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/// M-l 0 8T9U 1 %Bmk FOREWORD This is the story of Operation WOWSER. It is the story of the greatest heavy bomber effort ever launched by the Fifteenth Air Force in cooperation with Allied Ground Armies in ITALY. The operation brought to the peak of success the use of heavy bombers in a tactical role in ITALY. This report documents the part played by Fifteenth Air Force planes and men in aiding the Fifteenth Army Group to start their mighty 1945 Spring Offensive which crushed completely the German Armies in ITALY. Of the six WOWSER operations the most outstanding mission was flown on 15 April. On that memorable day 1233 heavy bombers were airborne against the enemy. This force represented 98.6 percent of all the combat heavy bombers in ITALY. Such a near- perfect achievement of the theoretical "maximum effort" is cer tainly an accomplishment without parallel in the history of large scale heavy bomber operations. The execution of Operation WOWSER was a fitting climax to the hard bitter months of aerial warfare carried on from ITALY by the Fifteenth Air Force. It demonstrated in a final and un forgettable manner that when the combined efforts of every in dividual within the Air Force are devoted to a common purpose, there is forged an overwhelming weapon for victory. N. F. TWINING V MAJOR GENERAL, USA COMMANDING CONTENTS PAGE SITUATION OF ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY 9 APRIL 1945 1 PLANNING 5 OPERATION OF 10 APRIL 1945 IN COOPERATION WITH THE EIGHTH ARMY 11 OPERATION OF 15 APRIL 1945 IN COOPERATION WITH THE FIFTH ARMY 29 EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT BCMBERS 57 TARGET MATERIALS 59 TRAINING 68 COMMUNICATIONS 69 RESULTS ACHIEVED 71 ANALYSIS OF BOEING' 79 STATISTICAL SUMARY 87 * * * * * INTRODUCTION Operation WOWSER was a series of six missions flown by the Strategic Air Force in ITALY in cooperation with the Spring Offensive of the 15th Army Group. The first mission was flown on 9 April and the last mission was flown on 19 April. During this period 7,152 aircraft were airborne and 6,308 aircraft completed effective sorties. On 16 April the bulk of 675 non-effective sorties were caused by excessive cloud cover at the target. On the remaining five days more than 95# of the aircraft airborne flew effective sorties. The total tonnage of bombs dropped during the operation was 9,250 tons. The Fifteenth Air Force lost 21 aircraft to all causes while the feeble Luftwaffe suffered a further reduction of 16 planes in their forces, all but one of which were destroyed in the air. Our losses were 3/10 of one percent of our total force. The results of the bombing were generally excellent. A detailed assessment of bomb damage and a study of the effect on the morale of enemy troops may be found in another section of this report. Sections U and 5 contain detailed presentations of the tactical planning and execution of the attacks of April 10 and 15, on the Eighth and Fifth Army fronts respectively. The remaining four operations differed from these only in scale of attack and location of targets. Details of all six attacks aire indicated in the statisti cal summary at the end of this report. THE SITUATION ON THE ITALIAN FRONT - 9 APRIL 1945 Despite the almost catastrophic sequence of events on Germany's Western Front, there was little apparent change in the enemy's policy and capabilities in Italy prior to the commencement of the Fifteenth Army Group offensive on 9 April, 1945* He showed considerable nervousness as to Allied intentions, but was obviously determined to meet any offensive operation in his strongly held positions. This was the only possible course open to him. Condemned, as a result of his virtual isolation from the Reich, to retain a large force in Italy and to occupy large areas of Italian territory, he was nevertheless unable to carry out a general voluntary withdrawal to a militarily more economical line behind the Adige because of diminishing fuel resources which had to be conserved for the more vital demand of a possible rear-guard action towards the PO. The enemy could do no better than await the inevitable attack where he stood. Hie Germans were also short of transport and ammunition. Furthermore, the continued interdiction of their supply routes into Italy made impossible any amelioration of their position. However, they were occupying well prepared and heavily de fended positions backed by a series of switch lines. The formations were better found in men and materiel than any other in the Germany Army, and while it was unlikely that the shortages of materiel would effect the intitial stages of the battle the situation was such that over a prolonged period of time the Germans would be unable to conduct a mobile battle against the well supplied Allied Forces on the offensive. To the enemy, Italy provided decided economical ad vantages plus the moral advantage of fighting on foreign soil while protecting the Southern approaches to Germany. The possession of Italian territory, al though a heavy commitment to the enemy, was an invaluable source of supply. This and the presence of the German forces therein afforded a hindrance to Allied efforts toward a complete and rapid defeat of Germany. Available for the defense of Northern Italy and the Southern approaches to the Reich, General von Vietinghof, German C-in-C Southwest, had 23 Divisions plus 2 Divisions in the process of formation. His two Armies, the 10th and 14th were the two best organized armies remaining in the Wehrmacht. They were respon sible for the main Italian front from the West coast through the Central Appenines and along the SENIO River to LAGO DI CCltACCHIO on the East coast. Of the 23 Divi sions, 15 were in the line on the main front. Two Panzer Grenadier Divisions were in mobile reserve, one north of BOLOGNA and the other held against a possible Allied seaborne landing in the Venetian area but still accessible for intervention on the main front if necessary. One division was on the Adriatic Coast North of LAGO DI CC4£ACCHI0, two on the FRANCO-ITALO front and three in Northeastern Italy. Certain Italian Infantry Divisions were also available to the C-in-C South west, but played an insignificant part in the subsequent operations. General Mark Clark's Fifth and Eighth Armies were well prepared to strike the last devastating blow. From CASSINO and ANZIO, victorious through all the bitter fighting, they had marched steadily northward, overcoming all resistance. Halted in the Appenines south of BOLOGNA by the difficult terrain, of which the enemy was taking every advantage, and the appalling winter conditions, the Fifth Army had continued to engage the enemy and make limited gains. On 4 December, the Eighth Army troops entered RAVENNA, the Eastern gateway to the PO Valley and steadily moved forward during December and January to reach the SENIO River thus threatening to turn the enemy's Appenine Line. The following weeks found the amies preparing for the forthcoming major attack - resting, refitting and build ing up. Eighth Army with four Corps composed of Polish, New Zealand, Indian and Italian troops was along a front from the ADRIATIC to Southeast of BOLOGNA. Fifth Army with two Corps composed of American, South African and Brazilian troops were on the remainder of the front from South of BOLOGNA through the rugged Appenines to the West coast. The battle order of the opposing forces is indicated in the attachea diagrams. I Throughout the long Italian campaign, from SALERNO onwards, Allied air attacks had gradually destroyed the enemy air forces. By the spring of 1945 the GAF had withdrawn the fragments of its Italy-based units into the Reich, with the exception of a few reconnaissance planes which continued to make sporadic short sorties over the Allied lines, chiefly at night. The Italian Air Force had been reduced to two ineffective fighter groups, which occasion ally attacked straggling or crippled bombers which had become separated from formations returning from Germany or the Brenner Pass. Otherwise, the IAF devoted its effort to hiding its ME 109's, by dispersal and camouflage, from the constant airdrome attacks of Allied bombers and fighters. The energy and efficiency of the German ground forces in organizing de fensive positions during the winter months of 1944-45 however, had enabled him to build up formidable powers of resistance to an Allied ground offensive. Southwest of Lake Comacchio, the Eighth Army was confronted by a series of canals and rivers, each heavily defended by mortar, machine gun, artillery, antitank and rifle emplacements, and interspersed with extensive minefields. Opposite the Fifth Army, the mountainous ridges and valleys had been developed into a succession of well organized defenses in depth. Throughout the Italian campaign the two primary objectives of Allied tac tical and strategic air power had been to maintain the elimination of the enemy's air forces; and to interdict and destroy his lines of communications and supply columns. In the final offensive, the Mediterranean Allied Strategic and Tactical Air Forces undertook a third task, - the neutralization, - and so far as possible the destruction, of the enemy personnel, weapons, supplies and emplacements in the forward positions of the German defensive system. The plan and operations by which the Strategic Air Force (Fifteenth Air Force and 205 Group, RAF) shared in this mission are described in the following pages. 2 ALLIED BATTLE ORDER IN ITALY 9 APRIL 1945 SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER - MEDITERRANEAN Field Marshal Alexander FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP - (General Mark Clark) EIGHTH ARMY - (Lieutenant General McCreerv) V CORPS - 56 Div; 78 Div; 2 N.Z.