Mona ELKOUEDI (Egypt)

Mona ELKOUEDI (Egypt) The Egyptian Revolution against Mubarak’s Regime in 2011 The making of new public spaces in Tahrir Square FINAL RAPORT 1 On January 25th, 2011, Egyptians took to the streets of Cairo and other major cities, demanding the resignation of the Minister of Interior. The demand was accelerated with the rising number of Egyptians taking to the streets and turned into demanding the fall of Mubarak’s regime. This was manifested in the people’s expressive slogan ‘al-sha’b yurid Isqat al-Nizam’ (the people want the fall of the regime’. After 18 days of persistent protests, accompanied by an occupation of Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo, President Mubarak, one of the most resilient dictators, stepped down after spending 30 years in power. In 18 days, ordinary Egyptians managed to regain their dignity, their right to express themselves and they have certainly managed to claim back their Tahrir square, their public spaces. In this report, I will discuss the success of the Egyptian people to reclaim Egyptian public spaces through redefining their functions and characteristics as being open, accessible and visible spaces, used to express their rage against Mubarak’s regime. I argue that this process of re-claiming public spaces took three stages: 1) taking to the streets for foreign policy issues, 2) the rise of Kefaya and reclaiming the street to protest against Mubarak, 3) the creation of secured virtual public spaces and finally 4) confirming people’s visibility and access to the regime controlled public spaces and using them to express public rage against Mubarak’s regime, which was manifested in Tahrir Square. This process came in response to Mubarak’s unpopular discourse and the oppressive measures he adopted which had led to the creation of a shared feeling of injustice and oppression, resulting in the rise of new political forces managed to reclaim public spaces. I will focus on the period post 1997, which signals the decline of the threat of militant Islamism and the regime’s adoption of a new public discourse to control public spaces. The new public discourse, which was propagated by the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), had particularly focused on the creation of a civil and economically liberal state. This discourse had failed to capture the sympathy of the majority of Egyptians who suffers from poverty and experience the brutality of the police forces frequently. The gap between the regime and the majority of people expanded significantly since the 1990s as a result of the rising power of businessmen in the society and the corruption associated with it. The political rise of President Mubarak’s son, Gamal, and his appearance with business tycoons as a main player at the NDP, had provoked public discontent against the ruling regime, and had induced Egyptians to create new spaces of dissent that eventually turned revolutionary. I will first examine the impact of the decline in militant Islamism on Mubarak’s regime and the regime’s new discourse publicized by the ruling NDP. I will then discuss the rise of new political forces that challenged the ruling regime’s restrictions and manipulation of public spaces and who managed to gain both visibility and access to these spaces. I will finally show the battle over Tahrir square, which exemplifies Egyptians’ desperate fight for their public space. The End of Militant Islamism and the rise of Mubarak Junior: Losing public spaces? During Mubarak’s first 20 years, public spaces, where citizens can come together to discuss the issues that concern them, were compromised for the sake of stability. 2 Mubarak’s rise to power came in a critical moment, where the Egyptian state was facing a prominent threat from radically violent groups who managed to assassinate the head of the state and were preparing to confiscate the state itself. Mubarak’s claim to power was strengthened by the security threats facing the Egyptian state. Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, a prominent Egyptian journalist who was also the minister of information during Nasser, had argued that Mubarak’s legitimacy was to achieve stability after the assassination of Sadat1. Consequently, although militant Islamists posed a significant threat to the Egyptian state, they have legitimised Mubarak’s claim to power and strengthened his discourse of stability. In order to gain support for his stability discourse, Mubarak started reconciliation with almost all political forces that had been marginalised and imprisoned by Sadat, including the Muslim Brothers 2 . Nevertheless, following the decline of militant Islamism at the end of 1990s, Mubarak’s discourse of stability had been massively criticized by various political analysts including Heikal who said on Al-Jazeera ‘oh stability, how many crimes are being committed in your name’ 3 , referring to Mubarak’s use of stability as a justification to curb political opposition and block political spaces. Indeed, although Mubarak started his reign with some decorative political reforms that were primarily directed towards party politics4, he had systematically restricted access to all spaces where an autonomous public opinion could be formulated, under the pretext that they might be misused by militant Islamists to spread their radical violent ideology. These restrictions were legally fortified through the reinforcement of Egypt’s long lasting emergency law, which restricts public gatherings and activities. After the 1997 terrorist attacks in Luxor, which marked the decline of the threat of militant Islamism, Mubarak’s stability discourse was no longer sufficient to justify the restrictions imposed on the public space. Unlike Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak had no national project5 that could maintain the regime’s control over public spaces. The beneficiaries of Mubarak’s regime, the nouveau riche of Sadat’s era who turned to ‘fat cats’ during Mubarak, were alerted to this fact and started thinking of Gamal Mubarak as someone who would be able to protect the ancient regime. According to Hassan Nafaa6, the project for presidential succession started in 1998, through the American- Egyptian council headed by Ibrahim Kamel, a controversial business tycoon whose wealth is being questioned. Nafaa argues that since that date, Gamal 1 Muhammad Hassanein Heikal in an interview with Al-Jazeera Arabic, by Muhammad Krishan on 16/12/2007, the script of the interview is available from Al-Jazeera Website website: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/E095A0B6-CBBD-498E-80A2-A2CA9F0860A3.htm 2 The first decision of Mubarak was to release political activists of all political orientations (Leftists, Nasserists, Islamists) who were imprisoned by Sadat in 1981 two month before his assassination in a massive wave of political persecution. 3 Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, With Heikal program on Al-Jazeera Arabic, 4/01/2007, script to the episode is available in Arabic on Al-Jazeera Website: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/AF0A9DED-CACD-40FC-8E08-B3C81AC35CAB.htm 4 See Maye Kassem (2004), Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, p.54-55. 5 Amr el-Shobaky, Personal Interview, 24/6/2010, Cairo, Egypt. 6 Hassan Nafaa was the coordinator and co-founder of the Egyptian campaign against presidential succession. He was also a former head of political science department at Cairo University. 3 Mubarak was preparing himself for a public role, ‘Mofeed Shehab 7 asked me to recommend some university professors to meet with Gamal Mubarak, because he was interested in public affairs… it was apparent that Gamal Mubarak was trying to have access to universities, trade unions, and intellectuals’ circles… the presidential succession project was in the making since the end of the 1990s’8. Indeed, Gamal Mubarak was exploiting his privileged position as the president’s son to access public spaces. And to institutionalize his attempts, he created ‘gam3eyet geel el-mostaqbal’ (Future Generation), an NGO that provides Egyptian youth with employment skills, which had allowed him access to university students9. In 2000, Gamal Mubarak joined the NDP, which gave him the institutional and formal status to access public spaces and manipulate it. The NDP underwent serious restructuring by 2002, following its poor performance in the 2000 parliamentary elections 10 , the National Democratic Party (NDP) with Mubarak Junior as its energizing power, had declared the ‘New Thinking Initiative of the National Democratic Party’ or ‘mobadret al-fikr al-gedid lel hizb alwatani al-dimokrati’. According to new initiative, the party will start a massive process of restructuring and institutionalization and the ruling party will adopt democratic measures that should allow the party to have greater role in Egyptian politics11. In 2007 it publicized its “comprehensive strategic vision” of a state that would be politically civil, economically liberal, and socially driven, and which would shape the national security strategy to serve the interests of the Egyptian state. The reasons behind the NDP’s initiatives for reform are vague, according to Dr. Mohamed Kamal, the former head of the media committee of the NDP and a close aide to Gamal Mubarak, had stressed that the process of reforming the NDP was in response to the poor performance of the NDP in the 2000 parliamentary elections, and not as some people suggest as a result of US pressure for democracy after 9/11 nor to polish Gamal Mubarak for presidency12. The excessive visibility of Gamal Mubarak in public platforms had alerted political opposition. New political forces had emerged to challenge Gamal Mubarak’s (mis)use of public spaces. They were seeking access to public spaces that were consumed by the violent struggle between the state and militant Islamists. According to Hossam el- Hamalawy, the confrontation between the state and the militant Islamists had meant ‘the death of street action’13. Moreover, technological innovations had led to the 7 Mofeed Shehab is a law professor at Cairo University and is close to the presidential circles, he later became a minister for higher education and then state’s minster for parliamentary affairs.

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