DOCSLIB.ORG

Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy December 2008 13 English There is no EU-wide debate on EU-Turkey rela- Series tions, but rather a set of overlapping yet distinct European debates reflecting the different actors, interests and ideas across the European mosaic. Talking Turkey II unpacks this complex reality by TALKING TURKEY analysing the positions of national stakeholders IN EUROPE: across the EU, the reactions of Turkish stakehol- ders to these EU debates, as well as the influen- TOWARDS A DIFFERENTIATED ce of the US in shaping European debates on Turkey. The underlying aim of this research is to COMMUNICATION STRATEGY develop an EU Communication Strategy for Tur- key. Based upon the findings of this project, a edited by Nathalie Tocci Communication Strategy ought to be differen- tiated and dynamic. It must also engage in a ge- nuine two-way communication with its interlo- cutors. It is only by Talking Turkey and making such talk a two-way street that Turkey’s Europe- Talking Turkey II an course may be strengthened in the long-term. IAI-TEPAV Project Quaderni IAI ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI Istituto Affari Internazionali 00186 Roma - Via Angelo Brunetti, 9 Tel. 39-6-3224360 Fax 39-6-3224363 http://www.iai.it - e-mail: [email protected] Per ordini: [email protected] December 2008 13 English Series IAI TALKING TURKEY IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A DIFFERENTIATED COMMUNICATION STRATEGY edited by Nathalie Tocci Talking Turkey II IAI-TEPAV Project Quaderni IAI ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI This project and publication has been made possible with the generous support of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, (TOBB), the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation - Turkey (OSIAF- Turkey), the Compagnia di San Paolo and The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF-US). Quaderni IAI Direzione: Natalino Ronzitti Redazione: Sandra Passariello Istituto Affari Internazionali 00186 Roma – Via Angelo Brunetti, 9 Tel. 39-6-3224360 Fax 39-6-3224363 http://www.iai.it – [email protected] Per ordini: [email protected] © Istituto Affari Internazionali Finito di stampare nel mese di dicembre 2008 dalla Tipografia Città Nuova della P.A.M.O.M.via San Romano in Garfagnana, 23 - 00148 Roma Telefono & fax 06.65.30.467 e-mail: [email protected] 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction, Nathalie Tocci 5 1. “Mamma Li Turchi!”: Just An Old Italian Saying, Emiliano Alessandri and Ebru Canan 11 2. Polish Stakeholders in the EU-Turkey Debate, Adam Balcer 41 3. Austrian Stakeholders in the EU-Turkey Debate, Cengiz Günay 59 4. Greek Stakeholders in the EU-Turkey Debate, Kostas Ifantis and Eleni Fotiou 85 5. Danish Stakeholders in the EU-Turkey Debate, Dietrich Jung 103 6. Marcus Aurelius’ Foot: Looking for Turkey’s Project in the EU. An Interpretation of the French Debate on Turkey, Anne-Marie Le Gloannec 119 7. Wait-and-See Attitudes of German Stakeholders Towards EU-Turkey Relations, Barbara Lippert 135 8. UK Stakeholders in the EU-Turkey Debate, Richard Whitman 161 9. Attitudes of Key Stakeholders in Turkey Towards EU-Turkey Relations: Consensual Discord Or Contentious Accord? Asli Toksabay Esen and H. Tolga Bölükbas¸ı 175 3 10. The Effect of US Policy in the Middle East on EU-Turkey Relations, Henri J. Barkey 199 11. From Advocate to Stakeholder: US Policy Towards Turkey and Implications for EU-Turkey Relations, Ian O. Lesser 215 12. The Impact of Transatlantic Relations on the European Debate on Turkey, Hanna Ojanen 231 13. A European Communication Strategy on Turkey, Nathalie Tocci and Donatella Cugliandro 249 Notes on Contributors 279 4 INTRODUCTION Nathalie Tocci In 2007 IAI and TEPAV launched a network of European analysts assessing the public debates in several member states on EU-Turkey relations. The net- work analysed how perceptions and misperceptions shape European public debates on conditionality and impact in EU-Turkey relations. Beyond the cre- ation of the network “Talking Turkey”, the project organized a set of events in Rome, Ankara, at the European Parliament in Brussels, as well as spin-off meetings in Washington, London and Helsinki to present its first publication: Tocci, N. (2007) (ed.) Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations, Quaderno IAI (available in print and freely downloadable from: http://www.iai.it/sections/pubblicazioni/iai_quaderni/indiciEng.asp#9E). 1. Opening the Member State Box: European Stakeholders in the Turkey Question This first cursory analysis revealed that member state positions not only vary widely, but also and most saliently, that within each member state dif- ferent actors hold different views for different reasons on the Turkey ques- tion. In other words, Turkey is “talked about” in different ways both within and across EU member states, and the reasons for this are rooted in a diverse and dynamic set of interests and ideas. Having scratched the surface of this complex reality, in its second stage our project has adopted a con- stituency-based approach. The first phase provided valuable findings 5 Nathalie Tocci regarding the specific themes raised in the context of the EU-Turkey debate in different member states (see Table 1). Yet gaining a deeper understand- ing of which actor within which member state frames the debate on Turkey by focusing on which specific theme is of the essence. Table 1 - Core topics regarding Turkey’s EU membership as revealed by Talking Turkey I In order to communicate Turkey to the EU and the EU to Turkey, it is therefore necessary to identify and analyse far more clearly and carefully the positions of the stakeholders within different member states, concen- trating on the following set of questions: - Who are the principal stakeholders within each member state on the “Turkey question”? Which actors influence the state’s stance on EU-Turkey relations? Stakeholders include, where relevant, political parties, state insti- tutions, the business community, the media, civil society actors and interest groups, academia, key personalities in the arts and entertainment, as well as “public opinion” at large. - What is their position on Turkey? In this respect, the analysis focuses on stakeholder views and objectives regarding EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s accession process. - Why are these views and positions held? What are the underlying inter- ests and beliefs underpinning these stakeholder positions, are these related to specific Turkey-related concerns (e.g., specific business interests in 6 Introduction Turkey) or are they instrumental to other objectives and beliefs (e.g., pro- moting a particular understanding of the EU, its institutional functioning and identity)? - How do such stakeholders influence the overall position of each member state on the Turkey question? How influential are these actors, what kind of alliances do or might they forge, what is their overall influence within national debates? - What are the implications for the development of a differentiated and dynamic Communication Strategy? Given national stakeholders, their views, their underlying interests and their influence over national policy- making, what does this entail for a Communication Strategy that resonates within each member state? This set of questions is tackled by analysing eight member states: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and the UK. Of course, this list is far from comprehensive and other member states which play as critical a role in shaping European public debates on Turkey were exclud- ed. This selection has been driven by the priority of considering cases which exhibit relatively negative (e.g., Austria, France), positive (Italy, UK, Poland) as well as mixed (Denmark, Germany and Greece) attitudes towards Turkey’s accession process. This selection criteria was used in order to ensure as broad a representation as possible of the different actors, actions and arguments raised by Europeans in relation to Turkey. At the same time we wanted to keep the number of member state studies limited in number, in order for the final chapter to do justice to all authors. Finally, we include a study on Turkey. While also analysing the positions, interests and beliefs of Turkish stakeholders in EU-Turkey relations, the focus of this chapter is somewhat different. The objective here is not that of analysing how Turkish stakeholders shape the European debate on Turkey, but rather to examine how Turkish actors have reacted to European debates on Turkey, and what impact this has had on the evolution of EU- Turkey relations as well as on Turkey’s process of EU-driven reform. 2. The Transatlantic Dimension In addition to this set of questions, Talking Turkey II broadens the scope of analysis beyond the EU. As evident in the results from Talking Turkey I, the positions of different member states and stakeholders within them are cru- 7 Nathalie Tocci cially affected by their wider understanding of Turkey’s role in its region and in the world. As such a second branch of our research delves into the “Impact of Global Trends” on European stakeholders regarding the Turkey question. Arguably, the most important source of external influence on European stakeholders’ wider understanding of Turkey and its role in the world is the United States. US policies and positions have shaped European views, inter- ests and objectives regarding Turkey by operating on three different levels: - By interacting directly with Turkey and engaging Ankara in debate about its EU course; - By influencing the positions of the EU, its member states and Euro- Atlantic institutions on the Turkey question; - By shaping the overall regional and international milieu in which EU- Turkey relations unfold, including most saliently the situation in Iraq and the Middle East. More specifically, US policies towards Turkey, the EU and the wider Middle East have different impacts on different stakeholders within the EU. During periods of intense US pressure on European capitals to launch and proceed with Turkey’s accession process, such as for example in the run up to European Council meetings in 1999 or 2002, US lobbying efforts may have increased the propensity of some member states to pro- ceed with Turkey’s accession process (e.g., the UK and Italy), while back- firing with others (e.g., France).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • E42 Mark Blyth & David Kertzer Mixdown
    Brown University Watson Institute | E42_Mark Blyth & David Kertzer_mixdown [MUSIC PLAYING] MARK BLYTH: Hello, and welcome to a special edition of Trending Globally. My name is Mark Blyth. Today, I'm interviewing David Kertzer. David is the former provost here at Brown University. But perhaps more importantly, he knows more about Italy than practically anybody else we can find. Given that the elections have just happened in Italy and produced yet another kind of populist shock, we thought is was a good idea to bring him in and have a chat. Good afternoon, David. DAVID KERTZER: Thanks for having me, Mark. MARK BLYTH: OK, so let's try and put this in context for people. Italy's kicked off. Now, we could talk about what's happening right now today, but to try and get some context on this, I want to take us back a little bit. This is not the first time the Italian political system-- indeed the whole Italian state-- has kind of blown up. I want to go back to 1994. That's the last time things really disintegrated. Start there, and then walk forward, so then we can talk more meaningfully about the election. So I'm going to invite you to just take us back to 1994. Tell us about what was going on-- the post-war political compact, and then [BLOWS RASPBERRY] the whole thing fell apart. DAVID KERTZER: Well, right after World War II, of course, it was a new political system-- the end of the monarchy. There is a republic. The Christian Democratic Party, very closely allied with the Catholic Church, basically dominated Italian politics for decades.
    [Show full text]
  • An Uncertain Italy
    Geographical Overview | EU’s Mediterranean Countries Panorama An Uncertain Italy Marc Lazar has submitted his resignation in the wake of this dis- Professor of History and Political Sociology at aster. In fact, the PD’s defeat is yet another example Sciences Po, Paris of the deep crisis of the entire continental European President, School of Government, Libera Università left. For its part, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, with Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli (LUISS), 14% of the votes, has obtained its lowest election Rome results since it was founded in 1994. Il Cavaliere, at 81 years of age, no longer mobilizes anyone but his most diehard followers and no longer aggregates an The results of the 4 March 2018 Italian elections are arc of broader forces behind him ranging from the paradoxical. On the one hand, they clearly show extreme right to the centre. He has thus been great- Geographical Overview Mediterranean | EU’s Countries three winners and three losers. On the other hand, ly weakened by the results of this election. The ex- they have made Italy enter a stage of extreme politi- haustion of his party, which exists nearly exclusively cal uncertainty. for and by him, attests to a more generalized phe- The losers are, first and foremost, the two main po- nomenon, that of the difficulties of the European 192 litical parties that had been attempting to impose right, as can be seen, for instance, in France, Ger- their hegemony for years on their respective ends of many, Austria and Spain. In Italy, as elsewhere, the the political spectrum.
    [Show full text]
  • Il Postino • Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
    IL POSTINO VOL. 3 NO. 5 FEBRUARY 2003 / FEBBRAIO 2003 $2.00 MuralsMuralsMuralsMurals &&&& ArtArtArtArt ofofofof PrestonPrestonPrestonPreston StStStSt MuraliMuraliMuraliMurali &Arte&Arte&Arte&Arte didididi CCCCororororsosososo ItaliaItaliaItaliaItalia CUSTOMER NUMBER: 04564405 PUBLICATION AGREEMENT NUMBER: 1835041 IL POSTINO • OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA Page 2 IL POSTINO February 2003 IL POSTINO Letters / Lettere VOLUME 3 , NUMBER 5 Nostro lettore Luciano Pradal scrive: Nostro lettore Mario Bousiguore scrive: 865 Gladstone Avenue, Suite 101 • Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7T4 Sgn. Mingarelli: Caro Editore: (613) 567-4532 • [email protected] Desidero congratularti per la prima edizione Per primo voglio dire grazie! Avete mandato il www.ilpostinocanada.com dell’ anno 2003 de Il Postino; tutta l’ edizione giornale (Il Postino) e ho notato ciò che avete rifletteva la filosofia della cultura italo-canadese e pubBlicato riguardo del coro del Club Roma, a cui Publisher dei suoi unici valori! io faccio parte. Preston Street Community Foundation Le lettere al giornale, gli articoli di Ermanno La E così anch’io voglio dire due parole per farvi Italian Canadian Community Centre Riccia sulla cultura italo-canadese e sulla Madonna sapere che sono rimasto molto contento of the National Capital Region Inc. Della Difesa ora riconosciuta come Monumento dell’esperienza in Ottawa. L’accoglienze molto Nazionale Canadese, l’articolo sulla lingua Italiana calda e affettuosa, sia a Villa Marconi che a casa Executive Editor e soprattutto l’articolo sul Signor Italo Tiezzi, Abbruzzo e anche le visite al Parlamento sono state Angelo Filoso articolo che trovo vero, attuale, valorizzante e meravigliose. Però in ultimo quando si sono uniti stimolante per molti di noi. le due gruppi insieme per cantare “va pensiero” si Managing Editor Brava! a tu che sei una giovane italo-canadese è sentito un’emozione che non si può descrivere, Oliviana Mingarelli permettemi di dirti ancora una volta Brava! con- ed è rimasto in me un senso di fratellanze.
    [Show full text]
  • Italy Becomes More Anti-Immigrant and Anti-EU by Michael Guterbock
    Italy becomes more anti-immigrant and anti-EU By Michael Guterbock Unemployment, population decline, changes in immigration, and world events like the COVID-19 pandemic and the wars in Syria and Libya strengthen Italian anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties and their chances for national power. Significance: Domestic Italian issues (unemployment, rural emptying, population decline) and world events (COVID-19 pandemic, wars in Syria and Libya) will increase the power of anti-immigrant and anti- EU political parties in Italy. This trend heightens the chance of anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties winning elections and gaining ruling power in Italy to the detriment of European integration and open Italian markets. Forecast: Immigration and anti-EU rhetoric will play an increasingly important role in upcoming regional and national elections in Italy, helping Matteo Salvini and his anti-immigrant League party and Giorgia Meloni and her Brothers of Italy party win elections in regions that historically supported left-of- centre parties. The combination of domestic concerns and international events surrounding immigration issues will further allow the League, the Brothers of Italy, and the 5-Star Movement to gain national power in Italy, move Italian politics to the right, and harm Italy’s relations with the EU. Subsidiary impacts: • Increased anti-immigrant sentiment will cause more attacks against immigrant populations in Italy and create harsher anti-immigrant policies at all levels of government • Italy will further pursue an “Italy first” foreign
    [Show full text]
  • Facebook Ads: Politics of Migration in Italy
    Facebook Ads: Politics of Migration in Italy Arthur Capozzi?, Gianmarco De Francisci Morales, Yelena Mejova, Corrado Monti, Andr´ePanisson, and Daniela Paolotti ISI Foundation, Turin, Italy, isi.it Abstract. Targeted online advertising is on the forefront of political communication, allowing hyper-local advertising campaigns around elec- tions and issues. In this study, we employ a new resource for political ad monitoring { Facebook Ads Library { to examine advertising concerning the issue of immigration in Italy. A crucial topic in Italian politics, it has recently been a focus of several populist movements, some of which have adopted social media as a powerful tool for voter engagement. Indeed, we find evidence of targeting by the parties both in terms of geography and demographics (age and gender). For instance, Five Star Movement reaches a younger audience when advertising about immigration, while other parties' ads have a more male audience when advertising on this issue. We also notice a marked rise in advertising volume around elec- tions, as well as a shift to more general audience. Thus, we illustrate political advertising targeting that likely has an impact on public opin- ion on a topic involving potentially vulnerable populations, and urge the research community to include online advertising in the monitoring of public discourse. Keywords: Targeted advertising · Social media · Politics · Immigration 1 Introduction According to the International Organization for Migration, almost 130k migrants have arrived in Europe in 2019.1 Global migration is a systemic challenge for Europe [18], and for Italy in particular being on the Mediterranean route [12]. Therefore, it is not surprising that migration is a central issue in European and Italian politics [1].
    [Show full text]
  • Mapping Italy: Scenario and Political Risks
    in collaboration with Luiss Luiss School of European Luiss CISE School of Government Political Economy Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali Mapping Italy: scenario and political risks No. 6 October 2020 Monthly Report on Italy Table of contents 1. Scenario and risks 4 1.1. Politics 4 1.2. Scenario 5 1.3. Forecasts 7 1.4. Mapping risks 8 2. Polls 9 3. Economic Scenario 12 No. 6 October 2020 2 of 14 Monthly Report on Italy Italian politics has always been an arcane subject. A handful of specialists and enthusiasts love to talk of its Machiavellian intricacies for hours on end, but most people, especially north of the Alps, not only do not understand it, but see no reason why they should bother to understand it. Today there are at least three reasons why they should. First, in Italy the crisis of the political establishment that is now evident in many advanced democracies began a quarter century ago. This means that the country is further down the road of the democratic malaise – it is a laboratory and a bellwether. Second, Italy is the first country from within the historical core of the European community to be governed by anti-establishment parties. Third, its politics represent the greatest threat to the stability, or possibly even the existence, of the common European currency. Founded in 2010 in a University that has a very strong international vocation, the Luiss School of Government aims to facilitate the connection between Italy and the world outside of it. It aims to prepare the future Italian public elite for the complexities of an ever more integrated planet, and to provide first-class education to non-Italian students in Italy’s capital city.
    [Show full text]
  • ESS8 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS8 - 2016 ed. 2.1 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Czechia 7 Estonia 9 Finland 11 France 13 Germany 15 Hungary 16 Iceland 18 Ireland 20 Israel 22 Italy 24 Lithuania 26 Netherlands 29 Norway 30 Poland 32 Portugal 34 Russian Federation 37 Slovenia 40 Spain 41 Sweden 44 Switzerland 45 United Kingdom 48 Version Notes, ESS8 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS8 edition 2.1 (published 01.12.18): Czechia: Country name changed from Czech Republic to Czechia in accordance with change in ISO 3166 standard. ESS8 edition 2.0 (published 30.05.18): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2013 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ), Social Democratic Party of Austria, 26,8% names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP), Austrian People's Party, 24.0% election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), Freedom Party of Austria, 20,5% 4. Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne), The Greens - The Green Alternative, 12,4% 5. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ), Communist Party of Austria, 1,0% 6. NEOS - Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum, NEOS - The New Austria and Liberal Forum, 5,0% 7. Piratenpartei Österreich, Pirate Party of Austria, 0,8% 8. Team Stronach für Österreich, Team Stronach for Austria, 5,7% 9. Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria, 3,5% Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • Standing Apart Together? Analysing Lega (Nord) and Movimento 5 Stelle As New Challenger Parties in Parliament
    Italian Political Science, VOLUME 13 ISSUE 2, OCTOBER 2018 Standing apart together? Analysing Lega (Nord) and Movimento 5 Stelle as new challenger parties in Parliament Elisabetta De Giorgi António Dias FCSH-NOVA UNIVERSITY OF LISBON Abstract Following the 2018 election and a long phase of negotiations, Lega and the Five Star Movement (FSM) ap- pointed the first cabinet in Western Europe that does not include any mainstream party family. The ‘elective affinities’ between the electorates of these two challenger parties had been quite evident for some time, but in the present work we argue that there are further traits that the two parties had shared well before 2018 that could help to further prove their proximity. We propose a new dimension of analysis that should be taken into consideration when studying (new) challenger parties: their relationship vis-à-vis the other opposition parties. We would expect them to enter parliament for the first time with both the goals usually related to the two different opposition status (temporary vs. permanent) in mind: leaving the opposition and exploiting the opposition. Fur- thermore, we would expect them to stand apart from the other parties, no matter whether the latter are in government or in opposition. This is, in fact, one of the main reasons for their electoral success and, in the end, their essence. We will test these expectations by employing Social Network Analysis methods and analysing and comparing the cooperation attitudes of the Lega and FSM with the other opposition parties, using as an indicator the amount of legislative co-sponsorship during their first term in parliament (respectively 1992-1994 and 2013-2018) and the amount passed together while in opposition (2013-2018).
    [Show full text]
  • ITS | Periodical | a New Administration-The Spain of Pedro Sánchez
    THEITS The International Scholar THEITS Periodical of International Relations THEITS A New Government: The Spain of Pedro Sánchez — Cameron Vaské, 22 July 2018 Enter Pedro Sánchez Washington, D.C.—On the 1st of June, the social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker's Party, i.e. PSOE) passed a vote of no confidence against then-President Mariano Rajoy and installed the party leader Pedro Sánchez as the President of Spain. The vote came just days after the Audiencia Nacional shed light upon the Gürtel Case—a corruption scandal of immense proportion. The PP (“Popular Party”) operated a kickbacks-for-contracts ring from their central office, receiving illegal donations from companies in exchange for public contracts on behalf of the government. It is believed that Rajoy also benefitted from the illegal system that his party managed to the tune of several hundred thousand euros. The scandal gave the PSOE the definitive opportunity to unseat Rajoy, drawing support from Catalan and Basque separatist parties that could no longer afford to politically back him. This end has long been in the winds for the PP, which suffered negative shocks to public opinion time and again in the last years for various cases of corruption, the Vaské The International Scholar 1 largest recent case in 2013, involving then Secretary of the Treasury Luis Bárcenas, who ran a slush fund funded by the government and reaping huge financial benefits for the PP. The harbinger of Rajoy's political demise came on May 24th, when Bárcenas was sentenced to 33 years in prison and fined a total of €44 million ($51.3 million) for involvement in the Gürtel case.
    [Show full text]
  • PLAYING with FIRE Italy, China, and Europe
    THE NEW GEOPOLITICS MAY 2020 EUROPE PLAYING WITH FIRE Italy, China, and Europe GIOVANNA DE MAIO BROOKINGS – ROBERT BOSCH FOUNDATION TRANSATLANTIC INITIATIVE PLAYING WITH FIRE Italy, China, and Europe GIOVANNA DE MAIO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The most significant event for Italian foreign policy in 2019 was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which marked a break in the ranks of G-7, raising important concerns from Washington that Italy would become an entry point for Chinese influence in Europe. In reality, Chinese investment in Italy’s key industries, including energy and telecommunications, has been growing since 2013. Chinese foreign direct investment in Italy is also significantly lower than in other major European economies such as Germany and France, which have not endorsed the BRI but have secured important trade and investment deals with Beijing. Due to Italy’s difficulties in attracting investment because of high taxation and bureaucracy (among other factors), Italy’s decision to sign the MoU on the BRI is an attempt to gain advantages over its European competitors to attract Chinese investment and address longstanding economic stagnation. On top of these existing issues, the devastating economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (a 9.1% drop in GDP for 2020 is forecast by the International Monetary Fund) risks pushing Italy further into China’s arms. There are indeed mechanisms on both national and European levels to protect against foreign investment in strategic sectors, while different views on China in the Italian political landscape have led to more decisive actions to restrict the development of a 5G wireless network through Chinese technology.
    [Show full text]
  • CEIS - Sanità 2008 Regional Health Care
    Report CEIS - Sanità 2008 Regional Health Care. Assessment and Perspective seven years after the costitutional reform and just on the eve of fiscal federalism CEIS - Faculty of Economics, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”. Health Communication The 6th publication of CEIS , University of Tor Vergata- Rome, is the result of a public-private partnership. This partnership flanks CEIS with organizations which believe in the necessity of supporting stakeholders of the healthecare system and offering policymakers access to knowledge. The publication and circulation of the volume to healthecare operators and experts has been made possible thanks to the financial support and commitment of : • A.N.I.A. • Boehringer Ingelheim Italia • GlaxoSmithKline Italia • J&J Medical Holding • Pfizer Italia S.r.l. • TEVA Pharma Italia S.p.A. The partners in this initiative share with CEIS Sanità the necessity to offer elements that are necessary when taking rational decisions both to the operators in the sector and to politicians; offering business administrations the necessary information to improve their programming and organizational levels; as well as offering citizens and their associations some elements for understanding the system’s performance. The Report (which has been conceived, planned and accomplished in the dual Italian/English version) collects the work carried out by CEIS Sanità researchers, and other experts in the sector. 1 Index Difference and Uniformity: where Efficiency ends and Equity begins (or vice versa). 6 1 - Financing healthcare: an
    [Show full text]