Chiusa ft Ojjtf'o la Ctnfcp^a _ yii Fabbr L&mi la Berselli ai'zo Bos^ii! Cuvara // Rw>le \Casamen Osterioia ft h\=f£.PaizoG*bacagni ^fabb'ft Scuol y schr Pal'zoScuwifvpap^ Ai^^, . onte Vescchio V'la'Rora 135 ? f' )Via2u / ^ - -J.Jv%T^^//.V'la Fr?^C^,.V-ll M'c/dt sott 2k. // | V^Gesso Mad'na arfoggic^ la Aldm *di S.t-YCa f n Dalbetlo & Vla'Puglio (i 5SL S. Febbronia RlC - h V'l^r^gata^ 1 / ^ C/a abbreria

"o*di sqfcr 7 Z31 arbianell^^ «r ^ Via TM I. ^ W NAIthe^ .< la yallett

^ -r >^w

Cjo'Vahsi

tpflano uintftti oflurtiere.ij \\rsLi no fiasteijan M'te Guootino Gaibol la'*•Pantebuco izza jff£>£Qss'ne ^nojry ./<3 I Ppncaglia/ gjjfc.o $ Sarf ra Ottani r r\.(( 7/ )C 0-.!2/3 \^ y C i:7v pv ^y^ffeenjdaV^> SI ia\ «?A •. ..z H Enrichetta /- ^.LJi70,8^FV'^'/ 1 s. 1 missone /a ! Tirfiior *>>> f (bV^ Osp'o SjJKar -L9rri V^'la VSIfiore "~"7r oghettp Pizzoclyvo * 'h < ( 250= II ,r *r--t ^00-

~v \ N|-#-\\V cC^ >' • Pal'ztr^ x —y\ \ =tr // s-y ^v/ 1

Val di RWo ) da R14 BarDla ,,TlL>'M'1 or tagaa 11 'zo Tbrtcrellu V'laj^el Carto"^* f± Pal.'zo jP nt^chiar />.Albareta ^... / / s fV EQv&tmim ?} w a ; aaiI z^ dj^R^si N] n Nt

245 B-17 S OF FIFTH WING 585 B-24'S OF 47-49-55-304 WGS. IjMM 830 TOTAL HEAVY BOMBERS

S Lore

J

cafav - Gualando

20,240 100 LB. GP ,012 TONS Mauefl' 2,520 250 LB. GP 315 TONS 2,000 250 LB. RDX 250T0NS dt Jafio I uro MiP^rzoiluffio?t r rjKW** rZ W*k n!,,X/C^^ \\ 24,760 BOMBS TOTALS l,577T0NS \\W •• a dela Torrf Lupar St

f «i0° ^ »>/± KIWQ' rtaro^aV

^ M.-oJSRjovp deVMori

ua

Bardh

\\ . Va) del Eos W^t

!' ^dj£!>= ^JZ^Skceri»^ ma. KOIANOJ l°i ' 578°°°mE. 5 1C 84 90 05 596°°°mE. Too' West of Rome ITALY 1:50.000 SECOND EDITION - AMS 2 SHEET

West of / 5 000m 1°15' 78 E. 79 84 10- ATTACK OF 17 APRIL 1945 97000mE. 1

a rsioli Pancrape.. „ jy'i^pyiae ^ —i/,if Z~~?~ "o* •4 S.Ann / / W * f"• A " ^ a Falsin eramiche st'a Roveri ' *r. v. Gan rtoni '/ S.Antofy^ 6% , L V'la Alberaniiy ^'Ji., Cast'o abuFlHxtSri;^* [y*^.J / 1 'V'la Gandolfv^i rl. S^Vil ,r^Jj/ D- V'te^/irginia; " Jk*U>r1a •** j* 4? fffl ^i Clt\QOJ3t*()gr\ rY^Y^: }>>>r'>§V'l3 Gozza^nL^^^a lAlerrianni Giosepp :fvW le quat Omt'o la C wmw£ r Bl .Chiusa ff o yii\Fat>br V ^T*|jp - ^^ jf - F ^I y'la MaTvezzi Casamenti v'/a G t f|!'Ostenola j\^0lrPQNA Pal'zo pc^r^ij* PafiQ A^lni. onte Vecchio Via Rara caio Via Fr MNodisott L .°*V£ t;4.l.,| °V^'^ /v> *'k "1 S. Febbronia / Pago B Ht/y'la S""t : abbreria Via Sanguinetti azzarp y.r \ \197 //, ir^ianglld—% fc- N\ Cyej^inuovaT* i* / ^f.-Pal'z^. Monti a r^M •, TO/ A '°///\ la Biel»i ^ *'' BeJdVporto* f! /,% • 77^ o ^ •. ar-^/J 9»C.\VV Bl/l 'la/l Metoro oschiera i any lorayan lia a al'^-VaHs teilano ,/,Pfpf,u x 1 uc ,irt /// °/ >^s C'no Urfsteilan G . r,v t'" y»V'® i p f '1^ Fant^buco * w c-kir¥ i^a#^ ;,riX. Gaetan Enrichetta amefito> VerzaMia

j» . tV. jjr ioiay ^Pr^ta San\o r .fiV'IIM tumy»?»WMc 7/^1-^1 X 9 ft £' _fI Tir/lor^tMr/1,ur®jrb..I O, >Ut. ^ ^viiBastia SayertiIII 7A\ ?f ' 3cuol f -V&S&;zano/, Osp'o S [8.Liberata Sp! #C jSPavedagna la Valfidre rltart'a del Ma/W .a ' '<< ','" \iX~ 1 '^dJ )r#sK216*/ // - / " J)/ ' la Post VnaRipJz^iw. L Ras&gfrano \

y'iarjF*rn^nd rb %x % u y

',.; _pOst«ipia I'Abbjftl ^.Colpr^Car^ji fJVmPT 1 W-'^ ia di Se J-^nsWorji C^/4 '" J+'AM-Ug^ Brairt T v :> dli S U i trv^ jv .J'V, stel de V .iT': M, :A1T y; on gardm, >i" ; 8 4

Sil0^^ . I o

5?'Ǥ 248 B-I7'S OF FIFTH WING

ryf^ 503 B-24'S OF 47-49-55-304 WGS. Anna 751 TOTAL HEAVY BOMBERS n f

ottesninorox^i\oc6^_^^V S-ls^oroxv7^. a0^*^3 J A ,!!S ' oOW W

Gualanpp L035 300 LB. GP I 55.25 TONS Petizza 11,318 250 LB 6P I.4I4.75T0NS

745 100 LB. GP 37.25T0NS aziell' 13,098 BOMBS TOTAL 1,607.2570^

T'reVdi M tanchi WJri^ f Avw s &fr-M i x~..iJJvp^/'"Sfrirf %H~*K§i'fzJ&Z&i

yj3pr® if ^>Z^u y zza ' ^ "« Vf^r^WiA'"^ r*ti '/••ifi 1 1*7 L Rf 2 . /? 5?-r„n -ICS^ /-/ Wl /<>-!HfeWf' >0!

^ //.-I deV^orii o/ ^ £&/

J/7 4.0? \\. ^ ^sM.aei riatf / , //? U^-, V gfrrroni ' 'L6 Wa dd^WtsA _ Lvt^" %C'S? T A£J 1 v js\ wy^i

r rr ^ ff anovell Wvi

"•-willK((11 ®rr^ Va*l del^S; ^ /O v\Marzabotr IW vrZ -4—5Tv A.^5?,,„i^.A\ ;... y b- \ x ^ v^y^n°/ ^ if f Pc/f -Ji-w p> Mu Mhi^C !TSmou» azzola (LOIANOJ 5 m 1°15' 78°°° E. 87 90 05' 596°oomE. l°oo' West of f Scale 1:50,000 TALY 1:50,000 iOVJ'iU'U'UiBOLOGNA1/1 SECOND EDITION - AMS 2 SHEET 87"11

West of Rome 15' ••78OM-'E.79 ATTACK OF 18 APRIL 1945

Certosa |a^Palazzina/> .Paneraj )ebole •S.Anrw iF Falsing Mignar<>. V.Gan* 'ortoni .Antorii^/ 'sT/itak •Ross;/ 0 Pal'zo - i,v Ranuzz V'la^Trgmiaj .ittoriaU J' ' ^i-S: '^V'la Gozzadini tTordcyOi Vign< (V'la Tanan

^fTrahXx 'le quatl ODt.ro la C< .Chiusa VIlAFabbfi 'la Berselli" ^P?' jo Boschiy Ivezzii -la Groce.4* ff wjyii ibb'rTa KjffeoGNA y Scuol# joschr Pal'zo ScuWuP Pafzo A^ini', 5onte Vecchio 71 V'la'Rora I' V'la Zt M'o di sottc .^V113 / ^<7 J- A/'la Ak W/7tT!A S.Maggiore* v. vyWo$ is. Febbronia Jy Pal'o B«C! W//P"jL V'la Sanguinetti

'Abese. '' J Morina •Rivatx V'l^il Metorc Barbiano / >izzar< fal zo Valisi

NT FC'no C^aSteilani M'te 4ucotinc> ///*// ^ GaiboU •V|'3 Pantefeuco 'iz:a! !\Tla~ .Ottani i La/zari

rJ Vta_J Verzalha' Enrichettt imento>' k >&* V'la- jgToianJ :^Pre,te Sar X •aRTirW*. ' J' " 7A fySayerW ^ //Zirin* Paderncj< 321'/ Ji—v»JSytosp'o s-t -Iprricella //S.liberata il Qonzifio' V'la Ffossij jlPoggio // t216-/ >oaraj ia F*bst«

frano,

Farnet< >piaguer menji^ iVlETFern^ndj V /f ?v'la "Bextocca*; - Jj TIL' JVal di_F •Pila oa RiJ '^I'zp Marcor ' Via— (^oqfiolo Montagr^aV-^y//1" », A V • \335 ^ la'nezzi - .Scuole A> -Vi 5^>Monte Qgjvo PaTzoTr istef deirSrrttiJ lafnasia \Kir='y jerciosc ,3/GU Tongardinjt Morr^\

\iGorizia iU. J nr\A i IT affo Campiano#\ fypoggto ,\\ 562 4 0^1] •VizzaT

'Pi^ne del^lno. B-17 S OF FIFTH WING Ihidsa (fe? B-24'S OF 47 ft 304 WINGS

cftsiota TOTAL HEAVY BOMBERS

, LerzartO//3 ttCatemrmo

r.M.c/ella Capanna Ajfc*Calegare ^69 )a dell GCtBlandd|

[Pelizzapo 500 LB. RDX 57975TONS

20 LB. FRAGS 511.68 TONS ,Monazcano BOMBS TOTAL I 091.43TONS

£ f Morfebr< '•^dTjap! T're di MonteiuBgo * % 'al'zo di Riosto lianchi »ino«('/ ^ | ^orrt'ee d^l 6oJ?i

'Torre Lul R^iQjgcaryi^

, Casetto T FtfrnTe.Mutia^l]

w N jnj.ca

•475 / ^Tartarossa (OmbV^o« luovo ^ Poggio|| > dei Mori a^r M

'Cirrquydarrn \\Vallo Ner^

f.idei Frati Belmonie^L :otomi Barch.eJ =* J; ^ rOst'0 Jr/ u /( ^2#/ (i /A i\ H's

"ano^btta ^anov<

A1 vVV /] y Val del Guardoi^i M.Castellazi

«sano > 3 "H (LOIANO) 5 m 15' 78°°° E. 87 595000m£ West of Rome Scale 1:50,000 SUMMARY OF ATTACKS MADE ON THE FOLLOWING DATS:

9 April, 10 April, 15 April, 16 April, 17 April, and 18 April 1945

Total For 9 Apr 10 Apr 15 Apr 16 Apr 17 Apr 18 Apr Period Strength of Attack Aircraft Airborne 1220 1261 1790 977 1183 879 7310 Less Early Returns 12 —£2 _M 22 JO _iS2 No. of Aircraft Crossing Enemy Lines 1208 1238 1743 955 1159 849 7152 Less Non-Effective Sorties kk 18 621 12 844 Effective Sorties 1164 1220 1584 280 1123 837 5308

Percent of A/C Airborne Effective 95# 97# 94# 29# 95# 95# 86#

Tonnage Dropped 1767 1901 2376 223 1777 1206 9250 Tonnage per Effective Bomber Sortie 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.2

Number of Encounters with E/A - 9 2 13 7 2 33

Our Losses By Enemy Aircraft By Flak 2 6 1 9 Others 2 k 1 12 TOTAL LOSSES 2 7 10 1 1 21

Percent of* Attacking Force 0.2# 0.6# 0.6# 0.1# 0.1# - 0.3#

Victories E/A Destroyed in the Air 6 2 5 1 1 15 E/A Destroyed on the Ground = 1 1 Total 5 2 5 2 1 ~iS

Relative Coedsrisons Victories in Air per Loss 0.9 0.2 5.0 2.0 0.8 Tons Bombs Dropped per Bomber Loss 1767 380 792 223 1777 841 Victories in Air per 100 Encounters 66.7 100.0 38.5 14.3 50.0 45.5 Losses by E/A per 100 Encounters

NOTE: Above figures include all aircraft dispatched for the day indicated except weather & photo reconnaissance flights and their escorts. Prepared by Source: SCU Form 34 28th Statistical Control Unit 29 April 1945

87 COMMENDATIONS

To: Major General Nathan F. Twining, Commanding General Fifteenth Air Force

From: Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, Commanding General Mediterranean Allied Air Force

Following received from General Clark, Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group: Quote I want you to know how deeply I appreciate the thoroughly effective support which the Air Forces under your command have already given to the Fifteenth Army Group in the current attack. Your excellent cooperation began with the planning phases of our operation and has con­ tinued in a manner which is most gratifying to all personnel in the Fifth and Eighth Armies which you are supporting. The victory which we are confident we shall achieve will be a last­ ing tribute to that team work. Para I shall be grateful if you will convey my appreciation to your subordinate commanders. Unquote Para It is with profound gratitude to you that I add my sincere appreciation for the superior manner in which each and every unit has supported the above operations.

To: Major General Nathan F. Twining, Commanding General Fifteenth Air Force

From: Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, Commanding General Mediterranean Allied Air Force

My most hearty congratulations to your entire command for your record effort 15 April in support of our ground forces. To your ground personnel particularly great credit is due for the near miracle of maintenance which allowed 1233 heavy bombers and 629 fighters to be dispatched on that day. Operational and intelli­ gence staffs who conceived, planned and directed the execution have every reason to be proud. And to the combat leaders and crews I extend my congratulations and appreciation for a splendid day's work.

To: Major General Nathan F. Twining, Commanding General Fifteenth Air Force

From: Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, Commanding General Mediterranean Allied Air Force

I have received the following from General McCreery quote We much appreciate the wholehearted support of Fifteenth Air Force on 9 and 10 April and I am convinced that the carpet bombing in front of our assaulting divisions has been one of the decisive factors in our rapid advance to the River Santerno. I fully realize the special and intensive training that this task demanded of all bombing crews and the degree of success attained shows how enthusiastically all personnel tackled this close support mission for the Eighth Army. End quote. Please convey to an concerned my congratulations and appreciation for their fine efforts in this support of the new offensive by the ground forces.

88 To: Major General Nathan F. Twining, Commanding General Fifteenth Air Force

From: Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, Commanding General Mediterranean Allied Air Force

The following received from Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Croup quote I want you to know how fully I appreciate the splen­ did and effective air support which the Air Forces have already given us in the current attacks. I have been especially grati­ fied by the excellent cooperation which we have received from all Air Force personnel starting with the early planning phase. Our-air ground team is now a great success and I am confident of your all out support in the future.

To: Cannon for Twining

From: General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, USSTAF

The outstanding record of the Fifteenth Air Force in the number of heavy bombers and fighters dispatched from those assigned on 15 April 1945 mission is unsurpassed in the annals of U.S. Air Force activity. The effort your air and ground crews expended in this all out operation is most gratifying. The achievement of Brigadier General Rush's wing in having all of its aircraft operational is particularly commendable. I wish to congratu­ late you and the forces under your command, and particularly the ground crews, on this exceptional effort.

89 COMBINED ARMS RESEARCHLIBRARY |U|

REPRODUCED BY 94!ST ENGR BN